

Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Report submitted by Canada on steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

1. At the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, Canada supported a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East (resolution 67/28). In addition, Canada voted in favour of the resolution entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” (resolution 67/34), which, inter alia, called on States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work towards the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and recognized the endorsement by the 2010 Review Conference of practical steps in a process leading to the full implementation of the 1995 resolution, including the convening of a conference, to be attended by all States of the region, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Canada voted against the resolution entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East” (resolution 67/73). As expressed in Canada’s explanation of vote, the resolution unfairly singled out Israel by calling for its accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty while failing to address serious non-compliance issues by States in the region, particularly Iran and Syria.

2. Canada is committed to advancing the outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference, including a conference on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Canada fully supports the ongoing efforts of the Facilitator of the Conference, Finnish Ambassador Jaakko Laajava, to consult broadly with all relevant stakeholders to ensure a successful conference to be attended by all States in the region on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at. Any zone free of weapons of mass destruction should be negotiated by States in the region for States in the region, with support from other actors as requested.

3. Canada has called for universal and full adherence to and compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by States in the Middle East. At the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Canada actively supported the adoption of a resolution on the application of safeguards in the Middle East by the IAEA General



Conferences in 2005 and 2006. Canada regrets that it was unable to support this annual resolution from 2007 to 2012, given that changes presented by the drafters were not the result of a consensual approach and because the resolution did not address serious breaches in compliance with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards requirements by Iran and Syria as determined by IAEA and reported by the Agency to the Security Council. Canada welcomes the fact that all States parties to the Treaty in the region have ratified a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA. Canada has appealed to all States in the region to contribute further to regional stability and security by concluding additional protocols to their respective comprehensive safeguards agreements, which Canada considers to be the current verification standard pursuant to article III of the Treaty. We congratulate Jordan, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates on having fully in force additional protocols with IAEA.

4. With regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Canada co-sponsored the resolution on that Treaty (resolution 67/76) at the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, and has also encouraged all States in the region, particularly those listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, to ratify the Treaty as a confidence- and security-building measure.

5. Canada shares the serious international concerns about the scope and nature of Iran's past and ongoing nuclear programme and Iran's ongoing failure to meet its international obligations. Although Canada recognizes that, like all States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has a right to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, this right comes with international obligations with which all States, including Iran, must comply. However, Iran is in non-compliance with its comprehensive safeguards agreements and is in violation of 6 Security Council resolutions and 12 IAEA Board of Governors resolutions. Canada is deeply disturbed by Iran's continued and expanding enrichment activities as well as its heavy-water-related activities which are in unambiguous defiance of legal obligations in Security Council resolutions. Canada also notes with serious concern Iran's continued refusal to comply with its comprehensive safeguards agreement. Notably, Iran continues to be the only State with a comprehensive safeguards agreements in force that refuses to implement modified Code 3.1 provisions in violation of that agreement. Iran continues to refuse to provide sufficient information about the original purpose and chronology of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, as well as a majority of its other nuclear activities. Iran has also not provided information regarding its announced plans for the construction of new enrichment facilities and reactors. This failure to implement modified Code 3.1 and provide IAEA with the information it requires seriously hinders the Agency's ability to implement the necessary verification measures and provide international assurances about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

6. Most troubling of all is the continuing assessment of the Agency that "Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities." The IAEA report of November 2011 (GOV/2011/65) particularly reinforced long-standing and serious concerns about the military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme and provided credible evidence towards past and ongoing efforts related to nuclear weapons development and research. Indeed, the activities identified by IAEA can be understood only in the context of a nuclear weapons development programme. Canada stresses that Iran must immediately and fully cooperate with IAEA to address these serious

allegations. Repeated changes in the function of the Fordow facility, and Iran's ability to quickly quadruple its production of 20 per cent enriched uranium, have only heightened our existing concerns. Canada does not see a plausible peaceful use for this volume of enriched uranium. It only brings Iran closer to having a stockpile of weapons-grade material. This provocative activity further damages international confidence in the purported exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

7. Canada notes that Iran has lost the confidence of the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council through its two-decade history of concealing nuclear activities. In light of this history, as well as Iran's failure to provide any plausible justification for its efforts to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle, Canada fully supports Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008) and 1929 (2010) and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions GOV/2009/82, GOV/2011/65 and GOV/2012/50. These resolutions clearly express the international community's desire for a negotiated diplomatic solution which respects Iran's right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy while ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. The resolutions firmly and unambiguously state, however, that Iran must cooperate fully with IAEA and provide all necessary transparency and access without delay to enable the Agency to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran and to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is devoted to peaceful ends. Canada also calls on Iran to engage seriously and without preconditions in talks aimed at restoring international confidence. Canada welcomes efforts of the five plus one group in this regard and encourages Iran to engage constructively. Canada also urges Iran to cooperate fully and comply with the international obligations set out by the Security Council, provide "all requested information, clarifications and access" identified by IAEA without delay, and fully implement the Additional Protocol.

8. Canada remains deeply concerned about findings that point to possible undeclared nuclear material, facilities and activities in Syria, and also about possible nuclear cooperation between Syria and North Korea. Canada fully supported the Board of Governors resolution (GOV/2011/41) requesting the IAEA Director-General to report to the Security Council the assessment that an undeclared nuclear reactor existed at Dair Alzour, in breach of Syria's safeguards obligations. Despite the current security situation in Syria, IAEA continues to report that Syria has failed to provide the necessary cooperation needed to address Syria's outstanding compliance issues. We continue to call on Syria to urgently remedy its non-compliance and to meet its own commitment to "fully cooperate with the Agency to resolve related outstanding issues", so that the Agency can provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria's nuclear programme. Syria must be ready to provide access to the sites to which the Agency has requested access. We also continue to urge Syria to bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible. It is only through full, transparent and proactive cooperation with IAEA that Syria can restore confidence with respect to the scope and nature of its nuclear programme.

9. Canada has called on all remaining States not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to join as non-nuclear-weapon States. As a confidence-building measure in advance of this ultimate goal, Canada has also called on these same States to separate civilian and military fuel cycles and to place

all civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. These statements are in conformity with both the policies and actions of Canada, which include Canada's voting record on the resolutions at the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly which are referenced in paragraph 1 above.

10. Canada recognizes the growing interest in nuclear energy among States parties in the Middle East and welcomes the announcements made by a number of such States concerning new initiatives in this field. In welcoming these initiatives, we note that all nuclear power programmes should be accompanied by the strongest commitments to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety and nuclear security.
