

**Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review  
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty  
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/SR.4  
23 May 2003

Original: ENGLISH

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Second session  
Geneva, 28 April-9 May 2003

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 29 April 2003, at 3.10 p.m.

Chair: Mr. SALANDER (Sweden)

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GE.03-61477 (E) 150503 230503

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. ATTAR (Saudi Arabia) pledged Saudi Arabia's commitment to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and to the role of such bodies as the United Nations and the League of Arab States in pursuing that goal. Saudi Arabia also supported the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
2. Stressing the importance of universal accession to the NPT, he called for an adequate response by the international community to the challenge posed by Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty and its unacceptable acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, which threatened regional and global peace and security and impeded the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that area.
3. Saudi Arabia set great store by transparency and was fully complying with its reporting requirements under the Treaty. It called for practical implementation of the commitments agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, including the resolution on the Middle East. Expressing his hope for the early entry into force of the CTBT, he reaffirmed Saudi Arabia's opposition to all nuclear testing and called on States to eliminate all their nuclear arsenals.
4. Mr. WESTDAL (Canada) welcomed Cuba's accession to the NPT, which brought the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean to full membership. He called on India, Israel and Pakistan to support the drive towards universality by acceding to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. He also expressed profound regret at recent actions and announcements by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. All States parties had a clear responsibility to address its violation of its Treaty obligations, and to urge it to halt unsafeguarded operations of nuclear facilities and refrain from reprocessing spent fuel.
5. Continued strong support for the NPT regime was vital to deal with the current stark challenges: non-adherence by outsiders with nuclear ambitions; non-compliance; potential threats of nuclear terrorism; the erosion of several agreed steps towards nuclear disarmament; modifications in strategic doctrine; the conflation of threats in a manner inconsistent with negative security assurances; and challenges to the reliability of verification inspections. Non-compliance might require new and creative mechanisms and criteria for their use. In that context, the proven expertise and experience of IAEA were paramount.
6. Canada had welcomed the proposal for regular reporting adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, and was seeking to explore and develop its evident potential. Further elaboration and clarification would be a valuable outcome of the 2005 Conference. It also looked favourably on the interaction between Treaty members and civil society, including participation by non-governmental organizations in the review process. It looked forward to hearing the insights of civil-society representatives.

7. The steps which needed to be taken to move the disarmament process forward were clear: action to put into effect the 13 practical steps on implementation of article IV agreed in May 2000, entry into force of the CTBT, and negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, starting with moratoriums on testing and production.
8. All States parties should adopt and enforce additional protocols to bolster their current safeguards agreements with IAEA. There was also a need to reach early agreement on a well-defined amendment to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, enforce high standards in all nuclear activities and enact and apply adequate national legislation and regulations.
9. It should not be forgotten that the non-nuclear-weapon States had a legal obligation committing them indefinitely to non-proliferation. The counterpart was negative security assurances offered by the nuclear-weapon States, which constituted vital security benefits of the Treaty and should be strongly and unambiguously reaffirmed by the Preparatory Committee.
10. Canada welcomed the statements made by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2002 Preparatory Committee meeting reaffirming the objectives of the Treaty. It also welcomed the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty by the United States and the Russian Federation, and looked forward to its entry into force.
11. Mr. JOHANSEN (Norway) highlighted the need to deal with the new and serious challenges now facing the NPT, by building on the positive outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, reinforcing the instruments and procedures used to address cases of non-compliance, and ensuring further progress on article VI of the Treaty.
12. It was regrettable that progress had thus far been inadequate in pursuing the targets set in 2000. Universal adherence to the CTBT and its early entry into force were essential; in the interim, self-imposed moratoriums on nuclear testing were a useful measure. As verification stood at the core of the Treaty, financial and diplomatic support for the Preparatory Commission must continue unabated.
13. Norway welcomed the signing of the agreement on further reductions in strategic nuclear warheads by the United States and the Russian Federation, and called for the reductions to be carried out in a transparent and irreversible manner. More vigorous efforts were needed to reduce arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons, and, while reductions to date were welcome, it was important to address the challenge posed by the fact that such weapons fell outside any formalized arms control treaty.
14. He called on all States, within and outside the NPT, to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and urged the nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material not required for military purposes under IAEA verification and safeguards.
15. Norway considered that reporting on nuclear capabilities and the implementation of activities under article VI of the NPT should not be an option, but an obligation, in order to promote transparency and confidence in the NPT regime.

16. It was deeply disappointing that the Conference on Disarmament had not been able to adopt a programme of work. The present impasse was undermining its credibility. There was a need to start negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and to make progress on such issues as nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

17. Cuba's accession to the NPT was welcome, in the interests of universality, and the remaining three States outside the NPT should unconditionally accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States. Full compliance with all the Treaty's provisions, even by non-parties, was indispensable. Recent challenges to the NPT, especially by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, constituted dangerous setbacks to the nuclear disarmament regime. He called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reverse its course of action, comply with the provisions of the Treaty and cooperate fully with IAEA.

18. All allegations of non-compliance must be dealt with in a transparent manner. IAEA must be able to investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary action. The IAEA safeguards system was at the heart of compliance with and confidence in the NPT regime, and strengthening its effectiveness should be a priority. In addition, all States parties should sign safeguards agreements with IAEA, including agreements based on the model additional protocol.

19. The G-8 Global Partnership initiative was a very important step which had his country's full support. There was a need for stringent national control measures on exports, and he stressed the importance of the work of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, as well as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

20. The NPT regime could also be strengthened through a focus on regional issues, and he expressed support for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the need for all countries in South Asia to accede to the NPT unconditionally as non-nuclear-weapon States.

21. Mr. FAESSLER (Switzerland) deplored the persistent imbalance between the lack of progress in achieving nuclear disarmament in pursuance of article VI of the NPT and the implementation of other provisions, in particular articles II and III, given that the constituent parts of the NPT were interdependent. That imbalance was jeopardizing the two compromises which had paved the way for the conclusion and subsequent extension of the Treaty, forming a package which could not be undone. Furthermore, the decision to extend the NPT could not mean the indefinite prolongation of the status quo. The two compromises must be reaffirmed as a starting point for further efforts, in particular regarding the status of the nuclear-weapon States.

22. The issue of the universality of the NPT was highly topical, with the welcome news of Cuba's accession and the regrettable decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty. There was a need to develop means to apply pressure to non-parties to secure their unconditional accession, and to involve them in partnership in the meantime. An in-depth analysis should be carried out of ways to ensure the Treaty's continued attractiveness for existing parties, such as improvements in the area of technical cooperation. He also expressed concern at recent allegations of non-compliance with the Treaty, while emphasizing the need for peaceful measures such as verification to ensure its full application.

23. The risk of nuclear proliferation could best be countered by means of universal and non-discriminatory instruments of nuclear disarmament. While there had been few recent developments in that area, he welcomed the continuing implementation of the new treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on the reduction of strategic offensive nuclear forces. It was regrettable that nuclear disarmament efforts in the Conference on Disarmament remained deadlocked, but efforts to facilitate the adoption of a work programme were to be applauded. In the context of the struggle against terrorism, welcome efforts were being made to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The ability of IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities had been strengthened with the adoption by a number of countries of additional protocols to their safeguards agreements, and he urged other States to follow suit.
24. He welcomed the many reports that had been prepared on the implementation of the 13 practical steps contained in the 2000 Final Document, and hoped that the precedent thus created would generate momentum for further transparency in the future.
25. He expressed concern at recent reports of the development of military doctrines under which nuclear weapons might be used against States suspected of trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction - not only in violation of international law and the spirit of the NPT, but also in breach of international humanitarian law.
26. He appealed to all States holding stocks of nuclear materials for military purposes to halt the production of fissile material and transform surplus material in order to rule out irreversibly their reuse for military purposes. He also called for the elimination of all land-based, sea-based and air-based tactical nuclear arsenals. All States parties to the NPT should sign and ratify the CTBT, and, pending such action, should continue to respect the moratorium on nuclear testing. Negotiations should be initiated as soon as possible in the Conference on Disarmament on the provision of legally binding security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States.
27. Mr. KHOSHROO (Islamic Republic of Iran) associated himself with the statement made on behalf of the NPT States parties which were members of the Non-Aligned Movement.
28. He welcomed the decision by Cuba to become a party to the Treaty, as well as the endeavours of five central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region. On the other hand, he deplored the decision by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the NPT, and the failure of Israel to join the Treaty, place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and renounce its security policy based on weapons of mass destruction.
29. Chief among the formidable challenges that had emerged during the past two years was the unprecedented militarization of the international security environment, which threatened to undermine, if not ruin, the achievements of the 1990s. The current climate of unilateralism was causing great concern, and the need to uphold the principles of disarmament and arms control and protect past achievements was more important than ever.
30. The emergence of a new security doctrine rationalizing the possible use of nuclear weapons was disturbing. The development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems, the pursuit of advanced military technologies and a unilateral withdrawal from the

ABM Treaty threatened strategic stability and imperilled arms control and disarmament efforts. The only way to counter such challenges was to strengthen international instruments, and specifically the NPT as the cornerstone of international efforts.

31. The successful record of the NPT in halting proliferation - with only two cases of non-compliance recorded - was to the credit of the non-nuclear-weapon States, but the lack of progress towards the disarmament objectives of the NPT was due to reluctance on the part of some nuclear-weapon States. Action taken by the nuclear Powers to follow up the adoption of the 13 practical steps had fallen far short of expectations. Hence the Preparatory Committee should address the substance of nuclear disarmament, and an international conference should be held to identify ways and means of eliminating the nuclear danger, in pursuance of the Millennium Declaration.

32. The parties to the NPT faced the challenge of maintaining the balance between security concerns and the imperatives of socio-economic development, especially in developing countries. But it would be wrong to place excessive emphasis on the security aspects of disarmament treaties, and ignore the right of parties to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The credibility of the Treaty as an integrated structure would be impaired by selective and discriminatory approaches.

33. The Preparatory Committee should also focus on the need to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument providing for security assurances to non nuclear-weapon States, as a crucial step towards strengthening the Treaty. Another such step would be the establishment of a system of universal and comprehensive safeguards overseen by IAEA.

34. His country, while fully committed to all its obligations under the NPT, was engaged in vigorous efforts to exploit its right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It had fully complied with its obligations and kept IAEA fully informed of its activities, as the only appropriate mechanism for addressing questions or concerns in that area. At the same time, since it had no hidden agenda and acknowledged the importance of accountability, it was rigorously enforcing national laws and regulations, and would welcome constructive interaction with other parties, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

35. The NPT framework should not be misused by bringing up issues which should be handled by IAEA. In contrast, the United States Government had taken various actions which undermined a number of international instruments in the field of disarmament and arms control, which merited discussion in the Preparatory Committee and at other NPT meetings.

36. Ms. INOBUCHI (Japan) said that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems had increased the danger of conflict and heightened the threat of terrorism, so that preventing and curbing such proliferation was an urgent goal, which should be pursued through multilayered and mutually complementary efforts encompassing unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral approaches. Everything should be done to prevent weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery from falling into the hands of terrorists, and measures should be taken to ensure the safe and secure management of radioactive sources. The NPT, the main pillar of the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, should be further strengthened.

37. Japan welcomed Cuba's accession to the NPT, which had strengthened the NPT regime and brought the goal of universality closer. India, Israel and Pakistan should continue to be urged to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. At the same time, Japan was deeply concerned at the recent decisions taken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and strongly called on its Government to cooperate with the international community and comply with its NPT and IAEA obligations, refreeze its nuclear-related facilities and dismantle its entire nuclear weapons programme in a verifiable and irreversible manner. The issue should continue to be dealt with multilaterally and through peaceful efforts by the international community.

38. Japan called on all States parties to the NPT to strive to make progress in implementing specific measures of nuclear disarmament, including the 13 practical steps agreed in 2000. Regular reporting on efforts to implement article VI was an effective means to that end.

39. Japan welcomed the signature and United States ratification of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, and hoped that it would enter into force at an early date and benefit from steady implementation. The G-8 Global Partnership was of historic significance.

40. It was truly regrettable that the CTBT, which was vital not only to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but also to constrain their qualitative improvement, had yet to enter into force. He hoped that many more States would sign and ratify the Treaty, and that pending its entry into force the nuclear testing moratoriums would continue to be observed.

41. It was extremely disappointing that the Conference on Disarmament had neither begun negotiations on a fissile material ban nor established a committee to deal with nuclear disarmament. It was high time to overcome differences relating to mandates and resolve the deadlock. Further reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons were also important, and she emphasized that the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons should be kept as high as possible.

42. Japan attached great importance to the full implementation of IAEA safeguards and the strengthening of the Agency's ability to detect non-reported nuclear activity. The safeguards could be strengthened by ensuring that all States agreed an additional protocol with the IAEA, particularly, those possessing advanced nuclear-fuel-cycle technology.

43. She expressed strong support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and welcomed the progress reported in the central Asian region. Japan attached importance to the potential contribution of young people and civil society to advancing disarmament and non-proliferation, and welcomed the report on the subject submitted in mid-2002 by a group of governmental experts (A/57/124). Regional disarmament conferences were another effective means of enhancing awareness of the importance of disarmament.

44. Mr. HILALE (Morocco), associating himself with the statement made on behalf of the Arab group, said that, despite its relative flaws, the NPT remained the key international instrument for preventing nuclear proliferation, establishing a system of safeguards and ensuring free access for all States parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that context, Morocco welcomed the recent accession by Cuba to both the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, but regretted the decision by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the NPT and to remove its Yongbyon reactor from the IAEA safeguards system and called upon it to reconsider that decision.

45. Morocco also called for the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system and its inspection machinery and commended the efforts under way in the Agency to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

46. In the Middle East, serious concern was caused by the refusal of Israel, the region's only State with a military nuclear programme, to accede to the NPT, thus seriously impeding efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. His country reiterated its appeal to all NPT parties to work for the attainment of that goal.

47. Concern was also caused by the delay in the entry into force of the CTBT and Morocco appealed to those States which had not yet done so to ratify the Treaty and, in the meantime, to observe a moratorium on nuclear tests. To that end, it supported the proposed convening of a conference of ratifying States.

48. On the issue of security, Morocco was particularly interested in the recommendations to be submitted to the Review Conference on negative assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States parties to non-nuclear States parties. Reviewing his country's own progress towards signing an additional protocol with IAEA and its compliance with its Treaty reporting requirements, he also stressed that access to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, a right enshrined in the NPT, was of vital importance to sustainable development and encouraged IAEA to assist developing countries in acquiring such access.

49. Reaffirming that all States were equal before international law, he concluded by stressing that all disarmament and arms-control provisions should be applied strictly and on a non-selective basis to all parties.

50. Mr. MADI (Jordan) said that his country associated itself with the statement made on behalf of the League of Arab States and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The importance of the NPT as the cornerstone of international peace and security was borne home by the increasing number of States joining the Treaty, which also demonstrated the worldwide conviction that non-proliferation should be ensured under verifiable and effective safeguards and that, ultimately, all weapons of mass destruction should be eliminated.

51. The best way of enhancing the universal application of the Treaty was to render it more credible: all its goals should be promoted, including those agreed in 1995, and no parties should refuse to implement any of its provisions. In addition, Security Council resolutions 478 (1981) and 678 (1991) and other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly must be respected: Israel, the only nuclear State in the region, must be prevailed upon to join the Treaty and to place its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards.

52. Jordan welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and recognized the role played in that process both by IAEA and by the nuclear-weapon States themselves. It stood ready to make every necessary effort to ensure the universal application of the NPT, including through multilateral and bilateral dialogue.

53. Ms. LAOHAPHAN (Thailand) commended Cuba on its decision to join the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and reiterated Thailand's firm belief that the NPT was the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime.



54. Encouraging developments in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation since the Committee's last session in 2002 had been marred by some serious setbacks and, in that regard, Thailand associated itself with the statement made by the representative of Malaysia on behalf of the non-aligned countries. It remained fully committed to its obligations under the Treaty and to the agreements reached at the 1995 and 2000 review conferences and called for the full and speedy implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 conference.

55. Pending attainment of that objective, efforts must continue to promote universal adherence to the NPT and she therefore called on all non-party States with nuclear capabilities to accede to it as soon as possible and stressed that issues which had caused other States parties to withdraw must be resolved through peaceful negotiations.

56. Thailand advocated the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in many regions of the world and, as the depositary State of the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty), urged nuclear-weapon States to accede to the Protocol to that treaty, to ensure that it was fully operative and effective. It was also essential that nuclear-weapon States gave unconditional negative security assurances to all States in such zones and she reiterated the urging by the non-aligned States parties that the Preparatory Committee should focus on that issue.

57. Given the vital importance of transparency in confidence-building, Thailand supported the Canadian initiative of voluntary reporting within the NPT system and accorded high priority to cooperation with IAEA on the issue of nuclear safety. In that context, she reviewed progress by Thailand towards concluding an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with IAEA.

58. Finally, as a developing country, Thailand highly valued the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the related information exchange provided for under article IV of the NPT and thanked IAEA and its development partners for their support in that matter.

59. Mr. ALEINIK (Belarus) reiterated his country's commitment to the NPT as a component of the global security system and to full implementation of the decisions of the 1995 and 2000 review conferences. He commended Cuba on its accession to the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which represented an important contribution to the cause of non-proliferation and regional stability.

60. Reviewing his country's endeavours to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, he recalled that Belarus had been the first of the nuclear States arising on the territory of the former Soviet Union voluntarily to renounce its nuclear weapons and to take other irreversible steps in the area of disarmament. It was also implementing effective export controls, including by joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

61. The ultimate goal of the NPT, to eliminate nuclear weapons, necessitated a realistic and balanced approach, in which problems were tackled in a collective manner, based on the United Nations Charter and norms of international law. New threats in the modern world necessitated a strong response and Belarus therefore called on all States possessing nuclear facilities not under IAEA guarantees to join the NPT, thus helping to safeguard the NPT regime as a principal component in the fight against international terrorism.

62. Belarus also set great store by the universal application of the CTBT and called on States which had not yet acceded to that Treaty to do so as soon as possible. While it welcomed the voluntary moratoriums imposed by States not party to the CTBT, Belarus still believed that States should move from political declarations to compliance with that legally binding instrument. In that context, it looked forward to the forthcoming conference in Vienna in 2003, on promoting the entry into force of the CTBT.

63. Among other issues to which Belarus attached particular significance were the need for early negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty; efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, including the Middle East, south-east Asia and central Asia; and cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Belarus was particularly concerned about the processing and burial of spent nuclear fuel and the decommissioning of nuclear power stations.

64. Finally, sharing the general concerns about the unilateral withdrawal from the NPT of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, he stressed that the problem of that country's return to the Treaty must be solved in a peaceful manner in strict compliance with international law.

65. Mr. LABBÉ (Chile), reaffirmed the need to strengthen the NPT as the cornerstone of the disarmament structure and recalled the commitment entered into by the five recognized nuclear Powers under article VI to the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons, a commitment which had been qualified as unequivocal by the International Court of Justice during the 2000 Review Conference.

66. Noting with concern the growing trend of nuclear proliferation in the modern world, he stressed the need for the strict and unequivocal application of the principle of irreversibility in non-proliferation measures. Chile also regretted the withdrawal from the NPT by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and urged the Government of that country to reconsider its decision.

67. Strong political backing was needed for the CTBT and he described steps by Chile, taking advantage of its unusual geography, to enhance the Treaty's global monitoring network through the establishment of new monitoring stations in Punta Arenas and Easter Island.

68. In closing, he said that the 2005 Review Conference must achieve tangible results in the area of negative security assurances and must also give attention to the peaceful uses of atomic energy, in particular, the development of multilateral rules relating to the maritime transport of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, to protect the rights of coastal States.

69. Mr. KARIYAWASAM (Sri Lanka) said that the current session was being held against a backdrop of mounting political uncertainties and terrorist threats, in which the prospects of a world without nuclear weapons remained as distant as ever. In that context, Sri Lanka strongly cautioned against efforts to delink nuclear non-proliferation measures from nuclear disarmament, as the world would not be made safer by creating a permanent division between the "haves" and the "have-nots" in the realm of nuclear weapons. The only absolute guarantee against the use or

threat of use of nuclear weapons, not only by States, but also by non-State actors like terrorist groups, was the complete elimination of such weapons. Accordingly, the indefinite extension of the NPT should not be viewed as perpetuating the possession of nuclear weapons by certain States, but as a blueprint for the eventual elimination of such weapons.

70. Reporting on Sri Lanka's compliance with its treaty obligations, he stressed that all countries, large or small, must fully comply with their obligations and, in that context, was dismayed by the withdrawal by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the NPT, but welcomed the recent accession by Cuba.

71. Sri Lanka supported the formation in the Conference on Disarmament of an appropriate subsidiary body for nuclear disarmament as well as the conclusion of a legally binding instrument on security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States. It also supported the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, the maintenance of moratoriums on nuclear weapons tests, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, and the early launching of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

72. The disarmament cause would be significantly advanced by the early convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. That cause was also promoted by the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the provision of unconditional assurances by nuclear-weapon-capable States to the States in such zones against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

73. Finally, while it welcomed measures to downscale the deployment and operational status of nuclear weapons, such as the recent Moscow Treaty, Sri Lanka stressed that the role of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines of nuclear-weapons States must be reduced and that there was no substitute for irreversible cuts and the total elimination of such weapons.

74. Mr. CHANDRA ACHARYA (Nepal) reiterated his country's deep commitment to the NPT, which had served as an effective bulwark against proliferation, and, in that context, stressed the need for effective action by all States in compliance with their commitments under article VI. Nepal also stressed the importance of the negotiation of a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances by the five nuclear weapons States, an area in which the Preparatory Committee must reach firm recommendations for consideration by the 2005 Review Conference.

75. Welcoming the conclusion of the CTBT, Nepal called for the resumption of work within the Conference on Disarmament on the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, which represented a serious lacuna in the nuclear non-proliferation system. Given the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones in ensuring peace and security and in building confidence, Nepal welcomed the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba and called for the establishment of more such zones in other regions of the world.

76. Nepal attached particular importance to the dissemination of information to the public on disarmament and on the danger of proliferation and, to that end, had set up a regional centre for

peace and disarmament for Asia and the Pacific. The conclusions and recommendations emerging from the centre's activities had become known as the Kathmandu process and, it was hoped, would help promote further confidence and public awareness on disarmament issues.

77. If terrorists were to be prevented from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, the role of IAEA must be further strengthened. In general, the Preparatory Committee must give careful attention to ways of implementing the 13 practical steps and other major outcomes of the 2000 Review Conference, with a view to accomplishing the universality, indivisibility and mutuality of the Treaty obligations and realization of its other objectives. Given its position in a "nuclear neighbourhood", Nepal was particularly committed to the NPT as the cornerstone of a stable international security order.

78. Ms. DIVJAK-TOMIC (Serbia and Montenegro) said that her country, as a State possessing no weapons of mass destruction, strongly supported all efforts towards the total elimination of such weapons and therefore attached great importance to the Treaty, as the core international legal instrument in the field of nuclear non-proliferation.

79. Noting with concern certain negative developments, including the growing threat of international terrorism, she stressed the need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime set up by the Treaty and the obligation of all States parties to contribute to that regime and to work for its universal membership.

80. Serbia and Montenegro strongly supported the decisions of the 1995 and 2000 review conferences, in particular the 13 practical steps, and, by its statement on succession of 29 August 2001, it had fully committed itself to strict respect for all obligations stemming from the Treaty, including the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. Serbia and Montenegro had also signed the CTBT and was currently taking steps to ratify that treaty.

81. Finally, calling for strengthened implementation of IAEA activities in general, including in her country, she expressed thanks to the Governments of the United States and the Russian Federation for their recent assistance, in cooperation with IAEA, in removing radioactive material from Serbia and Montenegro to the Russian Federation.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.