

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
26 June 2015

Original: English

Main Committee II

Summary record of the 3rd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 5 May 2015, at 3 p.m.

Chair: Mr. Istrate (Romania)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General exchange of views (continued)

1. **Mr. Taalas** (Finland) said that the international community should take suitable measures to preserve the integrity of the non-proliferation regime and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Not only were the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards indispensable to the implementation of the Treaty, but the comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol should be universally accepted as the international verification standard. Finland supported consistent and universal implementation of IAEA safeguards based on the State-level concept, which would further strengthen IAEA's safeguard system and contribute to global non-proliferation efforts.

2. Finland had provided €860,000 in extrabudgetary support for the IAEA safeguards through its National Safeguards Support Programme, while another €400,000 had been provided for the implementation of IAEA monitoring and verification activities related to the joint plan of action regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme. Having been a consistent supporter of a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, Finland was encouraged by the recent agreement on the outline of a joint comprehensive plan of action, and looked forward to the completion of negotiations by June 2015. In contrast, the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to be an issue of concern.

3. The ongoing Finnish nuclear energy programme was implementing IAEA safeguards at the earliest phases of planning in its new nuclear power plants and final disposal facility. Strongly committed to strengthening nuclear security, Finland had ratified the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and encouraged all States to ratify and implement that amendment. Finland had also been an active participant in the Nuclear Security Summit process and looked forward to the 2016 session. To strengthen IAEA nuclear security functions, Finland continued to provide financial and in-kind support, including €250,000 to the Nuclear Security Fund since 2010. Finland also supported and was committed to the effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). His Government had assisted other States by contributing to the Global Partnership against the

Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and had channelled more than €1.5 million into other counter-proliferation initiatives since 2010.

4. Finland attached great importance to combating nuclear terrorism, including by preventing nuclear or other radioactive material from falling into the hands of terrorists. Accordingly, it would host the plenary of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in June 2015, and new partners were invited to participate.

5. **Ms. Paik Ji-Ah** (Republic of Korea) said that the non-compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the Treaty posed a serious threat to the global non-proliferation regime. Other threats included nuclear terrorism and the relatively weak safeguard system of the Treaty and. The recent agreement on the parameters for a joint plan of action with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme was encouraging, however.

6. The importance of the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in clarifying relevant unresolved issues should be highlighted. The pursuit by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of a nuclear programme and delivery system was a clear violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. That country had exploited the Treaty system to develop a nuclear weapons programme and had withdrawn from the Treaty. Having declared itself a nuclear-weapon State, it had gone on to conduct three nuclear tests. Her Government strongly urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to completely, irreversibly and demonstrably abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in accordance with its international obligations. The Republic of Korea would continue to work with the relevant parties to resume dialogue focused on preventing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from advancing its nuclear capability and ensuring the denuclearization of that country. The Conference should make it clear to that country that its non-compliance was unacceptable and highlight the necessity of abiding by international obligations.

7. Universal application of the additional protocol to the Treaty was important; it, along with the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement, allowed the Agency to determine that declared materials and facilities had not been diverted, and that undeclared materials and facilities were not present. State parties were urged to implement the additional protocol

without delay. The Republic of Korea appreciated the Agency's efforts to verify the correctness and completeness of State declarations and supported the introduction and application of the State-level concept in that regard. States should recall the importance of expanding safeguards via the universalization of the Treaty. Her Government looked forward to the discussions on withdrawal from the Treaty during the relevant subsidiary body session.

8. Notable progress in the combat against nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation by non-state actors had been achieved by the international community since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), in particular through the Nuclear Security Summit process. Having chaired and hosted the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, the Republic of Korea was an active participant in that combat, and would build on its recent experience as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to help achieve full implementation of that resolution.

9. **Mr. Filipsons** (Latvia) said that continued implementation of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was necessary to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, boost the strategic stability necessary for disarmament, and promote confidence that States would not abuse the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

10. Nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established with a view to strengthening global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. In that regard, his Government welcomed the 2014 signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk). Latvia also fully supported the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, commended the efforts of the Facilitator and co-conveners of the conference planned in that regard, and anticipated the convening of a relevant conference.

11. The agreement recently reached with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme demonstrated that security challenges could be successfully addressed through diplomatic engagement in strict accordance with international norms. It also demonstrated the continued relevance of the global non-proliferation regime. Hoping for both continued negotiations and

movement toward a final agreement, his Government had made a voluntary contribution to IAEA verification activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran within the framework of the joint plan of action.

12. Latvia was deeply concerned by the ongoing development of nuclear and missile programmes by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. His Government called on that country to comply with its international obligations and return to the denuclearization dialogue. The Six-Party Talks could provide a possible format for dialogue in that regard. In the light of the need for strengthened understanding of how to respond effectively to a State party's withdrawal from the Treaty, Latvia had co-sponsored a working paper (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.47) on the matter that should serve as a basis for further discussion. Latvia hoped for an agreement that would prevent the use of Treaty's withdrawal provisions as a means to avoid accountability.

13. **Mr. Mati** (Italy) said that the Italian Government was fully committed to effective multilateral action against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Major challenges to address included existing proliferation networks and programmes, difficulties in securing sensitive material, and the risk of terrorists obtaining access to such material.

14. Italy supported the strengthening of the IAEA safeguard system and viewed nuclear-weapon-free zones as a valuable instrument to ensure peace and security. In that regard, Italy fully supported the convening of a conference on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, as called for in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. Although his Government commended the efforts of the Facilitator and co-conveners, it regretted the failure to convene such a conference. All concerned parties should capitalize on the work done and demonstrate the political will that would allow that conference to take place. Italy called on all States of the region to redouble their efforts and to engage in that process. His Government welcomed proposals that could improve dialogue and understanding among the States of the region, and that contributed to the eventual convening of the conference. Italy also welcomed the statement regarding the joint plan of action on the Iranian nuclear programme, and looked forward to finalization of the plan.

15. With regard to comments of some delegations regarding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear-basing arrangements, it should be recalled that such arrangements had already been in place when the Treaty first entered into force. Those arrangements had been made clear to delegations negotiating the Treaty, had been made available to the public, and were fully compatible with the Treaty obligations of NATO allies.

16. **Ms. Paradas** (France) said that nuclear-weapon proliferation posed a major threat to international and regional peace, security and stability and compromised States parties' capacity to reach their goals under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Her delegation wished to propose a few objectives drawn from the States parties' experience of proliferation crises on which a strong and effective response to nuclear proliferation could be built.

17. A firm response to nuclear proliferation crises was needed. The preliminary agreement reached between the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany and Iran was an important step forward. In the coming weeks, France would be vigilant that the agreed parameters were developed into a robust, lasting and verifiable agreement. Her delegation also called on Iran to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency towards resolving unaddressed issues related to the possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme, which was an essential aspect of re-establishing trust. It regretted the lack of progress in that area. Her Government would continue to fully invest in the negotiations to ensure that the agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue definitively contributed to the international non-proliferation regime and global peace and security.

18. Since the previous Review Conference, North Korea had carried out another nuclear test and had continued to develop its ballistic and nuclear programmes in defiance of its international obligations, and those serious threats to international peace and security had been unanimously condemned by the international community. The European Union had bolstered Security Council resolutions 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013) with measures of its own aimed at obstructing North Korea's proliferation activities in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. North Korea must return to its commitments under the Treaty and comply with its obligations to the Agency. Its denuclearization

was not negotiable. Her delegation also recalled that Syria had still not shed light on its past or present nuclear activity.

19. States parties must persevere in strengthening the Agency's verification capacities. Only the combined implementation of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol could ensure compliance with article III of the Treaty, which was why their implementation remained a priority. Moreover, the State-level approach would significantly contribute to strengthening the safeguards system through a better use of existing resources, and States parties must support its implementation.

20. To strengthen the Agency's authority, States parties must better deter violations of safeguards agreements. To that end, the present Review Conference must encourage States parties to learn from cases where countries had been declared in violation of their non-proliferation obligations by suspending all civil nuclear cooperation with those countries.

21. States parties' means of preventing and thwarting nuclear proliferation must be strengthened. Stringent and universal export controls were indispensable to countering criminal supply networks without obstructing lawful nuclear commerce. The Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers' Group played an essential role in that regard. States parties must also improve their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) to both strengthen their national measures and help countries which needed help doing so.

22. The present Review Conference revealed two challenges which must be addressed by States parties as effectively as possible. To combat illegal attempts to secure knowledge and expertise that could be used for developing proliferation programmes, States parties must increase their vigilance with regard to access to training, research centres and the most sensitive information. To combat the transfer of proliferating goods, States parties must significantly impede traffic, as well as criminalize proliferation activity and identify and cut off its financing. Combating proliferation could not be effective unless a collective effort was mobilized. Her delegation hoped that the present Review Conference would help strengthen international cooperation towards achieving the aforementioned goals.

23. **Mr. Al-Fassam** (Kuwait) said that his country's delegation fully supported all outcomes and decisions

adopted by previous Review Conferences. All States, and particularly nuclear-weapon States, must redouble their efforts to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. They must cooperate fully with IAEA and take steps to strengthen the Agency's comprehensive safeguard regime, which remained the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation system.

24. Kuwait warmly welcomed the understanding reached between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany, and encouraged all parties to continue their efforts to conclude, by 30 June 2015, a comprehensive agreement on Iran's nuclear programme that would allay the concerns of the States of the region.

25. It was regrettable that Israeli intransigence had continued to prevent the convening of a conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. Indeed, by refusing to accede to the Treaty and subject its nuclear facilities to IAEA oversight, Israel was undermining all efforts to establish such a zone. However, Kuwait would continue to work with all stakeholders to facilitate its establishment, in accordance with the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, and called on all relevant stakeholders to redouble their efforts and enhance their cooperation to achieve that goal. In that regard, the Arab Group had submitted a working paper to the current Review Conference ([NPT/CONF.2015/WP.33](#)) containing proposals on ways to advance the process of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and urged the Conference to endorse that working paper.

26. **Mr. Adam** (Sudan) said that significant geopolitical changes had taken place, particularly in the Middle East, since the 2010 Review Conference, and the world was facing a number of new security challenges. It was vital that all three pillars of the Treaty were addressed in a balanced manner, and that States parties to the Treaty complied fully with all its provisions. Sudan was in full compliance with its obligations under the Treaty, including article II regarding the transfer to non-nuclear-weapon States of nuclear materials and technologies, and believed that, in order to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime, all non-nuclear-weapon States parties must ensure their full compliance with that provision. In parallel, nuclear-weapon States must take tangible

steps towards disarmament, pursuant to article VI of the Treaty, and negotiations should commence on a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, in accordance with the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference.

27. It was regrettable that it had not yet been possible to convene the conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Sudan believed that it was crucial to convene that conference at the earliest opportunity in order to strengthen peace and security in the Middle East, and fully endorsed the proposals in that regard contained in the working paper ([NPT/CONF.2015/WP.33](#)) submitted by Bahrain on behalf of the Arab Group.

28. **Mr. Alkaabi** (United Arab Emirates) said that the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty and, particularly, the IAEA safeguards system, had been challenged in the past and continued, in some cases, to fail to provide the required assurance on the exclusively peaceful nature of some States parties' nuclear activities. States parties developing nuclear energy for peaceful uses should fully adhere to comprehensive safeguards obligations, cooperate with the Agency and take the required steps to address all international concerns and obligations, including those stemming from relevant Agency and United Nations Security Council resolutions.

29. While the comprehensive safeguards agreement was designed to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of all declared activities, the issue of possible undeclared activities could not be addressed without an additional protocol in force. Therefore, it was essential to enhance the assurances provided by the safeguards agreement by using the tools offered by the additional protocol. His delegation welcomed the growth in the number of States parties bringing an additional protocol into force, which reflected substantive progress since the 2010 Review Conference. It urged all States parties which had not yet concluded an additional protocol to do so as soon as possible.

30. Given the importance of the non-proliferation pillar to the Treaty's objective, it was imperative that the present Review Conference addressed such non-proliferation challenges as non-compliance. Despite years of effort, the Agency had been unable to report substantive progress on outstanding issues in that regard, including those with possible military implications.

31. The international community had stressed that it was essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue towards the resolution of all outstanding issues concerning the Iranian nuclear programme, as affirmed by multiple resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council calling on Iran to provide access to all sites, equipment and personnel requested by the Agency. His delegation continued to support diplomacy and dialogue to address those issues and hoped that the ongoing diplomatic process would contribute to achieving a comprehensive agreement. Concrete results were needed to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

32. His delegation highly appreciated the efforts, commitment and dedication of the Facilitator with regard to preparing the long-overdue conference on establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. The United Arab Emirates had welcomed and contributed to all efforts supporting the Facilitator's work towards convening that conference, including through constructive engagement and participation at all consultation meetings. It therefore regretted that the conference had not taken place as scheduled in 2012 and continued to support its convening at an early date.

33. The convening process should be strengthened to avoid further postponement. His delegation emphasized that consultations, dialogue and preparatory work which followed a clear mandate and timeline and supported the objective were essential to successfully convening such a conference with the participation of all States in the region. His delegation would work constructively during the present Review Conference to achieve a positive outcome in support of the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

34. **Mr. Isnomo** (Indonesia) said that the International Atomic Energy Agency was the sole competent authority responsible for verifying the fulfilment of safeguards obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As a member State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in place, Indonesia had fulfilled its obligation in that regard. For many years, the Agency had concluded that all nuclear programmes and activities in Indonesia were intended for peaceful purposes. His Government recognized that the additional protocol was essential to confidence-building in the current

safeguards mechanism because the Agency was unable to provide full assurance of the peaceful nature of any country's nuclear activities without having such a protocol in place. Indonesia called on all States parties which had not yet done so to immediately sign the safeguards agreement and put all their peaceful nuclear facilities under the Agency's oversight. Furthermore, the combined comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol should be an internationally recognized safeguards standard for the supply of nuclear material and equipment.

35. Incentives should be provided to States parties which complied with Treaty provisions, and should aim to bolster their respective capacities in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology to achieve sustainable, internationally-agreed development goals. Thus, all States parties could collaborate to ensure the integrity of the Treaty.

36. Indonesia was aware of the increasingly complex safeguards challenges faced by the Agency with regard to the State-level concept, and believed that the Agency needed to improve safeguards' efficiency and effectiveness in anticipation of its growing future workload. While Indonesia supported those efforts, it believed that they should be made in close consultation with member States and any proposed measures and approaches should not entail new obligations for them.

37. Indonesia believed that nuclear-weapon States should undertake more transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable efforts to completely eliminate all types of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In that regard, Indonesia emphasized that the operations of nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes, and particularly those of nuclear-weapon States involved in the import and export of fissile materials, should be more transparent.

38. His delegation further expressed its support for efforts to improve the Agency's safeguards information security system, especially for information related to nuclear security. Serious efforts to protect information security would help maintain the credibility of safeguards and, at the same time, invalidate States members' justification for not providing information to the Agency.

39. Indonesia was strongly convinced that nuclear-weapon-free zones were important to achieving a

world free of nuclear weapons. As the President of the Third Conference of States parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and Mongolia, Indonesia expressed its disappointment over that conference's failure to adopt a final outcome document, which had been intended to affirm its effort to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world.

40. His delegation called on all concerned parties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones where they did not exist, particularly in the Middle East. It urged all concerned parties to redouble their efforts to bring about the long-delayed conference on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Indonesia reaffirmed that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes in the States parties' concerted effort to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.

41. **Mr. Pöstinger** (Austria) said that, despite efforts to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and extend it to the remaining countries, the International Atomic Energy Agency's comprehensive safeguards system had yet to be universally applied. Strengthening that system would make it possible to detect undeclared activities and build confidence within the international community with regard to the peaceful nature of individual countries' nuclear programmes, thereby reducing mistrust and the likelihood of conflicts related to alleged nuclear programmes. While the costs and efforts related to inspection regimes could seem too high to some, they were outweighed by the benefits and potential peace dividends, especially in regions where transparency, mutual trust and confidence were lacking. His delegation was very encouraged by the progress achieved in the negotiations on the comprehensive framework agreement for resolving unaddressed questions and concerns about the Iranian nuclear programme. A successful conclusion to those negotiations would be an important gain for the credibility of the Treaty. Austria was also pleased to have contributed to those negotiations by providing a venue and related services.

42. The evolution and spread of nuclear technology had had an impact on the functioning of the export control regimes of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, and there was a need for more in-depth and creative thinking about the nature and evolution of those regimes and their relationship to the Treaty. As an example, in order to strengthen the

Nuclear Suppliers' Group, Austria, together with Germany and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, had recently hosted an international workshop to discuss the impact of the growing participation in the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, particularly by countries which were non-States parties to the Treaty, on the non-proliferation and export control regimes.

43. Austria fully supported the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and noted the efforts that had been undertaken in that regard during the last review cycle. It joined others in regretting that the conference that was supposed to launch that important process could not yet be held, and hoped that the present Review Conference would provide renewed momentum to that end. It welcomed the working papers and many statements that had been presented on that issue as a clear indication of States parties' interest in taking that initiative forward.

44. **Ms. Yparraguirre** (Philippines) said that her Government could not overemphasize the importance of the Middle East, which had become a second home to millions of its people. It stood as one with the people of that region in aspiring for real and lasting peace, but was cognizant of the challenges and necessity of taking incremental steps towards that goal. Her delegation had called consistently for the immediate implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which provided for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. States parties had achieved a diplomatic feat at the 2010 Review Conference when they agreed to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, to have been held in 2012. Her delegation deeply regretted that States parties had failed to implement that agreement and that the issue had cast a shadow on their work on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in recent years.

45. Since 2012, the Philippines had appealed to the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution to convene that conference as soon as possible under the terms set by the 2010 Review Conference. Those terms included the attendance by all Middle Eastern States with a view to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by those States and with the full

support of nuclear-weapon States. Despite the difficulties that ensued since 2012, the Philippines commended the Facilitator for his hard work. Her delegation hoped that diplomacy and dialogue would guide and drive States parties as they continued to address that outstanding issue during the present Review Conference.

46. Currently, only 39 per cent of the world's population lived in nuclear-weapon-free zones. A Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone would be an important addition to existing zones. The Philippines believed that nuclear-weapon-free zones would be meaningless if States in possession of nuclear weapons were not parties to the treaties establishing such zones. Her delegation called on nuclear-weapon States to sign and ratify the protocols to those treaties, including the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), as soon as possible and without reservations.

47. The Philippines had been calling for strengthening the Agency's non-proliferation framework by means of more comprehensive safeguards agreements and the universalization of the additional protocol. The Agency's nuclear verification capacity should also be reinforced through the provision of appropriate legal tools and operational resources.

48. **Mr. El Oumni** (Morocco) said that his Government had strengthened its legal arsenal in the fields of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation. In September 2014, Morocco had enacted a law on nuclear and radiological safety and security, which aimed to harmonize its national legislation with the relevant provisions of international conventions. The law provided for the close monitoring of nuclear material and radioactive sources, as well as the maintenance of an inventory of such material and the application of safety and security measures. The second ratification of the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was at its final stage. Earlier that year, Morocco had also enacted a decree on the management of hazardous waste in conformity with the Convention's relevant provisions.

49. The present Review Conference should reiterate its support for strengthening the Agency's safeguards regime, including by promoting the universality of the additional protocol and the comprehensive safeguards agreement. It should reaffirm that all previously agreed measures remained valid and relevant and should be

fully implemented. Non-proliferation obligations were not intended to be barriers to the enjoyment of the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the delicate balance between rights and obligations should be preserved.

50. The present Review Conference should welcome the framework agreement between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany and reaffirm the importance of diplomacy and dialogue in resolving issues related to nuclear non-proliferation. All parties should continue engaging, in good faith, in order to arrive at a final agreement as soon as possible.

51. In order to be effective, the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be universalized. All States which had not yet done so should join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear-weapon-free zones played a valuable role in strengthening the non-proliferation regime and advancing the objectives of the Treaty. The present Review Conference should call on States parties to establish such zones where they did not yet exist. Morocco shared the disappointment at the inability of the recently-held Third Conference of the States parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and Mongolia to adopt a final outcome. Morocco had engaged constructively and in good faith in consultations leading up to that conference and believed that the draft outcome achieved prior to that conference was the best possible consensus text.

52. Morocco further regretted that, despite all efforts, the 2012 conference to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction had not been convened. The international community had missed an opportunity to launch a process that could contribute to building confidence among the region's countries and would enhance regional and global peace and security. All efforts should be made to convene such a conference in order to achieve the objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, on which the indefinite extension of the Treaty was based. Effective and practical measures should be taken to free the Middle East from all weapons of mass destruction. The present Review Conference should take bold measures to preserve the credibility of the Treaty and its established regimes.

53. **Mr. do Canto** (Observer for the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) said that in July 1991, Brazil and Argentina had signed an agreement for the exclusively

peaceful use of nuclear energy and had created a common system for the accounting and control of nuclear materials through his organization. The implications of that agreement included the exclusively peaceful use of all nuclear materials and facilities under the control of those two countries, as well as the recognition of the sovereign right of access of every nation to nuclear technology for the economic and social development of their inhabitants.

54. Joint cooperation between the International Atomic Energy Agency and his organization had produced good results, and encompassed unannounced inspections and the joint use of safeguards equipment units. That partnership was fundamental for both agencies to comply effectively and efficiently with their institutional objectives. His organization also maintained strong technical cooperation with the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, the European Atomic Energy Community, and with research and development institutions devoted to nuclear safeguards in several countries. Those efforts were primarily focused on non-destructive analyses, containment and surveillance, training courses and safeguards approaches. IAEA was challenged by expectations regarding the expanded use of nuclear reactors to satisfy growing energy demands, as well as the potential to use nuclear technologies in all areas of life. Regional systems implemented in coordination with IAEA could make a positive contribution to the application of safeguards, and his organization could serve as a reference in that regard.

55. **Mr. Al-Taie** (Iraq) said that the greatest threat to humanity was posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons. It was therefore extremely worrying that that nuclear-weapon States insisted on maintaining their nuclear arsenals and developing new types of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The entry into force of the Treaty had not prevented certain States from seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, and some countries had refused to adhere to the Treaty or fully implement its provisions, thereby weakening the global non-proliferation regime, undermining the Treaty's credibility and eroding trust among States. Although it must not be seen as an alternative to nuclear disarmament, a binding international legal instrument was needed that would provide assurances to non-nuclear weapon States that they would not be subject to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Negative security guarantees were critical for States that, by acceding to the Treaty, had voluntarily agreed not to develop military nuclear capacities.

56. The Iraqi delegation hoped that the 2015 Review Conference would succeed in strengthening all three pillars of the Treaty. To strengthen the global non-proliferation regime, it was critical to promote the universality of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Negotiations should also begin on a non-discriminatory and verifiable treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Preventing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons could only be achieved through their complete elimination, although their gradual elimination would build trust among States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, encourage all other States to accede to that Treaty, and allay concerns related to nuclear-weapon States' reliance on those weapons as part of their security doctrines. Furthermore, it was unacceptable to use non-proliferation concerns as a pretext for restricting the right of all States to develop, produce and use nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. Such restrictions constituted a clear violation of the letter and the spirit of the Treaty and impeded efforts by IAEA to fulfil its mandate. The unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of such technologies must be ensured.

57. The indefinite extension of the Treaty had been inextricably linked to the effective implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and in particular, to the creation of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. The States parties to the Treaty must therefore make every effort to uphold that bargain. The establishment of the zone would strengthen the security of the States concerned, foster regional stability and further the global goal of nuclear disarmament. Israel must take action to eliminate its nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty and place all its nuclear installations under an IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime, in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981). The United Nations and the Treaty's depositary States must shoulder their responsibilities in the light of the failure to convene the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, which was an abrogation of the commitments made in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference and undermined the credibility of the Treaty.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.