

**Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention  
on the Prohibition of the Development,  
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological  
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their  
Destruction**

17 December 2015

English only

**2015 Meeting**

**Geneva, 14-18 December 2015**

Item 7 of the agenda

**Standing agenda item: Cooperation and assistance,  
with a particular focus on strengthening cooperation  
and assistance under Article X**

**International/national implementation of Article X through  
transparent and reassurance mechanism**

**Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran**

**Implementation of Article X**

1. The Convention embodies a delicate equilibrium of rights and obligations and premising on the holistic approach, no provision is intended to hinder the legitimate transfer and exchange of equipments, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes between and among State Parties.
2. Full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X is essential for the realization of the objectives and purposes of the Convention.
3. State Parties should not use the provisions of Article III and IV of the Convention to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer or exchange of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials.
4. Denial strategies, coercive measures and reductionist approach in the implementation of the Convention that are unilateral, exclusive, discriminatory and politically motivated, would be divisive, and in the long run, would be to the disadvantages of the Convention and weaken it in its entirety.
5. Selective approach in the implementation of the provisions of the Convention, showing strong determination for strengthening export control regime, while lacking any sense of political will to cooperate with the developing State Parties in their capacity building policies, is paradoxical and detrimental to the integrity of the Convention, which should be addressed in any proposed formula for the strengthening of the Convention.
6. Activities prohibited by the Convention and the risk of the access of terrorism to biological (bacteriological) toxin and agents to be used for hostile purposes are of great concern for all States Parties; however, these should not be used in a way to justify adopting measures undermining the objectives and purposes of the Convention.



## **A multilateral approach**

7. Proliferation concerns are best addressed through a comprehensive, non-discriminatory and multilaterally negotiated and agreed mechanism and/or procedure, consistent with the provisions of the Convention.

8. A reassurance mechanism — instead of a denial approach — requires institutionalization of a procedure to monitor transfers for the sake of increasing transparency on trade activities, including through a reporting procedure, intended end-use and end-use assurance, consistency of each State Party's national regulations, national licensing, penal codes and the like.

9. Accordingly, a mechanism should be agreed upon and created through a comprehensive, non-discriminatory and multilaterally negotiation procedure, by establishing an open-ended working group, for the facilitation of the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the obligation undertaken under Article X.

10. State Parties should avoid prejudgment and resolve any concerns arising from any given transfers through a process of transparent consultation and clarification procedure.

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