
Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Overview

1. As a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and a foundation for the promotion of nuclear disarmament, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has made immense contributions to maintaining and strengthening international peace and security since its entry into force in 1970. Its role in this respect is indispensable. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, with the international community still burdened with the existence of huge nuclear arsenals and facing the prospect of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on an unprecedented scale, it is more than ever necessary for the international community to work to preserve and strengthen the NPT as the bulwark against such a danger.
2. The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 raised international awareness of the real and present threats that weapons of mass destruction terrorism poses to civil society. As emphasized by General Assembly resolution 56/24 T entitled "Multilateral cooperation in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and global efforts against terrorism", which was adopted by consensus on 29 November 2001, the international community must unite to fight the common threats posed by terrorism through the consolidation of the multilateral regime on disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as by strengthening national measures to combat terrorism. These efforts are complementary and do not conflict with each other. Maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime should be consistent with these global efforts.
3. At the 1995 Review Conference, it was decided that the purpose of the NPT Review process would be "to consider principles, objectives and ways", including those identified in the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, "in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference". Furthermore, at the 2000 Review Conference, it was agreed that the first session of the Preparatory Committee "should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of

subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty”. Accordingly, the first session of the Preparatory Committee should aim at promoting implementation of the Treaty with a view to the 2005 Review Conference, based upon the decisions and resolutions adopted at the 1995 Review Conference including the “Principles and Objectives”, and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference as yardsticks to measure achievements to date.

Nuclear disarmament

4. The NPT pursues both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The fact that an overwhelming majority of countries have renounced the possession of nuclear weapons significantly strengthens this non-proliferation regime. However, this achievement should not be taken for granted by nuclear-weapon States. In this regard, it should be recalled that the decision taken in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely was made as part of a package together with the agreement on the Decision on Principles and Objectives, which includes the promotion of nuclear disarmament. In response to such resolute actions as to forgo nuclear weapons on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States, nuclear-weapon States must also demonstrate tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament.

5. It is the desire of the people and the Government of Japan to realize a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date possible. Japan considers that it is imperative for States parties to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, while ensuring international security. Japan reaffirms its view that the NPT is the most important foundation for the realization of international nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and that the Treaty obligates all States parties to pursue both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

6. It is necessary for States parties, especially nuclear-weapon States, to strive faithfully to make progress in implementing the nuclear disarmament measures agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. At the General Assembly sessions in 2000 and 2001, Japan submitted a resolution entitled “A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (resolution 56/24 N of 29 November 2001), which identified concrete steps that should be taken to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, based on the agreements at the 2000 Review Conference. It also reflected the present situation of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and strongly appealed to the international community for progress in nuclear disarmament.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

7. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an historic milestone in the promotion of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; it does so by constraining the spread of nuclear weapons and the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. The CTBT, together with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, has a significant role as one of the major pillars of the NPT regime and is a practical and concrete measure towards realizing a world free of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, more than five years after its adoption in 1996, the CTBT has not yet come into force. This lack of progress is making the future of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation less certain and it is feared the NPT

regime may be negatively affected. In response to the Final Declaration of the Second Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT last year, the countries that have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, especially those whose ratification is a requirement for its entry into force, are strongly urged to do so at the earliest possible date. Also, it is important to continue efforts to establish an international monitoring system of the CTBT.

8. Japan has worked actively for the early entry into force of the CTBT. It served as the Chairman of the First Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in 1999 and played a central role as a coordinator in the practical preparations for the Second Conference by organizing the subsequent informal meetings. Japan has also made diplomatic efforts, including sending letters by its Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers and dispatching high level missions. In addition, Japan has encouraged ratification through such efforts as providing technical cooperation in the field of earthquake monitoring technology to facilitate the establishment of the international monitoring system in a number of countries.

9. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, all countries should maintain their political will to continue their moratoriums on nuclear-test explosions. Also, it must be recalled again that in paragraph 3 of its resolution 1172 (1998), adopted after nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, the Security Council called on all countries, not only those two, to refrain from carrying out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in accordance with the provisions of the CTBT.

Fissile material cut-off treaty; ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament

10. It is truly regrettable that, despite the conclusion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has not commenced negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Such negotiations must be commenced without delay. The FMCT is an important measure for promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

11. In the same vein, it is regrettable that the CD has not established an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament. General Assembly resolution 56/24 N on a path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, adopted by an overwhelming majority of Member States, emphasizes the importance and urgency of the establishment of such an ad hoc committee, as well as of the commencement of FMCT negotiations.

12. Japan believes that it is high time for CD member States to overcome their differences relating to mandates and resume their substantive work towards the common objective of strengthening international security through the multilateral disarmament regime.

Reductions of nuclear arsenals by the United States and Russia

13. Japan welcomes the recent announcement that the United States and Russia intend to reduce their nuclear arsenals and have been engaged in serious consultations to achieve this goal. This is a positive step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons by the two major nuclear-weapon States, following the complete implementation of START I at the end of last year. Japan strongly hopes for the successful conclusion of an agreement between these two countries at the

forthcoming summit talks in May and that this will bring about truly meaningful reductions in nuclear weapons.

Nuclear reductions by other nuclear-weapon States

14. Towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament by nuclear-weapon States other than the United States and Russia is also important. Like the United States and Russia, these other nuclear-weapon States are bound by article VI of the NPT. Prior to the 2000 Review Conference, nuclear-weapon States had made progress in nuclear disarmament. Since then, however, they have not taken further measures. Japan urges these nuclear-weapon States to take the unilateral nuclear disarmament measures indicated in the 2000 agreement without waiting for further reductions in nuclear weapons by the United States and Russia.

Other nuclear disarmament measures

15. It is necessary for nuclear-weapon States to take the steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, such as increased transparency with regard to their nuclear-weapon capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI; further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons; further reduction of the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies. The strict management and control of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, equipment and technology possessed by nuclear-weapon States is also extremely important for nuclear non-proliferation and prevention of nuclear terrorism. In particular, these States should consider seriously placing their so-called surplus fissile material under the IAEA safeguards system or some other international verification system.

Reporting

16. The submission by all States parties of reports on the implementation of article VI of the NPT to each Preparatory Committee is an important step in nuclear disarmament. Japan proposes that the specific ways of reporting should be discussed at this session of the Preparatory Committee. In particular, it is necessary to ensure that nuclear-weapon States report on their progress in implementing nuclear disarmament and on their future policies and fulfil their responsibilities to report on their own efforts in nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear non-proliferation

Strengthening of the commitment to NPT and IAEA safeguards

17. Full compliance with obligations under the NPT and the IAEA safeguards agreement is extremely important for maintaining the reliability and effectiveness of the NPT regime. Nuclear non-proliferation is a matter of great concern for both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. Therefore, first, non-compliance must be prevented; second, acts of non-compliance, including clandestine acts, must be detected; and third, non-compliance with these obligations must be corrected and suspicions totally eliminated.

18. For the prevention and detection of non-compliance, efforts fully to enforce and strengthen the IAEA safeguards system are essential. States parties that have not

concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA need to do so as soon as possible. At the present stage, however, the universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol is an urgent goal. The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference recommends that “the Director General of IAEA and the IAEA member States consider ways and means, which could include a possible plan of action, to promote and facilitate ... the agreements and additional protocols”.

19. Regarding non-compliance with the NPT, since there are no directly relevant provisions in the Treaty, it is necessary to complement it by other means. Verification on redressing of non-compliance should be stronger and more intrusive than ordinary inspections. In this context, the problems of Iraq and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, mentioned in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, remain matters of serious concern to the international community. Japan stresses that compliance by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with the NPT obligations should be ensured at an early stage and that any suspicion of non-compliance by that party should be completely resolved. Japan also urges Iraq to accept United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency verification in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

20. The IAEA safeguards are an important means of preventing nuclear proliferation through the management of nuclear materials. Strengthening the safeguards system is an urgent task, and it is important that as many countries as possible conclude the Additional Protocol. Regrettably, as of today, the number of countries which have already done so stands at only 24. Since its conclusion of the IAEA Additional Protocol in 1999, Japan has been making vigorous efforts to promote its universalization. Together with IAEA, Japan sponsored an international conference in Tokyo in June 2001 for the universalization of the Additional Protocol among countries in the Asia and Pacific region. Japan has also extended financial assistance and sent experts to seminars in Latin America and Central Asia. It will provide support for a seminar to be held in South Africa in June of this year. Furthermore, Japan plans to co-sponsor with IAEA a global conference in Tokyo this year.

21. The coordination of export controls through the Nuclear Suppliers Group is another important measure for preventing nuclear proliferation from the supply side. Furthermore, as a complement to nuclear non-proliferation efforts, it is necessary for the international community to tackle non-proliferation of the means of delivery of nuclear materials.

Measures against nuclear terrorism

22. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 made us aware once again of the real danger that nuclear weapons and nuclear materials may be used by terrorists. In order to anticipate and prevent nuclear terrorism, national, regional and international cooperation must be strengthened. Needless to say, the international exchange of information and surveillance is important. But it is also essential to establish strict border control systems to prevent the illegal trafficking of nuclear materials and impose accurate register controls and domestic nuclear material protection arrangements to prevent the theft of nuclear materials. Japan intends to make positive contributions to the struggle against nuclear terrorism. IAEA has an extremely important role to play in this area as well. At the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in March, Japan announced that it would contribute \$500,000 to

the Agency and it calls upon other member States of the Agency to make contributions as well.

23. Japan is convinced that the Additional Protocol can play a significant role in preventing such sensitive materials from falling into the hands of terrorists because it provides a mechanism for reporting on the export and import of nuclear material and equipment. The conclusion of the Additional Protocol should therefore be promoted in order to contribute to anti-terrorism efforts.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

24. The peaceful use of nuclear energy is vital not only to securing a stable energy supply, but also to preserving the global environment. Japan, as a State party to the NPT, has enjoyed and promoted the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Japan is continuing its research and development efforts relating to the use of plutonium for fast breeder reactors and light water reactors in order to develop a nuclear fuel cycle.

25. In promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Japan fully complies with the IAEA safeguards agreement, including its Additional Protocol, and ensures transparency in its use of plutonium. At the same time, Japan gives highest priority to ensuring the safety of its nuclear activities and facilities. In this connection, Japan hopes that the Second Review Meeting on the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which is currently being held in Vienna, will enhance the safety of nuclear activities globally and urges those countries that have not yet concluded this Convention to do so as soon as possible. Furthermore, Japan recognizes the important role of IAEA in strengthening the global “safety culture” through the foundation of guidelines for safety and training, and will continue to make contributions to the Agency’s activities.

26. Japan is making positive contributions towards promoting international cooperation in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Japan recognizes the important role of IAEA not only in the area of electric power generation, but also in the medical, agricultural, food and sanitary fields and will continue to make contributions to the Agency to activities in this area.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

27. Japan supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the regions concerned and on the condition that the establishment of such zones would contribute to regional stability and security. In particular, Japan appreciates the countries of Central Asia for their efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region as contributing to the prevention of nuclear terrorism. Japan has been supporting the work of the Department of Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat by, for example, twice hosting conferences in Sapporo addressing this issue. If the countries concerned wish it to do so, Japan is prepared to offer further cooperation for the promotion of discussions.

Negative security assurances

28. It is important to consider and discuss security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States of the NPT, based on Security Council resolution 984 (1995) as well as the relevant declarations of nuclear-weapon States. From this viewpoint, Japan supports the idea that a programme of work containing the establishment of an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances will be agreed upon at the Conference on Disarmament.

Universality of the NPT

29. As of today, 187 countries are parties to the NPT, which has attained almost worldwide universality. However, four countries remain non-member States. In 1998, the NPT regime was challenged from outside in the form of the nuclear weapon test explosions conducted by India and Pakistan, but at the 2000 Review Conference, the States parties made clear that these two countries would not receive new nuclear-weapon State status or any special status whatsoever. Lack of progress in the establishment of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East poses a serious problem for the credibility of the NPT. Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan should join the NPT as soon as possible.

Strengthening dialogue with civil society and future generations

30. In order to advance disarmament and non-proliferation, it is essential to gain the understanding and support of young people who will lead future generations, as well as civil society as a whole. Japan notes with interest that at present the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on this issue is studying specific measures to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education. In this connection, over the past 20 years, Japan has invited about 400 United Nations disarmament fellows to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, providing these young people who will be responsible for future disarmament diplomacy with the opportunity to understand the tragic devastation and long-lasting consequences caused by atomic bombs. Japan intends to continue to make such efforts.

31. A regional disarmament conference is also an effective means to enhance awareness of the issue of disarmament in the region concerned. Every year, Japan sponsors a United Nations conference on disarmament in a local city, providing a valuable opportunity for distinguished disarmament experts not only from the Asia and Pacific region but also from around the world to engage in useful discussions.

32. Dialogues with non-governmental organizations, which play a significant role in civil society, are also important. Japan appreciates that, on the basis of the agreement at the 2000 Review Conference, a non-governmental organizations session is being held during this session of the Preparatory Committee.

Procedural matters

33. This session of the Preparatory Committee is the beginning of the 2005 review process in accordance with the “strengthened review process” agreed at the 2000

Review Conference and provides an opportunity for States parties to review for the first time the implementation of the conclusion of the 2000 Review Conference. In order to ensure the success of the 2005 Review Conference, it is important for that process to start smoothly.

34. Towards the 2005 Review Conference, as stated clearly in the 2000 Final Document, it is necessary at this session to have discussions so as “to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality”. The discussions should be based upon the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives and the forward-looking aspect of the 2000 Final Document, and should be open and constructive. Japan is of the view that a balanced timetable should be prepared.

35. The results of this session should appropriately reflect our discussions here. We understand that, in accordance with the section entitled “Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the NPT” in the 2000 Final Document, a consensus recommendation to the Review Conference will be negotiated at the third and, as appropriate, fourth sessions of the Preparatory Committee. Therefore, Japan believes that there is no need for the factual summary of this session to be a consensus document and it supports the idea that a factual summary should be produced by the Chairman under his responsibility. Most importantly, it is hoped that the Chairman’s summary will reflect the discussions at this session and will lead to discussions at future sessions. The summary should be a message to the international community regarding the significance of the NPT.
