

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.1027
20 June 2006

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE THOUSAND AND TWENTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 20 June 2006, at 10.15 a.m.

President: Mr. Valery LOSHCININ (Russian Federation)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): The 1027th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order. On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I would like to extend a warm welcome to His Excellency Ban Ki-moon, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea, who will be our first speaker today. His Excellency Mr. Ban Ki-moon has had a distinguished career both in his country's Government and in international forums. I had an opportunity to work together with Mr. Ban Ki-moon some time ago in Vienna. In recognition of his current services and his great professionalism, he was recently put forward by the Government of the Republic of Korea for the post of Secretary-General of the United Nations.

For your information, on the list of speakers for today I have Her Excellency Professor Akiko Yamanaka, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan.

I now invite the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea, His Excellency Mr. Ban Ki-moon, to address the Conference. Your Excellency, you have the floor.

Mr. BAN (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, let me first say what a pleasure it is to speak under the chairmanship of such an accomplished President and old friend. I wish you every success in your noble endeavours. I still cherish very good memories of working with you while serving as Ambassador in Vienna.

I am greatly honoured to speak in this historic chamber, which for decades has been the home of international arms control affairs, and has given the world such milestone treaties as the NPT, the CWC, the BTWC and the CTBT.

While the productivity of the Conference has suffered in recent years, I am confident that in the longer term, the current lull will prove to be just that - a respite before the next harvest. But this will require the steadfast commitment of all to the multilateral approach to formulating a common platform for enhancing the security of all nations.

In this regard, I would like to commend all six Presidents of 2006 for their new initiative of focused in-depth debates. I would certainly encourage the Presidents to keep up the good work, in the hope that amidst the extensive discussions we may find a breakthrough.

The failures of the NPT Review Conference and the United Nations World Summit last year to produce any advances for non-proliferation and disarmament were deeply disappointing. But we must not despair. Instead, we must sound a wake-up call, and muster the best of our collective wisdom to breathe new vitality into the CD.

In this regard, I welcome the recent publication of the report by the WMD Commission led by Dr. Hans Blix of Sweden. The report recommends, among other things, the convening of a world summit for an overall review of non-proliferation and disarmament issues, the early entry into force of the CTBT and the resumption of negotiations on an FMCT at the CD.

(Mr. Ban, Republic of Korea)

I agree with the view that global engagement at the highest level on these issues will certainly be conducive to refocusing the world's attention on the current and future threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. In so doing, we may renew our resolve for progress in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

The Republic of Korea has fully supported the goals and objectives of all non-proliferation and disarmament treaties. We have also actively participated in all international efforts to secure effective compliance with the political and legal obligations of non-proliferation, including the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540, ratification of the IAEA Additional Protocol and strict adherence to the guidelines of the multilateral export control regimes.

We have also actively contributed to the discussions on major CD issues. On nuclear disarmament, we welcome the significant progress made thus far in curtailing nuclear stockpiles in nuclear-weapons States, and the commitments to further reductions under the Moscow Treaty. But we hope for deeper cuts and further engagements by the nuclear-weapon States so as to create an environment favourable to the diminished role of nuclear weapons in their security policies.

With regard to banning the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, we would like to see the CD address this issue as a matter of priority. The draft text of a fissile material cut-off recently tabled by the United States should serve as a useful basis for negotiations. We hope to find a formula under which the Conference can begin the negotiations at an early date.

On the prevention of an arms race in outer space, like many other countries, the Republic of Korea has greatly benefited from space-based technologies. We are keen to safeguard the uninterrupted and free use of outer space for peaceful purposes. We welcome the in-depth CD debates on PAROS. In the light of the complicated nature of the related issues, we believe a gradual and pragmatic approach is sensible at this stage.

Finally, on negative security assurances, insecurity, real or perceived, is in many instances a key motive for the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Thus, alleviating these concerns should be an important part of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

I would like to take this opportunity to offer an overview of the security situation in north-east Asia and some thoughts on how I wish to see the region evolve in the coming years.

As you all know, the North Korean nuclear issue is one of the most serious security challenges currently facing north-east Asia. It is the greatest threat to the security of the Republic of Korea. Thus, along with the United States, Japan, China, Russia and North Korea, the Republic of Korea has been a key player in the six-party talks aimed at a peaceful resolution of this issue.

(Mr. Ban, Republic of Korea)

After some painstaking rounds, the talks produced the joint statement of 19 September last year, setting out the objectives and principles to which all six parties committed themselves. In short, North Korea committed itself to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, and the other parties pledged to extend the economic and energy assistance and security assurances, and to undertake to normalize relations with North Korea.

Unfortunately, the process has stalled since last November, as North Korea has insisted on linking the resumption of the talks to an extraneous issue. We have been working closely with other participants to bring North Korea back to the talks.

Meanwhile, in recent weeks, North Korea's missile launch preparations have alarmed the world. My Government is deeply concerned that a launch of a long-range missile by North Korea would have serious negative repercussions for stability on the Korean peninsula and north-east Asia as well as for international efforts against the proliferation of WMDs.

North Korea is strongly urged to refrain from taking such a negative step. Instead, it should return to the six-party talks without preconditions, so as to work with other parties for the implementation of the 19 September joint statement.

In Europe, the key to the successful transformation of the cold war structure into a new order of peace was the strategic wisdom and insights of statesmen who were guided by their conviction in multilateralism. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, now OSCE, laid the groundwork for promoting dialogue between the democratic and communist sides of Europe.

In contrast, in north-east Asia, multilateral security cooperation has remained an alien concept. Unlike post-cold-war Europe, north-east Asia has been pulled in too many different directions for the countries of the region to ponder the idea of sitting together to discuss security cooperation. Instead of creating multilateral security mechanisms, they have preferred to rely on bilateral alliances.

However, with the challenge of the North Korean nuclear issue, the situation has changed. The issue has rallied the countries of the region around a shared security concern. It has underscored the need to work together toward a peaceful resolution that is to the satisfaction of all.

Indeed, after two years of working together in the talks, the six parties themselves have come to recognize the future prospect for multilateral security cooperation in north-east Asia. Thus, paragraph 4 of the joint statement reads: "The six parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in north-east Asia."

In this regard, in the six-party talks, historians might see the seeds of the north-east Asian version of OSCE. The countries in this region could build upon the experience of the six-party talks to develop a multilateral mechanism in north-east Asia to deal with a wide range of security issues of common concern. Such a future is eminently attainable if the leaders of the region have the vision and the willingness to work toward win-win solutions.

(Mr. Ban, Republic of Korea)

History has made the Republic of Korea a dedicated proponent of multilateralism. Now a full-fledged democracy with a thriving market economy, the Republic of Korea aspires to do what it can in the efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the global multilateral system as embodied in the United Nations. In particular, with first-hand experience of the devastation that befalls a people when peace is shattered and the distress that stirs them when security is threatened, we are devoted to multilateral efforts to further peace and security in our own region as well as around the world.

It is with such dedication that we continue to place our hope in the Conference on Disarmament to generate more in the future than it has in the past, and to pledge our best efforts toward its future successes.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I would like to thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea for his important address and also for the kind words addressed to the Chair and to myself. Thank you very much. Now I shall suspend our meeting literally for five minutes so that the Secretary-General of the Conference and myself may escort the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea out of the Council chamber. This meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 10.30 a.m. and resumed at 10.40 a.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): The 1027th plenary meeting of the Conference is resumed. I should now like, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, to extend a warm welcome to the next speaker, Her Excellency Professor Akiko Yamanaka, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan. Her Excellency Professor Akiko Yamanaka is well known in political and academic circles. She has a record of outstanding achievements in political sciences. In particular, she is a special adviser to the Rector of the United Nations University. She is also a member of the House of Representatives. I invite the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Her Excellency Professor Akiko Yamanaka, to address the Conference. Your Excellency, you have the floor.

Ms. YAMANAKA (Japan): I am greatly honoured to address this esteemed body on behalf of the Government of Japan, especially since I have devoted myself to promoting world peace as my lifelong mission.

The Conference on Disarmament, including its former incarnation as the Disarmament Committee, was the venue that negotiated and agreed to such important arms control and disarmament treaties as the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. It has left for later generations an imperishable monument of the endeavours to heighten the security of countries, not by the accumulation but through the reduction of weapons.

However, the CD has been in stalemate over the past decade. This was an unexpected and disappointing result in view of the fact that the cold war, which drew a long shadow over the world for so many years, has long since passed into history. Moreover, as new challenges to the

(Ms. Yamanaka, Japan)

NPT regime amass, such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as the risk of those weapons and materials falling into the hands of terrorists, the CD cannot even respond since it is unable to agree on the so-called programme of work. Diplomats to this forum have made continuous attempts in vain to break the deadlock. This year, however, we have seen a silver lining spread across this dark cloud that has shrouded the CD, thanks to the introduction of structured debates on all the issues of the agenda. This seems to be the first sign of momentum. Especially, the substantial discussions on a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons have generated new possibilities which we should transform into concrete action.

Structured debates have brought the substantial exchange of views back to the CD. The productive session last month on an FMCT was especially encouraging. Many experts attended the debates and several countries submitted working papers. Japan contributed to both aspects. In particular, we believe that the proposed United States draft treaty on an FMCT and mandate have provided us with a good starting point. I call upon all the experts gathered here, with their sagacity and extensive experience, to join together and utilize this proposal as a good basis on which to commence actual negotiations on an FMCT and conclude a treaty as early as possible.

While I believe many countries share my view, I am aware that some do not. However, I want to emphasize that the CD must not hesitate to revitalize its work.

Firstly, we should begin by doing what can be done. As you are all well aware, the impasse at the CD is not the result of diverse priorities among members but of the linkage approach, which conditionally links one item to another. To my knowledge, in the history of multilateral forums, such an approach has produced few positive outcomes. We should reconsider this approach. Nonetheless, abandoning linkages does not mean other items will be disregarded. Each item is meritorious in its own right, and we should begin work in accordance with those merits. An FMCT is considered ripe since not a single country has voiced an objection to embarking on negotiations. Of course, we should also continue to deliberate on nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances.

Secondly, we must avoid clinging to past approaches of the Conference. For instance, the five Ambassadors' proposal for a programme of work has produced few results, and we must break from its spell. We must review the present situation with fresh eyes while distancing ourselves from the past approaches. In this spirit, I believe that agreement to initiate negotiations on an FMCT without preconditions will suit the interests of all.

Now is the time for CD members to be flexible in their quest for a creative and pragmatic modus operandi. During the remaining three months of this year's session, the Conference should redouble its efforts to break the long-standing stalemate.

Let me conclude by expressing my strong faith in the deep knowledge and insight of the distinguished members of the CD, as experts of disarmament and non-proliferation. The "window of opportunity" is open and there is a real chance before us. It is our responsibility to grasp it, because, let me remind you, in the context of this forum, inertia is also a weapon of mass destruction.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Professor Akiko Yamanaka, for her important address. Now we shall suspend our work for a few minutes so that the Secretary-General of the Conference and myself may escort the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan from the Council chamber.

The meeting was suspended at 10.50 a.m. and resumed at 10.55 a.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): In accordance with our meeting schedule, today we begin our focused thematic debate on item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". We have a list of speakers. The representatives of Switzerland, the Russian Federation, Belarus, France and Germany have asked to speak. Immediately on conclusion of the official plenary meeting we shall have an unofficial plenary meeting on the same subject. We shall conclude our thematic week on agenda item 5 with an official plenary meeting on 22 June. I would like to inform you that at that meeting Russia's term in the Chair of the Conference will come to an end, and we shall be able to draw some conclusions.

Now let us begin the discussion. I give the floor to the distinguished Ambassador of Switzerland, Mr. Jürg Streuli. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. STREULI (Switzerland) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on the way you have guided our work during our focused structured debates during your term in the Chair. I have the pleasure and the privilege to make the following statement on behalf of France and Switzerland on critical civilian infrastructure.

At the opening meeting of the 2006 session, we heard you call on delegations to provide new avenues for work and new ideas for this forum. We believe that the Conference on Disarmament should be in a position to address all the subjects which are important in its field today and to maintain an ongoing dialogue on the major security issues linked to the disarmament subject area. It is in that spirit that, for two years now, Switzerland and France have together been developing ideas on critical civilian infrastructure. A French expert came to give his country's views on this subject during an informal plenary meeting held on 10 June 2004. On 28 and 29 October 2003 and 7 and 8 October 2004, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy organized two forums during which this issue was discussed at length. These events produced publications which we have circulated to the members of the Conference.

Switzerland supports the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) at the federal Polytechnic in Zurich. In the context of the Comprehensive Risk Analysis and Management Network, the CSS has published a number of guides on the protection of critical information infrastructure and other topics linked to the protection of critical infrastructure. Since 2003 the Swiss Foreign Ministry has organized annual workshops on the protection of critical infrastructure under the auspices of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Our next workshop, supported by Germany and NATO, is planned for August 2006. The Centre for International Security Policy in the Foreign Ministry has published summaries of the workshops, and a few copies are available to member States and observers in the Conference on Disarmament today.

(Mr. Streuli, Switzerland)

Lastly, France and Switzerland formally circulated a draft mandate on 2 February of this year.

In a spirit of seeking consensus and exploring ideas in our Conference, we would like the subject of critical civilian infrastructure to be considered in this forum. With that purpose in mind our two countries have brought along today two experts whose contributions may enrich our work this afternoon. We have also asked for an informal meeting of the Conference to be held after this meeting, when we will be in a position to share with you some of our ideas on this topic in an open and informal dialogue.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for your statement and for your kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation, Mr. Anton Vasiliev.

Mr. VASILIEV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): In the recent period the Russian Federation has often expressed its views on item 5 on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons." They remain unchanged. In the context of the five ambassadors' proposal (CD/1693/Rev.1), we would not object to the appointment by the Conference under this agenda item of a special coordinator to seek the views of its members on the most appropriate way to deal with this issue.

At the same time, bearing in mind the current situation in the Conference, it is obvious that a possible compromise on the programme of work can be found on the basis of a balanced approach to the so-called core issues, which do not include this item. Adding new issues to the equation would hardly be conducive to such a compromise. The CD should undoubtedly adapt to the new threats and challenges of today's world, but a CD which is not working will be equally unable to deal with either new or traditional issues. That is why our most urgent task is clearly to resume the normal functioning of the Conference.

On the subject of agenda item 5, we would like particularly to highlight the efforts of Belarus and Germany. The United Nations General Assembly resolution on "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament", adopted in recent years on the initiative of Belarus, is of prime importance. In it the Assembly reaffirms that effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction. We are concerned that at the sixtieth session of the General Assembly, for the first time, this resolution, whose wording was substantially unchanged, did not secure consensus, although it was adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes.

We would also like to pay tribute to the efforts being undertaken by Germany on the problem of radiological weapons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): Thank you for your statement. The next speaker on my list is the Ambassador of the Republic of Belarus, Mr. Sergei Aleinik. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. ALEINIK (Belarus) (translated from Russian): The Republic of Belarus believes that the “five Ambassadors’ proposal”, which has received the most support among delegations taking part in the work of the Conference, continues to form the basis for a broad consensus on the CD’s programme of work. In this connection, the Belarus delegation supports the creation within the CD of an ad hoc committee to conduct negotiations on a draft treaty on the prohibition of fissile material, as well as the establishment of auxiliary bodies of the Conference to discuss the subject of prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances. We believe that stepping up the work of the Conference in other spheres will be possible only when these key issues have been resolved.

Nevertheless, Belarus believes it is appropriate to maintain item 5 - “New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons” - in its current wording on the Conference agenda. The Republic of Belarus is the initiator of General Assembly resolutions 51/37 of 10 December 1996, 54/44 of 1 December 1999, 57/50 of 22 November 2002 and 60/46 of 8 December 2005 concerning the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Belarus supports the proposal put forward earlier in the CD concerning the development of a universal international treaty or convention to prohibit the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

We believe that the development and adoption of such an international legal instrument would be in accordance with the interests of the entire international community. We believe that such an instrument could create a strong legal basis to combat the development and production of new types of WMD.

As advocates of the preventive approach, we consider that the international community must take all possible steps to draw up such an international legal instrument before the production of new types of WMD becomes a reality.

We emphasize that detailed discussions of the problem of prohibiting new types of WMD will be possible only if the key issues before the CD are addressed step by step.

Belarus believes it would be counterproductive to begin a negotiating process on such an international legal instrument outside the machinery of the United Nations. We believe that substantive activity on this problem must be pursued only if there is a broad consensus on this issue in the international community, including support for such a process on the part of all the world’s key States.

The Republic of Belarus considers the provisions of the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to be an important legal basis in combating the development and production of new types of WMD. In particular, article 36 of the 1977 Additional Protocol to these Conventions states the following: “In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a high contracting party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or in all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the high contracting party.”

(Mr. Aleinik, Belarus)

In this connection, the Republic of Belarus supports the efforts of the international community to ensure the universality of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto, as well as compliance with all the provisions of these international legal instruments by all States parties. In our view, the provisions of these instruments oblige States parties to conduct a national evaluation of the lawfulness of new types of weapons, including new types of WMD.

With a view to fulfilling the international legal obligations of the Republic of Belarus under the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols thereto, and drawing up proposals for the incorporation of the rules of international humanitarian law into domestic legislation, the Government of Belarus has set up a commission for the incorporation of international humanitarian law. This commission is a standing consultative interdepartmental government body. Representatives of interested government bodies as well as the ICRC and other international organizations working in the sphere of international humanitarian law may take part in the work of this commission in a consultative capacity.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I now give the floor to the representative of France, Mr. Richard Narich. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. NARICH (France) (translated from French): I would first like to make three preliminary observations. First, the issue of the protection of critical infrastructure can be approached from two angles, in terms of business continuity or in terms of internal or national security. Naturally it is the second approach which we will choose here, since this brief statement is addressed to the permanent representatives accredited to the Conference on Disarmament.

Second observation: I will confine myself to a general presentation, which, if I understand correctly, will be fleshed out by other, more technical statements.

Third observation: the notion of critical infrastructure is a priori quite obvious, although what it covers varies from one country to another. This notion covers the installations necessary to the normal functioning of a country - for example, nuclear power stations, ports or roads.

I now turn to the four points in my statement. First of all, the expansion of the notion of critical infrastructure, which was originally coterminous with physical infrastructure alone, and which is being extended more and more to cover practically all critical functions in our societies.

The second point is the importance of providing protection for such infrastructure, which is now at the forefront of our countries' concerns in terms of security in a world where risks and threats have proliferated.

Thirdly: the way in which this challenge is addressed today. There are two approaches: a technical approach and an institutional approach.

Lastly, the fourth we shall see that critical infrastructure is only one vulnerable point among others.

(Mr. Narich, France)

Now, the first point: the expansion of the concept of critical infrastructure. Two ideas here. First, today we are seeing an evolution and an expansion of the scope of this concept. I will give you a few examples. First, and this supplements what I said earlier about physical infrastructure: infrastructure may be critical because it is important for the functioning of a set of activities, for example, a power plant. In that case, it is called systemic. Second example: we want to protect static infrastructure against all attacks but also, increasingly, services, physical and electronic information flows, and the messages carried by these flows. So next to a dam, which is an element of physical infrastructure, one can legitimately place supply chains or transactions carried out by banking and financial institutions. Third example: infrastructure can also be considered critical because it is symbolic. An obvious example is the World Trade Center in New York, but the same could be said of the Eiffel Tower or the British Houses of Parliament.

Second point relating to this expansion of the concept: there is a new concept which has arisen alongside that of critical infrastructure protection (CIP), and that is critical information infrastructure protection, or CIIP.

Protecting a dam or a nuclear power station has been a matter for reflection and the subject of protocols for many years, even if one can always do better and even if the necessary protection and precautions are not always ensured. The protection of technological information systems, however, is a new concern. It is crucial for three main reasons: these systems, as we said earlier, lie at the heart of all economic activity; they are growing more and more complex, and therefore more and more vulnerable; and finally, the threats are becoming more insidious and more effective. So, generally speaking, the concept of infrastructure now covers not just physical infrastructure but also, as I was saying earlier, the critical functions of society.

Second point: the protection of this infrastructure within the new international security context. Infrastructure protection is nothing new. Natural disasters and human error, which can create major harm, have always been a prime concern for the public authorities and for businesses. In cases of conflict, this infrastructure is also a strategic target to be given priority protection by those under attack, at the same time as being a prime target for the aggressor. Now, why has this subject acquired prominence in the field of security over the last few years? There are two reasons. The first is the information revolution with the new risks it entails, as I said earlier, which had to be mastered. The United States has played a pioneering role in this field since 1997. The second reason is related to the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. These two developments, each in its own way, reflect the complexity and growing interdependence of our modern societies and hence their fragility. This complexity and this interdependence are the result of different causes.

First, a technical cause: the interconnection of computer networks which currently underpin the bulk of productive activity. An economic cause: the process of privatization, which spread in the 1990s in many regions of the world, mainly in Eastern Europe, and which led to the shift of many previously State-controlled economic activities to the private sector, causing fragmentation and the need for coordination.

(Mr. Narich, France)

There is also a geopolitical cause: the process of globalization, going beyond borders, creating greater interconnectedness and interdependence. In this way, critical infrastructure in a particular country may be controlled by enterprises from a neighbouring country; or supply chains very often these days depend very closely on foreign markets. So, the management and protection of infrastructure becomes a task which is growing more and more difficult. Lastly, these developments are happening at a time when international terrorism is producing destructive effects, even though the consequences of natural disasters or health emergencies are even more serious.

Thirdly, how is this complex of problems currently addressed? First of all, there is the technical approach, and here too I will give three examples. First example: risk analysis. In the face of growing difficulties in protecting more and more complex installations and systems, increasing resort is had to this technique. Even though it is not yet perfect, its purpose is to provide answers to questions such as: what can the flaws be? What chances are there that the flaws will surface? What would the consequences be? What can be done? And so forth.

Second example: research programmes in the field of security which are currently financed by the European Commission and include projects that may contribute to the protection of critical infrastructure. Lastly, a third example: the European CIRCE programme launched a few months ago, whose aims include that of drawing up an inventory of all information technology research centres in the Union in order to enhance cooperation between them, eliminate overlaps, etc. That was the technical approach.

Now, the institutional approach, which is absolutely vital but still seriously inadequate. It takes into account the following elements, which are therefore realities: growing interdependence between sectors in a single country; growing dependence of national responses vis-à-vis the international environment; public/private/international organizations/civil society cooperation which is becoming more and more necessary. All the developed countries, and many international institutions, are trying to move forward in these areas. Here too I will give three examples.

First example: the European Commission, which launched a programme a few months ago to strengthen infrastructure in Europe in the context of efforts to combat terrorism. It encourages the member countries to draw up lists or to update existing lists. It also seeks to identify critical infrastructure at the European level.

Second example: protection of critical information infrastructure has been the subject of a huge effort at the international level. The G8 drew up recommendations on this topic three years ago, and that is just one among many initiatives in an area where there is much thinking being done and where tremendous efforts are being made to provide protection.

Third example: this topic of infrastructure has also become a pressing issue in developing countries, which are also exposed to terrorist threats. Considerable diplomatic activity has taken place over the last few months on the part of certain Western governments to encourage some of these countries which are particularly threatened to protect themselves, on the principle that security is indivisible.

(Mr. Narich, France)

These issues are not easy to deal with, so progress is sometimes quicker, sometimes not. In this quest for security, no one imagines any longer that there can be 100 per cent protection. That is why experts increasingly speak of “robustness” or “resilience” instead of using the term “security”.

Now the fourth and last point: critical infrastructure is only one of many vulnerable points. Dealing with the protection of critical infrastructure is not enough to make our societies totally secure. Critical infrastructure, as I said, is just one vulnerable aspect among others. For the sake of completeness, it is necessary to add protection of populations and borders. These three elements taken together, added to the range of risks and threats we now face, make up the real new subject-matter of security for the coming years. The governments of the principal countries are addressing this area, even if their approaches differ. In this way, the American Homeland Security initiative stresses the terrorist threat, against which a “war” is being waged, while federal machinery which did not previously exist has been set up or grouped together in that country to tackle this threat. The Nordic countries have a more decentralized and global approach (the “all-hazards approach”, also referred to as “societal security”), which places all threats and all risks on the same level and also mobilizes all resources and all citizens. For the European Union, the protection of citizens is the main issue. The terrorist threat is just one among many threats. The political approach has pride of place.

But we see that these differences in approach become blurred when crises are addressed. Responses are practically the same, whether one is dealing with a terrorist attack or an epidemic.

And people are realizing more and more that civil defence and the military have an interest in working more closely together. At the decision-making level, the question of whether to keep two different decision-making forums, one for civil defence operations and one for military operations, is now on the table. Cooperation between these two poles is clearly necessary when dealing with major crises. Lastly, systems which can be used for both civil and military purposes, so-called “dual-use” technologies, are growing in importance. I am thinking, for example, of drones, helicopters, launches, etc.

One last point: there is not a clear-cut boundary between defence as such and civil defence when it comes to nuclear, chemical or biological threats - or even trafficking in small arms, an issue being dealt with in your forum; these come up again in dealing with terrorism under the heading of “weapons of mass destruction”.

That is broadly speaking what I wanted to tell you. Now, a few conclusions.

First point: more than ever - and I would like to begin with this - the classic problems of war and peace, the arms race and efforts to secure disarmament, remain. Whatever anyone may say, we are still in a largely Westphalian world. Nevertheless, our societies are now also subject to threats in times of peace.

(Mr. Narich, France)

Second point: in order to tackle this, the global approach is legitimate, because, as I said earlier, the approach to problems is the same, whether we are dealing with a terrorist attack, a human error or a tsunami. It is also to be encouraged. Strengthening prevention, protection, response and post-crisis actions means strengthening all the mechanisms available to a society to defend itself, and thus indirectly discouraging terrorism by other means.

Third point: war and peace are still very largely the business of governments. Dealing with these new threats is the business of everybody - governments, international organizations, the private sector, research institutions, civil society.

It was with these few ideas that I wanted to conclude this report, which was obviously not intended to be more than a purely technical assessment. But it does seem to me that a forum for dialogue at the international level is lacking where these problems could be discussed comprehensively with all the stakeholders concerned.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): Thank you, Mr. Richard Narich. The next speaker on my list is the Ambassador of Germany, Bernhard Brasack. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. BRASACK (Germany): I would like to come back to agenda item 5, entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". I am going to focus on radiological weapons.

Since the time we had to witness the tragedy of Chernobyl 20 years ago, we have all been aware of the dangers of radioactivity. It contaminates indiscriminately, without control, without respect to national borders. Radiological weapons make use of the fear that spreads among the population when radioactive material is dispersed. However, for too long radiological weapons have been considered by many as a secondary issue, because the use of them seemed to be a non-imminent threat.

As you may remember, the deliberations on this issue started in 1979 with a draft text presented by the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Starting in 1981, the issue of a prohibition of attacks on civil nuclear installations became an integral part of these considerations. Maybe we should take these considerations up again, also keeping in mind that the issue of a possible prohibition of an attack on civil nuclear installations could be seen as an early precedent and one important example in any broader concept of the protection of any critical civil infrastructure. Only last week we dealt with another important example of this concept. It was during the thematic discussion of PAROS when we discussed the protection of satellites in space, which are more and more an important part of our critical infrastructure, so to speak.

The security environment has long since changed, and so have the global challenges to international security. However, also in a changed security environment, it still holds true that nuclear arms control can make an important contribution to meeting security challenges. One of

(Mr. Brasack, Germany)

the new challenges is the risk of terrorists exploding a crude nuclear device or setting off a so-called “dirty bomb”. This risk is real. The tragedy of 11 September 2001 has demonstrated that terrorists are ready to use any means to commit their criminal acts. That is why nowadays there is special focus on protecting nuclear material against terrorist attacks or theft.

As recently stated in the final report of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, “radioactive substances or nuclear waste not under full control might be acquired by terrorists and be used in dirty bombs - devices that disperse radioactive material to contaminate target areas or to provoke terror”.

In particular, IAEA, with its specific focus on improving the accountancy and physical protection of relevant materials and facilities, serves as catalyst for these efforts and has contributed greatly to improving the safety and security of radiological material. Creating a global inventory of radioactive material under proper controls is a long-term aim and will require a sustained and concerted effort. We welcome the revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources approved by IAEA in September 2003 and resolution 60/73 in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in October 2005. Already in 2004 the EU member States adopted a regulation on sealed highly radioactive sources that covers most parts of the IAEA Code of Conduct.

We also welcome the amendments made to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and urge all countries to sign, ratify and implement the new version as soon as possible.

An effective international regime to keep WMD out of the hands of terrorists must be built on a structure of multilateral arms control and non-proliferation measures, because this is no longer a question of solely national responsibility but of an overwhelming international interest. No one can deny that. Global solutions are essential because, like a chain, the system of physical protection of relevant materials can only be as strong as its weakest link.

While not detracting from the indispensable work done in the framework of IAEA and others, in particular on the safety and security of radioactive sources, we believe that a radiological weapons convention could create an important international norm. This norm would not only provide a barrier against the acquisition of radiological weapons by any State and provide a benchmark for judging State behaviour in this regard and improve the protection and accountancy as regards these materials, but it could also help to legitimize, revalue and give an impetus to international efforts aimed at providing for more effective protection and control of radioactive materials. It could establish a legal obligation to secure radioactive materials and, to that end, establish common standards of national implementation including, among others, a requirement to enact penal legislation relating to any prohibited activity undertaken anywhere on the territory of any State party or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of that party. A radiological weapons convention could be an expression of the fact that the issue of protecting radioactive materials is not a national matter but the joint responsibility of the international community.

(Mr. Brasack, Germany)

The Federal Republic of Germany renounced, on 23 October 1954, in the context of the accession to the Western European Union, all production of WMDs and agreed to on-site inspections on its territory. Interestingly enough, this renunciation not only encompassed nuclear explosives but also weapons which cause damage through the radioactivity of fissile material or the radioactive isotopes, or mass destruction or damage, including poisoning, on a massive scale. Germany is therefore the only country in the world that has renounced such weapons in a legally binding instrument.

Germany attached then and still attaches importance to both these issues, and therefore calls upon the world community to ban radiological weapons as an act of preventive arms control. The Convention on the Prohibition of Environmental Warfare of 1977 commends itself as an example for preventive arms control agreements being successful in cutting off possibly dangerous ways of warfare, even before they are introduced.

I would like to recall the seminar that we organized together with the Peace Research Institute of Frankfurt and UNIDIR in December 2002 here in Geneva. One of its conclusions was that the CD could make a significant contribution to addressing the risks of nuclear terrorism.

I would also like to recall that Germany suggested, during its CD presidency in summer 2002, in view of the risk that a “dirty bomb” could be used by terrorists, taking a fresh look at the issue. We would very much welcome the CD revisiting the working paper that Germany introduced in July 2002. The paper identifies the relevant questions that must be addressed in the course of a meaningful dialogue on the issue. In this context, we suggest that CD members consider the establishment of a contact group for in-depth exploration of all relevant aspects related to the question of radiological weapons. The discussion should establish whether a ban on radiological weapons should be pursued by the CD.

In addressing radiological weapons, the CD could prove that it is able to respond in a timely fashion to new risks. We realize with regret that a number of CD member States are as yet not prepared even to explore this issue. Are arguments to the effect that the issue should be the sole responsibility of IAEA not mere excuses? We continue to believe that any approach considered for radiological weapons should strengthen and not detract from or duplicate initiatives and efforts undertaken by IAEA, States and relevant regulatory bodies aimed at reducing the threats of nuclear theft and sabotage.

Furthermore, the consideration of the issue of radiological weapons should not be construed as detracting from the need to overcome the present stalemate in the CD. The A5 proposal - and I am referring here to paragraph 5 of this proposal - on appointment of a “special coordinator” by the CD “under agenda item 5 entitled ‘New types of [WMD] and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons’ to seek the views of [CD member States] on the most appropriate way to deal with this issue”, taking into consideration “all relevant views and proposals, present and future”, and to “present a report”, constitutes the lowest common denominator acceptable. This issue was, by the way, also mentioned in the intervention by the Russian Federation and Belarus which we heard just a few minutes ago.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Bernhard Brasack was the last speaker on my list. Does anyone else wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Mr. AN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, with your permission, I would like to make one comment on the statement that we have heard this morning.

My delegation welcomes the practice whereby high-level officials are supposed to make a constructive input into the work of the CD. It is the hope and expectation of my delegation that high-level officials will provide this forum with constructive, instructive and thought-provoking ideas and vision so that we can benefit from those ideas and that vision to enable us to start substantive work on the basis of early agreement on a programme of work.

However, the kind of statement that was made by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea is not at all what this delegation expects or hopes to hear. That statement has given disappointment to my delegation. It did not at all meet the expectation and hope of at least my delegation.

The statement of the Foreign Minister of South Korea, particularly on the Korean issue, is surprisingly aggressive and unexpected when we see positive developments taking place between the North and South of Korea after the historic adoption of the North-South Joint Declaration on 15 June 2000 in Pyongyang.

As the Foreign Minister of one country deeply concerned, he knows what the essence is of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. He knows what the stumbling block is to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. He knows what the greatest threat is to the stability of the Korean peninsula.

Through our statement - the statement of this delegation - on 19 May in this forum, we elaborated the essence of the nuclear issue and the stumbling block to a solution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. I will not repeat it again.

But if the content of his statement is a reflection of the change of the position of the Government, it is a violation of - or even a betrayal of - the North-South Joint Declaration adopted on 15 June 2000.

On the other hand, my delegation is coming to think he is trying to use this august forum for pursuing his personal aim. Yesterday, at the first meeting of the inaugural session of the Human Rights Council, he also mentioned the so-called "human rights issues" in my country, which did not fit in with the atmosphere of the inaugural session of the Council. It is a great concern if he uses these forums to push his personal aim to become the Secretary-General of the United Nations. I do not know whether he has received some assurance that he will receive some more marks from certain countries by making these kinds of statements.

My delegation rejects his statement on the Korean issue.

I hope that the high-level statements are helpful to the work of the CD.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement. Does anyone else wish to speak? No one does. As we agreed earlier, we shall now conclude the work of this formal plenary meeting and then, after literally two or three minutes, we will convene an informal plenary meeting on the subject of "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". This informal meeting will be open to members of the Conference, observer States and also experts who are part of delegations. The plenary meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.