

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Main Committee II

Summary record of the 4th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 6 May 2015, at 3 p.m.

Chair: Mr. Istrate (Romania)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General exchange of views (continued)

1. **Ms. Chan Valverde** (Costa Rica) said that nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were both keys to the effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and should be addressed in a balanced manner. The Treaty had been founded on a commitment that nuclear-weapon States would undertake a process of disarmament while non-nuclear-weapon States would refrain from obtaining or developing nuclear weapons. Lack of progress on nuclear disarmament and statements affirming and even elevating the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines were matters of great concern, affecting the credibility of the Treaty, influencing the maintenance of international peace and security and possibly encouraging proliferation.

2. Progress on nuclear non-proliferation and security would help build confidence among nuclear-weapon States, leading them to take more significant disarmament measures. In that regard, Costa Rica called for increased support for the verification and compliance tasks of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Given that the mission of IAEA was to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful to military uses, all States parties should be as transparent, forthcoming and inclusive as possible in their work with the Agency.

3. The Agency's comprehensive safeguards and additional protocol should become the standard norm for all States parties, in line with articles III and IV of the Treaty. Costa Rica supported continued optimization of the safeguards system, highly appreciated the improvements already made, and supported continued efforts by the Agency to enhance the system. It also reiterated the need to conclude a treaty banning the production of fissile material, which should include the regulation of existing fissile material, a verification mechanism and confidence-building measures.

4. Her delegation commended the work of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which had established lists of dual-use and nuclear items that did not hinder non-proliferation efforts or international trade. States should follow the Group's guidelines in order to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation.

5. Costa Rica was a party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and

the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and part of one of the first densely populated areas in the world to be declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Such zones were important in preventing horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, building regional confidence and security, reducing the role of nuclear weapons and paving the way to a world free of nuclear weapons.

6. The establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, with the agreement by all States in the region, was crucial to prevent further proliferation and build peace and security in the region. The conference to establish such a zone should be convened as soon as possible, and countries in other regions, including North-East Asia, the Arctic and Europe, should consider establishing similar zones.

7. Universalization of the Treaty would do much to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and allow for greater international peace and security. States that were not parties to the Treaty were reluctant to join as non-nuclear-weapon States, given that Treaty obligations for such States differed from those for nuclear-weapon States. Commencing negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention that would apply obligations on a non-discriminatory basis could help bring those States that were not parties to the Treaty into a comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation regime.

8. **Ms. O'Brien** (Ireland) said that the increased focus in recent years on the devastating humanitarian consequences of a nuclear weapons detonation would bolster the global norm against the proliferation of such weapons. Ireland was fully committed to furthering the non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

9. The non-proliferation goal of the Treaty could ultimately be achieved only through universalization of the Treaty, which was a collective obligation and responsibility of all States. States that had not yet done so should join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and, pending that accession, should adhere to its terms and pledge to pursue non-proliferation and disarmament.

10. Ireland welcomed the recent agreement reached on the parameters for a joint comprehensive plan of action between the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany, on the one hand, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, on the other, and fully

supported ongoing diplomatic efforts by the parties to bring the work to a successful conclusion by 30 June 2015. That plan of action would allow Iran to continue developing its civil nuclear power programme while providing reassurance to its neighbours and others that it would have no military nuclear programme. It would also provide for removal, in due course, of the sanctions placed on Iran, and for continued monitoring of the Iranian programme by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

11. Ireland deeply regretted that it had not been possible thus far to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, and was very grateful to the facilitator, his team and the co-conveners for their tireless efforts. The establishment of that zone would represent a significant contribution, both regionally and globally, further strengthening the Treaty.

12. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea represented the most serious nuclear proliferation challenge currently facing the international community. Ireland deplored the nuclear tests and satellite launches using ballistic missile technology being carried out by that country, in blatant violation of its international obligations. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea should desist from any further provocative actions and return to full compliance with its obligations under the Treaty and its IAEA safeguards agreements. The international community must continue to urge that country to reengage in talks on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, immediately and without prior conditions.

13. Ireland also deplored the undeclared steps that Syria was taking to develop a nuclear reactor, as set out in a series of IAEA reports since 2010. Syria should comply with its commitments under its safeguards agreement, cooperate fully and transparently with IAEA and sign and ratify the additional protocol as soon as possible.

14. Ireland and its partners in the European Union were subject to a comprehensive Code of Conduct on Military and Dual Use Exports, which required that export licences should be denied if their approval would be inconsistent with, *inter alia*, the non-proliferation provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ireland participated in a number of other export control regimes to counter, curb and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, material or know-how. Those

regimes must continue to facilitate transfers of technology and equipment for peaceful uses, while ensuring that they did not directly or indirectly facilitate the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

15. The IAEA safeguards system was of central importance to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. States that had not yet done so should bring comprehensive safeguards agreements and the additional protocol into force as soon as possible. Ireland fully supported the ongoing work of IAEA to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of its safeguards system. Later in 2015, it would host an IAEA integrated regulatory peer review mission to study its legal and governmental framework and regulatory infrastructure for safety.

16. The grand bargain of the Treaty was based on the understanding that States in possession of nuclear weapons would eliminate their arsenals in exchange for the undertaking by all other States parties not to pursue the acquisition of such weapons. The failure to start multilateral discussions on nuclear disarmament undermined the Treaty's non-proliferation achievements. The international community must act collectively to move both processes forward in order to strengthen the Treaty.

17. **Mr. Aadjali** (Algeria) said that after 45 years of existence, the Treaty had not only demonstrated its importance for the maintenance of international peace and security, but also shown that it remained the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and the foundation for pursuing disarmament. His delegation stood ready to work with the other States parties in considering non-proliferation and regional issues, and in mapping the way forward in preparation for the 2020 Review Conference. In order to be credible, that exercise should be carried out without losing sight of the fact that the three pillars of the Treaty were mutually reinforcing.

18. The IAEA safeguards system represented a basic element of the non-proliferation regime and played an important role in Treaty implementation. The Agency should continue to demonstrate its objectivity, impartiality and professionalism in carrying out its mandate of verifying whether States parties were complying with their obligations in that area.

19. For nearly 20 years, his Government had been cooperating in a variety of ways with IAEA to

disseminate scientific knowledge and techniques related to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. That cooperation was based on IAEA rules and standards and on many international instruments, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident.

20. The risk of criminal use of nuclear materials and facilities by non-State actors had led Algeria to expand its cooperation to the implementation of multi-year IAEA programmes and recommendations adopted at the Nuclear Security Summits. In that context, a nuclear security training and support centre had been established in the country and linked to the IAEA network of centres. Algeria also participated in the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative, hosting its regional office for North Africa.

21. The potential of nuclear-weapon-free zones to build confidence, protect the environment and reduce the risk of a nuclear arms race and of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of non-State actors was beyond dispute. The existence of such zones, particularly the one established in Africa under the Treaty of Pelindaba, was gratifying. In that context, Algeria regretted that the conference for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East had not yet been held.

22. The present Review Conference should draw lessons from the efforts of the sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the facilitator to implement the three practical steps called for in the 2010 action plan: convening a conference in 2012; appointing a facilitator; and identifying a host country for the conference. It was time for the present Conference to provide the States parties of the region with additional reasons to believe in the commitments made under the Treaty.

23. **Ms. Geels** (New Zealand) said that the IAEA safeguards system provided assurances of Member States' compliance, transparency and accountability, and helped to create the stability and confidence needed to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. New Zealand conducted only minor activities subject to safeguards, as it had no nuclear weapons, energy generating plants or reactors, and did not produce uranium or other similar materials. Nevertheless, it had a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an

additional protocol with IAEA, and continued to seek ways to strengthen the application of safeguards. To that end, it had signed a modified small quantities protocol and had joined the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network to facilitate the sharing of best practices in the region. An additional protocol should always be a condition of new supply arrangements for nuclear and associated material, and all countries, especially those with significant nuclear activities, should conclude and bring into force an additional protocol with IAEA as soon as possible.

24. The verification activities of IAEA were fundamental in assuring States parties that nuclear activities were being undertaken for solely peaceful purposes. Her delegation therefore welcomed the negotiations between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany, and hoped that the goodwill shown and the momentum established would be converted into a comprehensive final agreement by 30 June 2015, in order to contribute positively to regional stability in the Middle East. However, it was disappointed that there was no evidence of any positive change in the nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The continuing operations at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Centre, the missile launches and the breach of both Security Council and IAEA resolutions seriously undermined the international non-proliferation regime. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea should abandon its nuclear and missile programmes and instead focus on improving the lives of its citizens and engaging constructively with the international community.

25. New Zealand attached great importance to nuclear security and, as a member of both the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, it was working to coordinate and strengthen global export control measures for materials and dual-use goods that could be used in a nuclear weapons programme. It was a noteworthy achievement that 60 per cent of the States in the world were now covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones, including every State in the southern hemisphere, a powerful demonstration of the collective will that could exist at the regional level to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts should be made to establish such zones in other parts of the world.

26. Her delegation therefore regretted that, despite significant efforts, a conference on the establishment of

a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction had not been held. It also regretted that progress on strengthening non-proliferation had not been matched by progress on nuclear disarmament, since that lack of progress undermined the mutually reinforcing nature of the three pillars of the Treaty and challenged its credibility and integrity. States parties could and must do better.

27. **Mr. Ceylan** (Turkey) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and should be universalized and implemented fully. All nuclear-weapon States that remained outside the Treaty regime should accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without conditions.

28. IAEA played a crucial role in the effective functioning of the Treaty and its safeguards system, which provided a practical means for non-nuclear-weapon States to have access to nuclear energy and technologies for exclusively peaceful purposes, should be upheld and strengthened. All States parties had a common interest in ensuring that the Agency could carry out its safeguards implementation and verification mandate effectively.

29. Turkey had a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol with IAEA, and had worked closely with the Agency in developing its nuclear energy programme in a secure, safe and safeguarded manner. Given its impartiality and objectivity, the Agency should be provided with the necessary funds for the fulfilment of its mandate. States that had not done so should sign, ratify and implement comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols with IAEA without delay. His delegation supported the widest possible application of IAEA safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in nuclear-weapon States and the irreversible and verifiable removal of nuclear material once used for military purposes.

30. Turkey welcomed the political understanding reached between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany. It hoped that the current phase of negotiations would result in a comprehensive agreement that would satisfy all parties and contribute to peace, stability and security in the region. His delegation noted with satisfaction that IAEA regularly verified the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran and hoped that all outstanding

issues relating to the Iranian nuclear programme would be solved through dialogue and cooperation. To that end, Iran should continue to engage with IAEA in order to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear activities.

31. The ongoing crisis in Syria posed a direct threat to national security in Turkey; his delegation hoped that IAEA would be able to bring some clarity to and ultimately resolve the situation in that country. The nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remained another serious concern. The three nuclear explosion tests and ballistic missile launches conducted by that country, and the public statements about more tests, undermined trust, security and stability in the region and beyond. That country should return to the Six-Party Talks to allow the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

32. Turkey supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones wherever feasible and on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned, and considered it an important disarmament and non-proliferation measure. It was encouraging that most of the nuclear-weapon-States had ratified the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. On the other hand, the failure to convene an international conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction was a major disappointment. His delegation was nonetheless grateful to the facilitator for his commendable efforts and the report that he had submitted to the Review Conference.

33. Turkey strongly supported all appropriate measures designed to ensure the security of nuclear and other radioactive material and facilities and prevent their acquisition by terrorists. It had recently ratified the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. While responsibility for nuclear security lay with the State concerned, national efforts must be coupled with reinforced and effective international cooperation. At the national level, Turkey had revised its legislation with assistance from IAEA, while at the international level, it participated in the Nuclear Security Summit process.

34. Given the complexity of illicit procurement activities and the duty to prevent the acquisition of nuclear materials by unauthorized actors, including terrorists, all States parties should strengthen their

export control systems for nuclear materials and technology. Lastly, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) should be implemented fully through the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

35. **Mr. Al-Kumaim** (Yemen) said that the position of Yemen on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, weapons of mass destruction and the inalienable right of all States to possess nuclear energy for peaceful purposes remained unchanged. His Government was committed to fulfilling its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other multilateral agreements on disarmament that it had ratified. It welcomed General Assembly resolution 69/58 on the follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, as it would help to achieve the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. All nuclear tests and the qualitative development of nuclear weapons should be banned, to ensure the non-proliferation of those weapons and prevent their transfer across borders.

36. The Government of Yemen had established a national commission to ban nuclear weapons and criminalize their development. It was concerned at the persistence of the nuclear deterrence doctrine and stressed the need to implement all three pillars of the Treaty, which was the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and ensured international peace and stability.

37. The Israeli nuclear policy had started a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that was undermining international peace, stability and security. As a result of the international silence on that policy, Israel remained outside the Treaty and had still not placed its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards of IAEA, in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981).

38. The creation of zones free of nuclear weapons strengthened the non-proliferation regime. Consequently, all States parties, but especially nuclear-weapon States, should reiterate their commitment to the goals and substance of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In addition, all States that had not yet done so should join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, and Israel should accede to the Treaty and place all its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of IAEA.

39. **Mr. Jerman** (Slovenia) said that the IAEA safeguards system was a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and played an indispensable role in the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. His delegation welcomed the efforts to further develop the State-level concept and proposed that, in its report, the Committee should invite IAEA to continue its efforts in that regard.

40. Slovenia participated in all international export control regimes on missile technology and related dual-use goods, except the Missile Technology Control Regime, for which it had recently renewed its candidature. The Review Conference should fully recognize the importance of those regimes and States parties should improve their legal frameworks and institutional capacities for their enforcement, in order to combat proliferation.

41. Lastly, it was regrettable that a conference on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction had not been held, since such a conference would be a practical first step towards a long-held common goal and would contribute to international peace and security. Nevertheless, his delegation welcomed the tireless efforts of the facilitator, the States of the region and the co-conveners in trying to agree on arrangements for an inclusive conference attended by all States of the Middle East. It urged all States of the region to continue consultations in order to enable the conference to be convened as soon as possible.

The meeting rose at 4.05 p.m.