

Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Summary record of the 1st meeting

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Monday, 22 April 2013, at 10 a.m.

Temporary Chairman: Mr. Woolcott. (Australia)

Chairman: Mr. Feruta. (Romania)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

Opening of the session

1. **The Temporary Chair** declared open the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Election of the Chair

2. **The Temporary Chair** said that the Eastern European States had nominated Mr. Feruta of Romania to chair the second session of the Preparatory Committee.

3. *Mr. Feruta (Romania) was elected Chair by acclamation.*

4. *Mr. Feruta (Romania) took the Chair.*

Statement by the High Representative of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

5. Ms. Kane (High Representative of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs) said that the start of a new annual session of the NPT Preparatory Committee offered an excellent occasion to place the Treaty into a broader perspective than that offered by the NPT review process, with its narrow focus on the Treaty's three pillars of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Although the Treaty had not yet attained universality, despite making gradual progress to that end, it still boasted more States parties than any other international security treaty, apart from the Charter of the United Nations, and had contributed significantly to international peace and security and the establishment of global norms.

6. The review process, as both a diagnostic instrument for assessing the health of the Treaty and a means of improving it, must not be permitted to become an empty ritual that simply reaffirmed the status quo. The prospects for achieving universal support for prescriptions to improve the Treaty regime, such as the thirteen steps to nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference and the 64-point action plan for nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, were a function of their fairness to all the States parties. Despite tensions arising from the different obligations of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, the

legitimacy of the Treaty regime was still sustainable, provided that all the Treaty's provisions, especially those relating to nuclear disarmament, remained forward-looking.

7. The meetings held by nuclear-weapon States to discuss implementation of their commitments under article VI of the Treaty provided a forum for developing common positions on such issues as verification and transparency, a necessity in multilateral disarmament. Those States' readiness to provide more detailed reporting on their disarmament and non-proliferation activities would come under increased scrutiny. The Office for Disarmament Affairs had created a page on its website to provide a repository of data submitted by the nuclear-weapon States. She hoped that those countries would avail themselves of that resource.

8. Evaluations by individuals and civil society of State behaviour relative to past commitments to make progress towards disarmament and non-proliferation could be instrumental in strengthening the wider process of accountability, without replacing the NPT review process itself. The Treaty had faced setbacks outside the domain of article VI, such as the failure to convene an international conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. However, in light of the enormous support among States parties for such a conference, she hoped that it could be held later in 2013.

9. Other challenges included the deteriorating security situation on the Korean Peninsula, the arms race in South Asia involving fissile materials and both nuclear-capable missiles and nuclear weapons, and the failure to resolve through diplomatic channels the concerns over the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

10. In closing, she hoped that the present deliberations would create a climate conducive to the full implementation of all Treaty obligations and signal a resolve to move away from nuclear weapons and to de-legitimize their very existence. In that sense, disarmament and non-proliferation were to be pursued concurrently, with their implementation being monitored through the Treaty review process.

Statement by the Chair

11. **The Chair** said that the Committee's work at the current session must be carried out within an appropriate and realistic context based on the follow-up recommendations contained in the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. He hoped that States parties would not just reaffirm their joint undertakings but evaluate their accomplishments and setbacks to date. As upholding the Treaty's credibility and relevance was a shared responsibility, further engagement was required in order to continue to achieve tangible results.

12. While the primary task of the Preparatory Committee was to consider principles, objectives and ways of promoting full implementation and universality of the Treaty, States should also endeavour to preserve the achievements to date and strengthen the NPT regime.

Adoption of the agenda (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/14; NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/INF/3)

13. **The Chair** recalled that the agenda for all Preparatory Committee sessions had been adopted at the first session in 2012 and issued as document NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/14, and drew attention to the indicative timetable for the current session (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/INF/3), which had been circulated on 26 February 2013.

14. He took it that the Committee wished to take note of the indicative timetable contained in document NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/INF.3.

15. *It was so decided.*

Organization of work of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/CRP.1; NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/2; NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/INF/2; NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/INF/5)

16. **The Chair** recalled that, with regard to participation at sessions of the Preparatory Committee of entities other than States parties, representatives of specialized agencies and intergovernmental organizations as well as representatives of non-governmental organizations, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 2010 Review Conference, which were applied *mutatis mutandis* to the work of the Committee, representatives of the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

were entitled to attend the meetings of the Committee and to submit material, both orally and in writing.

17. At its first session, the Committee had also adopted the following decision, based on previous decisions and the relevant rules of procedure of the 2010 Review Conference:

“1. Representatives of States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their countries' nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Committee.

“2. Representatives of specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their organizations' nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit, in writing, their views and comments on questions within their competence, which may be circulated as documents of the Committee. Furthermore, the Committee decides, based on the agreement at the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, that specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations be invited to make oral presentations to the Committee upon the decision of the Committee, on a case-by-case basis.

“3. Representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should be allowed, upon request, to attend the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed, to be seated in the designated area, to receive documents of the Committee and, at their own expense, to make written material available to the participants in the Committee. The Committee shall also allocate a meeting to non-governmental organizations to address each session of the Committee.”

18. The State of Palestine had requested to attend the meetings of the Preparatory Committee as an observer.

The following specialized agencies and intergovernmental organizations had requested to attend the session of the Preparatory Committee: the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the European Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Arab States, and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization; in addition, 53 NGOs listed in document NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/INF/5 had submitted requests to attend meetings of the Committee.

19. He took it that the Committee wished to take note of those requests.

20. *It was so decided.*

Election of officers

21. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries had nominated Mr. Roman-Morey of Peru to serve as Chair of the third session of the Preparatory Committee. He took it that the Committee wished to elect Mr. Roman-Morey accordingly.

22. *It was so decided.*

23. **Mr. Roman-Morey** (Peru) *was elected Chair of the third session of the Preparatory Committee.*

Organization of the 2015 Review Conference

Dates and venue

24. **The Chair** suggested that the Committee might wish to adopt the following draft decisions contained in document NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/CRP.1:

“The Committee decides to hold its third session in New York from 28 April to 9 May 2014”.

“The Committee decides to hold the 2015 Review Conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in New York from 27 April to 22 May 2015”.

25. *It was so decided.*

Financing of the Review Conference

26. **The Chair** drew attention to document NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/2, in particular to paragraph 14 thereof, which, inter alia, recalled the oral statement delivered in connection with General Assembly

resolution 66/33, which indicated that costs associated with the preparation and holding of the 2015 Review Conference and the sessions of its Preparatory Committee would be borne by the States parties to the Treaty and that there would be no financial implications for the regular budget of the United Nations. Those activities would only be undertaken by the Secretariat after sufficient funding was received, in advance.

27. He also drew attention to document NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/INF/2, in particular paragraphs 12 and 13 on documentation. The Committee must conform to the guidelines for the submission of documentation mandated by the General Assembly to ensure timely translation and distribution of documents. To expedite the processing and issuance of in-session documents, it was strongly recommended that documents should not exceed five pages. To comply with those requirements, delegations were encouraged to provide only new information when submitting reports. Working papers and proposals already submitted in the review cycle needed not be resubmitted. Given that the production of official documentation in six languages was one of the most expensive budget items and a major factor in escalating costs, the cooperation of delegations in that regard was much appreciated.

28. Lastly, a serious attempt would be made to limit the distribution of hard copies. Pre-session documents were available online, either through the website of the Department for Disarmament Affairs or through the PaperSmart portal and statements by delegations would be made available. QuickRead codes were also available in the meeting room to facilitate online access to documents.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee

29. **Mr. Reza Sajjadi** (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of the Group of States parties belonging to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said that a nuclear-weapon-free world was of the highest priority. In that connection, the Group was extremely concerned at the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States toward eliminating their nuclear arsenals. Reductions in deployment and in operational status could not substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States should apply the principles of

transparency, irreversibility and international verifiability in all measures related to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations.

30. The indefinite extension of the Treaty did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear arsenals. The Group called for the complete exclusion of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from the military doctrines of nuclear-weapon States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, because they were based on promoting military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies.

31. In view of the unanimous ruling by the International Court of Justice that there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects, negotiations needed to begin on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, including a nuclear weapons convention. The Group called on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to the upgrading of their existing nuclear weapons systems and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which could result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold.

32. The mere possession or any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons violated the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international humanitarian law. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States must refrain, under all circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty. The Group called for the commencement of negotiations on a universal legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances by all nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group encouraged all Member States to participate at the highest level in the high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament to be held on 26 September 2013.

33. The Group reaffirmed the inalienable right of States parties to develop, research, produce and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination under article IV of the Treaty. Each State party had a sovereign right to define its national energy and fuel-cycle policies, including the inalienable right to develop, for peaceful purposes, a

full national nuclear fuel cycle. Accordingly, the choices and decisions of each State party in that regard should be respected without prejudice to its international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies. Any measure to restrict the fullest exercise of the inalienable rights under article IV of the Treaty would jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States parties and would widen the gap between developed and developing countries.

34. Non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States. Consequently, any restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development should be removed immediately. The continued vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons jeopardized the integrity and credibility of the Treaty and should be prevented. Proliferation concerns were best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. Any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, whether operational or under construction, posed a threat to international peace and security and constituted a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and IAEA regulations.

35. The exclusive purpose of safeguards was to verify the fulfilment of obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty. Safeguards should not hamper the economic or technological development of the parties to the Treaty or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities. The International Atomic Energy Agency was the sole competent authority to verify compliance with obligations under the respective safeguards agreements of Member States.

36. The Group had full confidence in the Agency's impartiality and professionalism and strongly rejected any politically motivated attempts by any State to politicize the work of the Agency. The IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements must be strictly observed during verification activities and the regime for the protection of confidential information related to safeguards must be strengthened.

37. The Group rejected any attempt to reinterpret the rights and obligations under the Treaty in a manner that

was inconsistent with its object and purpose, as well as any conditionalities beyond the Treaty's provisions. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones did not substitute for the legal obligations of the nuclear-weapon States to totally eliminate their nuclear weapons.

38. The Group called on those States to fulfil their obligations in accordance with treaties establishing such zones and their protocols, and to withdraw any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that were incompatible with the object and purpose of those treaties. The Group welcomed continued consultations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the nuclear-weapon States on the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty and urged the five nuclear-weapon States to sign and ratify the Protocol as soon as possible.

39. The Group considered the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East a priority and called for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The failure to convene the conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was contrary to the spirit of the 1995 resolution and violated the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. The Group urged the Secretary-General, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation to convene the conference without any further delay and to seek the unconditional participation of Israel in the conference, in order to maintain the relevance and credibility of the Treaty, the 2015 review process and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole.

40. The Final Document of the 2012 Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement called on all parties concerned to take practical steps towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and demanded that Israel renounce its possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without precondition or further delay, place all its nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards, and conduct its nuclear-related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. The acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel posed a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States. The Group also called for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of

assistance in nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel.

41. The full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of all provisions of the Treaty, as well as the complete and good-faith fulfilment of the undertakings assumed through the decisions, resolutions, final documents and plans of action of past Review Conferences were necessary to preserve and enhance the Treaty's relevance, credibility and effectiveness. The 2015 review cycle should build on the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, in order to strengthen implementation of the Treaty and to ensure that it achieved universality.

42. **Mr. Bylica** (Observer for the European Union), speaking also on behalf of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Iceland, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine, said that upholding the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its review cycle was a priority for the European Union, since the purpose of the review was to strengthen the effectiveness of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and to achieve tangible progress towards the goals enshrined in the Treaty. The European Union would therefore continue to promote a comprehensive, balanced and substantive implementation of the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, and called on all States parties to do the same.

43. The European Union worked with all States parties to promote international efforts against nuclear proliferation and responded resolutely to cases of non-compliance. It would work to pursue nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, and to ensure the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy by countries wishing to develop their capacities in that field and making progress towards implementing the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

44. Nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control should be addressed comprehensively. Effective multilateralism, prevention and international cooperation were the three main goals of the European Union Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The European Union called on States that had not yet done so to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and, pending their

accession to the Treaty, to adhere to its terms and pledge commitments to non-proliferation and disarmament.

45. The European Union remained committed to achieving concrete progress towards treaty-based nuclear disarmament and arms control, especially through an overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons. It welcomed the reductions made so far, but called on States that possessed the largest arsenals to make further reductions. In that connection, multilateral efforts must be renewed and multilateral negotiating bodies must be revitalized, in particular the Conference on Disarmament. The European Union called for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty as part of that Conference.

46. Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which the European Union was promoting through diplomatic and financial engagement, all States should uphold a moratorium on nuclear explosions. Congratulating Brunei Darussalam and Chad on their recent ratifications of the CTBT, he called on those States that had yet to sign and ratify that Treaty to do so.

47. The major proliferation challenges posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic must be addressed resolutely in order to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. The Security Council had the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security in that regard, including in cases of non-compliance.

48. The European Union strongly condemned the satellite launches carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea using ballistic missile technology in 2012 as well as the nuclear test conducted in 2013, and urged that country to abandon all its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. It also condemned that country's aggressive rhetoric, including repeated threats of the use of force, and called on it to refrain from further provocations and to return to full compliance with its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations. The European Union deplored the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's announced intention to resume its nuclear activities at

Yongbyon. Such a clear violation of Security Council resolutions and that country's own commitments undertaken at the Six-Party Talks would inevitably lead to an ever-more-united response from the international community.

49. The European Union was deeply concerned about the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran and continued to be engaged in renewed efforts to negotiate a comprehensive long-term settlement that would restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of that country's nuclear programme and of its compliance with all obligations under the Treaty and other relevant international resolutions, while fully respecting its right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

50. The recent meeting of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States (the "E3+3") and the Islamic Republic of Iran illustrated the European Union's efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution. He urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to take concrete steps towards comprehensive negotiations and to avoid further isolation.

51. The European Union deeply regretted the failure by the Syrian Arab Republic to comply with IAEA resolutions and requests and its very own commitments as well as the NPT Safeguards Agreement. The European Union urged the Syrian authorities to urgently remedy their non-compliance and to cooperate with the Agency, in order to clarify matters with regard to several sites and to sign and bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible.

52. The European Union regretted the postponement of the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The European Union had contributed to the process by sponsoring two relevant seminars in 2011 and 2012 and stood ready to provide additional support in close coordination with the countries of the region. Regarding the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under optimal conditions, the European Union focused its action in the areas of nuclear safety, nuclear security and international cooperation.

53. Lastly, the European Union still believed that the conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol represented the verification standard under article III of the Treaty, and that the NPT should be strengthened through a common

understanding of how to respond effectively to a State party's withdrawal from the Treaty. The Security Council must act promptly in response to such a development.

54. **Mr. Al Mazrouei** (United Arab Emirates) said that his Government's policy on its nuclear energy programme showed a commitment to transparency, the highest standards of safety, security and non-proliferation and full cooperation with IAEA, principles that should govern all nuclear activities and programmes. The NPT, which was fundamental not only to the non-proliferation regime but also to global security in general, facilitated the responsible exercise of the right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

55. The Preparatory Committee should focus on the challenges to the non-proliferation regime: the lack of specific steps aimed at disarmament; the existence of States outside the Treaty; non-compliance issues; and continued nuclear proliferation threats. The right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses came with responsibilities. States engaging in such activities should adopt comprehensive safeguards measures, cooperate fully with IAEA and take the steps required to address all concerns and obligations, including under relevant IAEA and Security Council resolutions. Adherence to an additional protocol would help garner the support and confidence of the international community and ensure the credibility of the IAEA safeguards system.

56. His country had begun the construction of its first nuclear power reactor in 2012, making it the first country to launch a new nuclear energy programme in 27 years. States with nuclear experience should assist others in developing nuclear energy for peaceful uses by providing technical expertise and facilitating the transfer of technology and materials to developing countries, including through practical export arrangements. The IAEA mandate in that area should also be strengthened. His Government welcomed the establishment of the IAEA nuclear fuel bank and encouraged further multilateral mechanisms to ensure the provision of fuel supplies and services for both the front end and the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.

57. To support implementation of the 2010 action plan, his Government had developed an innovative model for developing peaceful nuclear energy while maintaining high standards of safety, security and non-

proliferation. Together with nine other countries, it had established the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, which had submitted several working papers for the current meeting.

58. The CTBT was an important tool for building confidence and reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons. His Government sought through diplomatic efforts to promote its entry into force and implementation at the national, regional and global levels. The recent nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a clear provocation that merited a swift response, highlighted the importance of the CTBT. Implementation of agreed disarmament measures would strengthen non-proliferation efforts and the Treaty framework as a whole, but the only way to rule out the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was to eliminate them entirely.

59. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was long overdue. He deeply regretted the failure to convene a conference on that subject in 2012 and called on the convenors to work to ensure that the conference would be held as soon as possible, as progress on the issue would help to demonstrate the Treaty's effectiveness in ensuring global peace and security.

60. **Mr. Baati** (Tunisia), speaking on behalf of the States parties members of the League of Arab States, said that the 2010 NPT Review Conference had been a success, having addressed the three pillars of the Treaty — nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy — as well as the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Implementation of that resolution was key to achieving regional security and ending tensions related to nuclear proliferation in the region.

61. The success of a review process hinged on the extent to which obligations and agreements were implemented. Progress achieved towards nuclear disarmament remained limited. The continued possession of nuclear arsenals by nuclear-weapon States under the pretext of deterrence; the limited reduction in the number of deployed nuclear weapons; the development of new generations of such weapons and the provision of assistance to States not parties to the NPT undermined the Treaty's objectives.

62. The Arab States were concerned at attempts to reinterpret article IV of the Treaty, which enshrined the inalienable right of States parties to develop, research,

produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in an effort to limit the benefits that some non-nuclear-weapon States parties might derive from the Treaty, or to impose additional restrictions on those countries in a selective and politicized manner.

63. While the Arab States had hoped that implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East would lead to long-awaited progress on stalled efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, the situation was once again deadlocked. After taking an inexcusably long time to designate the facilitator and the host Government, the conveners of the conference had announced its indefinite postponement unilaterally and contrary to the demands and wishes of all countries in the region, except Israel.

64. Breach of the obligations agreed upon in 2010 undermined the credibility of the Treaty and of all multilateral commitments made in the area of disarmament. The Arab States did not regard the conference as a goal in itself but rather as a means of defining a clear action plan and timetable for implementing the resolution on the Middle East. They therefore called upon all States parties to demand that the conveners hold preparatory meetings to set the agenda and timeframe of the conference, which should be held no later than the end of 2013.

65. **Mr. Guerreiro** (Brazil), speaking on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa (the New Agenda Coalition), said that it was regrettable that the joint ministerial declaration issued at the Coalition's founding in 1998, which called on the nuclear-weapon States to immediately begin work on the practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, remained unfulfilled. At the inception of the Treaty, all States parties had struck a grand bargain in which nuclear-weapon States had committed themselves to nuclear disarmament and non-nuclear-weapon States had undertaken not to develop nuclear weapons. The States parties had also affirmed the inalienable right to pursue the peaceful application of nuclear energy.

66. While the nuclear non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty had largely been successful in limiting the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and had been strengthened over the years, the nuclear disarmament commitments embodied in the Treaty had yet to be realized. The only guarantee of a safe and peaceful world was the complete elimination of all

nuclear weapons, irrespective of their type, location or possessor. As long as those weapons existed, they could always be used, whether by accident or by miscalculation or design, and as long as some States continued to possess them, others would aspire to acquire them.

67. The continuing existence of nuclear weapons defied logic and was incompatible with the integrity of the nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime. On several occasions, a significant number of States had expressed concerns at the catastrophic humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and the need for all States to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law. Given that no State or group of States could mitigate the effects of a nuclear weapon detonation on civilian populations, all States parties to the Treaty must seize every opportunity to permanently rid the world of the threat posed by nuclear weapons.

68. The action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference must be fully implemented and States parties should report on how they were accelerating compliance with all the Treaty's provisions and obligations and the commitments made at past Review Conferences. The New Agenda Coalition called on South Sudan to adhere to the Treaty, and urged India, Israel and Pakistan to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions.

69. Pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon-free zones represented a valuable means to enhancing global and regional peace and security, strengthening nuclear non-proliferation efforts and contributing to nuclear disarmament. It was therefore important to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones where they did not exist, especially in the Middle East, which would benefit the region in particular and the world in general. In that regard, it was regrettable that the proposed conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction had not been convened in 2012. All efforts must be made to convene that conference without further delay.

70. Neither the pursuit nor the retention of nuclear weapons could ever guarantee a nation's peace and security, nor enhance regional or international security. The Coalition strongly condemned the nuclear tests carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in violation of its obligations under the relevant

Security Council resolutions. It urged that country to fulfil its commitments made at the Six-Party Talks, and to engage in dialogue in order to reduce tension in the region.

71. All States parties must seize the opportunity to begin work on the construction of a comprehensive, legally binding framework of mutually reinforcing instruments for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. Such a framework should include clearly defined benchmarks and timelines, and be backed by a strong system of verification.

72. **Mr. Woolcott** (Australia), speaking on behalf of Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (the Vienna Group of Ten), said that, despite a marked diversity of interests and perspectives, Group members shared a readiness to draft language and work on non-proliferation topics in a constructive spirit with a view to bridging differences, building goodwill and facilitating agreement.

73. The Group's prime objective was to achieve a fruitful outcome of the Treaty review cycle, particularly with due attention to the issues of verification and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To that end, it had produced six working papers aimed at promoting broad consultation and consensus. The topics covered were compliance and verification; export controls; nuclear safety; physical protection; and peaceful uses. A paper had also been submitted on the importance of the CTBT for non-proliferation and disarmament.

74. **Mr. Badr** (Egypt) said that most of the consensus decisions and commitments undertaken at NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committee meetings were ignored with impunity. Consequently, it was important to return to the original grand bargain struck at the inception of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, where nuclear-weapon States committed themselves to nuclear disarmament, non-nuclear-weapon States agreed not to develop nuclear weapons, and all States parties acknowledged their inalienable right to pursue the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

75. Since 1968, more States had been making use of nuclear energy with the assistance of IAEA. However, technical cooperation resources remained limited,

putting a strain on the efforts of developing countries in particular to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Moreover, many regions remained underrepresented in the Agency's governing structures, despite the decision taken in 1999 to expand the Board of Governors to better represent the world community.

76. Horizontal nuclear non-proliferation was the element of the grand bargain that had seen the most progress, with almost all countries in the world having acceded to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States in fulfilment of their obligations under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system. The few notable exceptions needed to be addressed for the Treaty to achieve universality. Vertical proliferation, on the other hand, remained a serious challenge, as all nuclear-weapon States continued to modernize their arsenals and nuclear weapons continued to be shared and deployed on the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, in violation of the letter and spirit of the NPT.

77. While progress on the other pillars was mostly positive, the steps taken towards achieving nuclear disarmament had been a disappointment. Forty-five years after the conclusion of the Treaty, negotiations on effective measures for stopping the arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament had not yet begun. Many practical action plans to that end had been adopted, but few had been implemented. Unilateral or bilateral initiatives to reduce nuclear arsenals, though welcome, were no replacement for a multilateral, legally binding and verifiable regime.

78. Moreover, arguing for the indispensability of nuclear weapons, which remained an integral part of the military doctrines of the countries that possessed them, was unhelpful. As there was no such thing as a nuclear weapon in good hands, they must be eliminated from all hands. There must be a balance between the responsibilities and obligations of nuclear-weapon States and those of non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, the double standard according to which the obligations of the non-nuclear-weapon States were legally binding while those of the nuclear-weapon States were merely to be implemented if convenient was unsustainable.

79. The continued failure to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, a measure endorsed by every NPT review conference since 1995, was disconcerting, as was the unilateral cancellation by the conveners of the conference that had been

originally scheduled for 2012 on that topic. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Arab Governments were becoming more accountable to their people, who were demanding a prompt resolution to the nuclear question in the Middle East.

80. He called on the conveners, the Secretary-General and the sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East to fulfil their mandate by convening the postponed conference without further delay.

81. **Mr. Countryman** (United States) said that his Government shared the interest of most countries in preserving the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a basis for global cooperation. It was doing its part by working to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy and the likelihood of their use, to strengthen international safeguards and encourage peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States that met their obligations, and to ensure that States that violated the Treaty were confronted with the requisite urgency.

82. The 2010 action plan had reset the NPT and each of its pillars at the centre of efforts to build a safer world. Its imperfections, which were understandable given the complexities of a multilateral negotiation among the Treaty's diverse membership, did not detract from its value. Progress on the action plan should be the subject of review by States parties. In that connection, his Government encouraged a balanced dialogue that addressed each of the Treaty's three pillars.

83. His Government acknowledged its special responsibility to work towards nuclear disarmament and had made a commitment not to develop new nuclear warheads or pursue new military missions for nuclear weapons. It was implementing the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) and would continue working to meet its commitments under the action plan, out of an abiding interest in extending forever the 68-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons.

84. However, disarmament required action by all States parties, not just the nuclear-weapon States. Non-compliance by Iran and Syria represented the most serious threat to the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. States parties must stand together and demand clearly that those Governments should return to full

compliance with the Treaty and hold them accountable for any Treaty violations or abuse of the withdrawal provision. They should also ensure that IAEA had the necessary resources and authorities to carry out its verification activities in conformity with the Treaty. With that in mind, his Government would continue working with those of other States parties to gain acceptance of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols as the standard for Treaty verification.

85. Great strides had been made to address the threat of nuclear terrorism through the Nuclear Security Summit process launched by his Government in 2010. The IAEA international conference on nuclear security to be held in July 2013 would also help to advance that urgent priority.

86. His Government recognized the right of States parties to access peaceful nuclear energy, consistent with the Treaty's non-proliferation provisions, and it had contributed generously to IAEA programmes that benefited non-nuclear-weapon States parties, including a pledge of \$50 million over five years for a new IAEA peaceful uses initiative. Cognizant of the new opportunities that international cooperation could offer countries seeking to benefit from nuclear energy, his Government supported new frameworks for civil nuclear cooperation, such as the establishment of an IAEA fuel bank.

87. His Government supported the goal of establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and the convening of a conference involving all States in the region to discuss it. Although it had been impossible to convene such a conference in Helsinki in 2012, his Government remained committed to working with all relevant parties to take steps that would create the conditions for a successful and meaningful conference. It hoped that the relevant parties would agree to hold one soon.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.