

2015 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons

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Main Committee II

Summary record of the 1st meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 4 May 2015, at 10 a.m.

Chair: Mr. Istrate (Chair) (Romania)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Organization of work

1. **The Chair** said that Main Committee II had the task of dealing with agenda items 16 (c) and 17. In addition, the plenary Conference had established a subsidiary body to examine regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution. He drew attention to the proposed programme of work for the Committee and its subsidiary body, contained in document [NPT/CONF.2015/MC.II/INF.1](#), and noted that the Committee had been allocated seven meetings, including those of its subsidiary body. He intended to submit a draft report on the work of the Committee for its consideration as soon as possible.

2. *The programme of work was adopted.*

General exchange of views

3. **Mr. Laajava** (Finland), speaking as the facilitator of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction (Helsinki conference), said that he had submitted his report [NPT/CONF.2015/37](#) to the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. He thanked the States of the Middle East region for their support and constructive engagement in consultations. The support and dedication of the conveners, namely the United Nations, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States was much appreciated, as was the financial support from Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. His work had been enhanced by the contributions of academic institutions, think tanks and non-governmental organizations from the Middle East and elsewhere.

4. States of the region continued to share the vision of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, within the context of sustainable peace in the region. The evolving situation on the ground highlighted the need for urgent progress in that regard. Hundreds of bilateral and multilateral consultations had been carried out as part of an inclusive approach aimed at ensuring that the views of all States in the Middle East were taken into account. The success of

the process would depend on those States assuming ownership of and responsibility for it.

5. The most significant meetings that had taken place were the five informal meetings held in Glion and Geneva, Switzerland, with the objective of facilitating an agreement among the States of the region on the arrangements for the Helsinki conference. While it had not been possible to continue the meetings after the summer of 2014 or to reach the concrete drafting stage, he appreciated the fact that States concerned had come together and engaged in a constructive and respectful dialogue on issues of primary importance for the security of their region. On the basis of the constructive proposals and ideas received from the parties, in November 2014 he had produced an orientation paper on the main aspects of the arrangements for the conference, which he intended to use in future consultations.

6. It was ultimately up to the States of the Middle East region to judge whether any progress had been made. He felt that one important outcome was the participants' improved understanding of the important issues involved and the positions held by the other parties. Furthermore, it was clear to all parties that the discussions related to a process, not a single conference. The goal of a Middle East zone free of all weapons of mass destruction had received a good deal of publicity and support. He hoped that the States of the region would recognize the value and potential of the channel for regional dialogue that had been opened by the informal consultations.

7. Achieving a more stable Middle East region without weapons of mass destruction would be an important contribution to international peace and stability as well as the continued vitality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He hoped that the 2015 Review Conference would keep that broader perspective in mind as it reviewed the results of the efforts that had been made so far towards holding the Helsinki conference and determined the next steps to be taken.

8. **Mr. Shaw** (Observer for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) said that the Agency now applied safeguards to over 1,250 facilities in 180 States, and the amount of nuclear material under safeguards had risen by around 15 per cent over the past five years. With many more nuclear facilities being built and placed under safeguards, that global trend was likely to continue. That presented a

challenge for the Agency, as its resources had not increased commensurately with its verification workload. One of the ways in which it was seeking to optimize its efficiency was through its “State-level concept”, which involved implementing safeguards in a manner that considered the nuclear and nuclear-related activities and capabilities of a State as a whole rather than on a facility-by-facility basis. Over the past two years, the Agency had engaged in an intensive and open dialogue with IAEA member States on the implementation of that approach, during which it had reassured them that the change would not entail the introduction of any additional rights or obligations on the part of States or the Agency or affect the interpretation of existing rights and obligations. Existing State-level approaches were currently being updated and those for other States would be developed progressively, in consultation with the concerned States and regional authorities.

9. He called on all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to conclude and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as soon as possible. States that had not yet brought additional protocols into force were also encouraged to do so, as they were vital tools for effective verification. Furthermore, all States with small quantities protocols were called on to amend or rescind them. There had been good progress in those areas since the 2010 Review Conference: six States had brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, 24 had brought into force additional protocols and 17 had accepted the revised small quantities protocol text. Another significant accomplishment since the previous Review Conference was the modernization of the Agency’s analytical laboratories, which was nearing completion and was expected to be finished on time and within budget. As part of that process, the construction of a new nuclear material laboratory had been completed in 2014.

10. The Agency remained seriously concerned about the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and called upon that country to comply fully with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the Agency in implementing its safeguards agreement, and to resolve all outstanding issues. It maintained its readiness to play an essential role in verifying that country’s nuclear programme as and when requested to do so.

11. With regard to the Syrian Arab Republic, IAEA had concluded in June 2011 that the building destroyed at the Dayr al-Zawr site in September 2007 was very likely to have been a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency. The Director General called upon the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with IAEA in connection with unresolved issues related to the Dayr al-Zawr site and other locations.

12. On the issue of safeguards implementation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, he said that IAEA continued to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material declared by that State under its safeguards agreement but was not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the country or, therefore, to conclude that all nuclear material in the State was being used for peaceful activities. In November 2013 the Agency and Iran had agreed to cooperate to resolve all present and past issues. The initial measures taken under the resulting framework for cooperation had seen Iran give IAEA inspectors access to uranium mines and other locations, which had provided the Agency with a better understanding of the country’s nuclear programme. However, progress had been limited since the Agency had proceeded to seek clarification on possible military dimensions. Nevertheless, the Agency continued to engage with Iran and would do its utmost to clarify those issues. Another important development was the Joint Plan of Action agreed between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany in November 2013 with the aim of reaching a mutually agreed, long-term and comprehensive solution that would ensure that the Iranian nuclear programme would be exclusively peaceful. At the request of the parties, IAEA had been carrying out monitoring and verification activities in relation to the Joint Plan of Action for the past 15 months, which had approximately doubled the Agency’s verification efforts in that country. IAEA welcomed the recent announcement by Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany regarding the key parameters for a comprehensive Joint Plan of Action and stood ready to play an essential verification and monitoring role once an agreement had been reached. Implementation by Iran of an additional protocol would enable the Agency to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

13. The Agency would continue its effort to meet the expectations of the international community. Its continued success would require States and regional authorities to cooperate with IAEA in the implementation of safeguards. Political, technical and financial support from States for IAEA safeguards was also essential.

14. **Mr. Najafi** (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, said that the Group fully recognized that IAEA was the sole competent authority responsible for verifying compliance with safeguards agreements and that it was the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation. While the Group supported the Agency's verification activities, it was essential that its members refrain from undue interference in those activities and strictly adhere to the Agency's Statute, particularly its provisions concerning confidentiality.

15. The Group urged all nuclear-weapon States and States not parties to the Treaty to place all of their nuclear facilities under the Agency's comprehensive safeguards. The nuclear-weapon States were called upon to undertake to accept comprehensive safeguards by concluding agreements with IAEA, with the aim of ensuring full compliance with their obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty, providing baseline data on the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament obligations, preventing further diversion of nuclear capacity from peaceful uses to military uses and ensuring strict observation of the prohibition of the transfer of nuclear equipment, material or information to States not party to the Treaty. In light of the assurances in article III, which provided for the verification of the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes in order to allow States to transfer nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, States parties should refrain from imposing or maintaining restrictions or limitations on other States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

16. Nuclear-weapon States were urged to commit to declare to IAEA all weapons-grade fissile material they possessed and to place that material under the supervision of IAEA or an alternative international verification arrangement, in line with action 16 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. The Conference should conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of those commitments by establishing a

mandatory international monitoring mechanism for nuclear-weapon States. The Conference should also establish a standing committee to monitor and verify unilateral or bilateral steps towards disarmament taken by those States.

17. States parties to the Treaty must not transfer nuclear technology or material to any State that did not strictly observe the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Treaty. All States that were not yet parties to the Treaty should accede without delay or preconditions.

18. It was important to draw a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures. In that regard, the Agency should avoid ultra vires actions that would jeopardize its integrity and credibility. States parties to the Treaty were urged to maintain and strengthen the technical nature of IAEA, in line with the Agency's Statute. The Agency's work should also reflect the differentiated nature of the financial obligations undertaken by its members. The Group underscored the need to strictly observe the principle of balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the Agency, in particular its activities related to verification and safeguards.

19. The Group was seriously concerned about certain unilateral, politically motivated attempts to prevent States parties from exercising their inalienable rights to develop their research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which were protected by article III of the Treaty.

20. The Treaty recognized the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. The group considered such treaties to be an important step towards strengthening nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes. However, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was not a substitute for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and nuclear-weapon States must fulfil their obligation to eliminate all of their nuclear weapons as soon as possible. The Group welcomed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free

Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk), which were all positive steps towards achieving global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also welcomed the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones. In that regard, it strongly supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and called for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The delay in implementing that resolution and the fact that no progress had been made with regard to Israel's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty were matters of serious concern. While the Group appreciated the efforts of the facilitator of the Helsinki conference, it was profoundly disappointed by the failure to hold the conference in 2012 as scheduled and deeply concerned that Israel continued to prevent the conference from taking place by not declaring its intention to participate. The sponsors of the 1995 resolution were urged to fulfil their responsibility in taking all necessary measures to ensure its full implementation without delay.

21. All nuclear-weapon States must provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States in nuclear-weapon-free zones that were parties to the Treaty. In that regard, the Group strongly called for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that were incompatible with the object and purpose of treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. It also called on nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations to achieve the objectives of such treaties and their protocols. The integrity of the statute of denuclearization provided for in the Treaty of Tlatelolco must be strengthened by a review of the declarations formulated by the nuclear-weapon States parties to Additional Protocols I and II thereto for possible withdrawal or modification.

22. The Group noted with satisfaction the third preparatory meeting for the Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia in May 2014 but called upon those States parties and signatories to put in place further forms of cooperation among themselves, their treaty agencies and other interested States. It would be important for nuclear-weapon States to ratify the relevant protocols to the Treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and

Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

23. He concluded by drawing attention to the working papers on verification (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.3), safeguards (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.6) and draft elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.14) submitted by the Group, and reading out recommendations 47, 50, 69, 70, 71, 72, 75, 76 and 77 of the Group's substantive recommendations for incorporation into the Final Document of the 2015 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.24), recommendations 43, 44, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55 of the Group's substantive recommendations submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.17) and paragraph 24 of its working paper on regional issues (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.49) submitted to the 2015 Review Conference.

24. **Mr. Grossi** (Argentina), speaking on behalf of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, said that the aim of the Group was to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons by reinforcing the objective of article III.2 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, namely ensuring that nuclear exports should contribute to peaceful nuclear cooperation. That was why it had developed guidelines aimed at ensuring that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes did not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. They went beyond article III.2 of the Treaty to cover technology and dual-use equipment and were frequently updated to reflect developments in the field. The Group commended the increasing number of States outside the Group that had harmonized their domestic legislation with its guidelines, in line with action 36 of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (vol. I)), and expected more States to participate in such efforts to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation. The guidelines had also been applied more widely to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime; for example, they had been used to set the scope of various bilateral nuclear agreements.

25. While effective export controls had an important role to play in ensuring non-proliferation, they also had a significant positive effect in promoting legitimate

trade and investment. The Group was much encouraged by the fact that in recent decades States outside the Group had come to recognize the need for effective export controls. During that time, the Group had made concerted efforts to promote openness and transparency and dispel the misperception that it was a closed, exclusive group. It now had an outreach programme and published a public statement on its website after every plenary meeting.

26. Mexico and Serbia had joined the Group since the 2010 Review Conference. Between 2010 and 2013, the Group had carried out a fundamental technological review of its control lists and established a group of experts tasked with keeping the lists in line with technical advancements. At its plenary meeting in 2011, members had agreed to clarify the guidelines on the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment, material and technologies, which was the most sensitive area in terms of nuclear weapon development. At the 2012 plenary meeting, the Group had agreed to modify its guidelines in order to facilitate access to nuclear material for peaceful uses. It had also approved a guidance paper on streamlining and strengthening its outreach activities. In 2013, it had decided to launch a multilingual public website and to amend the guidelines to take into account IAEA recommendations for physical protection. The focus of the 2014 plenary meeting had been on promulgating its guidelines in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Since the previous Review Conference, outreach information exchange seminars had been held in Jordan, the United States and Austria, and Group chairs had participated at events in Japan and Slovenia. The Group had also increased its cooperation and information sharing activities with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), in accordance with Security Council resolution 1977 (2011). In that regard, the Group's members could provide models for strict and effective national export control systems and share their expertise and extensive experience in the practical implementation of such systems.

27. In light of the nature and increasing importance of civil nuclear cooperation and international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology, the Group remained committed to strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy to supplement efforts under the Treaty regime. The Group

was also committed to enhancing the level of transparency of its activities and promoting dialogue.

28. Speaking in his national capacity, he said that Argentina believed that promoting and fostering a safe and secure nuclear energy market required cooperation, especially in the area of nuclear export control, and that the Group had an essential role to play in that regard. Through responsible action and international cooperation, his country had carved out a place for itself in the nuclear export market. During that process it had benefitted from the Group's role in enabling countries wishing to develop peaceful nuclear power programmes to acquire the best nuclear technologies available without undermining non-proliferation efforts. His country had a well-developed nuclear sector with three nuclear power plants, a strong industry base for research, an impeccable safety record and broad public support.

29. Under his country's chairmanship of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, there would be a focus on keeping pace with the developments, market trends and security challenges of nuclear technology. According to IAEA, 30 countries currently had nuclear power and an additional 30 were considering, planning or actively working to introduce nuclear energy. Argentina welcomed the increasing employment of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes worldwide, especially in developing countries, but recognized that the dissemination of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies presented an increased level of risk, as those technologies could produce fissile materials that could be directly used in nuclear weapons. The Group was an indispensable mechanism for ensuring that the nuclear trade, cooperation and transfer could proceed safely yet unhindered by unnecessary obstacles.

30. **Mr. Seokolo** (South Africa) said that safeguards contributed to mutual confidence in the peaceful nature of a State's nuclear activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities or material, which in turn would greatly facilitate the transfer of nuclear technology and the use of nuclear energy to the benefit of developing countries. At the same time, it was essential that safeguards measures should not adversely affect the inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy as envisaged in articles III and IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

31. South Africa maintained its principled position that it was the obligation of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to accept safeguards. All States that had yet to bring comprehensive safeguards agreements into force were urged to do so as soon as possible. His delegation was encouraged to note that 124 additional protocols were now in force. While additional protocols were not Treaty obligations, they were indispensable to enabling IAEA to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities and important tools in providing the necessary confidence in the peaceful nature of a nuclear activities, particularly in the case of States with advanced nuclear programmes. His delegation recommended that the 2015 Review Conference reaffirm that IAEA was the only internationally recognized competent authority responsible for verifying compliance with safeguards agreements.

32. His delegation had consistently expressed support for measures that would strengthen the safeguards system and had actively participated in discussions, consultations and decisions on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the system in IAEA. It welcomed the Agency's assurance that the State-level concept would not affect the rights or obligations of States or the Agency. In that regard, his delegation recommended that the Conference reiterate that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly and that decisions adopted by the Agency's policy-making bodies with a view to increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented by States.

33. His delegation noted that, in addition to their voluntary offer agreements, the five nuclear-weapon States had additional protocols in force and that IAEA had found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied. However, given that the specific actions agreed upon at the 2010 Review Conference included the development of legally binding arrangements to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material no longer required for military purposes, it was disappointing that no progress had been made with regard to additional declarations of stockpiled fissile material. Nuclear-weapon States must also refrain from withdrawing nuclear material from the selected facilities provided for in their respective agreements and apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability

and transparency to their Treaty obligations. His delegation therefore recommended that the 2015 Review Conference should reiterate the call for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and should stress that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons had been achieved. It also recommended that the Conference support the establishment of worldwide nuclear disarmament, under appropriate safeguards, and the development of appropriate, legally binding arrangements for IAEA verification in order to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to emphasize the statutory role of IAEA in nuclear disarmament. Those measures should include applying safeguards to nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons. Lastly, the Conference should urge the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring all weapon-grade fissile material in their possession to IAEA and to place such material under the supervision of the Agency or other relevant international verification arrangements as soon as practicable, in order to ensure that such material was never used for military purposes.

34. All States must remain vigilant with regard to the risks associated with the continued existence of nuclear weapons, including those relating to the illicit nuclear network and the threat of nuclear terrorism or other criminal activity involving radioactive material. His Government was committed to maintaining effective nuclear security at the national level and to cooperating with other States to raise nuclear security levels internationally. In that regard, it recommended that the 2015 Review Conference recognize that the primary responsibility for nuclear security lay with individual States; that IAEA had a mandate and central role to play in the area of nuclear security; and that any process to develop multilateral norms, guidelines or rules in nuclear security should be pursued within the IAEA framework and negotiated multilaterally in a gradual, inclusive and transparent manner.

35. South Africa continued to support the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the Middle East, as such zones played an important role in the

prevention of the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. They could also be significant in the promotion of regional and sub-regional programmes for cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology. His country looked forward to further ratification of the Treaty of Pelindaba. It welcomed the fact that four of the nuclear-weapon States had ratified the protocols to that Treaty and encouraged the fifth nuclear-weapon State to complete the ratification process. The one non-nuclear-weapon State that had yet to become a party to Protocol III to the Treaty was urged to complete that process without delay.

36. **Mr. Ozawa** (Japan) said that while the Treaty regime continued to be the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it had been facing serious challenges which could undermine confidence in the Treaty. All States must redouble their non-proliferation efforts in order to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while minimizing threats posed by possible nuclear proliferation.

37. The Committee needed to address a number of issues, including the IAEA safeguards. Japan was determined to promote actions to strengthen the IAEA safeguards further and welcomed the fact that more than 20 States had concluded additional protocols since the last Review Conference. That substantial increase showed the progress in universalization of the model additional protocol which, together with the comprehensive safeguards agreement, should be the safeguards standard. All States that had not yet concluded such agreements and additional protocols thereto should do so as soon as possible. In that regard, in December 2010, Japan had established the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security in an attempt to facilitate the ratification and implementation of an additional protocol for developing countries. Japan also called on supplier States to implement safeguards standards as a condition for supplying nuclear material, equipment and technology to a recipient country and, at the same time, for wider application of safeguards in the nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, given the importance of promoting more effective and efficient safeguards, all States should provide all political, technical and financial support to enable the Agency to continue to discharge its responsibilities fully.

38. Given the critical role of export controls in meeting nuclear non-proliferation obligations, some Asian countries had introduced or were in the process of introducing comprehensive legislation since the 2010 Review Conference. The increasing complexity of illicit procurement activities made it vital for all States to further strengthen national export control systems, including catch-all controls. Recalling action 36 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, he encouraged State parties to refer to and align with the relevant multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings, which would not only enhance their export transparency and competitiveness, but also strengthen the non-proliferation regime. In that regard, Japan would continue to assist other States, especially its Asian partners, in their efforts, including through the annual Asian Export Control Seminar.

39. Since the 2010 Review Conference, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had continued nuclear testing and missile development and further developed its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. Furthermore, it had taken no steps to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing programmes as agreed and, despite calls by the international community, had not yet retracted its announced withdrawal from the Treaty. Those intolerable actions constituted a serious threat to the international non-proliferation regime and to international security. The Conference should send North Korea a clear and robust message that it condemned the continued development of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and urged the country not to take any further provocative actions, including nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches, and to take promptly concrete actions to fulfil its commitments under the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. Furthermore, North Korea should fully comply with relevant Security Council resolutions and must immediately cease all nuclear-related activities, especially in Yongbyon. Sending such a message was not simply an issue for Japan or its neighbours, but was vital to credibility of the Treaty.

40. Japan welcomed the political understanding reached by the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran and commended efforts made by all parties. It was hoped that the ongoing negotiations would lead to a final and comprehensive resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue. Though such a resolution was,

understandably, not imminent, it would help to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime. In high-level exchanges with Iran, Japan had been emphasizing the importance of demonstrating flexibility and had also urged ratification of the IAEA additional protocol and the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay. Iran should cooperate fully with the Agency on outstanding issues, including possible military dimensions, in order to inspire greater trust with regard to its activities. The importance of the Agency's verification and monitoring work could not be overemphasized and Japan would continue to its efforts to guarantee the peaceful nature of all Iranian nuclear activities.

41. Japan fervently supported the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, in accordance with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the Final Documents of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. His country's high-level diplomatic engagement had been contributing to efforts to hold the international conference in Helsinki as recommended in 2010. While appreciative of efforts made thus far through five rounds of consultations, Japan encouraged the stakeholders to reach an agreement at the earliest and would continue to cooperate with all interested parties to that end. Middle East States should participate in the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, including the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Furthermore, Israel should accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

42. Welcome progress had been made in nuclear security since 2010 through various international initiatives. Among the tangible achievements made in Japan was the conclusion in 2014 of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. States that had not yet done so should conclude the Amendment to bring it into force as soon as possible. Japan had also received an International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission conducted by IAEA and, during the last Nuclear Security Summit had announced its pledge to remove all highly-enriched uranium and separated plutonium

from the fast critical assembly research reactors in Japan.

43. **Ms. García Guiza** (Mexico), recalling the importance of balance between the mutually reinforcing agendas of disarmament and non-proliferation, said that Mexico had more than fulfilled its non-proliferation obligations, in accordance with article III of the Treaty. In that regard, the important work of IAEA in the area of verifications and safeguards strengthened the non-proliferation regime. It was important for all States Parties, including all nuclear-weapons States, to fulfil their international obligations by cooperating with the Agency and implementing all relevant resolutions, including Security Council resolutions. Mexico contributed to global non-proliferation efforts through effective national controls on transfers of nuclear material, dual-use goods and related technology to prevent their direct or indirect use in the development or manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In that regard, her country exceeded its obligations under international law and its participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Group was a means of implementing its international security responsibilities.

44. Mexico supported the creation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones as an effective disarmament measure. The establishment of such zones around the world must be freely agreed to by the parties involved. In that sense, Mexico would respect the sovereign decisions of States wishing to conclude treaties for establishing new denuclearized zones. However, militarily denuclearized zones were not an end in themselves; they represented an important intermediate step towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. In that regard, it must be recognized that 116 countries — the vast majority of the international community — had signed treaties establishing such zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia and Central Asia, setting the foundations for a world free of nuclear weapons. Mexico therefore called upon all nuclear-weapon States to withdraw their reservations or interpretative declarations to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the protocols thereto, which would make them truly free of the threat of nuclear weapons.

45. The general debate held during the recent Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and

Mongolia reaffirmed the contribution of those zones to international peace and security and the non-proliferation regime. However, Mexico regretted that the outcome document of that Conference had not yet been adopted as planned. Her delegation also regretted the postponement of the Helsinki conference, which had been an essential part of the commitments for the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995, and called for the convening of that conference as soon as possible.

46. As an active promoter of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Mexico called upon Annex 2 countries to ratify that Treaty as soon as possible and encouraged them to refrain from conducting nuclear tests and from acts that would go against the object and purpose of the Treaty. While Mexico recognized the effectiveness of the Treaty's verification and monitoring system, it also recognized the need to conclude a treaty on fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, which was a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. The negotiation of such a treaty should be seen as part of a broad and comprehensive process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and should include elements such as the regulation of existing fissile material, a verification mechanism and confidence building measures. The several draft texts for the instrument should be considered as a basis for negotiation, without limiting the discussion and the analysis of other proposals, thus avoiding a discriminatory scheme. It was hoped that negotiations would be as inclusive as possible, given that disarmament and non-proliferation were relevant to all of humanity and not only a select few.

47. **Ms. Zanathy** (Observer for the European Union), speaking also on behalf of the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; the stabilization and association process country Bosnia and Herzegovina; and Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, said that the European Union remained fully committed to effective multilateral action against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and called on all States parties to implement, without delay and in a balanced manner, the 64 actions of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference. It also called on States that had not yet signed the Treaty to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States and, pending that, to adhere to

its terms and pledge commitments to non-proliferation and disarmament.

48. It was vital to strengthen the common understanding of States parties on effective responses to a State party's withdrawal from the Treaty, which included drawing attention to the potential implications thereof for international peace and security and urging the Security Council to address, without delay, any State party's notice of withdrawal from the Treaty. Any withdrawing State was still liable for violations of the Treaty perpetrated prior to withdrawal. The continued proliferation threats to international peace and security must be addressed resolutely in order to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of the Treaty regime. In that context, it was the primary responsibility of the Security Council to maintain international peace and security.

49. The European Union had repeatedly condemned in the strongest terms the nuclear tests, satellite launches using ballistic missile technology and recent launches of short range missiles conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in blatant violation of its international obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions. The European Union remained seriously concerned about the latest developments in that country's nuclear programme, in particular the uranium enrichment programme and the ongoing activities within the Yongbyon site. It urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with its international obligations fully, unconditionally and without delay. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea should abandon all its existing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and refrain from any further provocative actions and statements, including trade in related technologies. Further, the European Union urged it to return to the Treaty and IAEA safeguards at an early date and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

50. Welcoming the agreement reached by the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran on key parameters of a comprehensive Joint Plan of Action, the European Union fully supported the ongoing diplomatic efforts of the parties to conclude, by 30 June, a plan that would ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. Notwithstanding the conclusion of the Framework for Cooperation with IAEA, Iran had not yet produced a

clarification of the possible military dimensions. The European Union therefore urged Iran to cooperate fully and without delay with the Agency on all outstanding issues. However, the European Union deeply regretted that despite the resolution on implementation of the safeguards agreement by the Syrian Arab Republic, adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 9 June 2011, and the Syrian Government's pledge to respond positively and without delay to the Agency's request to resolve all outstanding questions, that country had yet to cooperate. Syria must remedy urgently its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement and sign and promptly implement an additional protocol.

51. The European Union reaffirmed its full support for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. It continued to support the outcome of the 2010 Review Conference concerning the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and regretted the failure to convene a conference on the establishment thereof. While commending all involved for their tireless efforts in that regard, the European Union called on all stakeholders to undertake consultations urgently so that the Conference could be convened as soon as possible, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at between the States of the region. Maintaining dialogue and building confidence in the region contributed to the realisation of the objectives of the 1995 resolution.

52. The European Union recognized the importance of appropriate effective export controls, in accordance with Article III, paragraph 2 of the Treaty and relevant Security Council resolutions. In that context, it fully supported the activities of the international export control regimes and the participation of the European Union member States therein. The Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group continued to be important fora in that regard, including by maintaining up-to-date guidelines and control lists. From 2010 to 2015, the European Union provided some €7 million in assistance to third countries to improve their relevant legal frameworks and institutional capacities.

53. The proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction continued to be a serious concern, which was heightened by a number of tests conducted in recent years, outside all existing transparency and pre-notification schemes and in violation of Security Council resolutions, especially by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iran. A multilateral response and international norms were the most

adequate and effective way to address that issue. In that regard, the European Union strongly supported the Missile Technology Control Regime and the objectives of the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (The Hague Code of Conduct), which was the only multilateral transparency and confidence building instrument addressing ballistic missile proliferation.

54. Noting the fundamental and indispensable role of the IAEA safeguards system in the implementation of the Treaty, and that comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols thereto constituted the current IAEA verification standard under Article III of the Treaty, the European Union called for their prompt universalization. At the end of 2014, 42 States still had operative small quantities protocols to be amended. The European Union urged those States to accelerate their efforts and reiterated its longstanding support for the evolution of safeguards as exemplified by the development of the State-level concept.

55. In addition to European Union support for the work of IAEA through the EURATOM Safeguards system and the provision of technical assistance through regional and national support programmes, its close cooperation with the Agency contributed to the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards and ensured member States' continued compliance with international non-proliferation obligations. The European Union, including through individual contributions of some member States, had contributed more than €18.5 million towards the modernization of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory and had also provided technology and expertise from the European Commission's Joint Research Centre and its Institutes. It also supported IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and was among the main contributors to the Agency's Nuclear Security Fund, having committed around €40 million to date to assist in strengthening nuclear security in more than 100 countries, in addition to technical support provided to IAEA in several other fields. The European Union intended to continue to support the Agency's work in recognition of its central role in the global nuclear security architecture.

56. In the light of the serious threat to international security posed by non-state actors obtaining weapons of mass destruction, the European Union underlined both the need for compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions and the importance of the

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. All States should sign and comply fully with the provisions of that Convention. Furthermore, the European Union and its member States called for improved security for high activity radioactive sources to reduce the risk of misappropriation and malicious use thereof. As part of its strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the European Union actively supported relevant Security Council resolutions and other international initiatives, including, inter alia, the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and the Proliferation Security Initiative. Effective physical protection was vital to prevent nuclear material falling into the hands of terrorists and proliferators, and to protect nuclear facilities against malicious acts. The European Union therefore called on all States that had not yet done so to sign the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities and to adhere to the 2005 amendment, so that the Convention might promptly enter into force. It also underlined the importance of ensuring the security of information relating to nuclear and other radioactive materials and appreciated the recent publication of IAEA guidance thereon.

57. Firmly convinced of the benefits of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, the European Union welcomed IAEA efforts to set up a low-enriched uranium (LEU) bank in Kazakhstan under the control of the Agency, a project to which it had contributed € 20 million, and looked forward to the early conclusion of the Host State Agreement and Transit Agreement.

58. **Ms. Stromšíková** (Czech Republic) said that the Czech Republic acknowledged the positive results of the work of the United Nations and numerous international control regimes and initiatives in the area of non-proliferation, which had strengthened the second pillar of the Treaty as never before. However, despite the general recognition of the undisputable validity of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), not all States complied with Security Council and IAEA resolutions or acted in line with the Treaty. Her country supported the right of States Parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but in full conformity with their non-proliferation obligations. Non-compliance should be challenged and States should be held responsible and accountable for their violations. All cases of non-compliance must be

reported, as required by the IAEA Statute, to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. A few such cases had been undermining the global non-proliferation system and international security for several years.

59. The Czech Republic therefore fully supported the Nuclear Security Summit process, which contributed to maintaining effective security and preventing non-State actors from acquiring nuclear materials. Through the framework of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and with the assistance of the United States, the Czech Republic had successfully repatriated all of its highly enriched uranium and converted all of its research reactors to low-enriched uranium fuel, thus effectively becoming a country free of highly enriched uranium and fulfilling one of the main objectives of the summit process.

60. In that regard, the Czech Republic emphasized the unique nature and role of IAEA, which, through its verification activities, directly contributed to bolstering international confidence and the credibility of the Treaty regime. In view of the challenges facing the Agency, the international community had a shared responsibility to ensure that the Agency had sufficient resources to fulfil its mandate stemming from the Treaty and all other tasks assigned to it. Her country remained fully committed to strengthening the IAEA safeguards system and had participated actively in Member State Support Programmes since 2002, organizing training for safeguards inspectors, developing and testing new IAEA surveillance systems and offering high quality analytical services in the field of nuclear materials.

61. To optimize IAEA verification activities, new verification standards were needed. The Czech Republic had long supported establishing additional protocols as the core standard of the verification process and the Agency's verification activities were essential for ensuring the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes. The acceptance of additional protocols was a deterrent to nuclear proliferation and introduced a "next logical level" concept in the implementation of integrated safeguards, the optimal combination of all safeguard measures available to the Agency.

62. **Mr. Biontino** (Germany) said that a firm non-proliferation regime was one of the crucial preconditions for the shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. The 2015 Review Conference should

thus acknowledge progress achieved in connection with non-proliferation crises. Regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, the Conference should take note of the substantial progress achieved during the review cycle. It was self-evident that Germany welcomed the agreement on parameters for a comprehensive Joint Plan of Action reached on 2 April, to be drafted into a final text by 30 June. While much work still lay ahead, it was well worth the effort as the Plan of Action would dispel the international community's concerns regarding the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and ensure that Iran did not acquire nuclear weapons. In that context the importance of the continued effective implementation of the 2013 Joint Plan of Action and the essential role played by IAEA in verifying the nuclear-related measures were undeniable.

63. Unfortunately, there had been little progress with regard to the non-compliance of other countries with their nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation obligations. The Conference should call on the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the Agency by providing access to the requested information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in that country. It should also condemn again, in the strongest possible terms, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for its ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and aggressive nuclear messaging and urge it to take concrete steps to honour its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks. That country must refrain from further nuclear testing, immediately cease all nuclear activities and launches using ballistic missile technology, and abandon all nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner as required by the relevant Security Council resolutions.

64. A robust nuclear non-proliferation system depended on the effective implementation of the IAEA safeguards system and adequate resources and political support for the Agency. The Conference should promote an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an additional protocol as the international verification standard, which should be taken into consideration during decisions on supplying nuclear fuel, equipment or technology. It should call on all States which had not yet done so to sign and bring into force an additional protocol and, where relevant, adopt the modified small quantities protocols. It should

also support the strengthening of export control regimes, which were an essential and complementary part of the international non-proliferation system. States Parties should be encouraged to adhere to the multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and best practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee in developing their domestic export control systems.

65. The dangerous combination of modern-day risks and challenges emanating from terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regional conflicts must be addressed with resolve. It was important to be aware of the challenges of maintaining a sufficient level of nuclear security, which was a complex task in peaceful and stable conditions and compounded in crisis conditions. The action plan of the 2010 Review Conference contained key recommendations in that regard. The Conference should take stock of progress already achieved in terms of structures, know-how and standards and in raising awareness on nuclear security. It was now up to the international community and to the relevant organisations and initiatives to make sure that those achievements were put into practice and the Conference should send a strong signal to that end. It should underline the importance of an effective and sustainable international nuclear security architecture that strengthened cooperation between the various stakeholders in making progress towards the shared vision of a world without nuclear threats.

66. Germany remained committed to the objective of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and stood by the pertinent decisions taken in the context of the Treaty. While his delegation commended the ongoing efforts of the facilitator and co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, it deeply regretted that, despite those persistent efforts, it had thus far not been possible to convene the Helsinki conference. After several rounds of consultations, progress had been made on which it should be possible to build. The current Review Conference should send a strong signal of support for advancing that important issue.

67. **Ms. Arfaoui Harbaoui** (Tunisia), speaking on behalf of the League of Arab States, said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Its credibility depended on States adopting a balanced and equitable

approach to its three pillars, namely nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, and on the extent to which the Treaty's universality was achieved. Indeed, the objectives set forth in the Treaty could only be realized following the accession of the remaining non-State parties as non-nuclear States. It was crucial, therefore, that all States parties, and in particular nuclear-weapon States, redoubled their efforts to achieve the universality of the Treaty, in accordance with their obligations under that Treaty and the outcomes of previous Review Conferences, which, *inter alia*, prohibited the transfer of all nuclear weapons and related technologies to non-States parties. In that connection, Arab States categorically rejected the provision of all technical assistance to non-States parties and all attempts to legitimize the nuclear status of non-States parties, which threatened to irreversibly undermine global non-proliferation efforts. Non-States parties were urged to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguard regimes.

68. Efforts by certain nuclear-weapon States to upgrade their nuclear arsenals constituted a threat to international peace and security. All States parties must comply with the provisions and the spirit of the Treaty so that the world could finally eliminate nuclear weapons, in accordance with relevant General Assembly resolutions. Furthermore, while attempts were made to proscribe the right of States parties to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, certain States parties possessing nuclear technologies and materials were cooperating on nuclear matters with non-States parties to the Treaty. Such blatant double standards contravened Decision 2, paragraph 12, on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, issued by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. It was, moreover, alarming that, in contravention of article 3, paragraph 2 of the Treaty and further undermining its credibility, non-States parties were repeatedly allowed to circumvent the strict rules imposed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which prohibited the transfer of nuclear materials to non-States parties that had not subjected all their nuclear facilities to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime.

69. Although many Arab States had chosen to sign additional protocols with IAEA, they rejected attempts

to make the voluntary signing of an additional protocol a necessary precondition for access to peaceful nuclear energy technologies and expertise on how those technologies could be used to foster development, particularly when no such preconditions were imposed on certain non-States parties. The reinterpretation of any article of the Treaty with a view to frustrating States' exercise of their fundamental right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy thwarted the very goals for which Treaty had been adopted. Arab States reaffirmed, moreover, that IAEA remained the only competent authority with a mandate to verify compliance by States parties with their Treaty obligations. It was unacceptable to impose new obligations on non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty before real progress had been achieved on its universalization, on nuclear disarmament, and on the implementation of States parties' existing obligations, including their obligation to implement the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. That resolution was an integral part of the Treaty extension package and the establishment a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction remained critically important. A working paper (NPT/CONF2015/WP.33) on the implementation of the 1995 resolution and 2010 outcome on the Middle East had been submitted by Bahrain on behalf of the Arab Group.

70. The League of Arab States also urged all States, and particularly nuclear-weapon States, that had yet to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to do so at the earliest opportunity with a view to facilitating its entry into force and achieving its universality.

71. **Mr. Hansen** (Australia) said that Australia firmly supported the Treaty, the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, as it had provided important security benefits to all States and prevented a global nuclear arms race. States parties must continue to reaffirm their support for the norms established by the Treaty. A country pursuing nuclear proliferation activities could threaten international peace and security and undermine the integrity of the Treaty and the global non-proliferation architecture. In that regard, Australia remained deeply concerned by the actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which was the only nation that still maintained an active nuclear explosive testing program, challenging the

non-proliferation regime and contravening established international norms. His delegation strongly urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and to return to compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement and the Treaty. No State party should be silent on that matter.

72. On a more positive note, Australia welcomed the announcement of a framework on the parameters of a comprehensive agreement over the Iranian nuclear programme. That was an important step towards a final agreement that, it was hoped, would address international concerns about the country's nuclear programme. He urged it to engage constructively to complete the negotiations for the comprehensive Joint Plan of Action by the end of June.

73. Australia had long been a strong supporter of the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose safeguards system provided an essential service: the assurance it gave was not only essential to preventing nuclear weapons proliferation, but also fundamental to ensuring confidence in trade and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and an important factor in continuing progress on nuclear disarmament. The Agency must be given adequate resources for safeguards to remain an effective instrument for verification, as required by the Treaty. Consistent with actions 25 and 28 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, Australia called on all States that had not yet concluded and implemented a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol with IAEA to do so without delay. However, safeguards were not static and should be continually assessed, as agreed at the 1995 and 2010 Review Conferences. The Agency should therefore be supported in taking steps to ensure that safeguards remained effective.

74. Australia recognized the need to ensure that relevant export control guidelines kept pace with technological and other developments. As part of those efforts, and consistent with its position as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia urged all States parties to establish, maintain and implement effective export controls over nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items and technology. It also encouraged all States parties to harmonise their export controls with relevant guidelines. Compliance with IAEA safeguards was a prerequisite for the supply of Australian uranium to any country and ensured that its uranium supply was

only ever used for peaceful purposes. Australia continued to abide by NSG rules and to meet its international obligations as a nuclear supplier in accordance with action 35.

75. Nuclear-weapon-free zones played an important role in strengthening the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. As a long-standing supporter of such zones, Australia strongly supported the early convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, and encouraged all interested States parties in the region to engage in a spirit of genuine and constructive cooperation to convene the conference.

76. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons was in the interests of all and should be pursued with vigour, resilience and determination. It was central to the Treaty's continuing relevance. It was a shared responsibility to support new initiatives to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime and ensure that no other States or non-State actors ever acquired nuclear weapons.

77. **Mr. Badr** (Egypt), recalling the objectives of the Treaty, said that while non-proliferation was an essential pillar of the Treaty, its effectiveness depended on achieving parallel progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. Promoting horizontal and vertical non-proliferation, consistent with Treaty obligations and those undertaken by consensus in the context of Review Conferences, was also essential. The current Conference should review the implementation of Treaty obligations in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, in all its aspects, taking into account relevant obligations adopted at previous Review Conferences, and decide on necessary measures for the full implementation of the Treaty.

78. In that regard, he proposed five actions that the Conference should undertake. Firstly, it should reaffirm the mutually-reinforcing relationship between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, confirming that progress on nuclear non-proliferation remained unsustainable without parallel progress in nuclear disarmament. Secondly, it should express regret that progress in the prevention of horizontal proliferation continued to be undermined by States non-parties to the Treaty that operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and conducted activities that contradicted the letter and spirit of the Treaty. Thirdly, it should affirm that greater transparency in nuclear weapons

programmes in nuclear-weapon States was required in order to verify progress in vertical proliferation and in nuclear disarmament. Fourthly, it should reaffirm that achieving universal ratification of the Treaty was vital to address non-proliferation challenges effectively and renew the collective commitment of States parties to pursue universal ratification. Lastly, it should reaffirm the importance of strict observance, by individual States parties as well as supply regimes, of the provisions stipulated in the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, in particular paragraph 12.

79. The non-establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction was the most flagrant of the unfulfilled commitments undertaken under the Treaty and Review Conferences. It epitomized the failure of the Treaty to deliver on legal obligations. Twenty years had elapsed since the adoption without a vote of the resolution on the Middle East, which had been an integral part of the package of decisions including the indefinite extension of the Treaty. The resolution remained the sole such text on a specific regional case, reflecting the particularity of the Middle East and its role in international peace and security. However, despite its crucial importance to the integrity and the sustainability of the Treaty, and notwithstanding the 2010 agreement on practical steps to implement it, it remained unfulfilled. The latest attempt to do so had been compromised by the lack of sufficient political will by some of the depositaries of the 1995 resolution. Meanwhile, the unilateral and unreasoned announcement of the postponement of the Conference would waste a further five years and added to a record of unfulfilled commitments.

80. Egypt and the Arab Group had spared no effort to implement the 2010 action plan, constantly engaging with the facilitator, including in informal meetings convened in Vienna, Glion and Geneva. Regrettably, that positive approach had been not reciprocated, but had been met by unreasonable efforts to empty the previously agreed Conference and mandate of its substantive content, and to launch an open-ended and futile pre-negotiation process in which the United Nations did not have a clear role. That derailed the process laid out at the 2010 Review Conference and threatened to undermine the 1995 resolution, if not the whole extension package. The consultations in Switzerland had merely given a false impression of

progress to the international community, while at the same time eroding confidence and entrenching divergence that could only block any effort to achieve the objective.

81. After five rounds of going in circles, it had been very clear that the informal meetings had reached their point of diminishing returns; the process lacked vision, clarity, transparency, structure, and above all political will. While some delegations would state that the mere fact that the parties had returned to the negotiating table constituted headway, the meetings had further divided parties and could not therefore be considered progress. Egypt and the Arab Group could not wait forever for the launch of a process already committed to under the Treaty. They could not continue to attend meetings and agree on outcomes that remained unimplemented, yet be expected to abide by the concessions they had made. In that context, it was important to underline that, with the failure to hold the 2012 Helsinki conference and the 2015 review cycle ending, the mandate of the facilitator, as stipulated in the 2010 Action Plan, had lapsed. Business as usual was no longer an option; a fresh approach was imperative. His and other delegations were not interested in a blame game, but intended to be forward-looking and engage in constructive discussion to achieve the original objective. To that end, the working papers presented by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties and the Arab Group ([NPT/CONF.2015/WP.33](#), [NPT/CONF.2015/WP.49](#)) provided a simplified approach laying out practical and detailed steps for initiating the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The working papers, whose elements were in accordance with the principles for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as adopted by the General Assembly and by the United Nations Disarmament Commission, called on the Conference to adopt them by consensus and to begin to fulfil the unimplemented obligations stipulated in the 1995 resolution. Convening the Helsinki conference was not an end in itself but a means to an end, and was perhaps the last opportunity to reassert the credibility of the Treaty and the relevant Review Conferences. The current Review Conference must take a step forward, not two steps back. It should send a strong and positive message to the world that the Treaty parties were willing and able to take concrete steps to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.