
**Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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Summary record of the 4th meeting

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 23 April 2013, at 3 p.m.

Chair: Mr. Feruta..... (Romania)

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Committee (*continued*)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Bauwens** (Belgium) said that the vision of a world without nuclear weapons could become reality only if all nuclear-weapon States were committed to concrete, irreversible and verifiable reductions of their arsenals and if the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was truly universal and fully respected. In that connection, he called once more on India, Israel and Pakistan to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. Convening a conference on the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, to be attended all States of the region, would have a tremendous bridge-building function.

2. Universality of the Treaty could not be achieved if States parties themselves created doubts about its centrality and relevance. Any scenario of a State intent upon leaving the Treaty represented a system failure, as illustrated by the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The rules concerning withdrawal from the Treaty should therefore be clarified. His Government welcomed the continued progress made in implementing the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (new START Treaty), as well as and the declared intention of the United States Government to include all types of nuclear weapons — deployed, non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic — in the negotiating process.

3. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Belgium had participated actively in the elaboration of that organization's new Strategic Concept and Deterrence and Defence Posture Review. The role and numbers of nuclear weapons in the NATO arsenal had been reduced, and the de-targeting and de-alerting status of the few remaining nuclear components had been confirmed.

4. All nuclear-weapon States should report fully to the Preparatory Committee in 2014 Total elimination of nuclear weapons required transparency, accountability, verifiability and irreversibility. The total elimination of nuclear weapons would require the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) and the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

5. Countries whose nuclear activities gave rise to serious concern had everything to gain from full transparency and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The past and present nuclear activities of Iran, as documented by IAEA, raised serious concern in the international community and hampered normal and constructive relations. Iran should dispel the mistrust created through its clandestine and dubious activities and should respond seriously and in a timely manner to the offer made by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States (the E3 + 3).

6. His Government strongly condemned the nuclear test carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in February 2013 and the provocative and aggressive rhetoric used by that Government. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must not be allowed to engage in nuclear blackmail. It must fully comply with the Treaty, IAEA safeguards obligations, Security Council resolutions and the commitments made at the Six-Party Talks.

7. In January 2013, his Government had deposited with IAEA its ratification instrument for the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In the context of its participation in the Nuclear Security Summit, it had agreed to convert its high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium, when technically and economically feasible. The Belgian Nuclear Research Centre continued to develop the multi-purpose hybrid research reactor for high-tech applications, an innovative reactor that provided security, non-proliferation and nuclear waste management benefits.

8. His Government was deeply concerned at the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and reaffirmed the need for all States to comply with applicable international law on the topic, including international humanitarian law, while making every effort to avoid nuclear war and nuclear terrorism. It also worked with civil society to educate the public on the tragic consequences of nuclear weapons.

9. **Mr. Gil Catalina** (Spain) said that universalization of the Treaty was extremely important for achieving the goals of non-proliferation and disarmament. Nuclear disarmament and arms control should proceed through an overall reduction in nuclear arms worldwide under article VI of the Treaty, with States possessing the largest numbers of weapons bearing

special responsibility for that endeavour. In that regard, the new START Treaty was a step forward.

10. Spain had partnered with Canada to submit a working paper that considered various issues related to a fissile material cut-off treaty, and with Morocco and the Netherlands to submit a working paper on asymmetrical proliferation. Non-State actors and terrorist groups must be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons, and States parties must agree on an effective response in the event of withdrawal from the Treaty by any State Party.

11. While his delegation would have preferred to see the conference on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East convened in 2012, it hoped that the conference would take place in 2013 with the participation of all stakeholders.

12. **Mr. Kongstad** (Norway) said that the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, hosted by his Government in March 2013, had focused on the practical consequences of a nuclear detonation, a matter relevant to specialists in health services, development, the environment, finance and emergency preparedness. It had been attended by a broad range of participants, reflecting the recognition that the issue was of concern and relevance to all.

13. The conference had concluded that no State or international body could address the immediate humanitarian emergency caused by a nuclear weapon detonation in any meaningful way; that no existing national or international emergency system would be able to provide adequate assistance to the victims; that the effects of a nuclear detonation would not be constrained by national borders; and that health, food security, natural resources and the socioeconomic development of future generations would also be affected.

14. Despite a new sense of urgency about the risks of nuclear detonations, some States still considered the use of nuclear weapons a realistic option. While the overall number of nuclear weapons in the world had decreased since the end of the cold war, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons remained in States' arsenals, and the number of States with access to nuclear arms had increased.

15. **Ms. Golberg** (Canada) said that the further erosion of the commitment of several States parties to the fundamental principles enshrined in the Treaty was

cause for great concern. Nuclear proliferation activities by North Korea, Iran and Syria and their continued non-compliance with their obligations under the Treaty undermined the Treaty's integrity and authority. The nuclear test carried out in February 2013 by North Korea and its inflammatory rhetoric about nuclear weapons use represented a clear and present threat to regional and international peace and security. They also violated multiple Security Council resolutions and impeded efforts to advance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

16. Parties to the Treaty must seek to ensure that a State could never again benefit from nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes, while illegally using for weapons purposes the technology and material it had received and claiming that the Treaty no longer applied to it. It appeared that Iran was going down that route and using its status as a Party to the Treaty as potential cover for nuclear weapons research. Reports that it intended to further expand its uranium enrichment capacity were cause for great concern. Such actions contravened its international obligations under Security Council and IAEA resolutions and undercut regional and international security. Should Iran fail to address the credible and very serious concerns about its nuclear programme, the conclusion that it was in non-compliance with the Treaty would be nearly unavoidable.

17. Canada and its partners in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) continued to advance implementation of key elements of the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, and had submitted seven working papers containing concrete recommendations to that end. Her Government had made active efforts to advance action 5 of that action plan, on nuclear disarmament, by calling for greater transparency from the nuclear-weapon States; actions 10 through 14, related to the CTBT, by promoting its universalization and early entry into force; and action 15, on a fissile material cut-off treaty, by supporting General Assembly resolution [67/53](#).

18. A comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA together with an additional protocol thereto constituted the current safeguards standard required under article III of the Treaty. Under Canada's safeguards agreement, IAEA could draw an annual conclusion regarding the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and

activities in Canada. States that had not yet done so should bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol thereto as soon as possible.

19. **Mr. Palauskas** (Lithuania) said that his Government welcomed the ongoing implementation of the new START Treaty and the second Nuclear Security Summit, held in Seoul in 2012. In keeping with the commitment made at that Summit, it had established a centre of excellence for nuclear security in Medininkai to contribute to international efforts to secure nuclear materials and prevent illicit trafficking. The centre would serve as the capacity-building and training venue for the relevant Lithuanian institutions in preventing, detecting, responding to and investigating cases of nuclear and radiological smuggling, and as a regional hub for training and exchange of best practices.

20. His country played an active role in the Proliferation Security Initiative and supported the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons through compliance with the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 should be the next logical step and a priority in the nuclear arms control and disarmament process. His Government urged all States that had not yet done so to ratify the CTBT without delay and without any conditions. Pending negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, all nuclear-weapon States should declare and maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

21. His Government supported efforts to improve the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system through universal implementation of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and additional protocols thereto, which would increase confidence in international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He urged all countries to make use of the full range of IAEA assistance and to perform risk and safety assessments of all their nuclear power plants. IAEA member States should also host Integrated Regulatory Review Service and other peer review missions and conduct regular national reviews.

22. **Ms. Nyirinkindi Katungye** (Uganda) said that her Government supported efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa and Mongolia, and urged other regions to establish

similar zones. It welcomed the entry into force of the new START Treaty and follow-up measures to the 2010 Review Conference by both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear-weapon States should fulfil in good faith their obligations under article VI of the Treaty.

23. Many developing countries, including Uganda, faced severe energy deficits, which made international cooperation to promote the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes all the more important. Non-nuclear-weapon States must receive support to develop and use nuclear energy in a range of areas, including medicine, agriculture, water management and research. Her Government had established an institutional framework to facilitate the peaceful use of nuclear energy by passing legislation on atomic energy and establishing an atomic energy council.

24. Nuclear terrorism was a grave threat to global security. The risk of nuclear attack had increased considerably over the years, as the capacity to construct nuclear weapons existed in many countries. Improved accounting, control and physical protections for nuclear and other radioactive materials were essential.

25. **Mr. Sukayri** (Jordan) said that the failure to achieve progress towards nuclear disarmament accounted for the critical situation in which the Treaty currently found itself, in spite of its successes. Furthermore, postponement of the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, notwithstanding the confidence-building measures undertaken in good faith by the Arab countries, was particularly distressing. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was, in effect, the fourth pillar of the NPT. While the Arab countries abided by all four pillars, one country in the region persistently refused to accede to the Treaty and place its facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime.

26. As the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons contravened international law and international humanitarian law, all States parties should work towards creating a world free of nuclear weapons, within a clear and defined time frame. In that connection, he welcomed the Oslo Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in 2013.

27. Achieving universality of the NPT was especially vital in an age when global security was interconnected in unprecedented ways. Resources previously spent on nuclear arsenals would be better utilized on economic projects and job creation in order to improve living standards. Moreover, the climate of distrust created by the possession of nuclear weapons heightened tensions and instability in regions such as the Middle East.

28. Jordan continued to develop its peaceful nuclear programme, observing international best practices and its own voluntary commitments undertaken with IAEA. The use of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes remained an inalienable right protected by the Treaty. In closing, States parties had the responsibility of restoring the Treaty's credibility by ensuring that its provisions and the outcomes of all NPT Review Conferences were implemented.

29. **Mr. Kwon Haeryong** (Republic of Korea) said that the continued development of nuclear weapons, ballistic missile programmes and uranium enrichment by North Korea posed a grave challenge to the NPT and the global non-proliferation architecture. Despite repeated warnings by the international community, that country had conducted its third nuclear test on 12 February 2013, which had been condemned by a wide range of countries and international organizations. North Korea had also announced in April that it would be using all its nuclear facilities, including one reactor that it had previously agreed to disable, in an effort to expand its nuclear arsenal, once again breaking its promises. His Government had serious concerns about North Korea's unwavering determination to expand its nuclear programme.

30. Under the Treaty, North Korea could not be considered a nuclear-weapon State. His Government was committed to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully, and urged North Korea to abandon all its nuclear weapons and nuclear programmes and abide by its international commitments and obligations. Continued nuclear development would only isolate the country further. Implementation of the 2010 action plan, which reflected balance among the three pillars of the Treaty and positions agreed upon by all the Parties, must receive the highest policy priority. To bolster international confidence in the Treaty, it must be made clear that non-compliance with its obligations, including the abuse of its withdrawal provision, would have clear and strong consequences.

31. The remaining eight States whose ratification was required for the CTBT to come into force should ratify it without further delay. The Disarmament Conference should also start negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty as a top priority. The right of all States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must be exercised in conformity with non-proliferation and safeguards obligations and accompanied by appropriate and effective levels of nuclear safety and security. His Government strongly supported international initiatives to respond to the threat of nuclear terrorism, such as the Nuclear Security Summits, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

32. The Republic of Korea took note of the recent meeting between the E3+3 and Iran held in Almaty and called upon Iran to fully comply with relevant Security Council resolutions and take specific steps to reassure the international community regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. He regretted the postponement of the proposed conference to discuss a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, and hoped that it would be convened as soon as possible.

33. **Mr. Gómez Camacho** (Mexico) said that the eight countries whose ratification was necessary for entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should ratify it to strengthen the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime. Mexico strongly condemned the recent nuclear test carried out by the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and called on that country to refrain from further nuclear tests, comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions, cease making belligerent threats and re-engage in dialogue and negotiation. His Government urged South Sudan to become a Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as soon as possible, in the interest of its universality, and India, Israel and Pakistan to join the Treaty without delay as non-nuclear-weapon States.

34. Despite the international community's repeated urging that Iran cooperate transparently with IAEA, doubts regarding its nuclear programme had not been put to rest. Mexico joined the IAEA Board of Governors in calling on Iran to suspend immediately and without preconditions its uranium enrichment activities. Mexico, as one of the States involved in

establishing the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world, supported the creation of other such zones around the world. It regretted the cancellation of the conference to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and hoped that it would be held at the earliest possible date.

35. The most effective means of non-proliferation was the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, because as long as nuclear weapons existed, there would be those who wished to possess and use or threaten to use them. Lastly, in 2014, Mexico would host a conference to continue the discussion on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons that 127 countries had begun in 2013 in Oslo.

36. **Mr. Montanyane** (Lesotho) said that, four decades after its adoption, the Treaty had yet to attain universality, and its implementation was beset by various setbacks. Thousands of nuclear weapons remained in stockpiles, threatening the extinction of humanity, and, with the CTBT still struggling to garner the ratifications needed for its entry into force, there was no international ban on nuclear weapons testing. Regrettably, some nuclear-weapon States had modernized their nuclear weapons and arsenals, while the number of States aspiring to possess nuclear weapons was steadily increasing.

37. The recent nuclear test conducted on the Korean Peninsula was a clear indication that some were still under the illusion that possession of nuclear weapons could provide security and power. On the other hand, the efforts of the nuclear-weapon States to discharge their obligations under the Treaty, as exemplified by the implementation of the new START Treaty, were encouraging. Nonetheless, those States must do more to restore confidence in their determination to implement the 13 practical steps leading to disarmament in a verifiable and irreversible manner.

38. The successful 2010 Review Conference had brought with it high expectations that decades of negotiations would soon bear fruit. However, implementation of the outcome document remained a challenge. Like others, Lesotho was disappointed at the unjustified failure to hold the conference on the Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone in 2012 and hoped that it would be held before the end of 2013.

39. Although all States had the right to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in order to address challenges such as energy security and

sustainable development, that right must be exercised in a safe and secure manner and with due regard to the non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. Assistance to developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be scaled up.

40. **Mr. Hannan** (Bangladesh) said that nuclear weapons in any hands posed one of the greatest threats to humanity, and only their total elimination could provide the absolute guarantee against their intended or accidental use. More efforts were needed to make progress towards a nuclear-weapons-free world, especially as the Conference on Disarmament had long been deadlocked over its programme of work. While the new START Treaty was encouraging, the world's largest nuclear weapons possessors should cut their nuclear arsenals further to comply with their commitments and obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

41. Only the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons could provide an absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In that connection, non-nuclear weapon States had the legitimate right to receive security assurances from nuclear-weapon States. While the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was a useful first step, negotiations must be begun on a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on nuclear security assurances as a matter of priority. The Conference on Disarmament was the most appropriate forum for such negotiation and for preventing an arms race in outer space, as all nuclear-weapon States were members of that body.

42. Peaceful uses of nuclear technology with IAEA safeguards and verification would contribute to the common goal of sustainable development, because they could help to not only generate power, but also address key development challenges, such as hunger, disease, pollution and climate change. All States parties should engage in constructive dialogue to implement the provisions of articles, I, II and IV of the Treaty.

43. Bangladesh supported the process begun recently in Oslo to address the possible catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. Disarmament could save millions of lives and provide a development dividend by diverting valuable resources from armaments to pressing development needs.

44. **Mr. Hamoui** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the Syrian Arab Republic had hoped that its accession to the NPT in 1968 would encourage Israel to accede as well and to renounce its nuclear weapons. However, Israel had refused and remained the only country in the Middle East region that had neither acceded to the Treaty nor placed its nuclear facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime, thwarting efforts to make the Treaty universal. By contrast, his Government had complied fully with its Treaty obligations and the safeguards agreement concluded with IAEA in 1992, in addition to establishing a national system for the oversight of nuclear materials that ensured that IAEA inspectors had access to its nuclear facilities.

45. Progress towards implementation of the Treaty must proceed on all three of its pillars. All States had an inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, without discrimination or conditions, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, that were incompatible with the mandate of IAEA. There was also a need to achieve a fair balance between the Agency's verification activities and activities relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, as set forth in the Treaty.

46. Given the lack of a discernible will on the part of nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and the inadequate security assurances they had provided to non-nuclear-weapon States, it was crucial to implement the decision on principles and objectives adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and to initiate serious negotiations towards an unconditional document concerning comprehensive security assurances. He regretted the postponement of the proposed conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and hoped that it would be convened without further delay.

47. The inability of Review Conferences to put in place legally binding timetables for nuclear-weapon States to dispose of their arsenals was a matter of grave concern. Given that the Arab States' accession to the Treaty had failed to ensure their safety, while the Israeli military arsenal continued to exacerbate regional volatility, the 2015 Review Conference must exert pressure on Israel, the only State in the Middle East to possess nuclear military capabilities that were not placed under international safeguards, to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State, open all its nuclear installations to inspection and place them under

IAEA safeguards. Meanwhile, nuclear-weapon States must cease assisting Israel in developing its nuclear capabilities, which would pave the way for a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East and restored credibility and effectiveness of the Treaty.

48. **Mr. Maimeskul** (Ukraine) said that non-compliance with the Treaty undermined its integrity and the confidence of the States parties and the elimination of nuclear weapons was the only guarantee against nuclear war. He called for the adoption of the CTBT through a long-term approach comprising disarmament measures taken by the international community in a transparent, non-discriminatory, verifiable and irreversible manner. The 13 steps toward nuclear disarmament and the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference would be instrumental in that regard.

49. His Government urged those States parties which had not yet done so to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA and adopt additional protocols thereto, in order to comply with article III of the Treaty. States parties should abide by the Security Council resolutions on the prevention of black market supply networks, trafficking and acquisition of nuclear materials by non-State actors. Nuclear facilities should be protected against the increased risk of terrorism. Legal instruments such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material should be respected. His Government had honoured the commitment it had made at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit to eliminate all its stockpiles of high-enriched uranium.

50. Security assurances from nuclear-weapon States would strengthen the non-proliferation regime by dissuading other States from acquiring such weapons and by building confidence in the global security environment. A draft international agreement providing non-nuclear-weapon States with assurances that such weapons would not be used would contribute to compliance with action 7 of the 2010 action plan, further the cause of non-proliferation and strengthen the Treaty regime.

51. The establishment of zones free of weapons of mass destruction was essential, particularly in regions where tensions were high, such as the Middle East. His Government regretted that the conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that

region had not been held in 2012. The peaceful use of nuclear technology was essential to sustainable development, provided that it was subject to IAEA safeguards. The Agency's technical cooperation programme was valuable in the development of nuclear energy for such purposes and should be adequately financed.

52. Since ensuring nuclear fuel supply was a complex matter with technical, legal, commercial and economic implications, it was important to adopt multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle where assurance mechanisms did not distort the nuclear market and addressed States' right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Initiatives such as the IAEA low-enriched uranium bank could provide reserves of fuel to States and help meet the increasing need for fuel while minimizing proliferation.

53. **Mr. Kakonge** (Kenya) said that it was regrettable that certain States parties had not met their Treaty obligations; that implementation of the 2010 action plan had yielded few results; that negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament remained deadlocked; and that despite international efforts the elimination of nuclear weapons remained a distant prospect. His delegation was pessimistic about the results of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly to be held in September 2013. More commitment to disarmament was required and the paralysis of the Conference on Disarmament should be resolved.

54. The nuclear-weapon States' legitimization of nuclear weapons, the incorporation of such weapons into defence strategies, and the development of new weapons worsened the situation, since the threat that such weapons could be used only encouraged proliferation. He urged the nuclear-weapon States to implement their commitments under article VI of the Treaty and appealed to India, Pakistan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Israel to ratify the Treaty. His Government welcomed the discussions at the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, which had highlighted the need for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning nuclear weapons.

55. His Government was committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which would facilitate peace consolidation and sustainable development in his country and in many other developing countries, and generate benefits in health, agriculture, water resources

and electricity production in Africa as a whole. Every State Party had an inalienable right to the free access to nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes under article IV of the Treaty.

56. The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty provided a framework for the responsible development of nuclear energy. In that connection, he urged the international community to redouble its efforts to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. The IAEA technical cooperation programme could help to facilitate access to nuclear power, especially for developing countries; its Technical Cooperation Fund should therefore be provided with more predictable resources.

57. **Mr. Dengo** (Costa Rica) said that the international community should act not only through the Security Council but also at the policy level to address the threatened use of nuclear weapons by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. His Government believed in non-proliferation and disarmament and that the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention submitted by his Government and the Government of Malaysia to the General Assembly in December 2007 could be a starting point for talks on the establishment of an instrument for building confidence in verification and ensuring that nuclear arsenals were dismantled.

58. His delegation regretted the failure to hold a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in 2012 and believed that one State's refusal to participate should not hinder the establishment of such a zone. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), which made Latin America and the Caribbean a nuclear-weapon-free zone, had served as a model for such initiatives worldwide.

59. His delegation welcomed the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and, in particular, the commitment made by its member States to a universal instrument prohibiting such weapons. It called on nuclear-weapon States to withdraw or modify their interpretative declarations to the additional protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

60. His Government would continue to work towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, the humanitarian consequences of which had been widely acknowledged. It called on the Governments of India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty, and on the nuclear-weapon States to comply with their disarmament obligations under article VI. The Treaty's indefinite extension in 1995 could not be understood as an endorsement of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.

61. **Mr. Orjiako** (Nigeria) said that complete nuclear disarmament was essential to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which were an unacceptable threat to humanity. Their humanitarian impact had been emphasized at the Oslo conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, held in 2013. His delegation urged the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States aspiring to acquire such weapons to reduce the role of those weapons in their military doctrines.

62. His Government was concerned by the nuclear-weapon States' lack of progress in eliminating their arsenals in accordance with their legal obligations, and called on them to show transparency in respect of their undertaking on irreversibility and verifiability. As a member of the De alerting Group, Nigeria stressed that the reduced operational readiness of nuclear weapons was not a substitute for their elimination. It called on the nuclear-weapon States to meet their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, ensure the implementation of the 13 steps toward nuclear disarmament as well as the 2010 action plan, and eliminate all such weapons.

63. The Treaty's indefinite extension in 1995 could not be understood as endorsing the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. His Government had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution [67/53](#) on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear devices; such a treaty, however, would be effective only if it applied to both future production and existing stocks.

64. His delegation looked forward to the high-level meeting of the General Assembly to be held in September 2013 and urged States parties to engage constructively in it. He called on IAEA to continue working with its member States to implement its Action Plan on Nuclear Safety in order to promote a robust safeguards system, while enabling the peaceful

use of nuclear energy in line with compliance mechanisms.

65. The establishment of new zones free of nuclear weapons and the consolidation of existing zones was a step towards the elimination of such weapons. His delegation called on States which had not yet done so to ratify the Treaty of Pelindaba without delay, and supported the convening of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. It was concerned by the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, which it attributed to a lack of political will. It called on the members of the Conference to show greater commitment to resolving the impasse and enabling the Conference to fulfil its mandate.

66. **Mr. Tóth** (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) were mutually reinforcing and essential to global security. The NPT expressed the States parties' determination to end nuclear weapons testing, and progress on the CTBT had contributed to the extension of the NPT in 1995.

67. The CTBT was a landmark in the history of multilateral verification and was supported by almost all States, although ratification by the eight remaining annex 2 States was still required for it to enter into force. Its importance lay not only in its symbolic value but also in its global reach. The worldwide facilities of its International Monitoring System scanned the earth and atmosphere for nuclear explosions, sharing that data with institutions in many countries, and its verification system was near completion.

68. The International Monitoring System had detected announced nuclear tests in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2006, 2009 and 2013, and had informed the international community accordingly. As the only country continuing to test nuclear weapons, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was undermining multilateral efforts to ban such testing. The international community should use the incident of its most recent nuclear test as a unifying event to help achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT.

69. The non-proliferation regime faced challenges, including the lack of progress on disarmament; the spread of associated technologies, material and

expertise; nuclear terrorism; and regional tensions. Both the NPT and the CTBT endorsed the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. The two treaties and zones free of nuclear weapons were technically and politically interdependent. A testing ban was integral to such zones, which received verification support from CTBT monitoring stations.

70. In the Middle East, 80 per cent of countries had signed the CTBT and 50 per cent of monitoring stations were in place. The Preparatory Commission was a forum for scientific cooperation in the region. The 2014 integrated field exercise in Jordan, which was a simulated onsite inspection, would bring together experts from all interested parties in the region.

71. At its inception, the CTBT had been based on the understanding that the elimination of nuclear testing in a verifiable manner was a practical goal. The international community needed to recapture the multilateral spirit which had given rise to the NPT and the CTBT. Recent events should spur progress towards that goal rather than diminish States' resolve. The continuing failure to achieve such progress threatened the sustainability of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

72. **Mr. Al-Hammadi** (Qatar) said that his country was a Party to the main international instruments concerning weapons of mass destruction, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. It had also concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA. Despite their commitment to nuclear disarmament made at the 2000 Review Conference, and despite taking some unilateral and bilateral steps and eliminating some of their weapons, many nuclear-weapon States had kept their nuclear arsenals at the centre of their strategic doctrines and increased their capability.

73. To date, eight NPT Review Conferences had been held and the low percentage of resolutions adopted at those gatherings that had been implemented eroded the credibility of the Treaty in the eyes of countries that took their Treaty obligations seriously. The aspiration to a just and peaceful world motivated his delegation to make every effort to ensure that the 2015 Review Conference would be a success. In that connection, the

thirteen steps toward nuclear disarmament, adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, and the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference would help the nuclear-weapon States advance towards the objective of nuclear disarmament and also provide security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons.

74. The IAEA comprehensive safeguards system and ongoing efforts to achieve universality of the Treaty should be strengthened. The inalienable right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and peaceful nuclear energy programmes developed in full compliance with IAEA regulations must be protected and facilitated. Countries developing such programmes must take confidence-building steps in order to allay any fears the international community might harbour regarding their activities.

75. The Arab countries' approval of the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 had been linked to the decision to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Following the postponement of the conference, originally slated for 2012, on the establishment of such a zone, it was incumbent upon the international community to reschedule the conference before the third session of the Preparatory Conference.

76. **Mr. Oyarce** (Chile) said that although progress had been made in non-proliferation, as non-nuclear-weapon States had honoured their undertaking not to acquire nuclear weapons, article VI, which called for a treaty on general and complete disarmament, had not been implemented. The non-proliferation and disarmament pillars therefore needed to be rebalanced. As a State Party to the Treaty and a member of the Non-Proliferation Defence Initiative and the De alerting Group, his country would continue to promote disarmament by calling for implementation of the 2010 action plan and the 13 steps towards nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference.

77. The Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons had shown that it was impossible to prepare for a nuclear attack and that the mere possession of such weapons generated the risk of such an attack. The humanitarian dimension of the use of nuclear weapons must be incorporated into the Treaty review process in a realistic manner. That process should enable progress in disarmament without sacrificing the gains made in non-proliferation, and should encourage multilateral and bilateral disarmament efforts.

78. The CTBT should be ratified by all remaining annex 2 States to facilitate its entry into force. The nuclear test conducted by North Korea, which his Government condemned, had underlined the need to implement the verification mechanisms laid down in the CTBT, thus consolidating the legal authority and technical efficacy of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Work on a fissile material cut-off treaty was a priority for the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, but the talks on such a treaty had been deadlocked for a decade. His Government had therefore been a sponsor of General Assembly resolution 67/53 and would support the group of governmental experts which would provide technical advice to the Conference on Disarmament.

79. Confidence-building was vital to the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. His Government would continue to encourage nuclear-weapon States to be transparent with regard to their arsenals. The international community should support the discussions among the nuclear-weapon States on verification and mutual trust so that they could submit the required reports to the Committee in 2014. The draft reporting form proposed by NPDI offered a comprehensive means of compliance with actions 20 and 21 of the 2010 action plan, which must be included in any future road map.

80. States enjoyed the right to pursue their own security objectives in accordance with international law and were responsible for contributing to international security. Multilateral action was ultimately aimed at the security of human beings. As a member of the De-alerting Group, Chile had called for a reduction in the operational readiness of nuclear weapons. The Group had submitted three resolutions to the General Assembly, each of which had received more support than the previous one, showing that the matter was of concern to the international community. De-alerting would help to build confidence and prevent the risks surrounding nuclear weapons, increase transparency and reduce the role of such weapons in security policies. The establishment of regional zones free of nuclear weapons required commitment from all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States. His Government had signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco and therefore supported efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

81. The peaceful use of nuclear energy was essential to a sustainable security regime. His Government

reaffirmed the inalienable right of States complying with their obligations under articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The safeguards regime must be effective in order to uphold that right. During the current review cycle, therefore, the States parties needed to improve information exchange through the IAEA technical cooperation programme. He encouraged those States parties which had not yet done so to conclude an additional protocol with IAEA and to apply its provisions on a transitional basis pending its entry into force. Lastly, his Government was convinced that civil society should be allowed to contribute to the establishment of a security mechanism and that disarmament education should be improved to build a peaceful world which rejected nuclear weapons.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.