

# Reunión de los Estados Partes en la Convención sobre la prohibición del desarrollo, la producción y el almacenamiento de armas bacteriológicas (biológicas) y tóxicas y sobre su destrucción

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## Reunión de 2014

Ginebra, 1 a 5 de diciembre de 2014

## Reunión de Expertos

Ginebra, 4 a 8 de agosto de 2014

Tema 9 del programa

**Aprobación del informe fáctico que recoge las deliberaciones de la Reunión**

## Informe de la Reunión de Expertos

Presentado por el Presidente

### I. Introducción

1. El Documento Final de la Séptima Conferencia de Examen de los Estados partes en la Convención sobre la prohibición del desarrollo, la producción y el almacenamiento de armas bacteriológicas (biológicas) y tóxicas y sobre su destrucción (BWC/CONF.VII/7) incluyó, en la sección relativa a decisiones y recomendaciones, la decisión siguiente:

"5. Reafirmando la utilidad de los programas entre períodos de sesiones anteriores de 2003 a 2010, la Conferencia decide mantener las mismas estructuras: reuniones anuales de los Estados partes precedidas de reuniones anuales de expertos.

6. El propósito del programa entre períodos de sesiones es examinar las cuestiones que la Séptima Conferencia de Examen ha decidido incluir en dicho programa y promover al respecto el logro de un entendimiento común y la adopción de medidas eficaces.

7. Reconociendo la necesidad de ajustar la ambición de mejorar el programa entre períodos de sesiones a las limitaciones —tanto financieras como de recursos humanos— que enfrentan los Estados partes, la Conferencia decide seguir asignando cada año diez días al programa entre períodos de sesiones.

8. La Conferencia decide que los siguientes asuntos serán temas permanentes del programa, y que serán tratados tanto en la Reunión de Expertos como en la Reunión de los Estados partes todos los años de 2012 a 2015:

a) Cooperación y asistencia, con especial hincapié en el fortalecimiento de la cooperación y asistencia en virtud del artículo X;

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- b) Examen de los adelantos en la esfera de la ciencia y la tecnología relacionados con la Convención;
  - c) Fortalecimiento de la aplicación nacional.
9. La Conferencia decide que los asuntos siguientes se debatirán durante el programa entre períodos de sesiones en los años indicados:
- a) Cómo propiciar una participación más plena en las medidas de fomento de la confianza (2012 y 2013);
  - b) Cómo fortalecer la aplicación del artículo VII, incluida la consideración de procedimientos y mecanismos detallados para la prestación de asistencia y la cooperación de los Estados partes (2014 y 2015).
10. Las reuniones de expertos reestructuradas tendrán una duración de cinco días, al igual que las reuniones de los Estados partes.
11. Las reuniones del primer año estarán presididas por un representante del Grupo del Movimiento de los Países No Alineados y otros Estados, las del segundo año por un representante del Grupo de Estados de Europa Oriental, las del tercero por un representante del Grupo Occidental y las del cuarto por un representante del Grupo del Movimiento de los Países No Alineados y otros Estados. Durante el año el Presidente será apoyado por dos vicepresidentes, procedentes de cada uno de los otros dos grupos regionales.
12. Cada Reunión de Expertos preparará, para ser considerado en la Reunión de los Estados Partes, un informe fáctico que recoja sus deliberaciones y su labor sobre los tres temas permanentes del programa y sobre el otro tema programado para debatirse durante ese año.
13. Además del informe de la Reunión de Expertos, las Reuniones de los Estados Partes también examinarán —anualmente— el progreso logrado en la universalización de la Convención y los informes anuales de la Dependencia de Apoyo a la Aplicación (DAA). En 2012 y 2013 la Reunión de los Estados Partes también examinará el informe de la Reunión de Expertos sobre las medidas de fomento de la confianza y, en 2014 y 2015, el informe de la Reunión de Expertos sobre el artículo VII.
14. Todas las reuniones, tanto de expertos como de los Estados partes, aprobarán todas sus conclusiones o resultados por consenso.
15. La Octava Conferencia de Examen examinará la labor y las conclusiones de esas reuniones y decidirá cualquier medida futura."
2. En su resolución 68/69, aprobada sin votación el 5 de diciembre de 2013, la Asamblea General, entre otras cosas, solicitó al Secretario General que continuara prestando la asistencia necesaria a los gobiernos depositarios de la Convención, que proporcionara los servicios que se requirieran para que se aplicaran las decisiones y recomendaciones de las conferencias de examen y que prestara la asistencia necesaria y proporcionara los servicios que se requirieran para las reuniones de expertos y las reuniones de los Estados partes durante el proceso entre períodos de sesiones de 2012-2015.

## II. Organización de la Reunión de Expertos

3. De conformidad con la decisión adoptada por la Séptima Conferencia de Examen y la Reunión de los Estados Partes de 2013, la Reunión de Expertos de 2014 se celebró del 4 al 8 de agosto de 2014 en el Palacio de las Naciones Unidas de Ginebra, bajo la

Presidencia del Embajador Urs Schmid, de Suiza, y con el apoyo del Embajador Mazlan Muhammad, de Malasia, y la Sra. Judit Körömi, Representante Especial del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Hungría para reducción de armamentos, desarme y no proliferación, como Vicepresidentes.

4. En su primera sesión, celebrada el 4 de agosto de 2014, la Reunión de Expertos aprobó, a propuesta del Presidente, su programa (BWC/MSP/2014/MX/1) y su programa de trabajo (BWC/MSP/2014/MX/2). El Presidente también señaló a la atención de las delegaciones cuatro documentos de antecedentes preparados por la Dependencia de Apoyo a la Aplicación (BWC/MSP/2014/MX/INF.1 y Add.1, BWC/MSP/2014/MX/INF.2, BWC/MSP/2014/MX/INF.3 y Corr.1 y BWC/MSP/2014/MX/INF.4).

5. En la misma sesión, a instancias del Presidente, la Reunión de Expertos hizo suyo, *mutatis mutandis*, el reglamento de la Séptima Conferencia de Examen, que figuraba en el anexo III del Documento Final de la Conferencia de Examen (BWC/CONF.VII/7).

6. Desempeñó las funciones de Secretaria de la Reunión de Expertos la Sra. Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, Jefa de la Subdivisión de Desarme Regional de la Oficina de Asuntos de Desarme en Nueva York. La Sra. Ngoc Phuong Van Der Blij, Oficial de Asuntos Políticos de la Dependencia de Apoyo a la Aplicación, desempeñó las funciones de Secretaria Adjunta. La Sra. Katherine Prizeman, Oficial Asociada de Asuntos Políticos de la Oficina de Asuntos de Desarme en Nueva York, prestó servicios en la secretaría.

### III. Participación en la Reunión de Expertos

7. Participaron en la Reunión de Expertos los 84 Estados partes en la Convención siguientes: Alemania, Arabia Saudita, Argelia, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrein, Belarús, Bélgica, Benin, Brasil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canadá, Chile, China, Chipre, Colombia, Cuba, Dinamarca, Ecuador, El Salvador, Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Eslovaquia, España, Estados Unidos de América, Estonia, Etiopía, Federación de Rusia, Filipinas, Finlandia, Francia, Gabón, Georgia, Grecia, Guatemala, Hungría, India, Indonesia, Irán (República Islámica del), Iraq, Irlanda, Italia, Japón, Jordania, Kenya, Kuwait, Letonia, Libia, Lituania, Madagascar, Malasia, Malta, Marruecos, México, Mongolia, Nigeria, Noruega, Nueva Zelanda, Omán, Países Bajos, Pakistán, Panamá, Perú, Polonia, Portugal, Qatar, Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte, República Checa, República de Corea, República Democrática Popular Lao, Santa Sede, Serbia, Singapur, Sri Lanka, Sudáfrica, Suecia, Suiza, Tailandia, Turquía, Ucrania, Uruguay, Venezuela (República Bolivariana de) y Yemen.

8. Además, conforme al artículo 44, párrafo 1, del reglamento, participaron en la Reunión de Expertos, sin tomar parte en la adopción de decisiones, cuatro Estados que habían firmado la Convención pero aún no la habían ratificado: Haití, Myanmar, Nepal y República Unida de Tanzania.

9. Dos Estados, Israel y Mauritania, que no son partes en la Convención ni signatarios de ella, participaron en la Reunión de Expertos en calidad de observadores, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 44, párrafo 2, del reglamento.

10. De conformidad con el artículo 44, párrafo 3, del reglamento, asistieron a la Reunión de Expertos las Naciones Unidas, con inclusión del Grupo de Expertos del Comité 1540 de las Naciones Unidas, el Instituto Interregional de las Naciones Unidas para Investigaciones sobre la Delincuencia y la Justicia (UNICRI), el Instituto de las Naciones Unidas de Investigación sobre el Desarme (UNIDIR), la Oficina de Coordinación de Asuntos Humanitarios de las Naciones Unidas (OCAH) y la Oficina de Asuntos de Desarme de las Naciones Unidas.

11. Con arreglo al artículo 44, párrafo 4, del reglamento, se concedió la condición de observadores para participar en la Reunión de Expertos al Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja (CICR), la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Alimentación y la Agricultura (FAO), la Organización Internacional de Policía Criminal (INTERPOL), la Organización Mundial de la Salud (OMS), la Organización Mundial de Sanidad Animal (OIE), la Organización para la Prohibición de las Armas Químicas (OPAQ) y la Unión Europea.

12. Además, a invitación del Presidente, teniendo en cuenta el carácter especial de los temas que se iban a tratar en la Reunión y sin crear un precedente, cuatro organizaciones y expertos científicos, profesionales, comerciales y académicos participaron, en calidad de invitados, en intercambios de información oficiosos durante las sesiones públicas de la Reunión de Expertos, a saber: Developing Countries Vaccine Manufacturers Network (DCVMN), Global Network of Science Academies (IAP), MIT Center for International Studies y Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO).

13. De conformidad con el artículo 44, párrafo 5, del reglamento, asistieron a la Reunión de Expertos 17 organizaciones no gubernamentales e institutos de investigación.

14. En el documento BWC/MSP/2014/MX/INF.6 figura una lista de todos los participantes en la Reunión de Expertos.

#### **IV. Trabajos de la Reunión de Expertos**

15. De conformidad con el programa de trabajo (BWC/MSP/2014/MX/2), la Reunión de Expertos escuchó las declaraciones introductorias de los 15 Estados partes siguientes: República Islámica del Irán en nombre del Grupo del Movimiento de los Países No Alineados y otros Estados, Pakistán, Indonesia, Brasil, Colombia, India, Kenya, Cuba, China, Federación de Rusia, Malasia, Argelia, Francia, Estados Unidos de América y México.

16. Entre el 4 y el 8 de agosto, la Reunión de Expertos celebró dos sesiones dedicadas a cada uno de los temas permanentes del programa, a saber: cooperación y asistencia, con especial hincapié en el fortalecimiento de la cooperación y asistencia en virtud del artículo X; examen de los adelantos en la esfera de la ciencia y la tecnología relacionados con la Convención; y fortalecimiento de la aplicación nacional (temas 5 a 7 del programa); y dos sesiones dedicadas al tema bienal, esto es, cómo fortalecer la aplicación del artículo VII, incluida la consideración de procedimientos y mecanismos detallados para la prestación de asistencia y la cooperación de los Estados partes (tema 8 del programa). Durante dichas sesiones, los Estados partes hicieron 100 ponencias o declaraciones, las organizaciones internacionales, 12, y los invitados de la Reunión, 4.

17. El Presidente, bajo su propia responsabilidad e iniciativa, preparó un documento que contenía una relación de las consideraciones, enseñanzas, perspectivas, recomendaciones, conclusiones y propuestas extraídas de las ponencias, las declaraciones, los documentos de trabajo y las intervenciones sobre los temas del programa examinados en la Reunión. La Reunión de Expertos señaló que dicho documento no había sido objeto de acuerdo ni tenía carácter oficial. A juicio del Presidente, el documento podía ayudar a las delegaciones en sus preparativos para la Reunión de los Estados Partes de diciembre de 2014 y en su examen de la manera idónea de "examinar y promover un entendimiento común y medidas eficaces sobre" los temas de conformidad con la decisión de la Séptima Conferencia de Examen. El documento preparado por el Presidente se adjunta como anexo I del presente informe (en inglés únicamente).

18. En el curso de su labor, la Reunión de Expertos utilizó varios documentos de trabajo presentados por los Estados partes y las organizaciones internacionales, así como

declaraciones y ponencias de los Estados partes, las organizaciones internacionales y los invitados de la Reunión, que se distribuyeron durante sus sesiones.

## **V. Documentación**

19. En el anexo II del presente informe figura una lista de los documentos oficiales de la Reunión de Expertos, incluidos los documentos de trabajo presentados por los Estados partes. Todos los documentos de esta lista pueden consultarse en el sitio web de la Dependencia de Apoyo a la Aplicación (<http://www.unog.ch/bwc>) y en el Sistema de Archivo de Documentos (ODS) de las Naciones Unidas, accesible en Internet en el sitio <http://documents.un.org>.

## **VI. Clausura de la Reunión de Expertos**

20. En la sesión de clausura, celebrada el 8 de agosto de 2014, la Reunión de Expertos señaló que el Presidente prepararía el programa provisional y el programa de trabajo para su aprobación y adopción en la Reunión de los Estados Partes que tendría lugar del 1 al 5 de diciembre de 2014.

21. En la misma sesión, la Reunión de Expertos aprobó por consenso su informe, contenido en los documentos BWC/MSP/2014/MX/CRP.1 a BWC/MSP/2014/MX/CRP.3, en su forma oralmente enmendada, que se publicaría con la signatura BWC/MSP/2014/MX/3.

## Anexo I

[Inglés únicamente]

**Considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions on the topics under discussion at the Meeting**

Note: the source is given using the following codes: P = presentation (with date); S = statement (with date); WP = working paper (with number). See also the list of abbreviations at the end of this annex.

**Agenda item 5: Standing agenda item: cooperation and assistance, with a particular focus on strengthening cooperation and assistance under Article X.**

**1. Challenges and obstacles to developing international cooperation, assistance and exchange in the biological sciences and technology, including equipment and material, for peaceful purposes to their full potential, and possible means of overcoming these**

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| Iran (NAM)        | ...we continue to believe that there is need for an effective mechanism to ensure the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X. In this regard, the Group has submitted a Working Paper on measures for full, effective and non-discriminatory Implementation of Article X last year that need to be considered further in the Meeting of Experts.  | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | The need to prevent harmful activities should never hamper scientific evolution for peaceful purposes and life-saving achievements like vaccine development. Developing countries, in particular, could benefit from advances in technologies that make vaccine production simpler, faster, cheaper and more efficient  | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | Imposing and/or maintaining unjustified restrictions contrary to the obligations under the Convention on the development of dual-use technology, materials and equipment needed to promote capacity building in the fields of sanitary control, detection, diagnosis and control of infectious diseases, including the production of some vaccines and other biological materials, should be considered a violation of Article X. | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Pakistan          | ...the potential dual-use nature of emerging technologies in itself should not be used as a pretext for proscribing or restricting their availability to developing countries for peaceful purposes.  | S 4/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
| Pakistan          | We note with concern that there continue to exist undue restrictions and challenges for the full and effective implementation of Article X. Pakistan firmly believes that the dual-use nature of emerging technologies in itself should not be used as a pretext for proscribing or restricting their availability to developing countries for peaceful purposes, which are duly permitted under the Convention.   | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| Brazil            | ...the issue of compulsory licensing is not under the mandate of the BWC.  | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Brazil            | ...the balance between security concerns and access to technological advancement is an issue to be carefully considered. Countries possessing more advanced technology in biosciences should not hinder the access by developing countries to these technologies.  | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Brazil            | ...placing restrictions on the development of dual-use technology, materials and equipment needed to promote capacity building in the fields of sanitary control, detection, diagnosis and control of infectious diseases, including the production of some vaccines and other biological materials, should be considered a violation of Article X.  | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Brazil            | Brazil also has strong reservations with regard to the establishment of informal arrangements aimed at controlling exports of biological agents of dual-use. We fear that, given the dual-use nature of most items submitted to controls, these arrangements may hinder the fullest possible exchange of equipment and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, in violation of Article X. Tighter controls over sensitive goods and technologies must be complemented by provisions on cooperation, so that the pursuit of security goals will not hamper legitimate rights to technical and scientific development. | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| India             | ...there should be no hindrance to peaceful activities, such as vaccine development, which are important for developing countries for meeting their public health needs.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Cuba              | Developed countries should promote international cooperation for the benefit of developing countries and eliminate restrictions on the free exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Avoiding obstacles that hinder economic and technological development is an obligation of States Parties.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | While taking note of the report of the ISU on the low rate of submissions from States Parties to the database, NAM reiterates that the database was established to facilitate requests for and offers of exchange of assistance and cooperation among States Parties. In this regard while NAM encourages all States Parties to use this system, underlines that such system shall not justify in any way delaying full and effective implementation of Article X by States Parties.   | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | ... one of the main challenges for the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X is the existence of unjustified restrictions and or limitations, including the politically motivated ones, imposed against States Parties in contravention of  | S 5/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i>  | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|--------------------|---|---------------|
|                    | the provisions and inconsistent with the spirit of the Convention. There is an urgent need for the removal of any such restrictions.  |               |
| Iran (NAM)         | States Parties should work together to develop procedures to promote the full, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X and develop procedures for the settlement of disputes arising from concerns about the implementation of Article X.   | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| Ecuador            | The implementation of Article X should not be subject to pre-conditions or informal arrangements of export control of dual-use biological agents, because that could hinder the most complete exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, which are an entitlement of all countries and that is the <i>raison d'être</i> of Article X. The legitimate security objectives and the need for more stringent controls on substances and sensitive technology must be complemented through higher provisions and enhanced cooperation, so that the legitimate right of countries to scientific and technological development is not impeded.  | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| Cuba               | Our country does not favour the establishment of export controls and unilateral, discriminatory and selective transfer controls outside the framework the Convention.   | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| United States      | If the intersessional process is to improve international cooperation, it is vitally important to have information about how States Parties are implementing their obligations and about the specific challenges and issues they have observed.   | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| United States      | Article X is non-discriminatory: there are no groups of States Parties with special responsibility, and none that are excused from their responsibilities.  | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| United States      | Exchange could be improved. And there are steps that can and should be taken by developed and developing Parties alike. Some of the principal challenges and obstacles include: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Lack of specific information about needs and capacity gaps: it is difficult to collaborate to address needs and gaps without knowing what they are.</li> <li>2. A range of barriers to trade and investment, including excessive import duties on pharmaceuticals – identified by the World Health Organization as a concern – lack of enforcement of intellectual property rights, which discourages investment, and arbitrary, non-science based barriers to biotechnology-based trade and investment.</li> </ol> | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| United States      | The export control measures required to implement Article III of the Convention, however, do not constitute a meaningful impediment to exchange for peaceful purposes.  | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| Russian Federation | The activities of States Parties to the Convention in transferring knowledge, information, technology, materials, and equipment designed for combating infectious diseases should be open and transparent, independent of the sources of the financing of the activities. The Russian Federation is in favour of the need to provide full information on such work, including on the goals, purposes, design and results of the work of donor countries in providing assistance to enhance the capacity of laboratory services  | S 5/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i>          | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|----------------------------|---|---------------|
|                            | of other countries. We believe it is necessary to avoid ambiguity of assistance when as technical assistance, a country sends resources which are designed for goals other than those announced. Assistance must be open and honest.  |               |
| BIO                        | Harmonization of regulatory standards – emergency use authorization mechanisms do not exist in most countries, limiting access to available countermeasures.  | S 5/8<br>PM   |
| India                      | ...difficulties continue to exist in accessing advanced technologies for application in peaceful uses, for example, in obtaining equipment for high containment laboratories, training opportunities in high containment laboratories, obtaining clinical samples from developed countries and complex visa procedures for scientists which hinders timely and regular collaboration in areas of common interest to the scientific community.   | S 5/8<br>PM   |
| India                      | Further, developing countries are compelled to obtain vaccines developed by using samples obtained from them at high prices from the developed countries. There are instances where we find that there are not adequate or equitable benefits from international cooperation even in cases where samples are taken from developing countries. There is need for more mutuality of benefit from international cooperation keeping in mind the need for ensuring appropriate and affordable support for the needs of developing countries.                    | S 5/8<br>PM   |
| India                      | We are not convinced of the need to bring issues on which other organisations, such WHO, WIPO or WTO have the relevant mandate into BWC. The developing countries need to meet their needs for cost-effective, affordable and quality assured medicines and vaccines including through provisions such as compulsory licensing or price controls. Bringing issues of patents into the BWC gives the impression that additional obstacles or sought to be created regarding international cooperation and assistance in peaceful uses of biological science. | S 5/8<br>PM   |
| Iran (NAM)                 | States Parties should undertake all efforts to prevent actions and decisions within the BWC that would raise obstacles to the development of biological sciences in developing countries. The need to prevent harmful activities should never hamper scientific evolution for peaceful purposes and life-saving achievements like vaccine development.  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (Islamic Republic of) | States Parties should undertake all efforts to prevent actions and decisions within the BWC that would raise obstacles to the development of biological sciences in developing countries. The need to prevent harmful activities should never hamper scientific evolution for peaceful purposes and life-saving achievements like vaccine development.  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (Islamic Republic of) | Any attempt to establish preconditions to the implementation of Article X and/or link its implementation to strengthening Article III is unacceptable. Full and effective implementation of Article X will strengthen the whole convention. All States Parties, in particular developed countries, should develop necessary laws and regulations for full and effective implementation of Article X in which, all restrictions and limitations on cooperation and assistance are  | S 6/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i>          | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|----------------------------|---|---------------|
|                            | removed, and international cooperation, assistance and exchange under this Article are facilitated.   |               |
| Iran (Islamic Republic of) | The established Database to facilitate requests for and offers of exchange of assistance and cooperation is not a substitute for the commitments and obligations of States Parties under Article X and in no way shall justify delaying the full and effective implementation of Article X by States Parties. To this end, we need a comprehensive mechanism for full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X as proposed by NAM. | S 6/8<br>AM   |

**2. A range of specific measures for the full and comprehensive implementation of Article X taking into account all of its provisions, including facilitation of cooperation and assistance, including in terms of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, and identification of critical gaps and needs in these areas**

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| Iran (NAM)        | The enhancement of international cooperation for the use of biological agents for peaceful purposes is an essential part of compliance with the Convention and is crucial for the realization of the purpose and objective of the Convention.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Brazil            | ...international cooperation serves as an incentive for more States to adhere to the BWC and to guarantee biological substances will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Brazil            | Brazil does not accept any attempt to establish preconditions to the implementation of Article X. For that reason, we have reservations to concepts such as 'facilitating implementation of Article X by strengthening implementation of Article III' or 'balance implementation of Article X and Article III of the Convention'.                               | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| India             | We believe that strengthened implementation of Article III would ensure that the cooperation envisaged under Article X is not abused.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Cuba              | The full implementation of international cooperation, without conditions or unjustified restrictions as applied to Cuba, is a must. Creating a mechanism for reporting and resolving such restrictions would be a specific measure to take one more step in the still distant full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X.               | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Malaysia          | Malaysia firmly believes that Article VII and Article X of the Convention can be implemented in such a way allowing States to undertake, facilitate and participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, scientific and technological information and at the same time ensure efficient mobilization and maximum utilization of resources. | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| European Union    | ... facilitating exchange in biological sciences and technology, including equipment and material for peaceful purposes, is a legitimate goal under the BTWC. However, in accordance with Article III, appropriate technology transfer controls are necessary in  | S 4/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
|                   | order to prevent deliberate or inadvertent transfers of technology to States or non-state actors for purposes prohibited under Article I. They contribute to the confidence in compliance by all parties involved and, as a result, help to promote trade, and scientific and technological assistance and exchanges under Article X.   |               |
| Iran (NAM)        | NAM and Other States Parties to the BWC therefore reiterate their firm position on the need for an effective mechanism to ensure the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the Article X. Such a mechanism will address various issues which are pertinent to the sub-agenda items being discussed in the standing agenda item of cooperation and assistance.  | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| Mexico            | ...it is necessary to evaluate existing cooperation and assistance activities and check them against requests for assistance from States. The aim is to reconcile supply and demand for technical assistance.   | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| Cuba              | For Cuba it is unacceptable for the implementation of Article X of the Convention to be conditional on strengthening the implementation of Article III.   | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| Cuba              | Cuba, along with other NAM members and other States Parties to the Convention, supports resuming negotiations on a legally binding and multilaterally negotiated protocol to include the basic pillars of the Convention, among them assistance and cooperation.  | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| Switzerland       | Article X and national implementation are inextricably linked. National implementation of obligations under the BWC – in particular the adoption of necessary national legislations – is an important prerequisite for cooperation and assistance under Article X to move beyond implementation support. A strong commitment by the recipient State to implement the provisions of the BWC at the national level and to develop the necessary national framework to this effect, constitutes the basis upon which further cooperation and assistance can be envisaged. Accordingly, the provision of assistance in the area of national implementation, and legislation in particular, may in many instances represent an initial priority. | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| United States     | Consideration of Article X reports submitted by States Parties should be at the heart of our intersessional discussions under this agenda item. To date, a very small number of States Parties have submitted these reports. We urge more Parties to submit such reports: concrete information will facilitate our work.  | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| United States     | Article X embodies an international commitment to partnership, sharing of information, and the development of mutually beneficial outcomes. Capacity-building and other forms of government-to-government assistance are part of this commitment, but only a small part of a much wider undertaking.  | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| United States     | ...the principle of 'open access'... substantially reduces barriers to access that may be posed by the costs of subscriptions to scientific journals.   | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| United States     | Lowering the cost of medicines and medical devices through substantial reduction or elimination of import tariffs improves access to medicines and medical products that are needed to treat a  | S 5/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i>  | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|--|---|---------------|
|  | wide variety of diseases effectively and ensure that these goods reach patients.  |               |
| United States  | Sometimes overlooked is the undertaking in Article X for Parties “in a position to do so” to contribute to the further development and application of the life sciences. The United States is a world leader in life sciences research and development, accounting for up to one-third of global investment in life sciences R&D.   | INF.5         |
| Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, and United States | By providing enhanced confidence that such exchange will be used for exclusively peaceful purposes, export controls serve to reduce levels of concern and enhance international exchange of life-science related knowledge, equipment, and materials.   | WP.8/ Rev.1   |
| Russian Federation   | The Russian delegation continues to call for a discussion of the need to develop clear criteria for providing assistance in the framework of the BWC. This is very important from the point of view of strengthening the regime of the Convention and not allowing substitution of it by other mechanisms which fall within the competence of other organizations. We should not forget that the main goal of the BWC is to prevent the use of pathogens as weapons.  | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| Canada   | Canada believes that the database can be a valuable tool for improving cooperation efforts among BTWC States Parties, and we encourage its continued and expanded use.  | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| India  | The cooperation and assistance database established in pursuance of the decision of the 7th Review Conference could be utilized for targeting resources by States Parties offering assistance and cooperation by making concrete offers in areas directly relevant to the Convention. While there is a correlation between public health and security, the BWC deals with a specific aspect of disease and a loss of focus in this regard could affect developing concrete action in dealing with issue of direct relevance to BWC.               | S 5/8<br>PM   |
| India  | Further, in the BWC there is a need for systematic and long-term provision of cooperation and assistance to generate equitable benefits for States Parties. Additional conditions should not be imposed on recipient countries for provision of such cooperation and assistance. In this context, India associates itself with NAM’s proposal for the establishment of a mechanism, for full and effective implementation of Article X.   | S 5/8<br>PM   |
| China  | To promote international cooperation in the peaceful use of biotechnology, as an important pillar of the Convention, facilitates the compliance capacity of States Parties and the healthy and sustainable development of the convention. China calls on the States Parties to actively implement Article X, by giving full consideration to the reasonable need of developing countries for bioscience, materials and equipment, and further explore ideas and measures of international cooperation, to truly benefit the developing countries. | S 4/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| China             | Relevant countries should not link Article III with Article X of the Convention   | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| Pakistan          | Pakistan reiterates the urgent need to develop an effective mechanism to ensure the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X.   | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| United Kingdom    | Article X reflects a basic objective of the Convention, to turn scientific endeavours towards peaceful pursuits, and includes the key obligation that the Convention should be implemented in a manner that does not hamper peaceful activities: it does not call for, nor does it require any additional mechanism to mediate or promote what is already happening in other fora and will continue.  | S 5/8<br>PM   |
| United Kingdom    | ... there is no such thing as a one-off state of ‘full implementation’ – progress and assistance are subject to a continuing process given the nature of scientific and technological development and the evolving nature of the threat posed by pathogens and toxins.  | S 5/8<br>PM   |
| United Kingdom    | We continue to see no need for any sort of Article X implementation mechanism as characterised in the various more or less identical Working Papers and statements that we have been seeing from some States Parties since 2006. Such a mechanism would likely duplicate, undermine or interfere with the very broad range of activities and programmes conducted by governments, academia, industry, inter-governmental organisations and other entities.  | S 5/8<br>PM   |
| United Kingdom    | Thus far ... only two States Parties have made requests for assistance in the three years after the launch of the [assistance and cooperation] database and, as far as we are aware, there has been little direct response to the much longer list of offers of assistance; this demonstrates to us that demands for an Article X implementation mechanism are largely political in nature rather than reflection of a real need. Experts on the ground are much more likely to avail themselves of assistance and cooperation run by the likes of the WHO, OIE and FAO to assist with capacity building for preventing and responding to disease outbreaks, as well as through the diverse and extensive bilateral assistance or other multilateral programmes, such as the Global Partnership, that are available in their fields. Article X and the BTWC simply do not appear on their radar when it comes to obtaining technical assistance or finding opportunities for collaborative programmes and projects. And that is how it should be. | S 5/8<br>PM   |
| United Kingdom    | We should instead be concentrating our efforts on how best the BTWC intersessional process can help publicise and facilitate efforts elsewhere that are relevant to Article X. The Convention must serve as an adjunct to those efforts, not as a replacement or rival, and should not hamper activities aimed at the prevention of infectious disease or for other peaceful purposes by introducing an additional and unnecessary process. Continued calls for an Article X implementation mechanism are a distraction from the sort of concrete and focussed efforts that would be of much more benefit to the implementation of Article X.   | S 5/8<br>PM   |

**3. Ways and means to target and mobilize resources, including financial resources, to address gaps and needs for assistance and cooperation, in particular from developed to developing States Parties, and from international and regional organizations and other relevant stakeholders**

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| Iran (NAM)        | Effective international action against biological threats needs to be universal, legally binding and non-discriminatory. In addition, this cannot be achieved without strengthening national capacity.  | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | The submission of clear, specific, and timely national reports on implementation of Article X as agreed at the Seventh Review Conference and also for effective utilisation of the electronic database for international cooperation in the context of Article X of the Convention is essential.  | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| Mexico            | ...it is important to stress that resources for cooperation are not confined to the financial, and in that sense, the exchange of information, experiences, lessons learned, best practices, education and exchange of technical knowledge must be a necessary complement to the assistance schemes in traditional formats for triangular or South-South cooperation, and it is necessary to ensure the sustainability of international cooperation projects.   | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| Switzerland       | ...exploring more effective means of bringing assistance offers to the attention of potentially interested States Parties.  | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| Switzerland       | ...substantial commitments as well as transparency of needs, challenges and implementation achievements on the part of recipient countries constitute a key prerequisite for any kind of successful cooperation.  | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| United States     | In fact, most of the exchanges of life-science related knowledge, materials and equipment around the world are not conducted by governments. The flows generated by industry, academia, and other groups substantially outweigh direct government activity not only in the US but globally. This fact helps explain why Article X speaks of our obligation to “facilitate,” rather than “conduct.”  | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| United States     | We generate both supply and demand in the applied life sciences, contributing both to the technological and the economic development of other Parties. Our commitment to free and fair trade directly promotes exchange under Article X.  | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| United States     | The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) provided more than \$50 million in cooperation with WHO to strengthen the ability of developing countries to sustainably produce influenza vaccines, potentially reducing the global threat of influenza pandemics. In addition, BARDA provided over \$20 million to support vaccine adjuvant technology transfer, biomanufacturing workforce training, and clinical trial and manufacturing technical support to developing country influenza vaccine manufacturers. | INF. 5        |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
| United States     | BARDA has also successfully established public-private partnerships with industry partners to develop novel antibiotics, including a five-year, \$200 million agreement with GlaxoSmithKline, designed to support the development of an entire portfolio of candidate antibiotic therapies.  | INF. 5        |
| BIO               | Austere budgetary environment and competing priorities make it difficult for individual countries to have robust stockpiles. Better suited for regional stockpiling model.   | S 5/8<br>PM   |
| Pakistan          | ...the only credible and sustainable method of strengthening the Convention is through multilateral negotiations aimed at concluding a non-discriminatory, legally binding agreement, including on verification provisions, dealing with all the Articles of the Convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner.  | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| United States     | ...in FY12, the US government spent approximately \$ 8.8 billion (estimated) in the Global Health Initiative alone, with an estimated \$1-2 billion in additional global-health related funding in other initiatives and mechanisms. The United States is a major contributor to the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, the WHO, and the Global Access to Vaccines Initiative Alliance. The U.S. Government's financial and technical contributions significantly improve and expand sustainable health systems and support the goal of a world safe and secure from emerging infectious disease threats. In 2014, the US government further pledged to work in partnership with at least thirty other countries, encompassing four billion people worldwide, in the next five years, to improve the prevention, detection and response to infectious disease threats. | INF. 5        |

#### **4. Education, training, exchange and twinning programmes and other means of developing human resources in the biological sciences and technology relevant to the implementation of the Convention, particularly in developing countries**

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| Pakistan          | The threats posed by the dual-use nature of biotechnology are real and cannot be over-stated. We are witnessing the growing marginalization of the need to possess real scientific knowledge or "tacit knowledge" due to easy access to wide-ranging scientific information on the internet. Also, the rapid advances in enabling technologies continue to decrease costs of performing scientific and procedures. In the backdrop of these latest developments and trends, the need to conclude a non-discriminatory, legally binding agreement on verification provisions, is therefore, ever-pressing and necessary. | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Kenya             | There is need for the... creation of linkages between universities with curriculum on biosecurity with those who do not have.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| Kenya             | There is need for ... continuous training on biosecurity and biosafety.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | NAM has already expressed its views in previous meetings on promotion of international cooperation in this field, which could contribute to full and effective implementation of Article X. Briefly, some of the tasks identified in that Working Paper are as follows:<br><br>(i) Identify and address the needs in terms of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information regarding the use of the bacteriological and toxin agents for peaceful purposes;<br><br>(ii) Identify and overcome the obstacles hampering the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X of the Convention, including by addressing the denial cases of States Parties;<br><br>(iii) Mobilize the necessary resources, including financial resources, to facilitate the widest possible exchange of equipment, material, and scientific and technological information regarding the use of biological and toxin agents for peaceful purposes, in particular from developed to developing States Parties;<br><br>(iv) Facilitate the development of human resources in developing States Parties in the implementation of the Convention, taking into account the special situation faced by them;<br><br>(v) Coordinate cooperation with other relevant international and regional organizations for financial and technological support of activities for the use of biological and toxin agents for peaceful purposes. | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| China             | States Parties should strengthen exchange and cooperation by hosting training programs, making study tours, holding workshops and exchanging students in areas such as national implementation, bioscience and technology and biosafety management, training personnel for implementation of the Convention, and sharing views and experience in research, biosafety management and so on.  | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| United States     | In February 2013 the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy directed all federal agencies to make the published results of federally funded research freely available within one year of initial publication. This substantially reduces barriers to access posed by the costs of subscriptions to scientific journals.  | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| United States     | American colleges and universities engage in joint research collaborations with colleagues across the globe, and educate many of the world's emerging scientists. In 2012, there were more than 163,000 foreign graduate students enrolled in science and engineering studies in U.S. universities. A growing number of major U.S. institutions are also making undergraduate and even some graduate courses freely available online.   | INF. 5        |
| United States     | The U.S. CDC Field Epidemiology (and Laboratory) Training Programs (FELTP), established in 1980 have helped launch more than 50 programs around the world and produced more than 3,000 graduates. CDC currently supports workforce development through  | INF. 5        |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
|                   | FELTPs in 46 countries, which are designed to build human capacity to characterize disease burden, respond to outbreaks, provide diagnostic capacity, and address locally-identified public health challenges. From 2009-2012, CDC-supported FELTP residents responded to over 1100 outbreaks and conducted 606 planned studies and 1268 surveillance assessments. Through these activities, FELTP residents and graduates strengthen critical public health systems, improve the effectiveness of key public health programs, and address their countries' public health priorities.   |               |
| United States     | The U.S. Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) in the Department of Health and Human Services engages with international partners to create an all-hazards approach to improve our collective capabilities to deal with public health emergencies including those that arise from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats, outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases, and natural disasters. The ASPR leads international programs, initiatives and policies to strengthen domestic and international public health and medical emergency preparedness and response, including coordinating efforts to rapidly exchange information and biological materials during acute public health emergencies. | INF. 5        |

**5. Capacity-building, through international cooperation, in biosafety and biosecurity, and for detecting, reporting, and responding to outbreaks of infectious disease or biological weapons attacks, including in the areas of preparedness, response, and crisis management and mitigation**

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| Pakistan          | ...reiterates the urgent need to develop an effective mechanism to ensure the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X.   | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| Indonesia         | Indonesia calls on the need for strengthening not only national, but also regional and international capacity to respond to the alleged use of biological weapons and in disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and preparedness as well as public health systems, including science and technology transfer. | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Kenya             | There is need for the ... provision of equipment for emergency response in case of suspected biological weapons attack.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Kenya             | There is need for ... strengthening disease surveillance divisions at regional, national and county levels.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | The developed countries bear special responsibility to promote international cooperation in the framework of the Convention for the benefit of developing countries and to remove and avoid all restrictions that are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention.  | S 5/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| Iran (NAM)        | The NAM and Other States Parties also attach importance to promoting South-South cooperation in the field of capacity building.   | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | NAM has already proposed measures to facilitate capacity building in our previous meeting which are still valid and relevant ... These measures are as follows:<br><br>(a) Identifying and addressing the need for, and facilitating the exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the use of biological agents for peaceful purposes, particularly to developing countries;<br><br>(b) Supporting states especially developing countries in building defences against new and emerging diseases and developing national capacity for responding to biological threats through detection, containment, and decontamination;<br><br>(c) Promoting interagency coordination and multi-sectoral cooperation to prepare for, detect, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks whether natural, accidental, or deliberate in nature;<br><br>(d) Developing and implementing appropriate, sustainable and effective laboratory safety and security measures, through international cooperation and assistance on exchange of the new technologies, training materials and resources..   | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | NAM and Other States Parties believe that exchanges in education and training are of fundamental importance for the development of human resources in the field of biological sciences. In this regard the following measures need to be taken:<br><br>• First, developed countries should provide full access to students, scientists and other personnel from developing countries to their universities, advanced laboratories, research institutions, production facilities etc and remove any unjustified restrictions or limitations contrary to the Convention in this regard such as through restrictive visa regimes.<br><br>• Second, it is important that access is given to developing countries in institutions of higher learning and those with cutting edge technology. For example, developing countries should be given opportunities for training in advanced laboratories. This is important for them to keep pace with new S&T developments and would help them build defences against diseases, whether naturally occurring or deliberate.<br><br>• Third, the sharing of results of advanced research in life sciences is especially important for the scientists, engineers, students and teachers in developing countries to take full advantage of new developments in biological sciences and technology. There is scope for further work in BWC on this issue with the aim of evolving institutional measures.<br><br>• Fourth, twinning programmes could be especially useful in capacity building and sharing of advanced expertise in developing countries and in improving global capacity for disease detection and control. | S 5/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| Iran (NAM)        | From a humanitarian point of view, it is essential that developing countries receive full and timely cooperation and assistance in the form of medicines, vaccines, diagnostics and related equipment and materials for peaceful purposes as enshrined in Article X.  | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| BIO               | Product Development is critical to create the infrastructure necessary to implement Article X.  | P 5/8<br>PM   |
| China             | States Parties should strengthen information exchange related to advancement of bioscience and technology, sharing the new achievements in this regard, notifying each other about the developments which might pose potential threats, and enhancing screening and monitoring relatively. It is also important to improve existing notification mechanisms on disease outbreaks and strengthen the information sharing in counter-bioterrorism and other biosafety issues. | S 5/8<br>PM   |
| China             | States Parties should promote biotechnology exchange and cooperation, through joint research, technology transfer and other forms, especially by transferring technology and equipment to developing countries to enhance their capacity on response to disease outbreaks, biosafety and health care, and by removing the export restrictions against the objectives of international cooperation.  | S 5/8<br>PM   |
| Canada            | Canada outlined Article X international assistance activities undertaken by its Global Partnership Program in West Africa, South-East Asia and the Middle East, and noted that additional Article X assistance and cooperation was being provided through other government channels as well.<br><br>We call upon interested States Parties that are interested in receiving or learning more about such assistance to approach Canada's Global Partnership Program.         | S 5/8<br>PM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | ...the Group stresses the importance of the adoption of a plan for active and fullest exchange of knowledge and technology in areas related to enabling and new technologies between developed and developing countries to ensure the unhindered flow of scientific information and technology.   | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | ...the Group stresses the importance of the adoption of a plan for active and fullest exchange of knowledge and technology in areas related to enabling and new technologies between developed and developing countries to ensure the unhindered flow of scientific information and technology.   | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | ...achieving necessary standards in the fields of biosafety and biosecurity requires capacity building, and is facilitated by international cooperation and through strengthened full and effective implementation of Article X of the Convention   | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Cuba              | Cuba emphasises the importance of building capacity through international cooperation in responses to outbreaks of infectious diseases in connection with biological weapons.   | S 6/8<br>PM   |
| United Kingdom    | ...national, regional and international efforts relevant to Article X seeking to improve further national and regional capabilities for infectious disease control will also help make Article VII more effective   | WP.1          |

| <i>Delegation</i>  | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|--|--|---------------|
| Australia,<br>Japan,<br>Malaysia,<br>Republic of<br>Korea,<br>Thailand | Effective implementation of the BWC includes, but is not limited to, effective national legislation, domestic biosecurity regulations and capabilities and export controls on sensitive materials (in some cases, developed through bilateral and regional cooperative efforts). These measures can all work in a complementary manner to enhance biological security globally, reduce the possibility of BW proliferation, and raise barriers to bioterrorism. These measures can also help to improve detection and response capabilities for natural or deliberate disease outbreaks, and facilitate exchange in the life sciences for peaceful purposes.   | WP.1<br>1     |
| United<br>States   | Fewer than 20 percent of countries report that they are adequately prepared to effectively detect, respond, or prevent global health threats caused by emerging diseases. The Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), launched in February 2014 with the support of twenty-nine countries, is framed around three primary strategies: 1) enhanced prevention of infectious disease threats, both naturally occurring and man-made; 2) more robust detection, including through real-time bio-surveillance and more effective diagnostics; and 3) more effective response, including through emergency operation centers with common standards. The GHSA vision is for all people in all countries to be effectively protected against threats posed by infectious disease, whether natural, accidental, or deliberate. Global health security must be addressed as one problem, not as a separate set of problems. We need to work seamlessly across health, security, agriculture, many other sectors, and across the globe, to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats. | INF. 5        |

## 6. Coordination of cooperation with other relevant international and regional organizations, and other relevant stakeholders

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
| Iran (NAM)        | ... we believe that the respective mandates of this Convention and other international organizations should be respected, while utilizing the experiences of the relevant multilateral organizations dealing with human and animal health on issues that are of direct relevance to the Convention. In this regard, no actions should be taken to undermine the Convention and/or interfere with its mandate.  | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Indonesia         | Indonesia notes the importance of the role played by relevant international organizations such as the World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization and World Organization for Animal Health in close cooperation and coordination with States Parties in the provision of assistance and coordination for the surveillance detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases including in cases of emergencies of international concern. | S 4/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i>  | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|--------------------|--|---------------|
| Iran (NAM)         | NAM and Other States Parties believe that relevant international and regional organizations such as WHO and OIE play an important role in disease surveillance, prevention, detection and response and there is merit in coordination of cooperation with them in accordance with their respective mandates. However, the unique role of BWC, as a Convention which deals with security related issues, needs to be recognized and further efforts should be made for full and effective implementation of Article X within the Convention itself.   | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| Mexico             | Mexico desires to increase synergies between the BWC and the World Health Organization (WHO), with the objective to leverage the expertise of that organization.   | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| Russian Federation | It is necessary to strengthen the role of the Convention as a coordinator of BWC relevant assistance which is provided in other formats. This Convention is the only legitimate multilateral mechanism for preventing the development and production of biological and toxin weapons. In connection with this, efforts for providing assistance to countries in need in applying information, technology, materials and equipment under Article X, but which is initiated in other formats, such as the Global Partnership, must be agreed upon and closely coordinated with the BWC. Moreover, such initiatives must be focused not on themselves but on the Convention and on strengthening the central role of the Convention in the architecture of global efforts to ban biological weapons | S 5/8<br>AM   |

**Agenda item 6: Standing agenda item: Review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention (focusing in 2014 on advances in the understanding of pathogenicity, virulence, toxicology, immunology and related issues)**

**1. New science and technology developments that have potential for uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention**

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
| Pakistan          | Pakistan is concerned about some new developments in Science and Technology that have the potential for uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Pakistan          | The recent advances in synthetic biology raise immediate concerns related to ethics, safety and security. In this regard, States should employ utmost transparency and confidence building measures during all their activities related to Synthetic biology. There is also a need for strict regulation on the development of synthetic biology, to ensure that it does not lead to any concerns related to safety and security as well as incidents of proliferation that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. | S 6/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i>          | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|----------------------------|---|---------------|
| Pakistan                   | There is also an urgent need to strictly regulate the industry and various laboratories including in the public and private sector, in the wake of various reports concerning experiments that have been taking place, with highly contagious, virulent flu strains like H5N1, motivated mainly by commercial interests. Similar reports have also come to light about lapses in bio-security practices.  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Pakistan                   | We firmly believe that the potential dual-use nature of emerging technologies in itself should not be used as a pretext for proscribing or restricting their availability to developing countries for peaceful purposes.  | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Pakistan                   | The threats posed by the dual-use nature of biotechnology are real and hence cannot be over-stated. We are witnessing the growing marginalization of the need to possess real scientific knowledge or “tacit knowledge” due to easy access to wide-ranging scientific information on the internet. Also, the rapid advances in enabling technologies continue to decrease costs of performing scientific experiments and procedures. In the backdrop of these latest developments and trends, the need to conclude a non-discriminatory, legally binding agreement on verification provisions, is therefore, ever-pressing and necessary.   | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)                 | ...recent advances demonstrating the increasing sophistication of synthetic biology, together with other enabling technologies, which have benefits, together with the potential for uses contrary to provisions of the Convention. All States must conduct such activities in a transparent manner, in order to build the confidence of other States Parties.  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)                 | Concerning the dual use nature of some of the new technologies, the Group is aware that due to the dual use nature of some of the new technologies, there is a potential for uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention including by programming cells to produce toxins, viruses or other cells which could cause harm, designing and building new or altered pathogenic viruses, the ability to confer mammalian transmissibility to viruses or drug resistance to pathogens, the decreasing genetic diversity and the development of incapacitating weapons and the increasing capacity to deliver biological weapons via the alimentary route.   | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (Islamic Republic of) | The new trend namely ‘the growing tacit knowledge requirement for life science work’ is alarming. This trend will make new restrictions and limitations in full transparency in scientific publications and exchange of knowledge within scientific community and make additional costs for developing countries in reproducing research. Proposals such as research collaborations are neither inclusive nor comprehensive and may lead to further gap and inequality among developed and developing countries in terms of infrastructure and technology. To remove this concern, we need to develop an action plan in which States Parties in particular developed countries facilitate international cooperation and ensure the unhindered flow of scientific information, knowledge and technology through removing restrictions and limitations. | S 6/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i>  | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|--------------------|--|---------------|
| Sweden             | Botulinum toxin – Benefits and risks (of increased knowledge)<br>(a) Know-how<br>(b) Non-licensed production<br>(c) Black-market sale<br>(d) Dual-use research of concern  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Russian Federation | The results of a range of current molecular microbiology research into the pathogens of human, animal and plant infectious diseases demonstrate that these can indeed be used for purposes which run counter to the Convention.  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Russian Federation | An analysis of recently published papers demonstrates that the most sensitive dual use bioresearch is being conducted in the following areas: firstly, multi-drug resistance and resistance to anti-microbials, secondly, pathogenicity of microorganisms; thirdly, genes of virulence; followed by studies into strain selection which change the characteristics of that strain and/or increase its pathogenicity; and lastly studies in the sphere of immunity resistant strains. | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Russian Federation | ...it is clear that the existing technological prospects for synthetic biology represent a great interest for those forces that would potentially want to wilfully use pathogenic biological agents.   | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Russian Federation | A free interpretation of the provisions of the BWC could open up loopholes for marginal scientific research or developments under cover of combating of infectious diseases. As a result, new microorganisms would appear with altered characteristics and there would be an increased risk that they could be used as biological weapons. Research from recent years demonstrates this.   | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Kenneth Oye        | Gene Drives<br>Security Issues:<br>(a) Gain-of-function enabling ability to host diseases<br>(b) Suppression of crops and livestock in traditional agriculture<br>(c) Suppression of pollinators and other keystone species<br>(d) Immunization drives may protect self and allies from effects<br>(e) Reversal drives may be withheld for economic or political gain<br>(f) Security implications uncertain – not ingenuity and creativity  | P 6/8<br>PM   |
| Cuba               | The dual use nature of new discoveries in science and technology should not be used as a pretext to stand in the way of exchange of information, cooperation between States Parties, both developed and developing, in this regard we fail to reduce the growing gap in areas of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related spheres.   | S 6/8<br>PM   |
| Nepal              | The dual-use nature of the synthetic biology products and the risk of these products falling in the wrong hands are always a big challenge and a lurking threat.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
| United States     | A capability to make predictions about the outcomes of host-pathogen interactions is inherently dual use knowledge... a predictive capability could theoretically be applied to the design of more virulent pathogens. While the topic of “designer pathogens” is disquieting, it is important to note that there are significant knowledge gaps – as well as technical hurdles – to their production.   | WP.2          |
| United States     | While the genomes of many pathogens have been sequenced, the functions of individual genes are frequently unknown or incompletely understood – though continued research is expected to fill these knowledge gaps over time.   | WP.2          |
| United Kingdom    | Knowledge gained through research on host-pathogen interactions and mechanisms used to overcome the host immune response could also be exploited for harmful purposes, for example in designing novel biological weapons agents or engineering existing agents to increase their suitability for biological weapons use. ...., for example, increased capacity to manipulate pathogenicity, host specificity, transmissibility, resistance to drugs, or ability to overcome host immunity. | WP.4          |

## 2. New science and technology developments that have potential benefits for the Convention, including those of special relevance to disease surveillance, diagnosis and mitigation

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| Pakistan          | Pakistan would like to highlight that the potential for uses contrary to the convention, due to the dual-use nature of certain new technologies in the life sciences, should not in any way impede the free exchange of information and technology between the Member States for peaceful purposes, especially towards the developing States Parties.   | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Pakistan          | The measures to contain biological risks should be proportional to the assessed risk and should not in any way obstruct the legitimate activities for the prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Pakistan          | The developing countries are faced with distinct challenges and requirements in respect of improving their public health care systems and building their capacity to diagnose and treat diseases. In this regard, developing countries could benefit from advances in technologies that make vaccine and drug production simpler, faster, cheaper and more efficient.                                     | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | ...the rapid pace of developments in biological science and technology has implications for the implementation of the BWC, both in terms of S&T advances which can be used for purposes contrary to the objectives of the Convention and S&T advances which could be of special relevance for the implementation of the Convention as well as for assistance and cooperation to the developing countries. | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | Advances in enabling technologies like bioinformatics; computational biology; DNA microarrays; gene synthesis   | S 6/8         |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
|                   | technology; high-throughput mass spectrometry; high-throughput sequencing; nanotechnology; synthetic biology; systems biology; and whole-genome directed evolution are critical for future life sciences research and development. These enabling technologies have many benefits in faster, cheaper, and easier application of biological science and technology for both public health and security purposes, increased capacity and better understanding of disease and healthcare technologies by more people in more locations throughout the world. | AM            |
| Iran (NAM)        | Furthermore new science and technology developments have many potential benefits for the Convention in improved health care, increasing capacity to diagnose and treat diseases, more efficient food production, more renewable energy resources and better pollution management.   | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | Developing countries, in particular, could benefit from advances in technologies that make vaccine production simpler, faster, cheaper and more efficient.  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Sweden            | Botulinum toxin – Benefits and risks (of increased knowledge)<br>(a) Treatment of neuromuscular disorders and other clinical applications<br>(b) Improved detection and diagnostics<br>(c) Improved therapy after exposure  | P 6/8<br>AM   |
| Germany           | While different methods for the detection of biological toxins are available, hardly any agreed standard methods exists because of still open questions regarding technical and standardisation issues. A big problem is the lack of reference material for biological toxins no compatibility of methods in different laboratories and especially for complex matrices that would be expected in a potential incident.   | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Germany           | In the heart of the project is the performance of 4 rounds of proficiency tests by the Robert Koch Institut, Germany, now in the position to identify best practices and critical gaps for detection of biological toxins.  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Germany           | Solid information on biotoxin detection capabilities based on proficiency testing are:<br>(a) Generation and characterization of toxin reference material – combining the expertise from EU laboratories<br>(b) Setting up proficiency testing schemes – including real sample materials (test for sample preparation strategies)<br>(c) Evaluation of result – performance of laboratories, comparison of methods used, identification of gaps, identification of best practices   | P 6/8<br>AM   |
| Switzerland       | Recently described advances in immunology are highly relevant for our deliberations, Less than a decade ago, a new component of the bacterial immune system has been described that has the ability to learn and remember while operating in a less complex way than the human immune system. This system, called CRISPR/Cas-system, enables bacteria to recognise pathogens that it had been exposed to  | S 6/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i>  | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|--------------------|--|---------------|
|                    | previously. Recent advances have now demonstrated that this feature of the bacterial immune system can be exploited to edit, silence and activate genes at any given site in virtually any kind of genome, including human cells. It promises to become a very powerful genomic engineering tool that may be very useful in terms of e.g. gene therapy research  |               |
| Switzerland        | Talking of research, the CRISPR/Cas-system will likely prove useful in so called gain-of-function experiments. Gain-of-function is a broadly used technique in the life sciences to explore the function of specific genes, by adding a new feature to an existing organism. This concept has direct implications on recent advances in the generation of potential pandemic pathogens such as the heavily debated H5N1 influenza research.  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Russian Federation | [A separate area of this is synthetic biology.] At present in this sphere, more than 100 major laboratories around the world are working on this front. In the last 10 years, there has been a rapid growth in the number of publications, patent applications, and the scale of financing for this. The anticipated practical applications of this new science cover the most pertinent areas some of which include innovative methods of treatment and vaccine production, food, and chemicals production, including the production of biofuels. | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| OPCW               | Benefits of Convergence [of biology and chemistry]<br><br>Combined with other advances, particularly in nanotechnology, the benefits related to CWC also include:<br><br>(a) developing improved defensive countermeasures<br><br>(b) beneficial developments in protective clothing and equipment<br><br>(c) decontamination<br><br>(d) medical countermeasures, and<br><br>(e) verification, detection/ diagnostics  | P 6/8<br>PM   |
| Cuba               | The advances outlined in the report [by the BWC ISU] should be placed at the service of developing countries for peaceful purposes. This will allow better understanding of the mechanisms of illnesses and make it possible to develop vaccines. It also allows the adoption of measures for scientific and technological exchange of knowledge and also the delivery of materials and technology and trained staff consistent with the Convention.   | S 6/8<br>PM   |
| Cuba               | Advances in technology, in particular for monitoring, detection, diagnosis or monitoring of infectious disease and similar phenomena caused by toxins in humans, animals and plants are very beneficial for public health of developing countries.   | S 6/8<br>PM   |
| United States      | Scientific research will continue to produce knowledge about host-pathogen interactions. New technologies combined with this knowledge will enable quicker and more detailed analyses of how these interactions lead to disease. Taken together, these S&T developments can reveal key interactions between host and pathogen that can be blocked in order to treat or prevent disease. For example, discovery of virulence factors can guide vaccine and  | WP.2          |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
|                   | drug development. It is highly desirable to have vaccines and drugs that specifically block the effects of virulence factors, because they can ameliorate symptoms while fighting the pathogen.  |               |
| United States     | As more is learned about host-pathogen interactions, it will become easier to more accurately predict the presence and effects of virulence factors in emerging pathogens based on sequence similarities or antibody cross-reactivity.   | WP.2          |
| United States     | When outbreaks from new or re-emerging pathogens occur, knowledge gained from studies on the mechanisms and evolution of pathogenesis should enable more rapid responses and development of countermeasures.   | WP.2          |
| United States     | A capability to make predictions about the outcomes of host-pathogen interactions is inherently dual use knowledge. In a positive sense, such knowledge would improve and hasten development of vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics with increased specificity for virulence factors. Such knowledge could also enable mitigation of the host immune response, turning it up or down to minimize host damage.  | WP.2          |
| United States     | Advances in microbiology and genome sequencing technologies are increasingly applied along with classical approaches to answer basic questions in bacterial pathogenesis.  | WP.2          |
| United Kingdom    | ...enabling technologies, including those related to genomics and other ‘-omics’, synthetic biology and systems biology ... such technologies are useful tools in increasing the understanding of virulence mechanisms and host responses to pathogens and subsequently to development of new vaccines and therapeutics and improved diagnostics.  | WP.4          |
| United Kingdom    | ...advances recognised in relevant technologies for disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and mitigation in many cases resulted from an increased understanding of the mechanisms of disease and the host immunological response.   | WP.4          |
| United Kingdom    | A fundamental expectation of studies in this field is that increased understanding of the molecular details of host-pathogen interactions and anti-immune systems will lead to a better understanding of the weaknesses in host defence systems and assist the development of vaccines and therapeutics.   | WP.4          |
| United Kingdom    | ...a recent study has reported a novel strategy in dengue vaccine development based on attenuated virus strains with a genetic mutation introduced to deactivate the MTase enzyme [... required to chemically modify its genetic material and escape detection by the host immune system] This proof-of-concept study demonstrated that the attenuated viruses were stable, safe and immunogenic, and showed their potential as a safe, highly immunogenic, rationally-designed dengue vaccine approach. | WP.4          |
| United Kingdom    | Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) ... to avoid detection in the host ... produces an enzyme called PLpro ... which removes host cell proteins involved in triggering the innate immune response. [...] A recent effort to understand the structural basis of PLpro activity ... enabled the creation of mutations in the  | WP.4          |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
|                   | enzyme to prevent interaction with the host cell proteins, while retaining the function for viral replication. Further work in this area is required, but this may represent a first step towards the development of a safe, live attenuated vaccine.  |               |
| United Kingdom    | Some pathogenic bacteria have an outer protective layer formed of capsular polysaccharides, which prevents them being recognised and destroyed by the host immune system. Thus the disruption of this layer could provide a strategy for therapeutic development ... could be the key to the development of a new antibiotic class active against pathogens with similar mechanisms for capsule formation.   | WP.4          |
| United Kingdom    | Some viral, bacterial, fungal and parasitic pathogens use a mechanism known as antigenic variation to avoid recognition by the adaptive immune response... Trypanosomes and Plasmodium species ... have evolved mechanisms to switch expression of various surface proteins through antigenic variation to avoid antibody binding. Further studies will help understanding of the molecular details of the host-parasite interactions and guide the development of therapeutics to tackle parasitic disease.   | WP.4          |
| United Kingdom    | A key element of the innate immune response is the recognition of microbial components by receptors on the surface of host immune cells ... and trigger a signalling pathway to activate an immune response. Recent work has identified a potentially novel evasion mechanism involving bacterial domain proteins ... that interfere directly with the signalling pathway and thus inhibit the activation ... Further understanding of the modes of action and the roles in virulence of these domains may help in developing strategies for novel countermeasures.  | WP.4          |
| United Kingdom    | A further example of an evasion system involving interaction with receptors on the surface of host immune cells... viruses such as West Nile and dengue activate ... central inhibitors of the innate immune response. Understanding of this mechanism may provide an attractive target for novel antiviral therapies which could... prevent interference with the innate immune system.   | WP.4          |
| United Kingdom    | <i>Yersinia pestis</i> (the causative agent of plague) also disrupts the host immune system by interacting with a receptor protein on immune cells... Plasminogen activator protein (Pla) activity degrades... the Fas Ligand (FasL) which is involved in the signalling process... and alters the host inflammatory response. Further understanding of the process by which <i>Y.pestis</i> evades the immune response may help in the development of effective medical countermeasures, for example by exploring the possibility that blocking Pla activity and thus restoring FasL signalling might give antibiotics more time to work. | WP.4          |
| United Kingdom    | A mechanism common to many bacteria involves the hijacking of host cells by the injection of microbial proteins... by which they exert a number of effects that assist their survival and block the host cell immune response... This type of mechanism could provide a target for the development of antimicrobials with a novel mode of action, but further investigation is required to understand better the molecular processes involved.   | WP.4          |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| United Kingdom    | A possible mechanism to evade the adaptive immune response that has recently been reported involves bacterial production of a broadly-reactive antibody-binding protein ... found to bind with high affinity to all types of human and non-human antibodies ... thus blocking antibody-antigen binding ... further studies are required to elucidate this potential mechanism to defeat the antibody response, which if confirmed may offer a target for new antibacterial therapies. Given its apparent ability for broad-scope, high affinity binding to antibodies, another potential use for this protein is in the large scale purification of therapeutic antibodies.   | WP.4          |
| United Kingdom    | ... immune cells called macrophages ... engulf invading pathogens inducing the production of a chemical called itaconate, which interferes with bacterial metabolism. However some pathogens, including <i>Yersinia pestis</i> , can degrade itaconate... The enzymes involved in this process might provide potential targets for the development of new antimicrobial agents.   | WP.4          |
| United Kingdom    | Advances in the understanding of evasion of the host immune response by pathogens have wide reaching potential benefits for the mitigation of infectious diseases and are highly relevant for the BTWC. The application of discoveries in this field to the development of vaccines and therapeutics has key implications for progress on the global response to infectious disease outbreaks, whether natural, accidental or deliberate. This is of relevance to the strengthening of Article VII, in providing assistance to any State Party exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention... It is also a significant issue for activities related to Article X, in the development and application of scientific discoveries for the global prevention of disease, and for other peaceful purposes | WP.4          |
| United Kingdom    | Advances have continued to be made in understanding the complex interplay between host and pathogens, and have allowed consideration of their application to the development of novel vaccines and therapeutics. Such strategies involve: targeting virulence factors, including toxins, factors that alter the host immune reaction and those involved in the formation of protective biofilms; and modulating the host immune response to overcome the virulence strategies of pathogenic microorganisms. Such positive developments may have relevance to some aspects of the Convention, including Articles VII and X.  | S 6/8<br>PM   |
| India             | We believe that peaceful activities such as vaccine development, which are important for developing countries for meeting their public health needs, should not be unnecessarily highlighted as posing a risk for uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention. On the other hand, we could discuss, for instance, when research accomplishments could allow the destruction of remaining stocks of live Variola virus in the current locations specified in the relevant WHO resolutions.   | S 6/8<br>PM   |

### 3. Possible measures for strengthening national biological risk management, as appropriate, in research and development involving new science and technology developments of relevance to the Convention

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
| Pakistan          | Pakistan believes that all scientific activities and experiments should be carried out under strict regulation and control, solely for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, as permitted under the Convention.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| India             | Our aim should also be to seek greater clarity on aspects of range of types and quantities of such agents and toxins, whether naturally occurring or altered which potentially could pose a risk to the Convention.  | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| India             | The measures taken to mitigate biological risks should be proportional to the assessed risk and not hamper legitimate peaceful activities including international cooperation.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Malaysia          | Oversight frameworks for biosafety and biosecurity are crucial to ensure research in biosciences are not diverted for the production of biological weapons   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| China             | The rapid advance of bioscience has led to many new trends and things. To timely assess the effect of bioscience development on the Convention, to enhance biosafety and security, to share experiences in bio risk management, to prevent the misuse of bioscience, are in line with the purposes and targets of the convention, and greater benefits to human welfare. China supports the States Parties to share useful practices of bio risk management, to strengthen capacity building in biosafety, in light of their national conditions, to set voluntary best standards of bioscience development, to carry out safety education of practitioners and to effectively respond to various biosafety risks and treats.  | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | NAM notes that there have been recent advances demonstrating the increasing sophistication of synthetic biology, together with other enabling technologies, which have benefits, together with the potential for uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention. All States must conduct such activities in a transparent manner, in order to build the confidence of other States Parties. There is a need to regulate these activities, to ensure that they do not lead to any concerns related to ethics, safety and security as well as any uses contrary to the Convention... Such regulation must, however, be undertaken in a manner that does not hamper scientific and technological developments that are in keeping with the spirit and letter of the Convention, which are of benefit, more especially to developing countries. | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | ...there is no commonly agreed definition of biosafety and biosecurity in the Convention. We strongly believe that the relevant national authorities should have the responsibility in defining and implementing such concepts, in accordance with relevant national laws, regulation and policies, consistent with the provisions of the Convention. The adoption of decisions and recommendations on this issue within the framework of the BWC belongs exclusively to the States Parties of the Convention.   | S 6/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
| Sweden            | <p>How to surveil development, manufacturing and marketing of a dual use agent with a substantial commercial value?</p> <p>Handling of dual-use issues:</p> <p>(a) Frequent assessment of science and technology</p> <p>(b) Awareness raising</p> <p>(c) Codes of conduct</p> <p>(d) National rules and guidelines</p> <p>An extended model:</p> <p>(a) Actors: WHO, national authorities and institutions</p> <p>(b) Intensified dialogue with industry</p> <p>In the era of synthetic biology:</p> <p>(a) New commercially successful products with dual use potential</p> <p>(b) A model for the future</p> | P 6/8<br>AM   |
| Switzerland       | <p>The on-going debate [on gain-of-function research] exposes the BWC community to several pertinent questions: Do these kinds of gain-of function experiments in fact improve both vaccine design and interpretation of surveillance? Is it worth taking the associated risks of such gain-of-function experiments, given the scale of potential harm that could occur in case of an accidental or deliberate release? This debate may be further accentuated in the future with the availability of more powerful techniques such as the CRISPR/Cas-system.</p>  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Netherlands       | <p>...biosecurity is a shared responsibility, several national stakeholders from government, private industry and the scientific community are involved in the process of developing the new regime. Within the regime each stakeholder further has its own responsibility.</p>  | S 14/8<br>AM  |
| Netherlands       | <p>...dual use aspects of H5N1 research. The lessons learned from this case are now also integrated in a new comprehensive biosecurity policy... As a basis for the new policy a framework was set up, in which certain preconditions were formulated which we deem essential ... has to be in line with international obligations... has to take into account public health, science as well as security interests... should guarantee and secure the freedom of science and innovation</p>   | S 14/8<br>AM  |
| India             | <p>The measures taken to mitigate risks should be proportional to assessed risks and not hamper peaceful activities including through international cooperation. It is important to share information on advanced research in the life sciences for the benefit of all countries.</p>  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| India             | <p>...we need to review when S&amp;T developments trigger Article I or Article XII of the Convention. Our discussions could help shape common understandings in this regard.</p>   | S 6/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i>  | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|--------------------|--|---------------|
| Russian Federation | There have been incidences which cast doubt on the high level of confidence placed in the biological security of major state scientific institutes. Dangers linked to synthetic biology have not yet been properly assessed. At the same time, the expert community acknowledges that these risks are exceptionally high and that the scale of their possible consequence is comparable to that of nuclear hazards.  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Russian Federation | There is now a need of a normative strengthening at global and national levels for the creation of a new system of risk assessment which would consist of a comprehensive, and experimentally exhaustive study of the consequences of research in synthetic biology.   | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Russian Federation | In many of the most advanced, developed States, dual use biotechnology research is being conducted against a backdrop of incomplete national legislation.  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Kenneth Oye        | <p>Recommendations on using lead time [generated via early publication and policy engagement]</p> <p>Scientists:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Assess environmental and security effects, flag sources of uncertainty, direct research at uncertainty</li> <li>(b) Effect of genetic instability of drives on the environment</li> <li>(c) Effect of lateral gene flow on diffusion of alterations</li> <li>(d) Improve test methods – mesocosms and microcosms</li> </ul> <p>Technologists:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Modify organisms and uses to minimize risks by designing, testing and incorporating safety features</li> <li>(b) Develop and test immunization drives</li> <li>(c) Develop and test reversal drives</li> <li>(d) Develop and test precision over generations</li> </ul> <p>Policy experts:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Identify and address gaps in policy, fund research, foster informed public debate</li> <li>(b) Functional approach – not just lists of pathogens</li> <li>(c) Red teaming /white hat hacking to flag misuses</li> <li>(d) Public debate over benefit/ risk in advance of release</li> </ul> | P 6/8<br>PM   |
| United Kingdom     | It is thus important to ensure that appropriate oversight and governance strategies for such dual-use research are in place to minimise the risk of its use for prohibited purposes, without having adverse effects on crucial progress on infectious disease control. It is clear from recent discussions and debates on dual-use research issues that it is critical to undertake consideration of all the implications of proposed work, including those related to publication, at an early stage to ensure that both the potential benefits and risks are clearly balanced and articulated.   | WP.4          |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
| United States     | Research that is categorized as DURC is often vitally important to science, public health and agriculture, and its findings often contribute meaningfully to the broader base of knowledge that advances scientific and public health objectives. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that a determination of research as being in the category of DURC does not suggest that the research should not be conducted, nor is it the intention of the institutional DURC policy to discourage its pursuit. Rather, a DURC determination indicates a need for greater oversight, and for a collaborative and informed assessment of the potential benefits and risks of the research. In recognition of this, both U.S.A. Government DURC policies note that oversight of DURC, including implementation of risk mitigation measures, should minimize, to the extent possible, adverse impact on legitimate research; should be commensurate with the risk; should include flexible approaches that leverage existing review processes; and should endeavor to preserve and foster the benefits of research. | WP.7          |

#### 4. Voluntary codes of conduct and other measures to encourage responsible conduct by scientists, academia and industry

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| Iran (NAM)        | Codes of Conduct remain the prerogative of the States Parties to decide on the development, content, promulgation and adoption of the code in accordance with relevant national laws, regulations and policies, consistent with the provisions of the Convention.   | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | Codes of Conduct should avoid any restrictions on exchange of scientific discoveries in the field of biology for prevention of disease and other peaceful purposes. Subjecting scientific research and the free flow of scientific information to undue restrictions may amount to a violation of obligations undertaken under Article X of the BWC.  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| India             | We share the view of several States Parties that education and awareness raising and other measures such as voluntary Codes of Conduct are a useful way of encouraging responsible conduct by scientists, academia and industry.  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Cuba              | We need, in the international community today, to achieve greater protection is by voluntary codes, for example, to counter the threat posed by biological weapons. This could take the form of non-discriminatory, legally-binding provisions. In this regard, we are of the view that codes for scientists could be beneficial, as could other models but in themselves will not solve the problem of the threat of use of biological weapons. They cannot be imposed. They must be the outcome of a democratic and inclusive process within the multilateral mechanisms within the United Nations and consistent with the Biological Weapons Convention. Codes of conduct and other models discussed in this room are the prerogative of States Parties and they will decide on adoption and promulgation consistent with their own domestic policies and legislation. | S 6/8<br>PM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
| United States     | The two U.S.A. Government DURC oversight policies work to engage life sciences research institutions and federal funding agencies in a shared responsibility to address the risk that knowledge, information, products, or technologies generated from life sciences research could be used for harm. In addition, the two U.S.A. Government DURC oversight policies together emphasize a culture of responsibility by reminding all involved parties of the shared interest in upholding the integrity of science and in preventing its misuse. | WP.7          |

## 5. Education and awareness-raising about risks and benefits of life sciences and biotechnology

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| Switzerland       | ...States Parties to the BWC should, collectively and individually, continue to deliberate and support the promotion of a culture of responsibility and security among life scientists.   | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| India             | We share the view of several States Parties that education and awareness raising and other measures such as voluntary Codes of Conduct are a useful way of encouraging responsible conduct by scientists, academia and industry.  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Canada            | Research and development in synthetic biology and other fields in the life sciences is no longer restricted to high-tech elite research institutes, but is now being conducted in institutions around the world at all levels, including undergraduate.<br><br>iGEM promotes responsible, safe, and ethical use of synthetic biology.<br><br>Engaging with the iGEM community is important, as research done in this context contributes to improved disease detection and diagnosis in cost-effective and sustainable ways (contributing to implementation of Article X), improved detection of biological weapons agents (Article VII). Furthermore, engagement will allow States Parties to maintain awareness of breakthroughs in science and technology relevant to the Convention, and for education and awareness-raising on the Convention, dual-use issues, and national legal requirements. | P 6/8<br>PM   |

## 6. Science- and technology-related developments relevant to the activities of multilateral organizations such as the WHO, OIE, FAO, IPPC and OPCW

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
| Switzerland       | ...the convergence of biology and chemistry is a scientific and technological development with enormous beneficial potential that also poses significant challenges for the BWC and CWC. This underscores the importance of a much needed closer cooperation | S 6/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
|                   | between the two communities, bringing scientific experts and policymakers together for greater interaction.   |               |
| Australia         | Encouraging stronger synergy between the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a crucial element of this. ... interested in ways the BWC community could leverage further work of the SAB. | S 6/8<br>AM   |

## 7. Any other science and technology developments of relevance to the Convention

| <i>Delegation</i>  | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|--------------------|--|---------------|
| Pakistan           | Pakistan would, also, highlight the importance of holding regular reviews of the developments in science and technology related to the Convention. These reviews should provide impetus not only to enhanced awareness regarding new technology related to the Convention but also towards enhanced cooperation and sharing of such technology   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)         | ...the Group stresses the importance of the adoption of a plan for active and fullest exchange of knowledge and technology in areas related to enabling and new technologies between developed and developing countries to ensure the unhindered flow of scientific information and technology.  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Switzerland        | The Eighth Review Conference provides an excellent opportunity to decide on the way forward regarding the establishment of a dedicated structure for the examination of developments in science and technology. Such a science advisory process could take on different forms. One example could be an open-ended working group composed of government experts. It might also be instrumental to seek support from international scientific organizations to provide collateral input for such a process. For an informed debate, it is imperative to exchange views among a broad range of States Parties from all regional groups. As a first step, it is important to define and agree upon a clear purpose and a set of expectations for such an advisory group. | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| India              | We sense a large measure of support for addressing S&T developments on a continuing basis through an appropriate mechanism established for this purpose. We had presented a Working Paper in this regard at the 7th Review Conference. In the run-up to the last review conference, we had suggested that such a review could be carried out through a panel composed of experts nominated by States Parties and would be ready to further explore this as well as other ideas.  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Russian Federation | Intersessional experts meetings are indeed a useful mechanism for discussing this problem and yet as part of this work, no assessment is made of some of the recent research. In order to further strengthen the Convention, it would seem expedient within the framework of the Convention forum to create a special expert group to develop criteria to assess the extent to which research relates to the Convention.   | S 6/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| India             | We would need to focus on what is the nature of dual use research that is of specific interest to the Convention as envisaged by Article I and Article XII. Article XII asks us to do a review and Article I prohibits any research or stockpiling that is not justified for peaceful use criteria under the Convention. The Russian Federation delegation said in the morning... that as we discuss science and technology developments we should focus on whether it is possible to evolve criteria to assess science and technology developments. We heard from the United States delegation that indeed such criteria have been evolved nationally, in their own national context... It is possible to increase our common understandings on what nature of dual use research is of particular interest to the Convention. If we all agree that this can be standardised, that a certain criteria can be evolved, that a certain set of factors can be isolated, then maybe that is one component that we can build upon in the future. | S 6/8<br>PM   |
| Cuba              | We need an integrated approach in analyzing the legitimate uses of these new technologies   | S 6/8<br>PM   |
| United Kingdom    | The breadth of this year's topic again underlines the benefits of bringing in a range of knowledge and expertise ... to assist us in considering the implications across all aspects of the Convention and in assessing the need for effective action to manage potential benefits and risks. It also highlights the cross over between the topics ... addressed ... over the years of the current intersessional programme and thus the need to consider implications from previous understandings in our continuing reviews.  | WP.4          |
| United States     | The fields relevant to the BWC – microbiology, genomics, synthetic biology, just to name a few – are fast-moving, and keeping up is no easy task. So during the remainder of this intersessional program, let us explore concepts like ... the open-ended groups that some Parties have proposed, and others so that we can make the most of the next intersessional program.   | S 06/8<br>AM  |

## **Agenda item 7: Standing agenda item: Strengthening national implementation**

### **1. A range of specific measures for the full and comprehensive implementation of the Convention, especially Articles III and IV**

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| Iran (NAM)        | NAM stresses that national implementation of the Convention as required under Article IV of the Convention requires commitments towards implementation of all provisions of the Convention. In this regard, NAM is of the view that full and effective implementation of Article X is of high importance. | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | This sub-agenda item could be productively used by States Parties to exchange ideas on what further measures and initiatives could be adopted by States Parties at the national level to further the implementation of the Convention's provisions.   | S 7/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| Malaysia          | ...we do believe that a balanced approach to all provisions of the Convention is important to ensure that the goals and objectives of the Convention are achieved.  | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Mexico            | The presentations and debates of the regional workshops on the implementation of the BWC in Central America and the Caribbean noted the need:<br><br>(a) To promote internal coordination of the States Parties and to establish national authorities for the national implementation of the Convention.<br><br>(b) For local, federal and State governments to develop a better cooperation and capacity in issues of public health.<br><br>(c) For development of Science & Technology<br><br>(d) To develop plans for biosafety and biosecurity<br><br>(e) To exchange of best practices with regional countries were highlighted, as well as with WHO and INTERPOL  | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Thailand          | Successful export control would serve to reduce levels of concern, and at the same time enhance international exchange of life science-related knowledge.   | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Mongolia          | Creating a better understanding of the provisions of the Convention among government agencies and civil society, improving and amending the laws and regulations dealing with toxic and hazardous wastes, strengthening the national capacity in the field of handling toxic and bio hazard wastes are the long-term objectives   | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Switzerland       | The development and continuous adaptation of national legislation, regulations, administrative measures and associated control mechanisms as well as their enforcement are crucial areas of national implementation.  | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Australia         | ...places importance on an effective export control system  | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Cuba              | Training is a fundamental element that contributes to the correct implementation of this Convention   | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| India             | India has always emphasized the responsibility of States Parties to fully implement their obligations under the Convention and adopt requisite measures to this end, including export controls to protect proliferation of sensitive materials and technologies.  | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| China             | To enhance national compliance measure is an important guarantee for the States Parties to comply with obligations under the Convention and to improve its effectiveness. In recent years the States Parties made unremitting effort in light of their national conditions. In our view, the States Parties should be encouraged on a voluntary basis, to gradually improve their national compliance measures and mechanisms. The measures currently put forth by countries to enhance national compliance should conform with the gradual and voluntary principles. Meanwhile, China would like to point out that the best compliance mechanism under the framework of the convention is to reach a protocol with verification measures, to comprehensively strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention. | S 4/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i>   | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i>   |
|---|---|-----------------|
| Iran (Islamic Republic of)  | Establishment of unilateral, discriminatory and selective export controls outside the framework of the Convention hinder the fullest possible exchange of equipment, scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes and is a violation of Article X.  | S 7/8<br>PM     |
| Nepal   | Strengthening national capabilities for effective implementation of the Convention, utilization of Confidence Building Measures for compliance and respecting the obligations of the provisions of the Convention, and full utilization of the existing mechanisms to avoid non-compliance and potential breach of the Convention assume critical importance.   | S 8/8<br>AM     |
| Nepal   | A well regulated and controlled trade of these products and transfer of technology only for prophylactic, protective and peaceful purposes, especially in the interests of the developing countries, including least developed countries, would serve the larger and far-reaching objective of this Convention.   | S 8/8<br>AM     |
| Australia,<br>Canada,<br>Germany,<br>France,<br>Japan,<br>Netherlands,<br>Spain,<br>United States | Well-designed and -implemented national controls are not only critical to fulfilling the obligations of Article III, they are also essential to implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540  | WP.8/<br>Rev. 1 |
| Australia,<br>Canada,<br>Germany,<br>France,<br>Japan,<br>Netherlands,<br>Spain,<br>United States | Appropriately designed and implemented controls are fully consistent with the requirements of Article X of the BWC and limited to non-proliferation measures, neither favouring the commercial development of industries nor hindering legitimate economic development of other countries. In practice, controls should affect only sales in the very few cases where there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to developing or maintaining a chemical or biological weapons (CBW) capacity or terrorism. | WP.8/<br>Rev. 1 |
| Australia,<br>Canada,<br>Germany,<br>France,<br>Japan,<br>Netherlands,<br>Spain,<br>United States | While national systems may vary in many details, there is a series of attributes or elements common to effective control systems.   | WP.8/<br>Rev. 1 |
| Australia,<br>Canada,<br>Germany,<br>France,<br>Japan,<br>Netherlands,<br>Spain,<br>United States | Effective systems for processing requests for government permission for transfers of tangible and intangible goods and technologies generally have six key components:<br><br>(a) Laws and regulations that are sufficiently clear and comprehensive, and that establish necessary legal authorities and appropriate penalties for violations;<br><br>(b) Clearly established procedures and mechanisms for investigation and enforcement;  | WP.8/<br>Rev. 1 |

| <i>Delegation</i>  | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i>   |
|--|--|-----------------|
|  | <p>(c) A list of items subject to control that is clearly written and focused on the materials and technologies needed to develop, produce, or stockpile biological weapons...</p> <p>(d) Controls on technology directly associated with listed items, including transfers of such technology in intangible form and via intangible means;</p> <p>(e) A “catch-all” provision that obligates exporters to seek government permission for an export if they have reason, either from government communication or in the course of business, to suspect the export is intended to contribute to the development, production, or stockpiling of biological weapons; and</p> <p>(f) Regular outreach to life science researchers and the biotechnology industry concerning these requirements to ensure awareness and compliance.</p>                     |                 |
| Australia,<br>Canada,<br>Germany,<br>France,<br>Japan,<br>Netherlands,<br>Spain,<br>United<br>States | BWC States Parties could make a substantial contribution to strengthening implementation of the BWC and to international security by adopting a clear “common understanding” that these six components are the core elements of the effective national export controls called for by the 2012 Meeting of States Parties.   | WP.8/<br>Rev. 1 |
| Australia,<br>Canada,<br>Germany,<br>France,<br>Japan,<br>Netherlands,<br>Spain,<br>United<br>States | <p>Officials evaluating requests for government permission to export BW-relevant items should therefore take into account indicators of proliferation risk, such as:</p> <p>(a) Information about proliferation and terrorism involving biological weapons...</p> <p>(b) The significance of the transfer in terms of: the appropriateness of the stated end-use...</p> <p>(c) The assessment of the end-use of the transfer...</p> <p>(d) The role of distributors, brokers, or other intermediaries in the transfer...</p> <p>(e) The capabilities and objectives of the chemical and biological activities of the recipient State and the extent and effectiveness of the export control system of the recipient State, as well as any intermediate States;</p> <p>(f) The applicability of relevant multilateral agreements, including the BWC</p> | WP.8/<br>Rev. 1 |
| Australia,<br>Canada,<br>Germany,<br>France,<br>Japan,<br>Netherlands,<br>Spain,<br>United<br>States | States Parties could take a further important step toward effective action by agreeing upon a “common understanding” that the six indicators of proliferation risk cited above, which are widely recognized as international best practice, should be taken into account by States Parties in making licensing decisions for the export of BW-relevant items.  | WP.8/<br>Rev. 1 |

| <i>Delegation</i>  | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|--|---|---------------|
| United States  | The importance of engagement with civil society, particularly the scientific community, to promote awareness and a culture of responsibility and/or provide oversight of research and development (R&D).  | WP.1<br>0     |
| Australia,<br>Japan,<br>Malaysia,<br>Republic of<br>Korea,<br>Thailand | Effective implementation of the BWC includes but is not limited to effective national legislation, domestic biosecurity regulations and capabilities and export controls on sensitive materials (in some cases, developed through bilateral and regional cooperative efforts).  | WP.1<br>1     |
| Australia,<br>Japan,<br>Malaysia,<br>Republic of<br>Korea,<br>Thailand | States Parties need to recognize the importance of measures to cover: legislative and regulatory frameworks including; export control regimes; biosafety and biosecurity; disease surveillance and outbreak response capacity; oversight of science; educational efforts and awareness raising; assistance and protection capacity; responding to alleged use; exchanges of information; and building capacity for peaceful use.  | WP.1<br>1     |
| Australia,<br>Japan,<br>Malaysia,<br>Republic of<br>Korea,<br>Thailand | ...for the legislation to be effective, it must be implemented effectively and properly promulgated and enforced. Critical in this process will be awareness-raising among key stakeholders such as parliamentarians, the scientific community, and law enforcement and border control officials.   | WP.1<br>1     |
| Australia,<br>Japan,<br>Malaysia,<br>Republic of<br>Korea,<br>Thailand | For many States Parties national implementation is challenging, requiring education of, and coordination between different national stakeholders. The importance of making an effort towards a whole-of-government approach to implementation needs to be understood. Some specific suggestions on best practices for raising awareness of the BWC and establishing a national BWC implementation mechanism include:<br><br>(a) Establishing a central point of contact and coordination for national implementation of the BWC<br><br>(b) Establishing mechanisms for regular communication amongst key stakeholders, for example a regular meeting of an inter-governmental committee<br><br>(c) Ensuring regular and timely participation in the confidence building measures process, including by involving all relevant areas of government and related areas<br><br>(d) Organising awareness-raising workshops and training for establishing of efficient communication and coordination between national stakeholders, and<br><br>(e) Promoting the BWC through related initiatives, such as outreach to industry, education and research sectors, and through the European Union CBRN Centres of Excellence. | WP.1<br>1     |
| Australia,<br>Japan,<br>Malaysia,<br>Republic of<br>Korea,             | In this context, national implementation also requires a focus on compliance with the 2005 International Health Regulations, to ensure States Parties can respond to public health emergencies, bioincidents and allegations on the use of biological weapons. Other initiatives such as the new Global Health Security Agenda initiative   | WP.1<br>1     |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| Thailand          | are also important, which brings together health security and BW non-proliferation objectives.  |               |
| Japan             | CBMs are for promoting transparency and increasing mutual trust among State Parties, and the same time, a State Party can facilitate inter-governmental communication through CBM preparation process and also could review the current status of national implementation of the BWC.                                 | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Japan             | Japan anticipates States Parties that have either never submitted a CBM return or have difficulties in submitting forms annually will voluntarily place a “Step-by-step approach in CBM participation” and would encourage the States Parties who place the approach to produce feedback to forthcoming BWC meetings. | S 7/8<br>AM   |

**2. Ways and means to enhance national implementation, sharing best practices and experiences, including the voluntary exchange of information among States Parties on their national implementation, enforcement of national legislation, strengthening of national institutions and coordination among national law enforcement institutions**

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| Malaysia          | Whilst there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution for national implementation... collaborative efforts would certainly help in strengthening or complementing existing national frameworks or action plans.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| European Union    | ...stress once more our collective responsibility to ensure that we are not inadvertently assisting in developing biological weapons under the guise of cooperation in biological sciences or in the economic and technological fields  | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| European Union    | The current inter-sessional process offers also an opportunity to identify innovative approaches, to enhance national implementation through voluntary exchanges of information, such as the proposed peer-review mechanism.  | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| China             | To enhance national compliance measure is an important guarantee for the states parties to comply with obligations under the convention and to improve its effectiveness. In recent years the states parties made unremitting effort in light of their national conditions. In our view, the states parties should be encouraged on a voluntary basis, to gradually improve their national compliance measures and mechanisms. The measures currently put forth by countries to enhance national compliance should conform with the gradual and voluntary principles. Meanwhile, China would like to point out that the best compliance mechanism under the framework of the convention is to reach a protocol with verification measures, to comprehensively strengthen the effectiveness of the convention. | S 4/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| Iran (NAM)        | The unhindered exchange of science and technology in the framework of the Convention is also important in the context of enhanced national implementation of the Convention by developing countries which in many circumstances lack resources- technological, financial and human – for effective implementation of all provisions of the Convention.  | S 6/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | ...it is necessary for States Parties to work together for enhancing national implementation by sharing best practices and experiences, exchange of information on enforcement of national legislation, on possible ways for strengthening national institutions and coordination among national law enforcement institutions and finally building national capacity through international cooperation.   | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Canada            | <p>Systematic reporting of laboratory exposures and/or laboratory acquired infections aims to increase the overall level of awareness and critical thinking about risk factors associated with accidental or intentional incidents involving human pathogens and toxins. This activity provides opportunities for early detection and response and will gather consistent evidence-based data to guide development and strengthening of biosafety and biosecurity management systems.</p> <p>Canada welcomes the opportunity to engage in discussions with partners to share definitions, standards and data collection system design for reporting of laboratory exposures or laboratory acquired infections. Engaging in these discussions early, as partners are thinking about, planning or presently collecting data on laboratory exposures provides an opportunity for alignment across states parties. Sharing of information and/or integration of data on laboratory exposures or laboratory acquired infections among interested States Parties would build a larger, more robust evidence base from which to quantify and describe accidental or intentional exposure events and their associated risk factors to guide decision making for early response, detect emerging risks and/or prevent future occurrences and spread.</p> | P 7/8<br>AM   |
| Australia         | Australia also considers that it is necessary to continue to underline the value of the Confidence Building Measures (CBM) process – under this agenda item – as an important international transparency mechanism. [Australia] encourages greater participation by States Parties in the CBM process   | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Australia         | CBMs can also help improve domestic coordination and enhance domestic understanding of national activity related to the BWC   | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Switzerland       | Switzerland believes that national implementation, coordination and oversight will be reinforced by having an effective system in place at the national level for the collection and compilation of relevant CBM data from the diverse pertinent domestic agencies. Domestically, the process of collecting CBM-relevant information has not only the benefit of drawing together stakeholders but also enables a clear overview of implementation measures and respective gaps, and hence contributes to the improve-ment of national implementation. Apart from the domestic benefits of a national CBM process, it also offers significant external value  | S 7/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i>  | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|--------------------|--|---------------|
| Switzerland        | Switzerland is of the view that participation in the CBMs is an indicator of States Parties' commitment towards fulfilling the Convention's requirements and implementing its provisions. The quality and scope of information provided in annual returns also play an important role in effectively fostering transparency and confidence. At the moment, the utility of the CBMs as a means to reinforce implementation, confidence and transparency is undermined by the limited level of meaningful participation. | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Pakistan           | The ability of States Parties to fully implement all provisions of the Convention depends upon their respective national capacities. We therefore believe in the need for improving capacity of developing States Parties, to strengthen their existing institutions through cooperation and assistance from the developed States and other relevant international and regional organizations in terms of materials, equipment, financial resources, technology and human resource development.                        | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Pakistan           | This would better equip them for detecting, reporting and responding to outbreaks of infectious diseases, biological weapons attacks or other challenges that may arise in the context of the BTWC, including their preparedness, response, crisis management and mitigation capabilities.   | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Pakistan           | ...States Parties should work together for enhancing national implementation of the BTWC by sharing best practices and experiences, with the aim of building national capacity of member States, especially developing States Parties, through international cooperation and assistance, in order for them to fully implement all provisions of the Convention.  | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Pakistan           | The issue of CBMs has been discussed at length during the previous two years in 2012 and 2013. We do not see any value in opening the past debates as our respective positions on CBMs are well known. However, since the issue of CBMs was raised, we will, therefore, just for the record, like to reiterate our position on CBMs.   | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| Pakistan           | Pakistan views the CBMs as a voluntary tool for increasing transparency and building trust and confidence among States Parties in the implementation of the Convention and believes that a reduced reporting burden would enhance participation from all States Parties in the CBMs. However, CBMs cannot be used a tool for assessing compliance by the States Parties, for which the only method is a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding mechanism with verification provisions.                             | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| Pakistan           | Pakistan believes that the only sustainable method of strengthening the Convention is through multilateral negotiations aimed at concluding a non-discriminatory, legally binding agreement, including on verification provisions, dealing with all the Articles of the Convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner.   | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| Russian Federation | Many States at the time of their accession to the Geneva Protocol made reservations, mainly concerning the possibility of retaliatory use in war of chemical and bacteriological weapons... The BTWC Review Conferences since the time of the Third Review Conference in 1991 have always included in their reports a consensually adopted call for the withdrawal of the reservations... in reality   | S 7/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
|                   | progress in withdrawing the reservations has been stalled since 2002... Russia has consistently advocated strengthening the Convention's regime, and it calls upon all States Parties that have not done so to withdraw the reservations to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 without delay and to notify the Protocol's Depository  |               |
| France            | <p>The expected benefits for this mechanism are to strengthen the implementation of the Convention by its States Parties, to improve the level of confidence between States Parties thanks to increased transparency, to exchange good practices and to provide for an opportunity to develop international cooperation.</p> <p>The concept presented by France is a concept that is voluntary and modular. The way in which France organized this first session reflects the manner in which we see this concept, but other modalities, equally as pertinent, could be considered, provided they meet the objective of strengthening confidence and transparency among States-parties.”</p>                 | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Netherlands       | The Peer Review mechanism aims at enhancing national implementation, enhancing confidence between States Parties through transparency, sharing best practice and enhancing international cooperation.  | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| India             | The peer review concept is only at a nascent stage and it would be difficult to draw any definitive conclusions on its utility. Along with a number of other delegations, we are yet to be convinced about the concept of peer review as a means of assessing national implementation but we are not opposed to further discussion on the subject.   | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| United States     | <p>The United States has proposed a simple, three-part approach to addressing this situation collaboratively:</p> <p>(a) First, we need better information about what measures States Parties have in place, and what capacity gaps they face;</p> <p>(b) Second, we need to continue the ongoing process of developing clearer and more specific ‘common understandings’ to provide better guidance to Parties on the issues that need to be considered and approaches that have been shown to be effective;</p> <p>(c) And third, we need to bring technical and financial resources to bear in a targeted way to build capacity and strengthen implementation, guided by those shared understandings.</p> | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| United Kingdom    | This CBM [CBM E] helps tell which States Parties have taken steps to implement the provisions of Article IV, and how they have gone about this in order to meet their own particular constitutional and contextual conditions; it also tells us who has not done so and this can help us all to identify those who might need assistance to draft and enact implementing legislation. Similar considerations apply to providing a window on how a State Party approaches legislative and other governance arrangements to ensure appropriate biosafety and biosecurity measures.   | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| United Kingdom    | This CBM [CBM E] also encompasses measures that States Parties have taken (or not taken) to implement the provisions of Article III.   | S 7/8<br>PM   |

| <i>Delegation</i>  | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|--|--|---------------|
| United Kingdom   | Knowing which States Parties have implemented legislation, having an opportunity to review that legislation and other associated guidance helps give confidence over time that the Convention's obligations are being met... Equally, knowing where the gaps are as indicated by CBM E can help those in a position to provide support to identify those States Parties that might benefit from assistance on building and maintaining their national implementation capacities.   | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| United Kingdom   | ...we should continue to use this Standing Agenda Item on national implementation as an opportunity to remind States Parties of their continuing commitments under the CBMs and of the assistance opportunities and packages that exist to help such States meet those commitments.  | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| United Kingdom   | Making these annual [CBM] returns must be seen as part of a State Party's continuing efforts to implement the Convention and its associated commitments effectively ...  | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| United Kingdom   | ...we repeat the call to those States Parties that have not done so... to submit their first CBM – having done so once clears the main obstacle to meeting that requirement and should make subsequent annual returns easier to compile.   | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| United Kingdom   | Annual CBM returns offer an indication of a political commitment to sustaining the Convention and its core provisions by, at the very least, the translation of the Convention's core provisions into domestic law.  | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| United States  | We see the concepts of "peer review," "compliance assessment," and other voluntary transparency measures as opportunities to strengthen national implementation itself and to enhance transparency about that implementation, rather than as approaches to determining a Party's compliance.   | WP.1<br>0     |
| Australia,<br>Japan,<br>Malaysia,<br>Republic of<br>Korea,<br>Thailand | National implementation legislation is important as it demonstrates political support for the BWC, and is useful in identifying other implementation requirements such as training and assistance needs to strengthen biosecurity preparedness. This would also encourage investments in the field of biology and, most importantly, prevent biological weapons proliferation.   | WP.1<br>1     |
| Australia,<br>Japan,<br>Malaysia,<br>Republic of<br>Korea,<br>Thailand | There could also be value during the BWC intersessional period in identifying and exploring parallels in compliance requirements across different disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and international agreements, to maximise synergies and take advantage of existing or planned measures.   | WP.1<br>1     |
| Switzerland  | This Convention is in need of stronger mechanisms for resolving concerns about implementation of, and compliance with, the BWC. The development of a legally-binding compliance framework needs to be based on a careful identification and thorough evaluation of practicable approaches in terms of their technical feasibility and effective capacity to address contemporary challenges of modern-day biology.<br><br>As States Parties continue to explore options for developing a legally-binding compliance framework, it is important to strengthen | S 7/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i>  | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|--|--|---------------|
|  | the confidence-building measures and pursue voluntary approaches, such as the compliance assessment initiative or the peer-review mechanism. These tools and initiatives could not only reinforce assurances of compliance, but potentially ease the way towards more stringent measures and mechanisms.   |               |
| Australia,<br>Japan,<br>Malaysia,<br>Republic of<br>Korea,<br>Thailand | The International Health Regulations core capacity monitoring framework requires annual completion of a 28 page questionnaire requiring multi-agency involvement and covers areas such as national legislation, coordination, risk communication, and commitment. The questionnaire is voluntary, but the fulfilment of this obligation establishes compliance with the IHRs and supports national level BWC implementation. | WP.1<br>1     |
| Australia,<br>Japan,<br>Malaysia,<br>Republic of<br>Korea,<br>Thailand | While there are many ongoing national programmes, changes in priorities and new developments can provide challenges to the implementation of such efforts. The importance of connectivity through networking, cooperation/collaboration and coordination to promote capacity building cannot be overstated. Such activities are required at the national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.                   | WP.1<br>1     |
| Australia,<br>Japan,<br>Malaysia,<br>Republic of<br>Korea,<br>Thailand | Identifying leaders and champions may help drive the implementation of the Convention at the national level. Engagement with civil society and the establishment of public-private partnerships can also play a positive role in building capacity.  | WP.1<br>1     |
| Australia,<br>Japan,<br>Malaysia,<br>Republic of<br>Korea,<br>Thailand | Capacity-building will also be increased through training and awareness-raising activities. "Train the Trainer" is a useful and efficient method for reaching a wider group of actors/stakeholders (often separated geographically or by language barriers), to facilitate the transfer of knowledge. Local-based training could benefit from support by national and/or regional associations and organisations.            | WP.1<br>1     |
| France   | Enhancing national implementation, improving confidence amongst States Parties through increased transparency, sharing good practices, providing the opportunity to develop international cooperation, while fully respecting national sovereignty, are the main benefits of this proposed peer review mechanism.  | WP.X<br>X     |
| France   | France hopes that the organization of the peer review pilot exercise has played its role in dispelling possible concerns about the possible nature, scope and methods of a proposed peer review mechanism. It was also important, in doing so, to establish the wide degree of autonomy that BTWC States Parties would enjoy in defining the scope and purpose of a peer review that they could undertake to organize.       | WP.X<br>X     |
| France   | ...the aim of the work undertaken in this field [on peer-review] remains... to prepare the ground for the possible consideration, at the Eighth Review Conference of establishing such a voluntary mechanism within the BTWC framework.  | WP.X<br>X     |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| India             | A number of delegations have raised the issue of CBMs in the context of national implementation. We see CBMs are a tool for building transparency, trust and confidence among States Parties in the implementation of the Convention. We believe that it would not be productive to reopen the debates of the Review Conference regarding the role of the CBMs in the BWC regime. CBMs are not declarations and cannot be a tool to assess compliance, for which the only method is a legally binding mechanism with verification provisions. In any case, the consideration of CBMs in the intersessional process was completed last year. | S 7/8<br>AM   |

### 3. Regional and sub-regional cooperation that can assist national implementation of the Convention

| <i>Delegation</i>  | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|--|--|---------------|
| Iran (NAM)   | It is useful for States Parties to learn from each other by sharing national experiences in the implementation of the Convention and to collectively think about ways and means to enhance national implementation, including through regional and sub-regional cooperation.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Mexico   | The presentations and debates of the regional workshops on the implementation of the BWC in Central America and the Caribbean noted the need... for exchange of best practices with regional countries, as well as with WHO and INTERPOL   | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Mexico   | The presentations and debates of the regional workshops on the implementation of the BWC in Central America and the Caribbean noted the fundamental role of cooperation of countries in the region and international and regional organizations in order to augment and better the national implementation of the instrument as well as to develop plans and programmes for biosecurity and bio risks. | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Australia,<br>Japan,<br>Malaysia,<br>Republic of<br>Korea,<br>Thailand | The importance of connectivity through networking, cooperation/collaboration and coordination to promote capacity building cannot be overstated. Such activities are required at the national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.  | WP.1<br>1     |
| Australia,<br>Japan,<br>Malaysia,<br>Republic of<br>Korea,<br>Thailand | Local-based training could benefit from support by national and/or regional associations and organisations.  | WP.1<br>1     |
| Australia,<br>Japan,<br>Malaysia,<br>Republic of<br>Korea,<br>Thailand | Sub-regional and regional networks have an important role to play in helping to foster understanding and share lessons learned.  | WP.1<br>1     |

| <i>Delegation</i>          | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|----------------------------|--|---------------|
| Iran (Islamic Republic of) | All States Parties, in particular developed countries, should develop necessary laws and regulations for full and effective implementation of Article X in which, all restrictions and limitations on cooperation and assistance be removed, and facilitate international cooperation, assistance and exchange under this Article. | S 04/8<br>AM  |

#### 4. National, regional and international measures to improve laboratory biosafety and security of pathogens and toxins

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
| Kenya             | Engage governors, farmers, academia and public on biosecurity and biosafety programme.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Kenya             | Developing regulations on accreditation and registration of research institutes that will ensure biosecurity and biosafety.  | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Kenya             | Developing strategy for establishment of the national physical sciences research laboratory for engineering and new production technologies.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| China             | In favour of sharing best practices in monitoring biological risks ... capacity should be enhanced to ensure biosafety ... must have appropriate practitioners trained.<br><br>The best way to achieve this is to have verifiable protocol in comprehensive manner   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Mexico            | The presentations and debates of the regional workshops on the implementation of the BWC in Central America and the Caribbean noted the need... to develop plans for biosafety and biosecurity.  | S 7/8<br>AM   |
| Canada            | Canada's oversight of pathogens and toxins, under the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA) and Regulations is designed as a comprehensive safety and security regime, which aims to protect the health and safety of the public against risks posed by human pathogens and toxins. Passing of the Act by the Canadian Parliament in 2009, further strengthened implementation of the BTWC. Likewise, proposed regulations, requirements and supporting activities under the Act will address multiple areas for strengthened pathogen and toxin oversight to further reduce the risks posed by activities being undertaken with human pathogens and toxins.<br><br>Once the HPTA comes into full force in 2015, mandatory reporting of laboratory exposure incidents by all licence holders will become an important new mechanism to strengthen and expand Federal oversight of laboratory biosafety and biosecurity. In particular this requirement will provide for the collection of systematic evidence that can be used to guide and strengthen biosafety and biosecurity decision making aimed at earlier detection and improved prevention and control of accidental or intention exposure to pathogens and toxins. Over time, standardised data on laboratory exposure | P 7/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i>  | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|--|---|---------------|
|  | incidents are expected to facilitate earlier detection of events and risk factors of concern and to improve timeliness and accuracy of intervention and prevention measures to mitigate or prevent future incidents within facilities and across the laboratory community of practice. Likewise, these data will contribute evidence for pathogen and toxin risk assessment and guide biosafety training, practices, and policies to target specific gaps and weaknesses.   |               |
| Japan  | ‘Hard measures’ such as laws and regulations are the basis to ensure biosecurity. However, a risk of over regulation, jeopardizing public health and research and development for preparedness and response, should be carefully considered.  | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| Japan  | Multi-sectoral and interdisciplinary platform is crucial to promote discussion on biosecurity, as biosecurity is an interdisciplinary agenda.   | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| Chile,<br>Colombia,<br>Spain,<br>Mexico                                | ...the Convention has not yet agreed to a document recommending the characteristics of the facilities handling the biological agents that might be useful to State Parties nationwide.  | WP.6          |
| Chile,<br>Colombia,<br>Spain,<br>Mexico                                | The workshop participants have elaborated a questionnaire that might be useful in acquiring relevant information on the facilities dealing with biological agents on a national level... The questionnaire might be useful to strengthening the Convention nationally as well as determining the minimum technical characteristics that would bestow reliability to the laboratory identifying the biological agent by the country claiming a possible biological attack in its territory and moreover in relation to the documentation to be provided by the State Parties when proposing an analytical and diagnostic facility. | WP.6          |
| Australia,<br>Japan,<br>Malaysia,<br>Republic of<br>Korea,<br>Thailand | Strong political will is needed to ensure effective national implementation of the BWC. A low political will results in the absence of appropriate legislation, administrative measures and a lack of funding, leading to a lack of infrastructure and appropriate training. An additional complication arises from the multi-agency nature of BWC implementation. Therefore, an appropriate agency that can assume ownership and constitute a central authority is required to establish efficient coordination as well as biosafety and biosecurity measures.   | WP.1<br>1     |
| Australia,<br>Japan,<br>Malaysia,<br>Republic of<br>Korea,<br>Thailand | National implementation requires a focus on national efforts to establish and apply measures to ensure biological agents are handled in a safe and secure way. The rapid developments in biological sciences make biosafety and biosecurity increasingly important considerations. If there is a limited understanding of the BWC and/or a limited awareness of biosecurity, the potential for deliberate or inadvertent mishandling of biological material, and for the proliferation of biological materials, expertise and technology to individuals or countries of concern, remains and may be exacerbated.                  | WP.1<br>1     |
| United<br>States   | The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) in their 2009 report entitled “Enhancing Personnel Reliability among Individuals with Access to Select Agents defined personnel reliability measures as those insuring that “individuals granted  | P 7/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
|                   | <p>access to sensitive materials are trustworthy, responsible, and stable, and can competently perform their duties.” The NSABB, like many other expert bodies in the area of laboratory biosecurity, recognized the significant importance of the “insider threat” to the security of dangerous biological agents and that one of the most effective ways to counter this threat is to hire and retain reliable staff members.</p>  |               |
| United States     | <p>The U.S. applies step-wise approach to the application of personnel reliability requirements for work with biological materials:</p> <p>It is expected that any person working with an infectious agent has a basic background in safe laboratory techniques and has had adequate training in safe and ethical behavior. As a general workplace, the laboratory is covered by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations which require that an employer provide his or her workers with an environment in which the risk of exposure to a workplace hazard is adequately remediated.</p> <p>A small subset of all infectious agents are those considered to be of high risk to public health or agriculture. This set of 65 bacteria, viruses, and toxins is covered by the select agent regulations, which require additional safety, security, incident response, and inventory control measures at institutions where these materials are stored, used or transferred. One of the select agent security requirements is that anyone applying for access to a select agent or toxin must undergo a security risk assessment by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation prior to obtaining access, and every three years thereafter.</p> <p>For the select agents and toxins representing the highest risk to the public and agriculture, there must be a personnel reliability program in place, in addition to the security risk assessment provision. For select agents of absolute highest concern, such as Variola virus, there are additional specific personnel reliability requirements, such as having a Top Secret Security Clearance, in addition to being enrolled in the local personnel reliability program and maintaining a security risk assessment.</p> | P 7/8<br>AM   |
| United States     | <p>For pre-access suitability, the recommended minimum information includes: home address, work, education, and criminal history, a resume or curriculum vitae (including scientific publications and affiliations), information on applicable professional licensure or certification, Visa status (if the applicant is not a U.S. national), and references, including contact information. A formal, structured interview with the applicant and an assessment of personal behavior and work practices is also highly recommended.</p>  | P 7/8<br>AM   |
| United States     | <p>The Guidance document also contains information for entities to use in developing their self- and peer-reporting procedures. The types of information to be reported include conditions or observed behaviors that may negatively impact an individual’s ability to</p>   | P 7/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
|                   | work safely and securely with select agents and toxins. The reporting system should be robust enough to allow for self-reporting, peer reporting, reporting by supervisors, and anonymous reporting. It is critical that this system has an appropriate environment to respond to these reports and protect their sensitivity.   |               |
| United States     | The ongoing monitoring of suitability of individuals for access can be accomplished through processes already in place, such as employee safety and performance reviews. As part of this program, Responsible Officials should periodically review all access records to ensure that those granted access have the appropriate training and are included in the required local oversight programs. | P 7/8<br>AM   |

## 5. Any potential further measures, as appropriate, relevant for implementation of the Convention

| <i>Delegation</i>  | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|--------------------|--|---------------|
| Russian Federation | Consideration should be given to examine opportunities for strengthening the Convention and improving its implementation based on the negotiating mandate agreed by consensus at the BWC Special Conference in 1994.   | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| Russian Federation | Consideration should be given to those issues on which there is likely to be broad agreement or consensus.   | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| Russian Federation | It should be recalled that the 1994 negotiating mandate contains a lot of flexibility and does not presuppose the outcome of negotiations or the shape of a future legally binding instrument.   | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| Russian Federation | Such a legally binding instrument would not supplant the Convention but would create added value for States Parties by setting up enabling mechanisms for cooperation, for assistance and protection, and for national implementation thereby strengthening the Convention and improving its implementation.   | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| Russian Federation | It is proposed that challenge/complaint procedures relevant to Article VI of the Convention, if and when initiated by one State Party against another, should continue to be addressed by the mechanism specified in Article VI (namely, lodging a complaint with the UN Security Council).  | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| Russian Federation | Consideration should be given to the following thematic areas as being part of a legally binding instrument in the further consideration of these ideas: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Investigations of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons (initiated by the affected State Party and conducted on its territory).</li> <li>(b) Investigations of suspicious outbreaks of disease or toxin poisoning (initiated by an affected State Party and conducted on its territory)</li> <li>(c) Promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes</li> </ul> | S 7/8<br>PM   |

| <i>Delegation</i>          | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|----------------------------|---|---------------|
|                            | (d) Assistance and protection against biological and toxin weapons  |               |
|                            | (e) Confidence building measures (existing or potentially enhanced formats)   |               |
|                            | (f) National implementation   |               |
|                            | (g) Monitoring science and technology developments  |               |
| Russian Federation         | Consideration should also be given to the structure of a future Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (and the size of its Technical Secretariat) that would be necessary to implement a legally binding instrument.   | S 7/8<br>PM   |
| Iran (NAM)                 | Compliance with the Convention is a concept different from national implementation. In an international legal instrument such as the BWC, the assurance of compliance with the Convention's provisions has to be undertaken collectively through appropriate multilateral verification arrangements. In the past, useful work has been done in this regard under the BWC in the Ad-hoc Group and NAM continues to attach high importance to preserving and eventually resuming that work.<br><br>While the Group recalls its position on proposals related to compliance assessments, reiterates that such proposals should not distract the attention of States Parties away from strengthening the Convention in all its aspects including the need for a verification mechanism. NAM and Other States Parties to the Convention reiterate the importance of multilateral negotiations aimed at concluding a non-discriminatory, legally binding agreement, including on verification provisions, dealing with all the Articles of the Convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner. | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (Islamic Republic of) | As repeatedly reaffirmed by the BWC Review Conferences, the use of biological and toxin weapons is a violation of Article I of the Convention. In this regard and in accordance with the final document of BWC Seventh Review Conference, we call upon all States Parties that have not withdrawn their reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, to do so without further delay.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (Islamic Republic of) | On compliance assessment, we believe that compliance with the Convention is a concept different from national implementation. The assurance of compliance with the Convention's provisions has to be undertaken collectively through an appropriate multilateral verification mechanism.  | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (Islamic Republic of) | All States Parties, in particular developed countries, should develop necessary laws and regulations for full and effective implementation of Article X in which, all restrictions and limitations on cooperation and assistance be removed, and facilitate international cooperation, assistance and exchange under this Article.  | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| United States              | Maintaining and promoting confidence that parties are abiding by their commitments is essential to any treaty. The BWC poses special challenges in this regard. The broad nature of its obligations, the intent-based nature of the Article I prohibition, the inherently dual-use nature and widespread availability of the materials and technology in question, and the potential significance of even small   | WP.1<br>0     |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
|                   | quantities of pathogenic material all combine to render traditional arms control approaches to enhancing assurance ineffectual.   |               |
| United States     | The increased significance in recent years of non-state actors as an element of the international biological weapons (BW) threat the Convention seeks to address exacerbates this problem. As a result, there is no simple “checklist” of specific actions or activities that may be applied to determine that a State Party is complying with all its obligations under the Convention.  | WP.1<br>0     |
| United States     | <p>While a definitive compliance “checklist” is not possible, it is certainly possible to identify key elements that might be taken into consideration in evaluating compliance. Any such judgment must consider the basic obligations of the Convention. Compliance requires a State Party to refrain from certain actions (e.g., developing, stockpiling, or transferring biological weapons) set out in Articles I and III. It also requires a Party to take a number of actions, the most critical of which are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To eliminate any existing biological weapons or related facilities, in accordance with Article II.</li> <li>• To establish appropriate measures to ensure that the Party never transfers biological weapons to any recipient, directly or indirectly, or in any way assists in the acquisition of biological weapons. In general, this is accomplished through efficient and effective national export licensing systems to ensure that materials are only exported for permitted purposes. Given the Convention’s intent-based prohibition, flexible “catch-all” provisions are an essential element of such systems.</li> <li>• To adopt “any necessary measures” to “prohibit and prevent” anyone under a Party’s jurisdiction or control from developing, acquiring, or stockpiling biological weapons.</li> </ul> <p>To be effective, laws and regulations should be clear, enforceable, and actively enforced. They should prohibit conduct proscribed by the Convention, and provide for meaningful penalties to deter such action, but they should also aim to prevent such action. Such prevention requires a Party to exercise some mixture of oversight, regulation, and outreach for certain permitted activities in order to guard against misuse. Examples include regulations on biosafety, biosecurity, and oversight on the possession, use, and transfer of biological agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat.</p> | WP.1<br>0     |
| United States     | The threat of biological weapons acquisition and use by non-state actors has become increasingly clear and relevant. Accordingly, the importance of Articles III and IV as elements of State Parties’ compliance with the Convention is greater than it once was. Thus, our collective thinking about compliance with the BWC and how to demonstrate it must take into account this fundamental shift in the BW threat.   | WP.1<br>0     |
| United States     | It is often not possible to reach a definitive conclusion about whether or not another Party is fully complying with its obligations under the Convention, nor is it easy to envision a mechanism that would substantially change this situation. As a result, the question   | WP.1<br>0     |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
|                   | that confronts States Parties is ultimately about the level of confidence we share in the compliance of States Parties, individually and collectively – or, put another way, the level of concern we have about non-compliance.  |               |
| United States     | Confidence in compliance can be increased through greater transparency regarding activities and national implementation (where current transparency measures are most notably weak). Means of enhancing transparency include providing and regularly updating information through the existing mechanisms of confidence-building measures (CBMs), the National Implementation Database (NID), compliance reports submitted to BWC Review Conferences, and making available information contained in 1540 Reports and VERTIC legislative surveys. | WP.1<br>0     |
| United States     | Article V provides a valuable mechanism for enhancing assurances of compliance. It may be valuable to develop illustrative examples of options Parties might employ in addressing doubts and ambiguities during Article V consultations.   | WP.1<br>0     |
| United States     | While it might be possible to develop elements to lend greater structure to the process of raising questions and concerns under Article V, such as timelines for responses, on the whole the flexible nature of Article V is an asset and should be preserved  | WP.1<br>0     |
| United States     | Mutually agreed, voluntarily hosted visits to sites of concern have long been an option that is available to States Parties to address questions or concerns, and may or may not prove useful, depending on the nature of the concern and the behavior of the States Parties involved. It would be counterproductive to develop detailed rules or processes for such visits, as flexibility is critical.   | WP.1<br>0     |

### **Agenda item 8: How to strengthen implementation of Article VII, including consideration of detailed procedures and mechanisms for the provision of assistance and cooperation by States Parties**

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
| Brazil            | Brazil fully agrees that international assistance is needed in many situations, but we also affirm our position that any demand for the provision of support in response to a biological attack has to be upon the request of the affected State.    | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Indonesia         | Indonesia is of the view that States Parties' national preparedness contributes to international capabilities for response, investigation and mitigation of outbreaks of disease, including those due to alleged use of biological or toxin weapons. | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| India             | ...the lack of a comprehensive Protocol to strengthen implementation of all aspects of the BWC has created a gap in the international community's capacity to respond effectively to provide assistance to States Parties to the BWC.                | S 4/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| India             | An event relating to a violation of the BWC is more than a public health emergency under the IHR (2005). While coordination and cooperation with relevant UN bodies such as the WHO, FAO, OIE, etc. are important complementary measures, the lack of an institutional mechanism to provide assistance remains a concern to the international community.  | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Kenya             | There is need for the... provision of equipment for emergency response in case of a suspected biological weapons attack   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Malaysia          | Malaysia firmly believes that Article VII and Article X of the Convention can be implemented in such a way allowing States to undertake, facilitate and participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, scientific and technological information and at the same time ensure efficient mobilization and maximum utilization of resources.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Algeria           | States Parties should look at the ways and means of attributing assistance efficiently, and this needs to be done in a rapid, prompt manner. An urgent intervention might be needed in a timely manner. For this purpose, WHO, OIE, FAO and UN organisation involvement should be considered.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | Although this Article has not been yet invoked, the international community should be prepared to face such a situation well in advance and to dispatch emergency assistance in case of use of bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons, and also provide humanitarian assistance in case of the threat of use of such weapons, to the requesting State Party.   | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | <p>...an international detailed procedure and mechanism for timely, effectively and adequately response needs to be developed. In this context, the following elements should be considered in such mechanism:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Preparing an inventory of the types of assistance that the States Parties could provide,</li> <li>2. Establishing a data bank containing freely available information concerning various means of protection against bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons,</li> <li>3. Information on the kind of assistance that States Parties could provide in response to a request for assistance,</li> <li>4. Providing the equipment related to the means of protection against the use of biological weapons to the requesting State Party without restrictions,</li> <li>5. Establishing a fund for assistance to concerned States Parties in particular to developing countries,</li> <li>6. Promoting capacity building through the more active cooperation with relevant regional and sub-regional organizations that have mandates relevant to assistance and protection against biological weapons. Such cooperation could include joint exercise and training, including by the use of e-learning modules,</li> </ol> | S 4/8<br>PM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| Iran (NAM)        | ...upon the request of the concerned State Party, the capacities and experiences of UN and relevant international organizations should be identified and used, within their mandates.   | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | ...each State Party should facilitate, and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning means of protection against bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons.  | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| Iran (NAM)        | The States Parties should also have the right to conduct research into, develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use means of protection against bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. In this regard, developed countries should assist developing states parties through providing required technology and resources, as well as sharing experiences, expertise and laboratory cooperation.   | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| OCHA              | We must understand that the primary responsibility for assisting its population lies with the Member State.   | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| OCHA              | When the capacity of the affected community or society to cope is overwhelmed by the humanitarian impact of the emergency, regional and international assistance can be requested. Such assistance is only provided with consent and upon request of the affected State and can entail the direct or indirect provision of goods and services to the affected population on the part of international actors.   | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| OCHA              | In the case of biological... incidents specific technical assistance can be provided on public health, environmental, food security or logistical issues as part of the overall humanitarian response. Additionally, coordination support can be provided to assist Member States in assessing needs, mapping population movements, coordinating incoming relief, establishing communication with affected communities and setting up mechanisms for humanitarian organizations coordination with military and civil defence and protection assets.   | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| OCHA              | ...taking the case of a biological or toxin weapons incident, it is evident that significant expertise rests with the military.   | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| OCHA              | ... foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets deployed to support a biological and toxin weapon-related emergency can include specialised personnel and equipment such as detection, containment and decontamination capability, aircraft, helicopters, ships, field hospitals and water purification units. Any such deployment of foreign military and civil defence assets should be provided in accordance with the humanitarian principles and international guidelines, ensuring their use supports and complements ongoing civilian relief operations without compromising principled humanitarian action and the civilian character of humanitarian operations. | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| OCHA              | Without explicit or detailed assessment of all the possible implications of a biological or toxin weapon incident to the humanitarian response system, it is clear that such an incident poses a number of practical and policy challenges for the humanitarian community.  | S 4/8<br>PM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
| OCHA              | ...there is generally a low level of awareness within the humanitarian system about the specificities of nuclear weapon detonation events or its ability to respond to them. This conclusion would almost certainly apply also to situations involving the use of biological or toxin weapons.  | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| OCHA              | ...because of the specificities of such an event, the humanitarian system would likely take longer to deploy than in a natural disaster scenario.   | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| OCHA              | Better operational preparedness will enable us to respond timely and effectively to humanitarian needs in a context where a Member State may have been affected by a biological or toxin weapons incident.  | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| ICRC              | An international humanitarian response to assist the victims of use of CBRN weapons would prove to be an extremely complex exercise.  | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| ICRC              | ...there is an important distinction between assistance to a State and assistance to victims as part of a humanitarian response   | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| ICRC              | In case of alleged use of CBRN weapons, a response to assist the victims may be perceived as a verification of use  | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| ICRC              | There are political and security implications for any organization or agency that, whilst responding to an outbreak of disease, comes into possession of information pertaining to whether the outbreak resulted from a deliberate release. The relevant questions are: Who gathers this information? To whom is it reported? Who analyses it? Who 'owns' it? Who makes the judgement about whether the epidemic results from an intentional act or not? Who breaks the news? To what extent is patient confidentiality at stake? To what extent does an organization such as the ICRC have to compromise on its traditional policy of confidentiality? | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| ICRC              | The complexity of mounting an international response to assist victims of use of biological weapons, and the potentially very limited impact of any response, underscores the vital importance of continued preventive work by States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.   | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| OIE               | OIE signed a memorandum of understanding with UNODA, detailing when and under what circumstances OIE would provide experts for United Nations Security General (UN SG) Mechanism missions, as well as the modalities of joint training.   | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| WHO               | The public health consequences of a CBW agent being used intentionally necessitates preparedness. WHO recognizes its potential role and has developed operations for deliberate events. WHO has an obligation (WHA54.14 and WHA55.16) to build capacity towards CBRN preparedness in Member States. WHO's approach is through public health system improvement and the International Health Regulations (2005). And there is also a Memorandum of Understanding with the Office for Disarmament Affairs on the UN Secretary General Mechanism for Investigating Alleged use of chemical biological and toxin weapons.                                   | S 4/8<br>PM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
| WHO               | The International Health Regulations (2005) does not distinguish events as natural, deliberate, or accidental, which are instead distinguished by hazards (infectious, chemical, radiological, foodborne, etc.). It has two fundamental components: internationally coordinating monitoring, information sharing and response; and strengthening of the core public health capabilities of countries to detect, assess, respond and recover in every single country, including at points of entry. | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| OPCW              | Under Article 9 or under Article 10 of the CWC, an investigation of alleged use can be launched. Each State Party has the right to request and to receive assistance and protection if it considers that: a) chemical weapons have been used against it; b) riot control agents have been used against it as a method of warfare; or c) it is threatened by actions or activities that are prohibited for States Parties by Article I.   | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| OPCW              | On the authority of the Director General of the OPCW, an assistance, coordination and assessment team (ACAT team) can be deployed. Once their report has been completed, the team– at the demand of the receiving State– can remain in-country to provide assistance.  | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| OPCW              | OPCW carries out a wide series of capacity building events throughout the year, such as international courses, national/regional training, specialized courses, train-the-trainer courses, table top and practical exercises; these activities fall under Article X, paragraph 5 of the CWC.   | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| UNODA             | Unlike the CWC, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has no equivalent investigating authority of alleged use. It is therefore particularly important to ensure that the SGM is effectively operational in the biological area. UNODA has cooperative relations and agreements with relevant international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) in support of the SGM.  | P 4/8<br>PM   |
| Germany           | Problems / Key issues – Detection phase<br><br>1. Transport of samples to international reference centres may be delayed due to IATA regulations (CatA transport not possible or refused)<br><br>2. Sharing of strains... among international reference centres is difficult due to dual-use regulations (long export control process, greater than 3 months)  | P 4/8<br>PM   |
| Germany           | Problems / Key issues – response phase<br><br>1. In country logistics<br><br>2. On-site infrastructure required (tent, rooms, power)<br><br>3. Biosafety and biosecurity on site (samples often not properly packaged)<br><br>4. Shipment of samples (tested positive) for safe storage outside the country<br><br>5. Security of staff (health security, accidents, infections, other illness, repatriation difficult)  | P 4/8<br>PM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
| South Africa      | There are two sets of issues of contention with regard to Article VII: the need for a procedure for assistance and the possible relationship between Article VII and Article X.  | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| South Africa      | It is suggested that States Parties consider a set of guidelines to aid a State Party when submitting an application for assistance to the UN Security Council. The guidelines provided in WP.9 could be useful in this regard.  | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| Brazil            | Assistance, under Article VII of the Convention, refers to an emergency case, when a biological attack has been launched against a country with no means and resources, at the national level, to mitigate its effects.  | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| Brazil            | Reaffirm that any demand for the provision of support in response to a biological attack has to be upon the request of the affected State.   | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| United States     | In many cases, a biological weapons attack might not initially be recognised as a deliberate event. Even if it is, Article VII guarantees will not formally be triggered until after a Security Council decision. So the initial international response will almost always be a public health response.  | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| United States     | There are real impediments to the rapid and coordinated provision of assistance that affect such responses and will also, unless they are addressed, impede our ability to effectively honour our article VII obligations.   | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| Canada            | Canada recalls that a number of very good agreements were made at the 2010 Meeting of States Parties and the Seventh Review Conference. For example, States Parties noted that there are differences among countries in terms of their capacities to respond to an alleged use of a biological weapon, and emphasized the value of assisting other States Parties by, inter alia, enhancing relevant capabilities, strengthening human resources, and sharing appropriate and effective practices. States Parties also noted the value of, inter alia, a coordinated government approach in emergency management; addressing the full range of possible implications; establishing clear channels of communication; and accessing expert advice, when conducting an investigation. Furthermore, States Parties agreed on the value of working to improve effective cooperation between the law enforcement health sectors... the Canadian delegation recommends the analysis of the 2010 MSP report, and proposes that relevant agreements be brought forward for further consideration at the 2014 MSP, 2015 meeting, and the Eighth Review Conference. | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| Australia         | Close cooperation between the Biological Weapons Convention community and the global health community is invaluable. [...] Preparedness is key, whether to respond to a naturally-occurring, accidental, or a deliberate release incident.   | S 4/8<br>PM   |
| France            | A number of points on Article VII necessitate further clarification. In this regard, a number of paths to operationalize Article VII are proposed in the relevant Non-Paper.   | S 4/8<br>PM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
| Ukraine           | The specific sphere of interaction should cover all aspects of protection against bio-threats starting from the determination of future threats, problems of indication, timely notification, decontamination, and development of efficient vaccines, providing proper medical assistance and some other areas of work.  | S 5/8<br>AM   |
| India             | [...] views Article VII assistance as a legal obligation of States Parties, as clearly laid out in the Convention and as agreed in previous Review Conference documents. Assurance of prompt emergency and humanitarian assistance to an affected state party is one of the key pillars of the Convention and is essential to underline the concrete benefits of accession to the Convention and is thus relevant for this universality.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| India             | Essentially, investigation of alleged use procedures can run parallel to assistance and is not a precondition.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| India             | Assistance should be broadly defined: coordination and delivery to state part requesting assistance including the following: detection equipment, including biosensors, alarm equipment, protective equipment, decontamination equipment and decontaminants, prophylactic; diagnostic and therapeutic medical measures and materials and associated equipment and exchange of information and technology regarding assistance.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| India             | It is clear that the lack of a comprehensive Protocol to strengthen implementation of all aspects of the BWC has created a gap in the international community's capacity to respond effectively to provide assistance to States Parties to the BWC.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| India             | An event relating to violation of the BWC is more than a public health emergency under the IHR (2005). While coordination and cooperation with relevant UN bodies such as the WHO, FAO, OIE, etc. are important complementary measures, the lack of an institutional mechanism to provide assistance remains a concern to the international community.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| India             | India in particular would like to mention the creation of a separate data base in the ISU on Article VII assistance, different from the Assistance and Cooperation Database. This new database could be established by the ISU on the BWC website accessible to States Parties to include agreed procedures for States Parties to seek assistance – such procedures should not be linked with procedures for requesting investigation of alleged use, but allow for States Parties to seek assistance based on information concerning various means of protection, offers of assistance made by other States Parties, including material, equipment, advise, technology and financial offers. This database could also include contact points in the States Parties – both providers of assistance and first users of assistance and relevant international organizations. | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| India             | A trust fund could be created.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| India             | States Parties in cooperation with relevant international organizations could also consider a tabletop exercise to improve coordination, awareness and improve response times in case of actual events of requests for assistance under Article VII.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
| Netherlands       | We need to get a better understanding on how to respond if a biological weapon were to be used.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Netherlands       | In practice what happens is: if there is an outbreak of an infectious disease or another incident with biological agents, the first priority is to aid the ones affected. The question whether the incident with biological agents is the result of natural causes, an accident or an intentional action has to be answered later, although it will be necessary to determine the cause of the incident.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Netherlands       | International organizations, such as the WHO, the World Organization for Animal Health and FAO are well prepared to give immediate assistance if an incident occurs. Moreover States Parties have their own organizations and procedures to provide and support assistance.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Netherlands       | On a national basis the Netherlands has developed the so called Environmental Assessment Module (EAM) to contribute to disaster relief upon request. After a disaster, the effects on the environment and public health can be assessed quickly and comprehensively... The EAM will be deployed at the request of the UN or other international organizations wishing to make use of the expertise it provides.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Netherlands       | ...it will be important to further develop international mechanisms for forensic investigation to the cause of an incident.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Pakistan          | ...Pakistan recalls the final declaration on Article VII, of the Seventh Review Conference, which clearly states the responsibility of all State Parties to the Convention for provision of timely and effective assistance, irrespective of whether the disease outbreak has occurred naturally or has been deliberately caused, and that such timely and effective assistance should also cover diseases and toxins that may harm humans, animals, plants, or the environment. | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Pakistan          | ...The Secretary-General's mechanism however, does not substitute the need for a dedicated verification mechanism for the Convention which would ensure that biological and toxin weapons are never developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained, thereby precluding their use by States Parties.   | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Pakistan          | Pakistan believes that the only credible and sustainable method of strengthening the Convention is through multilateral negotiations aimed at concluding a non-discriminatory, legally binding agreement, including on verification provisions, dealing with all the Articles of the Convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner.  | S 4/8<br>AM   |
| Pakistan          | The outbreak of the deadly Ebola virus in West-Africa is a stark reminder of the obligation of all States Parties to provide timely and effective assistance in order to combat outbreaks of diseases, whether natural, accidental or deliberate, those harm humans, animals and plants.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Pakistan          | There is an ever-pressing need for development of a detailed mechanism for provision of timely and effective assistance in wake of disease outbreak or an attack employing biological and toxins weapons.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
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| Pakistan          | We note that the Secretary-General's mechanism has never been invoked for investigation of alleged use of biological and toxins weapons. We would, therefore, request the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) to prepare a detailed information paper, ahead of the upcoming MSP in December 2014, focusing on the complete procedure and mechanism that would come into play, if the provisions of Article VII were invoked by a State Party.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Pakistan          | Such a focused information paper, in our view, would help the States Parties to better understand the Secretary-General's mechanism as well as to ascertain their respective capabilities and subsequent requirements for assistance, in order to: detect quickly; effectively respond to; and recover from, the alleged use of biological or toxin weapons.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Pakistan          | In conclusion, Pakistan would like to reiterate that the Secretary-General's mechanism does not substitute the need for a dedicated verification mechanism for the Convention.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| United States     | ...WHO's critical role in coordinating the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, GOARN is a collaboration of existing institutions and networks for the rapid identification of, and response to, outbreaks of international importance, and one of the key mechanisms for international outbreak response.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| United States     | These [Security Council] deliberations are important – they determine whether Article VII is formally activated – so getting necessary information to this body is essential. But at the same time, it is important to recall that a number of States Parties have expressed their willingness to provide assistance in advance of a Security Council decision, or in cases where the perpetrator is not a Party to the Convention.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| United States     | ...it seems to us that a request for assistance should not only be submitted to the Secretary-General, but also shared with all States Parties through the ISU. It might also make sense for the request to include additional details on assistance needs where possible. In particular, it should include a point of contact for those wishing to provide immediate assistance.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| United States     | ...in order for any requests to be effectively fulfilled, States Parties must address legal, regulatory, and logistical challenges to providing and receiving international assistance   | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Switzerland       | Article VII requires and implies a significant level of coordination to match needs and offers for assistance in case a States Party has been exposed to a danger. Coordination raises the issue of the development of standard procedures where appropriate and possible, an issue that will require further work and consideration.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Switzerland       | Regarding the Convention itself, coordination mechanisms are currently lacking within this framework apart from bilateral consultations, In our view, it is important to keep in mind that assistance and coordination capabilities can be provided in cooperation with other relevant international organizations, such as the WHO, FAO and OIE. We believe it is important for States Parties to be aware of this fact and to seek to complement existing efforts without unnecessary duplications. That said, more work still | S 8/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i>  | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
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|                    | needs to be done with regard to the provisions of assistance and coordination with relevant organization, including coordination within the UN system.  |               |
| Switzerland        | ...cooperation and assistance measures taken under Article X as well as certain elements of national implementation of the Convention may foster capacity building with regard to effective response and mitigation capabilities under Article VII.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Australia          | ...it is important for all members states of the BWC to focus on how to strengthen procedures and mechanisms for providing assistance, including ensuring such requests are framed in a way that members states can readily respond to.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Australia          | ...we want to avoid duplication of efforts and clearly, it is crucial that we need to build up respective national capacities.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Australia          | We also want to ensure we have a workable system in place. I was very interested, in this regard, to hear the idea of members states undertaking a possible table top exercise, raised by our distinguished Indian colleague earlier today. This is a suggestion that bears further consideration, along with the conducting of practical workshops, perhaps on a regional basis, that delves further into this issue.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Australia          | We agree the types of assistance that could be provided could usefully be submitted to the ISU's Article X database. And this could be drawn on by states parties.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Japan              | The basic policy of the Government of Japan on countermeasures against biological events is based on the following five basic principles for maintaining a state of readiness. These principles consist of a basic part of the capabilities to implement Article VII nationally and internationally, and will enable it to react in a prompt and effective manner to a biological event.<br><br>(a) Strengthen the public health care system through the implementation of infectious diseases countermeasures and vaccine stockpiling,<br><br>(b) Strengthen cooperation between relevant organizations and enhance their response readiness;<br><br>(c) Strengthen security and precautionary measures for the prevention of terrorist attacks and the control of biological agents;<br><br>(d) Strengthen the response capacities of the police, the self-defence forces, the fire department, the coast guard and other relevant organizations;<br><br>(e) Provide accurate and timely information to the public. | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Russian Federation | There is a lack of a clear understanding and definition of what exact, specific types of assistance should be provided, in what volume, by States Parties in the event of a corresponding decision by the UN Security Council. There is no clear definition of who coordinates such assistance and who would also send it; how duplication could be avoided in the assistance provided, which could also come from other international organizations.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i>  | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
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| Russian Federation | What we need here is a corresponding organization [to the OPCW] with all the integral components and elements of such an organization.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Mexico             | Protocols to be followed in the event of the use of a biological agent or toxin weapon should be clear, providing immediate support... We need to build national capacity in terms of cooperation under the Convention, with a view to formulating tools for sampling, epidemiological information, research, and also diagnosis and detection techniques and equipment. We need to generate appropriate technical knowledge and establish international, regional and national networks of laboratories. | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| India              | It is the right of a States Party to seek assistance and we believe that this assistance should be provided in as prompt a manner as possible.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| India              | National capacity to receive assistance and use assistance as effectively as possible is a worthy aspiration but it cannot be a condition for receiving assistance.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| India              | The national laws, regulation and constitutional procedures will never be identical. You cannot have a single standard for effective command and control.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Cuba               | Cuba recognises the importance of coordination and provision of appropriate assistance and in regard to specialised knowledge, information, protection, detection, decontamination, prophylactic equipment, medical equipment and other types of equipment which may be necessary to help States Parties who so request in the event that they are exposed to a threat as a result of a violation of the Convention.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Cuba               | We agree that States Parties and international organizations should be ready to provide timely emergency assistance in the event of use of biological and toxin weapons and also to provide humanitarian assistance in the event of the threat of use of such weapons, if so requested by the States Party.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Cuba               | While recognising the contribution of the United Nations and international organizations in coordinating and mobilizing the delivery of assistance and support we do emphasise that the role of such organizations is complementary in nature and consistent with their respective mandate and cannot take the place of States Parties.   | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Cuba               | Cuba reiterates the importance of providing the Convention with an institutional mechanism and the involvement of the UN Security Council reduces the possibility of developing measures within the Convention to strengthen Article VII. The Convention needs an institutional mechanism to provide a response, in terms of assistance, to States which have been exposed to threat by a violation of the Convention.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Cuba               | The Secretary-General's mechanism is an international institutional mechanism to investigate cases of suspected use. It is not clear how the mechanism would function in such an event because Article VII has never been invoked.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
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| Cuba              | We support the provision of an institutional mechanism that is multilaterally agreed upon, that is non-discriminatory or selective, and consistent with the Convention to investigate alleged use that also includes affective and detailed mechanisms to provide assistance resulting from collective agreements  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Cuba              | (a) a detailed procedure for the provision of assistance and cooperation for States Parties under the Convention...<br>(B) the establishment of a databank...<br>(c) a voluntary fund<br>(d) the provision by the Secretariat, at the request of a States Party, of advisory services<br>(e) means to improve and build capacity for protecting against biological weapons.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| United Kingdom    | Records of the original Convention negotiations from 1968 to 1971 make it clear, that 'assistance' means essentially that medical or relief assistance would be provided on request.   | WP.1          |
| United Kingdom    | ... the United Kingdom recommends that appropriate language is elaborated in a common understanding agreed by the Meeting of States Parties for subsequent incorporation in the Eighth Review Conference Final Declaration Article-by-Article Review section, for example:<br><br>"States Parties reached a common understanding that the term 'assistance' in Article VII of the Convention means medical, or associated relief such as that including expertise, information, protection, detection, decontamination, and other equipment, provided on request in the event that a State Party believes it has been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention." | WP.1          |
| United Kingdom    | ... "exposed to danger" means circumstances involving the use or threat of use of biological or toxin weapons when:<br><br>(a) Biological or toxin weapons have been used or suspected of being used by any State(s) or other entity against a State Party;<br><br>(b) A State Party is threatened by actions or activities of any State or other entity that are prohibited for States Parties by Article I.'   | WP.1          |
| United Kingdom    | It is quite likely that in the first instance the capabilities of the WHO, OIE or FAO to mobilise responses to outbreaks of infectious disease of international concern will be the principal means of responding to an Article VII-relevant incident. Thus any discussion of the practical aspects of implementing Article VII must consider carefully the extent to which the WHO and the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, and other intergovernmental organisations, are best placed as the primary responders, and the extent to which further assistance is required to enhance rather than duplicate their capabilities.  | WP.1          |
| United Kingdom    | ... the United Kingdom believes that it would be useful to break the problem down into three component parts:<br><br>(a) What could and should a State Party do nationally to deal with a  | WP.1          |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
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|                   | <p>threat or actual use of biological or toxin weapons, including identification of advice on actions and procedures that it should adopt for its own first responder capabilities?</p> <p>(b) How do we determine the sorts of assistance that would be required from States Parties and international organisations and who could provide it?</p> <p>(c) What are the challenges to providing that advice in order to expedite the necessary assistance and how do we address these most effectively?</p>   |               |
| United Kingdom    | ... national, regional and international efforts relevant to Article X seeking to improve further national and regional capabilities for infectious disease control will also help make Article VII more effective. It therefore makes sense to keep both Articles in mind as we work through the issues affecting responses to the use of biological and toxin weapons.  | WP.1          |
| United Kingdom    | Building and sustaining a national capacity requires effective coordination and integration of cross-governmental planning and response as the skills, expertise and knowledge required are highly unlikely to reside in a single government ministry or agency.  | WP.1          |
| United Kingdom    | <p>The development of an effective detection capability is an exceptionally challenging task and there is no single universal solution. Relevant capabilities include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Development and availability of reliable and affordable wide area detection capabilities, in combination with disease and syndrome reporting through health monitoring that could alert authorities to a biological event.</li> <li>2. Primed and sustained vigilance in the clinical and veterinary communities to spot and report the signs of high-impact disease outbreaks.</li> <li>3. Development of cost-effective rapid diagnostics tests.</li> <li>4. Availability of accurate mapping to help pinpoint the source or sources of the outbreak.</li> </ol> | WP.1          |
| United Kingdom    | Preparation is of vital importance in mitigating the impact of a biological incident, as well as a coordinated, equipped and trained multi-agency operational response; this includes ensuring the availability of appropriate countermeasures and recovery and decontamination options.  | WP.1          |
| United Kingdom    | Much depends on each State Party's current capabilities and capacities and the nature of the event that has resulted in its being "exposed to danger". For this reason it is not feasible to compile a comprehensive, "one-size fits all", detailed list of requirements. This highlights the need for States Parties to complete a prior evaluation and assessment of national capabilities and a gap analysis, and to develop and implement national action plans to prevent, detect, and respond to threats, taking into account the most likely events.   | WP.1          |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
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| United Kingdom    | Regular training activities will also strengthen national capacities for disease prevention, surveillance, risk assessment, control and response.  | WP.1          |
| United Kingdom    | Requests and offers for training and support in the context of Article VII-related assistance could also be made through the BTWC's assistance and cooperation database, but as ever it is essential not to duplicate or confuse efforts.  | WP.1          |
| United Kingdom    | Notwithstanding the need for case-by-case assessment, it is possible to identify some generic categories of assistance, including the provision of training and operational and technical support as well as financial assistance.   | WP.1          |
| United Kingdom    | <p>...assistance could be crucial in creating and supporting a range of capabilities, for example:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Well-trained, well-equipped and organised first responders, who know how to recognise, tackle and deal with a suspicious outbreak of disease or apparent or actual release of biological agents or toxins, and with clear chains of command capable of acting decisively and quickly when deployed to the field.</li> <li>2. An ability to integrate international assistance promptly and seamlessly into national operations, including fast-tracking of medicines for use in emergencies.</li> <li>3. A sensitive surveillance and alert system to verify rumours rapidly, follow-up actively on new suspect cases, and ensure daily follow-up of cases and contacts.</li> <li>4. Trained health and community workers able to detect, notify and manage suspected and confirmed cases.</li> <li>5. Adequate infection prevention and control practices in all health care settings in affected districts, and at-risk areas, and standard precautions in place in the rest of the country.</li> <li>6. Availability of rapid diagnostic kits, field laboratories, medical countermeasures, decontaminants and decontamination procedures.</li> <li>7. Support for field laboratory capacity, appropriate sample shipment, and reference laboratory capacity.</li> <li>8. Provision of field logistic support and equipment for outbreak response operations.</li> <li>9. Coordination of field activities and partner support at local, provincial and national level.</li> </ol> | WP.1          |
| United Kingdom    | The United States set out very clearly a range of challenges in the path of making Article VII effective in a Working Paper to the 2013 Meeting of Experts. These are characterised as a combination of legal, regulatory and logistical issues impeding the ability of governments to both provide and receive international assistance during public health emergencies all of which require attention to overcome.  | WP.1          |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
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| United Kingdom    | <p>The United States of America identified some general considerations for the international deployment and receipt of medical countermeasures or public health and medical personnel in response to an international health emergency:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Recognition or waiver of medical credentials, licences, and professional certifications of personnel by the recipient country.</li> <li>2. Liability protections for medical providers or those who manufacture, distribute or administer medical countermeasures.</li> <li>3. Regulatory clearance to import and/or use medical products in a host country.</li> <li>4. Mission funding.</li> </ol>                                     | WP.1          |
| United Kingdom    | <p>The United Kingdom recommends that, in the output from this biennial topic, States Parties agree a common understanding that... challenges should be expressly recognised and that effective action by States Parties at the national level is needed to address them. States Parties might also be encouraged to report on actions taken.</p>  | WP.1          |
| United Kingdom    | <p>...the ISU could conceivably administer a voluntary fund for assistance similar to the one created by the CWC's Article X. The ISU could perhaps also maintain a separate register of States Parties able and willing to offer assistance, and the type of assistance they can provide, as part of the assistance and cooperation database established by the Seventh Review Conference.</p>  | WP.1          |
| United Kingdom    | <p>Indeed, the assistance and cooperation database currently includes some relevant offers of assistance. At the very least, States Parties could come prepared to the Conference to report on what sorts of assistance directly relevant to making Article VII effective could be offered. These could then be added to the database.</p>   | WP.1          |
| United Kingdom    | <p>... we might note that, notwithstanding Article VII, States Parties could be encouraged to conclude individual agreements with other States Parties concerning the emergency procurement of assistance.</p>   | WP.1          |
| United Kingdom    | <p>The challenges in creating an effective global infrastructure to give better effect to the intentions behind Article VII are considerable. Time and sustained effort are required across a very broad range of activities at the national, regional and international level.</p>  | WP.1          |
| United Kingdom    | <p>A further challenge is to ensure that these efforts are integrated and not at cross-purposes with those of other organisations. However, the work undertaken by the WHO and its member states to implement fully the International Health Regulations, by the OIE in its PVS Pathway and laboratory twinning programme, and by the IPPC in support to capacity development, helps to build effective defences against the use of biological agents and toxins for hostile purposes. This is why it is so essential to keep in mind the organic link between cooperation and assistance measures taken under Article X as these help give substance to effective response and mitigation capabilities under Article VII.</p> | WP.1          |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
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| United States     | ...efforts to strengthen implementation of Article VII should focus, first and foremost, on how to ensure efficient, effective response to an outbreak at the earliest possible point, and ensuring that transition to formal activation of Article VII provisions is seamless and complementary to any ongoing public health or animal health response.  | WP.3          |
| United States     | Although a deliberate biological weapons incident poses additional challenges (for example, evidentiary, chain-of-custody, and security considerations), it is undergirded by public/animal health and emergency response capabilities, on the part of both donor and recipient, that are largely required for both intentional and naturally-occurring events.   | WP.3          |
| United States     | [The United States] advocates that BWC member States agree on an agenda to strengthen implementation of Article VII by selecting issue areas where the BWC forum can complement other global efforts and make real progress towards improving preparedness and response to biological incidents.  | WP.3          |
| United States     | Given the range of activities and efforts related to preparedness and response, it is important for the BWC forum to capitalize on what has already been accomplished by other international entities, to seek their advice and input on these issues, and to focus on a set of discrete issues that are not sufficiently addressed and that have direct bearing on BWC Parties' ability to provide and receive assistance in the event of a biological incident. | WP.3          |
| United States     | Improve global access to MCMs [Medical Countermeasures] during responses to public health emergencies through the development of bilateral, regional and global frameworks for the international deployment of medical countermeasures, consistent with the International Health Regulations (2005) and aligned with the objectives of the Global Health Security Agenda.   | WP.3          |
| United States     | Support WHO and other international partners in the development of adapted prequalification processes, or other regulatory mechanisms, to facilitate the import, distribution and use of emergency public health MCMs [Medical Countermeasures] internationally.  | WP.3          |
| United States     | Explore bilateral, regional and multilateral opportunities for joint development and/or procurement of public health emergency MCMs [Medical Countermeasures], considering existing models such as Joint Procurement Agreement for MCMs in the European Union and the Pan American Health Organization Revolving Fund.  | WP.3          |
| United States     | Encourage review of the WHO Essential Medicine list to evaluate whether the MCMs [Medical Countermeasures] on the list sufficiently address the need for WHO Member States to be prepared for known BW agents.  | WP.3          |
| United States     | Develop and strengthen bilateral, regional and global frameworks and tools to facilitate the international deployment of public health, medical, and veterinary personnel in response to international public and animal health emergencies.  | WP.3          |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
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| United States     | Develop a code for States Parties on rights and responsibilities for providing and receiving support in response to a biological emergency.   | WP.3          |
| United States     | States Parties should prioritize the development of internal capacities to respond efficiently and effectively to biological emergencies, while pursuing multilateral arrangements and agreements to facilitate external assistance during crises.  | WP.3          |
| United Kingdom    | Advances in the understanding of evasion of the host immune response by pathogens [...] and [...] the application of discoveries in this field to the development of vaccines and therapeutics [...] is of relevance to the strengthening of Article VII, in providing assistance to any State Party exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention   | WP.4          |
| United Kingdom    | The first response to any case of suspect biological weapons use is very likely to be that of the State Party on whose territory an identifiable incident takes place; international assistance may appear on the scene shortly after the incident, or even some considerable time afterwards. In whichever scenario applies, an ability to organise, direct and contain such an incident is essential in ensuring an effective response in which humanitarian assistance can be provided promptly – primarily diagnostic, medical countermeasures and decontamination. | WP.5          |
| United Kingdom    | A key issue highlighted was the need to address fully the command, control and coordination of multi-agency assets during an initial response and as the operation progresses.  | WP.5          |
| United Kingdom    | Command and control – the organisation, management and tasking of the response - especially in the initial stages when first responders arrive on the scene and are trying to determine the nature and scale of the problem, is thus a critical capability in ensuring early identification of the nature of the hazards and of the measures required to save lives.  | WP.5          |
| United Kingdom    | In the case of a biological weapons attack, a deliberate release of agent may not always be obvious and may only become apparent gradually with no clear location of release on which to focus an immediate field response. In such cases, effective command and control at the strategic and tactical level remains essential for ensuring an effective response.  | WP.5          |
| United Kingdom    | ... effective command and control must be maintained throughout the response to a BW incident to avoid confusion amongst national emergency services and international assistance efforts arriving at the scene subsequently, and to prevent duplication of effort, misdirection or non-use of response capabilities and resources.   | WP.5          |
| United Kingdom    | Clarity of purpose coupled with a clear definition of the various roles that are required for a first response to a suspect biological weapons incident are essential: delineation of responsibility for command and control at the scene of the initial incident is a fundamental requirement and this should reside in a single individual whose task will be to take overall operational command; to coordinate multi-agency activity and to decide upon and direct immediate action.  | WP.5          |

| <i>Delegation</i>              | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
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| United Kingdom                 | All activity must support the strategic intention of preserving and protecting lives, reducing the impact of the incident, informing the public and maintaining public confidence, and assisting an early return to normality. It must also be carried out in a way that ensures the health and safety of responders and safeguards the environment. It is also important to keep in mind the need to preserve evidence that could help in any investigation into source of the attack; there may be conflicts between the competing objectives of collecting and preserving evidence and providing humanitarian assistance that would need to be resolved.                             | WP.5          |
| United Kingdom                 | Three things must be done on first arrival at the scene of a suspect biological weapons attack: assess the situation; manage information; and manage the scene. Establishing what has happened requires collection and review of information as this provides the foundations on which to build an effective response.  | WP.5          |
| United Kingdom                 | Identifying priorities for immediate action follows on from this along with assessing the immediate impact factors that could arise as a result of the incident, such as implications for critical infrastructure (water supplies, sewerage, power stations, hospitals, transport networks, food supplies) and populations downwind; this will help determine the steps required to mitigate the effects of the attack.   | WP.5          |
| United Kingdom                 | Keeping control of all the diverse and possibly conflicting strands of information that are likely to flow in large volumes in such situations is an essential task; there must be procedures and capabilities in place to ensure that it is collated, stored, and available and communicated to those who need it.   | WP.5          |
| United Kingdom                 | The United Kingdom therefore suggests that the Meeting of Experts reaches a common understanding to this effect, with a view to the Meeting of States Parties making a recommendation for effective action as follows:<br><br>“States Parties agree on the critical importance of effective command and control in the management and coordination of a response to a biological weapons attack and in the containment of its effects, and encourages those States Parties in a position to do so to assist other States Parties in the development of national capacities and capabilities and to place any offers of training or support on the assistance and cooperation database.” | WP.5          |
| India                          | While effective utilization of assistance is a worthwhile operational goal, including through command and control system, it cannot be a pre-condition for providing assistance. Measures to promote cooperation in the fields of training, supply of equipment, material, advice and best practice could be considered.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Spain | The workshop participants have elaborated a questionnaire that might be useful in acquiring relevant information on the facilities dealing with biological agents on a national level... The questionnaire might be useful to strengthening the Convention nationally as well as determining the minimum technical characteristics that would bestow reliability to the laboratory identifying the biological agent by the country claiming a possible biological attack in its territory and moreover in relation to the   | WP.6          |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>   | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|---|---------------|
|                   | documentation to be provided by the State Parties when proposing an analytical and diagnostic facility  |               |
| South Africa      | <p>Guidelines for Requesting Assistance</p> <p>Information to be supplied with the Application</p> <p>(a) Name of the State Party.</p> <p>(b) Date and place of first reported case. If there was a related event, a description of the event. To the extent possible, the date and time, when the alleged event(s) took place and/or became apparent to the requesting State Party and, if possible, the duration of the alleged event(s).</p> <p>(c) Severity of the event. Number of cases and the number of fatalities, if any.</p> <p>(d) Symptoms and signs – diagnosis if possible. Information on the initial treatment and the preliminary results of the treatment of the disease</p> <p>(e) A description of the area involved.</p> <p>(f) All available epidemiological information</p> <p>(g) Actions taken to manage the outbreak.</p> <p>(h) International organisations already involved in providing assistance.</p> <p>(i) States already involved in providing assistance.</p> <p>(j) Indications of why the outbreak is considered to be the result of a biological attack.</p> <p>(k) Characteristics of the agent involved, if available.</p> <p>(l) Types and scope of assistance required.</p> <p>(m) Indication of any investigations conducted or being conducted</p> <p>Actions</p> <p>The application is to be submitted to the UNSG for forwarding to the UNSC as an urgent matter. It can simultaneously be submitted to one of the Depositories as an urgent matter.</p> | WP.9          |
| France            | <p>The assistance depends on two things:</p> <p>(a) on the one hand, on the request of the State exposed to danger. Only the requesting State is able to launch action, and</p> <p>(b) on the other hand, on the decision of the Security Council. The United Nations Security Council must rule that a Party has been exposed to danger following a breach of the Convention.</p>  | WP.X<br>X     |
| France            | <p>...the provisions of Article VII are not only relevant to the State targeted by the use of a biological weapon, but also any States which are “affected by the consequences”. This wording therefore means that assistance can be provided beyond the State which was principally exposed to danger. This provision appears logical given the possible consequences of a breach of the Convention but also given the specific nature of the biological threat, virus and bacteria knowing no borders.</p>  | WP.X<br>X     |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
| France            | ...it was specified that the party in breach of the Convention can be a State actor or otherwise   | WP.X<br>X     |
| France            | ...this Article only applies to Parties to the Convention.   | WP.X<br>X     |
| France            | Points to be strengthened<br>(a) The importance of coordinating assistance efforts was raised on several occasions under the BTWC.<br>(b) The possible coordinating role of the United Nations, with the support of relevant international organizations (WHO, FAO, OIE, IPPC) was mentioned on several occasions as part of the work of the BTWC<br>(c) the need to develop appropriate capabilities in the area of planning and emergency response   | WP.X<br>X     |
| France            | Article VII only provides for a commitment to assistance in very specific cases. It does not provide for a BTWC referral mechanism, or even information in the event of exposure to danger following a breach of the Convention. Finally, it does not provide for a follow-up or coordination mechanism for the assistance efforts.  | WP.X<br>X     |
| France            | The BTWC reporting procedures put in place for assistance actions could be increased, in the same way as the communication procedures within the BTWC. The States Parties to the Convention must have access to relevant information on the implementation of Convention provisions. It could be useful to prepare a form which the States Parties would send to the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and which could be consulted by the other States Parties via the ISU website (assistance and cooperation section). It could also be possible to arrange a dedicated session during the next BTWC meeting. | WP.X<br>X     |
| France            | It has often been highlighted that the presentation procedures for assistance requests should be more specific so as to improve the effectiveness of the requests and speed of the response. This work could be carried out within the Convention. Prior discussions would have to take place regarding a form, emergency instructions or standardized guidelines, enabling the key components of the request to be quickly identified (need for diagnostic capabilities, technical expertise, equipment, etc.).   | WP.X<br>X     |
| France            | Coordinating assistance is a crucial issue. And yet States dealing with an emergency situation may be unable to manage this coordination. It would be useful to discuss this aspect under the BTWC in order to specify the role of the Convention and its structures in this area, in support of coordination at national level, which must remain the priority. The role of WHO and other relevant international organization must be fully considered, especially based on their experience in information sharing and in the provision of assistance and coordination in crisis situations.                   | WP.X<br>X     |

| <i>Delegation</i> | <i>Text</i>  | <i>Source</i> |
|-------------------|--|---------------|
| France            | The need to strengthen in advance the planning and crisis-response capabilities in the biological field was identified on several occasions in recent years. More detailed work on this issue could be initiated within the BTWC in order to encourage shared experiences and best practices from countries which already have national response plans and to better identify the needs in this area. More detailed work on this issue could be carried out at the next intersessional cycle.  | WP.X<br>X     |
| France            | ... the link between the provisions of Article VII of the Convention and the conclusions of the United Nations Secretary-General's Mechanism for Alleged Use could also be strengthened: it is likely that certain assistance action could begin before the results of the investigation and could continue beyond the conclusions of the investigation. It is possible that the investigators could use data sent by countries which have provided assistance or, conversely, that the assistance procedures must take account of elements of the investigation conclusions.  | WP.X<br>X     |
| United Kingdom    | Effective command and control and coordination are essential to ensure that both national and international responses to a BW attack are effective and that assistance is channelled to those who require it without delay, misdirection or waste. There is no suggestion that national responses are a substitute for international assistance, the UK Working Paper 5 paper concentrated upon the national command and control aspects of managing a response, but noted that the command principles applied equally to international assistance too.  | S 8/8<br>AM   |
| United Kingdom    | The ICRC presentation highlighted some very pertinent questions concerning the challenges of providing assistance in the event of a BW attack and what happens if a humanitarian response uncovers evidence suggesting deliberate release of a biological or toxin agent. We would suggest therefore that the Meeting of Experts in 2015 should consider these questions as part of its work programme: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Who gathers this information? To whom is it reported?</li> <li>• Who analyses it? Who "owns" it?</li> <li>• Who makes the judgment about whether the epidemic results from an intentional act or not?</li> <li>• Who breaks the news?</li> <li>• Who breaks the news?</li> <li>• To what extent is patient confidentiality at stake? To what extent does an organization such as the ICRC have to compromise on its traditional policy of confidentiality?</li> </ul> | S 8/8<br>AM   |

**List of abbreviations**

|            |  |
|------------|--|
| BIO        | Biotechnology Industry Organization  |
| ICRC       | International Committee of the Red Cross   |
| Iran (NAM) | Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of the Group of the Non-aligned Movement and Other States Parties to the BWC  |
| OCHA       | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  |
| OIE        | World Organisation for Animal Health   |
| OPCW       | Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons   |
| S&T        | Scientific and technological   |
| SGM        | United Nations Secretary-General's mechanism for investigation of alleged use of biological and chemical weapons |
| UNODA      | United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs  |
| WHO        | World Health Organization  |

## Anexo II

### Lista de documentos

| <i>Signatura</i>  | <i>Título</i>   |
|---|---|
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/1   | Programa provisional de la Reunión de Expertos. Presentado por el Presidente  |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/2   | Programa provisional de trabajo de la Reunión de Expertos. Presentado por el Presidente   |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/3   | Informe de la Reunión de Expertos. Presentado por el Presidente   |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/INF.1 y Add.1                                   | Organizaciones internacionales que podrían participar en la prestación y la coordinación de la asistencia relacionada con el artículo VII. Presentado por la Dependencia de Apoyo a la Aplicación   |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/INF.2   | Acuerdos y entendimientos anteriores en el marco de la Convención relativos al fortalecimiento de la aplicación del artículo VII, incluida la consideración de procedimientos y mecanismos detallados para la prestación de asistencia y la cooperación de los Estados partes. Presentado por la Dependencia de Apoyo a la Aplicación |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/INF.3 y Corr.1                                  | Adelantos científicos y tecnológicos relacionados con la Convención. Presentado por la Dependencia de Apoyo a la Aplicación   |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/INF.4 y Corr.1                                  | Información básica sobre las dificultades y obstáculos persistentes para el desarrollo de la cooperación, la asistencia y el intercambio internacionales. Presentada por la Dependencia de Apoyo a la Aplicación  |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/INF.5   | Report on USA implementation of Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Submitted by the United States of America   |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/INF.6<br>[español, francés e inglés únicamente] | List of Participants  |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/WP.1<br>[inglés únicamente]                     | Making Article VII effective. Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland   |

| <i>Signatura</i>                                     | <i>Título</i>  |
|--|--|
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/WP.2<br>[inglés únicamente]          | Advances in science and technology: Understanding pathogenicity and virulence. Submitted by the United States of America   |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/WP.3<br>[inglés únicamente]          | Focusing Efforts to Strengthen Article VII: A proposed agenda for international cooperation and assistance in preparing for and responding to biological incidents. Submitted by the United States of America  |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/WP.4<br>[inglés únicamente]          | Advances in science and technology: Evasion of the host immune response by pathogens. Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/WP.5<br>[inglés únicamente]          | Responding to a case of suspect biological weapons use: The command and control element at the scene. Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland                                    |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/WP.6<br>[español únicamente]         | Aplicación nacional de la Convención sobre las Armas Biológicas: Una herramienta para la evaluación de las instalaciones con agentes biológicos <sup>1</sup> . Presentado por Chile, Colombia, España y México |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/WP.7 y Corr.1<br>[inglés únicamente] | The United States of America government policy for oversight of life sciences dual use research of concern (DURC). Submitted by the United States of America   |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/WP.8 y Corr.1<br>[inglés únicamente] | Strengthening national implementation: Elements of an effective national export control system. Submitted by the United States of America  |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/WP.8/Rev.1<br>[inglés únicamente]    | Strengthening national implementation: Elements of an effective national export control system. Submitted by Australia, Canada, Germany, France, Japan, Netherlands, Spain and the United States of America    |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/WP.9<br>[inglés únicamente]          | Article VII - Procedures. Submitted by South Africa  |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/WP.10<br>[inglés únicamente]         | A Response to BWC/MSP/2012/WP.11: "We Need to Talk about Compliance". Submitted by the United States of America  |

<sup>1</sup> El texto en español se acompaña de una traducción no oficial al inglés.

| <i>Signatura</i>   | <i>Título</i>  |
|--|--|
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/WP.11<br>[inglés únicamente]                     | National implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention. Submitted by Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Republic of Korea and Thailand  |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/WP.12<br>[francés únicamente]                    | Exercice pilote de revue par les pairs tenu du 4 au 6 décembre 2013 à Paris <sup>2</sup> . Présenté par la France  |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/WP.13<br>[francés únicamente]                    | Pistes de travail sur la mise en œuvre de l'article VII dans le cadre de la CIAB <sup>2</sup> . Présenté par la France   |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/CRP.1<br>[inglés únicamente]                     | Draft elements for the compilation of the considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions on the topics under discussion at the Meeting |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/CRP.2<br>[inglés únicamente]                     | Draft Report of the Meeting of Experts. Submitted by the Chairman  |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/CRP.3<br>[inglés únicamente]                     | Draft elements for the compilation of the considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions on the topics under discussion at the Meeting |
| BWC/MSP/2014/MX/MISC.1<br>[español, francés e inglés únicamente] | Provisional List of Participants   |

<sup>2</sup> El texto en francés se acompaña de una traducción no oficial al inglés.