

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

8 June 2010

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Summary record of the 6th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on 5 May 2010, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines)
later: Mr. Puja (Vice-President) (Indonesia)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Tommo Monthe** (Cameroon), speaking on behalf of the Group of African States, called on nuclear-weapon States to implement their obligations under the Treaty in good faith. While there had been some promising recent unilateral and bilateral initiatives, he believed that multilateral negotiations were the most effective means of bringing about disarmament. There should be renewed commitment to the 13 practical steps agreed on at the 2000 Review Conference, including diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies of the nuclear-weapon States to minimize the risk that those weapons would ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination. An early entry into force and eventual universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would also be concrete and meaningful steps towards disarmament. He reaffirmed that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was the sole competent authority responsible for verifying compliance with Treaty obligations.

2. The Group saluted existing nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, and called on the nuclear-weapon States and the other remaining States that had not yet signed the Pelindaba Treaty creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa to do so without delay. It reiterated its support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and in particular called on the three sponsors of that resolution to support regional efforts towards the establishment of such a zone. He stressed the need for technology transfer to assist developing countries to benefit from peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

3. **Ms. Gallardo Hernández** (El Salvador) said that her Government's commitment to eliminating the threat of nuclear weapons was based on moral and political principles and on the imminent threat that such weapons posed to international peace and security and to life itself. Even the nuclear-weapon States had expressed concern at the possibility of their use; in fact, their possession placed those States at greater risk of attack by other States which, feeling themselves threatened, had embarked on their own nuclear weapons programmes.

4. Such arm races were costly and diverted resources that could otherwise be used in pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals. The nuclear-weapon States should therefore abandon their counterproductive deterrence policies and should recognize that it was they who had the most to gain from nuclear disarmament dialogue and agreements with verification provisions and that they could best preserve their own security by fostering a climate of confidence based on respect for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and in international law. She called on those States to comply with the legal provisions of the disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and of the relevant international instruments.

5. She hoped that the Treaty would achieve universal accession and stressed that its three pillars must be implemented in a balanced, transparent and non-selective manner. The Review Conference offered an opportunity to examine the legitimate application of the Treaty and to make specific commitments regarding article VI thereof. The nuclear-weapon States must also implement the 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, including by placing themselves under the IAEA monitoring and verification regime through the negotiation of safeguards agreements.

6. She reiterated the importance of the confidence-building measures that could promote a sustainable, transparent bilateral and multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation framework with a view to international peace, stability and security. Her delegation rejected the use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent in military strategies and welcomed the signing of the 2010 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the unilateral measures adopted by France and the United Kingdom. It hoped that those initiatives would lead to additional disarmament commitments and was in favour of a verifiable nuclear disarmament process, particularly with a view to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

7. El Salvador was a party to the relevant international instruments and would welcome the adoption of a universal, legally binding instrument in which the nuclear-weapon States would provide the non-nuclear-weapon States with unconditional negative security assurances. In that respect, she drew attention to the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court

of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and endorsed the Court's remarks concerning the existence of an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

8. Her country's experience had shown that peace, security and development were intrinsically linked. She hoped that the States parties, and particularly the nuclear-weapon States, would demonstrate the political will and flexibility of position necessary to the success of the 2010 Review Conference.

9. **Mr. Núñez Mosquera** (Cuba) said that the recent agreement among the principal nuclear-weapon States for the reduction of their arsenals, although insufficient, should encourage further steps towards the irreversible, verifiable and transparent elimination of all nuclear weapons. Cuba had fully complied with all of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Inspections conducted under the comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement had proved positive. Cuba was a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the other relevant instruments. His country was also a participant in the Agency's Illicit Trafficking Database, and no incidents of nuclear trafficking had been reported.

10. His delegation was concerned at the lack of progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It was well known that there were plans for the deployment of new anti-missile defence systems. Nuclear weapons continued to be enhanced, and military alliances were being consolidated. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, action should be taken to obtain universal, unconditional and binding security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. All nuclear-weapon States must undertake not to be the first to use such weapons. The 13 practical steps approved at the 2000 Review Conference must be fully implemented.

11. Cuba was concerned that nuclear deterrence continued to be a core part of defence and security doctrines. It was unacceptable that global military expenditure was now higher than at any time during the so-called cold war; a single nuclear Power accounted for nearly half of that expenditure. At the same time, the statistics for global poverty remained

alarming. In such an unjust economic order, disarmament and development were closely interrelated. States that had no nuclear weapons and no interest in possessing them were denied the opportunity of serious, objective multilateral negotiations towards disarmament. The Conference must adopt a clear plan of action to implement all of the provisions of the Treaty, and establish a well-defined schedule for the irreversible, verifiable and binding elimination of all nuclear weapons by 2025 at the latest.

12. The most recent Nuclear Posture Review issued by one of the principal nuclear Powers indicated significant changes since the previous review, in particular with regard to the granting of negative security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. However, such changes were cosmetic, and the conditionalities attached to those guarantees remained in place. The document focused on countering proliferation and nuclear terrorism, but did not make a firm commitment to disarmament or the convening of multilateral negotiations on the topic. In contrast with its purported approach, it stressed the modernization of nuclear arsenals, the preservation of nuclear deterrence and anti-missile defence systems.

13. Cuba was concerned at the imposition of unilateral solutions and the interference of other bodies, such as the Security Council, in decisions for which IAEA had sole responsibility under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such issues could not be addressed through the imposition of non-transparent and discriminatory mechanisms which had a selective membership and acted on the fringes of the United Nations. Instead, the relevant mechanisms should be universal, comprehensive, transparent, non-discriminatory and open to all States.

14. Cuba hoped to see the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones. No serious effort had been made to implement the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference, despite numerous resolutions of the Security Council, General Assembly, IAEA and other bodies. The Conference should adopt a mechanism to achieve that objective. Cuba supported the idea of convening an international conference on the topic in 2011. Israel, the only State in the region that had not acceded to the Treaty or expressed an intention to do so, should become a party without further delay, place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, and comply with the Treaty. Transfers to Israel of nuclear equipment,

information, materials, facilities, resources and devices should cease, as should any assistance to that country on nuclear matters.

15. All States had a right to develop, produce and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Nuclear technologies made a significant contribution to key sectors of Cuba's economy. For that reason, it attached great importance to technical cooperation with IAEA. However, certain States continued to impose excessive restrictions on the export of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. Any such interference should be prevented.

16. **Mr. Gutiérrez** (Peru) said that the success of the 2010 Review Conference would require political will on the part of all States to maintain the current momentum in disarmament affairs through the adoption of a balanced consensus document with specific objectives promoting each of the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). There were two well-defined positions on disarmament and non-proliferation: one group of States sought to justify its possession of nuclear weapons by referring to its security needs and tended to stress strict compliance with the non-proliferation regime established by the Treaty; the other group, much larger, called for the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons. Those two groups had to work out a joint position at the 2010 Review Conference.

17. Peru was convinced that reductions in nuclear arsenals would strengthen the Treaty and, in that connection, welcomed the recent signing of an arms reduction agreement by the United States of America and the Russian Federation and the announcement of a new Nuclear Posture Review by the United States. Peru called for universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and welcomed the announcements by the United States and Indonesia of their intention to ratify that Treaty. It was hoped that other States that had not yet ratified the Test Ban Treaty, especially those listed in its annex 2, would soon do so and that, even pending that Treaty's entry into force, all States would refrain from nuclear tests. Peru supported the Secretary-General's efforts to move the opening of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty forward and hoped that all nuclear-weapon States would place their fissile materials under IAEA control.

18. Peru shared the concern of many that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had no specific provisions relating to the role played by non-State actors in nuclear proliferation, with potentially dangerous consequences. It supported proposals aimed at strengthening the security of nuclear materials and facilities through machinery established under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), at developing capacities for detection and investigation, at improving the sharing of information between States and at establishing an effective verification mechanism. In that connection, Peru welcomed the outcome of the recent Washington Nuclear Security Summit, which would strengthen efforts to combat nuclear terrorism. The Iranian nuclear problem was quite troubling, and Peru urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to open its facilities to IAEA inspection and heed with the Security Council resolutions addressed to it.

19. Peru benefited from IAEA cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which played a valuable role in the national food, health, environment and energy sectors, and was interested in various IAEA proposals regarding the security of nuclear fuel supply and multilaterally managed fuel banks. He therefore urged the 2010 Review Conference to recommend that IAEA should continue to hold regular meetings to prepare specific proposals on fuel supply issues.

20. As a member of the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone, Peru encouraged consultation and cooperation between such zones and called for progress on implementing the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, including through the convocation of a conference on the subject as proposed by the Secretary-General.

21. Although the right of States parties to withdraw from treaties was guaranteed under international law, it was problematic when a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons developed suspicious nuclear technology, supposedly in exercise of its right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and then sought to withdraw from the Treaty in order to avoid verification of its compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. Peru was open to all constructive proposals to deal with that problem. The increasingly acute problems facing the Treaty demonstrated the need for a permanent support unit and more frequent preparatory meetings. Peru

supported the proposal submitted by Canada and others as a possible basis for dealing with that need.

22. **Mr. Taiana** (Argentina) stressed the need to make substantial progress in a balanced manner on the three pillars of the Treaty: nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. His Government was fully committed to that instrument's objectives and provisions; it called for a world free of nuclear weapons, regretted the addition of new nuclear-weapon States and was disheartened by the continuing expansion of some States parties' nuclear arsenals. It was, however, encouraged by the new strategic arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation and hoped that the two countries would continue to negotiate with a view to expanding that instrument to include all the nuclear-weapon States. It also welcomed the unilateral declaration by the United States that it would not produce new nuclear weapons or conduct nuclear tests.

23. Those initiatives should be complemented by the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without further delay and with negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. It was also urgent to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty and a negative security assurances instrument; the recent announcement by the Government of the United States of America that it would not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against other States parties to the Treaty was a step in the right direction. In that context, he called on the nuclear-weapon States that had ratified the Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) with reservations and unilateral interpretative declarations to withdraw them; the commitment represented by nuclear-weapon-free zones should not be plagued by uncertainty regarding the presence, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in the regions concerned.

24. He paid tribute to the work of IAEA and its new Director General and reiterated his delegation's confidence in the Agency's ability to fulfil its mandate and the importance of strengthening all other technical areas related to the development of nuclear energy and to international cooperation.

25. The past 60 years of peaceful nuclear activities had been of benefit to the Argentine people and to the other peoples of the world that had used the technology developed, produced and exported by his country in

accordance with international law. The recent Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., was a clear indication of the importance of the safe, responsible processing of nuclear material and equipment under the current international circumstances. Argentina had successfully reduced the use of highly enriched uranium in its nuclear research reactors, thus becoming the first country to rely entirely on low-enriched uranium for its total production of radioisotopes.

26. It was important to strengthen international cooperation in making scientific and practical knowledge relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy available to all States. His Government stood ready to work bilaterally or within the framework of IAEA to share the benefits of such use, particularly as new applications emerged. The growth anticipated in that area in the coming years made it important to foster international trade and to avoid irresponsible attitudes that could hinder it; transparent trade strengthened all the objectives of the Treaty.

27. Argentina had learned by experience the advantages of non-proliferation. Together with Brazil, it had removed the spectre of nuclear competition that would have diverted resources needed for the well-being of their peoples and fostered mutual distrust; the Brazilian-Argentine Agency on Accountability and Control monitored the safeguards on their nuclear installations and material. The South American countries' progress towards regional integration through the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) would have been impossible without the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America.

28. The proliferation of nuclear weapons must be avoided in a clear, verifiable manner. The international community should show no hesitation in condemning non-compliance with the Treaty and its provisions; it was unacceptable for a State to attempt or threaten to withdraw from that instrument. He stressed the need to prevent non-State actors from acquiring nuclear weapons, welcomed the commitment to the work of IAEA that had been expressed by the participants in the recent Nuclear Security Summit and noted that expert-level follow-up to that event in preparation for the 2012 Summit, to be held in Seoul, would take place in Buenos Aires.

29. **Mr. Urbina** (Costa Rica) said that the Conference could not afford to have another failure. Neglecting

any one of the three pillars of the Treaty threatened the entire regime. It was urgent to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, improve IAEA safeguards and protocols, create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, promote new disarmament initiatives for the nuclear-weapon States, and initiate negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

30. Although the immorality of nuclear weapons was universally recognized and their illegality under international law had been confirmed by an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, there were still a handful of Governments that clung to military justifications for maintaining nuclear stockpiles that in themselves were a greater threat than any they were intended to confront. His country supported strengthening all the basic principles of the Treaty, including transparency, irreversibility, objective verification, non-militarization of outer space, inclusion of non-strategic weapons, and promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

31. The adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 1887 in September 2009, the agreement by the two largest nuclear powers to reduce their arsenals and the recent Nuclear Security Summit were all milestones. It was important, however, to restore the momentum for disarmament that had existed when the Treaty was adopted in 1968, particularly since nuclear weapons had become so much more numerous, widespread and destructive in the intervening four decades. In that spirit, his country had submitted to the 2007 session of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference an updated version of the framework nuclear weapons convention it had first presented along with Malaysia over a decade earlier, which it hoped would serve as a model for a robust international instrument. His country had also co-chaired the conference where the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missiles was launched, chaired the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) concerning weapons of mass destruction, and cast its vote in favour of Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) as an elected member of the Security Council. He called on States to rise above their narrow national interests to create a world free of nuclear weapons in the interest of all humanity.

32. **Mr. Kafando** (Burkina Faso) said that in a world where nuclear weapons were more numerous and destructive than ever before, balancing the Treaty's

three pillars was a task as urgent as it was delicate. Although there had been a number of hopeful signs in the preceding year, including the signature of a new arms reduction treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States, the nuclear-weapon States needed to do more to reassure the non-nuclear-weapon States of their good faith. At the same time, States that wished to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes needed to be more transparent. The capacities of IAEA should be strengthened, and acceptance of the Additional Protocol alongside comprehensive safeguards agreements should become universal. As long as the security provisions of the Treaty were complied with, nuclear energy had great potential to contribute to socio-economic development.

33. States should work for an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and needed to move beyond the goal of reduction to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear stockpiles. There was no place in military doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons; in that connection he hoped that the nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so would sign Protocol I of the Pelindaba Treaty as soon as possible. All necessary measures should be taken to ensure the physical protection of nuclear material, with IAEA taking the lead role, while technology transfer for development should continue to be promoted. All parties needed to make the compromises necessary to restore integrity and credibility to the Treaty.

34. **Mr. Labbé** (Chile), speaking on behalf of the States parties and signatories to treaties that established nuclear-weapon-free zones and Mongolia, recalled that the second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia had been held in New York on 30 April 2010, preceded by a meeting organized by representatives of civil society. He requested that the final document of that Conference, which included in an annex the conclusions of the meeting of civil society, should be circulated as an official document of the 2010 Review Conference.*

35. The message contained in that document was sent from a position of political and moral force by members of the international community that had succeeded in making nuclear disarmament, the ultimate and most lofty goal of the Treaty, a reality. He noted with satisfaction that in light of the geographical

* Subsequently issued as document NPT/CONF.2010/41.

coverage of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, that goal was more than half-way achieved; those zones, including Antarctica, occupied almost all of the southern hemisphere and were moving steadily northward. The States represented in the final document hoped that new nuclear-weapon-free zones would be established, particularly in the Middle East, and that other States would follow the example set by Mongolia in declaring its territory as a single-State nuclear-weapon-free zone. They hoped to act as friends of the President at the 2010 Review Conference.

36. **Mr. Wenaweser** (Liechtenstein) said that the failure of the 2005 Review Conference to achieve a concrete outcome underscored the perceived lack of balance in the implementation of the Treaty. The 2010 Review Conference provided a unique opportunity to restore the delicate balance between the three pillars of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For its part, Liechtenstein supported the complete disarmament of nuclear weapons in accordance with article IV of the Treaty and the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference.

37. Recent developments in the disarmament field gave the international community some reason for optimism. The new strategic arms reduction agreement concluded between the United States of America and the Russian Federation severely limited the number of nuclear warheads deployed by the two largest nuclear Powers, and it was hoped that both parties would pursue further arms reduction and disarmament initiatives. Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) also underscored the world's commitment to non-proliferation. The Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington in April had also advanced efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors.

38. However, much remained to be done. Liechtenstein supported the long-term goal of a nuclear weapons convention in line with the Secretary-General's five-point plan and he urged the Review Conference to prepare the ground for such a project by adopting a programme of action with concrete goals and deadlines. He also called for the de-alerting of nuclear weapons, which, by lengthening nuclear launch procedures, would reduce the risk of error and further reduce the role of nuclear weapons in military strategy.

39. Liechtenstein applauded the recent entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and the Treaty of Semipalatinsk, which established such a zone in Central Asia, and continued to support the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in accordance with the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

40. A number of practical steps could be taken to improve safety and security immediately, as had been outlined in the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. It was essential to prevent the misuse of civilian nuclear programmes for military or even terrorist purposes. Energy demand was surging all over the globe, which increased the interest in nuclear power. In that connection, it was more important than ever to address the risks posed by the nuclear fuel cycle. Some of those risks could be dealt with by making the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol the verification standard. Liechtenstein also supported the proposal for an international fuel bank under the auspices of the Agency, which would guarantee supply and significantly reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation.

41. States should fully comply with and implement the mechanisms established under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which sought to reduce the risk of terrorists gaining access to nuclear materials. While respecting the right of States parties to the Treaty to research and produce nuclear energy, in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty, the international community needed to ensure that such sensitive technology was used responsibly and did not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The activities undertaken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran in the recent past were cause for grave concern in that regard and were seriously testing the resolve of the international community.

42. Liechtenstein was a party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and believed that putting an end to nuclear testing would contribute to peace and security and provide a stepping stone towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. His delegation welcomed the United States announcement that it would pursue ratification of that Treaty, and urged other non-States parties, especially those listed in annex 2 of that Treaty, to do the same. The utter lack of

progress in the Conference on Disarmament was of great concern. Negotiations should be started in that body on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Until such a treaty was completed, Liechtenstein joined others in calling on all States concerned to declare and uphold a moratorium on the production of such fissile material.

43. The common immediate goal remained to bring all non-States parties into the NPT regime as non-nuclear-weapon States and to ensure the universal adherence to and application of the Treaty. Liechtenstein supported proposals to strengthen the review process of the Treaty by replacing the current series of Preparatory Committees with shorter, more frequent annual meetings of both a procedural and substantive nature, and creating a small support unit. The review process should also clarify the meaning and consequences of a withdrawal from the Treaty. Legally, it was clear that States found to be in violation of their treaty obligations should not be able to abdicate their responsibility by simply withdrawing from the Treaty.

44. **Mr. Borg** (Malta) said that Malta was convinced that the strengthening of the Treaty regime was achievable through a balanced and gradual approach to its three mutually reinforcing pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that connection the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference provided guidance for the way forward. However, the 2010 Review Conference needed to deal seriously and comprehensively with the issues of non-compliance and enforcement, as well as the problems posed by non-State actors who sought to gain possession of weapons of mass destruction. Malta urged countries that had not yet become parties to the various international conventions on counter-terrorism to do so as soon as possible and to adhere to the provisions of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

45. Malta continued to support all efforts and measures aimed at consolidating and strengthening the Treaty and called on the non-States parties to reconsider their position and accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States without any conditions. Malta also fully supported the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as long as the interested States effectively adhered to the applicable provisions and obligations specified in the Treaty and by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Malta also encouraged the universalization of the IAEA

Additional Protocol as the standard safeguards and verification regime.

46. In order to achieve the overall objective of a world free from nuclear weapons, Malta encouraged the inclusion of tactical and non-strategic nuclear weapons in verifiable and irreversible disarmament initiatives, a drastic reduction of operationally deployed warheads, and the marginalization by nuclear States of the role of nuclear weapons in their strategic postures. Malta also supported the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and urged all States, pending that Treaty's entry into force, to maintain a moratorium on nuclear test explosions and to refrain from any actions that were contrary to the obligations and provisions of that Treaty. Malta also attached priority to the early commencement in the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations without preconditions on a fissile material cut-off treaty including verification provisions.

47. Noting that security in the Mediterranean region was closely linked to European security as well as to international peace and security, Malta urged all the Mediterranean countries to work to strengthen confidence-building measures in the region, including in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. In that context, Malta also called for concrete and practical measures for the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which had urged the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone. Pending the establishment of such a zone, it was of vital importance that all nuclear activities and facilities in the region be placed under IAEA safeguards. Malta supported all of the already established nuclear-weapon-free zones and encouraged other countries to establish similar zones in other regions of the world on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned.

48. Malta welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and the communiqué adopted by the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington in April 2010, as they renewed the critical momentum in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and in global arms control and disarmament.

49. Like many countries, especially the small countries, Malta's security lay in the United Nations and its treaty bodies, including those that provided

arms control machinery covering weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. Multilateral cooperation based on disarmament regimes and non-proliferation agreements served the interests of all States, large and small, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. It was the responsibility of all States to maintain and even step up the momentum in the global effort to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.

50. **Mr. Shalgham** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that disarmament efforts continued to lack balance and objectivity, and were marred by selective and unjust policies. Vast nuclear arsenals remained in place, and a number of States continued to develop nuclear weapons. There had been little progress in implementing the decisions adopted at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, and in particular the resolution on the Middle East. Certain Powers had sought to connect the implementation of that resolution to other conditions which, owing to Israel's intransigence, might not be realized even in the long term.

51. In 2003, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had taken practical steps to renounce voluntarily all of its nuclear and chemical weapons programmes. The non-proliferation regime could be preserved only through such actions, which should take place in a transparent and verifiable manner, according to a well-defined schedule.

52. The mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency focused on non-proliferation, but not on verifying that nuclear-weapon States were complying with their disarmament obligations. In order to be truly international, the Agency should monitor all States without distinction. It should inspect the Israeli nuclear facilities in Dimona; failing that all of the States of the Middle East would have the right to possess nuclear weapons. All States should place their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. An international agreement should be concluded, in accordance with the Treaty and the Statute of IAEA, in order to verify the compliance of nuclear-weapon States with their disarmament commitments. That initiative would prevent the use of nuclear resources for military purposes and their transfer to non-parties.

53. The positive statements made by the Heads of State of certain nuclear-weapon States, and in particular the President of the United States of

America, gave cause for hope. The signing in April 2010 of a new treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation was another welcome sign. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, a universal, unconditional and binding instrument should be adopted in order to provide security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. His delegation supported the establishment of a subsidiary committee within the Review Conferences to work towards that objective.

54. It was essential to ensure a balance between the three pillars of the Treaty by upholding the inalienable right of all States parties to the use of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, without limitations or preconditions. The Agency had sole responsibility for verifying compliance with the Treaty. Any nuclear cooperation with non-parties, whether for peaceful or military purposes, contravened the letter, spirit and objectives of the Treaty, and prevented it from becoming universal.

55. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world and welcomed the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty. It called for the implementation of the resolution of the General Conference of IAEA entitled "Israeli nuclear capabilities", adopted at its 53rd session in September 2009. Israel was the only State in the region that had neither acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty nor expressed its intention to do so. It should become a party without delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State and place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, thereby avoiding an arms race in the region. The working paper submitted by the League of Arab States (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.29) outlined practical steps to ensure the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference.

56. **Mr. Mohamad** (Sudan) said that four decades after its adoption, the Treaty remained far from achieving its objectives. Certain States continued to interpret its provisions selectively, developing their own nuclear weapons while restricting the access of developing States to nuclear materials for peaceful medical, agricultural and industrial uses that had become all the more important given the recent global energy crisis.

57. He hoped that recent positive bilateral initiatives and changes in military doctrines would lead to

tangible progress towards specific timetables and clear benchmarks for disarmament, and that rapid progress could be made on negotiation of the fissile material cut-off treaty, negative security guarantees, and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy was a central principle of the Treaty, and he hoped that IAEA, unlike the United Nations Security Council, would maintain its impartiality in that regard.

58. Even though nuclear-weapon-free zones covered over half the globe, the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East continued to be obstructed by Israel. The Conference should establish a technical committee to set a specific timetable for implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and the three depository States should bring pressure to bear on Israel to accede to the Treaty and to submit its nuclear programme to IAEA safeguards. In the meantime, nuclear-weapon States should refrain from transferring nuclear-weapon technology to Israel, and States parties with information on Israel's nuclear programme should make it public. The Conference should also adopt effective measures to guarantee non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

59. With the signing of the Pelindaba Treaty in July 2009, Africa had become the largest nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world. He called on those States that had not yet done so to ratify that Treaty. His country had been an early signatory to numerous disarmament instruments, and his capital had been host to the first Regional Meeting of National Authorities of African States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, which had produced important recommendations for making Africa a chemical-weapon-free zone. He hoped that the Conference would advance the purposes and principles of the Treaty and thereby contribute to global security and stability.

60. **Mr. Ali** (Malaysia) said that in order to create a world without nuclear weapons, it was essential to comply with all three pillars of the Treaty. The statement made by the President of the United States in April 2009 in Prague, the conclusion in April 2010 of a new treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, and the issuance by the United States of

America of a new Nuclear Posture Review all gave cause for hope. At the same time, nuclear-weapon States must take further action towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. A few States continued to pursue nuclear weapons programmes, and some insisted on remaining outside the Treaty. Progress in reducing weapons arsenals, increasing transparency and reversing the high alert status of nuclear weapons had been slow.

61. In order to promote transparency, efforts towards the elimination of nuclear weapons must be balanced and verifiable. Such action should build on the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, and on the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. An incremental and comprehensive approach should be adopted, incorporating step-by-step measures within a time-bound plan. States parties fully compliant with IAEA safeguards should receive preferential treatment for the establishment of peaceful nuclear programmes.

62. Malaysia had regularly submitted to the General Assembly a draft resolution concerning follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat of use of nuclear weapons, reaffirming nuclear-weapon States' disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty. He called on all States to begin preparations for multilateral negotiations towards a nuclear-weapons convention. National legislation had been enacted to supervise and control all strategic items or activities that could facilitate the development or production of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. Malaysia supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and urged that nuclear weapons should be taken off high alert as one practical step to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

63. **Ms. Aitimova** (Kazakhstan), noting that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the cornerstone of international security, said that it was generally recognized that there was no greater threat to security than the existence and proliferation of nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan shared the view that States needed urgently to strengthen control over nuclear activities on their territories and prevent terrorist acts involving nuclear weapons and materials. In that connection, she welcomed the recent revival in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament activities, in

particular the new United States Nuclear Posture Review, the new strategic arms reduction agreement signed between the Russian Federation and the United States of America and the recent Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. The Secretary-General had visited the former nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan in April 2010 and had commended the decision to shut down that site as a powerful symbol of hope for a world free of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly had adopted a resolution (64/35) declaring 29 August — the day when the huge nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk had been shut down — as the International Day against Nuclear Tests.

64. Despite some positive steps, the international community had not been able to advance the main goals of disarmament within the NPT framework or to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and the emergence of the new nuclear-weapon countries. It was absolutely essential to achieve unconditional compliance on the part of States parties with their Treaty obligations, embodied in the three pillars of disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Furthermore, nuclear-weapon States should step up their efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty by reducing their nuclear arsenals.

65. Kazakhstan supported the conclusion of an international legally binding instrument on security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States by the nuclear-weapon States. She urged nuclear-weapon States to revise their military doctrines so as to exclude all possible use of nuclear weapons. She hoped that the announcements by the United States and Indonesia of their intention to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would serve as an example to other States and facilitate that Treaty's entry into force. Kazakhstan also supported the inalienable right of every State party to develop the use of peaceful nuclear energy in accordance with IAEA requirements, without monopolies or double standards. All States parties that had not yet concluded IAEA comprehensive safeguard agreements and additional protocols should do so as soon as possible. The IAEA role in inspecting and verifying the transfer and use of fissile materials should also be strengthened.

66. As a major uranium producer with experience in and capacity for refining highly enriched uranium into its low-enriched form, Kazakhstan had presented to IAEA a proposal to host an international nuclear fuel bank. That would help to eliminate some of the gaps in

the international legal arena with regard to the development of national peaceful nuclear programmes.

67. Last year, the Central Asian region had become the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the northern hemisphere, bordering on two nuclear-weapon States. It was hoped that the new zone would receive negative security assurances, which would demonstrate the genuine interest of the nuclear-weapon States in achieving a nuclear-free world. In that regard, Kazakhstan welcomed the willingness of the United States to assist in resolving the issue of signing the additional protocol. Kazakhstan also welcomed the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty establishing the African nuclear-weapon-free zone and urged the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. Inspired by a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan urged States parties to consider adopting a "Universal Declaration of a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World". Similarly, Kazakhstan called for the early commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, which would be a significant step towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

68. **Mr. Elisaia** (Samoa), recalling that the Pacific Ocean had witnessed numerous nuclear tests and the only hostile use of nuclear weapons, said that the very existence of nuclear weapons posed a threat. Although the Treaty had played a deterrent and restraining role, to rely on it for the prevention of nuclear war would be to invest too much faith and trust in humanity, as though it were infallible and therefore immortal. Aware of the fickleness and unpredictability of human nature, many States parties believed that a world without nuclear weapons would be safer and more prosperous.

69. Samoa was not a member of any military grouping, and had no aspiration to become one. It had no army, and its police force was unarmed. A friend to all Member States of the United Nations and an enemy to none, Samoa believed that the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination. The three pillars of the Treaty were mutually reinforcing, and must be implemented.

70. The Review Conference provided an opportunity for small island States such as Samoa to contribute views on how to make the Treaty more effective. His country had consistently called for the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Such weapons

represented the greatest contemporary paradox; nations desired peace, but greater sums were being spent on nuclear weapons than ever before.

71. Samoa was party to a number of relevant agreements, and commended the Treaty of Pelindaba, the new treaty signed in April 2010 between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, the United States Nuclear Posture Review, and the announcement that the United States Government was moving towards ratification of the Treaty of Rarotonga.

72. **Mr. Almansoor** (Bahrain) said that while both the recent Washington Nuclear Security Summit and the new arms reduction treaty signed by the United States and the Russian Federation were positive developments, the Treaty faced a number of major challenges. The resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had been the basis for the Arab States' agreement to the indefinite extension of the Treaty. But 15 years later, a nuclear-weapon-free zone along the lines of those established in Africa, Latin America, South-East Asia and Central Asia had yet to be established in the Middle East. Continued international silence in the face of Israel's nuclear programme and that country's refusal to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and submit its nuclear installations to the IAEA safeguards system cast doubt on the credibility of the review conferences and the future of the Treaty. He called for an international conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and also stressed the importance to development of the right of States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.