

# Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General  
1 June 2012

Original: English

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## Summary record (partial)\* of the 5th meeting

Held at Vienna International Centre, Thursday, 3 May 2012, at 10 a.m.

*Chair:* Mr. Woolcott. . . . . (Australia)

## Contents

General debate (*continued*)

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\* No summary record was prepared for the rest of the meeting.

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*The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.*

**General debate** (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Najib** (Iraq) said that implementing the decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 13 practical steps of the 2000 Review Conference and action plan of the 2010 Review Conference would strengthen the credibility and authority of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). International non-proliferation efforts could succeed, provided all States acceded to the Treaty and placed their nuclear facilities and programmes under the Comprehensive Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

2. Iraq adhered to international disarmament, weapons control and non-proliferation arrangements in accordance with its Constitution. Efforts to restore the regional and international role Iraq had played prior to 1991 had culminated in the lifting by the Security Council of all sanctions against it in the area of disarmament in 2010.

3. As party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a number of related international instruments and protocols, the Iraqi Government had formed a national oversight body to draft a law on the establishment of a unified national system to enable Iraq to meet its treaty obligations. The legislation would also define licit and illicit activities relating to the use of nuclear energy and establish penalties for illicit use.

4. The only way to guarantee the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was to ensure their complete elimination. Agreement must be reached regarding the establishment of a legally binding international instrument to provide guarantees of the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. Such guarantees would provide an incentive for States outside the treaty to accede to it.

5. Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996, which affirmed that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was a violation of international law, he called on nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations under article VI of the Treaty as well as those undertaken at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

6. Peace and security in the Middle East hinged on the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction,

chief among them nuclear weapons, as called for by various Security Council resolutions. It was therefore crucial for all States in the region to participate in the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. In preparation for the conference, Iraq was working in coordination with other Arab countries to formulate a unified Arab position that addressed regional concerns. Iraq affirmed its commitment to the Baghdad Declaration adopted at the 2012 Arab Summit. Consultation with neighbouring countries regarding nuclear reactors located in border areas was needed. Arrangements should be made and safeguards put in place, in coordination with IAEA and regional and international environmental organizations, to contain the potential negative impact of nuclear facilities on human settlements and the environment. Countries should abide by nuclear safety standards for the design, construction and securing of nuclear facilities.

7. **Mr. Zulys** (Lithuania) said that Lithuania was working actively for a balanced implementation of the action plan contained in the Final Document adopted by the 2010 Review Conference. To tackle the new nuclear challenges facing the world, including clandestine proliferation, threats of nuclear terrorism and withdrawal from the Treaty, the non-proliferation regime must be strengthened by making progress in the areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy, its three mutually-reinforcing pillars.

8. Lithuania welcomed the signing and implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the new START). It had attended the Nuclear Security Summit held in Seoul — its first appearance at any Nuclear Security Summit — and fully subscribed to its final communiqué. Lithuania would continue to support global efforts to counter nuclear security threats through such platforms as its Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security in Medininkai.

9. Lithuania played an active role in the Proliferation Security Initiative and supported the principles of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; both of those initiatives would enhance cooperation in order to prevent illegal transfers of nuclear material and equipment. In that regard,

multilateral export control regimes were important and efforts to strengthen and extend them were useful and necessary. Lithuania remained committed to general and complete disarmament and a world free of nuclear weapons. Until that goal was reached, effective arms control and further disarmament measures, especially the reduction of global stockpiles of nuclear weapons, remained of utmost importance. It was essential for all States to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), particularly those States whose ratification was necessary for its entry into force (annex 2 States). Negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty should also commence immediately, in order to facilitate the entry into force of the CTBT.

10. Lithuania strongly supported efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system. A comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency and an additional protocol thereto represented the verification standard, which should be further strengthened, universalized and imposed as a condition for the supply of nuclear material and technology.

11. All States that had signed and ratified an additional protocol with IAEA should be commended, because universalization of such protocols would reinforce the non-proliferation regime, increase confidence for international cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and enhance global security. Lithuania therefore encouraged all States, especially those currently operating or planning to build nuclear power plants, to take the necessary steps to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement and, most importantly, to sign, ratify and implement an additional protocol thereto.

12. IAEA played a key role in helping States to develop and implement national and regional nuclear security frameworks. It had helped Lithuania, for example, to review and assess the safety and security of its emerging nuclear sites, the readiness of its nuclear infrastructure, the maturity of its regulatory system, and its safety culture in general. Lithuania fully adhered to the principle that safety was a precondition for the responsible and sustainable use of nuclear technology and stood ready to share its experience in the field of nuclear safety, safeguards application, safe waste management and radiation protection.

13. Lithuania recognized the contribution of civil society in promoting the principles and objectives of the NPT. It also welcomed the positive trend in participation in international instruments, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, and the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and called on countries that had not yet done so to ratify and implement such instruments.

14. **Mr. Molnár** (Hungary) said that Hungary welcomed the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions agreed to by all States parties at the 2010 Review Conference and advocated a balanced implementation of the action plan. All States should make special efforts to establish the necessary framework for a world without nuclear weapons. In that connection, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were equally essential, interdependent and mutually reinforcing.

15. Nuclear-weapon States had reaffirmed their commitment to implement article VI of the Treaty, and Hungary welcomed the tangible results achieved, including the entry into force and implementation of the new START agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America in 2011. Negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty should commence without further delay and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would help to alleviate many of the current concerns on that topic.

16. Hungary attached great importance to the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and strongly supported the upcoming conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, one of the gravest threats to international peace and security, must be addressed effectively in order to preserve the credibility of the non-proliferation regime. Hungary welcomed all efforts to encourage dialogue and resolve issues of common concern and recognized that IAEA had a crucial role to play in that regard.

17. As a country with an active peaceful nuclear programme, Hungary had a keen interest in ensuring that all actors maintained the highest standards in all aspects of nuclear energy. In that connection, it had

participated in many initiatives and forums, shared its knowledge with the international community, provided experts to international missions, and helped to fund projects or initiatives designed for peaceful uses.

18. With regard to actions 19 and 22 of the 2010 action plan, Hungary was exploring the possibility of undertaking bilateral or regional projects on non-proliferation and disarmament education with the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, and intended to publish a new, updated and extended version of its non-proliferation handbook for practitioners and the general public. A proactive approach to the implementation of that action plan would determine the fate of the upcoming review cycle.

19. **Mr. Phan Ho The Nam** (Viet Nam) said that, in its 40-year history, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, helping to maintain international peace and security and the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The three pillars of the Treaty should continue to be promoted in a balanced and reasonable manner, in order to create a world free of nuclear weapons.

20. Nuclear-weapon States should implement article VI of the Treaty and the 13 practical steps for achieving nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. Negotiations for the conclusion of internationally binding agreements that would provide security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States and for a fissile material cut-off treaty should commence as soon as possible. The nuclear-weapon States should put in place measures for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and participate in the upcoming international conference. International programmes in that area, for instance those of IAEA, which played an important role in facilitating technical cooperation among countries, should be revitalized and the substantive work of the Conference on Disarmament resumed.

21. Viet Nam had always supported general and complete disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, and the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. It had signed additional protocols to its safeguards agreement with IAEA, acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and supported the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. It had cooperated effectively with IAEA, the Russian

Federation and the United States of America in completing the conversion of high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium at its Dalat research nuclear reactor. It had signed agreements with the Russian Federation on the return of spent fuel to Russia and with the Republic of Korea and IAEA on a pilot project to track radioactive sources.

22. Viet Nam was also considering acceding to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and ratifying the additional protocol thereto. It had joined other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to work toward making Southeast Asia a peaceful, stable and nuclear-weapon-free region. Viet Nam remained committed to the success of the current session and to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

23. **Mr. María Cura** (Argentina) said that the preparatory session for the 2015 Review Conference was being held in a much more optimistic and positive atmosphere than for the 2010 Review Conference. That optimism was due to the consensus reached at the 2010 Review Conference, initial implementation of the major decisions contained in its Final Document and preparations for the forthcoming conference on the Middle East. Nonetheless, real progress would be achieved only if the good intentions of that Final Document translated into concrete actions.

24. The focus should continue to be on implementing the three pillars of the Treaty in an integrated and balanced manner that satisfied the interests and concerns of all States parties. The 2015 Review Conference would provide the opportunity for a comprehensive review of the security framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons established under the Treaty. The Treaty was based on the premise that countries with nuclear weapons agreed to eliminate them, while those without such weapons agreed not to acquire them, and that there was a universal guarantee that no actors outside the regime could constitute a threat to countries that had given up nuclear weapons.

25. However, over the 45-year history of the Treaty, the only premise that had been upheld was that countries without nuclear weapons had not developed them. Given that undeniable fact, uneven progress on the topic of nuclear weapons and the non-universality of the Treaty could seriously jeopardize the security of States that gave up nuclear weapons, thereby creating an imbalance with potentially serious consequences.

The non-proliferation regime should therefore have adequate tools to restore, at least partially, the security conditions that many States had sought when they ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

26. Argentina welcomed the progress made in preparation of the 2012 conference on the Middle East, one of the geographic regions where the non-universality of the Treaty had a particularly negative effect. Special attention should also be paid to the establishment, on the basis of a legal instrument, of security guarantees giving States that did not acquire nuclear weapons the assurance that they would never be threatened with such weapons. There was no justification for the fact that, more than 40 years after the Treaty came into force, the possibility of nuclear deterrence being used against countries that had given up weapons of mass destruction had not been legally excluded.

27. **Mr. Al-Mansouri** (Qatar) said that while the Non-Proliferation Treaty had allayed some of the fears of the international community in its four decades of existence, a balanced treatment of the issues that the Treaty aimed to remedy remained elusive. In advance of the 2015 Review Conference, the current preparatory committee session and those to follow would provide another opportunity to redress that imbalance.

28. Qatar welcomed the efforts of the facilitator of the forthcoming 2012 conference on the Middle East and looked forward to the participation in the conference of all concerned States in the region. The nuclear-weapon States and the depository States should participate and show political will to arrive at practical outcomes that could be built on in order to achieve the accession to the Treaty by Israel as a non-nuclear-weapon State and to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

29. Qatar believed that no State should possess nuclear weapons and that the insistence of any country outside the Treaty on retaining its nuclear programme would obstruct its most important objectives. It was therefore crucial for Israel, the only country in the region that was not yet a party, to accede to the Treaty. All States in the region should take measures to increase transparency and build trust, abiding by resolutions of international legitimacy, including IAEA resolutions.

30. Expressing concern at the failure by nuclear-weapon States to implement the NPT, the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament efforts, his delegation called on nuclear-weapon States to enter into serious negotiations on a gradual programme to guarantee full implementation of the 13 practical steps according to a defined timetable.

31. In light of the inalienable right of States to peaceful use of nuclear energy and technologies under the Treaty, political conditions must not be imposed on States to hinder their access to nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. As the increased use of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy did create a need to verify the security of nuclear facilities, it was important to strengthen agreements and mechanisms to that end.

32. **Mr. Sánchez de Boado y de la Válgoma** (Spain) said that the international community should maintain the reasonable expectation that all countries that had nuclear weapons and those that wished to acquire them were aware of the price that all countries could pay for their use. Spain continued to call for a future world free of nuclear weapons, pursuant to article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

33. Spain placed priority on strengthening the non-proliferation regime, in order to ensure that the signing and ratification of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol thereto became the verification standard. It reaffirmed the need for tangible progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament, especially through an overall reduction of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, in accordance with article VI of the NPT, taking into account the special responsibility of the States that possessed the largest arsenals. Spain would also push for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. In that connection, the agreement reached by the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the reduction of their strategic nuclear weapons was a major step forward.

34. As for commencement of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty, and as an indispensable step towards fulfilling the obligations and final objective set out in article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Spain's priority would be to ensure that the States parties reached a common agreement on how to respond

effectively in the event that a State party withdrew from the Treaty.

35. Progress on the application of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East must be made. In that regard, the 2012 conference for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction was commendable, but it would have a positive outcome only if it led to high level of mutual trust, faith in the task at hand, and real commitment to denuclearize that strategic area of the world. Spain supported initiatives presented that led resolutely to that goal, based on a realistic model that was in keeping with the Middle East peace process.

36. Although the world expected meetings like the Review Conferences to provide a path towards a strict application of the Non-Proliferation Treaty with the adoption of concrete, effective, pragmatic and consensual measures that strengthened international non-proliferation efforts, and to promote disarmament and responsible development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, such collective efforts faced serious challenges which the international community must address firmly, especially in the Middle East and Far East regions.

37. Spain's commitment to fight for a world free of nuclear threats had led it to negotiate agreements under the multilateral framework of the United Nations. In other forums, working together to ensure that weapons of mass destruction did not fall in the hands of non-State actors with terrorist intentions remained the goal. In that connection, Spain welcomed the efforts made to implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the achievements reflected in the Nuclear Security Summit held in Seoul, as well as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

38. Spain believed in article IV of the Treaty, which recognized the right of any State to develop nuclear energy programmes for peaceful civilian purposes. However, mechanisms must be found to ensure the responsible use of nuclear energy in optimum conditions of security and non-proliferation and under the supervision of IAEA.

39. None of the discussions about nuclear disarmament, universalization of the NPT, nuclear proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or the implementation of the actions or commitments of the 2010 Review Conference would be sufficient without

stronger commitment, determination and mutual trust among the States parties.

40. **Mr. Maiba** (Namibia) said that Namibia fully subscribed to the principles of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful application of nuclear science and technology — the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It also attached great importance to the provision of the Treaty that recognized the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II. The multilateral setting of the NPT provided security for both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. All States parties, especially nuclear-weapon States, had a special responsibility to disarm and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, while promoting the peaceful application of nuclear technology.

41. Energy security was important for promoting sustainable development and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. IAEA had an important role to play in helping States parties to the Treaty develop effective programmes to improve their technical and regulatory capabilities for the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

42. Namibia had started developing its nuclear fuel cycle policy in order to strengthen its nuclear safety and security regime and fulfil its international obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It also undertook to abide by the principles articulated in international legal instruments that promoted disarmament, safeguarding of nuclear material and facilities, and the peaceful application of nuclear energy, as demonstrated by the ratification of its additional protocol with IAEA as well as the Pelindaba Treaty, which called for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Africa.

43. **Mr. Azeez** (Sri Lanka) said that the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be addressed in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner and that all States parties should work collectively and diligently to that end. The Treaty was the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Action on all those fronts as well as universalization of the Treaty were imperative for realizing a world free of nuclear weapons.

44. One key to a successful 2015 Review Conference was the fulfilment of all aspects of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, including the renewed commitment of nuclear-weapon States to make concrete progress toward nuclear disarmament. It was imperative to identify comprehensive and verifiable steps as well as a precise and realistic timetable for its achievement. All States parties should therefore implement the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, in order to advance progressively and systematically towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

45. As one of the founding members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Sri Lanka had played a pivotal role in rallying support for the call for disarmament, which ultimately had led to the convening of the first General Assembly session on disarmament. It was recognized both then and now that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation were interlinked and could not be pursued in isolation, a fact which should underlie all discussions on the organizational and substantive aspects of the 2015 Review Conference.

46. While the Non-Proliferation Treaty recognized that States had the inalienable right to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and that each State was primarily responsible for its nuclear safety and security, IAEA played a central role in facilitating effective implementation of safeguards standards. Sri Lanka considered that all multilateral treaties aimed at securing a world free of weapons of mass destruction were important. It was committed to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to its early entry into force. It recognized that a fissile material cut-off treaty would address the proliferation of fissile material and help to control the proliferation of nuclear arsenals.

47. As the Review Conference was taking place in 2015, the target year for reaching the Millennium Development Goals, it was important to strengthen the linkages between nuclear disarmament and those Goals and to make very effort to encourage their achievement.

48. **Ms. Laose** (Nigeria) said that the positive achievements of the 2010 Review Conference had deepened Nigeria's resolve to contribute constructively to the establishment of the proper platform for a successful 2015 Review Conference. The three equally

important goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, promoting nuclear disarmament, and promoting international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy — must be pursued in a fair, balanced and non-discriminatory manner. Despite the many challenges it faced, the Treaty remained a vital instrument for promoting global peace and security. Ways should be found at the current session to consolidate the gains of the 2010 Review Conference, including ensuring strict compliance with the Treaty by all parties in order to create a world free of nuclear weapons.

49. All States should affirm their commitment to the moratorium on nuclear testing and to the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. States that had not yet done so should ratify the Treaty without further delay. Progress should also be made towards adopting a universal and legally binding instrument on the provision of unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as a nuclear weapons convention.

50. Considering the importance of implementing the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference for moving progressively towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference should be implemented promptly and fully. To the extent that nuclear-weapon States had indicated their commitment to make concrete progress toward nuclear disarmament, they should respond to the urgent call contained in action 5 of that action plan.

51. Welcoming the entry into force of the new agreement on strategic arms reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, she called on both countries to do more to show their commitment to nuclear disarmament, and recommended that all other nuclear-weapon States should follow their example. Her delegation was convinced that the goal of creating a platform for a peaceful and secure world was achievable and would work assiduously to ensure that the 2015 review process was successful.

52. **Mr. Sadykov** (Kazakhstan) said that the long-term stability of the international security system based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty was dependent on a responsible attitude by the international community

and the unconditional fulfilment of its commitment to the three pillars and the universality of the Treaty. The action plan of the 2010 Review Conference was an important instrument which should revitalize the Treaty and ensure global peace and security, counter the threat of nuclear weapons and consolidate multilateral efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

53. Kazakhstan was fully committed to that action plan and was making a contribution to the implementation of the Treaty's objectives, in particular those pertaining to non-proliferation and advancement of States' right to develop peaceful nuclear programmes. It was at Kazakhstan's initiative that the United Nations had declared 29 August — the date of the official closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site — as the International Day against Nuclear Tests. As a country that had suffered the consequences of nuclear tests, Kazakhstan urged all remaining annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

54. To support universalization of that Treaty and increase public awareness of the importance of taking concrete actions against nuclear tests, Kazakhstan had hosted the International Forum for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World on the twentieth anniversary of the closure of its Semipalatinsk test site. Participants at that Forum had adopted the Astana Declaration, calling on all countries in possession of nuclear arsenals to eliminate them as soon as possible. Its Head of State had also proposed, at the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly, the adoption of a universal declaration on a nuclear-weapon-free world.

55. Kazakhstan called for the development of an international legally binding instrument through which nuclear-weapon States would provide security assurances to countries without nuclear weapons. It welcomed progress made by the States parties and nuclear-weapon States toward the signing of a protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. The Central Asian States were fully committed to complete institutionalization of the Semipalatinsk Treaty and stood ready to hold a constructive dialogue with the five permanent members of the Security Council for the early signing of a protocol on negative security assurances for States participating in that zone.

56. One of Kazakhstan's priorities as Chair of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation was to promote the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons. It was hoped that the political will to increase understanding and trust among countries of the region would help them to overcome their differences and that the meeting on the establishment of such a zone would be successful.

57. Adhering to the principle of equal access to the peaceful atom, Kazakhstan had offered to host the low-enriched uranium bank under the auspices of IAEA, which would create appropriate conditions for States to have guaranteed access to nuclear fuel and maintain their inalienable right to develop peaceful nuclear activities in full compliance with their Agency obligations. Kazakhstan supported the measures undertaken by the Agency and the international community to strengthen nuclear security and provide assistance to countries affected by nuclear incidents. At the April 2011 Nuclear Security Summit held in Kiev, it had made a financial contribution of \$2 million to avert further consequences from the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.

58. The Government of Kazakhstan had made a financial contribution to various IAEA programmes over the years, including the Peaceful Uses Initiative, which was fully consistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Technical Cooperation Fund. He welcomed the results of the 2012 Nuclear Summit held in Seoul, which helped to call attention to nuclear security issues. Though ambitious, the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world was achievable if nations and peoples worked together, whether or not they possessed nuclear technology.

59. **Mr. Shelli** (Libya) said that it was unfortunate that the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained a distant goal, four decades after its conclusion. The role of IAEA must not be limited to the non-diversion of nuclear material from peaceful use to military use; the Agency must also consider the verification of nuclear-weapon States' fulfilment of their obligation to reduce and ultimately eliminate their nuclear arsenals a priority matter.

60. The three pillars of the Treaty, namely, nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy, must be implemented in a balanced manner. His Government welcomed all



agreements between nuclear-weapon States on the reduction of nuclear arsenals, especially the bilateral treaties concluded between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, and called on the other nuclear-weapon States to commit to reducing their arsenals as well.

61. The nuclear-weapon States and the States not parties to the Treaty must place all their nuclear facilities under the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System. The nuclear-weapon States must also provide non-nuclear-weapon States with guarantees of non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons within a comprehensive, legally binding international instrument. The Conference on Disarmament should put in place a programme of work aimed at negotiation of a comprehensive, non-discriminatory and verifiable international treaty banning the production of fissile material for military purposes and providing for the destruction of all existing stockpiles.

62. Libya valued the efforts of IAEA to support the peaceful use of nuclear technologies by States in their development programmes through its technical cooperation programme, and called for those efforts to continue alongside its monitoring activities. Strengthening the Comprehensive Safeguards System should not have an adverse effect on the resources allocated for technical assistance and cooperation.

63. Reiterating the importance of implementing United Nations resolutions relating to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, he noted that Israel remained the only country in the region that had neither acceded to the Treaty nor declared any intention to do so, impeding its universality. The international community and depository States demanded that pressure be placed on Israel to compel it to accede to the Treaty, place its nuclear facilities and activities under the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System, and eliminate its nuclear weapons.

64. **Ms. Fei** (Singapore) said that the NPT was the only international treaty that addressed the three equally important issues of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It owed its success to its near-universal membership. However, that Treaty had been conceived in a different era. The geopolitical and security context had changed and many more countries were in possession of nuclear knowledge and technology than

at the time the Treaty had been signed. In addition, the three pillars of the Treaty had become politically divisive.

65. With regard to nuclear disarmament, despite recent positive developments, including the signing of the new START agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, the political will to implement article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in full remained weak. Some countries outside its regime, such as India and Pakistan, had acquired nuclear weapons and Israel was widely believed to possess them; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had withdrawn from the Treaty, ceased cooperation with IAEA and maintained its nuclear weapons and capability; and the Islamic Republic of Iran had an ongoing nuclear weapons programme. There were also indications that non-State actors were involved in the illicit transfer or attempted acquisition of nuclear materials, dual-use equipment and technology.

66. While nuclear disarmament remained a long-term aspiration, the international community, led in particular by the nuclear-weapon States, should work collectively to convince all States that nuclear weapons only weakened their security. Singapore welcomed Indonesia's ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and urged other annex 2 countries to follow its example. It supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, despite its understanding that all States would continue to give foremost priority to security in their policies, unless the basic structures and dynamics of international relations changed dramatically.

67. Therefore, nuclear-weapon-free zones should be considered from a pragmatic rather than a purist or ideological viewpoint, in order to assure parties or potential parties to such zones that their vital security interests would not be compromised. That was the approach adopted by Singapore with respect to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, which gave States parties discretion in respect of transits of foreign ships and aircraft. While the upcoming conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons was commendable, it was important not to lose sight of the broader geopolitical context of the region. Conditions should also be created to make the objective of establishing such a zone realistic, taking into account the security interests of all States in the region.

68. Serious concerns remained over the proliferation of dual-use equipment and technology that could be used to produce weapons of mass destruction. All countries should cooperate to establish a more robust export control regime, in order to guard against illicit trafficking without hampering legitimate trade. That would prevent proliferators from seeking out weak spots, as they were already doing. Singapore worked closely with the international community in those efforts through measures such as the Container Security Initiative, the Megaports Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the nuclear summit process and implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

69. Singapore strongly supported the right of States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, pursuant to article IV of the Treaty. However, in exercising that right, States had a responsibility to promote transparency through genuine dialogue and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to allow verification of their nuclear materials and activities, in order to ensure that they were applying nuclear science and technology for peaceful uses.

70. Following the stalemate of 2005, the positive outcome of the 2010 Review Conference was encouraging. Nonetheless, both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States must engage in a serious dialogue in order to bridge the widening gap between them, because developments outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty framework also affected the regime's relevance and effectiveness. All States parties to the Treaty must refrain from taking action that would undermine its credibility, in particular its articles I, IV and VI, and the common objective of universality of the Treaty.

71. **Ms. Belaguer** (Cuba) said that nuclear disarmament was Cuba's highest priority in the field of disarmament; it hoped that the upcoming review cycle would facilitate its realization. The current session would succeed if all States parties, but particularly some of the participating nuclear Powers, had the political will to work toward implementation of the agreements reached at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences and the action plan adopted in 2010. Nuclear weapons represented one of the major challenges for the survival of humanity and nuclear disarmament was the only realistic way of freeing the world of that threat.

72. The adoption of a legally binding international instrument that banned nuclear weapons completely was a priority. Unfortunately, the nuclear Powers had failed to meet their obligations under article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States had a legal obligation to find ways to completely eliminate those weapons. Cuba therefore called for the full and immediate implementation of the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference as well as action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan.

73. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries had made a noteworthy proposal that included an action plan establishing a concrete timetable for the gradual reduction of nuclear weapons until their total elimination and prohibition no later than 2025. Cuba was strongly committed to the task of convening an international high-level conference to identify ways and methods of eliminating nuclear weapons as soon as possible, as set out in the special communiqué on the total elimination of nuclear weapons adopted by the Heads of State and Government of Latin America and the Caribbean at the Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States held in December 2011.

74. The Non-Proliferation Treaty did not distinguish between horizontal and vertical proliferation. Cuba was deeply concerned that nuclear deterrence remained an essential component of the defence and security doctrines of some Powers, which was used to justify the allocation of millions of dollars to the development of new types of nuclear weapons. It was unacceptable that the world was spending more and more on measures to wage war and less and less on the promotion of the right to development. Over the past 10 years, military spending had increased by more than 49 per cent, reaching the astronomical figure of \$1.74 trillion.

75. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament efforts went hand in hand. Nuclear non-proliferation was not an end in itself but a step toward the greater goal of nuclear disarmament. Progress in all aspects of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation was essential for strengthening international peace and security. In that connection, nuclear-weapon States must provide non-nuclear-weapon States with effective guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In order to totally eliminate those weapons, a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument

on security guarantees for non-nuclear States must first be adopted.

76. Cuba supported the proposal to make the Middle East region a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The establishment of such a zone, in addition to making an important contribution to the achievement of nuclear disarmament, would represent a milestone in the Middle East peace process. It was for that reason that it signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

77. Israel, the only country in the region that had neither become nor stated its intention to become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, should renounce the possession of nuclear weapons and place all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in line with Security Council resolution 487 (1981), in order to comply promptly and unconditionally with the just demands of the international community. Cuba hoped that the international conference for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons would lead to a favourable outcome for the future of that region.

78. The need to maintain and respect the balance between the three pillars of the Treaty was of vital importance and called for the recognition of the inalienable right of all States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without any discrimination, pursuant to article IV of the Treaty. Calling into question the development of programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy not only went against the spirit and letter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty but also impeded the full and effective implementation of the mandate assigned to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

79. Cuba was concerned at the imposition of unilateral measures by certain States and the interference of other bodies, such as the Security Council, in the exercise by the Agency of its mandate under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the only competent authority to verify compliance with its safeguards. Imposing non-transparent and discriminatory mechanisms of selective composition that operated outside the United Nations and international treaties was definitely not the right way to tackle nuclear security or international terrorism.

80. Nuclear non-proliferation issues could best be addressed in a multilateral context, through the adoption of universal, comprehensive, transparent and non-discriminatory mechanisms open to participation by all States. She hoped that the 2015 Review Conference would lead to concrete undertakings in favour of nuclear disarmament, development and world peace.

81. **Ms. Burk** (United States of America), introducing a statement on behalf of the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/12), which was being distributed to the participants, said that the statement reflected the five countries' support for the agreement reached at the 2010 Review Conference. It also reflected the spirit of the action plan adopted at that Conference, which had called for increased engagement and sharing of information among the five countries.

82. **Mr. Tóth** (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) said that the promise of a universal nuclear test ban was entrenched in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty captured the status of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and played an integral role in that Treaty's review process. The 1980 Review Conference had failed largely due to the issue of the Test-Ban Treaty. The indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 had been secured through a package deal built around the CTBT. In 2000, the CTBT had featured prominently among the 13 practical steps adopted by the States parties for the achievement of nuclear disarmament.

83. The 2010 Review Conference had been successful owing to the optimism generated by the resurgence of multilateralism, with key players re-engaging in the Test-Ban Treaty, as well as to the adoption of a forward-looking approach building on previous commitments and culminating in a disarmament action plan featuring the CTBT. Some progress had been made since 2010: with Indonesia ratifying the Non-Proliferation Treaty, only eight steps remained to be completed for the Treaty to enter into force. Ratification by Trinidad and Tobago, the Central African Republic, Ghana, Guinea and Guatemala moved the Treaty closer to universality; the nearly completed international monitoring system had proven

its reliability and versatility in response to the earthquake in Japan and the crisis at the Fukushima nuclear plant.

84. However, entry into force of the Treaty was still elusive. Determined efforts were needed to achieve substantial progress on that front, which was one of the ways of sustaining the credibility and viability of the non-proliferation regime. While pursuing the goal of nuclear disarmament, it should be borne in mind that the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Test-Ban Treaty and the non-proliferation and disarmament regime required the active and informed involvement of a broad range of stakeholders, including Governments, academic and research institutions and civil society.

85. Over the past 50 years, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization had provided training to more than 2,000 technicians and professionals. It had expanded its activities in 2010 with its Capacity-Development Initiative and planned to further expand its training activities in 2012 by offering a free, multidisciplinary programme using modern, innovative and cost-effective methods. The Commission was also engaging with international organizations to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the United Nations Secretary-General (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education. Training and education for future generations would ensure that the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime remained relevant, robust and sustainable over time.

86. **Mr. Sharif** (African Union) said that Africa remained committed to the goals and objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a world free of nuclear weapons, where science and technology were used for the development of humanity. The African Union position with regard to nuclear non-proliferation was embodied in the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, which prohibited the research, development, manufacturing, stockpiling, acquisition, testing, possession, control and stationing of nuclear explosive devices in members' territories and the dumping of radioactive waste within the region. The Treaty came into force following the establishment of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy in November 2010. The African Union fully supported all multilateral instruments devoted to disarmament and

non-proliferation, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, whose three pillars — non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology — were mutually reinforcing and equally important.

87. The African Union was fully committed to achieving universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and believed strongly that the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in the Middle East region, would enhance Africa's security. On the other hand, States had the absolute right to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without any discrimination. A fruitful 2015 Review Conference leading to a programme of concrete national, regional and international actions would demonstrate that the international community was able to respond to the global challenge of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

88. **Ms. Ubeda** (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean) said that, 45 years after the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean with the ultimate goal of creating a world free of nuclear weapons, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) continued to advocate a world free of the nuclear threat. Although all countries were united in calling for a world that was safe, peaceful and free of nuclear weapons, their individual differences must be respected in order to have a fruitful dialogue that would lead to effective agreements on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

89. OPANAL recognized the recent progress made in each of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and hoped that nuclear-weapon States would conclude and/or ratify the additional protocols to each of their constituent treaties. In the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the hope was that nuclear-weapon States would withdraw or amend the interpretative declarations that they had formulated when they signed and/or ratified the Treaty. In so doing, they would provide full negative security guarantees, even though only the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons could provide an absolute guarantee.

90. OPANAL would cooperate with Indonesia, the Chair of the Third Conference of the States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-

Free Zones and Mongolia, to ensure that concrete steps were taken to strengthen and consolidate nuclear-weapon-free zones and their common goals. It welcomed the convening of the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Although the establishment of such a zone was a sovereign process that rested with the States of the region, the Latin American and Caribbean States were in a good position to share their experience on the topic. They hoped that the Middle East States would soon begin the long and complex process that could lay the groundwork for stable and lasting peace in their region.

91. With the ratification of the CTBT by Guatemala, 31 of the 33 member States of OPANAL were now part of that multilateral instrument. OPANAL would continue working to ensure that all its members joined the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty process, and hoped that all annex 2 States would ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. OPANAL had joined the efforts of other States, international organizations and civil society to achieve the goal of a legally binding and universal instrument banning nuclear weapons. That had been underscored at the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly, when its member States had expressed their support for the Secretary-General's call for all Non-Proliferation Treaty States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to commence negotiations on effective measures leading to nuclear disarmament.

*The discussion covered in the summary record ended at 12.10 p.m.*