

**2000 Review Conference of the Parties  
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation  
of Nuclear Weapons**

30 May 2000

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**Main Committee II**

**Summary record of the 2nd meeting**

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 2 May 2000, at 3 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Kobieracki . . . . . (Poland)

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*The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.*

### **Exchange of views** (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) said that nuclear non-proliferation, like nuclear disarmament, was an effective means and a necessary stage for the complete and comprehensive elimination of nuclear weapons, and its importance was self-evident. However, the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons could not proceed in a vacuum: it was closely linked to the international security situation and scientific and technological development. Although the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had been extended indefinitely in 1995, there had been a series of negative developments recently. The international arms control and disarmament process was now at a crossroads, and the defects and shortcomings of the international non-proliferation regime were becoming increasingly evident; correcting those unfavourable trends, overcoming problems and ensuring the correct direction for non-proliferation would be the key factors in determining the survival of the non-proliferation regime. At the same time, scientific and technological development, increasing globalization and the advent of the information age all helped to complicate the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Experience had shown that it would be very difficult to achieve the goal of non-proliferation by relying only on traditional means such as containment and pressure.

2. Under the new circumstances, the question of how to effectively prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons was an issue facing the entire international community. Accordingly, efforts needed to be made in three areas.

3. First, the countries of the world must work hard to build a new international political and economic order that was just and fair. If some countries made a commitment to renounce a nuclear deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons and pursuit of absolute military superiority, thereby giving all members of the international community a sense of security on a basis of equality, that would help to eliminate completely the incentive for some countries to acquire, develop or retain nuclear weapons. Therefore, States parties should express the firm belief that it was necessary to establish a global security environment of stability, cooperation and mutual trust;

that would be the basic guarantee for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

4. Second, the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be aimed at enhancing security for all countries, and the only criterion should be whether the NPT was being observed. It should not aim to increase the security of individual countries or a few countries and should not be based on the likings of individual States; it was even more inappropriate for a State to impose its own laws or interests upon the international community and other countries. That would damage the credibility of the non-proliferation regime, and the widespread support for the regime would be lost. States parties should therefore request the abolition of the practice of double standards or multiple standards in the field of nuclear non-proliferation; that was the most important prerequisite for the success of nuclear non-proliferation.

5. Third, the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could only be undertaken by the international community as a common effort. No country, however strong, could achieve the objectives of non-proliferation solely through its own efforts, or with the help of a few allies. Any unilateral tendencies would be contrary to the mainstream of international non-proliferation efforts. States parties to the Treaty should therefore urge the international community to enhance cooperation and dialogue in the field of non-proliferation issues and to seek solutions to all concerns or issues of proliferation or non-proliferation strictly in accordance with the obligations, procedures and mechanisms established by the relevant international legal instruments. That was the correct and most effective way to deal with the issue of nuclear-weapons proliferation.

6. A second issue facing the Committee was regional non-proliferation. The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 had clouded the future of the non-proliferation regime somewhat. The international community had reacted strongly: the foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the Security Council had issued a communiqué and the Security Council had adopted resolution 1172 (1998) on the subject. The States parties should therefore reaffirm that that resolution established the correct principles and directions for the solution of the nuclear issue in South Asia. The authority and integrity of the resolution must be safeguarded. The two countries concerned should fully implement it at an early date.

7. With regard to the Middle East, his delegation had made some comments on the previous day in a subsidiary body. China actively supported the proposal by the countries of the Middle East for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region and their active efforts to that end, since such a zone would promote peace and stability there. It urged Israel to accede to the NPT as soon as possible and accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. His delegation believed that active consideration should be given to the proposals made by Egypt in its working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.9).

8. With regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, the establishment of such zones would do much to advance the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the safeguarding of global peace and security, and the ultimate achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The non-nuclear-weapon States had made and were continuing to make active efforts in that regard. States parties should therefore support the efforts by non-nuclear-weapon States to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at among the States concerned. They should also support the efforts to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, and affirm that the principles on establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones adopted unanimously by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1999 remained valid and should be observed faithfully.

9. The IAEA safeguards mechanism was a very important means of achieving the purposes and objectives of the non-proliferation Treaty and should be effectively strengthened. States parties should fully support the IAEA 93+2 Protocol and urge all countries to conclude, ratify and implement the Protocol as soon as possible.

10. His delegation had submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.11) and hoped that it would be included in the report on the Committee's work or in the relevant parts of the final document of the Conference.

11. **Mr. Biggs** (Australia), speaking on behalf of Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Australia, said that those countries had submitted a series of working papers to the Committee, in documents NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.2 to WP.8.

Their objective was to promote the successful review of article 3 and article 4 issues within the relevant Main Committees and thereby promote a fruitful outcome of the Conference as a whole. The papers all included ideas and language suitable for use in three complementary ways: for recording significant developments over the past five years, for identifying States parties' aspirations and intentions over the next five years, and as a common foundation for national statements on non-proliferation topics, while recognizing that national views were likely to go beyond the basic positions expressed in the working papers. In drafting the working papers, particular attention had been paid to the work of Main Committees II and III in 1995, to the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and to recent resolutions of the IAEA General Conference.

12. Introducing the working paper entitled "Introduction", in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.2, he said that the submitting countries were aiming at a consensus output that would incorporate all the facts, views and proposals brought to the Committee's attention. The working paper drew heavily on the report of Main Committee II of 1995 and dealt essentially with the function of verification in the non-proliferation system and a number of political items, such as universality and the inability of IAEA to implement its mandate in Iraq or to conclude that there had been no diversion of nuclear material in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

13. **Mr. Maerli** (Norway) said that his delegation attached great importance to the work of IAEA to enhance nuclear non-proliferation, particularly by strengthening the comprehensive safeguards system. The very first IAEA safeguard inspection had taken place in Norway in 1962. His Government had signed an additional protocol to its 1972 comprehensive safeguards agreement, which would enter into force shortly. It urged States which had not yet done so to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols, in order to make the safeguards system as universal as possible.

14. The circumstances which made IAEA unable to fully implement its mandate in Iraq under the relevant Security Council resolutions and the lack of cooperation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in fulfilling its obligations under the safeguards agreement were of great concern. It was therefore of

the utmost importance that the two States should fully comply with the inspection mandate given to IAEA.

15. He welcomed the efforts of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to submit excess fissile material for IAEA verification, especially considering the huge quantities of fissile material in the two States, and called on all nuclear-weapon States to do likewise.

16. The IAEA workload had significantly increased; while IAEA must strive to optimize its resources, funding for safeguards activities must be made available in a sufficient and predictable manner.

17. He called on all States to take measures to ensure that exports of sensitive material, equipment and technologies were subject to a transparent system of surveillance and control; such efforts would facilitate cooperative technological development by assuring suppliers that goods, technology and material would be used only for peaceful purposes. Moreover, States should follow the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group when considering exporting sensitive nuclear-related material, equipment and technologies, taking into account full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply, in accordance with paragraph 12 of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

18. All States must ensure that sufficient physical protection was provided for nuclear material. Strict management of fissile material until it was deposited safely and irreversibly could reduce the proliferation risk substantially. International standards would serve as an important framework for implementing national security measures.

19. He welcomed the recent revision of the IAEA recommendations for the protection of fissile materials; since the degree of implementation varied widely at the national level, consideration should be given to making the voluntary recommendations mandatory. Moreover, States which had not yet done so should accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Efforts to make the Convention applicable to nuclear material for peaceful uses while in use or storage within a country should be supported.

20. His Government acknowledged the need for adequate and effective measures to interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials and believed that new and more comprehensive

cooperative efforts might be required. It therefore welcomed international and national inter-agency cooperative initiatives. The contact group model, successfully implemented in Norway, facilitated cooperation between relevant domestic agencies and could serve the needs of other States as well.

21. Norway's views were reflected in a separate working paper, in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.12.

22. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt), noting that there had been some positive developments in the safeguards regime of IAEA since the 1995 Conference, welcomed the adoption in 1997 of a Model Additional Protocol designed to strengthen existing safeguards agreements between States and the Agency. Egypt had participated in the elaboration of that regime with a view to enhancing its effectiveness as one of the main pillars for achieving nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, in accordance with the Principles and Objectives of the 1995 Review Conference.

23. At the same time, there was a need to expand the safeguards regime to include States which had not yet concluded full-scope safeguards agreements with IAEA or had nuclear programmes not covered by that regime. There was a clear relationship between the IAEA safeguards regime and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In the Middle East, for example, Israel continued its anachronistic nuclear-deterrent strategy and rejected the safeguards regime, thereby threatening the security and stability of the region. With a view to promoting non-proliferation and strengthening the safeguards regime, Egypt proposed that the conclusions of the Conference should include an appeal to the nuclear States not parties to the Treaty to accelerate the conclusion of full-scope safeguards agreements and to Israel in particular to accede without delay and to place all its nuclear facilities under the safeguards regime.

24. Egypt's initiative in the General Assembly over 25 years earlier in calling for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East reflected the importance it attached to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in that region. The President of Egypt had reiterated that call in 1990. In Egypt's view, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in any region was vital to the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and required both regional and international support. Some support was provided by

the guidelines adopted by the Disarmament Commission relating, *inter alia*, to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of a region.

25. Implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference depended on the political will of the States of the region. Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty and to submit to the IAEA safeguards regime until certain prior conditions were met impeded the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Consequently, the responsibility for attaining that goal fell to the nuclear-weapon States. Given that the Arab States had cooperated by becoming parties to the Treaty and placing their nuclear facilities under the safeguards regime or were about to sign agreements to that end, it was incumbent upon Israel to follow suit with a view to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and to enhancing the credibility of the Treaty, thereby establishing a solid foundation for a security system in the Middle East.

26. **Mr. Laohaphan** (Thailand) said that Thailand, as the depositary of the Treaty of Bangkok, establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia, appreciated the support expressed by many delegations for the progress of the Treaty, which had been signed in December 1995 and had entered into force in March 1997. Various organs had been established to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and meetings had been held to consider the rules of procedure and future work plans. The Treaty of Bangkok also provided for constructive engagement with IAEA in many areas. Consultations had been undertaken with IAEA on the implementation of the relevant provisions and on possible forms of cooperation between States parties and IAEA.

27. Little progress had been made regarding the accession of the nuclear-weapon States to the Protocol, even though they had all agreed to principle 5 of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. To date, China was the only State which had shown a readiness to sign and ratify the Protocol. It was hoped that other nuclear-weapon States would do so in the near future and would show more flexibility in reaching a compromise solution with the countries of the region.

28. His delegation regarded the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol to strengthen existing

safeguards agreements as a significant development of the safeguards system and believed that, once it was fully implemented, any undue export controls should be eliminated. Transparency and consultations with developing countries parties to the NPT were a prerequisite in strengthening the safeguards system in the future. The developments made in the safeguards system over the past five years should be reviewed, and the future plan of work needed to be determined.

29. On the financing of safeguards, his delegation believed that States which had taken part in the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, either directly or indirectly, had a special responsibility in that respect. The privilege of possessing nuclear weapons in the interests of national security should be accompanied by a responsibility to bear the burden of safeguarding those weapons and their materials. That commitment was stipulated in article 1 of the Treaty. It would be unjust if the States which complied with non-proliferation objectives had to assume the burden of safeguarding the dismantled materials or equipment from weapons they had never developed.

30. **Mr. Raja Adnan** (Malaysia) said that his delegation wished to associate itself with the working paper submitted by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries parties to the Treaty on the NPT (NPT/CONF.2000/18, annex) and, in particular, those paragraphs concerning articles III, IV and VII and other related provisions of the Treaty.

31. The adoption of the Model Protocol Additional to existent IAEA safeguards agreements had been a welcome development. Regrettably, there had been little progress in the signature and entry into force of such additional protocols. His delegation considered that the trigger list adopted as annex II to the Model Additional Protocol lacked explanation, giving rise to problems in its implementation, in particular by such front-line personnel as customs officers, who lacked the requisite technical expertise. There was a need to refine the trigger list by defining the relative proliferation-sensitivity of the items listed and bringing it into line with international customs coding systems. Also, assistance must be provided in training personnel from national enforcement agencies responsible for import and export control and licensing.

32. His Government considered that nuclear suppliers should apply less rigorous export controls with respect to non-nuclear-weapon States that had concluded

additional protocols with IAEA. Furthermore, unilateral export controls that went beyond the requirements of the extended safeguards system should be eased. Such measures would be consistent with the recognition of IAEA as the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with its safeguards system and would provide an incentive for States to sign additional protocols.

33. It was to be hoped that, in future, any further strengthening of the safeguards system would be undertaken with greater transparency. Due regard must be given to the concerns of States that had signed the NPT and, at the same time, were becoming major players in the legitimate international trade. The need to extend the safeguards system to include dual-use items must be reassessed.

34. The holding in 1997 and 1999 of two international seminars on the role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation had been a positive step, but more should be done to promote transparency in that area. His Government supported the proposal made at the 1997 seminar that the nuclear suppliers should circulate information on the approval and denial of nuclear-related exports to all States, including non-parties to the Treaty, and that IAEA should act as a clearing house for such information. The alternative was the operation of disparate multilateral nuclear-related export control regimes outside the scope and provisions of the Treaty. The recognition by the Conference of export control arrangements that were not open to all States parties to the Treaty would serve only to exacerbate the strain that already existed in the relations between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States.

35. IAEA was to be commended for its fairness and professionalism in carrying out the tasks entrusted to it by the Treaty. It would be important to draw on the Agency's experience when developing a verification system for the fissile material cut-off convention. Designating IAEA itself as the verification agency would avoid a proliferation of international arms control and safeguards bodies, ensuring thereby that the whole regime was more cost-effective and efficient.

36. His delegation, while welcoming the trilateral initiative of IAEA, the United States and the Russian Federation to consider practical measures for the application of IAEA verification to weapon-origin fissile materials, was concerned lest the Agency's no

less important role in promoting the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes should be overshadowed. The Agency's technical cooperation programme was a vital confidence-building measure, which encouraged member States to be more transparent with respect to their national nuclear programmes and helped to deter the diversion of nuclear materials for non-peaceful purposes.

37. The nuclear-weapon States had long enjoyed immense privilege and power through their continued possession of weapons of mass destruction. His delegation therefore considered that those States and any States that had hosted test sites or allowed nuclear weapons to be deployed in their territories had a special responsibility for the financing of safeguards and bilateral and multilateral nuclear arms control and verification initiatives. States that had unequivocally renounced nuclear weapons should not be burdened with the cost of their dismantlement.

38. Given the lack of progress achieved in the field of nuclear disarmament and the reversion to policies allowing first use of nuclear weapons, it was imperative that the nuclear-weapon States should become parties to the protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. Regrettably, only one nuclear-weapon State had signed the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), despite the commitment to support the establishment of such zones expressed in the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".

39. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation) noted with satisfaction that, since 1995, a further 28 States parties to the Treaty had concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA. All States parties that had not yet done so should conclude such agreements, in accordance with paragraph 10 of the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament". In paragraph 9 of that decision, the States parties had affirmed that IAEA was the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with its statute and safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties. The strengthening of the safeguards system would better enable the Agency to carry out its verification functions. His delegation supported IAEA efforts in that direction, in particular the adoption of the Model Protocol Additional to existent safeguards agreements. His Government, which had signed an

additional protocol on 22 March 2000, urged all States parties to the Treaty that had not yet done so to conclude such a protocol with IAEA as quickly as possible.

40. His delegation welcomed the commencement by IAEA of work on the establishment of an integrated safeguards system. Such a system must be more than the sum of the existing technical measures and monitoring procedures and the measures provided for in the Model Additional Protocol. It must be a means of ensuring that the Agency received comprehensive information on the nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, without being a burden on States that had concluded additional protocols with IAEA. The integrated safeguards system must take account of new technology developed to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials and the conversion of nuclear installations to non-peaceful purposes.

41. The Russian Federation was contributing to the technical development of safeguards through a national support programme aimed at improving analytical methods, modernizing the technical means employed, and producing and certifying samples of nuclear material. It conducted annual training for specialists working in the fields of nuclear materials accounting and monitoring and for IAEA inspectors.

42. A successful example of multilateral cooperation to enhance Agency safeguards was the trilateral cooperation between the Russian Federation, China and IAEA in developing new safeguards procedures that took account of the unique technical characteristics of gas-centrifugal equipment of Russian construction installed by the Russian Federation in a Chinese uranium-enrichment plant. Experts in the field considered that the new procedures could be applied to equipment of the same type in uranium-enrichment plants in other countries. The Russian Federation was engaged in similar cooperation with other countries members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

43. IAEA was to be commended for its efforts to organize international verification of weapon-origin fissile material deemed not to be needed for defence purposes. At their meeting in Vienna in September 1996 the Minister of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, the Secretary of Energy of the United States and the Director-General of IAEA had come to

an understanding concerning the importance of establishing a verification regime that, on the one hand, would not violate the obligations of the Russian Federation and the United States under article I of the Treaty and, on the other, would demonstrate the commitment of both States to the process of nuclear disarmament. A joint working group set up to consider the technical, legal, administrative and financial issues involved had concluded that it would be possible to implement Agency verification of weapon-origin fissile material without disclosure to the IAEA secretariat or its inspectors of information on the secret parameters of such material or indirect data on the characteristics of nuclear weapons.

44. In order for the States parties to the Treaty to comply with the provisions of article III, paragraph 2, there was a need for effective systems of nuclear materials accounting and control at the national level, as well as export control procedures. The Russian Federation was an active participant in such multilateral export control mechanisms as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, which had held two international seminars on the role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation with a view to increasing transparency and promoting dialogue with interested States parties, in accordance with the provisions of the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted by the 1995 Conference. The Russian Federation was also cooperating with other CIS member countries in the area of export controls.

45. The Russian Federation was continuously refining its national legislation on export controls. In accordance with its international obligations, nuclear materials, equipment and technology were supplied only to those non-nuclear-weapon States that had placed their peaceful nuclear activities entirely under IAEA supervision. In order to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive substances, it was participating in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database Programme and the review of existing international instruments in the field of physical protection of nuclear materials. In addition, it had undertaken to provide to IAEA on a regular basis data on its stocks of and strategy for handling civilian plutonium.

46. His delegation considered that significant progress had been made since 1995 in the enhancement of the IAEA safeguards system and the implementation

of the relevant provisions of the decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”.

47. **Mr. Mayor** (Switzerland) said that the events of the past decade in Iraq and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had demonstrated the fundamental role of safeguards in generating and maintaining the confidence necessary for the harmonious development of humankind. That confidence was clearly dependent on the credibility that all sides attached to the progress made in the negotiations on disarmament on the one hand and in the balanced implementation of the NPT on the other, the two being interlinked.

48. His delegation noted with satisfaction that 182 States had renounced nuclear weapons and, in so doing, had accepted IAEA safeguards. It also welcomed the signature of full-scope safeguards agreements with the Agency by a further 28 States since 1995. The adoption of the Model Additional Protocol to existent safeguards agreements had been another positive step. However, only eight States had ratified such protocols thus far. That failure was attributable in all likelihood to the lack of progress in the area of nuclear disarmament since the Treaty’s entry into force.

49. The efforts aimed at placing the weapon-origin fissile material of the nuclear Powers under IAEA safeguards were welcome, but there had been insufficient progress towards their implementation. Furthermore, if those efforts were to yield real results, there was a need to ensure that the fissile material could never return to the military cycle and that the international community had assurances, first, that the fuel removed would not simply be replaced and, second, that the arms destroyed would not be replaced by new, more sophisticated weapons. In other words, the initiative must proceed with complete transparency.

50. With the conclusion of further additional protocols, the cost to IAEA of the safeguards system would inevitably increase. That problem would be difficult to resolve since, in most States, public finances were subject to severe constraints. Nevertheless, his delegation urged other States to follow the example of Switzerland, which was to sign an additional protocol in the next few days.

51. **Mr. Kerma** (Algeria) said that the risk of nuclear proliferation had not diminished, despite the end of the arms race. All States that had yet to do so should therefore accede to the Treaty and place their nuclear

installations under IAEA safeguards. The credibility of the Treaty would be measured according to its universality.

52. Algeria, for its part, had affirmed its commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and its desire to contribute to the disarmament process by acceding to the Treaty in January 1995 and concluding a full-scope safeguards agreement with IAEA in March 1996. Subsidiary arrangements with respect to the modalities for implementation of the agreement were currently being finalized. In the meantime, Algeria had submitted all its nuclear installations to Agency inspection within the framework of the new regime.

53. His Government fully subscribed to the provisions of the decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” adopted by the 1995 Conference, in particular paragraph 9, which reiterated that IAEA was the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States with their safeguards agreements. Regrettably, a significant number of States had yet to conclude such agreements.

54. With the evolution of the nuclear threat, the Agency’s role was changing. It would need considerable support in the future, especially to counter the risk posed by transnational organized crime. In order to realize the legitimate right of developing countries to have access to nuclear technology, it would also be vital to ensure that the implementation of measures aimed at strengthening the safeguards system was not prejudicial to the Agency’s technical cooperation programme. In conclusion, the only real guarantee against the nuclear threat was the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

55. **Mr. Al-Hadithi** (Iraq), after noting that the representative of Norway had made a reference to Iraq’s supposed non-compliance with Security Council resolutions, said that the Committee was not the appropriate forum to discuss the implementation of Security Council resolutions with regard to Iraq or any other State. However, he would point out that the United States and the United Kingdom had not been authorized by the Security Council to use depleted uranium weapons in 1991 or to impose no-fly zones after the 1991 war or to begin airstrikes in 1998. Neither had the Security Council given the United States the right to use inspection teams for espionage purposes contrary to the vital security interests of Iraq.



56. Iraq was in full compliance with NPT safeguard regimes, and as recently as March IAEA had reported that an inspection had been completed successfully in January 2000 with the full cooperation of the Iraqi authorities. The Director-General of IAEA had already reported to the Security Council in October 1998 (S/1998/927) that he was satisfied that Iraq's nuclear weapon programme had failed, it had no more than a few grams of weapon-grade nuclear material and had no capacity to produce nuclear weapons.

57. Although paragraph 4 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.2 noted that IAEA had been unable to implement its mandate in Iraq since 1998, he stressed that it was the bombing campaign by the United States and the United Kingdom which had led to the withdrawal of United Nations inspectors. Iraq was complying with Security Council resolutions and IAEA inspection and he advised against politicizing the work of IAEA, which would undermine not only its credibility but that of the NPT.

58. **Mr. Twist** (Ireland), introducing the working paper entitled "Resources for safeguards" (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.6) on behalf of Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden, said that the text of the working paper was largely based on the 1995 agreed report of Main Committee II (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/1). In the sixth line of paragraph 3, "impending" should be replaced by "current" to reflect the work being conducted by the representative of Spain at the request of the Board of Governors. In addition, the following wording of an IAEA General Conference resolution should be added at the end of paragraph 4: "pursuing a target of equal representation of women at all levels of agency employment including senior policy level and decision-making posts."

59. **Mr. Ikeda** (Japan) said that the working papers on safeguards in documents NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.1 and WP.2 were a good starting point for discussions. He nevertheless wished to suggest some changes to the text of the second. Paragraph 9 should contain language recognizing the fact that the additional protocols had become integral parts of the safeguards system. Accordingly, he suggested that the words "and that those measures have now become integral parts of the IAEA safeguards system" should be added to the end of the third sentence. In paragraph 10, nuclear-weapon States should be urged to bring

into force additional protocols as well and, in that regard, he welcomed the fact that the five permanent members of the Security Council had indicated their willingness to do so in their statements. He also called on State's not parties to follow the example of Cuba by concluding additional protocols and said that greater energy must be devoted to promoting and facilitating the conclusion of IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

60. Although paragraph 12 of the same working paper captured the need for measures to strengthen and improve the safeguards system, a detailed plan of action was required. The following reference to such a plan could be added at the end of paragraph 12: "(a) For these reasons, it is imperative that the conclusion of safeguards agreements with the IAEA and additional protocols must be actively encouraged and promoted; (b) To this end, the Conference recommends the Director-General of IAEA and the IAEA member States to consider a plan of action to promote and facilitate the conclusion and the entry into force of such agreements, as well as additional protocols; (c) Such a plan of action may contain specific measures to assist States with less experience in nuclear activities to implement legal requirements and, if it is deemed appropriate and necessary, an arrangement to convene a high-level conference at an appropriate time to take stock of the situation and promote exchange of information in these aspects."

61. He hoped that those points could be incorporated into a revised text and submitted to the Chair as soon as possible.

62. **Mr. Schmidt** (Austria), speaking with reference to paragraph 4 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.3, stressed that it was important that even States without significant nuclear activities should implement simplified agreements with IAEA since they were essential for the entry into force of additional protocols. Paragraph 5 was a new paragraph which dealt with the situation relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. With regard to paragraphs 8 and 9, he recalled that IAEA Programme 93+2 had two parts: one on the strengthening of safeguard agreements and one on additional protocols. Paragraph 8 was related to the former and paragraph 9 to the latter. Paragraph 13 made it clear that the strengthening of safeguards should not lead to a decrease in the resources available for technical assistance and cooperation or for the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

63. **Ms. Pellicer** (Mexico), drawing attention to document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.6, said that the question of resources for safeguards was a delicate one. She supported the working paper in general but believed that in the second part of paragraph 3 the reference to the “review of the safeguards financing formula” under way in Vienna should be deleted since no decision had as yet been reached on whether to maintain the current formula or develop a new formula. The text should instead simply call on members to develop an equitable and stable funding formula to ensure adequate resources for safeguards.

64. With regard to document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.3, she believed that the text was too wide-ranging in scope and should not simply repeat the language of agreed texts from the 1995 Conference. Any paragraph which reiterated 1995 documents should be deleted or summarized briefly. The new text should concentrate on a review of events from 1995 to 2000 with a view to future actions.

65. **Ms. Pettersson** (Sweden) introduced the working paper on plutonium and highly enriched uranium management (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.7). The text had been updated to reflect developments since 1995.

66. **Ms. Frederiksen** (Denmark) introduced the working paper on safeguards in nuclear-weapon States and States with unsafeguarded inventories (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.5). Conceivably, in the Committee’s final report, the text could be divided into two parts (paras. 1-6 and para. 7 respectively).

67. **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece) welcomed the working paper on safeguards (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.3), which for the most part had Greece’s full support. Paragraph 3, however, failed to indicate that the Model Additional Protocol had been concluded as an extension of NPT safeguards and that all States might accede to it, including those not parties to the Treaty. A new paragraph might be inserted following paragraph 8 to the effect that the Conference fully supported the Additional Protocol of IAEA aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and urged all States to conclude, ratify and implement additional protocols as soon as possible. With regard to paragraph 10, he agreed with the representative of Japan that it should include a reference to nuclear-weapon States. As for paragraph 11, it should mention that cost reduction was the eventual goal of an integrated safeguards system.

68. **Mr. Bompadre** (Argentina), welcoming the working paper on resources for safeguards (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.6), endorsed the Mexican position on paragraph 3.

69. **Mr. Pinel** (France), referring to the working paper on safeguards (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.3), questioned the relevance of paragraph 6. States, after all, were not committed to an ongoing strengthening of safeguards. Although such a process was well under way, an evaluation would be premature. In paragraph 12, the reference to safeguards-strengthening measures was somewhat ambiguous. Although those measures should be mentioned in the relevant Chairman’s working paper, it would be very important to revert to the language of the previously proposed version of the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540).

70. Paragraph 1 of the working paper on safeguards in nuclear-weapon States and States with unsafeguarded inventories (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.5) seemed unnecessary: his Government did not deem it necessary to reaffirm a commitment it had never failed to uphold. With regard to paragraph 3, broadening the scope of the additional protocols was currently not an issue; emphasis should rather be laid on their application. In paragraph 6, all nuclear-weapon States were urged to submit materials and installations for international verification, but that did not take account of the fact that national situations with respect to fissile material differed. France, for its part, had always ensured that it had no excess material.

71. Although working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.7 was entitled “Plutonium and highly enriched uranium management”, the Guidelines cited in paragraph 2 concerned only plutonium. In paragraph 4, it was important to adhere strictly to the language finally agreed upon by the IAEA Board of Governors.

72. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) said that the previous speaker’s comments on paragraph 3 of the working paper on safeguards in nuclear-weapon States and States with unsafeguarded inventories (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.5) had considerable merit. With regard to paragraph 6 also, his delegation agreed that nuclear-weapon States were not obliged under the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards system. Given that the Agency lacked adequate resources for safeguards, one urgent task was to ensure that obligations under the Treaty could be fully carried out. The Principles and

Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament — including in relation to the transfer of peaceful or non-proscribed military utilization of nuclear-weapon materials — had already been stated in decision 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The reference in paragraph 6 of the working paper should be to nuclear materials already transferred to civil use. Moreover, it was important to stress that such transfers should be voluntary.

73. **Mr. Pygram** (United Kingdom) concurred with the comments made by the previous two speakers concerning paragraph 3 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.5. The United Kingdom had signed its Additional Protocol in September 1998; legislation to bring it into force was currently before the United Kingdom Parliament. The Additional Protocol had been negotiated with IAEA with the express intention of including all measures necessary to allow the Agency to draw up a full picture of nuclear activities relevant to non-nuclear-weapon States. The paragraph in question was thus redundant.

*The meeting rose at 6 p.m.*