

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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President: Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines)
later: Mr. Cancela (Vice-President) (Uruguay)
later: Ms. Štiglic (Vice-President) (Slovenia)
later: Mr. Cabactulan (President) (Philippines)

Contents

General debate (*continued*)
 Credentials of representatives to the Conference (*continued*)
 (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee (*continued*)
 Organization of work
 General debate (*continued*)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Paet** (Estonia) said that his Government supported all international arms control agreements, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. He welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in April 2010 as an important milestone towards nuclear disarmament. Emphasizing the need to further strengthen nuclear security, he hailed the renewed engagement expressed by participants at the Nuclear Security Summit, held in Washington, D.C., especially the commitment to secure all vulnerable nuclear material within four years, and acknowledged the efforts of countries seeking early ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which would help to prevent development of new weapons. He urged States, particularly those whose accession was necessary for the Treaty to enter into force, to sign and ratify it without delay and without conditions. Another positive step would be the ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes; in that connection, the declaration by certain countries of a unilateral moratorium on the production of fissile material was encouraging.

2. States must take joint action to effectively address breaches of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and must agree on measures to discourage States parties from withdrawing from it. He strongly urged States that had not yet ratified the Treaty to do so, as non-nuclear-weapon States, without delay. In addition to reducing the spread of nuclear arms, it was imperative to pursue verifiability, transparency and other confidence-building measures. In that regard, he recognized the indispensable role of the safeguards system established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It was crucial to facilitate lasting multilateral strategies to deal with the growing interest in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including the establishment of a low-enriched uranium bank under IAEA control. In developing multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, it was essential not only to ensure States' right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but also to avoid market distortions.

3. **Mr. Cravinho** (Portugal) said that it was time to seize the opportunity to further advance the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the fortieth anniversary of which was being commemorated in 2010. To that

end, the Review Conference must seize on the new momentum created by the recent agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on a new strategic arms reduction treaty. Building on that positive impetus, the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty must work towards strengthening and revalidating it, both in letter and in spirit.

4. As the world changed, negotiations over long-standing treaties, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, assumed new significance and were enveloped by new dynamics. The States parties to the Treaty must avoid being dragged into futile and negative divisions. Progress on each of the three pillars was the key to making the Treaty vitally relevant for the twenty-first century.

5. The States parties must break new ground in important areas while implementing disarmament instruments already at their disposal. Two cases stood out where further advancement was needed: the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and a fissile material cut-off treaty.

6. Portugal was a strong supporter of the rapid entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty and welcomed the commitment by the United States Government to pursue its ratification. Portugal called on all annex 2 countries which had not yet ratified it to do so without further delay. Pending the entry into force of that Treaty, Portugal further called on all States to observe a moratorium on nuclear test explosions and warmly welcomed the work of the Preparatory Commission, particularly concerning the international monitoring system, which included three stations strategically located in the Portuguese islands of the Azores.

7. The early entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty might also help to create the momentum and the political confidence needed to progress in the drafting of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Portugal favoured an early start for the negotiation of such a treaty, which should include an international verification mechanism. Pending the conclusion of the treaty, States concerned should observe an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. Portugal welcomed the commitments made in that regard by the five nuclear-weapon States. A moratorium would not only contribute to a safer world, but would also help to

create conditions conducive to the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

8. Progress on the aforementioned objectives, among others, would contribute substantially to the achievement of the objectives of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

9. The pursuit of non-proliferation required multilateralization of the nuclear cycle. That was why Portugal supported the creation of a nuclear fuel bank under the auspices of IAEA, for the benefit of all States parties to the Treaty that had signed IAEA safeguards agreements.

10. IAEA must also be strengthened in its role with respect to verification of compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself, including by the further consolidation and universalization of its safeguards agreements and additional protocols. That necessitated providing IAEA with the necessary means to continue responding efficiently to proliferation challenges.

11. Renewed and unequivocal negative security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States should be provided to all States that were in compliance with the Treaty. Similar assurances should be provided to all nuclear-weapon-free zones.

12. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, taking into account the interests of all States in the region, would enhance non-proliferation efforts in an area of the world that had a critical influence on international peace and security.

13. With regard to the Iranian nuclear programme, history taught that only negotiations held in good faith could bring about lasting peace and security. Portugal therefore called on Iran to engage in serious negotiations concerning its nuclear programme and to comply with all Security Council and IAEA obligations.

14. As to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Portugal urged the Government of that country to renounce its nuclear programme, to return to the six-party talks and to comply forthwith with Security Council and IAEA obligations.

15. Portugal strongly favoured a strengthening of the Treaty regime, including its institutional dimension, in particular the provisions concerning withdrawal from the Treaty. Conditions under which a State party might

withdraw should be clarified and should be absolutely exceptional. A revision of article X of the Treaty should provide for clear consequences for withdrawal from the Treaty, such that international peace and security would not be endangered.

16. Portugal had come to the current negotiations as a non-nuclear and peace-loving State with a constructive mindset, determined to do its utmost to ensure a successful outcome. The current juncture in history might be regarded by future historians as the moment when a safer world came into being. Alternatively, future historians might see missed opportunities and unsuccessful negotiations as having condemned humanity to a more precarious existence. Everyone had a duty to ensure a better future.

17. **Ms. Algayerová** (Slovakia) said that while her Government attached great importance to the principle of multilateralism in international efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, it welcomed any initiative that resulted in further reduction of existing nuclear arsenals. In that connection, she welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation.

18. States' non-compliance with their non-proliferation obligations was unacceptable: the international community must be prepared to address firmly any breaches of the Treaty. She furthermore called on all States parties that had not yet signed and ratified an additional protocol to do so, as such protocols were an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system. While recognizing States parties' inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a vital component of the Treaty, she stressed that that right must be accompanied by compliance with all other elements of the Treaty. IAEA and its Technical Cooperation Programme played a central role in facilitating the responsible development of nuclear energy and mutual trust in its exclusively peaceful application. Her Government was committed to complying with the highest safety and security standards while developing and using nuclear energy, which was essential to meeting Slovakia's energy needs.

19. **Mr. Rybakov** (Belarus) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained the fundamental key not only to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, but also to the maintenance of international security as a whole. The successful implementation of the Treaty

required that an appropriate balance be maintained between its three complementary and mutually reinforcing pillars.

20. Belarus, which had made a historic decision in the 1990s to renounce its nuclear weapons, remained convinced that the main strategic goal of the Treaty was the achievement of comprehensive global nuclear disarmament. It supported a realistic, balanced and gradual approach in the pursuit of that goal.

21. His Government welcomed the signing of a new arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation as a step that would make a significant contribution towards strengthening global security and stability. However, the disarmament process under way should provide for more than just the destruction of obsolete nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles; it should also require both parties to cease the further nuclear weapons development.

22. Nuclear non-proliferation efforts would be significantly strengthened by the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty within the Conference on Disarmament. A prerequisite for enhancing the authority and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the provision of unequivocal and unconditional negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States by nuclear-weapon States. Compliance with the Treaty regime was an important part of efforts to combat international terrorism, together with such multilateral instruments as Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

23. His Government strongly supported initiatives aimed at strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and the conclusion of additional protocols to IAEA safeguards agreements. It also stressed the importance of the non-discriminatory implementation of the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the Treaty.

24. **Mr. Salam** (Lebanon), speaking on behalf of the Group of Arab States, said that in order to restore confidence in multilateral diplomacy the recent steps taken by some nuclear-weapon States towards dismantling their arsenals must be consolidated by concrete actions within a clear, time-bound programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons. In that connection, the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States of America and the Russian Federation was a step in the right direction. However,

failure to make progress towards establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East might bring about the collapse of the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime.

25. The Group attached great importance to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. To that end, it had submitted four working papers setting forth its position. The Group was gravely concerned at the failure to implement the resolution on the Middle East since its adoption at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which had undermined the credibility of the resolution and of the Treaty itself. It considered that Israel's persistent refusal to accede to the Treaty and to accept relevant international resolutions posed a security threat to Arab States, all of which had become parties to the NPT and which, doubtful of the Treaty's capacity to bring about peace, might be forced to revisit their approaches in the future. It maintained that establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would constitute a fundamental step towards universality of the Treaty.

26. The Treaty struck a balance between strengthening international peace and security through nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and facilitating the exercise by non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty of their right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without exception. However, having become aware of double standards in the transfer of materials and technology to non-States parties, and faced with the international failure to implement the Arab initiative for a Middle East free of nuclear weapons, Arab States had considered appropriate alternatives and adopted a strategy for the peaceful use of nuclear energy at recent summits.

27. Noting the Arab States' demonstrated commitment over the years to the non-proliferation regime and to improving relations with IAEA, he expressed regret at comments made by the Agency's Director General regarding Syria — one of the first countries to accede to the Treaty — language that could be misinterpreted as accusing that country of refusing to abide by its legal obligations under the Treaty and the comprehensive safeguards agreement it had concluded with IAEA in 1992. Syria had also spearheaded the initiative by the Group of Arab States in the Security Council in 2003 to rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction. In the interest of objectivity, he pointed out Israel's dangerous refusal to

accede to the Treaty, along with its attacks on neighbouring countries and occupation of their land, effectively impeding the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

28. The comprehensive safeguards agreement was the Agency's sole legal framework for verifying the peaceful use of nuclear energy, whereas the additional protocol was a strictly voluntary, non-binding mechanism. No new obligations should be imposed on non-nuclear-weapon States until genuine progress towards universality of the Treaty was achieved and outstanding commitments were met, in particular the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The Group of Arab States therefore called upon States parties to demand that Israel accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State without delay and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. To that end, the Agency must implement all its resolutions concerning the Israeli nuclear question and submit periodic reports on their implementation to the Board of Governors and the General Conference. Lastly, States parties must intensify efforts to bring about universality of the NPT and refrain from transferring nuclear materials and technology to non-States parties, as doing so would encourage them to remain outside the Treaty, thus undermining the non-proliferation regime and international peace and security.

29. Speaking on behalf of his own country, he said that despite a number of positive steps seen in the area of nuclear disarmament, many nuclear threats had yet to be addressed. Noting that some 23,000 nuclear warheads remained in existence, he urged Member States to implement General Assembly resolution 63/241 on decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems. It was also of the utmost importance to implement the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference, which required Israel's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State. With its 200 nuclear warheads, Israel continued to pose a threat to regional and international security.

30. It was crucial to implement the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament as agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. He welcomed the Secretary-General's proposal for greater accountability and transparency in that area: achieving a world free of nuclear weapons was possible only if the total number of nuclear weapons was known and if nuclear-weapon

States made their disarmament efforts public. It was also important to further strengthen the international legal system. In that connection, he urged States parties to work towards the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to start negotiations on other international instruments such as the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention and a fissile material cut-off treaty. Appropriate mechanisms were also needed to address the fact that a few States that rejected the Non-Proliferation Treaty continued to reap the benefits of nuclear cooperation with complacent countries. Lastly, measures should be taken internationally to provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, such as universal commitment to the "no-first-use" principle, the gradual departure from reliance on nuclear weapons in military doctrines, and the relinquishing of the threat of use of nuclear weapons as a means to advance strategic interests.

31. His Government reaffirmed the inalienable right of all States parties to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and supported IAEA in its efforts to foster technical cooperation in that area.

32. *Mr. Cancela (Uruguay), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

33. **Mr. Abdelaziz** (Egypt), while noting a number of positive developments in respect of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, said that attempts to change the delicate balance upon which the Treaty had been founded, or to change the course or nature of the review process, must cease. Nuclear-weapon States' compliance with their obligations in the field of nuclear disarmament did not create for non-nuclear-weapon States any obligations additional to those stipulated by the Treaty in the areas of non-proliferation or peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The growing interest of non-nuclear-weapon States parties in the development-related benefits of nuclear energy was a legitimate right under article IV of the Treaty, and should not be used as grounds to impose additional restrictions on those States under the pretext of proliferation prevention, or to impose new restrictions on the exercise by States parties of their inalienable right to withdraw from the Treaty.

34. The verifications system agreed under the Treaty and implemented by IAEA should be based on material evidence, without politicization, selectivity or double standards, and should respect the principle of

non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It was regrettable that the three sponsors of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference had made no progress in its implementation. In that regard, he would welcome any constructive effort to promote negotiations on the proposals his delegation had made at the past three sessions of the Preparatory Committee aimed at beginning implementation of the resolution. He hoped that the final document of the current Review Conference would reflect progress on that issue.

35. A number of challenges continued to face States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. One such challenge was the insufficient progress made towards achieving the objectives of the Treaty in the field of nuclear disarmament and implementing the 13 practical steps. Noting that nuclear disarmament needed to be addressed within the international multilateral framework, he said that States parties must not settle for direct negotiations with nuclear-weapon States alone. It was crucial to conclude an international, legally binding convention to eliminate nuclear weapons within a specified time frame.

36. Regretting that nuclear-weapon States continued to rely on nuclear deterrence and to place nuclear weapons at the service of non-nuclear-weapon States, he said that such practices must cease and that every effort must be made to put an end to discriminatory implementation of the Treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon States, furthermore, must receive legally binding assurances that neither nuclear weapons nor nuclear threats would be used against them, pending the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament. Another issue of concern was the Security Council's intervention in the implementation by States parties of their obligations under the Treaty. The Treaty was a legally binding framework established by the Governments concerned and it could be altered only by the States parties themselves. Lastly, there was a need for an institutional framework for the Treaty as well as a clear mandate for following up on its work during the intersessional periods, similar to that which existed for other instruments, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

37. **Mr. Minty** (South Africa) said that the 2010 Review Conference should build on recent positive developments by strengthening all three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reaffirming the commitments agreed upon by consensus at the 1995

and 2000 Review Conferences, particularly the unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. While the many positive signs from those States were welcome, concrete measures to implement the 13 practical steps agreed upon in 2000 were long overdue.

38. To that end, a framework for consensus among participants at the current Review Conference could be based on the following points: nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing and complementary processes; the safeguards system was an essential part of collective efforts to address the threat posed by nuclear proliferation; IAEA additional protocols, while voluntary, were important as a confidence-building measure; non-proliferation efforts should not impede access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly for developing countries; the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference should be urgently implemented and additional nuclear-weapon-free zones established; nuclear-weapon States should provide non-nuclear-weapon States with legally binding security assurances; the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remained essential; negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty should commence as soon as possible; and concerns related to withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty must be effectively addressed.

39. His delegation supported a strengthened review process that would enhance the effectiveness of the Treaty in a cost-effective manner without duplicating existing efforts. However, care must be taken to ensure that undue emphasis on procedural matters did not detract from issues of substance.

40. **Mr. Alotaibi** (Kuwait) recalled that despite the international community's optimism over recent developments in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, Israel remained the sole State in the Middle East region that refused to comply with the nuclear non-proliferation regime, thereby impeding universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, leading neighbouring countries to use the leniency shown Israel as justification for acquiring or developing nuclear weapons of their own and single-handedly preventing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In a resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities adopted at its session in 2009, the IAEA General Conference had called on Israel to

accede to the Treaty and to place its facilities under IAEA safeguards. Until such time as Israel did so, nuclear-weapon States must undertake to refrain from providing Israel with direct or indirect assistance of any kind that would enable it to strengthen its nuclear capabilities, given the threat to regional and international peace and security and to the non-proliferation regime posed by such assistance. He urged IAEA to suspend its Technical Cooperation Programme with Israel until that country acceded to the Treaty.

41. Out of a firm belief in the importance of halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Kuwait had acceded to the Treaty in 1989 and ratified a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol, in addition to ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

42. Achieving full compliance with and unconditional universal accession to the Treaty, the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, were matters of utmost priority. In that connection, his delegation called for the creation of clear plans of action and mechanisms to ensure fulfilment of commitments made under the Treaty and at past review conferences, in particular the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The 2010 Conference must adopt a resolution on banning the development and production of new nuclear weapons and urge countries that had yet to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to do so, in order to expedite its entry into force.

43. In the context of its cooperation with IAEA, his Government's initiative to establish a national programme for the peaceful use of atomic energy would equip Kuwait to undertake electricity production and water desalination, effectively transforming national development efforts. In that connection, Kuwait fully supported the creation of a nuclear fuel bank to guarantee fuel supply to States seeking access to it, an initiative to which it had pledged 10 million dollars in 2009.

44. With respect to the Iranian nuclear question, his country affirmed the right of all States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under IAEA supervision. He hoped that the parties involved in resolving the Iranian question would redouble their efforts to reach a satisfactory outcome, and called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate with those efforts so as to

allay the international community's concerns regarding the nature of its nuclear programme and help make the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

45. **Ms. Štiglic** (Slovenia) said that, since the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the cornerstone of international peace, security and stability, States parties to the Treaty must do their utmost to preserve its integrity and to strengthen its future role with a view to the universal acceptance and implementation of all its objectives.

46. Her delegation welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction between the United States and the Russian Federation, the United States Nuclear Posture Review report of April 2010 and the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C. Those positive developments should pave the way for further concrete non-proliferation and disarmament steps, particularly the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the early commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and increased efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Conversely, such negative developments as unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty and non-compliance with IAEA safeguards obligations would also need to be effectively addressed.

47. While nuclear energy could serve as an important factor for economic growth and development, sensitive nuclear technologies posed an additional proliferation risk and must therefore be subject to appropriate controls in order to prevent misuse. Her Government fully supported the relevant IAEA verification activities in that regard. Recalling that Slovenia had recently ratified the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, she called upon all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to do the same.

48. *Ms. Štiglic (Slovenia), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

49. **Mr. Jomaa** (Tunisia) welcomed recent encouraging signs of increased political will to address non-proliferation and disarmament challenges, including the 2009 programme of work agreed upon by the Conference on Disarmament and the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation. While the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty were still far from being attained, there was now hope that the international

community might take advantage of the current favourable climate to make considerable strides forward.

50. The States parties to the Treaty must find the proper balance between their respective obligations and responsibilities under its provisions. In that context, his delegation reiterated the calls for the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil the unequivocal commitments they had made at the 2000 Review Conference to begin eliminating their arsenals. Tunisia hoped that they would honour their promise by speeding up negotiations on the 13 practical steps agreed upon in 2000. In the meantime, effective assurances were needed to prohibit the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Another imperative was the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, where Israel was the only State not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

51. Lastly, his delegation stressed that the Non-Proliferation Treaty must be applied in its entirety in a fair and balanced manner. It was a particular matter of concern that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which had been conceived as a complementary instrument, had not yet entered into force.

52. **Ms. Ochir** (Mongolia) said that her Government welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, and looked forward to its speedy ratification and to further cuts in both countries' enormous arsenals. Her Government also took note of other important initiatives, including the Washington Nuclear Security Summit held the previous month.

53. The Secretary-General's five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament was a balanced, realistic and promising initiative which her delegation supported fully. The entry into force of the Central Asian and African nuclear-weapon-free zones was another positive development that contributed to the goals of disarmament and non-proliferation. Her delegation was also encouraged by the announcement by the United States that it would embark upon the process of ratifying the protocols to the treaties establishing the African and South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zones and that it would support the third pillar of the Treaty by providing additional support for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

54. Her delegation called on all States parties to seize the present opportunity to make tangible progress towards the strengthening of all three pillars of the Treaty. To that end, the States parties already had a basis for their negotiations, namely: the decisions reached by the States parties at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and at the 2000 Review Conference. Those decisions contained important agreements which needed follow-up action, especially implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed on in 2000. The Test-Ban Treaty had still not entered into force and her delegation called on all remaining Annex 2 States to speedily ratify it. Negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty had yet to start. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was still not universal and her delegation called on the States that had not acceded to the Treaty to do so at the earliest date.

55. Other concerns included the lack of universality in the acceptance of the comprehensive safeguards agreements of IAEA and the still low acceptance of the additional protocol; the lack of progress on the issue of providing legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty; and a lack of progress in the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference.

56. Mongolia was a strong supporter of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia had reaffirmed the conviction that the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination. The conference had adopted an outcome document, the implementation of which could substantially contribute to promoting the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and creating a world without nuclear weapons.

57. In April 2009, Mongolia had hosted a meeting of focal points from nuclear-weapon-free zones in order to promote an exchange of views and further cooperation among them. That meeting had produced the first joint statement on issues of common interest, which had been communicated to the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference by her delegation.

58. Mongolia believed that a comprehensive study on nuclear-weapon-free zones would need to be carried out to take stock of the progress made since the first

such study by the United Nations in 1975, and to plan ways of supporting such zones as practical regional measures to promote the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

59. Mongolia strongly believed that every country could and should further the goals of nuclear non-proliferation, and its status as a nuclear-weapon-free State enjoyed wide international support. However, to be more credible, that status must be clearly defined. Since 2005, Mongolia had continued to promote the institutionalization of its unique status at the international level, which was reflected in the memorandum that its Government had submitted to the Conference, as contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/12. The goal of institutionalization was to clearly define, together with Mongolia's immediate neighbours, the international aspects of Mongolia's status and duly reflect it in a trilateral treaty, while seeking commitments from them and from the other three permanent members of the Security Council to respect Mongolia's status as a unique form of nuclear-weapon-free zone that reflected its geographical and geopolitical location.

60. With such institutionalization in mind, in 2007 Mongolia had presented to its neighbours a draft treaty that could serve as a basis for negotiation. Last year, Mongolia had held two rounds of talks with the Russian Federation and China regarding the content and format of the treaty. It was hoped that at some stage the other three permanent members of the Security Council would take part in finalizing a consensus regarding the content of the status.

61. Civil society organizations were natural partners of Governments in promoting the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and Governments must work more closely with them to inform the public about the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the dangers of their proliferation. Her delegation therefore supported Japan's proposal on disarmament and non-proliferation education.

62. **Mr. Al-Humaimidi** (Iraq) said that Iraq was striving to create a world free of nuclear weapons and it considered the 2010 Review Conference to be an important step towards nuclear non-proliferation. Iraq also welcomed the Washington Nuclear Security Summit, as well as the recent agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on a new strategic arms reduction treaty.

63. The Government of Iraq reaffirmed its commitment to and respect for international treaties, conventions and arrangements pertaining to disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, and it had taken legislative and executive measures to translate its obligations and commitments into reality.

64. Universal adherence to international agreements on weapons of mass destruction and global compliance with those agreements, together with the complete elimination of those weapons, would provide the international community with a certain guarantee against the use or the threat of use of those weapons. Iraq had affirmed that it would be free of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery, and had confirmed its commitment to the conventions and treaties on disarmament and non-proliferation following the harsh experience that the Iraqi people had experienced as a result of the policies of the former regime. That regime had obtained and used weapons of mass destruction leading to the destruction and devastation of Iraq and its people, wealth and infrastructure.

65. The Conference was being held at a crucial time for Iraq, which was endeavouring to obtain a review by the Security Council of the remaining disarmament restrictions previously imposed on it by Security Council resolutions, especially resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991). The new Iraq had adopted the policy of discarding the legacy of the previous regime and the Iraqi Constitution required the Iraqi Government to respect and implement Iraq's international obligations regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, non-production and non-use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In addition, it prohibited associated equipment, materiel, technologies and delivery systems.

66. In implementing that policy, Iraq had fulfilled all its obligations under the Security Council resolutions relating to disarmament. That, in turn, had led to Security Council resolution 1762 (2007) terminating the mandate of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and that of the special IAEA team in Iraq. Despite Iraq's efforts to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction and to implement the Security Council resolutions relating to disarmament, there were still some constraints that prevented Iraq from benefiting from scientific and technological progress. That limited Iraq's potential to be an active member of the

international community and its right to benefit from that progress in accordance with the statute of IAEA.

67. In that regard, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs had addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council and to the Director General of IAEA, stating the steps that Iraq had taken and was committed to take in the area of disarmament. The Iraqi authorities had achieved notable progress, including the accession of Iraq to the Convention on Chemical Weapons. It had also signed an additional protocol to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement, which had been submitted to the Iraqi parliament for ratification. Pending such ratification, Iraq had officially declared that it would voluntarily implement the Additional Protocol with effect from 17 February 2010, pursuant to article 17 of the Protocol. In 2008, Iraq had also signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

68. IAEA's Director General had sent a letter to the Security Council, in which he had noted the excellent cooperation of Iraq with the Agency. It was to be hoped that the Security Council would recommend the adoption of a resolution lifting the remaining disarmament-related restrictions imposed on Iraq.

69. The Middle East differed from all other regions of the world in that it was the most sensitive region of strategic importance and was economically unique. Consequently, any weapons escalation in the region would have far-reaching implications for international peace and security. At the same time, the Middle East continued to witness one of the longest-lasting conflicts in the world — the Arab-Israeli conflict — as well as other military conflicts and political unrest. Therefore, a failure to implement the 1995 resolution, which had called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, would perpetuate instability and tension in the region.

70. Security and stability in the Middle East region required the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction — especially nuclear weapons, pursuant to paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), to relevant General Assembly resolutions and to the resolution of the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

71. Tight security measures were needed to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear material on the black market.

72. The Non-Proliferation Treaty guaranteed the right to all member States to conduct nuclear energy research for peaceful purposes and to produce, develop and cooperate in the development of nuclear energy. However, in addressing the dual-use nature of nuclear energy, permanent arrangements should be adopted to reconcile the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the need for non-proliferation. Transparency and cooperation with IAEA, the application of the safeguards system and other relevant measures must be emphasized in addition to compliance with international conventions. IAEA had proposed a potential international initiative to provide low-enriched uranium. That initiative contained assurances whereby member States would retain the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to obtain advanced technology, to uranium enrichment and to obtain enriched uranium at fair prices and without discrimination.

73. *Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines), President, resumed the Chair.*

74. **Mr. Muburi-Muita** (Kenya) said that his delegation associated itself with the statements made by both the Group of African States and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. He noted that total nuclear disarmament must remain the ultimate goal. In the light of new threats, especially those posed by terrorists, there was a need to quicken the pace of disarmament negotiations. The Conference on Disarmament was therefore urged to embark on substantive work as a matter of urgency.

75. Rather than decrying the outcome of the 2005 Review Conference, the States parties should build on the 2000 agreements to achieve the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. His delegation underscored the merits of the 13 practical steps agreed on in 2000.

76. There was a need to commence early negotiations leading to the conclusion of an international convention for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

77. The current positive atmosphere in global nuclear disarmament presented an opportunity that must be seized. The Washington Nuclear Security Summit held the previous month was a major advance in that regard and should be followed up with concrete multilateral disarmament steps.

78. Universal adherence to the Treaty was imperative. Similarly, it was important for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to enter into force as soon as possible.

79. In order to strengthen the Treaty regime, a delicate balance must be maintained between its three pillars. It must not be forgotten that, in relinquishing their sovereign right to receive, produce or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear-weapon States had always understood that there would be a corresponding commitment from nuclear-weapon States to disarm. It was therefore a matter of concern to non-nuclear-weapon States that disarmament appeared to have become a secondary priority.

80. The Kenyan delegation welcomed the signing, in April 2010, of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

81. IAEA played a vital role, especially in the area of verification. The Agency should be strengthened and encouraged to carry out its mandate to ensure that professional and independent verification exercises were undertaken.

82. The Pelindaba Treaty was a strong indicator of Africa's commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Those regions that had not established nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially the Middle East, were encouraged to give the matter their serious consideration and to engage in discussions towards that end.

83. Peaceful uses of nuclear technology could be of tremendous benefit, especially for developing countries. It was therefore important to recognize States parties' inalienable right to determine their energy needs and to make arrangements to meet those needs. IAEA could be an important partner in ensuring a non-discriminatory approach to nuclear fuel and in fostering an atmosphere of trust and cooperation between suppliers and consumers.

84. The goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world was feasible if the States parties worked together and took bold political decisions at the Review Conference.

85. **Mr. Rugunda** (Uganda) said that the proliferation of nuclear weapons posed a serious threat to international peace and security and that as long as some countries possessed such weapons, others might

aspire to obtain them. Uganda therefore remained committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of multilateral efforts to contain that threat and as a framework for nuclear disarmament. It supported a package of proposals that would recognize past commitments and advance its three pillars, which should be implemented in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner. Nuclear-weapon States should comply with their Treaty obligations and work towards the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, while States not parties to the Treaty should be encouraged to accede to it. Uganda fully supported the banning of all nuclear explosions: the Test-Ban Treaty usefully complemented the Non-Proliferation Treaty. His country welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, South-East Asia, Central Asia, Africa and Mongolia and called on other regions to follow suit.

86. As a developing country, and one with potentially useful uranium deposits, Uganda could benefit from further international cooperation in promoting the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It was important to support non-nuclear-weapon States in that regard. Nuclear energy could provide an indispensable, cost-effective and clean source of energy and was also useful in other areas, including medicine, agriculture, water management and research.

Credentials of representatives to the Conference (*continued*)

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee (*continued*)

87. **The President** recalled that, at its first meeting, the Conference, in accordance with rule 3 of the rules of procedure, had appointed the Czech Republic, Mauritius, Republic of Moldova and Uganda as members of the Credentials Committee, leaving two members yet to be appointed. Accordingly, he proposed Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as the remaining two members of that Committee.

88. *Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland were elected as members of the Credentials Committee.*

Organization of work

Establishment of subsidiary bodies

89. **The President** said that, following consultations, he had prepared a draft decision on the establishment of subsidiary bodies (NPT/CONF.2010/CRP.1) which, following its adoption, would be issued as an official document of the Conference. The following would serve as the Chairmen of the subsidiary bodies, each of which would hold at least four meetings: for subsidiary body 1 (Main Committee I), Mr. Marschik (Austria); for subsidiary body 2 (Main Committee II), Ms. Kelly (Ireland); for subsidiary body 3 (Main Committee III), Mr. Cancela (Uruguay).

90. He took it that the Conference wished to adopt the draft decision on the subsidiary bodies (NPT/CONF.2010/CRP.1), as orally revised to include the names of the Chairmen of those bodies and with the addition of the words “at least four” in the penultimate sentence of subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c), respectively, which would therefore read: “It will hold at least four meetings within the overall time allocated to the Main Committee”.

91. *The draft decision, as orally revised, was adopted.*

Requests for observer status

92. **The President**, speaking with reference to rule 44, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure, said that a further request for observer status had been received from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. He took it that the Conference wished to accede to that request.

93. *It was so decided.*

Requests from intergovernmental organizations to make a statement

94. **The President** said that requests to make a statement during the general debate had been received from representatives of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the League of Arab States, respectively. He took it that the Conference, in accordance with the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee, wished to accede to those requests.

95. *It was so decided.*

General debate (*continued*)

96. **Mr. Al-Ja'afari** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his country had been among the first to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as it saw nuclear weapons as a destabilizing influence in the region and the world. The current Review Conference would have to address a number of outstanding issues, namely, whether States parties had managed to make the Treaty a balanced and non-discriminatory instrument; whether a time-bound programme to eradicate nuclear weapons had been defined; whether States parties, in particular nuclear-weapon States, intended to hold Israel accountable for its refusal to implement any of the numerous international resolutions calling for its accession to the Treaty; and finally, whether States parties could achieve universality of the NPT while preserving its credibility and authority as a legally binding international instrument.

97. The Syrian Arab Republic affirmed the importance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and called on States parties to implement article IV of the Treaty, which granted all States parties the inalienable right to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful ends. Moreover, the imposition of discriminatory restrictions on certain States for well-known political reasons must be avoided. The activities of IAEA in support of the peaceful use of nuclear technology were of particular importance to developing States.

98. In fulfilment of its Treaty obligations, his country continued to cooperate fully with the Agency, having concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with it in 1992 and submitted its nuclear activities to international inspection. Pursuant to that agreement, it had also established a national system for the monitoring of nuclear materials and made available to IAEA inspectors all facilities needed for the conduct of their tasks.

99. In 2007, Israel had destroyed a Syrian military facility with absolutely no links to nuclear activities, in flagrant violation of international law and Syrian sovereignty. Following that unilateral act which deserved unequivocal condemnation, IAEA had found that the attack had effectively prevented it from ascertaining the nature of the facility, about which politically motivated, baseless allegations had been made months after the strike. Those claiming to be concerned about the Agency's conduct of its activities should have provided pertinent information on the

facility before the Israeli strike, not months after the fact.

100. Syria had granted the IAEA team unrestricted access to the Deir-ez-zor site and supplied all information requested. According to the report of the IAEA Director General to the Board of Governors, no nuclear activity had been conducted at the site.

101. Stressing the role of IAEA as the sole international authority for verification and compliance through its comprehensive safeguards system — an authority far removed from politicization or pressures exerted by some for political ends — his delegation called on States parties, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to strive to achieve the universality of the Treaty and to avoid the imposition of any additional restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon States, which had adhered to the non-proliferation regime and renounced the nuclear option.

102. The Conference must make a clear distinction between activities undertaken by States parties in fulfilment of legally binding obligations under the Treaty and strictly voluntary confidence-building measures that States might take. The unilateral or multilateral assurances given to non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty by nuclear-weapon States were conditional and non-binding and therefore failed to adequately address the concerns and needs of the former; hence the importance of implementing the resolution on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which called for the negotiation of a legally binding instrument on security assurances.

103. The current Conference must address the grave concern of non-nuclear-weapon States, including Syria, regarding the failure of past review conferences and preparatory committees to set forth a time-bound, binding, unconditional programme for nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their arsenals, namely, by calling on the Conference on Disarmament to establish a subcommittee to undertake negotiation of such a programme.

104. Syria affirmed the need to protect the sovereign right of States parties to withdraw from the Treaty, particularly if a State considered its national interests to be placed at risk by unexpected events.

105. The 2010 Review Conference must identify a series of effective practical steps for the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, as that resolution constituted an integral part of the non-proliferation regime. Moreover, all nuclear facilities in the Middle East must be placed under IAEA safeguards. The Conference should also take into account the Arab States' legitimate security concerns. States parties, in particular nuclear-weapon States, must press Israel to accede unconditionally to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State, in addition to refraining from providing it with nuclear assistance or technology. The 2010 Conference should also adopt a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, specifically urging Israel to help achieve universality of the Treaty by acceding to it and submitting all its nuclear facilities to international inspection by IAEA.

106. It was regrettable that nuclear-weapon States, after securing the indefinite extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference — at which they had undertaken to considering the concerns of States parties in the Middle East — had since extended support to Israel in the nuclear sphere, in utter disregard for the concerns expressed by States in the region. The time had come to establish a time frame for implementation of that resolution.

107. **Ms. Blum** (Colombia) said that the world could not be freed from the threat of nuclear destruction until nuclear arsenals had been completely eliminated. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, as the only multilateral instrument that required nuclear-weapon States to take measures to that end, was therefore important; there remained, however, an urgent need for a legally binding international instrument prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons.

108. Colombia remained committed to the universalization and effective implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; it called on nuclear-weapon States to honour their commitment to eliminating their nuclear arsenals, with the goal of achieving general and complete nuclear disarmament. In the meantime, those States must undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States: a legally binding instrument needed to be put in place to provide negative security guarantees. Moreover, since the nuclear threat also lay in the possible development

of new weapons, it was important to negotiate a multilateral, non-discriminatory and verifiable treaty prohibiting the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons or other explosive nuclear devices and to arrive at a comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests. Colombia, which was itself a party to the Test-Ban Treaty, urged all Annex 2 States that had not yet ratified it to do so and called for a moratorium on all such tests pending that Treaty's entry into force.

109. The production, import and use of weapons of mass destruction was prohibited in the territory of Colombia, which was a party to the main international instruments on the subject, including the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It was also involved in other political initiatives to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the Proliferation Security Initiative. She called on nuclear-weapon States to respect unconditionally the denuclearization status of the States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and to withdraw the interpretative declarations made upon signature or ratification of its Protocols I and II. Nuclear-weapon-free zones made a leading contribution to the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and were a positive factor in international peace and security. She drew attention in that connection to the usefulness of disarmament and non-proliferation education, as a means of creating a culture of peace.

110. All States had an inalienable right, under articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; that required international cooperation to promote the exchange of equipment and materials and training in nuclear science. IAEA could play an important role in that respect and thereby contribute to the socio-economic development of States. Colombia, for its part, along with other States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, was committed to using nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. IAEA safeguards were currently applied in the country, for which an additional protocol to the safeguards agreement had entered into force in early 2009.

111. In conclusion, she emphasized the risk of the acquisition and possible use of nuclear weapons by terrorists and armed illegal non-State actors. In order to combat that risk, it was essential to comply strictly with all the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

and to apply all the relevant IAEA standards and mechanisms.

112. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation), speaking on behalf of the five permanent members of the Security Council (the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America) with reference to their joint statement to the Review Conference, said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained the bedrock of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the collective pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was therefore important for all States parties to implement it fully and to build on it so that it could effectively address the pressing challenges currently facing the world.

113. The permanent members of the Security Council welcomed the constructive spirit of the 2010 Review Conference, to which the Council summit on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament had made an important contribution, in particular through its unanimous adoption of resolution 1887 (2009). Other important recent events included the conclusion of the new arms reduction agreement between the United States and his country, the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington and the Paris Conference on Access to Civil Nuclear Energy.

114. As nuclear-weapon States, the permanent members reaffirmed their enduring commitment to the fulfilment of their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and their responsibility to take concrete and credible steps towards irreversible disarmament. In their joint statement, they recalled the unprecedented progress and efforts made by nuclear-weapon States in nuclear arms reduction, disarmament, confidence-building and transparency, and noted with satisfaction that stocks of nuclear weapons were currently at far lower levels than at any time in the previous half-century. The permanent members were determined to abide by their respective moratoriums on nuclear test explosions before the entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty, bearing in mind that such moratoriums could not be a substitute for legally binding commitments under that Treaty. They recognized that one key element in the effective implementation of article VI and in the prevention of nuclear proliferation was the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. They called for early commencement of negotiations on that proposed treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.

115. The permanent members underlined the fundamental importance of an effective IAEA safeguards system to prevent nuclear proliferation and facilitate cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They welcomed the fact that 131 States had signed an additional protocol and that 98 States had an additional protocol in force. They called on all non-nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement, as provided for in article III of the Treaty. They welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with article VII of the Treaty and the Guidelines from the United Nations Disarmament Commission's 1999 session. They supported enhanced consultation and cooperation among the parties to existing zones and called for the consideration of the establishment of new zones where appropriate and in conformity with the wishes of regional States. In particular, they were committed to full implementation of the 1995 Review Conference's resolution on the Middle East and supported all ongoing efforts to that end. They were ready to consider all relevant proposals in the course of the current Review Conference. They noted the importance of security assurances and were ready to engage in substantive discussions on that issue.

116. The permanent members recognized the inalienable right, reflected in article IV, of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and noted the increasing demand for nuclear energy. They were ready to work further with States parties to the Treaty in that connection.

117. They recognized the inalienable right to withdraw from the Treaty under article X, it being understood that State parties remained responsible for violations of the Treaty committed prior to their withdrawal and that any decision taken in relation to withdrawal should not lead to the revision of article X or to reopening the text of the Treaty.

118. The joint statement of the permanent members of the Security Council had been submitted to the Secretariat of the Conference to be issued as an official document. They hoped that it would serve as a valuable input for the Final Document.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.