

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

2 June 2000

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Main Committee I

Summary record of the 3rd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 2 May 2000, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Reyes Rodríguez (Colombia)
later: Mr. Lint (Vice-Chairman) (Belgium)
later: Mr. Reyes Rodríguez (Chairman) (Colombia)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

Exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Mr. De Icaza** (Mexico), speaking on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden and Mexico, said that the proponents of the New Agenda Initiative had taken note of the joint statement issued the day before by the nuclear-weapon States, which fell short of their expectations regarding nuclear disarmament. The States concerned appreciated the nuclear-weapon States' forward-looking approach to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and their acknowledgement of their special responsibility and a key role in that regard; however, the total elimination of nuclear weapons was an obligation and a priority, not an ultimate goal, and it was still less a goal linked to, subject to or conditioned on general and complete disarmament. The proponents of the New Agenda Initiative reiterated their appeal to the five nuclear-weapon States to make an unequivocal commitment to achieving the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and, in the course of the forthcoming period 2000-2005, to engage in an accelerated negotiation process and take steps to implement nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). They also reaffirmed the importance of the specific measures they had proposed as provisional steps to be taken by the five nuclear-weapon States.

2. **Mr. Wibisono** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the non-aligned countries that were parties to the NPT, took note of the joint statement issued on 1 May 2000 by the five nuclear-weapon States, particularly its paragraph 5. The non-aligned States parties were concerned at the conditionalities established by the five nuclear Powers. In that connection, he referred to the non-aligned States parties' long-standing and principled positions on nuclear disarmament and related issues of nuclear non-proliferation and testing, reaffirmed by the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Durban, South Africa, in 1998 and by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the non-aligned countries at their recent ministerial meeting, held in Cartagena, Colombia. He also referred to the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear

disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control, and to the conclusion of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that nuclear weapons should be accorded priority in disarmament negotiations. In that context, the total elimination of nuclear weapons was an obligation and a priority and not an ultimate goal, and even less a goal that was linked to, subject to or conditioned on general and complete disarmament.

3. The non-aligned States parties therefore urged the nuclear-weapon States to comply unconditionally with their commitments regarding nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty and to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures to halt the nuclear arms race at an early date and to achieve nuclear disarmament. They called for the early commencement of negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament, and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time-frame, including a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.

4. **Mr. Pham Binh Minh** (Viet Nam) said that the lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was alarming. Some 35,000 nuclear warheads still existed; the planned national missile defence and theatre missile defence systems in the United States threatened to undermine the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty); and nuclear weapons were becoming increasingly important in certain military doctrines. Despite the recent ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) by the Russian Federation, the START bilateral process was at an impasse, and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was being delayed by the nuclear-weapon States, which were supposed to be setting an example for all the others.

5. A number of steps could be taken to promote nuclear disarmament in the coming five-year period. First, further progress must be made towards universality of the NPT. Second, nuclear-weapon States must be requested to redouble their disarmament efforts and to take interim measures to reduce nuclear risks, such as the de-alerting of nuclear weapons, the removal of nuclear warheads from their delivery systems, the conclusion of joint agreements on the no-

first-use of nuclear weapons, greater transparency with regard to fissile material and the conclusion of legally binding international instruments to that effect. Third, nuclear-weapon-free zones must continue to be established and strengthened and, fourth, the Conference on Disarmament must commence without delay negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Fifth, the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty, particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must be reaffirmed and the technical cooperation programme of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to that end should be strengthened. Particularly vital in that connection was the application of nuclear technology in the fields of agriculture, hydrology, medicine and the environment.

6. His delegation welcomed the bilateral process under way between the Russian Federation and the United States of America and the unilateral efforts of the United Kingdom and France but believed that multilateral action was also needed. It therefore supported proposals to establish an ad hoc working group in the Conference on Disarmament in order to exchange information and facilitate nuclear disarmament efforts. In that connection, Viet Nam supported the working paper on nuclear disarmament introduced by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NPT/CONF.2000/18) and the measures outlined in the New Agenda Initiative's working paper on nuclear disarmament (NPT/CONF.2000/WP.3).

7. **Mr. Westdal** (Canada) stressed that the 1995 extension of the NPT in no way guaranteed any State party's right to possess nuclear weapons indefinitely but rather reaffirmed the obligations to eliminate them. Fifty years earlier Canada had renounced the option of developing nuclear weapons, although it had had the capability to do so. Noting that the nuclear testing in India and Pakistan in May 1998 had seriously hampered disarmament efforts, he reaffirmed his delegation's support for Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) and urged all States parties to promote its implementation. His delegation also urged all States parties to call upon India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba to accede to the Treaty and to appeal to all States which had not yet done so to sign and ratify the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) without further delay and without conditions. Referring to the working paper submitted by Canada to the Preparatory Committee in 1999 (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/10) he said that the pursuit of disarmament negotiations under article VI was not conditional on negotiating a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

8. Canada had fully supported the bilateral START process between the United States and the Russian Federation and welcomed the ratification of START II by the Russian State Duma. It encouraged the accelerated negotiation of START III and the integration of China, France and the United Kingdom into an expanded START process. It also called for full accountability and transparency in the nuclear-warhead inventories, including tactical weapons, of all five nuclear-weapon States. In the interim, appropriate safety measures must be implemented by reducing numerical and alert levels. The Conference on Disarmament should establish a practical mechanism for the exchange of information with a view to achieving further progress in nuclear disarmament through national, bilateral and multilateral initiatives. He stressed the importance of maintaining the 1972 ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability and of establishing a mechanism in the Conference on Disarmament to address outer space issues, particularly non-weaponization. Canada was also working hard with other countries to develop new confidence-and-norm-building measures to supplement the work of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Having signed the CTBT in 1996 and ratified it in 1998, Canada considered it to be provisionally in force and invited other States parties to that Treaty to do likewise.

9. His delegation, which had first proposed a prohibition on the further production of weapon-usable fissile material in 1979, called for the early conclusion within the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Parallel to those negotiations, appropriate non-proliferation and disarmament measures should be taken, including the identification of existing stocks of weapon-usable fissile materials and, within the framework of the current Review Conference, the declaration of a moratorium on their further production by all five nuclear-weapon States. His delegation

would be circulating proposals for a programme of action to strengthen and update the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

10. His delegation accorded high priority to the strengthened review process agreed in 1995, which should address what States parties were accountable for and how that accountability was to be exercised. The current Review Conference should consider those questions under agenda item 17. His delegation was circulating proposals for the further strengthening of the review process. For example, it believed that, at each session, the Preparatory Committee should consider and report publicly on key issues pertaining to the functioning and implementation of Treaty provisions, perhaps on an article-by-article basis, and summarize its deliberations for future sessions and review conferences. The Preparatory Committee and review conferences should also strive for greater transparency, including increased access and participation by non-governmental organizations, and enhanced media coverage.

11. **Mr. Al-Hariri** (Syrian Arab Republic) noted that the universality of the Treaty required the accession of the remaining States not parties to it, particularly those possessing nuclear facilities, and their conclusion of safeguards agreements with IAEA. It also required that the nuclear-weapon States should provide effective security assurances so that the interests of some States were not served at the expense of others. That called for a balance between the rights and obligations of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, there must be no nuclear cooperation with any State not a party to the Treaty, particularly a State which ignored international legitimacy and used such cooperation to develop its nuclear-weapon capability. Double standards must also be avoided in the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The fact that Israel possessed nuclear technology and nuclear weapons but was not a party to the Treaty cast doubt on the credibility of the Treaty and the future of non-proliferation. Consequently, it was the responsibility of the Conference to review the international control and transfer of nuclear technology and to ensure that it was non-discriminatory.

12. The progress made by the nuclear-weapon States so far was quite disappointing. Their recent joint statement gave the impression that they believed they had achieved all they wanted with the extension of the

Treaty in 1995, and that their obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons carried no specific time limit.

13. Accordingly, the Conference should strongly urge all nuclear-weapon States to implement article VI of the Treaty by taking steps to rid themselves of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, under strict international control; create an effective mechanism to accelerate nuclear disarmament and thereby defuse tension in critical regions of the world; and call on the nuclear-weapon States to exercise complete transparency by declaring their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, with emphasis on their physical protection and the prevention of illegitimate transfers.

14. His delegation believed that the Treaty had not provided reliable security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties, since the assurances contained therein were conditional, discriminatory and non-binding. In the Middle East, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties had the legitimate right to effective security assurances against the Israeli nuclear threat. Furthermore, the nuclear-weapon States were required under the Treaty to pursue negotiations on a legally binding instrument that would provide comprehensive and unconditional guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States under effective international control.

15. Such an instrument should embody a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States; should set forth the right of the non-nuclear-weapon States to guarantees that would be negotiated within a specific committee; and should contain explicit pledges by the nuclear-weapon States to achieve complete nuclear disarmament within a specific time-frame.

16. **Ms. Abounaga** (Egypt) emphasized the need to respect articles I and II of the Treaty without exception. The majority of States parties had concluded the Treaty on the understanding that both regional and global measures would be taken to prevent the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet despite certain achievements in the past few years, such as the conclusion of the CTBT and the recent decision by the Russian Federation to ratify the CTBT and START II, the dangers of nuclear proliferation remained critical. The objectives of non-proliferation and universality of the Treaty had not been achieved; nuclear proliferation

had not been prevented in South Asia; and the refusal of the United States Senate to ratify the CTBT undermined that instrument.

17. There was a lack of political will among the five nuclear-weapon States to embark on multilateral negotiations leading to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. They must heed the millions of voices crying out for an end to the nuclear threat; and they must heed the 1996 unanimous advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice confirming the obligation to pursue negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament under international control. In the context of universality, she emphasized the difference between non-adherence, used in the sense of non-accession, and non-compliance with the Treaty. Non-compliance was the responsibility of Main Committee I in the context of articles I and II of the Treaty, and the monitoring of compliance had been placed under the mandate of IAEA.

18. Egypt, after having signed the Treaty in 1968, had done its utmost to spare Africa from the nuclear threat, and in 1974 had proposed the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Since then, it had put forward numerous proposals for ridding the region and the world of weapons of mass destruction, and had continued to play an active role in many international forums to that end.

19. In that context, Egypt called on the Conference to evaluate the fulfilment by States parties — especially the five nuclear-weapon States — of their commitments under the Treaty and also those undertaken at the 1995 Conference. Furthermore, Egypt called for multilateral negotiations among States — including the nuclear-weapon States — to be held in parallel with other bilateral and multilateral efforts to reduce nuclear weapons.

20. The statement made on behalf of the five nuclear-weapon States at the current Conference did not fully meet the expectations of the other States parties. While it reaffirmed their commitment to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, it was silent about the only State in the region which possessed nuclear weapons — Israel — but mentioned Pakistan and India. The statement also ignored the possibility of negotiations on a multilateral treaty with binding legal force that would provide security assurances that there would be no threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The assurances provided for in

Security Council resolution 984 (1995) did not respond to concerns about the possibility of a nuclear threat, since they were not legally binding, were predicated upon certain conditions and could be modified in the future.

21. **Mr. Zabaluyev** (Russian Federation), noting that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was one of the cornerstones of the international non-proliferation regime, said that his Government was taking various measures under article VI of the Treaty. It believed that a gradual, systematic and well-financed approach was needed, involving all the nuclear Powers.

22. Russia's nuclear disarmament process comprised measures under its bilateral treaties with the United States and unilateral initiatives. In the bilateral sphere, under the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, two classes of land-based missiles had been eliminated and their production and testing halted. Under the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons (START I), Russia had, *inter alia*, eliminated some 950 missile launchers, 2,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and 80 heavy bombers. As a result the number of deployed nuclear warheads had been reduced to considerably below the level stipulated by START I. By the end of 2001, the United States and Russia's strategic nuclear forces would have been reduced by roughly 40 per cent.

23. His Government had ratified START II in April 2000. Under that Treaty, which provided, *inter alia*, for the elimination of ICBMs with multiple warheads, the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers would be reduced to between 3,000 and 3,500.

24. In that connection, his delegation emphasized that the 1972 ABM Treaty was crucial to both the START treaty process and to global strategic stability. Further reductions under the START process should be closely linked to the preservation of the ABM Treaty, the collapse of which would undermine the entire edifice of disarmament treaties built up over the years and, in particular, jeopardize the stability of the various non-proliferation regimes. His Government believed that the problem of missile threats could be solved without destroying the ABM Treaty. It had proposed the creation of a global system for monitoring the non-

proliferation of missiles and missile technology, and an international meeting of experts had recently been held in Moscow on that subject. The gradual establishment of such a system on a non-discriminatory basis would play a major role in strengthening global strategic stability.

25. With regard to tactical nuclear weapons, his country was implementing a number of unilateral initiatives, which included the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from ships, submarines and land-based naval aircraft, and their centralized storage; the elimination of a third of all nuclear ammunition for sea-based tactical missiles; the elimination of nuclear warheads for tactical weapons, and nuclear mines; and the elimination of half the country's nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and half its aircraft-carried nuclear bombs.

26. His Government had removed the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union from the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, thereby enabling them to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. As a result, Russia no longer deployed nuclear weapons beyond its own borders, and it called on other nuclear Powers to follow its example.

27. His Government was downsizing Russia's nuclear sector as part of its nuclear disarmament efforts. Two of Russia's four defence-industry factories were being closed down and, under a joint United States-Russian programme, 10 of its 13 plutonium-producing reactors had been shut down and the production of uranium for nuclear weapons had been halted. The number of defence-industry workers had been drastically reduced and the International Scientific and Technological Centre set up to convert defence-related scientific know-how to peaceful uses was continuing its retraining activities and its support for civilian projects.

28. In October 1991, Russia had imposed a moratorium on nuclear testing. On 21 April 2000, the State Duma had ratified the CTBT. In order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it was necessary to ensure the accession to the CTBT of all States with a nuclear potential and whose decision on ratification was important for the Treaty's entry into force.

29. Another significant non-proliferation measure would be the early convening of the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a treaty banning the

production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. It was important to ensure the safe disposition of weapon-origin fissile material and its conversion to spent fuel or other non-weapon-usable forms. In October 1997, his Government had informed the General Conference of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that it would be gradually withdrawing from its nuclear weapon programmes some 500 tonnes of high-enriched uranium and 50 tonnes of plutonium. A major programme for the conversion of high-enriched weapon-origin uranium to low-enriched reactor fuel was under way. The problem of the disposition of weapon-origin plutonium was being tackled in the context of Russia's national nuclear power development strategy, where its use as rapid reactor fuel was being considered.

30. Russia was involved in joint research initiatives with the United States, France and Germany on the use of uranium/plutonium fuel in Russian reactors, and Russian and United States scientists were working on the development of an experimental reactor fuel, produced from weapon-origin plutonium, for use in Canadian reactors. Lastly, under a trilateral initiative with the United States and IAEA, weapon-origin fissile material removed from weapons programmes was to be placed under international control.

31. *Mr. Lint (Belgium), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

32. **Mr. Mya Than** (Myanmar) said that the 2000 Review Conference was taking place at a time when prospects for arms control and disarmament were not encouraging, a situation reflected in the inability of the Preparatory Committee to put forward substantive recommendations to the Conference. Nevertheless, the recent decisions by the Russian Federation to ratify START II and CTBT could provide fresh impetus to the deliberations. His delegation believed that moderate tangible results were within reach, provided that all States parties showed flexibility and realism. The Conference had made a good start by establishing two subsidiary bodies to undertake substantive work.

33. Although it was too soon to predict the final outcome of the Conference, the minimum his delegation expected was a set of principles and objectives. Insofar as principles were concerned, the Conference could simply reaffirm those set forth in Decision 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The objectives adopted must be relevant to

the present situation and the new century. His delegation would like to suggest some elements that might be included in the final product.

34. In order to strengthen the review process, the practice of establishing subsidiary bodies to work on important issues should be carried forward. Interim measures to reduce nuclear danger should include reviewing and adapting nuclear policies, de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons, and de-alerting and de-activating nuclear weapons.

35. With respect to nuclear disarmament, the full implementation of article VI would require: the early entry into force of the CTBT and a continued moratorium on nuclear test explosions; the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a universal, non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein, and a moratorium on such production pending the entry into force of the convention; the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to carry out further deep reductions of nuclear weapons with a view to the total elimination of nuclear weapons; the commencement of multilateral negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States in that regard at an appropriate stage; and the establishment of an ad hoc committee by the Conference on Disarmament to address the issue of nuclear disarmament.

36. With regard to security assurances, the States parties should agree on the need to conclude an internationally legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. On the subject of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Conference should urge: expeditious completion of consultations on an amendment to the Protocol of the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), early accession by the nuclear-weapon States thereto and entry into force of the Protocol; formal recognition and observance of the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia; and early completion of negotiations on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

37. In addition to principles and objectives, his delegation felt that the Conference should adopt decisions on such important subjects as nuclear disarmament and security assurances and a resolution on the Middle East.

38. **Mr. Friedrich** (Switzerland) said that the mandate of Main Committee I included a review of the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and the programme of action on nuclear disarmament reflected in the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Nuclear disarmament was clearly far from complete, and progress in the last five years had been modest. The question before the Committee was how to revitalize the nuclear disarmament process.

39. His delegation welcomed the reaffirmation by the five nuclear-weapon States, in their common statement at the 10th plenary meeting of the Conference, of their commitment to the Principles and Objectives. It was reassuring to learn that none of their nuclear weapons were targeted at any State. It was also encouraging to learn that they were committed to preserving the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and a basis for further reductions and had reaffirmed the necessity of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and the adoption of a programme of work for the Conference on Disarmament. Those new undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States should be incorporated into an action plan setting forth supplementary practical measures for implementing the 1995 Principles and Objectives and article VI of the Treaty.

40. His delegation would like to submit for the Committee's consideration a working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.3) with suggested elements for such an action plan to be adopted by the Conference. Given the size of their nuclear forces, the United States of America and the Russian Federation had a special responsibility to step up their efforts to reduce their strategic offensive nuclear weapons under the START process. All States parties to the NPT should be systematically informed of the progress in nuclear disarmament and the changes in nuclear arsenals. Moreover, no reduction in nuclear weapons could be considered complete until all the fissile material in the warheads was irreversibly converted and placed under IAEA safeguards. His delegation deplored the lack of commitment and transparency displayed by some nuclear-weapon States. Tactical

(sub-strategic) weapons were another area of concern and should be included in formal disarmament processes.

41. With regard to other multilateral disarmament efforts, all parties with nuclear potential should observe a moratorium on nuclear testing pending the entry into force of the CTBT. Similarly, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for military purposes should be observed until a convention on the matter could be concluded. Efforts in the area of legally binding security assurances should be intensified and extended to non-nuclear-weapon States outside nuclear-weapon-free zones.

42. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America) said that his delegation wished to submit two working papers to be issued as Conference documents with suggestions for elements of the Committee's final report. One paper concerned the Committee's "backward look", or review of the implementation of article VI; the other concerned its "forward look" at means of implementing articles I and II in the areas of universality and non-proliferation. Many of the other working papers submitted had proposals his delegation could work with. In addition, the common statement introduced by France on behalf of the five nuclear-weapon States in the 10th plenary meeting contained elements that could be useful in drafting.

43. *Mr. Reyes Rodríguez (Colombia) resumed the Chair.*

44. **Ms. Mendes** (Portugal), speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that the European Union would be submitting a working paper, which it hoped would be useful for the work of the Committee.

45. **Mr. Shi Zhongjun** (China), introducing working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.2, said that his delegation had put forward proposals which it hoped would find a place in the Committee's report and the final document to emerge from the Conference. In that paper, it reaffirmed its belief in the need for the complete prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons and urged all the nuclear-weapon States parties to commit themselves to that goal and to negotiate and conclude a convention to that effect. It also urged the nuclear-weapon States to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons. Other key proposals concerned the CTBT, the ABM Treaty, prevention of an arms race in outer space, a programme of work for

the Conference on Disarmament and negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

46. **Mr. Kim Myong-jin** (Republic of Korea) said that, despite some achievements in disarmament, the non-proliferation regime faced grave challenges from, among other things, the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan and the delayed entry into force of the CTBT. All States parties must fulfil their treaty obligations.

47. The nuclear-weapon States should remember that disarmament was not only a prerequisite for non-proliferation but a binding obligation under the Treaty, and it was high time that they stepped up their disarmament efforts. In that regard, his delegation commended the Russian Federation for its decision to ratify START II and the CTBT and hoped that the action would revive the momentum of nuclear weapons reduction talks. While his delegation supported the step-by-step approach to disarmament, it shared the view that the international community had legitimate concerns and should be kept informed and exchange views on the issue. To that end, his delegation supported proposals for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

48. His delegation wished to reaffirm its strong support for the Principles and Objectives adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The basic direction taken at that time was still valid. Part of the Committee's task would be to assess implementation of the Principles and Objectives.

49. **The Chairman** said that he would soon be introducing a Chairman's working paper and welcomed suggestions in that regard.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.