

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

28 April 2010

Original: English

New York, 3-28 May 2010

Working paper submitted by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

I. Introduction

1. Building on the working papers presented by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the first, second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee, the present working paper represents the Group's inputs to be considered by the 2010 Review Conference (previous working papers are contained in the documents NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.5, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.7, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.9, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.11, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.12, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.16 and NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.30).

II. Procedural and other arrangements pertaining to the Preparatory Committee and the 2010 Review Conference of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty

2. The Group recalls that the Preparatory Committee, at its third session, adopted the draft provisional agenda of the 2010 Review Conference, according to which the Conference is mandated to review the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII (3), taking into account the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.¹

3. In the context of the above-mentioned mandate, the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty calls for an agreement, in accordance with rule 34 of the draft rules of procedure for the 2010 Review Conference, to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the 2010 Review Conference to deliberate on 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons; to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of

¹ 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, *Final Document*, vols. I-III (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I-IV)).



the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference;² and to consider and adopt a legally binding international instrument on unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

III. Recommendations pertaining to the principles and objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Basic principles and objectives

Recommendation 1

To emphasize that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the key international instrument aimed at halting the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, achieving nuclear disarmament and promoting international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Recommendation 2

To reaffirm that the balanced implementation of the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a non-discriminatory manner, remains essential for the effectiveness of the Treaty in realizing its objectives.

Recommendation 3

To reiterate that the continued existence of nuclear weapons represents a significant threat to humanity and that the full and effective implementation of all Treaty obligations, including in particular by nuclear-weapon States, plays a crucial role in promoting international peace and security.

Recommendation 4

To reaffirm the commitment of nuclear-weapon States to their undertakings on nuclear disarmament, including the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Recommendation 5

To reaffirm that each article of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is binding on States parties without distinction, and that States parties are required to comply strictly with their obligations under the Treaty as well as with those agreed by consensus at the review conferences of the Treaty, including, in particular, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference.

Nuclear doctrine and nuclear sharing

Recommendation 6

To note with deep concern security doctrines of nuclear-weapon States, including the “NATO Alliance Strategic Concept”, which not only set out rationales

² 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, *Final Document, Part I* (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) and Corr.2), annex.

for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies.

Recommendation 7

To reaffirm that every effort should be made to implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty. **Emphasize**, in this context, the particular importance attached to the strict observance of articles I and II.

Recommendation 8

To stress the importance of reaffirmation by nuclear-weapon States of their obligations, and full implementation of article I, and refrain from nuclear weapon-sharing with other States under any kind of security arrangements, including in the framework of military alliances.

Recommendation 9

To stress the importance of reaffirmation by non-nuclear-weapon States of their commitments to the full implementation of article II and to refrain from nuclear weapon-sharing with nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States and States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements in times of peace or in times of war, including in the framework of military alliances.

Nuclear disarmament

Recommendation 10

To reconfirm that negotiations on a fissile material treaty should be conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed both at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference.

Recommendation 11

To reaffirm the importance of the application of the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility by nuclear-weapon States in all measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

Recommendation 12

To voice concern about the potential for an arms race in outer space, in which the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race and further nuclear proliferation.

Recommendation 13

To agree that the development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes and the lack of significant progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies

undermine disarmament commitments and work counter to the letter and spirit of the Treaty.

Nuclear testing

Recommendation 14

To reaffirm that the only way to rid the world of the threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. In this regard, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and, therefore, cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Recommendation 15

To support the objective of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all forms of nuclear tests without exception, and to stop the development of nuclear weapons, in the direction of total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Recommendation 16

To realize the objective of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the commitment to nuclear disarmament of all States signatories, especially the five nuclear-weapon States, is essential. The five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in making the test ban a reality.

Security assurances

Recommendation 17

To recall that at the 2000 Review Conference, States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had agreed, by consensus, that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Recommendation 18

To reiterate that the improvement in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the existing nuclear doctrines of some nuclear-weapon States, including the nuclear posture reviews of certain States, contravene the security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States and violate the commitments undertaken by them at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Recommendation 19

To reaffirm that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee that there will be no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by nuclear-weapon States that there will be no use or threat of use of such weapons. Efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Recommendation 20

To welcome the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world.

Recommendation 21

To welcome the ongoing consultations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and nuclear-weapon States on the Protocol to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) and urge nuclear-weapon States to become parties to the Protocol to that Treaty as soon as possible.

Recommendation 22

To welcome the entry into force of the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and Central Asia and to stress the importance of the signature and ratification of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty), and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Semipalatinsk Treaty), as well as Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, by all States in their respective regions and by all concerned States, as well as signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other relevant States that have not yet done so of the relevant protocols to those treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty.

Recommendation 23

To reiterate the crucial need for practical steps aimed at achieving speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East without any further delay.

Recommendation 24

To welcome the talks by Mongolia with its two neighbours to conclude the required legal instrument institutionalizing Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status.

Regional issues: Middle East

Recommendation 25

To intensify the efforts aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and **call for** cooperation and consultation among States parties in order to identify and adopt necessary practical steps to achieve that goal in implementing the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

Recommendation 26

To stress that the adoption of resolution GC(53)/RES/16 on application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the Middle East and resolution GC(53)/RES/17 on Israeli nuclear capabilities by the IAEA General

Conference are another manifestation of the threat posed by such capabilities to regional and international peace and security, and remain the main obstacles to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Recommendation 27

To express concern that Israel continues to refrain from acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty despite the accession of all other States in the region.

Recommendation 28

To reaffirm the 1995 resolution on the Middle East (as well as the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (part I)), which “calls upon all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards”.

Recommendation 29

To recall that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis on which the Non-Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended, without a vote, in 1995, and reaffirm that the resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved.

Recommendation 30

To reaffirm the 2000 Review Conference Final Document, which underscored the importance of Israel’s accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the Middle East.

Recommendation 31

To stress that the outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference should contain concrete and practical recommendations concerning the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, including a commitment by each State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to strictly prohibit the transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance to and cooperation with Israel in the nuclear fields, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. States parties to the Treaty should also undertake to disclose all information available to them on the nature and scope of Israeli nuclear capabilities, including information pertaining to previous nuclear transfers to Israel.

Safeguards and verification

Recommendation 32

To reaffirm that IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards

agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their Treaty obligations, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

Recommendation 33

To acknowledge that it is fundamental to make a distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings are not turned into legal safeguard obligations.

Recommendation 34

To confirm that the obligation under article III in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are **called upon** to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

Recommendation 35

While **expressing** full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of IAEA, **strongly rejects** attempts by any State to politicize the work of IAEA, including its technical cooperation programme, in violation of the IAEA statute, and **stresses** that any undue pressure of interference in IAEA, especially in its verification process, which could jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of IAEA, should be avoided.

Recommendation 36

To emphasize that the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should consult and cooperate in resolving their issues with regard to implementation of Treaty-related safeguards agreements within the IAEA framework.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Recommendation 37

To underscore that nothing in the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be interpreted to affect the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty.

Recommendation 38

To stress that nothing in the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the right of States parties to technical cooperation among themselves or with international organizations, keeping in view the needs of the developing States parties.

Recommendation 39

To recognize the rights of all States parties under the provisions of the preamble and the articles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and ensuring that no State party is limited in exercising its rights in conformity with the Treaty.

Recommendation 40

To reaffirm that each country's choices and decision in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements or its arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

Recommendation 41

To note with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes persist.

Recommendation 42

To emphasize that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their "sensitivity", and only stipulates that such equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards.

Recommendation 43

To reiterate that the issue of assurances of nuclear fuel supply is a very complex and multidimensional concept with technical, legal, commercial and economic implications. In order to reach a consensual conclusion, it is premature for this issue to be considered before extensive, comprehensive and transparent consultations are held. In this context, **to reject**, in principle, any attempts aimed at discouraging certain peaceful nuclear activities on the grounds of their alleged "sensitivity"; and **emphasize** that any ideas or proposals pertaining to the non-proliferation of any peaceful nuclear technology that are used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of such technology are inconsistent with the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Recommendation 44

To reiterate a need for caution while thoroughly addressing the associated technical, legal and economic aspects, as well as the underlying political dimensions of the issue of assurances of nuclear fuel supply, so that any proposal that eventually emerges in this regard is in full accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and takes into account the respective legal obligations of States parties and the principle of non-discrimination. **To underline** that any further consideration of the issue of nuclear fuel supply assurances must be based on a coherent and comprehensive conceptual framework that adequately addresses the views and concerns of all States parties; and **recall** the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which has made it clear that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable

material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Recommendation 45

To reaffirm the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities — operational or under construction — poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and regulations of IAEA. **To recognize** the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks, or the threat of attacks, on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Recommendation 46

To emphasize that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute.

Recommendation 47

To stress that the IAEA technical cooperation programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, is formulated in accordance with the IAEA statute and the guiding principles, thereby ensuring that the projects are consistent with all the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs. **To reiterate** that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective, and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the aforementioned objectives.

Recommendation 48

To stress its full support to all efforts aimed at strengthening the role of IAEA in line with the objectives of the IAEA statute. In this context, **to emphasize** that efforts towards strengthening all statutory activities of IAEA should be balanced.

Recommendation 49

To underline that concerns related to nuclear weapons proliferation shall not in any way restrict the inalienable right of all States parties to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In this context, **to underscore** the importance of peaceful nuclear technology for the sustainable socio-economic uplifting of developing nations, provided that nuclear activities are subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards.

Recommendation 50

To stress the importance of nuclear safety and security. While nuclear safety and security are national responsibilities, IAEA should play the key role in the development of international safety standards and nuclear security guidance based on best practices. **To emphasize** that undue nuclear safety and security concerns

should not be used to hamper the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, especially in developing countries.

IV. Action-oriented recommendations pertaining to the implementation of obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty

4. The 2010 Review Conference should establish the following set of recommendations pertaining to progress in the following fields: universality, nuclear disarmament, nuclear testing, security assurances, nuclear-weapon-free zones, regional issues, particularly in the Middle East, safeguards and verification, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Universality

Recommendation 51

To call on States that are not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, with a view to achieving its universality at the earliest possible time.

Recommendation 52

To call on all States parties to exert all possible efforts to promote universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and not to undertake any actions that could negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.

Recommendation 53

To reaffirm the integrity of article IX, paragraph 3 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the commitment of all States parties not to accord any status or recognition in any form contrary to the provisions of the Treaty to any State not party to the Treaty. **To reaffirm** also, towards the attainment of these objectives, the commitment of all States parties to prohibit completely the transfer or sharing of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources or devices, or the extension of scientific and technical assistance in the nuclear field, to States not parties to the Treaty in a manner inconsistent with the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by consensus at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

Nuclear disarmament

Recommendation 54

To call for the full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those agreed by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.

Recommendation 55

To accelerate the process of negotiations that should be undertaken, in accordance with article VI, as well as implementing the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, without further delay, in order to advance towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Recommendation 56

To agree on an action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, without delay. The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty presents its proposal to the Review Conference on such an action plan in a separate document.

Recommendation 57

To agree on a programme of work for the Conference on Disarmament that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations of a verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, with a view to its conclusion within five years.

Recommendation 58

To establish a standing committee by the Review Conference to monitor and verify nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement.

Recommendation 59

To reaffirm commitment by nuclear-weapon States to end the production of new types of nuclear weapons and the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons.

Recommendation 60

To establish, as a matter of priority, a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament, in Main Committee I, mandated to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI and further practical measures required to achieve progress in that regard.

Nuclear testing**Recommendation 61**

To stress the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, requiring its ratification by the remaining annex 2 States, including, in particular, by two nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and towards the enhancement of international peace and security.

Recommendation 62

To ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by Nuclear-Weapon States with all expediency. Positive decisions by nuclear-weapon States would have a beneficial impact towards the ratification of the Test-Ban Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to encourage progress on the entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty. These actions would encourage annex 2 States, in particular those which have not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Test-Ban Treaty.

Security assurances**Recommendation 63**

To call for the negotiation of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the realization of the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons, legally binding security assurances within the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty remain essential and should be materialized without further delay.

Recommendation 64

To seek the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to be undertaken to consider legally binding security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Legally binding security assurances within the context of the Treaty would provide an essential benefit to the States parties and to the credibility of the Treaty regime.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones**Recommendation 65**

To confirm that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty) and the Treaties of Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk, as well as Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, represents a positive step and an important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Recommendation 66

To urge nuclear-weapon States that, having signed or ratified some of the relevant protocols to a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, have done so with reservations or unilateral interpretations that affect the denuclearization status of that zone to modify or withdraw such reservations or unilateral interpretations.

Recommendation 67

To highlight the importance of holding the second Conference of States parties and Signatories to the Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

and Mongolia and its contribution to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

Middle East

Recommendation 68

To focus the activities of the 2010 Review Conference substantially on the Middle East including, in particular, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region in accordance with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; and to recommend that States parties to the Treaty, in particular the three Treaty depositories and sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, should report on steps they have taken to promote the undelayed establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

Recommendation 69

To recommend the establishment of a standing committee composed of members of the Bureau of the 2010 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally on the implementation of the recommendations concerning the Middle East and to report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committees.

Recommendation 70

To recommend the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2010 Review Conference to consider and recommend proposals on concrete practical steps to promote the earliest implementation of the resolution on the Middle East.

Recommendation 71

To call upon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to provide appropriate support in order to facilitate the implementation of IAEA General Conference resolutions GC(53)/RES/16 on application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and GC(53)/RES/17 on Israeli nuclear capabilities.

Recommendation 72

To call upon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to disclose all information available to them on the nature and scope of Israeli nuclear capabilities, including information pertaining to previous nuclear transfers to Israel.

Recommendation 73

To reiterate the commitment of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources or devices, and extension of know-how or any kind of assistance to and cooperation with Israel in nuclear fields, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

Recommendation 74

To support the efforts of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties in the Middle East in pursuing the earliest implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and **invite** the Conference on Disarmament to closely consider the proposals put forward by States parties of the region in this regard.

Safeguards and verification**Recommendation 75**

To reiterate that the work of IAEA with regard to safeguards and verification needs to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and full-scope safeguards agreements.

Recommendation 76

To request all States that have not yet done so to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as soon as possible with a view to consolidating and enhancing the verification system for the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, through the universalization of comprehensive safeguards.

Recommendation 77

To request all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. This should be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with the Treaty and the IAEA statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the obligations of nuclear-weapon States, with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty in a manner inconsistent with the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by consensus at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

Recommendation 78

To consider the strengthening of the IAEA system for the protection of confidentiality of safeguard-related information.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy**Recommendation 79**

To stress the commitment of developed countries to facilitate and assist the legitimate development of nuclear energy by the developing countries by allowing them to participate to the fullest extent in the possible transfer of nuclear equipment,

materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, with a view to achieving maximum benefits and applying pertinent sustainable development in their health, industry, agriculture and other development-related activities.

Recommendation 80

To emphasize that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.

Recommendation 81

To reiterate that any undue restrictions or limitations on peaceful uses of nuclear energy that are incompatible with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be removed.
