
**2000 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

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Main Committee II

Summary record of the 4th meeting

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 8 May 2000 at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Kobieracki (Poland)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

Exchange of views

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

1. **Mr. Alimov** (Tajikistan), speaking on behalf of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, said that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones made a major contribution to the consolidation of peace and security at the global and the regional levels. That idea had been supported in a number of international documents and agreements, including the Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

2. In order to strengthen the NPT regime and to increase regional security, the five republics of Central Asia had decided to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Regional political support for the creation of such a zone had been expressed after high-level meetings in Almaty, Tashkent and Bishkek. The States of Central Asia had taken specific steps towards the establishment of the zone, and he was pleased to report that they had prepared a working document which reflected the substantial progress achieved on the draft treaty to establish the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. The States of Central Asia hoped that the working document would receive support from the participants in the Conference and that it would be reflected in the report of Main Committee II and the final document of the Conference.

3. **Mr. Kerma** (Algeria) said that the NPT, by explicitly recognizing in its article VII the right of groups of States “to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories”, had confirmed the importance and complementary nature of treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. New developments in international affairs and disarmament, and non-proliferation in particular, had led to intensified efforts in that direction since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The Treaties of Bangkok and Pelindaba, concluded for the purpose of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones in South-East Asia and Africa, respectively, represented a new stage in attempts to codify the status of such zones. Currently, over 100 countries on four continents were members of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The efforts to establish such a zone in Central

Asia and the desire of Mongolia to declare itself a non-nuclear-weapon State illustrated the growing commitment to work towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the world.

4. The Treaty of Pelindaba expressed the collective political will of African States in that regard, but in order for it to be effective the nuclear Powers must honour their commitments as contained in its second Additional Protocol. His Government believed that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa would enhance collective security, the international non-proliferation regime and world peace. Regional denuclearization was an essential complement to global disarmament. However, because of the close ties between Africa and the Middle East and their geographical proximity, Algeria was deeply concerned at the lack of progress in creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the latter region, where Israel alone persisted in refusing to join the NPT and to submit its nuclear installations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. A greater commitment was needed, therefore, in the effort to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region, which the United Nations General Assembly had already supported by consensus.

5. **Mr. Bompadre** (Argentina) said that, as a member of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone, established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Argentina was convinced of the benefits of such zones. Indeed, that area of the non-proliferation regime had seen the greatest progress since the 1995 Conference, with the adoption of the Treaties of Bangkok and Pelindaba and the negotiations under way in Central Asia.

6. In order for a zone to be effective, all the States of the region must accede to the treaty establishing the zone and the nuclear Powers must accede to the relevant protocol. The exchange of information on non-proliferation between the various zones should also be encouraged. The resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (resolution 53/77 Q) was clearly in the spirit of article VII of the NPT. The results obtained in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, South-East Asia and Africa should encourage the Conference to promote the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions, especially those where sources of tension were located.

7. **Mr. Thamrin** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said that its members which were States parties to the Treaty expressed their support for measures taken to conclude nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and proposals to establish such zones in other parts of the world where they did not exist, such as the Middle East and South Asia, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned as a measure towards the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. They welcomed the initiative taken by the States in Central Asia, freely arrived at among themselves, to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region, and supported the recent adoption by the Mongolian parliament of legislation as a concrete contribution to the international efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

8. The States parties which were signatories of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba reaffirmed their commitment to promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties, explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. They reaffirmed their determination to extend their fullest cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

9. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that his delegation supported the statement by the previous speaker. Egypt had actively participated in the process leading to the adoption of the Treaty of Pelindaba, which sent a clear message about its resolve to avoid the horrors of nuclear weapons. Fifty States had signed the Treaty, while 12 had ratified it and deposited their instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity.

10. The security of Africa was organically connected to security in the Middle East because of the geographical and political overlap between the two regions. He drew attention to United Nations General Assembly resolution 54/48 and urged that the interaction between those two regions should be taken into consideration in the Committee's deliberations. The 1995 Principles and Objectives had addressed the Middle East specifically as well. Israel should accede

to the NPT and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards in implementation of the Treaty of Pelindaba.

11. His delegation welcomed the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones, all of which would contribute to the goals of the NPT. Making the southern hemisphere free of nuclear weapons would show respect for the most fundamental human right: the right to life.

12. **Mr. Tucknott** (United Kingdom) said that the positive developments in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones were heartening. His Government had ratified the protocol to the Treaty of Rarotonga, and had supported General Assembly resolution 53/77 D on Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status.

13. His delegation welcomed the establishment of two new nuclear-weapon-free zones since the 1995 Conference. However, its ratification of the protocol to the Treaty of Pelindaba was only part of the picture, as only 12 out of the 28 necessary States had ratified the Treaty thus far. His delegation urged the completion of the ratification process as soon as possible.

14. The United Kingdom would work with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty of Bangkok and would also work with the States of Central Asia in their efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region.

15. **Mr. Cordeiro** (Brazil) reaffirmed the statement delivered by his delegation on 24 April 2000 and expressed support for the statements made by Argentina and by Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. In that regard, his delegation particularly wished to stress paragraph 37 of the document introduced by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.6). Moreover, in preparing his report, the Chairman should take into account the proposal made by Brazil at the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/35)

16. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) said that China had always believed that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones helped to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote nuclear disarmament, while helping to preserve regional peace

and security. That was why China had signed and ratified the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba. His delegation had also endorsed the General Assembly resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In recent years, China had actively supported the efforts of the five Central Asian countries to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region and hoped that those countries would be able to establish such a zone as soon as possible. His delegation also supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Mongolia.

17. **Mr. Reznikov** (Belarus) said that achieving the universality of the NPT brought into play both past events, such as the entry into force of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties in various areas of the world, and future events, such as the need for Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty and for the early establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In that regard, he called for the early signing and entry into force of an agreement on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and for the establishment of such a zone in South Asia. The international community must consistently support initiatives for the establishment, on the basis of internationally accepted principles, of nuclear-weapon-free zones by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In that regard, his delegation found the initiatives to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in the southern hemisphere and the southern Caucasus, respectively, encouraging.

18. His country, which had renounced the nuclear-weapons option, had eliminated such weapons from its territory and had acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State, intended to launch an initiative for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free space in central Europe. Such an area would strengthen regional security, especially in the light of the extremely explosive situation in the Balkans. Moreover, the mechanism for the illicit trafficking in nuclear material and the prevention of the transport of fissile material across that region would be strengthened. He hoped that, as a result of broad support from Eastern European countries, consultations could start in order to discuss the ultimate goal of establishing nuclear-weapon-free areas in Central and Eastern Europe in order to further strengthen security in the region. His delegation had submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.16) which reflected the national

position of Belarus on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free space in Central and Eastern Europe. That document was not intended to influence or affect the positions of other States.

19. **Ms. Abdul-Rahim** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in areas of conflict, helped to strengthen regional and international peace and security and would ultimately lead to global disarmament. The nuclear-weapon-free zones that were currently in place had been extremely successful and had permitted the strengthening of international criteria with respect to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Israel's persistent refusal to accede to international treaties on the subject or to support such texts as General Assembly resolution 54/51 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East had made the Middle East a region of tension and conflict. Consequently, the reaffirmation by the Conference of the need to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in areas of tension, would require the accession by Israel to the NPT and its agreement to open up its facilities for inspection by IAEA. In that regard, it was regrettable that the Chairman's draft report did not contain any reference to Israel, which was the only country in the Middle East with a military nuclear arsenal, and which therefore represented a serious threat not only to the Middle East but also to international peace and security. Moreover, the report did not exert any pressure on Israel to accede to the NPT or to submit its nuclear facilities to international inspection. A reference was made to the States parties to the Treaty that had yet to conclude comprehensive agreements with IAEA. In her view, a reference should also be made to those States not members of the Treaty, including Israel. Indeed, the policy of double standards could have incalculable implications.

20. **Mr. Ikeda** (Japan), referring to the statement made by the representative of Tajikistan, said that his Government hoped that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan would finalize the treaty as soon as possible, thus establishing the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the northern hemisphere. He believed that the establishment of such a zone would contribute not only to the disarmament of the region, but also to the enhancement of regional security.

21. **Ms. Tsirbas** (Australia) said that her delegation supported efforts to establish new nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States concerned. It placed great importance on nuclear-weapon-free zones as a vehicle for providing negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. In that regard, her delegation welcomed the significant progress that had been made since the 1995 Review Conference. With the signature by nuclear-weapon States of the Protocols to the Treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba, the number of non-nuclear-weapon States benefiting from legally binding negative security assurances from all five nuclear-weapon States had trebled, from 33 to 99.

22. She welcomed the signing by the United Kingdom of the Protocol to the Treaty of Pelindaba, the finalization of the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone and the further discussions aimed at securing the signature by nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok. Her Government was prepared to offer practical assistance to the Central Asian States and to Mongolia in respect of its consideration of establishing a single nuclear-weapon-free zone State.

23. **Mr. Apunte** (Ecuador) reiterated the statement made by his delegation on 2 May 2000, in which it had encouraged the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned. He supported the comments which the representative of Indonesia had made on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, with respect to paragraphs 36 and 37 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.6.

24. **Mr. Friedrich** (Switzerland) welcomed the growing success of nuclear-weapon-free zones. His delegation, which had given its full support to the initiative of the five Central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their area, hoped that agreement in that regard would be concluded soon. In order to be effective, such zones must be based on the guidelines of the Disarmament Commission, including the need to be internationally recognized and to be the result of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned.

25. **Mr. Tongprasroeth** (Thailand) said that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions was a step towards achieving the final objective of the NPT: a nuclear-weapon-free world. Such zones also greatly enhanced regional security and

served as confidence-building measures in the areas concerned. In that regard, he urged all nuclear-weapon States to support the aims of various nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and arrangements and welcomed their stated intention to complete the process of signing the protocols thereto. With regard to the Treaty of Bangkok, nuclear-weapon States were once again urged to show greater flexibility in reaching a compromise with ASEAN countries in connection with the signing of the protocol to that Treaty.

26. **Mr. Tomaszewski** (Poland) expressed surprise at the statement made by the representative of Belarus on the establishment of a Central and Eastern European nuclear-weapon-free space since, during the general debate, the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belarus had clearly stated that his country was aware of the attitudes of countries in the region towards that proposal. His delegation had stated its position and concern with regard to that proposal on several occasions in the past and would do so again after it had taken full cognizance of the document.

27. **Ms. Hallum** (New Zealand) said that the Chairman's revised working paper of 20 May 1999 in document NPT/CONF.2000/1 contained most of the elements needed and formed a good general basis for the Committee's work. Her delegation had already proposed the addition of a paragraph urging all nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so to ratify the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. She welcomed the statement made by the nuclear-weapon States on 1 May regarding plans to ensure the necessary ratifications; that statement was of relevance to the Treaty of Rarotonga, for which one ratification was outstanding.

28. The other aspect of the proposal which her delegation had made at the third session of the Preparatory Committee related to the text on the nuclear-weapon-free status of the southern hemisphere and moves towards attaining that goal. Her delegation had recommended for inclusion the text referred to by the representative of Brazil at the same session of the Preparatory Committee.

Export controls

29. **Mr. Naziri** (Iran), referring to document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.14, which his delegation had submitted, noted that paragraph 1 referred to the importance of the role of IAEA in verifying States

parties' compliance with the Treaty. Paragraph 2 proposed multilateral negotiations to develop effective transfer guidelines, a similar proposal being under consideration in the context of the ad hoc group dealing with the question of biological weapons. Paragraph 3 noted that unfortunately some States were keeping to unilaterally enforced measures rather than collective measures which could take place in the context of IAEA, thus hampering the access of developing countries to nuclear materials.

30. The present version of the Chairman's working paper was not satisfactory in terms of export controls. His delegation could not agree to the text unless the Iranian working paper was taken into account.

31. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) expressed concern that the export control regime currently in force laid down rules which applied to States that had not participated in their establishment. Accordingly, the non-nuclear-weapon States did not feel that their concerns were being taken into account, especially concerns relating to access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the purposes of socio-economic development. All States should be able to voice their opinions and have them taken into account prior to the implementation of export controls.

32. **Mr. Griccioli** (Italy) noted that Italy currently held the Presidency of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and had already spoken about transparency in that connection. Paragraph 2 of the Iranian working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.14) called on countries members of the NSG to take practical steps to fulfil the task of promoting transparency. His country had taken that duty very seriously and hoped that the statement in the paper submitted by Italy had been fully considered. The Iranian paper also stated that transparency in the proceedings and decision-making of the nuclear-related export control regimes should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation (para. 2). That had been another of Italy's concerns. It had conducted several dialogues with countries outside the Group and during its Presidency the Group had enlarged to include three new member States.

33. **Ms. Tsirbas** (Australia) said that in the context of States parties' clear obligation to take steps to prevent nuclear proliferation, export controls were a means to that end. Effective export controls were also central to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

which depended on the existence of a climate of certainty about non-proliferation. There was a clear relationship between the non-proliferation obligations in articles I, II and III and the peaceful-uses objectives of article IV. Export controls did not impede legitimate nuclear trade and cooperation. Rather, they fostered the environment of long-term assurance and stability that was essential to nuclear cooperation.

34. Good progress had been made in implementing the call made in the 1995 Principles and Objectives for transparency in nuclear-related export controls. In response to that call, members of the NSG had made a concerted effort to promote transparency and openness towards non-members. Her delegation welcomed the paper submitted to the Conference by Italy, in relation to the NSG's transparency activities, and also the paper presented by the Zangger Committee describing the work of that Committee and setting out its objectives. Her Government had been a consistent supporter of greater transparency and had organized NSG transparency seminars and conducted annual outreach programmes on nuclear export controls for the countries of South-East Asia and the South Pacific.

35. **Mr. Abdullah Faiz** (Malaysia) said that his delegation shared the concerns expressed by the representative of Egypt. The NPT made no provision for any export regime. To achieve effective transparency, membership of the Zangger Committee should be made universal and not restricted to an elite group which imposed its will on non-members.

36. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China), referring to document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.14, said that some of the proposals it contained were very reasonable. The Chinese Government understood that the purpose of the proposals was to strengthen the national security of all countries, to contribute to promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to remove double standards in the field of nuclear exports, which was an important prerequisite for the successful prevention of nuclear proliferation. On the basis of that understanding, his delegation supported the proposals contained in the working paper.

37. **Mr. Kerma** (Algeria) noted that the delegations of Egypt, Iran and Malaysia had referred to the difficulties of the non-nuclear weapon States in acquiring equipment for peaceful purposes. His delegation had experienced similar difficulties. The export control process had thus far been conducted in a

non-transparent manner, and it was clear that the guidelines and rules for exports were not entirely being followed and actually constituted obstacles for countries. Multilateral guidelines should be prepared in conjunction with IAEA and with the participation of all States concerned, and the export control process should be endorsed with greater transparency.

38. **Mr. Schmidt** (Austria), referring to the transparency issue, said that article III, paragraph 2, of the NPT clearly meant that every State party, whether a major supplier or a non-major supplier, had a specific obligation to provide for legislation and for national criteria to meet the objectives of the NPT in order to ensure that any export from its own country complied with the particular criteria provided for in that article. On that basis, several States, later referred to as the Zangger Committee, had met at the beginning of the 1970s to consider what their obligations were and to take account of the understanding of other countries. They had come to the conclusion that a certain minimum level of export criteria was required. Since September 1974, the understanding of the Zangger Committee had been available in document form to all interested members of the IAEA and hence to all States parties. The NSG also gave seminars and issued papers. Sufficient information had been available for years.

39. He would support the proposal on multilateral export control arrangements if it helped to achieve greater acceptance of the provisions of article III, paragraph 2. He was in favour of the multilateralization, or internationalization of export control criteria, always on the understanding that it remained the sovereign obligation of each individual State to make sure that whatever was exported was not used for any other purposes, as required by the NPT. Multilateralization could imply making transparent criteria available to all States, but of course the decision as to whether something left the country or not had to remain the decision of each individual country. Multilateralization might therefore not be appropriate to the first part of export controls, which was licensing, but it definitely related to the second part of export controls, when an item had gone across the border. It was not a new idea, and was already reflected in the IAEA Additional Protocol. The exporters informed IAEA of exports of trigger-list items, which were articles subject to article III, paragraph 2, of the NPT. IAEA then evaluated whether the items transferred were appropriate to the nuclear

programme of the recipient country. It would verify that the item arrived in the country and then observe how it was used. An element of multilateralization thus already existed. Delegations should exchange ideas on how that process could be improved.

40. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that at present export controls were being imposed by a group of States with a monopoly in nuclear matters, on other States, which had not been allowed to participate in the decision-making process. There were two groups of States parties to the Treaty: States that had nuclear weapons and States that did not. It was not right for one group to make the decisions and apply them to the other group. The countries importing nuclear materials had the right to participate in the decision-making process which established the rules governing the use and export of those materials. There was no transparency. The importing States were subject to decisions adopted behind closed doors. It was not a democratic system.

41. As the representative of Austria had said, there had to be an internationalization process. Otherwise the gap between the “haves” and the “have nots” would get even larger.

42. **Mr. Cordeiro** (Brazil) said that his country was a member of the NSG but was not a member of the Zangger Committee. His delegation hoped that the Committee would do what was necessary to achieve the necessary balance between safeguards, export controls and the right of all States parties to the NPT to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but it was not in favour of an excessive emphasis on new conditions in that area.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.