
**Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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Held at the Vienna International Centre, Vienna, on Monday, 30 April 2012, at 3 p.m.

Chair: Mr. Woolcott. (Australia)

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Committee (*continued*)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (*continued*)

1. **The Chair** said that he had received requests from the African Union, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the League of Arab States and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to make statements during the general debate. He took it that, in accordance with its decision adopted at the first meeting of the current session, the Preparatory Committee wished to accede to those requests.

2. *It was so decided.*

3. **Mr. Grossi** (Observer for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) said that IAEA played an instrumental role in enforcing States' compliance with their obligations under article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In addition to ensuring that all nuclear materials were used solely for peaceful purposes, safeguards helped to foster nuclear cooperation. IAEA was currently working to resolve major outstanding issues in the implementation of safeguards in three States. In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, IAEA had not been able to implement any verification measures since 2009 and could not, therefore, draw any conclusions regarding the implementation of safeguards.

4. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material. However, since Iran was not cooperating sufficiently, including by not implementing its additional protocol, IAEA could not provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities and therefore could not conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was used for peaceful activities. IAEA would continue to pursue dialogue with Iran with a view to resolving all outstanding issues. The Director General had urged Iran to take steps towards full implementation of the safeguards agreement and its other obligations, as required in the binding resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council.

5. With regard to the Syrian Arab Republic, IAEA had concluded in June 2011 that the building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site in September 2007 had very likely been a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the

Agency. The Board of Governors had reported Syria's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement to all States members of IAEA and to the Security Council and General Assembly. The Director General had urged Syria to cooperate fully with the Agency in connection with those and other unresolved issues.

6. While six additional States had concluded Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with IAEA, 14 still had not done so. The Agency therefore could not draw any conclusions with regard to the safeguards implemented by those States. It urged all remaining States parties to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements as quickly as possible. IAEA also encouraged all States with small quantities protocols to either amend or rescind them, as appropriate. To date, the revised, standardized small quantities protocols text had been accepted by 53 States.

7. An additional 17 States had adopted an additional protocol, bringing the total to 115. Additional protocols were essential to provide IAEA with credible assurances that declared nuclear material was not being diverted from peaceful uses, but also that a State had no undeclared nuclear material and activities. IAEA encouraged all States to bring additional protocols into force as quickly as possible.

8. IAEA had intensified its efforts to develop further the so-called "State-level concept", an approach whereby a State and its nuclear activities and capabilities as a whole were considered in the planning, conduct and evaluation of safeguards activities. Technology was a crucial component of the Agency's work in respect of safeguards. Significant progress had been made on the project entitled "Enhancing Capabilities of the Safeguards Analytical Services", which was essential for maintaining and strengthening the Agency's ability to provide independent and timely analysis of nuclear material and environmental samples. The Clean Laboratory Extension in Seibersdorf, Austria, had become operational in 2011 and work had begun on a new Nuclear Material Laboratory. IAEA was grateful to those States which had provided voluntary extrabudgetary contributions for the project and encouraged other States to contribute.

9. Subsequent to the 2010 Review Conference, which had encouraged nuclear-weapon States to place all fissile material designated by them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other

relevant international verification, the Agency had been requested by the Russian Federation and the United States of America to assist in the independent verification of the implementation of their bilateral agreement on the management and disposition of plutonium designated as no longer required for defence purposes. Work on a draft trilateral verification agreement was under way. IAEA stood ready to cooperate in increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.

10. He welcomed the cycle of conferences initiated by nuclear-weapon-free zones and Mongolia as an important adjunct to the strengthened review process of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In addition, in November 2011, the IAEA Director General had convened a forum in Vienna on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The lively discussion had been further indication of the continued importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the evolution of regional international security. Participants had made it clear that they expected IAEA to continue to play an important role in that process in the future.

11. Nuclear power remained an important option for many countries. While the Fukushima Daiichi accident was expected to slow the growth of nuclear power, it was not expected to reverse it. Indeed, there continued to be increasing global demand for energy, as well as concerns about climate change, volatile fossil fuel prices and security of energy supply. Most of the growth was projected to occur in countries that already had operating nuclear power plants, with Asia as the main centre of expansion. It was the sovereign decision of each country whether or not to add nuclear power to its energy mix. Countries which opted for nuclear power could count on the assistance of IAEA to introduce it knowledgeably, profitably, safely and securely. In 2012, IAEA was strengthening its focus on supporting national infrastructure development in Member States with firm plans to begin using nuclear power.

12. In response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, IAEA member States had adopted and begun implementing a comprehensive Action Plan for Nuclear Safety. IAEA continued to help its member States to make nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities more secure. Renewed support for the Agency's efforts had been expressed by world leaders at the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. Also at the Summit, the IAEA Director General had

reminded participants that the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials had still not entered into force, even though it had been adopted in 2005. Its entry into force, which would expand the coverage of the Convention to include the protection of nuclear facilities against acts of terrorism, would make a significant difference to global nuclear security. It was clear from constant reports of incidents of illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material that States could not afford to be complacent concerning nuclear security. As the only international organization with the technical competence and the relevant mandate, IAEA would continue to work with its member States to strengthen security globally.

13. For over 50 years, technical cooperation had been a principal mechanism for implementing the Agency's Atoms for Peace mission. Its Technical Cooperation Programme had evolved into a partnership with member States that was based on the sharing of knowledge and expertise to promote sustainable growth and human security. Currently, IAEA delivered technical support to 123 countries in 30 fields of activity. Guided by the priority needs of member States, the Programme addressed needs in human health, supporting agriculture and rural development, advancing water resource management, addressing environmental challenges and helping sustainable energy development.

14. Human health had been the largest component of the Programme in 2011, followed by food and agriculture. In Asia and the Pacific, technical cooperation had focused on nuclear safety, followed by radioisotope production and radiation technology. In Europe, the nuclear fuel cycle had drawn the largest share of the technical cooperation budget, followed by nuclear safety, whereas in Latin America, human health, followed by nuclear safety, had been the main areas of focus. In 2012, given the importance of the Rio+20 Conference, sustainable development issues were at the forefront of the development agenda. The technical cooperation budget in 2011 had been around €105 million. Extrabudgetary contributions provided through the Peaceful Uses Initiative had significantly expanded the Agency's ability to carry out its work in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Since the launch of the Initiative, over €22 million had been made available through the Initiative in support of activities, and further contributions were encouraged.

15. Nuclear applications in food and agriculture continued to have an impact in both developing and developed countries. The Agency's annual scientific forum would focus in 2012 on nuclear applications in food, especially food production, protection and safety. Cancer had reached epidemic proportions in developing countries. Through its Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy, IAEA, working with global partners including the World Health Organization, helped member States to develop comprehensive cancer control programmes. To date, 38 low-to-middle-income member States had benefited from services in that area. IAEA also played a significant role in facilitating the production of important medical radioisotopes.

16. IAEA helped countries to mitigate and adapt to the effects of ocean acidification, which, together with climate change, was a concern for many. The Agency's environment laboratories also helped States to assess their water resources and develop policies to ensure a more rational allocation of surface and ground water resources, and to prevent possible conflicts related to water use.

17. A number of important developments had taken place since the 2010 Review Conference in the area of assurance of supply of nuclear fuel, including the establishment of an IAEA-owned-and-operated low-enriched uranium bank and the approval of a proposal for a nuclear fuel assurance mechanism by the United Kingdom, co-sponsored by European Union members, the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

18. **Mr. Voronetsky** (Belarus) said that Belarus had been among the first States to renounce voluntarily and unconditionally the possession of nuclear weapons. While his Government welcomed the implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), future measures to reduce strategic nuclear weapons should envisage the destruction of obsolete nuclear warheads and the means of their delivery and commitments to stop further development of new types of nuclear weapons.

19. The process of multilateral nuclear disarmament was important for peace and security and needed to be restarted. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva was preparing for the negotiation of a fissile material

cut-off treaty, which would contribute to the implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by more annex 2 States was needed. Only a universal legal international obligation could serve as a barrier to nuclear testing around the world.

20. The risk of nuclear materials and technologies falling into the hands of terrorists was one of the greatest risks to international security. IAEA played an important role in strengthening the non-proliferation regime, and its system of safeguards needed to be further strengthened. Universal adherence to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism would further reduce risks. The export controls regime being carried out by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Sanger Committee also played a key role. All of the institutions mentioned must have a greater presence in the non-proliferation regime.

21. Legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty would foster greater trust, strengthen the non-proliferation regime and achieve universality of the Treaty. The lack of progress in that regard had given rise to a range of problems in the field of non-proliferation and had weakened the Treaty. The reservations contained in Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) had raised the prestige attached to nuclear weapons. The time was ripe for a universal, legally binding convention that would provide non-nuclear-weapon States with unequivocal security assurances. Belarus supported the creation of a working group in the context of the Conference for Disarmament to discuss such a convention.

22. In that context, Belarus welcomed the statement made by United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Russian Federation reaffirming that the trilateral security assurances contained in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum would remain in force after the date of termination of the START I treaty. Action 8 of the 2010 Action Plan obliged nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. It remained unclear why some nuclear-weapon States ignored their commitments and resorted to economic and political pressure on States which had adopted a non-nuclear status.

23. One of the most important objectives of the non-proliferation regime was to safeguard peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, the number of which was growing, as was the number of countries interested in developing such technologies. IAEA had all the necessary tools to enable equal access to all interested countries to the benefits of nuclear energy.

24. It was critical to promote the universality of the Treaty. Belarus remained concerned that some States were operating non-safeguarded nuclear facilities outside of the Treaty regime. The successful establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones would strengthen the non-proliferation regime and contribute to nuclear disarmament. The establishment of such a zone in the Middle East was important for both regional and international security. An effective nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia required the signature of the Protocol by all five nuclear-weapon States.

25. **Mr. Bayer** (Turkey) said that Turkey supported the greatest possible enjoyment of the benefits of nuclear energy for all States that complied with their international obligations. Nuclear non-proliferation measures taken collectively must in no way hinder international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy and access to nuclear technology, equipment and material for peaceful purposes. While non-proliferation measures focused on ensuring the security of nuclear and other radioactive materials worldwide, it was equally important to ensure the benefits that those materials and their related applications offered. Such benefits were crucial to countries such as Turkey, which needed to integrate nuclear power into their energy supply mix to meet growing domestic demand.

26. Despite a number of positive developments, the long-standing stalemate in respect of the Conference on Disarmament continued. His Government encouraged the immediate resumption of substantive work in the Conference. There was an urgent need to establish a mutually agreed programme of work, which would pave the way to negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and facilitate advances in other areas. The challenges facing the Conference, rather than resulting from procedural difficulties or internal dynamics, reflected a number of bottlenecks at different but interrelated levels. It was important to take a broad and progressive approach and not to divert attention away from substantive issues by introducing additional points of contention in the deliberations. The resumption of the substantive work of the Conference would strengthen

international efforts towards disarmament. To that end, it was important to strive for further mutual trust and understanding within the Conference, while not dismissing potential external developments.

27. Possible benchmarks for the sustainability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the long term included its universalization, strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system, reinforcement of export controls, early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, resumption of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, and the peaceful settlement of contentious cases through dialogue and diplomacy. An overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, in accordance with article VI, in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, was also key.

28. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery was all the more worrying in the context of terrorism. The international community needed to remain vigilant regarding the risk of acquisition of such weapons by terrorists. Recognition of the importance of ensuring peaceful uses of nuclear energy and of the crucial role of IAEA in that respect was also essential.

29. Another major priority was the establishment of effectively verifiable zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction wherever feasible. Given the volatile situation in the Middle East, developing a common regional understanding on the establishment of such a zone in that region was of the utmost importance. The 2012 conference to be held in that connection would be an initial step in a long process, the success of which would depend on the genuine political engagement of all States in the Middle East from the very beginning.

30. **Mr. Laggner** (Switzerland) said that it was essential to maintain the momentum created by the adoption of the Action Plan at the 2010 Review Conference. The Action Plan should not be viewed as an end in itself, but rather as a means of achieving the full implementation of commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and thus of consolidating its credibility. In addition, the final document adopted in 2010 had introduced new aspects, including the humanitarian aspect of nuclear disarmament, which would be a priority for Switzerland in the years to come.

31. States parties should take stock of developments since the adoption of the Action Plan and identify areas

where progress was still needed. To that end, Switzerland had supported a study to monitor its implementation, the results of which would be presented during the meetings of the first preparatory committee.

32. The nuclear disarmament obligation had been a major element of the compromise that had led to adoption of the Treaty. However, two decades after the end of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence remained firmly established in the security doctrines of nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, all such States were pursuing programmes to modernize their nuclear arsenals. To ensure the long-term viability of the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States must significantly intensify their efforts to realize the disarmament goal. The continuing deadlock affecting the Organization's disarmament machinery further complicated progress in multilateral disarmament; he therefore called on all States to invest in the efforts being made to overcome those obstacles.

33. Another significant challenge to implementation of the Treaty was the failure to address effectively the cases of nuclear proliferation in certain States parties. His Government called on the States concerned to respect their obligations. There was a link between progress on nuclear disarmament and on non-proliferation. More significant progress on disarmament might help to foster broader acceptance of more effectively binding safeguards.

34. Lastly, given the unfortunate accident in Fukushima, it was imperative to pay greater attention to issues of nuclear safety in the future. He encouraged States parties to implement without delay the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety adopted by IAEA in September 2011. His Government remained convinced, however, that more binding commitments would have to be made in the area of nuclear safety.

35. **Mr. Simon-Michel** (France) said that although the Action Plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference could have been more ambitious on the subject of withdrawal from the Treaty and on States' compliance with their international obligations, his Government recognized that the text had been the result of a delicate compromise and called on all parties to implement it in a balanced manner.

36. France had met the objective set in 2008 to reduce by one third the missiles and nuclear warheads that made up the airborne component of the French

deterrent forces. In total, over 15 years, his Government had cut in half the number of nuclear warheads in its possession, which now numbered less than 300. In doing so, France demonstrated its unequivocal commitment to disarmament. It had furthermore dismantled its ground-to-ground component, nuclear test site and facilities for the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

37. In July 2011, France had invited the other nuclear-weapon States to attend a follow-up meeting to the Review Conference in Paris to discuss mainly disarmament and non-proliferation issues. The nuclear-weapon States thus showed their determination to continue taking practical steps to comply with their commitments under the three pillars of the Treaty. That process in turn helped to improve transparency and confidence among the nuclear-weapons States and vis-à-vis non-nuclear-weapon States.

38. France had finalized discussions with the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to implement a protocol to the Bangkok Treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia following three rounds of talks in Geneva, New York and Bali. It was hoped the protocol would be signed without delay. He welcomed the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by Indonesia, as one of the States listed in annex 2 of that Treaty, and called on all those that had not yet done so to do the same.

39. **Mr. Brennan** (Ireland) said that since becoming the first State to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Ireland had been committed to achieving success across all three pillars of the Treaty. More had been achieved on the non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty than on the nuclear disarmament pillar. Nuclear disarmament must be a priority, and the 13 practical steps of the concluding document of the 2000 Review Conference were still as valid as they had been in 2000. In order to achieve success in 2015, the nuclear-weapon States must continue to build confidence that they were implementing steps to achieve the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals under article VI of the Treaty, including by providing progress reports.

40. It was a matter of deep concern that more than 15 years after the CTBT had been opened for signature, it had yet to enter into force. In particular, annex 2 States, whose ratification was required to achieve entry into force, were urged to ratify the Treaty. It was also a

matter of profound regret that the Conference on Disarmament had yet to include negotiations on a fissile materials treaty in its programme of work. The three States that had not yet done so were urged to sign and ratify the NPT.

41. His country was pleased to have played a role in brokering the 2010 agreement on a text on implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East (NPT/CONF.1995/32/(Part 1), Annex). There was now a fair measure of understanding of what was required to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The 1995 resolution contained most of the fundamental elements required. Political will and political leadership were needed, both in the region and beyond.

42. The 2015 review cycle must develop a new package of ambitious agreements, supported by specific and measurable benchmarks.

43. **Mr. Tiendrébéogo** (Burkina Faso) said that owing to a crisis of confidence with regard to nuclear disarmament, non-nuclear-weapon States, including those who wished to enjoy their legitimate right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, needed further guarantees. While non-nuclear-weapon States were being called on to provide assurances to the international community and conduct their programmes with transparency, the responsibility was a joint one, and nuclear-weapon States must also meet their commitments in full. For IAEA to fulfil its mission, there must be trust. Everyone must cooperate, especially States developing nuclear programmes.

44. Reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be regarded as urgent tasks. Africa was actively involved in such matters, particularly with regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, through the Pelindaba Treaty, which had entered into force in 2009.

45. **Mr. Uliyanov** (Russian Federation) said that strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the non-proliferation regime as a whole was one of his Government's top foreign policy objectives. The Treaty was the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and served as a framework for an effective network of mechanisms for restricting the spread of nuclear weapons and sensitive nuclear materials.

46. The New START agreement, concluded in 2011, improved security for both the United States of America and the Russian Federation and was a victory for the global community at large. In the light of the danger of nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists and the emergence of clandestine proliferation networks, there was a pressing need to comprehensively strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Achieving international cooperation with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was equally complex but it would help to reduce the risk of the spread of sensitive technologies around the world with scrupulous respect for the rights of the States parties. Urgent diplomatic solutions were needed to address regional challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

47. Contemporary challenges to that regime should be dealt with on the basis of the Treaty and the inviolability of its provisions and in strict compliance with international law. Much remained to be done to ensure that obligations under the Treaty were respected, which would require difficult decisions to be made during negotiations.

48. His Government supported expanding the coverage of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In 2011, the Russian Federation had ratified Protocols I and II to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, and the signing of the Bangkok Treaty had been brought closer through intense negotiations. It was hoped that further progress would be made with respect to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region at the conference planned for 2012.

49. The review process was an opportunity to send a powerful signal to the international community concerning the unity of States parties in support of the Treaty and their readiness to fulfil their obligations; it required a high level of collaboration among the Conference participants.

50. **Ms. Higgie** (New Zealand) said that in order to avoid the disappointment of unmet commitments and expectations, all elements of the Action Plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference must be fulfilled, by all States parties, across all three pillars of the Treaty.

51. The lack of progress in implementing the 1995 resolution on the Middle East was a matter of great concern in the region and beyond. Her Government fully supported the difficult task of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. A successful 2012

conference on the Middle East would be an important contribution to the realization of the 1995 resolution.

52. To avoid the disastrous humanitarian consequences of a nuclear war, both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were necessary. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing. While IAEA was central to non-proliferation, all States had a responsibility to comply with their obligations and to act collectively to hold to account any State party not living up to its commitments.

53. **Mr. van den IJssel** (Netherlands) said that his Government welcomed the recent entry into force of the New START agreement and encouraged both States to work towards further comprehensive reductions in all categories of their nuclear arsenal.

54. Non-nuclear-weapon States had a role to play in the increased transparency, irreversibility and verifiability that were essential for sustainable disarmament. The Netherlands and other Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative countries had proposed a draft standard nuclear disarmament reporting form.

55. The Netherlands was very worried about the continued stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament and the lack of implementation of actions 6, 7 and 15 of the 2010 Action Plan. The legitimacy of the Conference on Disarmament was at stake.

56. The Netherlands was committed to universalizing the CTBT and promoting its early entry into force, pursuant to action 13. Expansion of civilian use of the International Monitoring System for early warning and emergency response should be explored.

57. The Islamic Republic of Iran must restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities and meet its international obligations. Transparency was needed regarding the full extent of the programme, particularly its possible military dimensions.

58. The Netherlands strongly condemned the recent missile launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which was in clear violation of its international obligations. Various actions by the country were a source of grave concern. It was urged to return to the Six-Party Talks and to accept IAEA safeguards for all of its nuclear facilities.

59. A fundamental objective of his Government's foreign policy was to do everything possible to make sure that terrorists never obtained nuclear material. The

Netherlands was fully committed to implementation of the Work Plan and Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit and to the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit and was honoured to host the next Summit in 2014. It had ratified the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

60. The Netherlands was working towards the elimination of the use of highly enriched uranium targets in the production of medical isotopes and had pledged at the Summit in Seoul to finish the process in 2015. The Netherlands, which produced 40 per cent of the world's medical isotopes, was working with other countries to secure the world's supply. It was providing an accelerator to Ghana along with the relevant training.

61. **Ms. Adamson** (United Kingdom) said that the 2010 Review Conference had represented a major success for multilateralism, and had been marked by a demonstrable commitment from all 189 States parties to the grand bargain that the Treaty represented, and to its three pillars. The Action Plan had marked a major step forward.

62. In recent years, however, the Treaty had come under unprecedented pressure owing to the nuclear ambitions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the risk of terrorists acquiring nuclear materials, the global renaissance in civil nuclear energy potentially leading to the dissemination of sensitive technology and a fraying of the international consensus that had underpinned the Treaty owing to the competing priorities of States parties. The Treaty was too important to be allowed to be undermined. It must be strengthened across all three pillars during the current review cycle.

63. Her country was fully committed to a world without nuclear weapons and had a strong track record in meeting its disarmament commitments under the Treaty. At the same time, as long as large arsenals of nuclear weapons remained and the risk of nuclear proliferation continued, only a credible nuclear capability could provide the necessary guarantee of national security. Her country was therefore committed to maintaining a minimum national nuclear deterrent and to proceeding with the renewal of the Trident and the submarine replacement programme.

64. The United Kingdom had engaged in important confidence-building measures, including announcing for the first time the overall size of its warhead stockpile; publishing the most detailed security and

defence information in its history; reducing the number of warheads on its submarines; reducing its nuclear weapon stockpile; and providing updated negative security assurances. Warhead numbers were being reduced 15 years ahead of schedule.

65. Some States parties might find it hypocritical that the United Kingdom maintained its nuclear weapons while calling on other States not to develop them. However, the United Kingdom did not insist on a “proliferation first” policy, but rather accepted that progress must be made across all three pillars in parallel.

66. While the Treaty conferred the right to enjoy the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, those rights came with certain obligations. Those who would develop clandestine nuclear weapons programmes through the manipulation of Treaty rights should continue to be taken firmly to task by the international community.

67. **Mr. Ishimov** (Kyrgyzstan) said that his delegation was pleased that States parties had resolved procedural issues expeditiously, enabling them to turn their attention to matters of substance relating to Treaty implementation, namely, Decisions 1 and 2 and the resolution on the Middle East from the 1995 Review Conference, as well as the Action Plan and recommendations of the 2010 Review Conference.

68. Nuclear-weapon-free zones were one of the most promising approaches to disarmament and non-proliferation. Such zones now covered the entire southern hemisphere and parts of the northern hemisphere, including territory where nuclear weapons had previously been based. The Kyrgyz Republic was gratified by the entry into force in 2009 of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. Its innovative features included provisions calling for efforts to remediate environmental damage resulting from nuclear weapons activities and the requirement for parties to adhere to the IAEA additional protocol to the comprehensive safeguards agreement. The Kyrgyz Republic regarded international safeguards and the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities as the first line of defence against nuclear terrorism and strongly endorsed IAEA efforts to strengthen the international safeguards system, including adoption of the additional protocol. It also endorsed efforts to strengthen the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) to address proliferation challenges posed by non-State actors.

69. Mitigation of the environmental consequences of uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel cycle activities was a matter of great importance. All Governments and international organizations that had expertise in clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants were urged to consider giving appropriate assistance. Given that the problem of radioactive and toxic tailings was transboundary in nature, the Kyrgyz Republic planned to submit a draft resolution to the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly on engaging the international community in mitigating radiation threats in Central Asia.

70. **Mr. Petersen** (Norway) said that his country intended to host a conference in early 2013 to highlight the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, including the incompatibility of their use with international humanitarian law. Reporting as much as possible on implementation of the 2010 Action Plan was strongly encouraged, to build trust through accountability. All procedural questions should be resolved before the 2015 Review Conference, and the Preparatory Committee should be used to maximize technical and substantive preparation.

71. The Treaty could not be accepted piecemeal. Disarmament could be achieved only in full confidence that there was no possibility of circumventing the non-proliferation regime. The steps to make non-proliferation requirements more rigorous could be taken only if there was clear and irreversible progress towards the elimination of existing nuclear arsenals while facilitating peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

72. The New START accord should be the first step of a more intensified disarmament process. The total number of warheads must be substantially lower by 2015. Reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in security policies must continue, and negative security assurances must be strengthened. Efforts to sustain existing regional nuclear-weapon-free zones must be intensified and steps must be taken to move closer to such a zone for the Middle East. Innovative approaches were needed, including reaching out across regional groupings, overcoming past polarizations and mobilizing civil society.

73. **Reverend Monsignor Michael Banach** (Observer for the Holy See) said that the links between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation must be recognized. Their interdependence and implementation were one of the primary instruments not only in the

fight against nuclear terrorism but also in the realization of a culture of life and of peace. It was morally insufficient to draw down the stocks of superfluous nuclear weapons while modernizing nuclear arsenals and investing vast sums to ensure their future production and maintenance. That would ensure the perpetuation of those weapons indefinitely.

74. The Holy See supported not only political solutions to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also ways to prevent war from being seen as a way of resolving conflicts. All nations must weave the economic and political bonds of peace that stood like a rampart against every claim of recourse to arms.

75. Threats to security came from attitudes and actions hostile to human nature and it was, therefore, on the human level that one must act, i.e., on the cultural and ethical level. Prevention measures with deep cultural and social roots were called for. Training programmes that disseminated a “culture of non-proliferation” were necessary both in the nuclear sector and to raise public awareness. Security depended not only on the State but above all on the sense of responsibility of each person. Political will to remove nuclear weapons had been lacking for far too long. A profound rethinking was needed. Peace would not be achieved through passivity and waiting.

76. **Mr. Stacey** (Ecuador) said that his country had actively participated in the process leading up to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco), under which Latin America and the Caribbean were a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Treaty of Tlatelolco served as a model for such initiatives worldwide.

77. It was unfortunate that the multilateral commitments necessary to achieve a world free of weapons of mass destruction had yet to be achieved. It was also regrettable that no serious multilateral steps had been taken to achieve nuclear disarmament, despite the linkage between the commitment of non-nuclear-weapon States not to obtain nuclear weapons and that of nuclear-weapon States to disarm.

78. It was the role of IAEA to facilitate the cooperation that would make it possible for a State to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, a right granted under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The use of unilateral military force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a State in order to hamper its exercise of the right to develop a nuclear programme

for peaceful purposes could not be tolerated. Further, it was regrettable that efforts to implement a multilateral instrument that would provide negative security assurances had thus far been unsuccessful.

79. **Ms. Chaimongkol** (Thailand) said that despite the successes of the 2010 Review Conference, diverging views remained on a number of issues. The universality of the Treaty must be stressed and the three pillars addressed in an equal and balanced manner. The 2010 Action Plan must be seriously and fully implemented by nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike.

80. Thailand looked forward to the start of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material and supported legally binding negative security assurances. Nuclear-weapon-free zones must cooperate with each other. Agreements between zones and nuclear-weapon States would serve as confidence-building measures at the regional and global levels. As a State party to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), Thailand welcomed progress by the States parties and the nuclear-weapon States towards the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty.

81. **Mr. Minty** (South Africa), speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said that while significant progress had been made in meeting the non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty, the nuclear disarmament pillar had yet to be realized. Nuclear disarmament was, therefore, the primary concern of the New Agenda Coalition. The world could no longer remain complacent at the reluctance of the nuclear-weapon States to take the fundamental and requisite step of making a clear commitment to the speedy, final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capabilities.

82. The New Agenda Coalition continued to reject any justification for the retention or presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. That was clearly incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime. Despite the breakthrough achieved with the 2010 Action Plan, in which the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their unequivocal commitment to accelerate progress towards the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the threat posed by nuclear weapons endured and the objectives of article VI of the Treaty were far from being met. The continued existence of nuclear weapons and the threat

of their proliferation contradicted the commitments made by States parties under the Treaty.

83. The Treaty must be implemented in full. Each article was equally binding on the States parties at all times and in all circumstances. The long-term success of the Treaty was dependent on the realization of all of its objectives. Selective approaches to implementation undermined the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and reinforced existing inequalities.

84. The New Agenda Coalition welcomed the appointment of Under-Secretary of State Jaako Laajava of Finland as the facilitator of the 2012 conference on the Middle East, to be attended by representatives of all States of the region, and the designation of Finland as the host State for the conference. The facilitator would also assist in implementation of follow-up steps towards the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and would present a report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings. The New Agenda Coalition considered the 1995 resolution on the Middle East to be valid until its full implementation.

85. India, Israel and Pakistan were urged to adhere to the Treaty without delay and without conditions. The New Agenda Coalition urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to rescind its announced withdrawal from the Treaty and to terminate its nuclear weapons programme in a way that was verifiable.

86. **Mr. Mabhongo** (South Africa) said that the Treaty represented a historical bargain between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States, whereby the former had undertaken to eliminate their nuclear weapons based on the reciprocal undertaking by the latter not to pursue nuclear weapons.

87. Agreement on the 2010 Action Plan, while a major success, did not indicate that the States parties were satisfied with progress in implementing past agreements. Most were seriously concerned about the lack of urgency and seriousness with which these solemn undertakings continued to be approached.

88. Despite positive announcements, little concrete progress has been achieved in the area of nuclear disarmament. Nonetheless, the steps to implement the New START agreement were welcome. The 2010 Action Plan contained a commitment to continue work on achieving deeper reductions in nuclear arsenals. Reductions were indeed crucial, but were no substitute

for concrete, transparent, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament measures.

89. The development of new categories of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems was a clear indication that some harboured aspirations for the indefinite retention of such instruments of destruction, counter to their legal obligations and political commitments. While negative security assurances were a key element of the Treaty, their provision was not an ultimate objective in and of itself, but a pragmatic, interim and practical measure to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

90. The strengthened safeguards system was an essential element of collective efforts to address the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and would build confidence in the peaceful application of nuclear energy. The Additional Protocol, while voluntary, was important as a confidence-building measure, especially with regard to States with advanced nuclear programmes and facilities. It was indispensable for strengthening the IAEA verification system and providing credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities.

91. Since the 2010 Review Conference, four States parties had brought the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement into force, and five had signed an Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

92. South Africa welcomed the prospect of renewed negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and IAEA and between the EU3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran in Istanbul in April, 2012. The participants should continue to negotiate in good faith towards sustainable solutions in keeping with the Treaty.

93. For a variety of reasons, nuclear energy would have a larger part in the energy mix for African and other countries, owing to decreasing natural resources, global warming, climate change and other factors. IAEA would have to play an increasing role to accelerate and expand the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity. Many IAEA projects were of strategic importance to developing countries, thereby playing a meaningful role in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and alleviating poverty in the region. Therefore, every effort must be made to ensure that IAEA had sufficient resources for technical cooperation.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.