
2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

13 June 2000

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Summary record of the 11th meeting

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 2 May 2000 at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Abelian (Vice-President) (Armenia)
Later: Mr. Baali (President) (Algeria)

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In the absence of Mr. Baali (Algeria), Mr. Abelian (Armenia), Vice-President, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Alemán** (Ecuador) said that despite the important advances of the past 55 years, nuclear disarmament had stalled. Those States which had decided not to develop nuclear weapons and had ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) were justly concerned by the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear arms, by the development of more sophisticated weaponry for reasons of national security, by military doctrines that did not exclude the first use of nuclear force, by the slow pace of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and by obstacles to international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

2. Ecuador itself was a party to the NPT and to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and had been active in the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL). The Latin American countries had been the first, in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, to declare a nuclear-weapon-free zone and advocated extending the zone to include the entire southern hemisphere by linking it to similar zones in other regions.

3. The NPT must become universal. It was inconceivable that countries with proven nuclear capabilities should not be covered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system, and the fact that four States had not ratified the Treaty was undermining peace and stability in their regions. On the other hand, the recent ratification of the CTBT and the second of the strategic arms reduction treaties, START II, by the Russian Federation was an encouraging development. In view of the huge arsenal still in the possession of the nuclear Powers, the risk of an inadvertent war had not diminished even though increasing political, moral and legal limitations had been placed on the effective use of such weapons. The periodic reviews of the NPT should not simply go over the same ground but should make headway in extending its implementation and the observance of its principles and objectives. All nuclear-weapon States, a number of which continued to deploy nuclear weapons

on alert status for supposed security reasons, had to negotiate in good faith to eventually achieve total disarmament under effective international control. Accordingly, his delegation supported the working paper submitted in document NPT/CONF.2000/WP.3 as a significant contribution to further progress.

4. **Mr. Pérez-Otermin** (Uruguay) observed that the instruments of war and destruction had to give way to development projects that would advance human well-being, and a safe method of disposing of the nuclear wastes from power plants had to be found. The Latin American region had taken the leadership in renouncing the possession of nuclear weapons and declaring a zone of peace, and all States parties to the NPT must strive towards the same overriding goal. The entry into force of the CTBT was becoming more urgent as an unequivocal expression of support for the aims of the NPT. The Lima Appeal by the OPANAL member States had shown the way.

5. Looking to the future, the Conference must propose ways of ensuring verification and peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and the nuclear States must think in terms of humanity as a whole by cooperating in the transfer of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear States. The Conference must also give a clear message that would satisfy the concern of coastal States with regard to the regulation of transit shipments of plutonium and radioactive wastes on the high seas, a hazardous activity completely incompatible with article IV of the NPT. The likelihood of an accident was high, and such a disaster would have an incalculable impact on coastal countries. Such catastrophes were completely avoidable if proper action was taken now to suspend all such transport. Many other challenges, such as the proliferation of anti-ballistic missiles, nuclear proliferation, illicit traffic in nuclear materials and the dangers of an arms race in space would also have to be dealt with in the spirit of the NPT.

6. **Ms. Durrant** (Jamaica), speaking on behalf of the 14 States parties which were members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) observed that many approached the Review Conference with a strong sense of foreboding and feelings of frustration at the disappointing lack of progress on the multilateral disarmament agenda. The meeting nevertheless presented an important opportunity to redirect action and adopt an aggressive strategy aimed at strengthening the NPT regime.

7. In the five years since the indefinite extension of the NPT, the number of ratifications had risen to 187. With the accession of Chile and Brazil, the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean had been expanded, and nuclear-weapon-free zones had been created in Africa and South-East Asia with the Treaties of Pelindaba and Bangkok. The CARICOM countries welcomed the adoption in 1997 of the Model Additional Protocol, which provided IAEA with a more effective verification mechanism. Since the adoption of the CTBT in 1996, 54 States had ratified it, among them 28 of the 44 whose ratification was essential for the Treaty's entry into force. The Russian Federation's recent decision to ratify START II and to begin discussions with the United States on START III was another positive development. Even so, the anticipated progress had not been realized. The continued arrogation of superior nuclear power by a few had served only to incite others to challenge that superiority, thereby undermining the goals of non-proliferation and disarmament. In that, the nuclear-weapon States must bear the weight of responsibility, for they had failed to pursue negotiations in good faith on the various measures essential for the achievement of the NPT goals and had shown a glaring lack of commitment to the NPT preamble and provisions. The stalemate had served as the dismal background for the nuclear tests undertaken in India and Pakistan in 1998. Universality of the NPT had still not been achieved. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia and the Middle East remained a distant objective. All those were issues that demanded urgent attention at the Review Conference.

8. Expressing support for the working paper presented by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NPT/CONF.2000/18, annex), the CARICOM States also reaffirmed the right of all States parties to develop and produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and urged the removal of all obstacles to the transfer of the relevant technology. The CARICOM States remained concerned over the risks to which coastal States were exposed by the practice of shipping nuclear wastes through the Caribbean Sea. The Review Conference was the appropriate forum for addressing the matter squarely. The International Maritime Organization Code of Practice, while binding, did not protect en-route coastal States, and they consequently had no legal recourse to compensation for accidents, which became more likely as shipments of radioactive nuclear wastes increased

dramatically. The CARICOM States consequently intended to introduce for consideration in Main Committee III a working paper under article IV, which would call for consultations leading to the establishment of a comprehensive international regime for the protection of the population and marine environment of en-route coastal States from shipments of nuclear material.

9. **Mr. Kittikhoun** (Lao People's Democratic Republic) said that, despite the indefinite extension of the NPT, existing nuclear arsenals continued to pose the greatest danger to the survival of civilization. Nuclear weapons had been modernized, States had found new rationales for their use, and the CTBT had not yet entered into force. All States, but particularly the nuclear-weapon States which bore the greatest legal responsibility, must in good faith pursue negotiations leading to total nuclear disarmament.

10. The performance of the NPT over the past years had not yielded the expected results. The negotiations on banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices had yet to begin. His delegation regretted the lack of progress on that issue, and hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would soon conclude the negotiations for a non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production of fissile materials. It was important to address nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament measures in parallel.

11. Learning from its past experiences about the danger of nuclear weapons, the international community should make every effort, on entering the new twenty-first century, to ensure that mankind could live without the threat of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the Conference, at its current session, should lay the groundwork for States parties to the Treaty to agree to negotiate and conclude a legal instrument to provide assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States concerning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In that context, the issue of concluding a legal binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States deserved the utmost attention of the world community and should be strongly pursued.

12. His Government welcomed the increase in the number of States parties to the NPT since its entry into force in 1970. The fact that 187 States were now parties to the Treaty, testified to its global appeal in terms of both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear

disarmament. His Government supported the strong aspirations of the peoples in many parts of the world in their efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in their respective regions, including South-East Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and the South Pacific. The creation of those zones would help to free the peoples concerned from the nuclear threat. In that context, he welcomed the adoption of the principles and guidelines by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in the previous year on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones based on arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned as well as the adoption by the Mongolian parliament of the legislation on Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status.

13. In view of the significant contribution made by nuclear material, equipment and technology to scientific research, and hence to economic growth, it was a cause of concern that developing countries had only restricted access to them. That practice was inconsistent with the prevailing international atmosphere of cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

14. The present Conference provided an excellent opportunity for all States parties to evaluate and consider adopting new measures to ensure that the provisions of the NPT and the decisions adopted in 1995 were fully implemented. For its part, the Lao People's Democratic Republic would continue to cooperate fully with other States parties towards the achievement of the ultimate goal of the Treaty: the building of a world free from nuclear weapons.

15. **Mr. Lelong** (Haiti) commended commitment to the cause of nuclear disarmament manifested by Japan, a country which, because of its own painful experience, was all too aware of the dreadful consequences of nuclear proliferation. Recalling the positive developments that had taken place in the disarmament process, he said that, as a sign of good faith, France and the United Kingdom had adopted transparency measures: they had taken courageous initiatives relating to arms reductions, had immediately ratified the CTBT and were observing a unilateral moratorium on the production of fissile material for military purposes. The United States and the Russian Federation, for their part, had taken bilateral action to advance the disarmament process within the framework of the START treaties. His delegation welcomed the Russian Federation's recent ratification of START II

and trusted that negotiations on START III would begin in the near future. The decision of the Russian parliament to ratify the CTBT following the presidential elections was also an encouraging event.

16. There had been positive progress in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. His delegation welcomed the entry into force in March 1997 of the Treaty of Bangkok for South-East Asia and hoped that the African countries would not delay in taking action to ratify the Treaty of Pelindaba, signed in April 1996. As had been true in the case of the adoption of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967 and the Treaty of Rarotonga in 1985, the establishment of the two new zones could only serve to strengthen international peace and security. He looked forward to the outcome of the negotiations to establish a fifth zone in central Asia.

17. He welcomed the decision of the nine countries which had joined the NPT in 1995, thus helping to make it the most universal disarmament instrument in existence, and the fact that the role of the IAEA as a competent and responsible authority for verifying and ensuring the respect of the commitments of the States parties had been strengthened with the adoption in May 1997 of the Model Additional Protocol.

18. At the same time, the agreements between States parties on the question of nuclear disarmament seemed to be merely agreements of principle, as the actions of certain Powers did not always reflect the obligations they had undertaken in accordance with article VI of the NPT. Also, the mistrust or belligerence which had lasted for decades was not about to disappear. It was only by creating attitudes appropriate to the new era and to a culture of cooperation and mutual assistance that the world could finally free itself of the baggage of the cold war.

19. His Government had always taken great care to emphasize the inequality inherent in the international regime. Accession to the NPT was a move towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the area of horizontal and also vertical proliferation. The doctrines of "sufficiency", "nuclear deterrence" and "self-defence" advocated or maintained by the nuclear-weapon States had not increased the confidence of the non-nuclear-weapon States. If it was a question of self-defence, then why deprive others with a similar aim? Moral authority was paramount: preaching should be by example, and preferential treatment should be

avoided. Otherwise, it would seem that the nuclear Powers were more devoted to the cause of hegemony than to the possibility of complete disarmament for the benefit of the whole planet. The Canberra Commission had described the situation as highly discriminatory and thus unstable, a situation which could not be sustained, since the possession of nuclear weapons by any State was a constant stimulus to other States to acquire them.

20. Efforts should be strengthened to ensure the universality of the NPT. The nuclear tests carried out in May 1998 by India and Pakistan were sufficient to show that a state of emergency should be declared. Thirty years after the entry into force of the NPT, and despite the positive impact noted, the global situation, although unipolar, was no less threatening. Clandestine nuclear programmes had been discovered, transparency and non-respect of safeguards agreements were prevalent, and there was the stubbornness of the nuclear Powers. A negotiation mechanism for a treaty to ban fissile material had still not been established. Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were still in disagreement with the IAEA on inspection issues. China had not yet ratified the CTBT, although it had been open for signature since 24 September 1996, in suggesting an amendment to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), the United States was planning to develop a national missile defence system, thus reviving the concerns of the international community, particularly the Russian Federation. As for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its security argument was not convincing. Indeed, it was hardly conceivable that the alliance that already had the most sophisticated conventional weapons should wish to cling to its nuclear weapons and its divisive policy, on the pretext of deterring potential aggressors.

21. Haiti, like many other States in the Caribbean region, was extremely concerned about the risks of accidents that could occur during the maritime transport of radioactive material. Given its experience of the illegal dumping of toxic waste on the Haitian coast, waste that had stayed there for more than ten years, his Government was very sensitive to the potential for ecological disaster and reiterated its support for General Assembly resolution 54/225. Paragraph 5 of that resolution called for an improvement in emergency response capabilities with a view to a timely, effective and coordinated response for

the containment of environmental damage in the Caribbean Sea area in the event of an accident or incident relating to maritime transport.

22. His delegation rejected the argument that the security of nations was dependent on any form of nuclear weapon. It deplored the growth of military expenditure and the extravagant allocations for defence budgets. Used for other purposes, such funds would certainly help to reduce the widening gap between rich and poor countries. It was surely high time for politicians to understand that genuine security was based on the socio-economic development of nations and the development of a culture of peace between peoples for them to act accordingly.

23. **Mr. Thapa** (Nepal) said that the NPT stood at a crossroads. Thirty years after the Treaty had entered into force, there was little to be proud of in terms of the realization of the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty. Despite the positive results that had emanated from the operation of the NPT, serious challenges lay ahead to silence its critics, although the disregard of its provisions by some States, both parties and non-parties, should not be viewed as failure of the Treaty.

24. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT had been a milestone event in view of its success in reaching three important decisions and adopting a resolution on the Middle East. It would be recalled that those historic decisions formed a package deal and that a bargain had been struck between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in order to give permanency to the NPT. Whereas the non-nuclear-weapon States had kept their promise to forgo the nuclear option, there was hardly any evidence to indicate that the nuclear-weapon States had fulfilled their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, which required them "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

25. The present situation looked gloomy because of the following factors: the Treaty still lacked credible universality as three of the States remaining outside the non-proliferation regime possessed nuclear capabilities; the South Asian nuclear tests in May 1998 had posed a serious threat to the entire non-proliferation regime; START II was still not

operational pending completion of the ratification procedure; until the required number of instruments of ratification was obtained, the CTBT could not enter into force; some States were reaffirming nuclear doctrines in order to justify the retention of and reliance on nuclear weapons for security purposes; and the leading nuclear-weapon State was intent on pursuing a national missile defence programme which would adversely affect the integrity of the ABM Treaty.

26. The encouraging progress made in the field of nuclear disarmament should be acknowledged, however limited it might be. The recent decision of the Russian Federation to ratify START II and the CTBT, the unilateral decision by some nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear stockpiles, the observance of moratoriums on nuclear tests after the 1996 signing of the CTBT, the growing number of nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world and the 1997 Model Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements were indeed positive steps towards achieving long-cherished goals of nuclear disarmament.

27. The Conference was taking place at a critical juncture. There was much at stake not only for States and Governments, but for civil society and responsible individuals as well. The entire world community was closely watching the outcome of the Conference. It was therefore vital for all to demonstrate what could be done to make the world a safer and better place to live in.

28. **Mr. Maquieira** (Chile) said that his country had acceded to the NPT in 1995, immediately after the Review and Extension Conference and prior to the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which clearly established the obligation to negotiate in good faith for nuclear disarmament, the ultimate and fundamental aim of the system established by the Treaty. The extension of the Treaty was legitimate only to the extent that it was accompanied by a serious commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

29. Some progress had been made since 1995, including the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones, the conclusion of a strengthened safeguards systems, the real reductions of nuclear stockpiles in some of the five recognized nuclear Powers, and, most recently, the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT.

30. Progress had been less than expected, however, and the many unfinished tasks needed to be dealt with urgently and in a spirit of compromise, given the tendency emerging among some of the international actors. It seemed that the security of some was to be increased at the cost of the security of others. Henry Kissinger had once said that the absolute security of one State would imply the absolute insecurity of all the others. It was imperative to reverse that dangerous trend, and in that context his country fully supported the New Agenda Coalition, which represented a moderate and constructive approach to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

31. Chile was a party to all the regional treaties which contributed to disarmament and international security, including the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Also, his Government had recently finalized the internal process for ratification of the CTBT, another of the hoped-for outcomes of the system created in 1968. It regarded the negotiation of a convention banning the production of fissile material as an urgent task awaiting the international political community as another means of promoting international peace and security, Chile was playing an active role in MERCOSUR, an economic and political entity in the southern cone of the continent which had declared a peace zone and was encouraging confidence-building measures. Lastly, he supported the statement made on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the working paper which had been submitted in document NPT/CONF.2000/18.

32. Another cornerstone of the efforts being made to strengthen the review process for the Treaty was the set of principles and objectives decided upon in 1995. The States parties should update those principles and objectives, recognizing the ones which had been met thus far and outlining those which should be met in the next five years. Together with the launching of negotiations on fissile material, universal and binding guarantees should be obtained on the non-use of nuclear weapons. To meet the Treaty's important objective of ensuring equitable access to technologies and materials for developing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the States parties should ensure that the control of exports was transparent and that it was made progressively multilateral in structure and scope. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be duly protected through a strengthened system of safeguards, such as the one developed by IAEA, which Chile strongly supported.

33. Of particular relevance in the light of the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, at a time when all but one of the States of the region had acceded to the Treaty. In the broader context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, Chile attached special importance to the regulation of the international maritime transport of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel according to the highest international safety standards. Such transit should be regulated by means of friendly negotiations in which the views of riparian and transit States, in particular, were taken into account.

34. With 187 States parties, the Treaty had the potential to offer the international community the chance to create truly universal conditions for an existence free of the nuclear threat. Chile had deplored the conduct of nuclear tests by India, Pakistan, China and France. It welcomed Brazil's recent accession to the Treaty and urged those countries which had not yet done so to follow suit. The regime established by the Treaty was characterized by a balance between the responsibilities and obligations of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. That fact must be borne in mind in efforts to strengthen the review process for the Treaty, with a view to both non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the measures agreed upon to strengthen the review process for the Treaty formed a whole, together with the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely, and were therefore inseparable. The decision on extension had solemnly proclaimed the political will to end nuclear proliferation; the decision to strengthen the review process had strengthened the obligation of all States parties to comply with the Treaty; and the decision on principles and objectives was the point of departure for the gradual but complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

35. **Mr. Mabilangan** (Philippines) said that the lack of progress in the preparatory process for the Review Conference, together with recent developments in the areas of nuclear proliferation and disarmament, painted a bleak picture for those who longed for a world free of nuclear weapons. The Treaty was the outcome of compromises built on compromises and of the uneasy union between the desire of the nuclear-weapon States to maintain their nuclear advantage and the desire of the rest of the world for the fulfilment of the legal

commitments enshrined in article VI of the Treaty. The best solution to nuclear proliferation was nuclear disarmament.

36. Failure was not an option, in view of the renewed arms race; the weakening of the anti-ballistic missile regime; the heightened possibility of regional nuclear war; the proliferation of fissile material and the possible use of nuclear weapons by terrorists; the militarization of outer space and the continued improvement of nuclear arsenals and capabilities; and the nuclear-weapon States' immutable adherence to nuclear doctrines. The stakes were even higher in the Asia-Pacific region, where nuclear weapons had first drawn blood and the final nuclear tests of the last millennium had been conducted. All the most volatile flashpoints were in the Asia-Pacific region, and all of them had a decidedly nuclear dimension. Region-wide efforts continued with a view to addressing the causes of conflict and the potential for war, *inter alia* through the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, while the individual States of the region continued to engage other States on regional security matters.

37. He reiterated his support for the conduct, at the earliest possible date, of an international conference aimed at reaching agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, which should prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use and should provide for their destruction. He welcomed the Secretary-General's call for a major international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers (A/54/2000, para. 253), as well as the decision to establish a subsidiary body under Main Committee I to consider practical steps for the systematic elimination of nuclear weapons. He supported the statement made and the working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/18, annex) introduced by the Indonesian delegation on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

38. Although the lack of progress in relation to the regime established by the Treaty was disheartening, the fact that so many States had condemned that situation, that all States not parties to the ABM Treaty had been called upon to accede to it and that all the nuclear-weapon States had reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear disarmament showed that there was hope that those abominable weapons would be eliminated. While he welcomed the statement made the preceding day by

the French delegation on behalf of the nuclear-weapon States, he recalled the need to translate words into deeds. He also appreciated the statement made by the Secretary of State of the United States of America and sympathized with the concerns which had prompted the United States to propose a national missile defence system. However, those perceived threats must be weighed against the already delicate balance in the non-proliferation and disarmament equations. The United States should consider carefully all the ramifications of its intended course of action and should not be bound by artificial constraints.

39. In view of the need for creative approaches to nuclear disarmament, he welcomed the initiative taken by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden in issuing a communiqué entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda" (A/54/423), which provided fresh perspectives that broadened the choices available to the international community. Nuclear-weapon-free zones contributed not only to nuclear non-proliferation, but also to nuclear disarmament. The inaugural meeting of the Executive Committee for the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, held in October 1999, had been an important step towards the implementation of that Treaty. Negotiations were under way to address the concerns of the nuclear-weapon States with a view to encouraging them to sign the Protocol to that Treaty. He welcomed Mongolia's initiative to establish itself as a single-nation nuclear-weapon-free zone (NPT/CONF.2000/16), and recalled that the Philippines had done likewise in 1987.

40. Recently, owing to competing partisan interests and the propensity for misunderstanding, established legal norms had been disregarded or misapplied. The Review Conference provided States parties with a crucial opportunity to strengthen the rule of law by ensuring that all of them fulfilled their legal commitments. To that end, the States parties must consider all proposals that sought to ensure the sanctity of those commitments, such as the proposal to establish an institutional framework for the Treaty, which had been put forward in various forums. That idea deserved further study, as did the larger question of the evolving institutional relationships among the various international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. It must be borne in mind that, while the Treaty did not legitimize the possession of nuclear weapons, its extension had not been unconditional but

had been part of a package of agreements. Insinuations to the contrary were not helpful.

41. While all the States parties were responsible for the successful outcome of the Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States had a special role to play in that regard. They had not fully complied with the provisions of article VI of the Treaty or with the principles and objectives agreed upon at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In that connection, he welcomed the recent developments in the Russian Federation with respect to START II and the CTBT. The slow pace of nuclear disarmament owing to political realities should not stop the international community from doing more. He trusted that the Conference would help ensure that article VI of the Treaty, which currently seemed to be suspended in a time warp, would be put into practice so that the common aspiration for a world free of nuclear weapons would be one step closer to fulfilment.

42. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) took the Chair.*

43. **Mr. Jokonya** (Zimbabwe) said that, while the Treaty was the cornerstone of the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the new world order did not seem to provide a framework for strengthening the review process as a means of promoting the full implementation of the Treaty, as reflected by paragraphs 249 and 250 of the Secretary-General's report to the Millennium Assembly (A/54/2000). Zimbabwe, as a party to the Treaty, was committed to the goal of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Treaty required both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to make progress towards general and complete disarmament. Some nuclear-weapon States recognized that fact, as shown, *inter alia*, by the statement made by the Chinese delegation in the First Committee on 14 October 1998 (A/C.1/53/PV.5), which had called upon the nuclear-weapon States to intensify their efforts to fulfil their obligations under article VI of the Treaty.

44. As long as there was an exclusive club whose members were reluctant to give up their nuclear option, threshold nuclear Powers would always be tempted to try to gain entry into that club. He hoped that the current adverse trend in disarmament would not trigger a new nuclear arms race. Recent negative developments had included the failure of the United States Senate to ratify the CTBT, despite the assurances given by the United States delegation in the First

Committee on 14 October 1998 (A/C.1/53/PV.5); the maintenance of nuclear weapons as an essential part of NATO and United States security policy; the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament; the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan; and the challenges to the ABM Treaty.

45. On the positive side, Zimbabwe welcomed the Russian Federation's recent ratification of START II and the CTBT, which demonstrated the Russian Federation's full commitment to its obligations under article VI of the NPT. Due consideration should be given to the Russian Federation's concerns about the challenges to the ABM Treaty, since further reductions in strategic offensive weapons could only be considered in the context of the preservation of that Treaty. As the representative of the Russian Federation had stated on 25 April 2000, if one component of the system of arms control agreements was weakened, the entire system would be destabilized. That observation echoed the Secretary-General's assertion, in paragraph 251 of document A/54/2000, that unless plans to deploy missile defences were devised with the agreement of all concerned parties, the progress achieved thus far in reducing the number of nuclear weapons might be jeopardized.

46. At the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the Review Conference, his delegation had stated that its experience in the Conference on Disarmament had demonstrated the futility of engaging in negotiations without political will. The Secretary-General had made a similar observation in his address to the Review Conference, and had proposed a results-based Treaty review process that focused on specific benchmarks, such as the entry into force of the CTBT. The latter not only set up political and technical obstacles for any country designing nuclear weapons for the first time but also represented a cornerstone of efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. It was disheartening to note that some nuclear-weapon States had chosen not to ratify that instrument, even though it would enable them to meet their obligations under article VI of the NPT.

47. Another benchmark would be an irreversible reduction in stocks of nuclear weapons. The New Agenda Coalition had put forward proposals to that end. The current Review Conference should not only consolidate existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, but also negotiate the establishment of new ones. A third benchmark would be the provision of binding security

guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States should formally recognize the legally binding nature of assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty and to regional nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. The determination of whether a State was in good standing under those treaties and protected by such assurances should be made by IAEA or another authoritative international body. Lastly, he urged the nuclear-weapon States to continue negotiations aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons, pursuant to article VI of the Treaty and in line with the advisory opinion rendered in 1996 by the International Court of Justice.

48. **The President** said that the representative of Bangladesh would be unable to deliver his statement as scheduled, his arrival in New York having been unexpectedly delayed. Copies of the text were being distributed and, if there was no objection, a summary of the statement would be included in the official records of the meeting.

49. *It was so decided.*

Summary of the statement by Mr. Shafi Sami (Bangladesh)

50. The vision of the twentieth century that would emerge from the Millennium Summit must be shaped by the realization that nuclear weapons were the most dangerous threat to civilization; nuclear non-proliferation was a goal that could be achieved through political will. The delegation of Bangladesh endorsed the five benchmarks established by the Secretary-General in his opening statement and was prepared to cooperate with him in the achievement of those goals.

51. Non-compliance with the safeguards provisions of the Treaty and differences of opinion regarding the full implementation of that instrument and the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons posed a clear and present danger. His Government was particularly concerned at the "nuclearization" of South Asia and urged India and Pakistan to become parties to the Treaty and to sign the CTBT. He congratulated the States parties that had concluded agreements establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in South-East Asia and Africa since 1995 and supported the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East and other parts of the world. His delegation also welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT and to reduce its nuclear stockpiles.

52. Full disarmament was mandated in the Constitution of Bangladesh. His Government had been the first in South Asia to accede to the CTBT and was contributing a seismic station to the International Monitoring System of the CTBT verification regime. It had concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA and was considering the conclusion of an additional protocol thereto. He called upon States parties that had not yet signed safeguards agreements to do so.

53. His delegation welcomed the forward-looking decisions of the 1995 Review Conference, which had laid the foundation for a strengthened review process, and thought that it might be time to consider establishing an elected executive council to deal with questions of non-compliance and implementation.

54. As President of the Conference on Disarmament at its 2000 session, it was Bangladesh's goal to play a moderating and facilitating role in enhancing appreciation of differences, bridging gaps and creating consensus. It would continue to contribute to the process of consensus-building with a view to the adoption of a declaration of principles and objectives to be achieved by 2005. The current impasse in the Conference, which was the only consensual universal multilateral body on disarmament issues, was undesirable. The 2000 Review Conference should seek common ground on the basis of the 1995 programme of action and in particular with regard to negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and working groups on nuclear disarmament, security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

55. He was encouraged by the fact that the Treaty was only four accessions short of universality and noted that Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) had urged India and Pakistan, and all other States that had not yet done so, to become parties to the NPT and the CTBT without delay and without conditions.

56. His Government attached great importance to implementation of article IV of the NPT. It was disappointing that, 32 years after the entry into force of the Treaty, the developing States had yet to gain access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. He called for a closer study of the matter and hoped that the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which had been established for that purpose, would be transparent in its operations and that States parties would adhere to the provisions of the Treaty in both letter and spirit.

57. Lastly, he urged States parties to overcome their disagreements and to remember that nuclear proliferation had serious implications not only for international peace and security, but also for development, which constituted the agenda of over two thirds of the world's inhabitants.

Election of Vice-Chairmen (*continued*)

58. **The President** recalled that the Vice-Chairmen of Main Committee II and Main Committee III had not yet been elected. He had been informed that the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries had endorsed the candidacies of Mr. Yaw Odei Osei (Ghana) and Mr. Hamid Baeidi Nejad (Islamic Republic of Iran) for the posts of Vice-Chairmen of Main Committees II and III, respectively.

59. *Mr. Osei (Ghana) was elected Vice-Chairman of Main Committee II and Mr. Baeidi Nejad (Islamic Republic of Iran) was elected Vice-Chairman of Main Committee III.*

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.