

# 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

7 June 2010

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## Summary record of the 4th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 4 May 2010, at 3 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Cabactulan . . . . . (Philippines)  
*later:* Mr. Manfredi (Vice-President) . . . . . (Italy)

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General debate (*continued*)

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*The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.*

#### **General debate** (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Fukuyama** (Japan) said that he welcomed the landmark speech recently delivered in Prague by the President of the United States of America, as well as the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, the Washington Nuclear Security Summit, and the five benchmarks proposed by the Secretary-General at the opening meeting of the Conference. He read a message from Yukio Hatoyama, Prime Minister of Japan, stating that as the only country that had actually experienced nuclear attack, in which as few as two atomic bombs had claimed the lives of 200,000 civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan felt a special responsibility to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons. In that message, Prime Minister Hatoyama urged all parties to the Treaty to bridge their differences in order to pave the way for a world without nuclear weapons in which atomic energy was used only for peaceful purposes.

2. As co-chair, with Australia, of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and co-author, with Australia, of a working paper submitted to the Conference, containing a package of practical nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures, his country called on all nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and on all States possessing nuclear weapons to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament. He applauded the announcement made by the United States at the Conference's opening session that it would make public the number of nuclear weapons in its stockpile. He also called on the nuclear-weapon States and on all other States possessing nuclear weapons to commit themselves to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies and to provide stronger negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. In that regard, he welcomed the recent Nuclear Posture Review issued by the United States. He called for an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and welcomed the announcement by Indonesia at the Conference's opening session that it would initiate the ratification process for that Treaty. He also called for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. With regard to the statement made by

Iran at the opening session of the Conference about military bases in Japan, he stressed that his country would continue to adhere to its three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.

3. The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards were the most effective means of preventing nuclear proliferation, and assistance should be extended to developing countries that accepted IAEA safeguard standards including the Additional Protocol. The nuclear activities that had been conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were unacceptable, and he urged that country to take steps to abandon all nuclear weapons in accordance with the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks of September 2005 and the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. He also urged Iran to cooperate fully with IAEA and comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

4. He reaffirmed the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. His country had reaped great benefits from the peaceful use of nuclear energy while maintaining the highest standards of safety and security, and would be happy to share its experiences with other States parties. He expressed support for the IAEA Director General's priority focus on using nuclear energy to benefit human health and resource management. He called for universalization of the Treaty, and noted that the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Group of Eight had agreed to take practical steps towards the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

5. Because of its experience at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, his country felt a special obligation to alert the world to the dangers of nuclear weapons and work for disarmament, and supported civil society initiatives such as the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol. He called on the Conference to display the political will necessary to restore confidence in the Treaty.

6. **Mr. Kmoníček** (Czech Republic) said that the previous year had seen renewed momentum for the nuclear agenda, including United Nations Security Council resolution 1887 (2009), on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, the new treaty between the United States and the Russian

Federation that had been signed in his country's capital, and the Washington Nuclear Security Summit. He appealed to States possessing nuclear weapons to continue to work towards global disarmament, and called on all States to comply with existing rules and work for comprehensive bans on nuclear testing and the production of fissile materials for military purposes. Countries should not be allowed to use the withdrawal provision of the Treaty to evade sanctions and penalties for violations committed prior to withdrawal.

7. He applauded the expertise and impartiality displayed by IAEA in its handling of the crises precipitated by the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and urged that the Agency should be shielded from political pressure and equipped with the resources it needed to carry out its tasks. His country was a strong advocate of universal acceptance of the Additional Protocol in conjunction with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, which together comprised an efficient mechanism for deterring proliferation and verifying compliance.

8. **Mr. Phiri** (Zambia) said that recent progress made by the United States and the Russian Federation in reducing their nuclear arsenals had set an example that other nuclear-weapon States should follow. The cessation by France and the United Kingdom of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons was also an encouraging development. But the ultimate goal remained the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

9. All the African States were parties to the Treaty and had declared their continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Pelindaba Treaty, which his country was in the final stages of ratifying. He looked forward to a nuclear-weapon-free zone also being established in the Middle East. His country supported international efforts to prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons. It also supported the right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and was eager to establish regional and international partnerships to assist it in the safe and secure exploitation of its own potential uranium reserves. His country had signed the IAEA Additional Protocol on 13 May 2009. He urged Annex 2 States to accede to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and called for universalization of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

10. **Mr. Cho Hyun** (Republic of Korea) said that there were many promising signs for a positive outcome of the Review Conference. Some nuclear-weapon States had been more forthcoming in fulfilling their obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and in reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their military doctrines. There was also widespread support for the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and for strengthening all three pillars of the Treaty.

11. However, the Treaty was facing unprecedented challenges, the most serious of which was nuclear proliferation involving States that were developing nuclear materials for military purposes under the guise of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The nuclear activities undertaken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and that country's subsequent announcement that it had withdrawn from the Treaty posed a serious threat to regional peace and security and to the NPT regime. The international community had responded to that challenge, through Security Council resolutions and sanctions, by insisting that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea denuclearize, cooperate with the international community and return to the Treaty. The Republic of Korea urged its neighbour to resume dialogue through the Six-Party Talks process and implement its denuclearization commitments. The nuclear activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran raised similar concerns regarding the true purpose of its nuclear programme. The Republic of Korea urged Iran to respond positively to international calls for openness, dialogue and cooperation with IAEA.

12. The Republic of Korea welcomed the new strategic arms reduction agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America and called for the entry into force soon of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the early commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Action should also be taken to strengthen the IAEA nuclear safeguards and verification regime, including by universalizing the additional protocol system, as envisaged at the recent Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. The peaceful use of nuclear energy was an important pillar of the Treaty and the Republic of Korea was particularly interested in multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and innovative nuclear reactors.

13. The Republic of Korea was fully committed to the success of the 2010 Review Conference, which provided a unique opportunity to revitalize the Treaty and the global non-proliferation regime.

14. **Mr. Mitsialis** (Greece) said that Greece had been one of the first States to sign the Treaty, as well as other agreements furthering its goals, and placed many of its hopes for a more secure world on that instrument. The review process continued to provide a solid foundation for the three pillars of the Treaty — disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy — which could be reached gradually in a balanced and mutually reinforcing manner.

15. It was to be hoped that the 2010 Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms would pave the way for deeper reductions in the future. He also welcomed the recent Nuclear Posture Review by the United States that would facilitate progress towards a world without nuclear weapons. Other necessary steps towards nuclear disarmament included the commencement of substantive negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty; the provision of security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States; the promotion of additional confidence-building measures, including the strengthening of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the establishment of new ones; and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. He urged the nine States whose ratification of that instrument was still required to increase their efforts to complete the requirements.

16. The recently adopted Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament reaffirmed a comprehensive basis for disarmament and non-proliferation with the Treaty and IAEA as the cornerstone of international understanding on nuclear issues. The nuclear safeguards implemented by IAEA were the best way to deter, detect and prevent proliferation; all States should assist IAEA in its work and play their part in strengthening the safeguards system by concluding and implementing additional protocols to their comprehensive safeguards agreements. Strengthened safeguards, combined with implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), provided a strong basis for a robust non-proliferation regime and for countering the threat of nuclear terrorism.

17. The current proliferation challenges constituted a serious threat to international security and destabilized the institutional foundations of transparency and mutual trust. His delegation was deeply concerned at the increasing number of activities related to nuclear materials and ballistic missiles, particularly in Asia and the Middle East. It supported all efforts to promote universalization of the Treaty and of all multilateral agreements related to weapons of mass destruction. The IAEA Additional Protocol should be the safeguards verification standard.

18. Article X of the Treaty gave States parties the right to withdraw from the Treaty in extreme cases of threats to their national security. However, the consequences of withdrawal had serious implications for regional and international stability, particularly when the right was exercised mala fide by a State in non-compliance with its Treaty obligations, and the Conference should consider modalities for addressing that risk. Special attention must be given to the legal instruments, guidelines and the best practices that IAEA was promoting in order to bolster nuclear safety and nuclear security features in all kinds of peaceful nuclear activities as a sine qua non for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His Government supported the cautious, peaceful use of such energy in strict conformity with the obligations established in the Treaty and in States' safeguards agreements. It attached particular importance to nuclear waste management and the environmental effects of radiation and viewed as promising opportunities the disposal or downgrading of weapons-grade material, conversion of reactors, gradual securing or elimination of highly enriched uranium stockpiles and promotion of a multilateral, cost-effective, politically neutral fuel cycle.

19. His delegation supported the European Union's commitment to implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the commitment of all members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to pursue a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems.

20. **Ms. Larsen** (Norway) said that the international atmosphere had never been more favourable for making progress towards a safer world without nuclear weapons. Norway welcomed the new strategic arms reduction agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation, the new United States Nuclear

Posture Review and the outcome of the recent Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. There were also encouraging signs that a consensus was forming that the best way to address the dangers posed by nuclear weapons was to abolish them.

21. There were, however, worrying signs, namely, the proliferation concerns raised by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the continuing impasse in multilateral disarmament bodies such as the Conference on Disarmament and the inability of the international community to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force.

22. The non-governmental organization (NGO) community in Norway, concerned that the 2010 Review Conference might, like the 2005 Review Conference, fail to produce meaningful results, had communicated to the Government their expectations for the Conference. Her Government found itself largely in agreement with their views.

23. In Norway's view, the final document should reaffirm the underlying compact of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, set a forward-looking agenda reaffirming the overall political objective of a world without nuclear weapons, and establish a programme for the next review cycle that included clear and binding commitments on all three pillars.

24. The new Russian-United States agreement should be seen as merely a first step in a broader and deeper arms reduction process involving all categories of weapons and all nuclear-weapon States, based on the principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility. There should be significant reductions in the role of nuclear weapons in security policy and a strengthening of negative security assurances. The regional nuclear-weapon-free-zone process should also be strengthened. Determined efforts were needed to achieve the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to resume negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. IAEA and its system of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols should be strengthened through greater international cooperation on nuclear fuel cycles, greater security for sensitive nuclear materials and the substitution of low-enriched uranium for high-enriched uranium in research reactors. Finally, the right to peaceful nuclear applications, many of which could

bring economic and social benefits, should be reaffirmed.

25. Norway had worked with various partners in recent years on numerous projects to support disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including the elimination of tactical weapons in Europe, modalities of nuclear disarmament verification and regional nuclear-weapon-free zones.

26. **Mr. Hoyer** (Germany) said that, during its 40 years of existence, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been instrumental in halting the spread of nuclear weapons, thus strengthening world security. Germany favoured the balanced enhancement of all three pillars of the Treaty and hoped that the 2010 Review Conference would revive the Treaty's "grand bargain" between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States through specific proposals by the former aimed at strengthening the international non-proliferation regime. The Review Conference should send out a strong signal of unity calling for more cooperation and arms control and less weaponry.

27. There had been major positive events in recent weeks, for example the new strategic arms reduction agreement signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, the new United States Nuclear Posture Review and the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. The common aim must be a world without nuclear weapons. Germany welcomed the announcement by the United States Secretary of State that her country would reveal the size of its existing nuclear potential, which was a concrete step towards strengthening transparency.

28. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons, still not subject to any kind of arms control mechanism, must also be included in the ongoing disarmament process, as had been agreed in principle at the 2000 Review Conference. Confidence-building measures and efforts to create transparency could help reduce and finally eliminate such outdated weapons, which served no military purpose and did not create security. The German Government intended to negotiate the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Germany and to urge further scaling down of the role of nuclear weapons in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Strategic Concept.

29. It was unacceptable that the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament had been inactive for years, that the ban on the production of further

weapons-grade fissile material had made no progress, and that the continuing refusal by a number of countries to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was preventing it from entering into force. Germany also called for progress on the 1995 mandate to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and proposed in that connection that the European Union should sponsor a conference to bring all sides to the negotiating table as soon as possible. Further progress in conventional arms control would also play a vital role in confidence-building and would remove the pretext that disparities in conventional weapons justified maintenance of nuclear potentials.

30. It was essential to strengthen the IAEA control options through the system of additional protocols as an integral part of verification standards. It was also necessary for States parties to the Treaty to agree on rules governing withdrawal from the Treaty and their reaction to Treaty violations. A balanced approach was needed that would fully guarantee the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy while preventing misuse for military purposes. In that connection multilateral solutions to the nuclear fuel cycle provided an interesting option.

31. There was a real danger that proliferation cases like those of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's breakaway and the Islamic Republic of Iran could erode the Treaty and lead to a new nuclear arms race. The German Government would continue to work with other States parties towards a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear programme. Further sanctions must make it clear to that country that its refusal to heed the international community bore a price. The States parties must send a strong signal that they all stood by the rights and duties imposed by the Treaty.

32. Disarmament and arms control were the keystone of a global security architecture. Much time had already been lost in the first decade of the century, and Germany therefore called for a new decade of active disarmament. The Review Conference must provide the necessary stimulus by making forward-looking, specific agreements and recommendations.

33. **Mr. Danon** (France) said that his delegation welcomed the new strategic arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. The progress of nuclear disarmament, the current proliferation crises and the increased civilian use of nuclear energy were proof that the Treaty was, more

than ever, the cornerstone of collective nuclear security. He hoped that all States parties would strongly reaffirm their support for the Treaty and their determination to preserve its integrity, and that they would find common ground for concrete and realistic solutions designed to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

34. France was committed to meeting its obligations under the Treaty and the commitments made at previous review conferences. Over the past 15 years, it had halved the number of its nuclear warheads and announced a ceiling of 300 warheads for its total arsenal, totally dismantled its ground-to-ground component and reduced its airborne and submarine components by 30 per cent, ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, dismantled its test centres, halted production of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium and dismantled related facilities at a total cost of 6 billion euros. Its national policy limited the use of nuclear weapons to deterrence in extreme cases of self-defence. Similar action on the part of all States would enhance international security.

35. His delegation stressed the importance of strengthening the non-proliferation regime by bringing the Test-Ban Treaty into force and starting negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. It therefore welcomed Indonesia's announcement on the previous day of its intention to initiate the process of ratifying that instrument and recalled that since September 2009, France and Morocco had chaired the so-called "Article XIV conference" aimed at promoting the entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty. Similar efforts should be made with respect to biological, chemical and conventional weapons, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and space-launched vehicles in order to enhance international security and ensure that nuclear disarmament was not offset by a new arms race in those areas.

36. It should, however, be borne in mind that the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and France had made headway on disarmament solely because the strategic context had changed with the end of the cold war and the unification of Europe. Tangible progress towards disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons could be achieved in the long run not by emphatic statements of good intentions, but through a comprehensive strategy that included the resolution of regional tensions, enhancement of collective security

mechanisms and implementation of the action plans for which the European Union had called.

37. A response to the growing demand for the civilian use of nuclear energy must also be found. France, which had opted resolutely for nuclear energy, stood ready to cooperate with any country that met its international obligations. A State's respect for such obligations did not mean renouncing its inalienable rights, but simply exercising them responsibly in a world where the issue of energy could only be addressed through solidarity and with a view to sustainable development. Nuclear energy should be used in a climate of confidence and with application of the highest standards of security, safety, non-proliferation and environmental protection. The challenges relating to the increased use of such energy — proliferation risks, the safety and security of nuclear facilities, prevention of trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials for terrorist or criminal purposes, addressing training needs, ensuring the security of supply, financing the development of nuclear energy and taking environmental issues into account — should be addressed collectively within the framework of a new global governance. Such an approach would require strengthening the IAEA system and preventing uncontrolled dissemination of sensitive technologies, guaranteeing the supply of nuclear fuel, considering jointly the question of radioactive waste, focusing on training and examining innovative financing of nuclear infrastructures. His delegation hoped that the Review Conference would provide an opportunity to enter into that essential discussion and to reaffirm the major principles for guiding and facilitating the development of nuclear energy; it planned to put forward proposals to that end.

38. Disarmament and the development of civilian uses of nuclear energy could be pursued only if nuclear proliferation was halted. North Korea had shown what happened when the international community let time pass and resigned itself to *faits accomplis*; that scenario must not be repeated with other countries. France, together with its five partners in negotiations with Iran, had worked ceaselessly to arrive at a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue that would both meet Iran's needs and address the international community's serious concerns about the purpose of its nuclear programme. But dialogue was not an end in itself; it must produce results. The defiant attitude of the Iranian Government and the ensuing concern on the

part of IAEA, other countries in the region and the international community as a whole, had forced the Security Council to consider new sanctions in the effort to persuade Iran to negotiate.

39. His delegation understood the frustration felt by many countries over the slow implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference. States parties must do their utmost to speed up its implementation; he hoped that the 2010 Conference would make it possible to agree on realistic courses of action.

40. In order to strengthen efforts to prevent proliferation, it was essential to give IAEA the authority and the means to fulfil its crucial verification mission. To date, 128 countries had signed additional protocols allowing for enhanced verification of their nuclear programmes and it was to be hoped that the remaining countries would join them as the development of nuclear energy could prosper only with mutual trust. Strengthening the non-proliferation regime also required ceaseless efforts to achieve the universality of the Treaty, including by encouraging States that were not parties to that instrument to adhere to its terms and to accede to other non-proliferation and disarmament instruments.

41. The ultimate goal in the coming years was to develop a comprehensive nuclear strategy for a safer world in which all States would work resolutely to advance disarmament; in which the doctrines of nuclear Powers would restrict the role of nuclear weapons to extreme circumstances of self-defence where their vital interests were under threat and their arsenals would be scaled down to a level of strict sufficiency in light of the international strategic context; in which proliferation was combated firmly, since history had shown the price to be paid for failing to react in time; in which civilian uses of nuclear energy could develop under conditions of optimum safety, security and non-proliferation; in which nuclear and radioactive materials were even better protected; in which States not parties to the Treaty took a keener interest in the non-proliferation regime by making new commitments; and in which nuclear energy could become a symbol of effective international cooperation and solidarity within the framework of worldwide sustainable development. His delegation hoped that the Review Conference would lay the foundations of that new nuclear order by adopting an ambitious, pragmatic road map that could be implemented by 2015.

42. **Mr. Li Baodong** (China) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had played a major and irreplaceable role in preventing nuclear proliferation, advancing nuclear disarmament and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The international community should further enhance the universality, authority and effectiveness of the Treaty in order to safeguard international and regional peace and stability in the interest of all countries.

43. There was a growing consensus in favour of non-proliferation and the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons, as well as interest in the atom as a source of renewable and clean energy. It is the shared responsibility of all States parties and the international community to make the 2010 Review Conference a success. All nuclear-weapon States should fulfil in good faith their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and publicly undertake to eliminate their nuclear weapons. China welcomed the recent signing of the new bilateral nuclear disarmament treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. Drastic, verifiable and irreversible reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two biggest nuclear Powers would contribute to the ultimate realization of complete nuclear disarmament. Similarly, China called for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at an early date and the early commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. When conditions were ripe, other nuclear-weapon States should also join the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The international community should, at an appropriate time, develop a viable long-term plan of phased nuclear disarmament actions, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon States should undertake unequivocally not to be the first to use nuclear weapons or use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

44. Nuclear disarmament must follow the principle of maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all. The development of missile defence systems, which disrupted global strategic stability, should be abandoned, as should efforts to mount an arms race in outer space. China adhered to the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons and had made an unequivocal commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China supported the early

entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the opening of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and would continue to keep its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security.

45. All countries should seek to foster an international security environment of cooperation and trust, and respect the security concerns of other countries. In that connection it was necessary to consolidate the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, strengthen the safeguards function of IAEA and promote the universality of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Practices based on expediency and double standards must be discarded. All States should strictly fulfil their non-proliferation obligations, strengthen their export control systems and pursue peaceful solutions to regional nuclear issues through dialogue and negotiations.

46. China had participated actively in all relevant international non-proliferation activities and had put in place a complete legislative and regulatory framework of export control. With a view to safeguarding the international non-proliferation regime and maintaining world and regional peace and security, China was committed to promoting diplomatic solutions of the Korean Peninsula and Iranian nuclear issues. It should be noted that peaceful uses of nuclear energy were the legitimate rights of all States parties, which should be fully respected and safeguarded. The international community, in particular the developed countries, had the obligation to provide all necessary assistance to developing countries in that connection. IAEA should continue to play an active role in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and related international cooperation. China had actively engaged in cooperation and exchanges with relevant countries and IAEA on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, subject to the prerequisite that those countries strictly abide by NPT non-proliferation obligations.

47. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was of great significance to promoting nuclear disarmament and preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons, and nuclear-weapon States should vigorously support efforts by States to that end. In that connection China welcomed the entry into force of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, and called on the parties concerned to work together to implement



the relevant General Assembly resolutions on the Middle East and, especially, the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

48. The Chinese delegation sincerely hoped that all parties would seize the major opportunity provided by the 2010 Review Conference and work together to advance in a balanced way the three objectives of the Treaty, namely nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

49. **Mr. Čekuolis** (Lithuania) said that his country welcomed the new treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, and also the Washington Nuclear Security Summit. His country had played an active role in the Proliferation Security Initiative and supported the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the extension of the control regimes to include the European Union. The elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons through compliance with the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of the early 1990s should also be a priority.

50. His country supported efforts to improve the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system through universal acceptance of the Additional Protocol alongside the comprehensive safeguards agreements, which would both prevent proliferation and increase confidence in the security measures necessary for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He hoped that the trend towards increasing participation in international instruments such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources would continue.

51. Nuclear energy projects should only be undertaken in transparent consultation with neighbouring countries. He urged all countries to make use of the full range of IAEA assistance in ensuring the safety and security of such projects. He also encouraged the Conference to acknowledge the indispensable contribution made by civil society to promoting the objectives of the Treaty.

52. **Mr. Scotti** (Italy) said that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were now once again prominent on the international agenda. He hoped that the personal commitment of the President of the United States of America would help to encourage a successful outcome for the Conference. The L'Aquila Statement on

Non-Proliferation adopted by the Group of Eight in 2009 had highlighted a commitment to creating the necessary conditions for that objective. The current Review Conference should focus equally on all three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Italy welcomed the new treaty signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in April 2010, and encouraged all States to take strategic and security measures to promote a world without nuclear weapons.

53. The Treaty was concerned primarily with non-proliferation. The existence of efforts to establish clandestine programmes therefore posed an unacceptable threat. In view of the challenges posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and by the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the ultimate aim must be to ensure compliance with the Treaty, which was further weakened by its lack of universality.

54. There was a risk that nuclear weapons could be used by non-State actors. He therefore commended the President of the United States for successfully hosting the first Nuclear Security Summit. At the same time, Italy strongly reaffirmed its commitment to the inalienable right of all States parties to develop, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. A nuclear renaissance was now taking place, as States sought new methods to generate power while reducing carbon emissions. IAEA had a key role to play in ensuring compliance with the Treaty in order to facilitate that process.

55. In order to strengthen the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty must formally enter into force. He urged those States that had not yet signed or ratified it to reassess their position. In addition, an effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty was needed. By putting an end to the production of weapons-grade fissile materials and encouraging the conversion of manufacturing plants to civilian uses, such a treaty would eliminate the supply of the main components of nuclear warheads, thereby making disarmament irreversible. He hoped that the Conference would break the deadlock and allow negotiations on that treaty to begin.

56. Italy called on all States that had not yet done so to promptly accede to the Additional Protocol, thereby strengthening IAEA safeguards. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle were an important tool to address

the growing need for nuclear fuel while minimizing the risk of proliferation.

57. The Conference should examine ways to make progress in achieving the objectives of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference. It should also address the issue of withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty; although States had a right to withdraw, they could not be allowed to do so in order to escape from their obligations. Specific mechanisms should be established, including the involvement of the Security Council and IAEA, in order to ensure the fulfilment of safeguards obligations. In a more general sense, the operations and procedures of the Treaty should be reviewed in order to enhance its effectiveness, allow a swifter response to events and enable States parties to better demonstrate their political will.

58. **Mr. Valero Briceño** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) said that the world was seeking a new global balance founded on the principles of equality, solidarity, international cooperation, multilateralism and the peaceful coexistence of States. Practices incompatible with the juridical equality of States had no place in the contemporary world. It would be discriminatory to hold certain States to their international obligations while exempting others. The States parties to the Treaty should cooperate to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and to uphold the authority and credibility of IAEA.

59. The very existence of nuclear weapons constituted a threat to humanity. His country hoped that the treaty signed recently by the United States of America and the Russian Federation in April 2010 would become part of a more wide-ranging initiative extending to non-strategic nuclear weapons. Although the new treaty focused primarily on monitoring rather than reduction, it might encourage both States to take measures to reduce their arsenals.

60. The current environment should encourage States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to break the deadlock caused by persistent unilateral positions. Nuclear-weapon States bore primary responsibility for implementing measures to reduce and eliminate nuclear arsenals. Unfortunately, certain nuclear Powers had not shown the political will to comply with their international commitments. The Conference constituted an opportunity to reaffirm those commitments. The

adoption of a nuclear disarmament plan would act as a road map to create a world without nuclear weapons.

61. The priorities determined in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, remained particularly relevant in view of the continuing modernization of nuclear weapons. The Conference on Disarmament should fulfil its responsibility as the only forum for negotiation on that issue.

62. A binding international instrument should be negotiated in order for nuclear-weapon States to commit to refrain from using, or threatening to use, such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. A fissile material cut-off treaty must be concluded, with specific provisions for verification. His country welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world, and strongly supported the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. Israel, the only country in the region that had not become a party to the Treaty or expressed an intention to do so, should renounce the possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty and place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. It was worrying that the Prime Minister of Israel had acknowledged that his country possessed nuclear weapons, which had negative consequences for peace and security in the region.

63. In accordance with Articles I and II of the Treaty, all States had a right to develop nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela rejected any attempt to restrict that right through actions jeopardizing the integrity of the Treaty. Certain States were exerting pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to compel it to renounce its legitimate right to develop its nuclear industry. Such pressure must cease in order to facilitate a negotiated political solution, which should take into consideration the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran and of IAEA. The politicization of that issue had damaged the authority of the Conference, drawing the focus away from the technical character of the safeguards system.

64. **Mr. Medina Morel** (Dominican Republic) said that the Dominican Republic was a nuclear-weapon-free State and supported any multilateral initiative that would contribute to world peace and progress. It was a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin

America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as well as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

65. Nuclear technology could contribute to the welfare and progress of mankind or produce the most destructive of weapons. One of the basic principles of radiological protection was that the benefits derived from the use of nuclear technology must be greater than the damage that it might cause. As a State party to the Treaty since 1971, the Dominican Republic remained committed to the principles, rights and obligations enshrined therein. His Government believed that the implementation of its three pillars — disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy — would help give future generations a world free of nuclear weapons.

66. As a founding member of IAEA, his Government paid tribute to the Agency's efforts to promote the peaceful, safe and reliable uses of nuclear energy by all countries and to its technical cooperation programme. The Dominican Republic had signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement in 1973 and had accepted the amendments to the small quantities protocol approved by the Board of Governors of IAEA in 2005; the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement had been promulgated by the President of the Republic on 18 March 2010. He urged States parties that had not yet signed such agreements and protocols to do so in order to strengthen implementation of the Treaty.

67. His Government supported unconditionally the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a key disarmament, peace and non-proliferation measure. It welcomed the positive steps taken by the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the agreement by the Governments of the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce their arsenals of strategic weapons, and encouraged the strengthening and gradual expansion of such agreements.

68. His Government attached great importance to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. He commended the efforts of the Preparatory Commission for that Treaty and its Provisional Technical Secretariat for promoting

the early entry into force of the instrument and for setting up the verification regime envisaged therein.

69. Lastly, he reiterated his Government's support for the Review Conference and its hope that the event would contribute to the strengthening of the Treaty, a valuable international instrument, and enhance implementation of the commitments arising therefrom.

70. **Mr. Acharya** (Nepal) said that the international community was far from achieving the goals of the Treaty. Both horizontal and vertical proliferation continued unabated and his delegation was not convinced that nuclear weapons had made the planet any safer than in the past. In the modern world, the concept of security went well beyond the accumulation of armaments; the compelling security challenges emanating from climate change, poverty and underdevelopment, pandemic disease and terrorism threatened the very existence of a large part of the world's population.

71. Disarmament must be viewed both as a moral imperative and as justice for all. While millions of people around the world were reeling under the grinding, dehumanizing conditions of poverty and hunger, billions of dollars were being spent on weapons designed to kill and maim indiscriminately on a massive scale. In the light of the significant challenges to the mobilization of financial resources for achievement of the Millennium Development Goals in the wake of the global economic and financial crisis, the availability of a "disarmament dividend" would send a positive message across the globe.

72. The possession of weapons, whether nuclear, chemical or bacteriological, was bound to generate tension rather than security. The three pillars of the Treaty — disarmament, non-proliferation and the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes — were an integral whole and could not be pursued selectively. While nuclear disarmament was a long and difficult process, it was not unattainable if the nuclear-weapon States would lead the way. States that had not yet become parties to the Treaty should be encouraged to do so as the instrument's universality would enhance its legitimacy.

73. His delegation welcomed the signing of the new strategic arms limitation treaty by the United States and the Russian Federation and hoped that equally vigorous initiatives would follow. States parties should agree to prepare a road map in order to achieve nuclear

disarmament in a time-bound manner and to establish a nuclear-weapon-free world within a reasonable period of time. Pending the complete elimination of such weapons, the nuclear-weapon States must provide unequivocal negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States through a legally binding instrument.

74. The international community must reject the policy of nuclear deterrence and place a permanent ban on nuclear weapon testing; the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty with an international monitoring mechanism would be another crucial step. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions could serve as building blocks for complete disarmament at the global level. Implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference would be another major contributor to non-proliferation; his delegation also called for effective implementation of the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference.

75. In order to ensure that the nuclear facilities permitted under article IV of the Treaty were not diverted for military purposes, the monitoring, supervisory and verification capacities of IAEA must be enhanced substantially. Equally important was an active, effective technical cooperation programme that facilitated the scientific use of nuclear technology for industry, health, agriculture and other useful purposes. That issue should be given due priority in the deliberations of States parties and in the outcome document of the Review Conference.

76. **Mr. Al-Nasser** (Qatar) said that certain nuclear-weapon States recognized as such under the Treaty continued to develop their nuclear arsenals, thereby contravening the most important provisions of the Treaty. Other nuclear-weapon States had not become parties, or had concluded agreements outside the framework of the Treaty. The review process should take into consideration the resolutions adopted at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. Although bilateral agreements had been made between certain nuclear-weapon States, the objective of the Treaty remained full nuclear disarmament. The Conference should adopt the proposals formulated by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and work towards the prompt granting of negative security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States.

77. Qatar was committed to promoting the three pillars of the Treaty. In particular, it was important not to hinder the inalienable right of all States parties to the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. His country also supported the early implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in accordance with the position of the League of Arab States. Qatar had established a committee to monitor compliance with the Treaty, and had held numerous workshops and activities on implementation of international instruments concerning nuclear weapons, the combating of nuclear terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. He hoped that international consultations would ultimately lead to an international convention on the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

*The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.*