

AD HOC GROUP OF THE STATES PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION
OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND
STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL
(BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS
AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

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PROCEDURAL REPORT OF THE AD HOC GROUP OF THE
STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION
OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF
BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS
AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

1. The Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction held its eighth session at the Palais des Nations, Geneva from 15 September - 3 October 1997, in accordance with the decision taken at its seventh session. The Group held 29 meetings during that period under the chairmanship of Ambassador Tibor Tóth of Hungary. Ambassador John Campbell of Australia and Ambassador Javier Illanes of Chile served as Vice-Chairmen of the Group. Mr. Ogunsola Ogunbanwo, the Senior Coordinator of the Disarmament Fellowship and Training Programme, Centre for Disarmament Affairs, Department of Political Affairs, served as Secretary of the Group.

2. At the eighth session of the Ad Hoc Group, the following States Parties to the Convention participated in the work of the Group: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, and Viet Nam. The following signatory States to the Convention also participated in the work of the Group: Egypt, Morocco and Myanmar.

3. At the 1st meeting, the Ad Hoc Group decided to continue its consideration of Agenda Item 9 entitled "Strengthening of the Convention in Accordance with the Mandate as it is contained in the Final Report of the Special Conference of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention".

4. At its eighth session, Ambassador Dr. Günther Seibert (Germany) and Mr. Ajit Kumar (India) were requested to assist the Ad Hoc Group as Friends of the Chair on Confidentiality and on National Implementation and Assistance respectively. Accordingly, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group was assisted by Friends of the Chair in his consultations and negotiations on particular issues as follows:

Definitions of Terms and Objective Criteria

- Dr. Ali A. Mohammadi (Islamic Republic of Iran)

Measures to Promote Compliance

- Mr. Richard Tauwhare (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

Investigations Annex

- Mr. Peter Goosen (South Africa)

Measures Related to Article X

- Mr. Carlos S. Duarte (Brazil)

Legal Issues

- Ambassador John Campbell (Australia).

Confidentiality Issues

- Ambassador Dr. Günther Seibert (Germany)

National Implementation and Assistance

- Mr. Ajit Kumar (India)

5. Out of the 29 meetings the Ad Hoc Group held in accordance with the programme of work, 12 meetings were devoted to issues related to "Measures to Promote Compliance", 3 meetings were devoted to "Measures Related to Article X", 3 meetings were devoted to "Definitions of Terms and Objective Criteria", 1 meeting was devoted to "Legal Issues", 4 meetings were devoted to "Investigations Annex", 3 meetings were devoted to "Organization/Implementational Arrangements" issues, 2 meetings were devoted to "Confidentiality" issues, and 1 meeting was devoted to "National Implementation and Assistance". The Friends of the Chair were assisted by Mr. Vladimir Bogomolov, Political Affairs Officer of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs and Ms. Iris Hunger, Professional Assistant.

6. The results of discussions are attached to this draft report. (Annex I) In addition to the statement of the Chairman that the position of delegations is not prejudiced by this paper, individual brackets have been introduced to cover specific preliminary concerns of delegations and it is recognized that further and detailed consideration of all elements will be required at the future sessions.

7. In addition to the documents presented at its previous sessions, the Ad Hoc Group had before it 37 working papers covering all elements of the mandate under discussion and which are listed in Annex III.

8. The Ad Hoc Group addressed, in the course of Chairman's consultations and informal meetings, the issue of the intensification and programme of work of the Ad Hoc Group.

The Ad Hoc Group agreed to have three sessions of three weeks and one session of two weeks in 1998. The three-week sessions will be held as follows: 5 January-23 January, 22 June-10 July, and 28 September-16 October.

As for the dates of the two-week session, the Ad Hoc Group agreed, without prejudice to the position of delegations on that issue, to take a decision by the end of the January 1998 session, whether the two-week session should be held between 23 March-3 April or between 30 November-11 December 1998. Notwithstanding any future decision about the scheduling of the two-week meeting in 1998, the Ad Hoc Group will take a decision on the timing and duration of meetings in 1999 no later than during the 28 September-16 October meeting in 1998.

During periods when both the Ad Hoc Group and the Conference on Disarmament are in session, Ad Hoc Group meetings will not convene on Wednesday mornings and Thursday mornings. Further, during such overlapping periods, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group will consult with the President of the CD in an effort to avoid scheduling conflicts. In the event that overlap between meetings of the Ad Hoc Group and the CD is unavoidable, the Chairman will seek the cooperation of the President in order to adjust the specific timing of conflicting meetings. If, notwithstanding these efforts conflicting meetings are still unavoidable, the programme of work of the Ad Hoc Group will be adjusted by rescheduling those meetings for early morning or early afternoon periods.

9. The Ad Hoc Group considered and adopted the Programme of Work for the ninth session to be held from 5-23 January 1998. (Annex II)

10. At its 29th meeting on 3 October 1997, the Ad Hoc Group adopted the estimated costs of the ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth sessions of the Group as contained in document BWC/AD HOC GROUP/37.

11. At its 29th meeting on 3 October, the Ad Hoc Group considered and adopted its draft procedural report (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/L.1 and Adds. 1 to 30 and corrigenda Nos. 1 to 10).

ANNEX I

**ROLLING TEXT* OF A PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF
THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL
(BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION**

* This rolling text is without prejudice to the positions of delegations on the issues under consideration in the Ad Hoc Group and does not imply agreement on the scope or content

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PREAMBLE¹

[The States Parties to this Protocol,

Being Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, which was opened for signature on 10 April 1972, and entered into force on 26 March 1975, hereinafter referred to as the Biological Weapons Convention,

Being Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972 (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972),

Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,

Mindful of their obligations under that Convention never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes or weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict,

Mindful of their obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention, and desiring to further the objectives of the Biological Weapons Convention,

Noting the reaffirmation by the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 at the Fourth Review Conference that the use by States Parties, in any way and under any circumstances, of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a violation of Article I of the Convention,

Reaffirming that the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 is essential to international peace and security,

1. Preliminary discussions were held on the Preamble. Further consideration needs to be given to this topic.

Reiterating their firm commitment to the Preamble and the provisions of that Convention, and their belief that universal adherence to that Convention would enhance international peace and security,

Convinced that the current international situation provides an opportunity to enhance the implementation and effectiveness of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 and to further strengthen its authority,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress toward general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition of all types of weapons of mass destruction,

Desiring to contribute to the realization and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (Geneva Protocol of 1925) and calling upon all States to strictly comply with them,

Conscious of the contribution the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 have already made to mitigating the horrors of war,

Recognizing the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, which was opened for signature on 13 January 1993, and entered into force on 29 April 1997,

Welcoming the entry into force on 29 April 1997 of the Convention on the Prohibition on the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, signed in Paris on 13-15 January 1993, and the measures it provides to verify compliance with its provisions,

Recognizing the significant advances in the field of biotechnology since the entry into force of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, and that achievement in this field should be used exclusively for the benefit of all peoples,

Recognizing the significant advances in the field of biotechnology since the entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention and that achievement in this field should be used exclusively for the benefit of mankind, and conscious of the apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and technological developments as expressed by States Parties at the Review Conferences held in 1986, 1991 and 1996 of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention,

Determined for the sake of all peoples to exclude completely the possibility of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention or use of biological weapons through the implementation of this Protocol, furthering the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972,

Determined to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention,

Reaffirming the commitment made by each State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention at the Third Review Conference to implement, on the basis of mutual cooperation, the Confidence Building Measures set forth in the Final Declaration of that Conference, including its annex, irrespective of whether it becomes a party to this Protocol,

Desiring to promote international cooperation and exchange of scientific and technical information in the field of biotechnology in accordance with Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, to enhance the economic and technological development of all States Parties,

Desiring to promote international cooperation and exchange of scientific and technical information in the field of biotechnology for purposes not prohibited under the Biological Weapons Convention to enhance the economic and technological development of all States Parties,

Emphasizing the increasing importance of the provisions of Article X, especially in the light of recent scientific and technological developments in the field of biotechnology, bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins with peaceful applications, which have vastly increased the potential for cooperation between States to help to promote economic and social development, and scientific and technological progress, particularly in the developing countries, in conformity with their interests, needs and priorities,

Concerned with the increasing gap between the developed and the developing countries in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related areas,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Declaration of Principles adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, States should cooperate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for sustainable development by improving scientific understanding through exchanges of scientific and technical knowledge, and by enhancing the development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies, including new and innovative technologies,

Determined to promote international cooperation on all developments in the field of frontier science and high technology in areas relevant to the BTWC, and urging the developed countries possessing advanced biotechnology and knowledge in such fields as medicine, public health and agriculture to adopt positive measures and to continue to promote technology transfer and cooperation on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, in particular with the developing countries, for the benefit of all mankind,

Convinced that to contribute as effectively as possible to the prevention of the proliferation of biological and toxin weapons, and therefore to enhance international peace and security, all States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 should become States Parties to this Protocol,

Convinced that the most effective way to ensure a world free of biological and toxin weapons is to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, in particular through the inclusion of effective verification provisions,

Convinced that the adoption of additional measures to provide increased transparency with respect to potential biological weapons related activities and facilities will enhance compliance with and help deter violations of the Biological Weapons Convention,

Have agreed as follows:]

ARTICLE I
GENERAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE II

[DEFINITIONS²

The definitions of the following terms were discussed by or proposed to the Ad Hoc Group and may need further consideration in the context of specific measures. The appearance of any term on this list is without prejudice to whether that term has either an acceptable definition content or is acceptable for inclusion in any final legally binding instrument.

[1. Bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons

A type of weapon specifically designed [to cause disease, death or any harm to][for mass destruction] of human beings, animals or plants, the effects of which are based on the properties of biological agents and toxins.

The term "Bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons" shall be applied to the following:

- Biological agents and toxins (except when they are designed for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, provided that the types of agents and toxins and their quantities are appropriate for those purposes);
- Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed for the use of biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.]³

[2. Biological agents (microbiological and other biological agents, bacteriological (biological) means, bacteriological (biological) agents) [organisms]

Microorganisms, their genetically modified forms and other biological agents [designed] to [destroy] [cause death, disease and incapacitate] human beings, animals or plants.]⁴

2. Delegations expressed different views about the appropriate location of any agreed definition. One view was, that any agreed definitions should compose an Article of the final document. Another view was that any agreed definitions should be contained in an appropriate Annex.

3. A view was expressed that any proposal to define Article I terms would have the effect of amending the Convention outside the legal provisions of Article XI, contrary to the mandate of the Group. Another view was expressed that defining those terms is indispensable for the purposes of a verification mechanism and will not have the effect of amending the Convention.

4. Ibid

3. Biological defence facility

Facility which works in [one or more of the following areas of] [a biological defence programme] [/defence programme against biological and toxin weapons] [as one of its principal and/or permanent roles in research, development, testing, production and evaluation].

4. [Military][civilian] [biological defence programme] [/Defence programme against biological and toxin weapons]

[Research, development, production, testing and evaluation] programme designed to detect and assess the impact of any use of microbial or other biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict, and/[or] to prevent, reduce and neutralize the impact of biological and toxin weapons on humans, animals or plants.

5. Biosafety Level 3

Biosafety level 3 comprises the safety practices [as specified in the 1993 WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual], [and the] building designs and [structure], equipment used in research, development, testing or diagnostic work in laboratory activities involving [pathogens that pose a high risk of infection]. [microbial or other biological agents, or toxins that pose a high risk [to health] [of causing infectious disease or a similar occurrence in the case of toxins (intoxination)] [of infection] [or intoxication] [or intoxication]].

[Biosafety level 3 characteristics include buildings with negative pressure to the environment and access control and the exhaust air from safety cabinets that pass through high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. Other characteristics could also include buildings sealable for decontamination, with a ventilation system that establishes a directional airflow from the access space into the laboratory room, double door entry into the room, sealable windows and effluent disinfected. Equipment used inside include biosafety cabinets and specialised autoclaves. [The two person rule whereby no individual ever works alone in the laboratory applicable, biohazard warning signs displayed when work is in progress and, where applicable, protective laboratory clothing, worn inside.]]

6. Diagnostic Facility

[Any] [A] facility which tests [only] samples for the purpose of diagnosis of human, animal and plant disease⁵ [by means of detection, isolation and identification of microbial or other biological agents or toxins].

5. Encyclopedia Britannica, 1992.

7. Facility

A combination of physical structures, equipment, workforce and principal associated support infrastructure [having an identifiable boundary and a single administration] whether under construction, operational or non-operational. [for [the] [either] [research,] development, production, testing, processing, stockpiling, otherwise acquiring or retaining microbial or other biological agents or toxins].

8. [Genetic modifications]

Genetic modification involves a process of arranging and manipulating nucleic acids of an organism to give it a capability to produce novel molecules or to add to it new characteristics, [excluding classical genetic techniques, natural processes and applications involving somatic hybridoma cells].⁶

[8 bis In the context of declaration triggers, genetic modification of listed agents and toxins means any manipulation of listed agents and toxins involving the application of techniques used in genetic modification, whatever the outcome.]

[9. Hostile purposes

The use of bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons or biological agents by a State (States) to [destroy] [cause death, disease and incapacitate] human beings, animals or plants in a State (States) which is (are) not engaged in a military conflict with the former State (States) with a view to inflicting military, economic or moral damage.]⁷

10. Military medical programme

Medical programme to monitor, maintain and/or restore the physical, mental and social health, including detection, diagnosis, prophylaxis and treatment of infectious diseases and intoxications [that occur naturally] of serving and/or retired military personnel and their dependents, as well as civilians other than in the context of defence against the use of microbial or other biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

6. It may include alterations in the genetic material of organisms in performing new functions like:

- enhancement or reduction in pathogenicity and/or virulence;
- resistance to biotic and abiotic stress;
- change in antigenicity;
- enhancement of stability in environment and ease in cultivation.

7. See footnote 3.

11. Primary production containment

Primary containment in production comprises the safety practices and equipment design features used in production activities involving microbial or other biological agents or toxins where there is a need to prevent incidental release into the environment. [Microorganisms, [viruses] and eukaryotic cells are handled in a [closed] system which physically separates the process from the environment (closed system) with seals so as to prevent release of organisms from the system, exhaust gases from the system treated so as to prevent release [and effluent treated before final discharge,] [from the system].] Sample collection, addition of material to the system and transfer of viable organisms to another closed system, performed so as to prevent release. This system could be located within a controlled area.]

[11 bis Primary production containment comprises the safety practices and equipment design features used in production activities involving microbial or other biological agents or toxins where there is a need to prevent incidental release into the environment. Microorganisms and eukaryotic cells are handled in a closed system.]]

[12. Closed System

A system, which physically separates the process from the environment with seals so as to prevent release of organisms from the system, exhaust gases from the system are treated so as to prevent release and effluent is treated before final discharge. Sample collection, addition of material to the system and transfer of viable organisms to another system, is performed so as to prevent release. This system could be located within a controlled area.

A closed system may also contain closed vessels used for the preparation, growth and storage of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins.]

13. Production capability

Expertise and capability to produce microbial or other biological agents or toxins, whatever their origin or method of production.

[14. Purposes not prohibited by the Convention

[Industrial, agricultural and medical research] Treatment, prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.]⁸

15. Site

A geographically defined location or area having an identifiable boundary that contains [or has contained (in a time frame to be specified)] one or more facilities.

[16. Toxins

Toxic by-products of microorganisms, natural poisons of animal or plant origin, whatever their method of production, designed to [destroy] [cause death, disease and incapacitate] human beings, animals or plants.]⁹

17. Vaccine

Preparations, including live-attenuated, killed or otherwise modified organisms or their components, and nucleic acids, which when introduced by any of multiple routes into a human being or animal induces in it an active immune response for prophylactic or protective use.

18. Work with [listed] biological agents and toxins

[Any manipulations with [listed] biological agents and toxins that cover for instance research, development, production and diagnosis using [listed] biological agents and toxins including the study of properties of biological agents and toxins, detection and identification methods, genetic modification, aerobiology, prophylaxis and treatment methods [maintenance of culture collections] [registered culture collection].]

[18 bis In the context of declaration triggers, work with listed agents and toxins means any manipulation or production of listed agents and toxins involving the application of techniques used in genetic modification, whatever the outcome.]

[19. Plant inoculant

A formulation containing pure or predetermined mixture of microorganisms, such as living bacteria, fungi or virus particles for the treatment of seeds, seedlings, other plant propagation material, or plants for the purpose of enhancing the growth capabilities, or disease, or frost resistance or otherwise altering the properties of the eventual plants or crop.]

9. See footnote 3.

[20. Biocontrol agent

[A material of biological origin or] An [micro-]organism used for the prevention, elimination or reduction of the disease, pest [or] which may have negative impact on a plant or crop.]

[21. Antitoxin / Therapeutic Serum

Immunizing product formed of serum taken from an animal or human which has developed antibodies to a disease and used to protect and treat a patient from that disease. Any other products produced by cellular culture directed to accomplish the same objective, or directed to diminish a toxic effect are also included under this definition.] [Human or animal blood serum which contains antibodies to a microorganism or toxin and is used to protect or treat humans and animals from the disease caused by this microorganism or toxin.]]

ARTICLE III

COMPLIANCE MEASURES

A. [LISTS AND CRITERIA (AGENTS AND TOXINS)]

B. [EQUIPMENT]

C. [THRESHOLDS]¹⁰

1. [Each State Party can store at facilities, for the purposes of developing and testing means of protection against biological weapons, established threshold quantities of biological materials containing listed agents. Specific values of threshold quantities shall be determined in accordance with the Annex IV. These thresholds do not cover quantities that are used in day to day work and for the production of immune biological, medical and other preparations.]
2. [Thresholds are meant to limit the scope of Article I of the Biological Weapons Convention and as such are of no value for this Protocol.]

10. Views were expressed that the application of threshold limits to the possession of biological agents and toxins is not a useful means to strengthen the Convention and could undermine the provisions of Article I; this would clearly be outside the mandate of the Group. Peaceful quantities of an agent cannot be defined independently of the particular circumstances of the use, which means that fixed thresholds cannot be used. There would be a risk of a threshold for work for defence purposes being used to conceal offensive activities. The application of threshold limits could provide inaccurate impressions of the scale of activities at a facility because the self-replicating nature of micro-organisms means that an agent amount at or below a threshold could be exceeded within a matter of hours. Finally, even small quantities of biological agents and toxins could, depending upon their intended purpose, violate the object and purpose of the Convention.

Another view was that the establishment of threshold quantities of biological agents and toxins is essential for an effective verification regime under the BTWC. Such threshold limits do not contradict in any way the mandate of the Group, since the mandate specifies that the Group shall, *inter alia*, consider "definitions of terms and objective criteria, such as lists of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, their threshold quantities". This approach does not affect the scope of Article I of the Convention.

D. DECLARATIONS

1. [Each State Party shall declare , regardless of the form of their ownership [or control], all activities or facilities listed below which exist on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control.]
2. [Each State Party shall submit [to the BTWC Organization] an initial declaration according to the format in Annex ..., not later than [60] [90] days after the Protocol has entered into force for that State Party. [This declaration shall include information on past offensive and/or defensive biological research [and] development [testing or production] programmes [at any time since [17 June 1925] [1 January 1946] [26 March 1975]] [unless this information has already been provided under the CBMs].]]
3. [Thereafter, each State Party shall submit an annual declaration, according to the format[s] in Annex ..., not later than 90 days after the end of the previous calendar year on the activities of that year.]
4. [The initial and annual declarations required under this Article shall be made available by [the BTWC Organization] on request to all States Parties.]
5. [The declarations shall include the following] [The following shall be declared]:
 - (a) Activities
 - (i) the presence/absence of [military] [civilian] [national] [biological] defence programmes [against biological and toxin weapons],¹¹
 - (ii) any additional information related to past offensive and/or defensive activities not provided in the initial declaration.]]

11. The term "[Military][civilian] [national] [biological] defence programme [against biological and toxin weapons]" is defined in this specific context as follows: [Research, development, production, testing and evaluation] programme designed to detect and assess the impact of any use of microbial or other biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict, and/[or] to prevent, reduce and neutralize the impact of biological and toxin weapons on humans, animals or plants.

[(b) Facilities

- (i) [taking part in] [military] [civilian] [national] [biological] defence [facilities taking part in] programme(s) [against biological and toxin weapons]¹¹ [and conducting work on microorganisms or toxins as well as material imitating their properties];
- (ii) which produce vaccines¹² [and/or antitoxins] [licensed by the State Party] for the protection of humans [and animals] [against listed agents or toxins] [with a production capacity as specified in Annex ...] [with primary production containment];
- [(iii) which produce plant inoculants and/or biological control agent(s)¹³ and have a plant quarantine capacity,]
- (iv) which have any maximum containment laboratories meeting criteria designated as biosafety level 4 ((BL4) according to WHO classification) or P4 (according to WHO classification) or equivalent standards;

12. *The term "vaccine" is defined in this specific context as follows: Preparations, including live-attenuated, killed or otherwise modified organisms or their components, and nucleic acids, which when introduced by any of multiple routes into a human being or animal induces in it an active immune response for prophylactic or protective use.*

13. *The terms "Plant inoculant" and "Biocontrol agent" are defined in this specific context as follows: [A formulation containing pure or predetermined mixture of microorganisms, such as living bacteria, fungi or virus particles for the treatment of seeds, seedlings, other plant propagation material, or plants for the purpose of enhancing the growth capabilities, or disease, or frost resistance or otherwise altering the properties of the eventual plants or crop.] and [[A material of biological origin or] An [micro-]organism used for the prevention, elimination or reduction of the disease, pest [or] which may have negative impact on a plant or crop.]*

[(v) containing areas protected according to biosafety level 3¹⁴ (BL3) [as specified in the 1993 WHO laboratory Biosafety Manual] [and working with listed agents or toxins] but excluding purely diagnostic [and medical] facilities;]

(vi) which

[work with listed agents or toxins]¹⁵ [with the exclusion of facilities involved only in diagnostic and/or medical treatment activities];

conduct any of the following activities with any of the agents or toxins listed in Annex A [excluding those involved only in diagnostic and/or medical treatment activities]:

[- research and development, including on detection or identification methods [and with an aggregate production capacity on site of 100 litres or more] [and with certain containment characteristics including negative air pressure]];

[- production of such agents or toxins [and/or of vaccines against them] [with an aggregate production capacity on site of 100 litres or more] [and with certain containment characteristics including negative air pressure]];

14. The term "Biosafety Level 3" is defined in this specific context as follows: Biosafety level 3 comprises the safety practices [as specified in the 1993 WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual], [and the] building designs and [structure], equipment used in research, development, testing or diagnostic work in laboratory activities involving [pathogens that pose a high risk of infection]. [microbial or other biological agents, or toxins that pose a high risk [to health] [of causing infectious disease or a similar occurrence in the case of toxins (intoxination)] [of infection] [or intoxication] [or intoxication]].

[Biosafety level 3 characteristics include buildings with negative pressure to the environment and access control and the exhaust air from safety cabinets that pass through high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. Other characteristics could also include buildings sealable for decontamination, with a ventilation system that establishes a directional airflow from the access space into the laboratory room, double door entry into the room, sealable windows and effluent disinfected. Equipment used inside include biosafety cabinets and specialized autoclaves. [The two person rule whereby no individual ever works alone in the laboratory applicable, biohazard warning signs displayed when work is in progress and, where applicable, protective laboratory clothing, worn inside.]]

15. The term "Work with [listed] biological agents and toxins" is defined in this specific context as follows: [Any manipulations with [listed] biological agents and toxins that cover for instance research, development, production and diagnosis using [listed] biological agents and toxins including the study of properties of biological agents and toxins, detection and identification methods, genetic modification, aerobiology, prophylaxis and treatment methods [maintenance of culture collections] [registered culture collection] [any manipulation or production of listed agents and toxins involving the application of techniques used in genetic modification, whatever the outcome].]

- [- maintaining culture collections [registered and designated by the government] and provide professional services on demand];
 - [- genetic modification¹⁶] [applying genetic modification techniques] [to enhance pathogenicity, virulence or resistance to environmental factors/antibiotics] [focussing on genetic elements containing nucleic acid sequences coding for the determinants of pathogenicity of listed microorganisms or toxins];
 - [- aerobiology];
 - [- any of the above activities and with areas protected according to biosafety level 3 (BL3)];
- [(vii) other microbiological production facilities [including development facilities¹⁷] not working with listed agents which have an aggregate fermenter production capacity of [100] [1000] litres or more

16. *The term "Genetic modification" is defined in this specific context as follows: [Genetic modification involves a process of arranging and manipulating nucleic acids of an organism to give it a capability to produce novel molecules or to add to it new characteristics, [excluding classical genetic techniques, natural processes and applications involving somatic hybridoma cells] [any manipulation of listed agents and toxins involving the application of techniques used in genetic modification, whatever the outcome].*

It may include alterations in the genetic material of organisms in performing new functions like: enhancement or reduction in pathogenicity and/or virulence; resistance to biotic and abiotic stress; change in antigenicity; enhancement of stability in environment and ease in cultivation.]

Genetic modification requires further discussion. [It may be necessary to:

- *restrict genetic modification to enhancement of pathogenicity, virulence, or resistance to environmental factors/antibiotics;*
- *focus on genetic elements containing nucleic acid sequences coding for the determinants of pathogenicity of listed microorganisms;*
- *focus on genetic elements containing nucleic acid sequences coding for listed toxins.]*

17. *The term "development facility" is defined in this specific context as follows: (A definition of this term has yet to be discussed.)*

[with primary production containment;]^{18 19}

[- which produce by fermentation (i) medicines and/or (ii) antibiotics or (iii) other microorganisms in closed systems²⁰.]

[(viii) not working with listed agents or toxins which

- possess [aerosol [explosive] test chambers of ... m³ or above for work with microorganisms or toxins] [equipment for aerosol dissemination in the open air with a particle mass median diameter not exceeding [10] microns][excluding those for purely routine agricultural [, health or environmental] use]²¹;

[- conduct genetic modification¹⁶ [to enhance pathogenicity and virulence²² [or resistance to environmental factors/antibiotics]] [with BL3 containment or equivalent standard] [and have an aggregate production capacity of 100 litres or more].]]

18. The term "Primary production containment" is defined in this specific context as follows: [Primary containment in production comprises the safety practices and equipment design features used in production activities involving microbial or other biological agents or toxins where there is a need to prevent incidental release into the environment. [Microorganisms, [viruses] and eukaryotic cells are handled in a [closed] system which physically separates the process from the environment (closed system) with seals so as to prevent release of organisms from the system, exhaust gases from the system treated so as to prevent release [and effluent treated before final discharge,] [from the system].] Sample collection, addition of material to the system and transfer of viable organisms to another closed system, performed so as to prevent release. This system could be located within a controlled area.]

[Primary production containment comprises the safety practices and equipment design features used in production activities involving microbial or other biological agents or toxins where there is a need to prevent incidental release into the environment. Microorganisms and eukaryotic cells are handled in a closed system.]

19. This term has been referred to the Group of the Friend of the Chair on Definitions for further discussion.

20. The term "Closed System" is defined in this specific context as follows: [A system, which physically separates the process from the environment with seals so as to prevent release of organisms from the system, exhaust gases from the system are treated so as to prevent release and effluent is treated before final discharge. Sample collection, addition of material to the system and transfer of viable organisms to another system, is performed so as to prevent release. This system could be located within a controlled area.

A closed system may also contain closed vessels used for the preparation, growth and storage of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins.]

21. This term has been recognized to need further clarification during forthcoming sessions.

22. This term has been referred to the Group of the Friend of the Chair on Definitions for further discussion.

[Transfers

6. Each State Party shall declare annually all transfers of listed agents or toxins, equipment [or means of delivery].
7. Each State Party declaring such transfers shall submit information according to the format in Annex ...]²³

[Appearance of outbreaks of disease or epidemics

8. [Each State Party shall declare to an international epidemiological network,] in accordance with guidelines set out in Annex ..., any relevant information on outbreaks of disease, epidemics (or similar occurrences caused by toxins) that occur on its territory or in areas under its jurisdiction or control, caused by listed agents or toxins for humans, animals or plants [or which have clinical and epidemiological effects similar to diseases or syndromes caused by listed agents or toxins but are undiagnosed].]

[Declarations on the Implementation of Article X of the Convention

9. Each State Party shall declare annually the measures taken individually or together with other States and international organizations in implementing Article X of the Convention
10. Each State Party shall have the right to declare any restrictions, in non-compliance with the obligations under Article X, on the transfer of biological materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.
11. Each State Party shall submit a declaration on the implementation of Article X of the Convention according to the format in Annex ...]

23. The format developed by the FOC on CBMs for Data on Transfers and Transfer Requests may need to be appropriately modified to take into account the provisions of guidelines for strengthening implementation of Article III that may be provided for in the Protocol. Further consideration of the need for such guidelines is required

E. CONSULTATION, CLARIFICATION AND COOPERATION²⁴

- [1. Each State Party shall have the right to submit [to the BTWC Organization] a request for clarification of any ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly, omission or any other issue [relating to the declaration obligations of any State Party under this Protocol].
- [2. [Each State Party] [and/or] [the BTWC Organization] shall have the right to seek [directly or through [the BTWC Organization]] clarification from any State Party of any ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly or omission relating to the declaration obligations of any State Party under this Protocol, through consultations with the State Party concerned.]
- [3. Each State Party shall also have the right to request visits in accordance with]
4. [Without prejudice to the right of a State Party to request an investigation] [the BTWC Organization] and the requested State Party [may, as appropriate, make efforts] [shall] [as a rule] [make every effort] to resolve the ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly, contradiction in, or omission from, the State Party's declarations through consultations and/or correspondence, as provided for in section ... of this Protocol.]

24 This section requires further consideration.

F. [VISITS AND INVESTIGATIONS]^{25 26 27}

[I. [Visits²⁸]

(A) [Random Visits]

1. [The BTWC Organization] shall conduct, in accordance with the detailed provisions contained in the Annex on Implementation, a limited number per year of Random Visits [which shall be non-confrontational [and confidence-building] in nature] to declared facilities [which shall be designed [, *inter alia*,] to confirm, in cooperation with the Visited State Party] that declarations are consistent with the obligations under this Protocol.
2. The [Technical] Secretariat shall, at random, identify declared facilities for Random Visits through appropriate mechanisms as specified in the Annex on Implementation.²⁹
3. There shall be no more than [...] Random Visits per year, and they shall be distributed [fairly] among the regional groups [and proportional to the number of the declared facilities of each State Party].

25. The need for general provisions on visits and investigations will be considered in the light of the forthcoming discussions.

26. The inclusion of this section is without prejudice to a final decision on whether provisions for other visits and procedures will form part of the future Protocol.

27. Some delegations expressed the view that it would not be expedient to include Non-Challenge Visits as a compliance measure in a future Protocol to the BTWC. These delegations noted that the declared goals of Non-Challenge Visits could be achieved through other measures. According to this view the efficiency of such visits would be low. Non-Challenge Visits would require additional national structures to provide organizational support to such visits which would lead to a further increase in costs related to the functioning of the BTWC control mechanism for the States Parties. Moreover, Non-Challenge Visits would increase the risk of revealing confidential scientific, technological and commercial information and would unduly hinder the industrial enterprises' activities.

28. Some delegations expressed the view that, to be effective, a future Protocol should include provisions which would allow the possibility of visits to facilities to review the observance of declaration obligations under the Protocol in circumstances other than to investigate a non-compliance concern. These delegations believe that procedures envisaged for Random Visits, Ambiguity-Related Visits, Declaration Clarification and Consultation Procedures (including Request Visits) described in Article III and the visits described in Article VII 20(d) of document BWC/AD HOC GROUP/36 are all valid concepts which should be further developed and which could form components of an integrated system of Visits. These same delegations expressed the view that further work focusing on their similarities and differences is required.

29. Procedures for selecting Random Visits need further consideration.

4. In the case of Random Visits, [the Director-General] shall issue a standard mandate for the visit, which shall confirm that declarations are consistent with the obligations under this Protocol. [The mandate shall also encourage cooperation with the Visited State Party and shall require that the visit take place in the least confrontational manner possible.]

5. [...] hours before the arrival of the Visit Team, [the Director-General] shall notify the representative of the Visited State Party and, at the same time, shall make available to the Visited State Party the mandate for the visit.

[(B) Ambiguity-Related Visits]

6. [The BTWC Organization] may also conduct, in accordance with the provisions of this article and the detailed provisions contained in the Annex on Implementation, Ambiguity-Related Visits to declared facilities to resolve ambiguities in declarations.

7. In cases where the [Technical] Secretariat has identified ambiguities in the declarations of facilities, and has not been able to resolve these ambiguities [through the process of consultation provided for in Section E], the [Technical] Secretariat may, in accordance with the detailed provisions contained in the Annex on Implementation, identify those facilities for Ambiguity-Related Visits.

8. In the case of Ambiguity-Related Visits, [the Director-General] shall, in consultation with the Visited State Party, issue a mandate for the visit which shall be limited to resolving the identified ambiguities. [The mandate shall also encourage cooperation with the Visited State Party and shall require that the visit takes place in the least confrontational manner possible.]]

9. [...] hours before the arrival of the Visit Team, [the Director-General] shall notify the representative of the Visited State Party and, at the same time, shall make available to the Visited State Party the mandate for the visit.]

[(C) Clarification Visits]

10. [The BTWC Organization] may also conduct, in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the detailed provisions contained in the Annex D, Clarification Visits in order to resolve any ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly or omission in the declarations of a State party and to promote accuracy and comprehensiveness in future declarations.

11. Should [the BTWC Organization] and the requested State Party be unable to resolve the ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly or omission satisfactorily [through the process of consultation and clarification initiated by [a State Party][and/or][the BTWC Organization] under Section E],

[the BTWC Organization] [shall have the right to] [may, upon the request of the State Party] visit the declared facility or facilities in respect of which the ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly or omission has arisen.

[12. [The BTWC Organization] may also visit other relevant sites [specified in the visit plan and with the] [by] agreement [with] [of] the requested State Party.]

[13. For the purpose of clarifying the ambiguities, the number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of visits to a particular facility shall be arranged and agreed between the State Party and [the BTWC Organization].]

14. [The BTWC Organization] shall carry out a maximum of [...] visits under this Section [Article] during each two year period.

15. Within the overall limit specified in paragraph 14, [the BTWC Organization] shall carry out a maximum of [...] visits under this Section [Article] during each two year period, to States Parties within each of the five regional groups of countries - Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Western European and other States.

16. [The BTWC Organization] shall carry out no more than [...] visits under this Section [Article] to each State Party during each two-year period.

17. A State Party may offer visits in addition to those stipulated above in order to clarify any situation. [The Director-General] shall decide on the implementation of such visits, taking into account the resource implications.

18. The Director-General] shall, in consultation with the Visited State Party, issue a mandate for the visit which shall be limited to resolving the identified ambiguities, uncertainties anomalies, contradictions or omissions. [The mandate shall also encourage cooperation with the Visited State Party and shall require that the visit takes place in the least confrontational manner possible]

19. [21] days before the arrival of the Visit Team, [the Director-General] shall notify the representative of the Visited State Party and, at the same time, shall make available to the Visited State Party the mandate for the visit.]

(D) [Request Visits]

[20. Each State Party shall have the right to request [the BTWC Organization] to undertake up to [...] visits per year in order, *inter alia*, to help compile individual facility and national declarations as well as to further the cooperation and assistance provisions of this Protocol. [[The

Director-General] shall decide on the implementation of such visits taking into account the resource implications.] Such visits shall be subject to the same procedures, where relevant, as other visits. The detailed arrangements to, and contents of, a Request Visit, shall be agreed before hand between the [BTWC Organization] and the State Party concerned.]

[(E) Voluntary Visits]

[21. For the purpose of clarifying the ambiguities, the number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of visits to a particular facility shall be arranged and agreed between the State Party and [the BTWC Organization].]

Procedures for Visits

22. [The Director-General] shall designate the Visit Team, limiting its number to the minimum necessary to carry out the visit, and, in any case, no more than [4] [6] from [the BTWC Organization]. Approved equipment shall be brought on to the facility only with the agreement of the Visited State Party.

23. Upon arrival at the facility to be visited, and before the commencement of the visit, the Visit Team shall be briefed by the facility representatives and the representatives of the Visited State Party on the facility and the activities carried out there. The Visit Team, the facility representatives and the representatives of the Visited State Party shall then prepare the Visit Plan.

[24. The visit plan may identify, as appropriate and at the request of the facility representative, areas in which the Visit Team may provide technical assistance. These areas may include, *inter alia*, fulfilment of declaration obligations, biosafety standards, and good laboratory or manufacturing practices.]

25. Representatives of the Visited State Party and of the facility shall accompany the Visit Team throughout the duration of the visit to the facility.

26. The visit shall be carried out according to the Visit Plan and in the least intrusive manner possible. The Visited State Party shall cooperate with the Visit Team in the achievement of the objectives of the mandate.

27. [Access by the Visit Team shall be negotiated and agreed upon by the Visit Team and the Visited State Party.] The Visited State Party [shall have the right to negotiate the access requested by the Visit Team] [may apply managed access techniques, as illustrated, *inter alia*, in Annex D, where necessary] to protect sensitive information. The rights and obligations of the Visit Team and of the Visited State Party shall be as contained in this Protocol and the Annexes.

28. The focus of a Clarification Visit shall be the declared facilities and activities, especially those aspects connected with the ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly, contradiction in, or omission from, the declaration. The visiting team shall have the right to ask questions about other parts of the facility and its activities where these are relevant to improving its understanding of the facility declaration and the specific issues under clarification. The visiting team shall also have the right to request access to other parts of the facility. Access shall be by agreement of the facility.

29. The principal on-site measures shall be interviewing, identification of key equipment, auditing and visual observation as appropriate. Sampling shall only be conducted if offered by the facility and deemed useful by the visiting side. Any mutually agreed sampling and analysis shall be performed by facility personnel, but in the presence of the visiting team

30. The Visit Team shall collect only that information necessary to carry out its mandate

[31. During the conduct of the visits, as appropriate and at the request of the facility representatives, the Visit Team may give technical assistance in such areas as the fulfilment of declaration obligations, bio-safety standards, and good laboratory or manufacturing practices]

32. The duration of the visit shall be no more than [..] days unless extended by agreement of the Visit Team and the Visited State Party.

33. At the end of the visit, the Visit Team shall prepare its report

34. The report shall summarize the general activities undertaken during the visit and the factual findings of the Visit Team. The report shall be considered confidential

[35. The report may make recommendations if requested and in cooperation with the facility representatives, in such areas as the fulfilment of declaration obligations, bio-safety standards, and good laboratory or manufacturing practices.]

36. The report shall immediately be submitted to the Visited State Party. The Visited State Party may make written comments which shall be [annexed to] [included, as appropriate, in] the report. The report shall then be submitted to [the Director-General], who shall circulate it, including any findings relevant to the issue(s) raised under the clarification and consultation procedures, to all States Parties.

37. In cases where declarations remain inaccurate or incomplete, or where ambiguities remain, [the Director-General] shall inform [the Executive Council] [the politically representative body] which shall consider what, if any, further action is required.]

II. [MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE III]

[1. States Parties, in order to ensure compliance with Article III of the BTWC, shall only transfer dual use microbial and other biological agents, toxins and equipment for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, in accordance with the following guidelines.

2. In pursuance of paragraph 1, and recognizing that most of the agents, toxins, equipment and technologies are of a dual use nature and with the objective of preventing dual-use items from being utilized for purposes prohibited by BTWC, the guidelines shall be as follows:

(i) any request made by a State Party for the procurement of a specific agent/toxin reagent shall be accompanied by information on purpose, quantity required, site or facility for proposed use, quantity to be produced at the site or facility, place where intended to be stored and end-use certificate.³⁰

(ii) any request for transfer or procurement of equipment envisaged to be declared under CBMs, for use by a State participating in the compliance regime in a BL-4 facility, including details of its proposed application and the site/facility for intended use, shall be intimated to [the BTWC Organization];

(iii) any transfer of technology related to delivery systems, aerosol dispersion of toxins and pathogens, stabilization of agents/toxins to environmental stress shall be intimated to [the BTWC Organization];

(iv) transfer of agents, equipment and material shall not be allowed to non-States Parties of the compliance regime under the Convention without prior approval of [the BTWC Organization].]

[3. (a) To ensure compliance with Article III of the BTWC, [no] [each] State Party shall [only] authorize transfers to any recipient whatsoever, of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, or equipment which [is capable of using such agents or toxins for hostile purposes] [can be used in contravention of Article I of the Convention], [unless that State Party has] [if it is] determined that these will be used solely for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.

30. The format on Transfers developed by the Friend of the Chair on CBMs on "Data on Transfers and Transfer Requests and on Production" in pages 43-44 of BWC/AD HOC/ GROUP/32 would need to be modified in this context. Paragraph 2 above may be considered for Annex.

- (b) (i) Each State Party shall report to [the Organization] on the national laws and regulations it has adopted to implement Article III of the BTWC not later than [...] days after the entry into force of this Protocol for that State Party and whenever an amendment thereto is made.
- (ii) Each State Party shall report to [the Organization] on its administrative and other national measures to implement Article III of the BTWC not later than [...] days after the entry into force of this Protocol for that State Party and whenever an amendment thereto is made.
- [(iii) Such reports shall contain detailed information. If available, the information contained in these reports may be subject to examination during a visit under the Article I investigation procedures of this Protocol.]

[(c) No transfer of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, or equipment which is capable of using such agents or toxins for [hostile purposes] [for purposes which would contravene Article I of the Convention], shall be allowed to non-States Parties of the Convention and the Protocol.]³¹

[(d) Each State Party, in implementing these measures, shall ensure that they do not impede the peaceful economic and technological development of States.]]

4. [Proposed] Transfer Guidelines

- (i) The provisions of the Convention shall not be used to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials for purposes not prohibited under the Convention.
- (ii) In order to promote transparency in the biological trade, the States Parties may agree on arrangements for exchanging the end-user certificate related to biological exports in a manner that will entail no restrictions or impediments on access to biological materials, equipment or technological information by all States Parties. This would replace all existing Ad Hoc regulations in the biological trade at the time of entry into force of the Protocol for States Parties.
- (iii) An end-user certificate may be required from the recipients stating, in relation to the transferred biological agents or toxins and equipment (to be identified as relevant by the Ad Hoc Group), the following:

31. Further consideration should be given to possible humanitarian implications of such a prohibition

- (a) That they will only be used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention for the States not party to the Convention;
 - (b) That they will not be retransferred without receiving the authorization from the supplier(s);
 - (c) Their types and quantities;
 - (d) Their end-use(s); and
 - (e) The name and address(es) of the end-user(s).
- (iv) States Parties shall resolve suspicions arising from such transfers through the process of consultation and clarification in accordance with Article V of the Convention.]

III. INVESTIGATIONS³²

(A) TYPES OF INVESTIGATION

1. Investigations to address a non-compliance concern may be of two types:

[(1) Field Investigations where there is an event(s) of release of, or exposure of humans, animals or plants to microbial or other biological agents and toxins [that cause a concern about non-compliance with Article I of the BTWC by any other State Party]. These investigations would take place in affected geographic areas.]

[(1) Investigation of the alleged use of biological weapons.]

[(2) Facility Investigations where there is concern that a particular facility(ies) is involved in activities prohibited by Article I of the BTWC and will be conducted inside the perimeter of the facility.]

[(2) Investigation of any other alleged breach of obligations under the provisions of the Convention.]

A State Party requesting an investigation to address a non-compliance concern [may] [shall] specify which type of investigation it was seeking.

[(3) Investigations where there is a concern that a transfer has taken place in violation of Article III of the Convention.]

[2. [All] [natural] [outbreaks of] disease [which are demonstrated to be natural] [and accidents] are of no concern under the [Convention] [Protocol].]

32. There is no agreement on terminology of investigations. One possible term is "Investigation to Address a Non-Compliance Concern". Another possible term is "Challenge Inspection (under Article VI)".

(B) INITIATION

3. Each State Party³³ [to the Protocol]³⁴ shall have the right to request an investigation (as defined in paragraph 1 above) into a specific concern about non-compliance with [Article I [and Article III]] of the BTWC by any other State Party [to the Protocol].
4. A State Party may request a [field investigation] [investigation of alleged use of biological weapons] (as defined in paragraph 1 above) about a situation [either] on its own territory [, or on the territory of another State Party,] [or of a non-State Party].
5. Investigations may be conducted on the territory of any State Party or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party regardless of the form of ownership of the facility or the geographic area subject to the investigation.
6. Each State Party shall be under the obligation to keep all requests within the scope of the Convention and refrain from unfounded requests.
7. The investigations shall be carried out for the sole purpose of determining the facts relating to the possible non-compliance.
8. Requests for investigations [under this Protocol] [may] [shall] be submitted to [the BTWC Organization] [the politically representative body of the States Parties] [the United Nations Security Council, in accordance with Article VI of the Biological Weapons Convention] [and agreed procedures established under the Protocol].
- [9. In the case of a non-compliance concern involving a State which is a Party to the BTWC but not to the Protocol, [the BTWC Organization and/or] [States Parties], where appropriate, shall use the relevant provisions of the Convention to seek to resolve the concern. In cases where an investigation has been initiated, the provisions and rights with regard to access and conduct of investigations foreseen under the Protocol may be applied to such investigations as [agreed and] appropriate.]
- [10. In the case of a State Party requesting a [field] investigation [of the alleged use of biological weapons] on the territory of a non-State Party to the Convention, [another State Party shall be named as the alleged perpetrator]. [Consultations would need to be undertaken with the non-State

33. Further consideration is required in each case of whether specific references to "a State Party" mean "a State Party to the Protocol" or "a State Party to the Convention".

34. The term "Protocol" is used without prejudice to a decision on the form of the legally binding instrument.

Party with a view to securing] [[Subject to its agreement] the non-State Party shall be requested to provide] access to the relevant area(s) of concern on its territory. The provisions and rights with regard to access and conduct of investigations foreseen for States Parties under the Protocol may be applied to investigations on the territory of a non-State Party as [agreed and] appropriate.]

[11. In cases of investigations of non-compliance concern involving a State not Party to the BTWC or in territory not controlled by a State Party, the BTWC Organization should closely cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. If so requested, the BTWC Organization should put its resources at the disposal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.]

12. Other States Parties may undertake to assist, to the extent they may be capable and/or are requested, in clarifying or resolving matters related to a concern about non-compliance

[13. Other States Parties may undertake to assist in clarifying or resolving matters related to a concern about non-compliance. The [BTWC Organization] may also request that States Parties provide such assistance on a voluntary basis.]

(C) CONSULTATION, CLARIFICATION, AND COOPERATION³⁵

14. States Parties [shall] [may] make [full] use [where possible and as appropriate] of opportunities for bilateral and multilateral clarification and consultation [through the Organization] [in accordance with Article V of the BTWC] [and established procedures under the Protocol] to resolve any concern about non-compliance with the Convention [[prior to][or] [in parallel to] a request].

[15. [International organizations such as WHO, FAO and IOE] [and an international epidemiological network] may play a role in such consultation and clarification procedures.]

(D) INFORMATION TO BE SUBMITTED WITH A REQUEST FOR AN INVESTIGATION TO ADDRESS A CONCERN OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION

[16. A State Party requesting an investigation shall provide [,to the extent possible,] [all] relevant [available] information indicating a non-compliance concern including [location, how the concern arose, the type of non-compliant activity, the specific event or activities which gave rise to the concern, the date and place of any such event or activities]. All information shall be as precise as possible.]

35. The inclusion of this section is without prejudice to any final decision on whether such procedures shall be mandatory and/or whether they shall take place prior to the initiation of an investigation

17. The requesting State Party shall provide relevant information about the source, [confirming [proving] [and demonstrating] its [reliability] [and impartiality,] [its non-discriminatory nature] [that it is well-founded] [and open to multilateral scrutiny]].]

18. Requests for [facility investigations] [investigations of any other alleged breach of obligations under the provisions of the Convention as indicated in section B] shall at least include [the following information:] [the information specified in Annex D.]³⁶

[(i) [Name of the State Party in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction or control the non-compliant activity has allegedly taken place;] [The State Party to be investigated;]]

(ii) Information, [to the extent possible,] on the [research], development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention [indicating specifically] [which prohibited activity took place] [the specific event, or series of events, which gave rise to a non-compliance concern] of

(a) microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;

(b) weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict;

(iii) The location [and area] of any alleged non-compliant activity. This shall include as much detail as possible including a description, the location, boundaries and geographic co-ordinates, specified to the nearest second, if possible;

(iv) The approximate period during which the non-compliant activity or event is alleged to have taken place;

[(v) Information from and/or the outcome or results of [any] prior consultations / clarifications [or prior field investigation] [or prior investigation of the alleged use of biological weapons] relevant to the request;]

[(vi) Information to demonstrate that the non-compliance concern is not a natural outbreak of disease.]

36. Subparagraphs (i) to (x) of this paragraph have been reproduced in Annex D.

The following other types of information could also be important:

(vii) Whether any facility concerned has been declared under the Protocol; and any information included in or absent from the declaration return relevant to the allegations;

(viii) If not, any information to suggest that the facility concerned should have been declared under the Protocol;

(ix) Details of the ownership and/or operation of the facility concerned;

(x) Any additional relevant information, e.g. on extent and nature of the alleged non-compliant activity.]

19. Requests for [field investigations] [investigations into alleged use of biological weapons] shall at least include [enough of the following [precise] information to support a prima facie case of a non-compliance concern] [to the extent possible] [the following [precise] information:] [the [precise] information specified in Annex D.³⁷]³⁸

[(i) Name of the State Party in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction or control the alleged [event] [use] has taken place;]

(ii) [Approximate] date [and] time [and duration] of the alleged [event] [use];

(iii) The location, geographic coordinates and the characteristics of the area(s) involved, [whether the area is on the territory of the requesting State Party, and if not, the name of the State who controls that territory as well as whether that State is a State Party to the Protocol and/or the Convention];

(iv) [Aided by epidemiological data,] a description of the circumstances under which the [event] [use] took place, a description of the [event] [use] itself as well as an indication of whether it was a single [event] [use] or a series of [events] [uses]. An indication of the suspected cause and/or perpetrator of the [event] [use];

37. A view was expressed that information supporting a request will be lacking many precise details regarding the essential elements described above. This should not be allowed to prevent an allegation receiving serious consideration. It may be that one single item of evidence will be sufficient to be decisive. The burden of proof must not be placed unreasonably on to the complainant State. Further consideration needs to be given to whether or how these requirements might be modified in respect of a request for an investigation on the territory of another State Party or a non-State Party

38 Subparagraphs (i) to (xvi) of this paragraph have been reproduced in Annex D

[(v) The victims (human, animals or plants), the effects on them and the number affected. Symptoms and signs of the disease [or similar occurrence caused by toxins] [or other physical evidence] [, the treatment and the results of the treatment of the victims] shall be described;]

(vi) Information [to the extent possible] on:

- (a) The [use] [release] of microbial or other biological agent(s) or toxin(s) for other than peaceful purposes;
- (b) The use of weapons, equipment or means of delivery;

[(vii) Any epidemiological data substantiating an allegation why the event shall not be considered to be a natural outbreak of disease [including data on natural disease profiles and occurrences in the area affected, as well as demographic data];]

[(viii) Information to demonstrate that the non-compliance concern is not a natural outbreak of disease;]

[(ix) Information from and/or the outcome for results of [any] prior consultations / clarifications relevant to the request.]

The following other types of information could also be important:

(x) Reports of any internal investigation including results of any laboratory investigations;

[(xi) The victims (human, animals or plants), the effects on them and the number affected. Symptoms and signs of the disease [or similar occurrence caused by toxins] [or other physical evidence] [, the treatment and the results of the treatment of the victims] shall be described;]

(xii) [Any] affidavits of eye witness accounts, photographs, samples or other physical evidence;

(xiii) Data on natural disease profiles and occurrences in the area affected, as well as demographic data;

(xiv) A description of the control measures and their result in the affected area, if available;

(xv) Other corroborative information;

[(xvi) Requests for specific assistance, if applicable.]]

(E) SCREENING (TO GUARD AGAINST ABUSIVE REQUESTS)

20. [Requests for an investigation [into a non-compliance concern] [may] [shall] be submitted to [the United Nations Security Council] for decision on whether to initiate an investigation and on the need to conduct an inspection.] [Requests for an investigation into a non-compliance concern [may] [shall] be submitted to the [politically representative body of States Parties] [the Director-General]. Providing the request satisfied agreed requirements, the investigation would proceed [if formally approved by [at least a two-thirds majority] [a three quarters majority] [present and voting] of this representative body] [unless this body decides by a three quarters majority of all its members against carrying out the investigation.]]

21. [The consideration of investigation requests [may] [shall] be assisted by [technical advice from [an appropriate body of experts] [a scientific support centre]] [consultation with experts of States Parties to the Protocol] [and by advice from relevant international organizations including WHO [and OPCW] where appropriate]. [In this regard, an international epidemiological network could assist in distinguishing natural outbreaks of disease from unusual or artificial phenomena potentially related to a violation [or attempted violation] of the 1972 Convention]

[22. In considering whether an investigation request should proceed, the politically representative body of the States Parties and/or its technical advisers may also consider whether to request more information; whether to implement bi- or multilateral consultations to resolve the issue; whether to reject the request pending further information or, whether to request the WHO/FAO/IOE to conduct an investigation of an unusual outbreak of disease. The decision to proceed with any of these activities may be determined, in part, by the information submitted with the investigation request.]³⁹

[(F) PRE-INVESTIGATION [PROCEDURES] [ACTIVITIES]^{40 41}

Designation of the [site] [facility] under investigation

23. The [facility or] [site] designated for investigation by the requesting State Party shall be designated as precisely as possible by providing a site diagram related to a reference point, with

39. Further detailed consideration of this concept and these alternative options is required.

40. This section addresses investigations of facilities and of any other alleged breach of obligations under the provisions of the Convention. Further consideration needs to be given to the procedures for other types of investigation

41 Further consideration has to be given to whether all or parts of this section should be moved to the Annex

geographic coordinates specified to the nearest second if possible. [Whenever feasible] the requesting State Party shall also submit a map specifying the site under investigation, which shall also include the [site's] [requested] perimeter [clearly delineated].

[24. The [requested] perimeter [of the [facility or] site] under investigation shall:

(a) [where possible] run at least [10] metres outside any buildings or other structures;

(b) not cut through existing security enclosures; and

(c) [where possible] run at least [10] metres outside any existing security enclosures that the requesting State Party wishes to include within the [requested] perimeter [of the [facility or] site] under investigation.]

[25. If the [requested] perimeter does not conform with the specifications of paragraph 24, it shall be re-drawn by the investigation team in consultation with the State Party to be investigated to ensure that it conforms with that provision. [If the perimeter is not agreed to by the State Party to be investigated ...]]

[Designation of the area under investigation

26. The area designated for the [field] investigation [of the alleged use of biological weapons] by the requesting State Party shall be designated as precisely as possible by providing the geographic co-ordinates, specified to the nearest second if possible, within which the affected area falls. [Whenever feasible] the requesting State Party shall also submit a map specifying the area under investigation as well as the geographic characteristics of the area.]

Issue of investigation mandate

[27. Investigations should have a clear and specific mandate [which should be strictly observed by the investigation team].]

28. The [Director-General] shall [issue] an investigation mandate for the conduct of the investigation. The investigation mandate shall be the investigation request put into operational terms, and shall conform with the investigation request.

29. The investigation mandate shall be made available to the State Party to be investigated by the investigation team, upon the latter's arrival at the point of entry.

[Appointment] [Assignment] of investigation team⁴²

[30. [The Director-General shall prepare a list of qualified experts whose particular fields of expertise could be This list shall be communicated in writing to each State Party not later than ... after the entry into force of the Protocol.] The [Director-General] shall determine the size of the investigation team and select its members [on as wide a geographical basis [as possible]] taking into account the circumstances of the particular request. The size of the investigation team shall be kept to a minimum necessary for the proper fulfilment of the mandate. No national [or resident] of the requesting State Party or the State Party to be investigated shall be a member of the investigation team.]

[31. The investigators and investigator assistants shall be designated as set out in Annex D. Members of the investigation team shall be selected in accordance with the procedures set out in Annex D. The privileges and immunities of the investigators and investigator assistants shall be as set out in Annex D.]

[Observer

32. The requesting State Party may, subject to the agreement of the State Party to be investigated, send a representative who may be a national either of the requesting State Party or of a third State Party, to observe the conduct of the facility or [field] investigation [of the alleged use of biological weapons].

[33. The State Party to be investigated shall notify its acceptance or non-acceptance of the proposed observer to ...]

[34. [In case of acceptance,] the State Party to be investigated shall grant access to the observer in accordance with Annex D.] [The observer shall have access to the investigation site as granted by the State Party to be investigated.]

[35. The State Party to be investigated shall, as a rule, accept the proposed observer, but if the State Party to be investigated exercises a refusal, that fact shall be recorded in the final report.]]

Notification

[36. The [Director-General] shall, not less than [12] [36] [48] hours before the planned arrival of the investigation team at the point of entry, inform the [politically representative body of States Parties] [Executive Council] about the location of the requested facility as specified in paragraphs

42 Delegations raised a number of issues under this sub-heading which require further consideration

23 and 24. At the same time, he shall also transmit the request to the State Party to be investigated, including the [precise] location of the [facility] [site].]

[37. The [Director-General] shall immediately acknowledge receipt to the requesting State Party of its request for a [field] investigation [of the alleged use of biological weapons] and inform [the Executive Council and] all States Parties.]

[38. If applicable, [the Director-General] shall, not later than [12] [36] [48] hours prior to the arrival of the [field] investigation [of the alleged use of biological weapons] team at the point of entry, notify the State Party on whose territory the investigation has been requested. [The Director-General] shall also notify other States Parties if access to their territories might be required during the investigation.]

39. The State Party to be investigated shall acknowledge receipt of the notification of an investigation not later than [one] [two] [hour[s]] [days] after receipt of such a notification.

Time-frame for an investigation

40. The [Director-General] shall dispatch an investigation team as soon as possible after an investigation request has been received [and approved in accordance with agreed procedures]. The investigation team shall arrive at the point of entry specified in the request in the minimum time possible consistent with agreed procedures for the notification and review of requests.

41. The period of the investigation shall not exceed [84] hours, unless extended by agreement with the State Party to be investigated. [The period of investigation means the period from ... until]

[42. The estimated period of duration of a [field] investigation [of the alleged use of biological weapons] shall be indicated in the investigation mandate [and finalised after the pre-investigation briefing and shall not exceed that time unless extended by agreement of the State Party to be investigated] [shall not exceed ... days unless an extension is authorized by [the Executive Council]].] [The period of investigation means the period from ... until]

Monitoring of site

[43. Not later than [12] hours after [the arrival of the investigation team at the point of entry] [its notification], the State Party to be investigated shall begin collecting factual information of all vehicular exit activity from all exit points for all land, air and water vehicles of the investigated site's perimeter. This obligation may be met by collecting factual information in the form of traffic logs, photographs or video recordings.]

[44. Upon the investigation team's arrival at the site under investigation, it shall have the right to begin implementing exit monitoring procedures in order to secure the site such procedures shall include: the identification of vehicular exits, the making of traffic logs, the taking of photographs, and the making of video recordings of exits and exit traffic by the investigation team. The investigation team has the right to go, under escort, to any other part [of] [within] [along] the perimeter to check that there is no other exit activity.]

[45. All activities for securing the site and exit monitoring shall take place within a band around the outside of the perimeter, where possible not exceeding [50] metres in width, measured outward.]

[46. The investigation team has the right to inspect on a managed access basis vehicular traffic exiting the site. The State Party to be investigated shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate to the investigation team that any vehicle, subject to inspection, to which the investigation team is not granted full access, is not being used for purposes related to the possible non-compliance concerns raised in the investigation request.]

47. The application of the above procedures may continue for the duration of the investigation, but shall not unreasonably hamper or delay the normal operation of the site.

Pre-investigation briefing

[48. The State Party to be investigated shall provide a pre-inspection briefing to the investigation team prior to granting it access, which shall not normally exceed [three] hours. [This shall include information concerning safety regulations in force in the facility, including rules of observation and quarantine, a medical examination of the members of the investigation team and documentary evidence that they have been vaccinated.] The briefing should wherever possible include a windshield tour of the site. It shall include the scope and a general description of activities at the facility, details of the physical layout and other relevant characteristics of the site (including a map or sketch showing all structures and significant geographic features) [, and details of the availability of facility personnel and records]. It may also include an indication of areas the State Party to be investigated considers sensitive or not related to the purpose of the investigation.]

[49. In the case of [field] investigations [of the alleged use of biological weapons], the investigation team shall have the right to be briefed by representatives of the State Party to be investigated upon arrival and at any time during the investigation according to the guidelines as set out in Annex D.]

Investigation plan

[50. After the pre-inspection briefing the investigation team shall prepare an initial plan which specifies the activities to be carried out by the team, including the specific areas of the site, [documentation and personnel] to which access is desired, and whether the team intends to divide into sub-groups. The investigation team [may] [shall] not divide into [more than [two]] sub-groups [, in addition to members of the investigation team responsible for perimeter activities] unless otherwise agreed by the State Party to be investigated. This plan shall be made available to the State Party to be investigated [prior to the commencement of the investigation].]

[51. Before the commencement of a [field] investigation [of the alleged use of biological weapons], the investigation team shall prepare an initial investigation plan to serve *inter alia* as a basis for logistical and safety arrangements. The investigation plan [shall] [may] be updated as need arises.]

[Situation report

52. The [field] investigation [of the alleged use of biological weapons] team shall, not later than 24 hours after its arrival on the territory of the State Party to be investigated, send a situation report to [the Director-General]. It shall send further investigation progress reports as necessary.]

(G) [ACCESS AND MEASURES TO GUARD AGAINST ABUSE DURING THE]
[CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATIONS]

[53. The investigated State Party shall provide access [to the investigation team] [within the time frame specified in paragraph 41] [within the [approved] investigation area for the sole purpose of collecting facts relevant to the mandate and] [in accordance with] [to which it is entitled under] [the Protocol and its Annexes].

[The investigated State Party shall be under the obligation to allow the greatest degree of access to facilities or areas to be investigated for the sole purpose of establishing facts relevant to the concern regarding possible non-compliance [taking into account] [without prejudice to] its constitutional obligations with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures.]

54. The investigated State Party shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with [the Convention] [and this Protocol] and to this end to enable the investigation team to fulfill its mandate.

55. [The extent and nature of access to a particular place or places within the [approved] investigation area shall be negotiated between the investigation team and the investigated State Party [on a managed access basis].]

The investigated State Party shall have the right [under managed access] to take such measures [as are] [it deems] necessary to protect sensitive national security or commercial proprietary information not related to activities prohibited by the Convention [, or to comply with its constitutional obligations with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures].

This may include restricting access to any particularly sensitive [facility], area or information [unrelated to the prohibitions of the BTWC][not related to activities prohibited by the Convention] [unrelated to the contents of the request].

[The extent and nature of access to a particular place or places will in such cases be negotiated between the investigation team and the investigated State Party [on a managed access basis] [, so as to enable the investigation team to fulfil its mandate].]

An illustrative list of specific measures which an investigated State Party might, if necessary, take to this end is set out in Annex D.

If the investigated State Party provides less than full access to places, activities, or information, it shall [as a rule] make all reasonable [and feasible] efforts to provide [reliable] alternative means to demonstrate compliance.

[56. The investigated State Party shall have the right to restrict [or deny] access to any particularly sensitive [facility], area or information not related to activities prohibited by the Convention.]

[The investigated State Party shall have the right to make the final decision regarding any access of the investigation team, taking into account its obligations under this Protocol and the provisions on managed access [without prejudice to the provisions in paragraph 53].]⁴³

or

[57. Pursuant to a request for an investigation of a facility or location, and in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex D, the investigated State Party shall have:

(a) The right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with [the Convention] [and this Protocol] and, to this end, to enable the investigation team to fulfil its mandate;

43. Paragraphs 53 to 56 and paragraph 57 were regarded by some delegations as alternatives

(b) The obligation to provide access within the [requested site] [[facility or] [site] designated for investigation] for the sole purpose of establishing facts relevant to the concern regarding possible non-compliance [[taking into account] [without prejudice to] constitutional obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures]; and

(c) The right to take measures to protect sensitive installations, and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data, not related to activities prohibited by the Convention.]⁴⁴

58. The investigation team shall conduct its investigation in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with its effective and timely implementation of its mandate, and shall collect only relevant information necessary to clarify the specific non-compliance concern.

59. In cases of [field] investigations [of the alleged use of biological or toxin weapons], [the investigated State Party shall provide access to] the investigation team [[shall] [may] with the consent of the receiving State Party, have access] to all such areas that might have been affected, including hospitals, refugee camps and other places, as it considers necessary for the effective conduct of its investigation without interfering with national measures to contain [and remedy the consequences of the alleged use of biological or toxin weapons] [the outbreak] [or the possible outbreak].

60. The investigation team shall have the right to request clarifications in connection with ambiguities that may arise during an investigation. Such requests shall be made promptly to or through the representative of the investigated State Party. The representative shall make every reasonable effort to provide the investigation team with such clarification as may be necessary to remove the ambiguity.

61. The investigation team may [request to] conduct any or [all] [a combination] of the following on-site activities: interviewing, visual observation, [identification of key equipment,] [auditing,] [medical examination] [and sampling and identification]. These specific on-site activities shall be implemented in accordance with the provisions set out above in this section as well as in Annex

62. During [field] investigations [of the alleged use of biological weapons] the investigation team may [request to] conduct any or [all] [combination] of the following activities: interviewing, visual observation, [auditing,] [medical/disease-related examination,] [sampling and identification and collection of background information and data].

44. Paragraphs 53 to 56 and paragraph 57 were regarded by some delegations as alternatives.

[63. These provisions may not be invoked by any investigated State Party to conceal any evasion of its obligations not to engage in activities prohibited under the Convention.]

(H) POST-INVESTIGATION [PROCEDURES] [ACTIVITIES]

[Preliminary findings and evaluation] [Initial report]

64. Upon completion of the investigation, the investigation team shall meet with the investigated State Party to review the team's preliminary findings and to clarify any remaining ambiguities. The team shall provide to the investigated State Party its preliminary findings in written form [having taken into account the provisions of the Confidentiality Annex], together with a list of any samples and copies of written information and data gathered and other material [intended] [proposed] to be taken off site. This document shall be signed by the team leader. In order to indicate that the investigated State Party has [taken notice of] [reviewed] the contents of the initial findings, the representative of the investigated State Party shall countersign the document. This meeting and these procedures shall be completed not later than [24] hours after completion of the investigation.

65. In accordance with [the applicable principles of managed access and] the detailed provisions set out above and in Annex ..., [and without prejudice to the obligation of the investigated State Party to allow the investigation team to fulfill its mandate] the investigated State Party may [place restrictions] [request that restrictions be placed] on [or deny altogether] the removal of specific samples, documents or other materials, if [it deems this] necessary to protect commercial proprietary or national security information. The investigated State Party may also draw to the attention of the investigation team any information in the initial findings which, in its view, is unrelated to the investigation mandate [and should therefore be deleted] [In these cases the investigated State Party may request that the information be considered confidential or deleted] [In such cases the investigated State Party shall have the right to ensure that such information is deleted] [The investigated State Party shall have the right to request the removal from the initial [factual] [findings] [report] of any information unrelated to the investigation mandate]

Departure

66. The investigation team shall depart from the territory of the investigated State Party [at the point of entry] in the minimum time possible, following completion of the [investigation and the [meeting] [review] described in paragraphs 64 and 65 above] [post-investigation [procedures] [activities]].

[Interim field investigation report

67. An interim [field] investigation [of the alleged use of biological weapons] report [containing details as set out in Annex D,] shall be made available to the investigated State Party not later than [30] days after completion of the investigation. The investigated State Party shall have the right to comment on the contents of the report.]

[Laboratory reports

68. Laboratory investigations and identification of agents shall be reported by means of the following types of reports :

(a) Initial laboratory report. An initial laboratory report shall be made available to the leader of the investigation team, by the laboratory as soon as possible after receipt of the sample(s) and shall indicate initial findings and an estimate of the duration of further work.

(b) Intermediate laboratory report. The laboratory shall make an interim laboratory report to the leader of the investigation team if its has not finalised its work after 30 days since the initial report. It shall report progress in work and a final estimate of further work.

(c) Final laboratory report. The laboratory shall make a final report of its findings to the leader of the investigation team as soon as it has finalised its work, but not later than 6 months after receipt of the sample(s).]

Final Report

69. The report shall [describe] [summarise in a general way] the activities conducted by the investigation team and its factual findings [, particularly with regard to the concerns regarding possible non-compliance with Article I of the BTWC,] and shall be limited to information directly related to these [non-compliance concerns] [findings]. It shall also include an account by the team of the degree and nature of access and cooperation granted to the team and the extent to which this enabled it to fulfil the inspection mandate.

70. A draft final facility investigation report shall be made available to the investigated State Party not later than [20] days after completion of the investigation. The investigated State Party shall have the right to identify any information and data not related to the non-compliance concern which in its view, due to its confidential nature, should not be contained in the final version of the report to be circulated to States Parties. [The investigation team shall consider these observations and, using its own discretion, wherever possible adopt them.]

71. [The field investigation shall be considered completed upon receipt of the final laboratory reports from all the laboratories that were tasked, as applicable, but not later than 6 months after the end of the on-site investigation.] A draft final field investigation report shall [then] be made available to the investigated State Party not later than [20] days after completion of the investigation. The investigated State Party shall have the right to identify any information and data not related to the non-compliance concern which in its view, due to its confidential nature, should not be contained in the final version of the report to be circulated to States Parties. [The investigation team shall consider these observations and, using its own discretion, wherever possible adopt them,] before submitting the final report to the Director-General.

[72. The final investigation report shall [immediately] be made available to the investigated State Party, but not later than . . . There shall be attached to it any written comments that the investigated State Party may at once make concerning the findings contained in it The final report, together with the attached comments by the investigated State Party, shall be transmitted to [the Technical Body] no later than [...] days after the completion of the investigation]

Further clarification

73. [The BTWC Organization] [The Technical Body] [may] [shall] undertake consultations with the investigated State Party to allow for further clarification including on matters raised by the investigated State Party, if there are remaining uncertainties identified by the investigation team [, or in case the cooperation offered by the investigated State Party is not considered to meet required standards]. [If the uncertainties cannot be removed or if the established facts are of a nature to imply non-compliance with obligations under the Convention, the Technical Body shall convene the Consultative Council to examine the final report.]

[Adoption of a decision on the basis] [Consideration] of the findings of the investigation

[74. [The Executive Council] [The politically representative body of States Parties] shall consider whether there has been any non-compliant activity and take a decision on any response or further action.]

[75. [The Executive Council] [The politically representative body] shall, in accordance with its powers and functions, review the final report of the investigation team as soon as it is presented, and [address] [decide on] any concern as to]:

- (a) Whether any non-compliance has occurred;
- (b) Whether the request had been in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol;
- (c) Whether the right to request an investigation has been abused.]

76. With respect to any concerns raised under 75 (c), one or more of the following factors could be taken into account, where relevant:

(i) Information relating to the investigated site available prior to the investigation request (the authenticity and reliability of any information would need to be carefully assessed);

(ii) Whether any of the information submitted as part of the investigation request was shown to be false;

(iii) Information from and/or outcome or results of [any] prior consultations/clarifications relevant to the request;

(iv) Whether any investigation(s) (including any instituted under Article VI of the Convention) had previously been requested by the same State Party vis-à-vis the same investigated site, and if so, their number, frequency and outcome (including any follow-up action);

(v) Whether the same requesting State Party had launched any prior requests for investigation which had been deemed by [the Executive Council] [the politically representative body] to be frivolous, abusive or beyond the scope of the Convention.

77. In the case of abuse, [the Executive Council] [the politically representative body] shall examine whether the requesting State Party should bear any of the financial implications of the investigation. [The Executive Council] [The politically representative body of the] States Parties [United Nations Security Council] [may] [shall] consider appropriate actions, including [possible] sanctions, in accordance with applicable international law, [by the BTWC Organization] if they decide that a request has been frivolous, abusive, or beyond the scope of the [Protocol] [Convention].

[78. The investigated State Party and the requesting State Party shall have the right to participate in the review process but shall have no vote. If [the Executive Council] [the politically representative body] reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers and functions, that further action may be necessary with regard to paragraph 75, it shall take the appropriate measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance, including specific recommendations to the Conference of States Parties.]

ARTICLE IV

CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS

1. [The Organization] shall conduct its activities provided for under this Protocol in the least intrusive manner consistent with the timely and efficient accomplishment of their objectives. It shall request only the information and data necessary to fulfil its responsibilities under this Protocol and shall use this data and information only for the purpose of this Protocol. It shall take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of information on civil and military activities and facilities [including such information coming to its knowledge] in the implementation of this Protocol and, in particular, shall abide by the [confidentiality] provisions set forth in [this Protocol] [the Confidentiality Annex].
2. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford special handling to information and data that it receives in confidence from [the Organization] in connection with the implementation of this Protocol. It shall treat such information and data exclusively in connection with its rights and obligations under [this Protocol] and in accordance with the provisions set forth in [this Protocol] [and, in particular, shall abide by the provisions on confidentiality set forth in this Protocol].
3. Each State Party shall have the right to take measures as it deems necessary to protect confidential information, provided that it fulfils its obligations to demonstrate compliance in accordance with the provisions of [the Protocol] [it fulfils its obligations in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol].
4. (a) [The Director-General] shall have the primary responsibility for ensuring the protection of [all] confidential information [which comes into possession of [the organization] from any source]. Based on guidelines provided for within [the Confidentiality Annex], the Director-General shall establish and maintain a stringent regime [governing the handling of confidential information by [the Technical Secretariat] as well as the necessary procedures to be followed in case of breaches or alleged breaches of confidentiality] to ensure effective protection against [unauthorized] disclosure. This regime shall be approved and periodically reviewed by [the ...].

[(b)⁴⁵ The regime referred to in paragraph (a) above shall include, among others, provisions relating to:

- (i) The implementation of general principles for the handling of confidential information, including the establishment of appropriate classification levels on the basis of the sensitive nature of the information;
- (ii) Conditions of staff employment relating to the protection of confidential information;
- (iii) Measures [to protect confidential information in the course of on-site activities] [to ensure the protection of confidential information made available to investigation of visit teams while they are on the territory of the investigated or visited State Party];
- (iv) Procedures in cases of breaches or alleged breaches of confidentiality;
- (v) Appropriate procedures to protect the confidentiality of data declarations.]

[5. Without prejudice to the privileges and immunities to be accorded pursuant to this Protocol, the Organization, the Director-General of [the Technical Secretariat], investigators and investigation assistants or other staff members of [the Technical Secretariat] shall, in accordance with the applicable laws specified in the private international law of the State of forum, be liable to the natural or legal persons for any damage caused by the Director-General of [the Technical Secretariat], the investigators and investigation assistants or other staff members of [the Technical Secretariat] through unauthorized disclosure of confidential information coming to their knowledge in connection with the implementation of this Protocol.]

[6. Any State Party to this Protocol which considers that it has been affected by a breach of confidentiality or that its natural or legal persons have suffered from damage through such a breach may seek to settle the dispute in accordance with the provisions set forth in Article XII or by referring it to the Confidentiality commission to be set up pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Article.]

[7. The Conference of the States Parties shall establish and appoint, at its first session, a Commission for the settlement of disputes related to confidentiality (hereinafter referred to as "the Commission") as its subsidiary organ in accordance with Article IX, paragraph 22(j). The Commission shall have the powers and functions as set forth in this Protocol.]

45. It was proposed that this section be moved to Annex E.

ARTICLE V

MEASURES TO REDRESS A SITUATION AND TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE

1. The Conference shall take the necessary measures, in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, to ensure compliance with the Convention and this Protocol and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes their provisions. In considering action pursuant to this paragraph, the Conference shall take into account all information and recommendations on the issues submitted by the [Executive Council].
2. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the [Executive Council] [Conference] to take measures to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance, and where the State Party fails to fulfil the request within the specified time, the Conference [may] [shall], *inter alia*, [upon] [taking into account] the recommendation of the [Executive Council], restrict or suspend the State Party's rights and privileges under this Protocol until the Conference decides it has undertaken the necessary action to conform with its obligations under the Convention and this Protocol.
3. In cases where serious damage to the object and purpose of the Convention [or this Protocol] may result from non-compliance with the Convention [or this Protocol], in particular Article I [of the Convention], the Conference [may] [shall] recommend to States Parties [collective] [joint] measures which are in conformity with international law.
4. [[Without prejudicing the rights of each individual State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention under Article VI of that Convention,] the Conference [or, alternatively, if the case is particularly grave and urgent, the [Executive Council],] [may] [shall] bring the issue, including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the [General Assembly] or the Security Council of the United Nations.]

ARTICLE VI⁴⁶

ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION AGAINST BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

- [1. For the purposes of this Article, "Assistance" means the coordination and delivery [transfer] to States Parties of protection against biological and toxin weapons, including, *inter alia*, the following: detection equipment and alarm systems; protective equipment; decontamination equipment and decontaminants; medical antidotes and treatments; and advice on any of these protective measures.]
2. Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as impeding the right of any State Party to conduct research into, develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use means of protection against biological and toxin weapons, for purposes not prohibited under the Convention.
3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning means of protection against biological and toxin weapons.
- [4. For the purposes of increasing the transparency of national programmes related to protective purposes, each State Party shall provide annually to the [Technical Secretariat] information on its programme, in accordance with procedures to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article IX, paragraph]
- [5. The [Technical Secretariat] shall establish, not later than 180 days after entry into force of this Protocol and maintain, for the use of any requesting State Party, a data bank containing freely available information concerning various means of protection against biological and toxin weapons as well as such information as may be provided by States Parties.

The [Technical Secretariat] shall also, within the resources available to it, and at the request of a State Party, provide expert advice and assist the State Party in identifying how its programmes for the development and improvement of a protective capacity against biological and toxin weapons could be implemented.]

46. It was recognized that this Article has received only preliminary consideration with brackets introduced at this time reflecting only the specific initial views of some delegations.

While noting that the proposed language in this Article was drawn largely from the CWC, some delegations indicated that the text would subsequently need to be modified to take into account the differences between the biological weapons and chemical weapons context.

6. Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as impeding the right of States Parties [under Article VII of the Convention.] [to request and provide assistance bilaterally and to conclude individual agreements with other States Parties concerning the emergency procurement of assistance.]

[7. Each State Party undertakes to provide assistance [to the extent possible] through the [Organization] and to this end [may] elect to take one or more of the following measures:

(a) To contribute to the [voluntary fund] for assistance to be established by the Conference at its first session;

(b) To conclude, if possible not later than 180 days after this Protocol enters into force for it, agreements with the [Organization] concerning the procurement, upon demand, of assistance;

(c) To declare, not later than 180 days after this Protocol enters into force for it, the kind of assistance it might provide in response to an appeal by the [Organization]. If, however, a State Party subsequently is unable to provide the assistance envisaged in its declaration, it is still under the obligation to provide assistance in accordance with this paragraph]

8. Each State Party has the right to request and, subject to the procedure set forth in paragraphs [9, 10 and 11] to receive assistance and protection against the [use or threat of use of] biological and toxin weapons if it considers that:

(a) Biological and toxin weapons have been used against it;

(b) It is threatened by actions that are prohibited for States Parties by Article I of the Convention.

[9. The request, substantiated by relevant information, shall be submitted to the [Director-General], who shall transmit it immediately to the [Executive Council] and to all States Parties. The [Director-General] shall immediately forward the request to States Parties which have volunteered, in accordance with paragraphs 7 (b) and (c), to dispatch emergency assistance in case of use of biological and toxin weapons [or its use as a method of warfare], or humanitarian assistance in case of serious threat of use of biological and toxin weapons or serious threat of its use as a method of warfare to the State Party concerned not later than [12] hours after receipt of the request. [The [Director-General] shall initiate, not later than [24] hours after receipt of the request, an investigation in order to provide foundation for further action. The [Director-General] shall complete the investigation within [72] hours and forward a report to the [Executive Council]. If additional time is required for completion of the investigation, an interim report shall

be submitted within the same time-frame. The additional time required for investigation shall not exceed [72] hours. It may, however, be further extended by similar periods. Reports at the end of each additional period shall be submitted to the [Executive Council]. The investigation shall, as appropriate and in conformity with the request and the information accompanying the request, establish relevant facts related to the request as well as the type and scope of supplementary assistance and protection needed.]]

[10. The [Executive Council] shall meet not later than [24] hours after receiving an investigation report to consider the situation and shall take a decision by simple majority within the following [24] hours on whether to instruct the [Technical Secretariat] to provide supplementary assistance. The [Technical Secretariat] shall immediately transmit to all States Parties and relevant international organizations the investigation report and the decision taken by the [Executive Council]. When so decided by the [Executive Council], the [Director-General] shall provide assistance immediately. For this purpose, the [Director-General] may cooperate with the requesting State Party, other States Parties and relevant international organizations. The States Parties shall make the fullest possible efforts to provide assistance.]

[11. If the information available from the ongoing investigation or other reliable sources would give sufficient proof that there are victims of use of biological and toxin weapons and immediate action is indispensable, the [Director-General] shall notify all States Parties and shall take emergency measures of assistance, using the resources the Conference has placed at his/her disposal for such contingencies. The [Director-General] shall keep the [Executive Council] informed of actions undertaken pursuant to this paragraph.]

ARTICLE VII

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION

(A) [SCOPE]⁴⁷ [GENERAL PROVISIONS]

[The objective of this Protocol, to be pursued in accordance with its relevant provisions, is to strengthen the BTWC, and to ensure compliance with all the provisions of the Convention, through appropriate measures, including measures for [effective verification of compliance,] [effective implementation of the Convention] and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation, in matters to promote the peaceful uses, scientific and technological exchanges and transfers relating to the Convention, among the States Parties to the Protocol⁴⁸.]⁴⁹

1. Each State Party to the Protocol undertakes:

(i) To facilitate [subject to the protection of commercial proprietary information and national security information], [taking into consideration international law relating to the protection of commercial and proprietary information]⁵⁰ and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes and for the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes. To that end, the States Parties shall cooperate, as appropriate, on a global, regional, or bilateral basis, directly or through the institutional mechanisms provided for under this Protocol, in order to [comply] [enhance compliance] with the provisions of Article X of the BTWC;

47. The question of whether there should be a section on scope in this Article and the location of this section with its current language need further consideration.

48. Determination will have to be made as to whether to use the expression "States Parties to the Protocol" or "States Parties to the Convention", in light of the legal implications involved, wherever these expressions appear throughout this section.

49. A number of delegations asked for this paragraph to be moved to a separate Article entitled "General Provisions".

50. The point was made that the protection of commercial proprietary information and national security information might be dealt with in separate Articles of general applicability, in which case reference to those issues in various individual Articles could be reconsidered

(ii) To fulfil all its obligations under [Article X of the Convention and its] the Protocol in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic and technological development of States Parties [to the Protocol] [to the Convention], in particular of developing countries which are States Parties, and to foster international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

2. [The economic and social development of all States Parties include the requirement for multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory sensitive technology transfer agreements.]

(B) MEASURES TO PROMOTE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES

3. Each State Party to the Protocol undertakes:

(i) To implement specific measures in order to ensure that:

- (a) The provisions of Article X of the BTWC on the peaceful [use of transfers] [exchange] of materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes are [more] [fully and] effectively implemented;
- (b) Transfers of materials, equipment and technology of concern [shall] [should] [only] take place in full compliance with [all] the provisions of [Article III and] [Article X] of the BTWC [and subject to the protection of commercial and proprietary information and of national security information] [taking into consideration the international law relating to the protection of commercial and proprietary information].

(ii) [To report periodically, through the institutional mechanisms provided for under this Protocol, on the specific measures it has taken to comply with the provisions of Article X of the Convention, with the aim of increasing and widening such exchanges and transfers [of bacteriological (biological)-related materials, equipment and technologies for peaceful purposes], for the benefit of all States Parties to the Protocol, and in particular the developing countries which are States Parties.]

[Each State Party shall declare annually the measures taken individually or together with other States and international organizations in implementing Article X of the Convention.]

4. Each State Party to the Protocol [undertakes] [is encouraged to]:

(i) In addition to its mandatory obligations under the Protocol on the declaration of information relevant to the Convention, [to participate in a wider exchange of information] [to report, subject to the protection of commercial and proprietary information] on all aspects concerning the peaceful use of the biosciences, biotechnology and genetic engineering;⁵¹

(ii) [Subject to the protection of commercial proprietary rights and national security information], to promote the publication, exchange and dissemination of information concerning current research programmes in the biosciences, and on research centres, and other scientific and technological developments and activities of relevance to the BTWC;

(iii) To cooperate, singly or together with other States and international organizations, to the further development of programmes and measures in the field of bacteriology (biology) for purposes of public health and the prevention or control of disease, and other peaceful purposes [The States Parties shall, to the extent possible, coordinate national, regional and multilateral activities and programmes in the relevant fields using existing mechanisms and structures and including, where appropriate, the institutional mechanisms provided for under this Protocol]

5. [Taking full account of existing agreements and competences of the relevant international organizations and bearing in mind the need to avoid duplicating existing activities, mechanisms and programmes] the States Parties to the Protocol shall promote and implement cooperative measures, directly or through the institutional mechanisms provided for under this Protocol, *inter alia*, in the following fields:

[(a) Encouraging [the dissemination of results] [cooperation] in the fields of biological research, [frontier science] and high technology in areas directly relevant to the objectives of the BTWC;

(b) Promoting the establishment and assisting the activities of [national centres and] research institutes for the examination of biological agents and toxins, and disseminating knowledge about examination and identification techniques, laboratory safety and other research projects in the biosciences;

(c) Supporting the establishment, operation and updating of biological data bases, in the collection and dissemination of information relevant to the BTWC;

51 The extent of information provided under these obligations will need further elaboration

(d) Promoting cooperation among States Parties in [surveillance] diagnosis, prevention and control of outbreaks of diseases, including exploring means to improve international cooperation on the development and production of vaccines;

[(e) Assisting in the establishment of and participating in the functioning of an international system for the global monitoring of emerging diseases in humans, animals and plants;]

(f) Promoting transfer of technology for peaceful use of genetic engineering and other scientific and technical developments [in the field of frontier science] and high technology relevant to the Convention;

[(g) Promoting programmes for the development of human resources in the biological field, including training expert personnel in biodefence activities;]

[(h) Making available on request, subject to relevant IPR protection and protection of national security information, and under fair and equitable commercial terms, instruments, equipment and technologies in the field of biodefence activities;

[(i) Promoting collaborative research and development projects and joint ventures in biodefence activities, particularly related to recombinant vaccine development and diagnostics systems.]]

6. The States Parties to the Protocol undertake:

(i) [Immediately after the entry into force of the Protocol, to consider ways and means to strengthen the States Parties' biological defence capabilities, including by the elaboration of guiding principles and possible scope of measures for States Parties to cooperate in useful exchanges intended to provide a sufficient degree of transparency and contribute to the effective functioning of the compliance regime established by this Protocol;]

(ii) To provide or support assistance, through appropriate measures, including a voluntary fund, to any State Party to this Protocol which has been exposed to [danger] [the use or threat of use of biological and toxin weapons] as a result of a violation of the BTWC or of the provisions of this Protocol. [Pending consideration of a decision by] [a politically representative body] [the BTWCO] [the Security Council in conformity with Article VII of the Convention], timely emergency assistance could be provided by States Parties if requested, including assistance provided through the above-mentioned voluntary fund and in coordination with competent international organizations such as the WHO.

7. [The States Parties to the Protocol] [shall endeavour] [are encouraged] to conclude bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements on a [mutually advantageous], equal and non-discriminatory basis, for their participation in the development and application of biotechnology and the development and of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for the prevention of diseases.

8. The States Parties to the Protocol shall:

(i) [Promote cooperation with other States Parties to the Protocol] [cooperate] [with the developing countries] for the establishment [and the development of the activities] of research institutes to carry out common projects for development of bacteriology (biology), biotechnology and vaccine production;]

(ii) [Cooperate to ensure that, based on equal rights and obligations, and a mutuality of interests, appropriate measures designed to promote transparency and compliance with the objectives of the BTWC, also provide incentives and benefits for all States Parties to the Protocol.]

(C) MEASURES TO AVOID HAMPERING THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF STATES PARTIES

9. [The States Parties to [this Convention] [the Protocol] shall:

(a) Have the right, individually or collectively, to conduct research with, to develop, produce, acquire, retain, transfer and use biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes,

(b) Undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes;

(c) Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, including those in any international agreements, which would restrict or impede trade and development and promotion of scientific and technological knowledge in the field of biology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related areas for peaceful purposes;

(c) *bis* [Undertake not to impose or maintain any discriminatory measure, [incompatible with the obligations undertaken under the Convention,] which would restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of scientific and technological knowledge, in particular in the fields of biological research, including microbiological, biotechnology, genetic engineering, and their industrial, agricultural, medical, pharmaceutical, public health applications, and other peaceful uses;]

(c) ter [Only establish among themselves guidelines to regulate the free flow of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information in the biological field as provided under Part ... of this Protocol;]

(c) quater [Only maintain among themselves restrictions of the free flow of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information in the biological field that are consistent with the BTWC and subject to [the relevant] [all] [specific] provisions of this Protocol;]

(d) Not use this Convention [this Protocol] as grounds for applying any measures other than those provided or permitted, under this Convention [this Protocol] nor use any other international agreement for pursuing an objective inconsistent with this Convention [this Protocol];

(d) bis [Not use the provisions [of the Convention or] of this Protocol to impose restrictions and/or limitations on transfers consistent with the objectives and provisions of the Convention on scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials;]

(e) [Undertake to review their existing national trade regulations in the field of biology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related areas for peaceful purposes in order to render them consistent with the object and purpose of this Convention;]

(e) bis [Continuously review, in the light of the implementation of the objectives of the BTWC and the provisions of this Protocol, the measures that they take to prevent the spread of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, and equipment for purposes contrary to the Convention, with the aim of removing any restrictions incompatible with the obligations undertaken under the Convention.]]

10. The States Parties shall [report periodically through the institutional mechanisms, provided for in this Protocol, on specific measures they have taken in order to comply with the provisions of Article X of the Convention [with the aim of increasing and widening such exchanges and transfers [of bacteriological (biological)-related materials, equipment and technologies for peaceful purposes], for the benefit of all States Parties [to the Protocol], and in particular the developing countries which are States Parties]. These reports shall be examined by those institutional mechanisms with the aim of making recommendations to States Parties for the effective implementation of Article X of the Convention.]

[Each State Party shall have the right to declare any restrictions, in non-compliance with the obligations under Article X, on the transfer of biological materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.]

(D) [INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS AND] INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION⁵²

[[11. The BTWC Organization shall develop a framework for activities aimed at providing assistance to the States Parties [to the Protocol], and in particular to the developing countries being States Parties [to the Protocol]. Taking full account of existing agreements and competences of the relevant international organizations, and bearing in mind the need to avoid duplicating existing activities and mechanisms, [the following should, *inter alia*, be considered by the States Parties directly or through a future institutional mechanism] [the BTWCO shall ensure, through its own institutional framework [or directly by States Parties,] provision of the following]:

- (a) Assistance to States Parties, if requested, for the establishment and functioning of national authorities;
- (b) Assistance to States Parties, if requested, for the preparation of declarations required [under this Protocol] [as part of the compliance regime];
- (c) Assistance to States Parties, if requested, in drawing up internal legislation necessary [under this Protocol] [to the compliance regime];
- (d) [Promotion and financing of the establishment of vaccine production facilities, particularly in developing countries [which are States Parties to the Protocol]];
- (e) [Inclusion of a cooperative dimension in (non-challenge/other on-site measures) visits to States Parties, with a view to:]⁵³
 - (i) Exchanging information and providing expert advice, assistance and appropriate recommendations on biological practices;
 - (ii) Sharing information concerning cooperative programmes in biosafety, identification of agents, diagnostics and the development of innovative vaccines, aimed at being low-cost products, safe and usable under difficult conditions;

52. Reference to the "BTWC Organization" does not prejudice its eventual existence, structure or functions.

53. Given that the question of a possible cooperative role for visits is also being considered under compliance measures, the issue needs further consideration.

[(f) Establish an international information exchange network using modern communication media which facilitates the possibility of continuous participation by national experts of the States Parties in the Organization's activities;]

(g) Convening national or regional seminars with a view to optimizing cooperation and developing a long-term programme of exchanges on scientific developments, [including the biodefence activities for peaceful purposes,] internships [and other (non-challenge) visits];

(h) Creating [a framework for donor countries], [including a [voluntary fund]] [to support an international system for the global monitoring of emerging diseases in humans, animals and plants, and] additional assistance for training of expert personnel and for the financing of scientific and technical cooperation and assistance projects.

12. [The BTWCO shall establish a cooperative relationship, maintain working ties and when necessary negotiate agreements and develop joint programmes with relevant organizations, including [OPCW] WHO, FAO, IOE, UNIDO, ICGEB, UNEP and other agencies engaged in the implementation of Agenda 21 and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CDB) in order to:]⁵⁴

(a) [Derive the greatest possible synergy in such fields as] [ensure that there is no duplication in such fields as]:

- (i) The collection and dissemination of information on listed pathogens;
- (ii) Sharing information on environmental release of genetically modified organisms;
- (iii) Good manufacturing practices (GMP), [safe laboratory procedures] [good laboratory practice (GLP)], biological containment and other biosafety regulations and practices;
- (iv) The elaboration of an adequate communication software to facilitate access to existing databanks (e.g. BINAS - Global Bioinformatics Network, jointly developed by UNIDO and ICGEB, ICGEBNET - International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology Network, etc.) and various tools of electronic communication (NEED - Network for Exchange of Epidemiological Data);

(b) Maintain a record of cooperative activities promoted by international organizations in areas considered relevant to the BTWC, to provide awareness and facilitate access to those

54. This paragraph could be moved to a section on general powers and functions of the organization.

activities by States Parties to the Protocol, and coordinate with those organizations its own promotional activities, avoiding duplication and rationalising the use of the resources;

(c) Support a framework for multilateral cooperation, including exchange of information among scientists and technologists from States Parties to the Protocol, with the aim to:

- (i) Utilize the scientific and technological capabilities, experience and know-how of States Parties to the Protocol;
- (ii) Facilitate regulatory harmonization by allowing cross-correlation of existing national regulations and administrative procedures;
- (iii) Assist developing countries which are States Parties to the Protocol in strengthening their scientific and technological capabilities in the biosciences, genetic engineering and biotechnology.]

13. [The BTWCO, in its analysis of information provided to it by relevant international organizations should be required to make assessment and recommendations as to how the objectives of Article X of the BTWC might be fostered by actions taken by those organizations directly or in cooperation with the BTWCO.] [The Organization, based upon its consultations with other relevant international organizations, shall make recommendations as to how the objectives of Article X of the BTWC might be furthered through the activities of those organizations for the benefit of States Parties to the Protocol.]

14. [In order to perform its duties, the future Organization shall be accorded the necessary personnel and resources.]]

(E) [SAFEGUARDS AND LIMITATIONS⁵⁵

15. The States Parties to the Protocol [are encouraged][shall], to the extent possible and in line with the provisions of the Convention [and the Protocol], [to] promote transparency and openness in their research activities.

16. In adopting cooperative and transparency measures within the context of Article X of the Convention, the States Parties to the Protocol should duly [take into account national security information and intellectual property rights (IPRs)] [taking into consideration the international

⁵⁵ There were proposals to the effect of deleting this section or moving it to another part of the Protocol that might deal with BTWC Article III matters. However, it was also pointed out that this section had no relevance with regard to Article III provisions of the BTWC.

law relating to the protection of commercial and proprietary information and the general provisions of Article IV] as well as their commercial implications.

17. [The States Parties to the Protocol [should][shall] take all practicable measures to prevent [that] the [misuse] [application] of scientific and technological research in areas associated with the Convention [designed to produce] [may benefit or induce] [the production of] [any kind of qualitative improvement in the field of] biological and toxin weapons.]

18. The States Parties to the Protocol, aware of the vast knowledge arising from new discoveries, *inter alia*, in microbiology, genetic engineering and biotechnology, [should] [shall] take all practicable safety precautions, including the bioethical dimension in those precautions, to protect populations and the environment in relation to activities not prohibited by the Convention.

19. [The States Parties to this Protocol] [shall comply with safety and immunization measures, and with legislative and administrative measures established by other States] [undertake to comply as fully as possible with the safety regulations of the international agencies (WHO, FAO, IOE) for the security and physical protection of research centres, laboratories and facilities intended to be used for scientific and technical exchanges.]]

ARTICLE VIII
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

ARTICLE IX

[[THE ORGANIZATION] [AND IMPLEMENTATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS]]⁵⁶

(A) GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The States Parties to this Protocol hereby establish the Organization for the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons (hereinafter referred to as "the Organization") to [strengthen] [promote] the [object and purpose] [the effectiveness and improve the implementation] of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction and [to[ensure] the implementation of the provisions of this Protocol] [[through the implementation of] this Protocol, to ensure the implementation of their provisions, [including those for international [verification of] compliance,] [as well as ensuring the promotion of technological cooperation for peaceful purposes] and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties].
2. All States Parties shall be members of the Organization. A State Party shall not be deprived of its membership in the Organization.
3. The seat of the Organization shall be [...].
4. There are hereby established as organs of the Organization: the Conference of the States Parties, [the Executive Council] and the [Technical] Secretariat.
5. Each State Party shall cooperate with the Organization in the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Protocol. States Parties [shall] [may] consult directly among themselves or through the Organization on any matter which may be raised relating to the implementation of this Protocol.
- [6. The Organization shall conclude an agreement(s) with the relevant specialized international organizations such as WHO which shall be entrusted with the verification responsibilities determined by this Protocol and with the rendering of conference, logistic and infrastructural support required by the Organization.]⁵⁷

56. This section on Organization has been recently introduced. It was not discussed in a sufficient way and it needs further consideration.

57. The view was expressed that tasking other international institutions and organizations such as the WHO with central functions raises legal, organizational and political concerns to be investigated further

7. The costs of the activities of the Organization shall be met annually by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and the Organization.

8. A member of the Organization which is in arrears in the payment of its assessed contribution to the Organization shall have no vote in the Organization if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it for the preceding two full years. The Conference of the States Parties may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to [conditions beyond the control of the member] [the unavailability of financial resources].

(B) THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES

Composition, Procedures and Decision-making

9. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter referred to as "the Conference") shall be composed of all States Parties. Each State Party shall have one representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.

10. The initial session of the Conference shall be convened by the Depositary[y][ies] no later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Protocol.

11. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions, which shall be held annually, unless it decides otherwise.

12. A special session of the Conference shall be convened:

- (a) When decided by the Conference;
- (b) When requested by [the Executive Council]; or
- (c) When requested by any State Party and supported by a majority of the States Parties.

The special session shall be convened no later than 30 days after the decision of the Conference, the request of [the Executive Council], or the attainment of the necessary support, unless specified otherwise in the decision or request.

13. The Conference may also be convened in the form of a Review Conference, in accordance with Article

14. The Conference may also be convened in the form of an Amendment Conference, in accordance with Article
15. Sessions shall take place at the seat of the Organization unless the Conference decides otherwise.
16. The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the beginning of each session, it shall elect its President and such other officers as may be required. They shall hold office until a new President and other officers are elected at the next session.
17. A majority of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum.
18. Each State Party shall have one vote.
19. The Conference shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a majority of members present and voting. Decisions on matters of substance shall be taken as far as possible by consensus. If consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for decision, the President of the Conference shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Conference before the end of this period. If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take a decision by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting unless specified otherwise in this Protocol. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.

Powers and Functions

20. The Conference shall be the principal organ of the Organization. It shall consider any questions, matters or issues relevant to the provisions of this Protocol, including those relating to the powers and functions of [the Executive Council] and the [Technical] Secretariat, in accordance with this Protocol. It may make recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues relevant to the provisions of this Protocol raised by a State Party or brought to its attention by [the Executive Council].
21. The Conference shall oversee the implementation of this Protocol, and review compliance with, [this Protocol] [the Convention] and act in order to promote its object and purpose. It shall also oversee the activities of [the Executive Council] and the [Technical] Secretariat and may issue guidelines to either of them for the exercise of their functions.

22. The Conference shall:

(a) Consider and adopt the report of the Organization on the implementation of this Protocol and the annual programme and budget of the Organization, submitted by [the Executive Council], as well as consider other reports;

(b) Decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by States Parties in accordance with paragraph 7;

(c) Elect the members of [the Executive Council];

(d) Appoint the Director-General of the [Technical] Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as "the Director-General") upon the recommendation of [the Executive Council];

(e) Consider and approve the rules of procedure of [the Executive Council] submitted by the latter;

(f) Review scientific and technological developments that could affect the operation of this Protocol. In this context, the Conference [may] [shall] [direct the Director-General to establish a Scientific Advisory Board to enable him, in the performance of his functions, to render specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to this Protocol to the Conference, [the Executive Council] or to States Parties. In that case, the Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed of independent experts and appointed, in accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference, on the basis of their expertise and experience in the particular scientific fields relevant to the implementation of this Protocol [and on the basis of equitable geographic distribution]] [utilize the part time staff of the SSC appointed according to provisions in Annex ...];

(g) Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Protocol and to redress and remedy any situation that contravenes the provisions of this Protocol, in accordance with Article ...;

(h) Consider and approve at its first session any draft agreements, provisions, procedures, operational manuals, guidelines and any other documents;

(i) Consider and approve agreements or arrangements negotiated by the [Technical] Secretariat with States Parties, other States and international organizations to be concluded by [the Executive Council] on behalf of the Organization in accordance with paragraph 34 (l);

(j) Establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Protocol;

[(k) Establish at its first session the Voluntary Fund in accordance with Article ...;]

(l) Promote international cooperation and [exchange] with States Parties in the field of bacteriological (biological) activities.

[(C) [THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL]⁵⁸

Composition, Procedures and Decision-making

23. [The Executive Council] shall consist of [...] members. Each State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, to serve on [the Executive Council].

24. Taking into account the need for [equitable geographical distribution], [the Executive Council] shall comprise:

[...]

25. The members of [the Executive Council] shall be elected by the Conference. In this connection, [each geographical region] shall designate States Parties from that region for election as members of [the Executive Council] as follows:

[...]

26. Each member of [the Executive Council] shall have one representative on [the Executive Council], who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.

27. Each member of [the Executive Council] shall hold office from the end of the session of the Conference at which that member is elected until the end of the second regular annual session of the Conference thereafter, except that for the first election of [the Executive Council], [...] members shall be elected to hold office until the end of the [third] regular annual session of the Conference, due regard being paid to the established numerical proportions as described in paragraph 25.

58 The view was expressed that there is a strong doubt concerning the establishment of the Executive Council within the Organization and that there is a need for further consideration of this subject.

28. [The Executive Council] shall elaborate its rules of procedure and submit them to the Conference for approval.
29. [The Executive Council] shall elect its Chairman from among its members.
30. [The Executive Council] shall meet for regular sessions. Between regular sessions it shall meet as may be required for the fulfilment of its powers and functions.
31. Each member of [the Executive Council] shall have one vote.
32. [The Executive Council] shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a majority of all its members. [The Executive Council] shall take decisions on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority of all its members unless specified otherwise in this Protocol. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.⁵⁹

Powers and Functions

33. [The Executive Council] shall be the executive organ of the Organization. It shall be responsible to the Conference. It shall carry out the powers and functions entrusted to it in accordance with this Protocol. In so doing, it shall act in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the Conference and ensure their continuous and proper implementation.
34. [The Executive Council] shall:
- (a) Promote effective implementation of, and compliance with, this Protocol;
 - (b) Supervise the activities of the [Technical] Secretariat;
 - (c) Supervise the implementation of the scientific and technological exchange and technical cooperation activities and measures stipulated in Article ...;
 - (d) Facilitate cooperation among States Parties, and between States Parties and the [Technical] Secretariat, relating to the implementation of this Protocol through information exchanges;

59. This provision is without prejudice to decision making procedures for initiation of investigations. This issue would require further consideration by the Ad Hoc Group.

(e) Facilitate consultation and clarification among States Parties in accordance with Article III, Part E;

(f) Receive, consider and [take action] [decide] on requests for, and reports on, investigations to address a non-compliance concern in accordance with Article III, Part F;

(g) Make recommendations as necessary to the Conference for consideration of further proposals for promoting the object and purpose of this Protocol;

(h) Cooperate with the National Authority of each State Party;

(i) Consider and submit to the Conference the draft programme and budget of the Organization, the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Protocol, the report on the performance of its own activities and such other reports as it deems necessary or that the Conference may request;

(j) Make arrangements for the sessions of the Conference, including the preparation of the draft agenda;

[(k) Receive, consider and [take action] [decide] on reports of non-challenge visits in accordance with Article III, Part F;]

(l) Conclude, subject to prior approval of the Conference, agreements or arrangements with States Parties, other States and international organizations on behalf of the Organization and supervise their implementation; and

(m) Approve any new operational manuals and any changes to the existing operational manuals that may be proposed by the [Technical] Secretariat.

35. [The Executive Council] may request a special session of the Conference.

36. [The Executive Council] shall consider concerns raised by a State Party regarding compliance and cases of non-compliance and abuse of the rights established by this Protocol. In doing so, [the Executive Council] shall consult with the States Parties involved and, as appropriate, request a State Party to take measures to redress the situation within a specified time. To the extent that [the Executive Council] considers further action to be necessary, it shall take, *inter alia*, one or more of the following measures:

- (a) Notify all States Parties of the issue or matter;
- (b) Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference;
- (c) Make recommendations to the Conference regarding measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance in accordance with Article V.]

(D) THE [TECHNICAL] SECRETARIAT [(INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL EPIDEMIOLOGICAL NETWORK)]⁶⁰

37.⁶¹ The [Technical] Secretariat shall assist States Parties in the implementation of this Protocol. The [Technical] Secretariat shall assist the Conference and [the Executive Council] in the performance of their functions. The [Technical] Secretariat shall carry out the [verification] [investigation] measures and the scientific and technological exchange and technical cooperation activities and measures provided for in this section [Annex ...]. It shall carry out the other functions entrusted to it by this Protocol, as well as those functions delegated to it by the Conference or [the Executive Council] in accordance with this Protocol. [The Technical Secretariat shall include, as an integral part, the Scientific Support Centre (SSC).] [The details with regard to the functions of the [Technical] Secretariat, the SSC and the system of support laboratories are set out in Annex [...], paragraph]

38.⁶² The functions of the [Technical] Secretariat with regard to [verification of] compliance with the Convention and this Protocol shall, in accordance with Article III and the Annexes, include, *inter alia*:

(a) Receiving and processing of declarations submitted by the States Parties to the Organization in accordance with the provisions of Article III, Part D,

[(b) Receiving, collecting, processing, analysing and storing data and all relevant information relating to the appearance of unusual pathologies or epidemics supplied by States Parties and existing international organizations;

60. The view was expressed that there is a need for adjustment in the whole section in case specialized international organizations such as WHO would be entrusted with the verification responsibilities

61. It was proposed to move this paragraph to be the fourth paragraph of section D

62. It was proposed to take this paragraph out of the main body and include it in a new Annex on the Technical Secretariat (paragraphs 17 and 18)

(c) Establishing, on the basis of information supplied, epidemiological data bases for various geographical zones;

(d) Supplying, at the request of the Organization or any State Party, any relevant information drawn up on the basis of collected and processed data, *inter alia*, to help distinguish pathologies and epidemics deemed to have a natural cause from pathologies and epidemics which might be the result of a violation or attempted violation of the BTWC;

(e) Assisting [the Executive Council] in facilitating consultation and clarification among States Parties;

[(f) Conducting [[Non-Challenge] [Random] Visits] [and] [Clarification Visits] [Request Visits] [Confidence-Building Visits] [Voluntary Visits] in accordance with the provisions of Article III, Part F and of Annex G;]

(g) Receiving requests for [investigations to address a non-compliance concern][field and facility investigations][challenge inspections] and processing them, carrying out the preparations for, and providing technical support during, the conduct of [investigations to address a non-compliance concern][field and facility investigations] [challenge inspections], and reporting to [the Executive Council];

(h) Negotiating agreements or arrangements with States Parties, other States and international organizations and concluding, subject to prior approval by [the Executive Council], any such agreements or arrangements relating to [verification] activities with States Parties or other States;

(i) Assisting the States Parties through their National Authorities on other issues of [verification under] [implementation of] this Protocol; and

[(j) Implementing training programmes in order to facilitate the Director- General's responsibilities with regard to paragraph 47.]

39.⁶³ The functions of the [Technical] Secretariat with respect to administrative matters shall include:

(a) Preparing and submitting to [the Executive Council] the draft programme and budget of the Organization;

63. It was proposed to take this paragraph out of the main body and include it in a new Annex on the Technical Secretariat (paragraph 25).

(b) Preparing and submitting to [the Executive Council] the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Protocol and such other reports as the Conference or [the Executive Council] may request;

(c) Providing administrative and technical support to the Conference, [the Executive Council] and other subsidiary organs;

(d) Addressing and receiving communications on behalf of the Organization relating to the implementation of this Protocol; and

(e) Carrying out the administrative responsibilities related to any agreements between the Organization and other international organizations.

40.⁶⁴ The functions of the [Technical] Secretariat with regard to scientific and technological exchange and technical cooperation for peaceful purposes shall, in accordance with Article ..., include, *inter alia*:

(a) Administer the voluntary fund referred to in ...;

[...].

[41. The functions described in 38 (b), (c) and (d) are discharged by the International Epidemiological Monitoring Network, an integral part of the [Technical] Secretariat.]

42.⁶⁵ The [Technical] Secretariat shall develop and maintain, subject to approval by [the Executive Council], operational manuals in accordance with Article III and the Annexes. These manuals shall not constitute integral parts of this Protocol or the Annexes and may be changed by the [Technical] Secretariat subject to approval by [the Executive Council]. The [Technical] Secretariat shall promptly inform the States Parties of any changes in the operational manuals.

43.⁶⁶ All requests and notifications by States Parties to the Organization shall be transmitted through their National Authorities to the Director-General. Requests and notifications shall be in

64. It was proposed to take this paragraph out of the main body and include it in a new Annex on the Technical Secretariat (paragraph 24).

65. It was proposed to take this paragraph out of the main body and include it in a new Annex on the Technical Secretariat (paragraph 18(k)).

66. It was proposed to move this paragraph to be the seventh paragraph of section D

one of the official languages of this Protocol. In response the Director-General shall use the language of the transmitted request or notification.

44.⁶⁷ With respect to the responsibilities of the [Technical] Secretariat for preparing and submitting to [the Executive Council] the draft programme and budget of the Organization, the [Technical] Secretariat shall determine and maintain a clear accounting of all costs for each of the activities of the Organization.

45.⁶⁸ The [Technical] Secretariat shall promptly inform [the Executive Council] of any problems that have arisen with regard to the discharge of its functions that have come to its notice in the performance of its activities and that it has been unable to resolve through consultations with the State Party concerned.

46.⁶⁹ The [Technical] Secretariat shall comprise a Director-General, who shall be its head and chief administrative officer, and such scientific, technical [, administrative] and other personnel as may be required. The Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference upon the recommendation of [the Executive Council] for a term of four years, renewable for only one further term.

47.⁷⁰ The Director-General shall be responsible to the Conference and [the Executive Council] for the appointment of the staff and for the organization and functioning of the [Technical] Secretariat. [The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff [in the Technical Secretariat] and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of professional expertise, experience, efficiency, competence and integrity] [, on equitable geographical distribution]. Only citizens of States Parties shall serve as the Director-General, [members of the SSC or the clerical staff] as [inspectors] [investigators] or as members of the professional and clerical staff. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. Recruitment shall be guided by the principle that the staff shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the proper discharge of the responsibilities of the [Technical] Secretariat.

67. It was proposed to move this paragraph to be the eighth paragraph of section D.

68. It was proposed to move this paragraph to be the ninth paragraph of section D.

69. It was proposed to move the first sentence to be the first paragraph of section D, and the second sentence to be included in a new Annex on the Technical Secretariat (paragraph 1).

70. It was proposed to take the first sentence out of the main body and include it in a new Annex on the Technical Secretariat (paragraph 16), and to move the last four sentences to be the third paragraph of section D.

48.⁷¹ The Director-General shall be responsible for the organization and functioning of the Scientific Advisory Board referred to in paragraph The Director-General shall, in consultation with States Parties, appoint members of the Scientific Advisory Board, who shall serve in their individual capacity. The members of the Board shall be appointed on the basis of the expertise in the particular scientific fields relevant to the implementation of this Convention [and equitable geographical distribution]. The Director-General may also, as appropriate, in consultation with members of the Board, establish temporary working groups of scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific issues. In regard to the above, States Parties may submit lists of experts to the Director-General.

49.⁷² In the performance of their duties, the Director-General, [members of the Scientific Support Centre,] the [inspectors] [investigators], the [inspection] [investigation] assistants and [other] [the] members of the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other source external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action that might reflect adversely on their positions as international officers responsible only to the Organization. The Director-General shall assume responsibility for the activities of an investigation team.

50.⁷³ Each State Party shall respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Director-General, [the Scientific Support Centre,] the [inspectors] [investigators], the [inspection] [investigation] assistants and the members of the staff and shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

[51.⁷⁴ Scientific and technical expertise in the [Technical] Secretariat shall be contained in a specialized multidisciplinary Scientific Support Centre (SSC). The SSC shall consist of a small permanent staff and an ad hoc panel of experts as well as a system of support laboratories including a small organizational laboratory supported by accredited and local laboratories. The details of these structures are set out [below] [in Annex ...]. [The details with regard to the structure of the SSC and the system of support laboratories are set out in Annex [...], paragraph]

71. It was proposed to take this paragraph out of the main body and include it in square brackets in a new Annex on the Technical Secretariat (between paragraphs 16 and 17).

72. It was proposed to move this paragraph to be the fifth paragraph of section D.

73. It was proposed to move this paragraph to be the sixth paragraph of section D

74. It was proposed to move this paragraph to be the second paragraph of section D

(E) PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

52. The Organization shall enjoy on the territory and in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions.

53. Delegates of States Parties, together with their alternates and advisers, representatives of members elected to [the Executive Council], together with their alternates and advisers, the Director-General and the staff of the Organization shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.

54. The legal capacity, privileges and immunities referred to in this Article shall be defined in agreements between the Organization and the States Parties as well as in an agreement between the Organization and the State in which the Organization is seated. Such agreements shall be considered and approved in accordance with paragraph 22 (h) and (i).

55. Notwithstanding paragraphs 52, 53 and 54, the privileges and immunities enjoyed by [the Director-General,] the [inspectors] [investigators] [and visitors], the [inspection] [investigation] [and visit] assistants [and the members of the staff of the [Technical] Secretariat] during the conduct of investigation activities [and visits] [as well as the waiver procedures of immunities of the investigators [and visitors] and investigation [and visit] assistants, the other staff of the [Technical] Secretariat, the Director-General of the [Technical] Secretariat and the Organization itself in relation to such activities] shall be those set forth in the Annexes.

[56. Provisions set forth in Section D 2. of the Annex shall apply, when applicable and mutatis mutandis, to the waiver of immunities of the Director-General and the staff of the [Technical] Secretariat and the Organization itself in relation to activities of the Organization other than investigation activities [and visits].]

[[A. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

1. A request relating to an alleged breach of the Convention shall be submitted to the Security Council in accordance with article VI of the Convention. It shall then be referred to a technical body, either an existing one, or one specially set up on the basis of an existing unit in the United Nations system.]

[B. TECHNICAL BODY

2. The Technical Body would be able to make an expert technical appraisal of the request, assessing the material submitted in relation to the criteria set forth in the Protocol, and also, on

the basis of Article V, shall assist with bilateral and multilateral consultations. In drawing up the list of criteria for consideration of a request, the Ad Hoc Group shall specify that no evidence is to be regarded by the persons considering it as having pre-established value. Evidence obtained in violation of the law either of the country requesting the inspection or of the country where the inspection is to be conducted shall be treated as having no legal value and may not be used as the basis for any accusation or as confirmation of the allegations made in the request.

3. Consideration of a request for an investigation shall be assisted by consultations, explanations and cooperation between States Parties in accordance with Article V of the Convention in order to allay any concern about a breach of the Convention, the mechanism of bilateral and multilateral consultations being used for these purposes (unless otherwise agreed in the Protocol) with the assistance of the technical body.

4. All States Parties shall, in accordance with Article VI of the Convention and the procedures established, give the technical body, at its request, any necessary assistance in order to facilitate the conduct of the investigation.

5. In considering a request, the technical body may also ask for additional information and hold further consultations.

6. If the requesting State does not supply the amount of information required by the Protocol (including additional information), or if the concern that has arisen about a breach is allayed in the course of consultations, explanations and cooperation, the investigation will be terminated and the requesting State duly informed.]

[C. CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL

7. If the technical body established that the request meets the agreed criteria that are to be set forth in the Protocol and the concern about a breach is not allayed in the course of consultations, explanations and cooperation, the decision on an inspection will be taken by a politically representative body (e.g. a consultative council) convened for the purpose by the Depositary States of the Convention. This consultative council board shall consist of representatives of States Parties and shall meet only in order to take a decision on carrying out an inspection upon request. Questions relating to its membership and the procedure for establishing and convening it will have to be worked out by the Ad Hoc Group. A decision to carry out an inspection would be taken by a two-thirds majority of the full membership of the advisory board.]]

ARTICLE X

NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES

[1. Each State Party [to the Protocol] shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to implement its obligations under [the Convention and] [this Protocol]. In particular, it shall:

[(a) Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention, including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity;]

[(b) Prohibit natural and legal persons from undertaking any such activity anywhere under its control; and]

[(c) Prohibit, in conformity with international law, natural persons possessing its nationality from undertaking any such activity anywhere.]]

[2. Each State Party may, where requested, cooperate with other States Parties and afford [the appropriate form of] legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the obligations under paragraph 1.]

[3. In order to fulfil its obligations under this Protocol [the Convention], each State Party shall designate or set up a National Authority and shall so inform the [Organization] upon entry into force of this Protocol for it. The National Authority shall serve as the national focal point for liaison with the [Organization] and with other States Parties.]

4. Each State Party shall inform the [Organization] of the legislative and administrative measures taken pursuant to this Article.

5. Each State Party, during the implementation of its obligations under this Protocol, shall take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of people and to protect the environment, and may cooperate as appropriate with other States Parties in this regard.

6. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the [Organization] in the exercise of all its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the [Technical Secretariat].

ARTICLE XI⁷⁵

RELATIONSHIP OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE BTWC
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

1. This Protocol shall [supplement] [be additional to] the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as in any way modifying or amending that Convention.
2. Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any States under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, the Geneva Protocol [or the Chemical Weapons Convention].

75. The inclusion of articles relating to legal issues in the Rolling Text shall not prejudice the delegations' positions as regards the ultimate content of the articles. Further detailed consideration of these articles will be required at the future sessions.

ARTICLE XII⁷⁶

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

1. Disputes that may arise concerning the application or interpretation of this Protocol shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Protocol and in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the [relevant][applicable] provisions of international law.

2. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties, or between one or more States Parties and [the Organization], relating to the application or interpretation of this Protocol, the parties concerned shall engage in consultations without delay with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation [or by other peaceful means of the Parties' choice]. The parties to a dispute shall keep the [politically representative body][Executive Council] informed of the actions being taken as well as the commencement of the consultations. The [politically representative body][Executive Council] may contribute to the settlement of a dispute by negotiation by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices. At the end of the negotiation the parties to a dispute shall inform the [politically representative body][Executive Council] by means of a joint statement whether or not the dispute has been resolved.

3. If the dispute is not disposed of as a result of the consultations and negotiations referred to in paragraph 2 [within three months] from the commencement of the consultations, the parties to a dispute shall resort to other peaceful means of the parties' choice, including recourse to appropriate organs of this Protocol or other organs established and entrusted by the [politically representative body][Executive Council] with tasks related to the settlement of these disputes in conformity with Article IX, and, by mutual consent, referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court. The parties involved shall keep the [politically representative body][Executive Council] informed of these actions and their outcome.

4. A Conference of States Parties shall consider questions related to disputes raised by States Parties, [the Organization] or brought to its attention by the [politically representative body][Executive Council].

5. A Conference of States Parties and the [politically representative body][Executive Council] are separately empowered, subject to authorization from the General Assembly of the United

76. A view was expressed on the need for further consideration on how to deal in this Article with the Confidentiality Commission.

Nations, to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of the activities of [the Organization]. An agreement between [the Organization] and the United Nations shall be concluded for this purpose in accordance with Article IX.

[6. This Article is without prejudice to Article III and V of this Protocol.]

ARTICLE XIII

REVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL

1. [Within] [five] [ten] years after the entry into force of this Protocol, States Parties shall meet to review its operation [with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Protocol are being realized]. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Protocol. This Review Conference of the Protocol shall be held [immediately preceding] [immediately following] [jointly as appropriate with] [the] [a] Review Conference of the Convention [as provided for under Article XII of that Convention]. This Review Conference of the Protocol shall be held [at Geneva, Switzerland] [or,] [at the seat of the Organization] [or unless otherwise decided by the Conference]].
2. At intervals of [five] [ten] years thereafter, unless otherwise decided upon, further such Review Conferences of the Protocol shall be convened with the same objective, [immediately preceding] [immediately following] [jointly as appropriate with] the Review Conference of the Convention.]

ARTICLE XIV

AMENDMENTS

[1. Any time after the entry into force of this Protocol any State Party may propose amendments to this Protocol [or its Annexes or Appendices]. Any State Party may also propose changes, in accordance with paragraph 4, to the Annexes [and Appendices] of this Protocol. Proposals for amendment shall be subject to the procedures in paragraphs 2 and 3. Proposals for changes, as specified in paragraph 4, shall be subject to the provisions set out in paragraph 5.

2. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to [the Director-General]. The proposed amendment shall be considered only by an Amendment Conference. [The Director-General] shall circulate the proposal to all States Parties and seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If [one third or more] of the States Parties notify [the Director-General], not later than 30 days after the circulation of the proposal, that they support the convening of an Amendment Conference, [the Director-General] shall convene such a Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a regular session of a Conference of States Parties unless all States Parties which support the convening of an Amendment Conference request that it be held earlier. In no case shall an Amendment Conference be held sooner than 60 days after the circulation of the proposed amendment. Amendments shall be adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive vote of a majority of all States Parties [present and voting], with no State Party casting a negative vote.

[3. Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 30 days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification or acceptance by all of the States Parties casting a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.]

4. In order to assure the viability and effectiveness of this Protocol, [provisions in] [Sections ... of] the [Annexes] [and Appendices] shall be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 5, if proposed changes are related only to matters of a technical or administrative nature. [Sections ... of the [Annexes] [or Appendices] shall not be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 5].

[5. Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 4 shall be made in accordance with the following procedures:

(a) The text of the proposed changes, together with supporting documentation, shall be transmitted to [the Director-General]. [The Director-General] shall promptly communicate any

such proposal to all States Parties and the [politically representative body] [Executive Council]. Any State Party and [the Director-General] may provide additional information to assist in the evaluation of the proposal;

(b) No later than 60 days after its receipt, [the Director-General] shall evaluate the proposal to determine all its possible consequences for the provisions and implementation of this Protocol and for the provisions and implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 and shall communicate any such information to all States Parties and the [politically representative body] [Executive Council];

(c) The [politically representative body] [Executive Council] shall examine the proposal in light of all the information available to it, including whether the proposal fulfils the requirements of paragraph 4. Not later than 90 days after its receipt, the [politically representative body] [Executive Council] shall notify its recommendations, with appropriate explanations, to all States Parties for consideration. States Parties shall acknowledge receipt within 10 days;

(d) If the [politically representative body] [Executive Council] recommends to all States Parties that the proposal be adopted, it shall be considered approved if no State Party objects to it within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation. If the [politically representative body] [Executive Council] recommends that the proposal be rejected, it shall be considered rejected if no State Party objects to the rejection within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation;

(e) If a recommendation of the [politically representative body] [Executive Council] does not meet with the acceptance required under sub-paragraph (d), a decision on the proposal, including whether the proposal fulfils the requirements of paragraph (4), shall be taken as a matter of substance by a Conference of States Parties at its next session;

(f) [The Director-General] shall notify all States Parties of any decision under this paragraph;

(g) Changes approved under this procedure shall enter into force for all States Parties 180 days after the date of notification by [the Director-General] of their approval unless another time period is recommended by the [politically representative body] [Executive Council] or decided by a Conference of States Parties.]]

ARTICLE XV

DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

1. This Protocol shall remain in force so long as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 is in force.
2. Each State Party to this Protocol shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Protocol, have jeopardised its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to [the Depositary/ies] all other States Parties to the Protocol, the [politically representative body] [Executive Council] and the United Nations Security Council [...] months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardised its supreme interests.
3. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Protocol shall not in any way affect its obligations under other international legal instruments to which it is a Party, particularly the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, the Geneva Protocol [and the Chemical Weapons Convention].
4. Any State Party that withdraws from the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 shall be deemed to have withdrawn from this Protocol, irrespective of whether it has complied with the procedure set forth in paragraph 2 of this Article. The Protocol shall cease to be in force for such a State on the same day as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 ceases to be in force for it.

ARTICLE XVI

STATUS OF THE ANNEXES [AND APPENDICES]

1. The Annexes [and Appendices] to this Protocol form an integral part of the Protocol. Any reference to this Protocol includes the Annexes [and Appendices].

ARTICLE XVII

SIGNATURE

1. This Protocol shall be open for signature to all States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, before this Protocol enters into force.

ARTICLE XVIII

RATIFICATION

1. This Protocol shall be subject to ratification by States Signatories according to their respective constitutional processes.

ARTICLE XIX

ACCESSION

1. Any State Party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 which does not sign this Protocol before its entry into force may accede to it at any time thereafter.

ARTICLE XX

ENTRY INTO FORCE

- [1. This Protocol shall enter into force [...] days after the date of the deposit of the [...]th instrument of ratification, but in no case earlier than [...] years after its opening for signature.
2. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Protocol, it shall enter into force on the [30]th day following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession.]

ARTICLE XXI
RESERVATIONS

1. [The Articles of this Protocol [shall not be subject to reservations] [incompatible with the object and purpose of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972]. The Annexes [and Appendices] of this Protocol shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 [or the object and purpose of this Protocol].]

ARTICLE XXII

DEPOSITARY/IES

1. The [Secretary-General of the United Nations] [Governments of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America] [is] [are] hereby designated as the [Depositary] [Depositaries] of this Protocol and shall, *inter alia*:

(a) Promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Protocol, and of the receipt of other notices;

(b) Transmit duly certified copies of this Protocol to the Governments of all signatory and acceding States; and

(c) Register this Protocol pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE XXIII
AUTHENTIC TEXTS

1. This Protocol, the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the [Secretary-General of the United Nations] [Governments of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America].

2. IN WITNESS THEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have signed this Protocol.

Done at ... on

ANNEXES

A. DECLARATIONS

I. [DEFINITIONS⁷⁷

The definitions of the following terms were discussed by or proposed to the Ad Hoc Group and may need further consideration in the context of specific measures. The appearance of any term on this list is without prejudice to whether that term has either an acceptable definition content or is acceptable for inclusion in any final legally binding instrument.

[1. Bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons

A type of weapon specifically designed [to cause disease, death or any harm to][for mass destruction] of human beings, animals or plants, the effects of which are based on the properties of biological agents and toxins.

The term "Bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons" shall be applied to the following:

- Biological agents and toxins (except when they are designed for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, provided that the types of agents and toxins and their quantities are appropriate for those purposes);
- Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed for the use of biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.]⁷⁸

[2. Biological agents (microbiological and other biological agents, bacteriological (biological) means, bacteriological (biological) agents) [organisms]

Microorganisms, their genetically modified forms and other biological agents [designed] to [destroy] [cause death, disease and incapacitate] human beings, animals or plants.]⁷⁹

77. Delegations expressed different views about the appropriate location of any agreed definition. One view was, that any agreed definitions should compose an Article of the final document. Another view was that any agreed definitions should be contained in an appropriate Annex.

78. A view was expressed that any proposal to define Article I terms would have the effect of amending the Convention outside the legal provisions of Article XI, contrary to the mandate of the Group. Another view was expressed that defining those terms is indispensable for the purposes of a verification mechanism and will not have the effect of amending the Convention.

79. Ibid.

3. Biological defence facility

Facility which works in [one or more of the following areas of] [a biological defence programme] [/defence programme against biological and toxin weapons] [as one of its principal and/or permanent roles in research, development, testing, production and evaluation].

4. [Military][civilian] [biological defence programme] [/Defence programme against biological and toxin weapons]

[Research, development, production, testing and evaluation] programme designed to detect and assess the impact of any use of microbial or other biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict, and/[or] to prevent, reduce and neutralize the impact of biological and toxin weapons on humans, animals or plants.

5. Biosafety Level 3

Biosafety level 3 comprises the safety practices [as specified in the 1993 WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual], [and the] building designs and [structure], equipment used in research, development, testing or diagnostic work in laboratory activities involving [pathogens that pose a high risk of infection]. [microbial or other biological agents, or toxins that pose a high risk [to health] [of causing infectious disease or a similar occurrence in the case of toxins (intoxination)] [of infection] [or intoxication] [or intoxication]].

[Biosafety level 3 characteristics include buildings with negative pressure to the environment and access control and the exhaust air from safety cabinets that pass through high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. Other characteristics could also include buildings sealable for decontamination, with a ventilation system that establishes a directional airflow from the access space into the laboratory room, double door entry into the room, sealable windows and effluent disinfected. Equipment used inside include biosafety cabinets and specialised autoclaves. [The two person rule whereby no individual ever works alone in the laboratory applicable, biohazard warning signs displayed when work is in progress and, where applicable, protective laboratory clothing, worn inside.]]

6. Diagnostic Facility

[Any] [A] facility which tests [only] samples for the purpose of diagnosis of human, animal and plant disease⁸⁰ [by means of detection, isolation and identification of microbial or other biological agents or toxins].

7. Facility

A combination of physical structures, equipment, workforce and principal associated support infrastructure [having an identifiable boundary and a single administration] whether under construction, operational or non-operational. [for [the] [either] [research,] development, production, testing, processing, stockpiling, otherwise acquiring or retaining microbial or other biological agents or toxins].

8. [Genetic modifications]

Genetic modification involves a process of arranging and manipulating nucleic acids of an organism to give it a capability to produce novel molecules or to add to it new characteristics, [excluding classical genetic techniques, natural processes and applications involving somatic hybridoma cells].⁸¹

[8 bis In the context of declaration triggers, genetic modification of listed agents and toxins means any manipulation of listed agents and toxins involving the application of techniques used in genetic modification, whatever the outcome.]]

9. Hostile purposes

The use of bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons or biological agents by a State (States) to [destroy] [cause death, disease and incapacitate] human beings, animals or plants in a State (States) which is (are) not engaged in a military conflict with the former State (States) with a view to inflicting military, economic or moral damage.]⁸²

10. Military medical programme

Medical programme to monitor, maintain and/or restore the physical, mental and social health, including detection, diagnosis, prophylaxis and treatment of infectious diseases and intoxications [that occur naturally] of serving and/or retired military personnel and their dependents, as well as civilians other than in the context of defence against the use of microbial or other biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

81. It may include alterations in the genetic material of organisms in performing new functions like:

- enhancement or reduction in pathogenicity and/or virulence;
- resistance to biotic and abiotic stress;
- change in antigenicity;
- enhancement of stability in environment and ease in cultivation.

82. See footnote 78.

11. Primary production containment

Primary containment in production comprises the safety practices and equipment design features used in production activities involving microbial or other biological agents or toxins where there is a need to prevent incidental release into the environment. [Microorganisms, [viruses] and eukaryotic cells are handled in a [closed] system which physically separates the process from the environment (closed system) with seals so as to prevent release of organisms from the system, exhaust gases from the system treated so as to prevent release [and effluent treated before final discharge,] [from the system].] Sample collection, addition of material to the system and transfer of viable organisms to another closed system, performed so as to prevent release. This system could be located within a controlled area.]

[11 bis Primary production containment comprises the safety practices and equipment design features used in production activities involving microbial or other biological agents or toxins where there is a need to prevent incidental release into the environment. Microorganisms and eukaryotic cells are handled in a closed system.]]

[12. Closed System

A system, which physically separates the process from the environment with seals so as to prevent release of organisms from the system, exhaust gases from the system are treated so as to prevent release and effluent is treated before final discharge. Sample collection, addition of material to the system and transfer of viable organisms to another system, is performed so as to prevent release. This system could be located within a controlled area.

A closed system may also contain closed vessels used for the preparation, growth and storage of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins.]

13. Production capability

Expertise and capability to produce microbial or other biological agents or toxins, whatever their origin or method of production.

[14. Purposes not prohibited by the Convention

[Industrial, agricultural and medical research] Treatment, prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.]⁸³

83. See footnote 78.

15. Site

A geographically defined location or area having an identifiable boundary that contains [or has contained (in a time frame to be specified)] one or more facilities.

[16. Toxins

Toxic by-products of microorganisms, natural poisons of animal or plant origin, whatever their method of production, designed to [destroy] [cause death, disease and incapacitate] human beings, animals or plants.]⁸⁴

17. Vaccine

Preparations, including live-attenuated, killed or otherwise modified organisms or their components, and nucleic acids, which when introduced by any of multiple routes into a human being or animal induces in it an active immune response for prophylactic or protective use.

18. Work with [listed] biological agents and toxins

[Any manipulations with [listed] biological agents and toxins that cover for instance research, development, production and diagnosis using [listed] biological agents and toxins including the study of properties of biological agents and toxins, detection and identification methods, genetic modification, aerobiology, prophylaxis and treatment methods [maintenance of culture collections] [registered culture collection].]

[18 bis In the context of declaration triggers, work with listed agents and toxins means any manipulation or production of listed agents and toxins involving the application of techniques used in genetic modification, whatever the outcome.]

[19. Plant inoculant

A formulation containing pure or predetermined mixture of microorganisms, such as living bacteria, fungi or virus particles for the treatment of seeds, seedlings, other plant propagation material, or plants for the purpose of enhancing the growth capabilities, or disease, or frost resistance or otherwise altering the properties of the eventual plants or crop.]

[20. Biocontrol agent

[A material of biological origin or] An [micro-]organism used for the prevention, elimination or reduction of the disease, pest [or] which may have negative impact on a plant or crop.]

[21. Antitoxin / Therapeutic Serum

Immunizing product formed of serum taken from an animal or human which has developed antibodies to a disease and used to protect and treat a patient from that disease. Any other products produced by cellular culture directed to accomplish the same objective, or directed to diminish a toxic effect are also included under this definition.] [Human or animal blood serum which contains antibodies to a microorganism or toxin and is used to protect or treat humans and animals from the disease caused by this microorganism or toxin.]]

II. LISTS AND CRITERIA (AGENTS AND TOXINS)⁸⁵

Human Pathogens

The following list of human pathogens and toxins was discussed by the Group and recognized to be relevant for developing a list or lists of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for specific measures [in particular for initiating or triggering declarations] to strengthen the Convention:

[I. Natural organisms]

Viruses

1. Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus
2. Eastern equine encephalitis virus
3. Ebola virus
4. [Hantaviruses]
5. [Japanese encephalitis virus]
6. Junin virus
7. Lassa fever virus
8. [Machupo virus]
9. Marburg virus
10. Rift Valley Virus
11. [Tick-borne encephalitis virus]
12. Variola virus (Smallpox virus)
13. Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus
14. Western equine encephalitis virus
15. Yellow fever virus
16. [Kyasanur Forest Disease virus]

85. The view was expressed that although the Lists and Criteria section has been the subject of technical discussions during earlier sessions of the Ad Hoc Group as a Friend of the Chair paper, only a preliminary review has been completed with respect to its incorporation into the rolling text. Some individual brackets and footnotes have been introduced at this time to address initial concerns of some delegations. In light of the complexity and importance of the issues involved, this view recognized that further and detailed consideration of this Section will be required at future Ad Hoc Group sessions.

Another view was expressed according to which the Ad Hoc Group had had sufficient discussion of the issue relating to the incorporation of the Lists of Agents and Criteria Section. At the same time in order to reach final agreement on the Lists of Agents and Criteria their further discussion would be required at future sessions of the Ad Hoc Group.

Bacteria

1. *Bacillus anthracis*
2. [*Brucella* spp]
3. [*Chlamydia psittaci*]
4. [*Clostridium botulinum*]
5. *Francisella tularensis* (tularemia)
6. *Pseudomonas* (*Burkholderia*) *mallei*
7. *Pseudomonas* (*Burkholderia*) *pseudomallei*
8. *Yersinia pestis*

Rickettsiae

1. *Coxiella burnetti*
2. *Rickettsia prowazekii*
3. *Rickettsia rickettsii*

Fungi

1. *Histoplasma capsulatum* (incl var *duboisii*)

[II. New organisms resulting from genetic manipulations

III. Molecular agents]

Toxins

1. Abrin (*A. precatorius*)
2. Botulinum toxins (*Clostridium botulinum*)
3. *Clostridium perfringens* (tox)
4. *Corynebacterium diphtheriae* (tox)
5. Cyanginosins (Microcystins) (*Microcystis aeruginosa*)
6. Enterotoxins (*Staphylococcus aureus*)
7. Ricin (*Ricinus communis*)
8. Saxitoxin (*Gonyaulax catanella*)
9. Shigatoxin (*Shigella dysenteriae*)
10. Tetanus toxin (*Clostridium tetani*)
11. Tetrodotoxin (*Spheroides rufripes*)
12. Trichothecene mycotoxins
13. Verrucologen (*Myrothecium verrucaria*)
14. [Aflatoxins]

[IV. Other agents]

Criteria for human pathogens and toxins

The following criteria were discussed by the Group and may be used in combination for selection of human pathogens and toxins to be included in a list of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins:

1. [Vectors or]⁸⁶ Agents known to have been developed, produced, stockpiled or used as weapon;
2. Low infection dose or high toxicity;
3. [Short incubation and] high level of morbidity;
4. High level of contagiousness in population;
5. Infection or intoxication [by variety of route, especially] by respiratory route,
6. High level of incapacity or mortality;
7. No effective prophylaxis (i.e. immune sera, vaccines, antibiotics) and/or therapy commonly available and widely in use;
8. Stability in the environment;
9. Difficulty of detection or identification [at the early stage];
10. Ease of production [and transportation].

Definition of some terms:

Morbidity: Ratio of [sick] [new cases of disease] to [healthy persons] [total population];

Contagiousness: Capability to be [communicable] [transmissible specially through contact];

Incapacity: Lack of physical or intellectual power;

Mortality: Ratio of dead to [sick persons] [total population].

⁸⁶ The view was expressed that if vectors were to be considered further on they should be included in the appropriate list

Animal pathogens

The following list of animal pathogens was discussed by the Group for further consideration with a view to developing a future list or lists of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, where relevant, for specific measures designed to strengthen the Convention:

[I. Natural organisms]

1. African swine fever virus
2. Avian influenza virus (Fowl plague virus)
3. [Bluetongue virus]
4. [Camel pox virus]
5. Classic swine fever virus (Hog cholera virus)
6. [Contagious bovine (pleuropneumonia)/Mycoplasma mycoides var. mycoides]
7. [Contagious caprine (pleuropneumonia)/Mycoplasma mycoides var. capri]
8. Foot and mouth virus
9. [Herpes B virus (monkey)]
10. Newcastle disease virus
11. [Peste des petits ruminants virus]
12. [Porcine enterovirus type 9]
13. [Rabies virus]
14. Rinderpest virus (Cattle plague virus)
15. [Sheep pox virus]
16. [Teschen disease virus]
17. [Vesicular stomatitis virus]
18. [African horse sickness virus]
19. [Swine vesicular disease virus]

[II. New organisms resulting from genetic manipulation]

III. Molecular agents

IV. Other agents]

Criteria for animal pathogens

The following criteria were discussed by the Group and may be used in combination for selection of animal pathogens to be included in a list of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins:

1. [Vectors or]⁸⁷ Agents known to have been developed, produced or used as weapons;
2. Agents which have severe socio-economic and/or significant adverse human health impacts to be evaluated against a combination of the following criteria:
 - (a) High morbidity and/or mortality rates;
 - (b) Short incubation period and/or difficult to diagnose/identify at an early stage;
 - (c) High transmissibility and/or contagiousness;
 - (d) Lack of availability of cost effective protection/treatment;
 - (e) Low infective/toxic dose;
 - (f) Stability in the environment;
 - (g) Ease of production.

Definition of selected terms:

Morbidity. Ratio of sick to healthy animals;

Mortality: Ratio of dead to sick animals;

Contagiousness: Capability to be communicable from a sick to healthy animal;

Stability in the environment: Ability of the agent to retain its properties and resist temperature, humidity and insolation;

Infective dose: The smallest quantity of the agent which infects animals.

87 The view was expressed that if vectors were to be considered further on they should be included in the appropriate list

Plant pathogens

The following list of plant pathogens was discussed by the Group for further consideration with a view to developing a future list or lists of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, where relevant, for specific measures designed to strengthen the Convention:

[I. Natural organisms]

1. [Citrus greening disease bacteria]
2. *Colletotrichum coffeanum* var. *Virulans*
3. [*Chochliobolus miyabeanus*]
4. [*Dothistroma pini* (*Scirrhia pini*)]
5. *Erwinia amylovora*
6. [*Microcyclus ulei*]
7. [*Phytophthora infestans*]
8. *Pseudomonas solanacearum*⁸⁸
9. [*Puccinia erianthi*]
10. [*Puccinia graminis*]
11. *Puccinia striiformis* (*Puccinia glumarum*)
12. *Pyricularia oryzae*
13. [Sugar cane Fiji disease virus]
14. [*Tilletia indica*]
15. *Ustilago maydis*
16. *Xanthomonas albilineans*
17. *Xanthomonas campestris* pv *citri*
18. *Xanthomonas campestris* pv *oryzae*
19. [*Sclerotinia sclerotiorum*]
20. [Thrips *palmi* Karny]
21. *Frankliniella occidentalis*

[II. New organisms resulting from genetic manipulation

III. Molecular agents

IV. Other agents

⁸⁸ The taxonomy of No. 8 *Pseudomonas solanacearum* is complicated and still changing. The current name for potato brown rot pathogen is *Ralstonia solanacearum* (that is *Pseudomonas solanacearum* biovar 2 race 3), but pathogens causing brown rots and bacterial wilts in other crops may have different names.

[Definition of selected terms

Natural organisms: Bacteria, viruses, fungi, rickettsiae, chlamydiae, mycoplasmas, protozoa, insects and any other living organisms which, owing to their characteristics and in accordance with the selection criteria, could be used as biological weapons.

New organisms resulting from genetic manipulation: Organisms whose genetic material has been altered using genetic manipulation techniques. The following must be included:

(a) Genetically modified organisms containing nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity derived from listed agents;

(b) Genetically modified organisms containing nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the listed molecular agents;

(c) Genetically modified organisms containing nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of agents classified in risk groups 3 and 4 (in accordance with the criteria set out in the 1993 WHO Laboratory Biosafety Handbook), which are not necessarily listed;

(d) Genetically modified organisms which, owing to their new characteristics, would fall in risk groups 3 and 4 (in accordance with the criteria set out in the 1993 WHO Laboratory Biosafety Handbook).

Molecular agents: Toxins, bioregulators or chemical substances of biological origin.

Other agents: Prions (at the stage of research, development and production, excluding diagnostic activities) and any other new agent not included in the previous groups.]

Criteria for plant pathogens

The following criteria were discussed by the Group and may be used in combination for selection of plant pathogens to be included in a list of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins:

1. [Pests or]⁸⁹ Agents known to have been developed, produced or used as weapons;
2. Agents which have severe socio-economic and/or significant adverse human health impacts, due to their effect on staple crops⁹⁰, to be evaluated against a combination of the following criteria:
 - (a) Ease of dissemination (wind, insects, water, etc.);
 - (b) Short incubation period and/or difficult to diagnose/identify at an early stage;
 - (c) Ease of production;
 - (d) Stability in the environment;
 - (e) Lack of availability of cost-effective protection/treatment;
 - (f) Low infective dose;
 - (g) High infectivity;
 - (h) Short life cycle.

Definition of selected terms:

Infective dose: The smallest quantity of the agent which infects plants;

Stability in the environment: Ability of the agent to retain its properties and resist temperature, humidity and insolation;

Infectivity: Ratio of infected plants to the total number of plants exposed.

89. The view was expressed that if pests were to be considered further on they should be included in the appropriate list.

90. Staple crops: a description/definition will need to be developed for the purposes of the BTWC drawing from usage in relevant international bodies, e.g. FAO, WTO.

III. LIST OF EQUIPMENT⁹¹

The following list of equipment was discussed by the Group in the context of a declaration format for a declared facility. [Such equipment could be divided in four different categories] [according to the activity of a facility]:

[1. Aerobiology]

- Aerosol chambers [(dynamics, static and explosive)] [designed and/or] used for test or study of microorganisms or toxins.

	Yes / No	[Volume]	Lab. Containment ⁹²	Application ⁹³
[dynamic
static
explosive]
<hr/>				
Total				

[- Various types of aerosol chambers and other equipment for study of characteristics of micro-organisms aerosols, their components, including toxins, or other biological materials.

Yes / No ...]

91. A list of equipment may also have utility in the context of specific on-site activities during investigations; and in the context of declarations of, and [any] guidelines on [all] transfers of dual-use items. Some other equipment was also proposed by some delegations, which needs to be discussed by the Group.

92. Used under BL3 or BL4 or equivalent containment.

93. Application means work with microorganisms or toxins, or work with the biologically active material or other applications

- Aerosol dissemination equipment with the ability of generating [[90 % of particles] [monodisperse particles] of size [1-10 μm].][of particles mass median diameter not exceeding 10 μm].

	Yes / No	Indoor or outdoor use	Application
Powder aerosol capacity ... gram/minute
Liquid aerosol capacity ... ml/minute
[Aerosol particle analysing equipment]]

[2. Production]

- [Aggregate] fermenters / bioreactors.

Total capacity range	Yes / No	Lab. Containment	Process Containment ⁹⁴
[5-99 litres]
100-999 litres
1000-9999 litres
10.000 litres or more

- [- Equipment for batch fermentation with a capacity of over 300 litres per hour.

Yes / No ...

- Equipment for continuous fermentation with a capacity of over 50 litres.

Yes / No ...]

- [- Any other fermenters under containment level BL3 and/or BL4.]

94. OECD Category 2 or 3 or equivalent.

- High speed self-sterilizable centrifugal separators or decanters for continuous or semi-continuous operation.

Capacity range	Yes / No	Lab. Containment	Process Containment
5-99 litres/hour
100 litres/hour or more

- [- Centrifugal separators or tanks for continuous or semi-continuous operation with a capacity of over 100 litres per hour.

Yes / No ...

- Plate press filter separators with a capacity of over ... litres per hour.

Yes / No ...

- Rotor continuous flow centrifuges with a capacity of over 100 litres per hour.

Yes / No ...]

	Yes / No	Lab. Containment	Process Containment
Cross-flow tangential filtration equipment; capacity of filter area greater than [5] [square metres] [diameter of pore size less than 5 microns].
Freeze-drying equipment; with a condenser capacity more than 5 kg of ice in 24 hours.

	Yes / No	Lab. Containment	Process Containment
Spray drying equipment.
Drum drying equipment.]

3. [[Work with listed agents and toxins]

	Yes / No	Lab. Containment
Biological safety cabinets class III [and class II] containment, [class I cabinets that are convertible into class III cabinets] [flexible isolators with air-handling characteristics equivalent to class III cabinets].
Cell disruption equipment; with a flow rate greater than 10 litres per hour.
[Microencapsulation equipment. II

4. [Genetic Modification]

	Yes / No	Lab. Containment
Automatic DNA sequencing equipment.
Automatic DNA synthesizer.]

[5. Plant inoculant equipment

	Yes / No	[Total working area (m ²)] [Area ranges]
Rooms /other enclosures providing quarantine utilized for plant growth.

	Yes / No	[Total working area (m ²)] [Area ranges]
Plant inoculation chambers providing quarantine.

	Yes / No	[Total working area (m ²)] [Area ranges]
Insect rearing chambers providing quarantine.]

[6. Cell disruption equipment

- Cell disruption equipment capable of continuous operation without the release of aerosols and having a flow rate greater than 10 litres per hour.

Yes / No ...

7. Milling equipment

- Milling equipment having a capacity of milling grain size less than 10 microns and a production capacity of over ... kg per hour.

Yes / No ...]

IV. [THRESHOLDS]

[Specific threshold quantities of biological materials stored at facilities for the purposes of developing and testing means of protection against BW shall be established on the basis of the following characteristics:

- Characteristic "a" - effective dose (ED_{50})⁹⁵ of an agent with the highest virulence (cells or plaque forming units)⁹⁶;
- Characteristic "b" - genuinely achievable concentration of the agent in biological material (cells/ml or plaque forming units/ml)⁹⁷;
- Characteristic "d" - maximum quantity of biological material containing this agent, which can be held at the facility at one time (kg)⁹⁸.

Based on these values the ED_{50} quantity of this agent ("K" value) which can be held at the facility at one time shall be calculated as follows:

$$K = d \times 1000 \times b/a$$

The quantity of another biological material containing another agent, or the same one with a different virulence or concentration, that can be held at the facility at one time shall be determined by way of inserting the actual concentration and ED_{50} of the agent (ED_{50} values are given in Table) into the following formula:

$$M = K \times ED_{50}/C \times 1000, \text{ where}$$

- M is the quantity of biological material containing the agent of a given virulence and concentration which can be held at the facility at one time (kg);
- C is the concentration of the agent in biological material (cells/ml or plaque forming units/ml).

95. ED is an effective dose of a biological agent (LD_{50} , ID_{50}) determined through experiments on model animals with the use of certain means of infection under normal conditions.

96. Specific value of the parameter is to be agreed upon in advance.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

Table

Value of effective doses of biological agents

Biological agent	Experimental animal	Method of infection	Effective dose
1	2	3	4
Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus	white mice	intracerebrum	0,1 PFU ⁹⁹
Chikungunya virus	white mice	intracerebrum	0,5 PFU
Eastern encephalitis virus	white mice	intracerebrum	0,1 PFU
Ebola virus	white mice guinea pigs	intracerebrum intraperitoneum	0,3 PFU 0,1 PFU
Hantavirus	rats	aerogenic	0,5 PFU
Japanese encephalitis virus	white mice	intracerebrum	0,01 PFU
Junin virus	guinea pigs	intraperitoneum	0,02-150 PFU
Lassa fever virus	guinea pigs	hypodermic	0,3 PFU
Machupo virus	guinea pigs	hypodermic	2 PFU
Marburg virus	guinea pigs	intraperitoneum	0,1 PFU
Rift Valley Virus	white mice white mice white mice	intracerebrum intraperitoneum aerogenic	0,03 PFU 3 PFU 0,2-0,3 PFU
Tick-borne encephalitis virus (Russian spring-summer encephalitis virus)	white mice white mice	intracerebrum intraperitoneum	0,01 PFU 0,1 PFU

99. PFU - plaque forming unit

Variola virus (Smallpox virus)	rabbits	aerogenic	15 PFU
Venezuelan encephalitis virus	white mice guinea pigs	hypodermic intraperitoneum	0,3 PFU 3 PFU
Western encephalitis virus	white mice white mice	intracerebrum intraperitoneum	0,03 PFU 1 PFU
Yellow fever virus	M. mulatta	aerogenic	0,5 PFU
Kyasanur Forest Fever virus			
Bacillus anthracis	white mice guinea pigs	hypodermic hypodermic	10 cells 30 cells
Brucella spp.	white mice	hypodermic	5 ... 20 cells
Chlamydia psittaci	chicken embryo		1000 cells
Clostridium botulinum			
Francisella tularensis	white mice	hypodermic	1..10 cells
Pseudomonas mallei	golden hamsters	hypodermic	10..100
Pseudomonas pseudomallei	white mice golden hamsters guinea pigs	hypodermic hypodermic hypodermic	10 cells 10 cells 10 cells
Yersinia pestis	rats white mice	hypodermic hypodermic	5 cells 15 cells
Coxiella burnetii			
Rickettsia prowazekii			
Rickettsia rickettsii			

[For toxins, three general categories could be considered based on their LD₅₀. Accordingly for the specific measure of declaration, the following thresholds could be envisaged for each category of the toxins:

Group 1: Toxins with LD₅₀ of less than 1 microgram/kg, such as:

- Botulinum toxin;
- Neurotoxin (Shigella toxin);
- Tetanus Toxin (Clostridium tetani).

Declarations are required for more than 5 milligram of these toxins.

Group 2: Toxins with LD₅₀ of between 1 and 5 microgram/kg, such as:

- Abrin (A. precatorius);
- Enterotoxin (Staphylococcus aureus);
- Ricin (Ricin communis);
- Saxitoxin (Gonyaulax catanella).

Declarations are required for more than 100 milligram of these toxins.

Group 3: Toxins with LD₅₀ of between 5 and 15 microgram/kg, such as:

- Tetrodotoxin (Spheroides rufripes);
- Trichothecene mycotoxin.

Declarations are required for more than 500 milligram of these toxins.

(The level of toxicity and/or LD₅₀ is based on the experiment on the animals.)¹⁰⁰

[Threshold quantities of toxin containing materials stored at facilities for the purposes of developing and testing means of protection against BW shall be determined on the basis of the following characteristics:

- a - Effective dose (ED₅₀) of the toxin reduced to 100 kg mass (micrograms);
- b - Threshold quantity of effective doses of the toxin stored at the facility;

100. The toxins have been selected among those reflected in the list of pathogens and serve only as examples.

- c - Toxin concentration in biological material (microgram/ml);
- m - Threshold quantity of toxin containing material (kg).

With these characteristics in mind, the quantity of a toxin containing material that can be stored at a facility at one time shall be calculated as follows:

$$m = b \times a \times c \times 1000.$$

Values of "a" and "b" parameters shall be agreed upon in advance.

Example:

The ED₅₀ value of botulinum toxin has been agreed upon at the level of 100 micrograms.

The agreed threshold quantity of effective doses of toxins authorized for storage at a facility at one time shall be 300 ED₅₀.

Actual toxin concentration in the material shall be 10 microgram/ml.

Inserting the appropriate values into the formula we arrive at:

$$m = 300 \times 100/10 \times 1.000 = 3 \text{ kg]}$$

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V. PROGRAMMES AND FACILITIES

VI. DECLARATION FORMATS

B. [[NON-CHALLENGE] [RANDOM] VISITS]¹⁰¹

101. The inclusion of this paper is without prejudice to a final decision on whether provisions for other visits and procedures will form part of the future Protocol.

C. [MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF ARTICLE III]

D. INVESTIGATIONS

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

(A) DESIGNATION OF INVESTIGATION PERSONNEL

1. The personnel of an investigation team shall consist of investigators and, as necessary, [investigation assistants]. [An investigation shall only be carried out by qualified investigators specially designated for this function.] They may be assisted by specially designated [investigation assistants] [, such as technical [and administrative] personnel and interpreters]. [The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity.] [Due regard shall be paid also to the importance of selecting investigation personnel on as wide a geographical basis as possible]. [The investigation personnel shall be selected on the basis of equitable geographic distribution.] [No national [or resident] of the requesting State Party or the investigated State Party shall be a member of the investigation team.]
2. Investigation personnel [shall be nominated for designation by the States Parties] on the permanent [or part time staff] of the [Scientific Support Center (SSC)] [[Technical] Secretariat] on the basis of their expertise and experience relevant to the purpose of investigations of non-compliance concerns. The State Party shall indicate whether a person is proposed for the permanent or part time staff of the [Scientific Support Center (SSC)] [[Technical] Secretariat].]
3. Each State Party, no later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Protocol or accession to the Protocol, shall notify the Director-General of the names, dates of birth, gender, ranks, qualifications and professional experience of the persons proposed by the State Party for designation as investigation personnel.]
4. No later than [60] [30] days after the entry into force of this Protocol, the [[Technical] Secretariat] shall communicate in writing to all States Parties an initial list of the names, nationalities, dates and places of birth, gender, passport numbers and ranks of the investigation personnel proposed for designation by the Director-General [and the States Parties], as well as a description of their qualifications and professional experience.
5. Each State Party shall immediately acknowledge receipt of the initial list of investigation personnel proposed for designation. Any investigator or [investigation assistant] included in this list shall be regarded as accepted unless a State Party, no later than 30 days after acknowledgment of receipt of the list, declares its non-acceptance in writing. The State Party may include the reason for the objection. In the case of non-acceptance, the proposed investigator or

[investigation assistant] shall not undertake or participate in on-site investigation activities on the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party that has declared its non-acceptance. The [[Technical] Secretariat] shall immediately confirm receipt of the notification of non-acceptance [and also inform other States Parties of such objection]. The [[Technical] Secretariat] shall, as necessary, submit further proposals in addition to the initial list.

6. Whenever additions or changes to the list of investigation personnel are proposed by the Director-General, replacement investigation personnel shall be designated in the same manner as set forth with respect to the initial list. [Each State Party shall promptly notify the [[Technical] Secretariat] if an investigator or [investigation assistant] nominated by it can no longer fulfil the duties of investigation personnel.] [Any person designated to be an investigator [or investigation assistant] may withdraw from the list by informing the Director-General in writing]

7. The [[Technical] Secretariat] shall keep the list of investigation personnel up to date and notify all States Parties of any additions or changes to the list.

8. Subject to paragraph 9, a State Party shall have the right at any time to object to an investigator or [investigation assistant] who has already been accepted. It shall notify the [[Technical] Secretariat] of its objection in writing and may include the reason for the objection. Such objection shall come into effect 30 days after receipt of the notification by the [[Technical] Secretariat]. [The [[Technical] Secretariat] shall immediately confirm receipt of the notification of the objection and inform the objecting State Party [and nominating States Parties] of the date on which the investigator or [investigation assistant] shall cease to be designated for that State Party.] [The [[Technical] Secretariat] shall immediately confirm receipt of the notification of the objection and also inform [other States Parties] of such objection. Such objection shall come into effect [30] days after receipt by the [[Technical] Secretariat]. The [[Technical] Secretariat] shall immediately inform the State Party concerned of the withdrawal of the designation of the investigator or [investigation assistant].]

9. A State Party that has been notified of an investigation shall not seek the removal from the investigation team of any of the investigation personnel named in the investigation mandate.

10. The number of investigation personnel accepted by a State Party shall be sufficient to allow for availability of appropriate numbers of investigation personnel. If, in the opinion of the Director-General, the non-acceptance by a State Party of proposed investigation personnel impedes the designation of a sufficient number of investigation personnel or otherwise hampers the effective fulfilment of the purposes of an on-site investigation, the Director-General shall refer the issue to the [Executive Council].

11. The members of the investigation team carrying out an investigation of a facility or an area of a State Party located on the territory of another State Party shall be designated in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Annex as applied both to the investigated State Party and to the Host State Party.

[12. Each investigator or [investigation assistant] included in the list of investigation personnel shall receive necessary training. Such training shall be conducted by the [[Technical] Secretariat] pursuant to the procedures specified in the [Appendix ...]. The [[Technical] Secretariat] shall co-ordinate, in agreement with the States Parties offering appropriate training, a schedule of training for the investigators.]¹⁰²

[(B) ACCREDITATION OF LABORATORIES

13. No later than [30] days after entry into force of this Protocol the [[Technical] Secretariat] shall communicate to the States Parties the laboratory capabilities required for accreditation. [Determination of such capabilities shall be made during the preparatory process prior to entry into force.]

14. States Parties shall nominate laboratories possessing the required capabilities, to the [[Technical] Secretariat] for accreditation.

15. Nominated laboratories shall be [evaluated] by the [SSC] of the [[Technical] Secretariat]. The successful laboratories shall be accredited to the [[Technical] Secretariat].

16. The [[Technical] Secretariat] shall no later than 30 days after the completion of the [evaluation process], communicate a list of all the successful laboratories to all States Parties.]

(C) PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

17. Following acceptance of the initial list of investigators [and visitors] and investigation [and visit] assistants as provided for in paragraph ... or as subsequently altered in accordance with paragraph ..., each State Party shall be obliged to issue, in conformity with its national visa-related laws and regulations and upon application by an investigator [or visitor] or investigation [or visit] assistant, multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas and other relevant documents to enable each investigator [or visitor] or investigation [or visitor] assistant to enter and to remain on its territory

102. It was stated that the question of training also needed proper consideration in the context of training prior to selection in order to ensure that the Organization's roster of investigators was based on the principle of equitable geographical distribution

for the sole purpose of carrying out investigation activities [and visits] on the investigated [visited] State Party. Each State Party shall issue the necessary visa or travel documents for this purpose no later than [48] hours after receipt of the application. Such documents issued by the investigated [visited] State Party shall be valid for as long as is necessary to enable the investigator [or visitor] or investigation [or visitor] assistant to remain on its territory for the sole purpose of carrying out the investigation activities [and visits].

18. To exercise their functions effectively, investigators [and visitors] and investigation [and visit] assistants (hereinafter referred to as "members of the investigation [visit] team") shall be accorded by the investigated [visited] State Party and the Host State Party privileges and immunities as set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (i). Privileges and immunities shall be granted to members of the investigation [visit] team for the sake of this Protocol and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. Such privileges and immunities shall be accorded to them for the entire period between arrival on and departure from the territory of the investigated [visited] State Party¹⁰³ and Host State Party¹⁰⁴, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their official functions in accordance with their mandate.

(a) The members of the investigation [visit] team shall be accorded the same inviolability as is enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961.

(b) The living quarters and office premises occupied by the investigation [visit] team carrying out investigation [visit] activities pursuant to this Protocol shall be accorded the same inviolability and protection as are accorded to the premises of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

(c) The papers and correspondence, including records, of the investigation [visit] team shall enjoy the same inviolability as is accorded to all papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The investigation [visit] team shall have the right to use codes for their communications with the [Technical] Secretariat [, in accordance with national procedures of the investigated [visited] State Party and the Host State Party].

103. "Investigated State Party" means the State Party on whose territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control an investigation pursuant to this Protocol takes place, or the State Party whose facility or area on the territory of a Host State is subject to such an investigation.

104. "Host State" means the State on whose territory lie facilities or areas of another State, Party to this Protocol, which are subject to investigation under this Protocol. "Host State Party" means a Host State which is party to this Protocol.

(d) [Samples and] approved equipment carried by members of the investigation [visit] team shall be inviolable subject to provisions contained in this Protocol and exempt from all customs duties. [Hazardous samples shall be transported in accordance with relevant regulations.]

(e) The members of the investigation [visit] team shall be accorded the same immunities as are accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 31, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

[(f) The members of the investigation [visit] team carrying out prescribed activities pursuant to this Protocol shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.]

(g) The members of the investigation [visit] team shall be permitted to bring into the territory of the investigated [visited] State Party or Host State Party, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for personal use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations.

(h) The members of the investigation [visit] team shall be accorded the same currency and exchange facilities as are accorded to representatives of foreign Governments on temporary official missions.

(i) The members of the investigation [visit] team shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the investigated [visited] State Party or the Host State.

19. When transiting the territory of non-investigated State Parties, the members of the investigation [visit] team shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Papers and correspondence, including records, [and samples] and approved equipment, carried by them, shall be accorded the privileges and immunities set forth in paragraph 18 (c) and (d).

20. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities the members of the investigation [visit] team shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the investigated [visited] State Party or Host State and, to the extent that is consistent with the investigation [visit] mandate, shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State. If the investigated [visited] State Party or Host State Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities by the members of the investigation [visit] team, consultations shall be held between the State Party and the Director-General to determine whether such an abuse has occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such abuse.

[21. The Director-General shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity of any member of the investigation [visit] team or the other staff of the [Technical] Secretariat in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to [the purposes for which the immunity is accorded] [the implementation of the provisions of this Protocol]. In the case of the Director-General, the Executive Council shall have the right [and the duty] to waive the immunity. Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in respect of civil or administrative proceedings shall not be held to imply waiver of immunity in respect of the execution of the judgement, for which a separate waiver shall be necessary. Waiver [must] [shall] always be express.]

[22. The immunity from jurisdiction of members of the investigation [visit] team may be waived by the Director-General in those cases when the Director-General is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of this Protocol. Waiver must always be express.]

[23. In parallel to the procedure set forth in paragraph 21 of this Annex, [the Director-General] shall consider whether to waive the immunity of the Organization as a body responsible for the acts by the investigation [visit] team. The Director-General may waive the immunity of the Organization in any case where, in its opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to [the purposes for which the immunity is accorded] [the interests of the Organization]. Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in respect of civil or administrative proceedings shall not be held to imply waiver of immunity in respect of the execution of the judgement. The authority to waive the immunity of the Organization from the execution of the judgement shall be vested with the Conference. Waiver [must] [shall] always be express.]

[24. Observers shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities accorded to investigators [and visitors] pursuant to this section, except for those accorded pursuant to paragraph 18 (d).]

25. In the event of an alleged breach of confidentiality, the Director-General, [the Executive Council] or the Conference, as specified in paragraphs 21 and 22, depending on the immunity at issue, shall request and pay [utmost respect to the opinion] [due regard to the views] of the "Commission for the settlement of disputes related to confidentiality" (hereinafter referred to as "the Commission") as to whether to waive immunity.]

(D) STANDING ARRANGEMENTS

Point(s) of entry

26. Each State Party shall designate its point(s) of entry and shall supply the required information to the [[Technical] Secretariat] no later than 30 days after this Protocol enters into force for it. These point(s) of entry shall be such that the investigation team can reach any investigation area from at least one point of entry within [24] [12] hours. Locations of point(s) of entry shall be provided to all States Parties by the [[Technical] Secretariat]. Point(s) of entry [may] [shall] also serve as point(s) of exit.

27. Each State Party may change its point(s) of entry by giving notice of such change to the [[Technical] Secretariat]. Changes shall become effective 30 days after the [[Technical] Secretariat] receives such notification, to allow appropriate notification to all States Parties.

28. If the [[Technical] Secretariat] considers that there are insufficient points of entry for the timely conduct of investigations or that changes to the points of entry proposed by a State Party would hamper such timely conduct of investigations, it shall enter into consultations with the State Party concerned to resolve the problem.

[29. In cases where facilities or areas of an investigated State Party are located on the territory of a Host State Party or where the access from the point of entry to the facilities or areas subject to investigation requires transit through the territory of another State Party, the investigated State Party shall exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations concerning such investigations in accordance with this Annex. The Host State Party shall facilitate the investigation of those facilities or areas and shall provide for the necessary support to enable the investigation team to carry out its tasks in a timely and effective manner. States Parties through whose territory transit is required to inspect facilities or areas of an investigated State Party shall facilitate such transit.]

[30. In cases where facilities or areas of an investigated State Party are located on the territory of a State not Party to this Convention, the investigated State Party shall take all necessary measures to ensure that investigations of those facilities or areas can be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Annex. A State Party that has one or more facilities or areas on the territory of a State not Party to this Convention shall take all necessary measures to ensure acceptance by the Host State of investigators and [investigator assistants] designated to that State Party. If an investigated State Party is unable to ensure access, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access.]

[31. In cases where the facilities or areas sought to be investigated are located on the territory of a State Party, but in a place under the jurisdiction or control of a State not Party to this

Convention, the State Party shall take all necessary measures as would be required of an investigated State Party and a Host State Party to ensure that investigations of such facilities or areas can be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Annex. If the State Party is unable to ensure access to those facilities or areas, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access. This paragraph shall not apply where the facilities or areas sought to be investigated are those of the State Party.]

[[Access]

[32. In cases where the investigation area is under the jurisdiction or control of the investigated State Party but is located on the territory of another State Party or where the access from the point of entry to the investigation area requires transit through the territory of a State Party other than the investigated State Party, the investigated State Party shall exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations concerning such investigations in accordance with this Protocol. In such a case, the State Party on whose territory the investigation area is located shall facilitate the investigation and shall provide for the necessary support to enable the investigation team to carry out its tasks in a timely and effective manner. States Parties through whose territory transit is required to reach the investigation area shall facilitate such transit.

33 In cases where the investigation area is under the jurisdiction or control of the investigated State Party but is located on the territory of a State not Party to this Protocol, the investigated State Party shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the investigation can be carried out in accordance with this Protocol. A State Party that has under its jurisdiction or control one or more areas on the territory of a State not Party to this Protocol shall take all necessary measures to ensure acceptance by the State on whose territory the investigation area is located of investigators and investigation assistants designated to that State Party. If an investigated State Party is unable to ensure access, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access.

34. In cases where the investigation area is located on the territory of a State Party but is under the jurisdiction or control of a State not Party to this Protocol, the State Party shall take all necessary measures required of an investigated State Party and a State Party on whose territory the investigation area is located, without prejudice to the rules and practices of international law, to ensure that the investigation can be carried out in accordance with this Protocol. If the State Party is unable to ensure access to the investigation area, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access, without prejudice to the rules and practices of international law.]

[35. In cases where facilities or areas of an investigated State Party are located on the territory of a Host State Party or where the access from the point of entry to the facilities or areas subject to investigation requires transit through the territory of another State Party, the investigated State

Party shall exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations concerning such investigations in accordance with this [Annex] [Protocol]. The Host State Party shall facilitate the investigation of those facilities or areas and shall provide for the necessary support to enable the investigation team to carry out its tasks in a timely and effective manner. States Parties through whose territory transit is required to investigate facilities or areas of an investigated State Party shall facilitate such transit.

36. In cases where facilities or areas of an investigated State Party are located on the territory of a State not Party to this Protocol, the investigated State Party shall take all necessary measures to ensure that investigations of those facilities or areas can be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this [Annex] [Protocol]. A State Party that has one or more facilities or areas on the territory of a State not Party to this Protocol shall take all necessary measures to ensure acceptance by the Host State of investigators and investigation assistants designated to that State Party. If an investigated State Party is unable to ensure access, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access.

37. In cases where the facilities or areas sought to be investigated are located on the territory of a State Party, but in a place under the jurisdiction or control of a State not Party to this Protocol, the State Party shall take all necessary measures as would be required of an investigated State Party and a Host State Party [without prejudice to the rules and practices of international law] to ensure that investigations of such facilities or areas can be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this [Annex] [Protocol]. If the State Party is unable to ensure access to those facilities or areas, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access [without prejudice to the rules and practices of international law]. This paragraph shall not apply where the facilities or areas sought to be investigated are those of the State Party.]

[38. In cases where the investigation is related to paragraphs [32, 33 and 34] [35, 36 and 37], [the Director-General] shall notify the states directly involved in accordance with paragraph]

Arrangements for use of non-scheduled aircraft

[39. Where timely travel to the point of entry is not feasible using scheduled commercial flights, an investigation team may utilize non-scheduled aircraft. [No later than 30 days after this Protocol enters into force for it, each State Party shall inform the [[Technical] Secretariat] of the [standing] diplomatic clearance number for non-scheduled aircraft transporting an investigation team and equipment necessary for investigation]. Aircraft routings shall be along established international airways that are agreed upon between the State Party and the [[Technical] Secretariat] as the basis for such diplomatic clearance.]

[40. When a non-scheduled aircraft is used, the [[Technical] Secretariat] shall provide the investigated State Party with a flight plan, through the National Authority, for the aircraft's flight from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the State in which the investigation site is located to the point of entry, not less than six hours before the scheduled departure time from that airfield. Such a plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft. For its owned or chartered flights, the [[Technical] Secretariat] shall include in the remarks section of each flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and the appropriate notation identifying the aircraft as an investigation aircraft.]

[41. Not less than three hours before the scheduled departure of the investigation team from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the State in which the investigation is to take place, the investigated State Party or Host State Party shall ensure that the flight plan filed in accordance with paragraph ... is approved so that the investigation team may arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arrival time.]

[42. The investigated State Party shall provide parking, security protection, servicing and fuel as required by the [[Technical] Secretariat] for the aircraft of the investigation team at the point of entry when such aircraft is owned or chartered by the [[Technical] Secretariat]. Such aircraft shall not be liable for landing fees, departure tax, and similar charges. The [[Technical] Secretariat] shall bear the cost of such fuel, security protection and servicing.]

Administrative arrangements

43. The investigated State Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities necessary for the investigation team such as transport, communications means, interpretation, working space, lodging, meals and medical care. In this regard, the investigated State Party shall be [fully] reimbursed [within ... days] by the Organization for [all] [such] costs incurred by the investigation team.

[Approved investigation equipment

44. The equipment for use during on-site investigations is specified in Appendix Specifications for the use of the equipment, as detailed in [Appendix ...] [Operational Manual for On-Site Investigations] shall take account of safety and confidentiality considerations where such equipment is likely to be used. [The Conference, at its initial session shall approve a list of equipment for use during investigations.]

45. [The [[Technical] Secretariat] shall, as appropriate, update the list of equipment. The updated list shall be considered and approved by the Conference.] [The list of agreed equipment for each specific type of investigation shall be considered and approved by the Conference.]
46. The [[Technical] Secretariat] shall ensure that all types of approved equipment are available for on-site investigations when required. When required for an on-site investigation, the [[Technical] Secretariat] shall duly certify that the equipment has been calibrated, maintained and protected. To facilitate the checking of the equipment at the point of entry by the investigated State Party, the [[Technical] Secretariat] shall provide documentation and attach seals to authenticate the certification.
47. Any permanently held equipment shall be in the custody of the [[Technical] Secretariat]. The [[Technical] Secretariat] shall be responsible for the maintenance and calibration of such equipment.
48. Subject to paragraph 49, there shall be no restriction by the investigated State Party on the investigation team bringing into investigation site such equipment on the list which the [[Technical] Secretariat] has determined to be necessary to fulfil the investigation requirements [The investigation team shall use such equipment in accordance with local regulations.]
49. The investigated State Party shall have the right, without prejudice to the prescribed time-frames, to inspect the equipment in the presence of investigation team members at the point of entry, i.e., to check the identity of the equipment brought in or removed from the territory of the investigated State Party or the Host State. To facilitate such identification, the [[Technical] Secretariat] shall attach documents and devices to authenticate its destination and approval of the equipment. The investigation of the equipment shall also ascertain to the satisfaction of the investigated State Party that the equipment meets the description of the approved equipment for the particular type of investigation. The investigated State Party may exclude equipment not meeting that description or equipment without the abovementioned authentication documents and devices.
50. [As appropriate, the [[Technical] Secretariat] shall make arrangements with States Parties to provide equipment mentioned in the list. Such States Parties shall be responsible for the maintenance and calibration of such equipment.] [In cases where the investigation team finds it necessary to use equipment available on site not belonging to the [[Technical] Secretariat] and requests the investigated State Party to enable the team to use such equipment the investigated State Party shall comply with the request to the extent it can.]]

(E) MEASURES TO GUARD AGAINST ABUSE DURING AN INVESTIGATION

51. [Investigations under this Protocol shall be carried out strictly in accordance with the provisions of] In carrying out the investigation in accordance with the investigation mandate, the investigation team shall use only those [agreed] methods necessary to provide sufficient relevant facts to clarify the concern about possible non-compliance concern described in the investigation mandate and shall refrain from activities not relevant thereto.

52. It shall collect and document such facts as are related to the possible non-compliance concern described in the investigation mandate but shall neither seek nor document information which is clearly not related thereto, unless the investigated State Party expressly requests it to do so Any material collected and subsequently found not to be relevant shall not be retained

53 [Investigators shall, in accordance with the relevant rules laid down in international law, be liable to physical or juridical persons for any intentional or accidental damage resulting from unlawful actions on their part, including the leaking of confidential information that becomes known to them in the course of investigation work]

[[II. FIELD INVESTIGATIONS]

(A) INVESTIGATION REQUEST

Information to be submitted with a request for a Field Investigation¹⁰⁵

1. Requests for field investigations shall include [enough of the following [precise] information to support a prima facie case of a non-compliance concern] [to the extent possible] [the following [precise] information]:

(i) Name of the State Party in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction or control the alleged [event] [use] has taken place,]

(ii) [Approximate] date [and] time [and duration] of the alleged [event];

(iii) The location, geographic coordinates and the characteristics of the area(s) involved, [whether the area is on the territory of the requesting State Party, and if not, the name of the State who controls that territory as well as whether that State is a State Party to the Protocol and/or the Convention];

(iv) [Aided by epidemiological data,] a description of the circumstances under which the [event] [use] took place, a description of the [event] [use] itself as well as an indication of whether it was a single [event] [use] or a series of [events] [uses]. An indication of the suspected cause and/or perpetrator of the [event] [use];

(v) The victims (human, animals or plants), the effects on them and the number affected. Symptoms and signs of the disease [or similar occurrence caused by toxins] [or other physical evidence] [, the treatment and the results of the treatment of the victims] shall be described,]

(vi) Information [to the extent possible] on:

(a) The [use] [release] of microbial or other biological agent(s) or toxin(s) for other than peaceful purposes;

(b) The use of weapons, equipment or means of delivery;

[(vii) Any epidemiological data substantiating an allegation why the event shall not be considered to be a natural outbreak of disease [including data on natural disease profiles and occurrences in the area affected, as well as demographic data];]

[(viii) Information to demonstrate that the non-compliance concern is not a natural outbreak of disease;]

[(ix) Information from and/or the outcome for results of [any] prior consultations / clarifications relevant to the request.]

2. The following other types of information could also be important:

(x) Reports of any internal investigation including results of any laboratory investigations;

[(xi) The victims (human, animals or plants), the effects on them and the number affected; Symptoms and signs of the disease [or similar occurrence caused by toxins] [or other physical evidence] [, the treatment and the results of the treatment of the victims] shall be described;]

(xii) [Any] affidavits of eye witness accounts, photographs, samples or other physical evidence;

(xiii) Data on natural disease profiles and occurrences in the area affected, as well as demographic data;

(xiv) A description of the control measures and their result in the affected area, if available;

(xv) Other corroborative information;

[(xvi) Requests for specific assistance, if applicable.]

Investigation mandate

3. The Investigation mandate addressed to [...] and issued by the [Director-General] shall contain at least the following :

[(a) The decision of the [politically representative body] [Consultative Council] [Executive Council], on making of an investigation;]

(b) The name of the State Party or States Parties to be investigated;

- (c) The nature of the [investigation] [request] [allegation] including any effects on humans, animals or plants;
- (d) The area where the investigation will commence specified on a map;
- (e) The planned types of activity of the investigation team;
- (f) Any transit or basing points to be used by the investigation team, as appropriate;
- (g) The names of the leader and of the other members of the investigation team;
- [(h) The name of the proposed observer, if any;]
- (i) The list of approved equipment to be used during the investigation;
- [(j) The expected time frame necessary to complete the investigation;]
- (k) Any other operational instructions;
- (l) Point of entry to be used by the investigation team.

Notification of Investigation

4. The notification made by the Director-General pursuant to Article III paragraph ... shall include, *inter alia*:

- [(a) Name of the State Party on whose territory the Field Investigation will take place;]
- [(b) The nature of the [investigation] [request] [allegation];]
- (c) The point of entry where the investigation team will arrive as well as the means of arrival;
- (d) The date and estimated time of arrival of the investigation team at the point of entry;
- [(e) If appropriate, the standing diplomatic clearance number for non-scheduled aircraft;]
- (f) Location and characteristics of the area(s) where the incident(s) of non-compliance is alleged to have been taken place;

[(g) Any effects on humans, animals or plants;]

(h) A list of approved equipment which the Director-General requests the investigated State Party to make available to the investigation team for use during the investigation;

(i) A list of laboratory facilities and other support which the Director-General requests, if applicable, the investigated State Party to make available to the investigation team for use during the investigation;

[(j) The investigation mandate;]

(k) Point of entry to be used by the investigation team.

Duration of an investigation

5. The estimated period of duration of a [field] investigation [of alleged use of biological weapons] shall be indicated in the investigation mandate [and finalised after the pre-investigation briefing and shall not exceed that time unless extended by agreement of the State Party to be investigated] [shall not exceed ... days unless an extension is authorised by [the Executive Council]]. [The period of investigation means the period from ... until]

(B) PRE-INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES

Appointment of the investigation team

[6. Upon receipt of a request for a field investigation by a State Party, the Director-General shall [request the [SSC] [[Technical] Secretariat]] to identify members for appointment to the investigation team according to the specific nature [and circumstances of the potential investigation and alert them for possible dispatch with in [24] hours.]]

[7. The Director-General shall appoint the leader of the investigation team from the [permanent staff] of the [SSC] [[Technical] Secretariat]. Other members of the investigation team shall be appointed by the Director-General [and may be drawn from the [permanent staff] [as well as the part time staff] of the [SSC] [[Technical] Secretariat]] as designated according to the procedures set out in Annex D para [In addition, members of the Investigation Team may be selected from the list of experts when in the view of the Director-General expertise, not available among the permanent staff, is required for the proper conduct of a particular investigation.] The size of the investigation team shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the proper fulfilment of the investigation mandate, [but shall not in any event exceed [...] persons].]

[8. The Director-General may extend the size of the investigation team when necessary and in agreement with the investigated State Party.]

Despatch/ arrival of investigation team

9. The Director-General shall dispatch the investigation team at the earliest opportunity after the receipt of the investigation request, [taking into account the screening process of the request] [taking into account the safety of the investigation team].

10. The Director-General may, when necessary, dispatch an element of the investigation team earlier than the rest if the time period for the compilation of the whole team is too long. The rest of the team may join the initial element at a later stage.

(C) ACTIVITIES UPON ARRIVAL OF THE INVESTIGATION TEAM.

[Alternative determination of final perimeter]

Inspection of approved equipment

11. The investigated State Party shall have the right to inspect the equipment of the investigation team to ensure that it is properly sealed, appears on the approved list of equipment and conform to the standards as set out in Appendix The investigated State Party may exclude [if it deems necessary] equipment that is not in [conformity with the investigation mandate or] that has not been approved in accordance with

Pre-investigation briefing

12. The investigation team shall be briefed by representatives of the investigated State Party with the aid of maps and other documentation as appropriate. The briefing shall include, *inter alia*, relevant natural terrain features, safety aspects, prevailing disease profiles in the area to be investigated, possible routes and means of transport to the area, logistical arrangements for the investigation, details of equipment and/or laboratory facilities provided on request of the Director-General and any other relevant information.

13. The investigated State Party may [indicate] [provide information indicating why, in their view, some] locations within the area under investigation [that in its view], are not related to the investigation. [This information would not be binding on the investigation team.]

14. The investigated State Party may provide additional information that became available after the request/ was made or that does not appear on the investigation mandate.

Investigation Plan

15. After the briefing the investigation team shall prepare an initial investigation plan to serve, *inter alia*, as a basis for logistic and safety arrangements . This plan shall contain the activities to be carried out by the team, logistic requirements of the team and provisional timings of the activities and requirements. This plan shall be made available to the investigated State Party [prior to the commencement of the investigation].

Situation report

[16. The situation report shall indicate any urgent need for technical, medical, veterinary or agronomic assistance and any other relevant information. The progress reports shall indicate any further need for assistance that might be identified during the course of the investigation.]

Time frames for activities

[17. The following time frames for specific activities upon arrival of the investigation team shall apply :

- (a) Inspection of equipment - not more than 2 hours;
- (b) Pre-investigation briefing - not more than 3 hours;
- (c) Investigation plan - not more than 2 hours.

[18. Activities upon arrival of the investigation team shall not exceed 7 hours.]]

(D) CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATION

[Managed] access

19. The investigated State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the obligation to demonstrate compliance and the right if necessary to protect sensitive information, as set out in paragraphs ... to ... of Article III, Section F, Subsection III, of the Protocol, to take specific measures which may include but are not limited to the following:

- (a) Managing access to buildings and other structures that contain particular sensitive equipment or information unrelated to the prohibitions of the BTWC;

[(b) Declaring restricted-access sites which are particularly sensitive and unrelated to the investigation;]

(c) Limiting the time investigation team members may spend in any area or building, while allowing the team to fulfil its mandate;

(d) The investigated State Party may at any time during the investigation notify products and processes in which it has a proprietary interest in order to help the team respect the investigated State Party's right to safeguard proprietary information. It may request that if a specific piece of information is released to the team, it should be accorded the most stringent protection measures with the Organization.

[20. When a restricted-access site is declared each such site shall be no larger than four square kilometres and shall have clearly defined and accessible boundaries.]

[21. The investigation team shall have the right to take steps necessary to conduct its investigation up to the boundary of a restricted-access site.]

[22. The investigation team shall have the right to observe visually all open places within the restricted-access site from the boundary of the site.]

23. The investigation team shall make every reasonable effort to fulfil the investigation mandate [outside the declared restricted-access site. If at any time the investigation team demonstrates credibly to the investigated State Party that the necessary activities authorized in the investigation mandate could not be carried out from the outside and access to the restricted-access site is necessary to fulfil the mandate, some members of the investigation team shall be granted access to accomplish specific tasks within the site. The investigated State Party shall have the right to shroud or otherwise protect sensitive equipment, objects and materials not related to the purpose of the investigation. The number of investigators shall be kept to the minimum necessary to complete the tasks related to the investigation. The modalities for such access shall be subject to negotiation between the investigation team and the investigated State Party.]

Implementation by the investigation team of specific on-site activities

Interviewing of eyewitnesses

24. The investigation team shall have the right to interview persons, with their[agreement] [written consent], who witnessed a specific incident or provide information on a series of incidents, [that could be used as information in the investigation.] The interview shall take place in the presence of representatives of the State Party on whose territory the investigation is conducted.

25. The investigation team may seek information relevant to the investigation which is necessary to fulfil their investigation mandate. If required, interpretation shall be provided by the investigation team, or where requested, by the State Party.

Interviewing of potentially exposed humans and owners of potentially exposed plants and animals

26. The investigation team shall have the right to interview potentially exposed humans, or personnel responsible for plants or animals potentially exposed to BTW, with their [agreement] [written consent], in order to establish how the exposed, plants or animals were affected. [The interview shall take place in the presence of representatives of the State Party on whose territory the investigation is conducted.]

27. The investigation team may seek information relevant to the investigation which is necessary to fulfil their investigation mandate. If required, interpretation shall be provided by the investigating team, or where requested, by the State Party.

Interviewing of officials / personnel

28. The investigation team shall have the right to interview any relevant personnel, such as national/local government officials, personnel of any involved institutions, hospitals/medical facilities, etc. with their agreement, in the presence of a representative of the State Party [with the purpose of establishing the relevant facts]. [Advance notice of interviews shall be given.]

29. The investigation team shall only request information [and data relevant to the incident under investigation] which is necessary for the conduct of the investigation. If required, interpretation shall be provided by the investigation team, or where requested, by the State Party.

[30. The investigated State Party shall have the right to object to questions posed to personnel if it deems that those questions are not relevant to the investigation or impinge on sensitive national security or commercial proprietary data. If the investigation team leader nonetheless continues to believe that these questions are relevant and should be answered, he may submit them in writing to the investigated State Party for reply, together with an explanation of their relevance to the investigation. The investigation team may note in its report any refusal by the investigated State Party to permit interviews or to allow questions to be answered and any explanations given.]

[31. Interviews shall be conducted in such a way as to avoid unduly hindering the work of the personnel interviewed. The investigation team shall give advance notice of interview requests.]

Visual [observation] [examination]

32. The investigation team shall have the right to examine visually [investigate] [visually observe] relevant areas in order to obtain information relevant to the investigation. All necessary precautions shall be taken to ensure the health and safety of the investigation team. The investigation team shall be accompanied by representatives of the State Party on whose territory the investigation is conducted.

[33. If direct visual observation is not possible because of national security, commercial proprietary or health and safety considerations, the investigated State Party shall provide other means to demonstrate that the area and objects concerned are not relevant to and have no effect on the fulfilment of the investigation mandate by the investigation team. These may include, for example, the use of a video camera, photographs or drawings]

[Disease-related examination]

34. Appropriate members of the investigation team shall have the right to conduct medical examinations, with informed consent, on persons affected, as well as on animals and plants affected, in order to be able to make a diagnosis and enable the investigation team to determine whether victims have in fact been affected and what they have been affected by.

35. The investigation team may, where necessary and applicable, with the necessary consent by the investigated State Party, and the written consent of the patient, take body samples in order to diagnose or confirm a clinical diagnosis of the disease or intoxication.

36. The investigation team may conduct post mortem examinations where relevant, with the necessary consent by the investigated State Party and the written consent by the family or the legal representative.

37. The investigation team may when necessary have access to [other] medical, veterinary or agricultural information relevant to the investigation, such as records, and may request the examination of laboratory animals or samples.

38. Whenever consent for an examination, sample collection or post mortem is refused, written explanation will be provided.

39. All medical information, excluding samples and other material taken from humans shall be accorded the most stringent protection measures by the]

Sampling and identification

[40. The investigation team shall have the right to take and evaluate, where appropriate, environmental samples, samples of affected plants, samples of munitions and devices or remnants of munitions and devices in order to conduct tests for the presence of specific [listed] pathogens or toxins.]

41. The investigation team may take samples itself in the presence of a representative of the investigated State Party. If the investigation team deems it necessary, they may request the investigated State Party assist in the collection of samples under the supervision of members of the investigation team. [The investigation team may also request the investigated State Party to take appropriate control samples from areas neighbouring the areas under investigation.] The investigated State Party shall receive duplicate samples, for its own analysis. The investigation team may test samples using any methods specifically designed or approved for use in such investigations, and available to the investigation team. At the request of the investigation team, the investigated State Party shall to the extent possible provide assistance for the analysis of samples, using locally available resources. Should it be negotiated that the investigated State Party itself performs analyses, the investigation team may request that this be done in the presence of members of the team. If the State Party itself performs analyses the investigation team or some member especially assigned by the team leader shall be present during all analytical processes. All sampling [shall be conducted according to agreed procedures and methods and] transport shall be performed according to the required safety standards

[42. Where the investigation team deems analysis on the territory to be impossible, it may remove samples for analysis in designated laboratories, [with the approval of the investigated State Party] [if it deems it necessary]. Representatives of the investigated State Party shall have the right to accompany all samples and observe any analysis and the subsequent destruction. [Any samples remaining after analyses that have not been destroyed shall be returned to the State Party of origin.]

[43. Analysis shall be carried out in the territory of the State Party where the investigation is being made and only in the presence of a representative of the State Party].

[44. Where applicable, the investigated State Party shall, in accordance with the principles of managed access, have the right to take measures to protect national security and confidential proprietary information such as requiring the use of specific tests or on-site analysis or, if necessary, to refuse a sample. In the latter case the investigated State Party shall be under the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate that the requested sample concerned is unrelated to the investigation mandate.]]

[Collection of background information and data

45. The investigation team shall have the right to collect and interpret background data necessary for the investigation. Background data may include normal and epidemic disease incidence and/or prevalence, demographic data [and data on the use of vaccines] [and vaccine production/purchase or usage]. [Only data that may have a direct effect on the investigation may be collected.]]

Communications

46. The members of the investigation team shall have the right at all times during the investigation to communicate with each other [and with the [[Technical] Secretariat].] For this purpose they may use their own duly approved and certified equipment with the consent of the investigated State Party, [to the extent that the investigated State Party does not provide them with access to other telecommunications.]

[Observer

47. In accordance with Article III section F paragraph.... the requesting State Party shall the requesting State Party shall liaise with the Technical Secretariat to coordinate the arrival of the observer at the same point of entry as the investigation team within a reasonable period of the of the investigation team.

48. The observer shall have the right throughout the period of investigation to be in communication with the embassy of the requesting State Party located in the investigated State Party, or in the case of absence of an embassy, with the requesting State Party itself. The investigated State Party shall provide means of communication to the observer.

49. The observer shall have the right to arrive at the investigation area and to have access to and with in the investigation area as granted by the investigated State Party.

50. The observer shall have the right to make recommendations to the investigation team, which the team shall take into account to the extent it deems appropriate.

51. Throughout the investigation, the investigation team shall keep the observer informed about the conduct of the investigation and the findings.

52. Throughout the investigation, the investigated State Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities necessary for the observer similar to those enjoyed by the investigation team as described in paragraph.... All costs in connection with the stay of the observer on the territory of the investigated State Party, shall be borne by the requesting State Party]

Expansion of the investigation team

53. If the investigation team deems that it lacks specific expertise necessary to conduct the investigation, it shall immediately notify the Director-General and the investigated State Party. [The Director-General shall [, with the agreement of the investigated State Party,] augment the team as appropriate from the fulltime [or part time staff] [of the [SSC] [[Technical] Secretariat]] [or list of qualified experts], who shall be dispatched as soon as possible after the notification.]

Extension of investigation area

[54. If the investigation team during an investigation deems it necessary to extend the investigation onto the territory of a neighbouring State, the Director-General shall [, with the agreement of the investigated State Party] notify that State about the need for access to its territory and request and confirm arrangements for the safe reception of the team.]

[55. If, during an investigation, the team considers it necessary to extend the investigation to a neighbouring State, the investigation should be conducted in accordance with the uniform procedures of initiation and conduct of investigations and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the applicable rules of international law. The Secretary-General of the United Nations or other appropriate persons/organizations could notify the State Party of the need for access to its territory. The consent of the other State Party would be required. The extent of any such access would be agreed between the parties involved.]

Extension of investigation duration

56. If the investigation team deems that safe access to a [specific area relevant to the investigation] [an area specified in the investigation plan] is not possible, the requesting State Party shall be informed immediately. If necessary, the period of investigation shall be extended [with the agreement of the requesting State Party] until safe access can be provided and the investigation team will have concluded its mission.

(E) POST INVESTIGATION [ACTIVITIES] [PROCEDURES]

[Preliminary findings and evaluation] [Initial Report]

57. The [preliminary findings and evaluation] [initial report] shall summarise in a general way the activities conducted by the investigation team, [particularly with regard to the possible non-compliance concern cited in the investigation mandate] [and shall be limited to information directly related to the Convention]

[58. No later than [...] hours after the completion of an investigation, the investigation team shall meet with representatives of the receiving State Party with a view to examining the team's initial report and clarifying any remaining ambiguities. The team shall provide its initial report in written form, together with a list of the information, data and other material which it is intended to take outside the State. This document shall be signed by the team leader. In order to indicate that the representatives of the receiving State Party have been given sight of the contents of the initial report, the representatives of the receiving State Party shall countersign the report.]

[59. In accordance with the applicable principles of managed access and without prejudice to the obligation of the receiving State Party to allow the investigation team to fulfil its mandate, the receiving State Party may place restrictions on request that restrictions be placed on or deny altogether the removal of documents or other materials if it deems this necessary to protect commercial proprietary or national security information. The receiving State Party shall have the right to request the removal from the initial report of any information unrelated to the investigation mandate.]

Departure

60. Upon completion of the post investigation [procedures] [activities], the investigation team and the [observer] shall leave the territory of the investigated State Party as soon as possible. The investigated State Party shall do everything in its power to provide assistance and to ensure the safe conduct of the investigation team, equipment and baggage to the point of exit. Unless agreed otherwise by the investigated State Party and the investigation team, the point of exit shall be the same as the point of entry used.

[61. Following completion of the investigation, the team shall depart from the territory of the receiving State Party in the minimum time possible via the point of entry.]

[Interim field investigation report

62. The interim field investigation report shall summarize the factual findings of the investigation, [particularly with regard to the alleged incident of release or exposure to BW cited in the investigation request]. In addition, the report shall include a description of the investigation process, tracing its various stages, with special reference to :

(a) The locations and times of any sampling and on-site analysis;

(b) Supporting evidence such as the records of interviews, the results of disease related examinations and epidemiological and scientific analyses, and the documents examined by the investigation team;

- (c) An account of the assistance and its timeliness, provided by the host State Party;
- (d) The result of any completed laboratory investigations and sampling and identification;
- [(e) An [assessment] by the investigation team of the degree and nature of access and cooperation granted by the investigated State Party and the extent to which this enabled the investigation team to fulfil its mandate.]]

[Initial laboratory report

63. The initial laboratory report shall contain initial diagnoses if available or at least a differential diagnosis as well as a plan for the conduct of further investigations and tests.]

[Intermediate laboratory report

64. The interim laboratory report shall contain details of progress of work and a preliminary diagnosis or identification and the final plan for future work.]

[Final laboratory report

65. The final laboratory report shall contain a description of the work done and a complete diagnosis or identification of an agent or agents. If it was not possible to make a positive diagnosis or identification, the report shall state that fact and give an explanation as to why it was not possible to make a final diagnosis or identification.]

Final report

[66. The final report shall contain all the detail contained in the interim field investigation report, the final laboratory reports as well as any other information it obtained after the initial field investigation report was made.]

[67. The final report shall also [include any] [integrate in a logical manner all] information the investigation team in the course of its investigation collected that might serve to [identify the origin of any biological agent or toxin found during the course of the investigation. Such evidence may include, *inter alia*, chemical composition and the presence of inert materials in the case of possible toxin weapons, and serological or molecular sequence evidence in the case of infectious agents. In either case, the report shall present such environmental and historical information as is available on the previous presence of the alleged agent in the region] [address the concerns expressed in the investigation mandate.]

[68. The report shall summarize the activities conducted by the investigation team and its factual findings, particularly with regard to the concern regarding probable use of BW against the State Party that requested the investigation. It shall also include an assessment by the team of the degree and nature of access and cooperation granted to the team and the extent to which this enabled it to fulfil the investigation mandate.]

[69. The final investigation report shall immediately be made available to the receiving State Party. There shall be attached to it any written comments that the receiving State Party may at once make concerning the findings contained in it. The final report, together with the attached comments by the receiving State Party, shall be transmitted to the Technical Organ no later than [...] days after the completion of the investigation]

[70. In the event that uncertainties identified by the investigation team persist or that the cooperation afforded by the receiving State Party is considered not to have met the required standards, the Technical Organ shall promote the holding of consultations for the purpose of obtaining further clarifications.]

[71. If the uncertainties cannot be removed or if the established facts are of a nature to imply that there was use of BW, the Technical Organ shall convene the Consultative Council to examine the final report]

[[II. INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED USE OF BW]

(A) INVESTIGATION REQUEST

Information to be submitted with a request for a Investigation of alleged use of BW¹⁰⁶

1. Requests for Investigation of alleged use of BWs shall include [enough of the following [precise] information to support a prima facie case of a non-compliance concern] [to the extent possible] [the following [precise] information]:

(i) Name of the State Party in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction or control the alleged [event] [use] has taken place;

(ii) [Approximate] date [and] time [and duration] of the alleged [event];

(iii) The location, geographic coordinates and the characteristics of the area(s) involved, [whether the area is on the territory of the requesting State Party, and if not, the name of the State who controls that territory as well as whether that State is a State Party to the Protocol and/or the Convention];

(iv) [Aided by epidemiological data,] a description of the circumstances under which the [event] [use] took place, a description of the [event] [use] itself as well as an indication of whether it was a single [event] [use] or a series of [events] [uses]. An indication of the suspected cause and/or perpetrator of the [event] [use];

(v) The victims (human, animals or plants), the effects on them and the number affected. Symptoms and signs of the disease [or similar occurrence caused by toxins] [or other physical evidence] [, the treatment and the results of the treatment of the victims] shall be described;

(vi) Information [to the extent possible] on:

(a) The [use] [release] of microbial or other biological agent(s) or toxin(s) for other than peaceful purposes;

(b) The use of weapons, equipment or means of delivery;

[(vii) Any epidemiological data substantiating an allegation why the event shall not be considered to be a natural outbreak of disease [including data on natural disease profiles and occurrences in the area affected, as well as demographic data];]

[(viii) Information to demonstrate that the non-compliance concern is not a natural outbreak of disease;]

[(ix) Information from and/or the outcome for results of [any] prior consultations / clarifications relevant to the request.]

2. The following other types of information could also be important:

(x) Reports of any internal investigation including results of any laboratory investigations;

[(xi) The victims (human, animals or plants), the effects on them and the number affected. Symptoms and signs of the disease [or similar occurrence caused by toxins] [or other physical evidence] [, the treatment and the results of the treatment of the victims] shall be described;]

(xii) [Any] affidavits of eye witness accounts, photographs, samples or other physical evidence;

(xiii) Data on natural disease profiles and occurrences in the area affected, as well as demographic data;

(xiv) A description of the control measures and their result in the affected area, if available;

(xv) Other corroborative information;

[(xvi) Requests for specific assistance, if applicable.]

Investigation mandate

3. The Investigation mandate addressed to [...] and issued by the [Director-General] shall contain at least the following :

[(a) The decision of the [politically representative body] [Consultative Council] [Executive Council], on making of an investigation;]

(b) The name of the State Party or States Parties to be investigated;

- (c) The nature of the [investigation] [request] [allegation] including any effects on humans, animals or plant;
- (d) The area where the investigation will commence specified on a map;
- (e) The planned types of activity of the investigation team;
- (f) Any transit or basing points to be used by the investigation team, as appropriate;
- (g) The names of the leader and of the other members of the investigation team;
- [(h) The name of the proposed observer, if any;]
- (i) The list of approved equipment to be used during the investigation;
- [(j) The expected time frame necessary to complete the investigation;]
- (k) Any other operational instructions;
- (l) Point of entry to be used by the investigation team.

Notification of Investigation

4. The notification made by the Director-General pursuant to Article III paragraph ... shall include, *inter alia*:

- [(a) Name of the State Party on whose territory the Investigation of alleged use of BW will take place;]
- [(b) The nature of the [investigation] [request] [allegation];]
- (c) The point of entry where the investigation team will arrive as well as the means of arrival;
- (d) The date and estimated time of arrival of the investigation team at the point of entry;
- [(e) If appropriate, the standing diplomatic clearance number for non-scheduled aircraft;]
- (f) Location and characteristics of the area(s) where the incident(s) of non-compliance is alleged to have been taken place;

[(g) Any effects on humans, animals or plants;]

(h) A list of approved equipment which the Director-General requests the investigated State Party to make available to the investigation team for use during the investigation;

(i) A list of laboratory facilities and other support which the Director-General requests, if applicable, the investigated State Party to make available to the investigation team for use during the investigation;

[(j) The investigation mandate;]

(k) Point of entry to be used by the investigation team.

Duration of an investigation

5. The estimated period of duration of a [field] investigation [of alleged use of biological weapons] shall be indicated in the investigation mandate [and finalised after the pre-investigation briefing and shall not exceed that time unless extended by agreement of the State Party to be investigated] [shall not exceed ... days unless an extension is authorised by [the Executive Council]]. [The period of investigation means the period from ... until]

(B) PRE-INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES

Appointment of the investigation team

[6. Upon receipt of a request for a Investigation of alleged use of BW by a State Party, the Director-General shall [request the [SSC] [[Technical] Secretariat]] to identify members for appointment to the investigation team according to the specific nature [and circumstances of the potential investigation and alert them for possible dispatch with in [24] hours.]]

[7. The Director-General shall appoint the leader of the investigation team from the [permanent staff] of the [SSC] [[Technical] Secretariat]. Other members of the investigation team shall be appointed by the Director-General [and may be drawn from the [permanent staff] [as well as the part time staff] of the [SSC] [[Technical] Secretariat]] as designated according to the procedures set out in Annex D para [In addition, members of the Investigation Team may be selected from the list of experts when in the view of the Director-General expertise, not available among the permanent staff, is required for the proper conduct of a particular investigation.] The size of the investigation team shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the proper fulfilment of the investigation mandate, [but shall not in any event exceed [...] persons].]

[8. The Director-General may extend the size of the investigation team when necessary and in agreement with the investigated State Party.]

Despatch / arrival of investigation team

9. The Director-General shall dispatch the investigation team at the earliest opportunity after the receipt of the investigation request, [taking into account the screening process of the request] [taking into account the safety of the investigation team].

10. The Director-General may, when necessary, dispatch an element of the investigation team earlier than the rest if the time period for the compilation of the whole team is too long. The rest of the team may join the initial element at a later stage.

(C) ACTIVITIES UPON ARRIVAL OF THE INVESTIGATION TEAM

[Alternative determination of final perimeter]

Inspection of approved equipment

11. The investigated State Party shall have the right to inspect the equipment of the investigation team to ensure that it is properly sealed, appears on the approved list of equipment and conform to the standards as set out in Appendix The investigated State Party may exclude [if it deems necessary] equipment that is not in [conformity with the investigation mandate or] that has not been approved in accordance with

Pre-investigation briefing

12. The investigation team shall be briefed by representatives of the investigated State Party with the aid of maps and other documentation as appropriate. The briefing shall include, *inter alia*, relevant natural terrain features, safety aspects, prevailing disease profiles in the area to be investigated, possible routes and means of transport to the area, logistical arrangements for the investigation, details of equipment and/or laboratory facilities provided on request of the Director-General and any other relevant information.

13. The investigated State Party may [indicate] [provide information indicating why, in their view, some] locations within the area under investigation [that in its view], are not related to the investigation. [This information would not be binding on the investigation team.]

14. The investigated State Party may provide additional information that became available after the request/ was made or that does not appear on the investigation mandate.

Investigation Plan

15. After the briefing the investigation team shall prepare an initial investigation plan to serve, *inter alia*, as a basis for logistic and safety arrangements . This plan shall contain the activities to be carried out by the team, logistic requirements of the team and provisional timings of the activities and requirements. This plan shall be made available to the investigated State Party [prior to the commencement of the investigation].

Situation report

[16. The situation report shall indicate any urgent need for technical, medical, veterinary or agronomic assistance and any other relevant information. The progress reports shall indicate any further need for assistance that might be identified during the course of the investigation.]

Time frames for activities

[17. The following time frames for specific activities upon arrival of the investigation team shall apply :

- (a) Inspection of equipment - not more than 2 hours;
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- (c) Investigation Plan - not more than 2 hours.

[18. Activities upon arrival of the investigation team shall not exceed 7 hours.]]

(D) CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATION

[Managed] access

19. The investigated State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the obligation to demonstrate compliance and the right if necessary to protect sensitive information, as set out in paragraphs ... to ... of Article III, Section F, Subsection III, of the Protocol, to take specific measures which may include but are not limited to the following:

- (a) Managing access to buildings and other structures that contain particular sensitive equipment or information unrelated to the prohibitions of the BTWC;

[(b) Declaring restricted-access sites which are particularly sensitive and unrelated to the investigation;]

(c) Limiting the time investigation team members may spend in any area or building, while allowing the team to fulfil its mandate;

(d) The investigated State Party may at any time during the investigation notify products and processes in which it has a proprietary interest in order to help the team respect the investigated State Party's right to safeguard proprietary information. It may request that if a specific piece of information is released to the team, it should be accorded the most stringent protection measures with the Organization.

[20. When a restricted-access site is declared each such site shall be no larger than four square kilometres and shall have clearly defined and accessible boundaries.]

[21. The investigation team shall have the right to take steps necessary to conduct its investigation up to the boundary of a restricted-access site.]

[22. The investigation team shall have the right to observe visually all open places within the restricted-access site from the boundary of the site.]

23. The investigation team shall make every reasonable effort to fulfil the investigation mandate [outside the declared restricted-access site. If at any time the investigation team demonstrates credibly to the investigated State Party that the necessary activities authorized in the investigation mandate could not be carried out from the outside and access to the restricted-access site is necessary to fulfil the mandate, some members of the investigation team shall be granted access to accomplish specific tasks within the site. The investigated State Party shall have the right to shroud or otherwise protect sensitive equipment, objects and materials not related to the purpose of the investigation. The number of investigators shall be kept to the minimum necessary to complete the tasks related to the investigation. The modalities for such access shall be subject to negotiation between the investigation team and the investigated State Party.]

Implementation by the investigation team of specific on-site activities

Interviewing of eyewitnesses

24. The investigation team shall have the right to interview persons, with their [agreement] [written consent], who witnessed a specific incident or provide information on a series of incidents, [that could be used as information in the investigation.] The interview shall take place in the presence of representatives of the State Party on whose territory the investigation is conducted.

25. The investigation team may seek information relevant to the investigation which is necessary to fulfil their investigation mandate. If required, interpretation shall be provided by the investigation team, or where requested, by the State Party.

Interviewing of potentially exposed humans and owners of potentially exposed plants and animals

26. The investigation team shall have the right to interview potentially exposed humans, or personnel responsible for plants or animals potentially exposed to BTW, with their [agreement] [written consent], in order to establish how the exposed, plants or animals were affected. [The interview shall take place in the presence of representatives of the State Party on whose territory the investigation is conducted.]

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Interviewing of officials / personnel

28. The investigation team shall have the right to interview any relevant personnel, such as national/local government officials, personnel of any involved institutions, hospitals/medical facilities, etc. with their agreement, in the presence of a representative of the State Party [with the purpose of establishing the relevant facts]. [Advance notice of interviews shall be given.]

29. The investigation team shall only request information [and data relevant to the incident under investigation] which is necessary for the conduct of the investigation. If required, interpretation shall be provided by the investigation team, or where requested, by the State Party.

[30. The investigated State Party shall have the right to object to questions posed to personnel if it deems that those questions are not relevant to the investigation or impinge on sensitive national security or commercial proprietary data. If the investigation team leader nonetheless continues to believe that these questions are relevant and should be answered, he may submit them in writing to the investigated State Party for reply, together with an explanation of their relevance to the investigation. The investigation team may note in its report any refusal by the investigated State Party to permit interviews or to allow questions to be answered and any explanations given.]

[31. Interviews shall be conducted in such a way as to avoid unduly hindering the work of the personnel interviewed. The investigation team shall give advance notice of interview requests.]

Visual [observation]

32. The investigation team shall have the right to examine visually [investigate] [visually observe] relevant areas in order to obtain information relevant to the investigation. All necessary precautions shall be taken to ensure the health and safety of the investigation team. The investigation team shall be accompanied by representatives of the State Party on whose territory the investigation is conducted.

[33. If direct visual observation is not possible because of national security, commercial proprietary or health and safety considerations, the investigated State Party shall provide other means to demonstrate that the area and objects concerned are not relevant to and have no effect on the fulfilment of the investigation mandate by the investigation team. These may include, for example, the use of a video camera, photographs or drawings.]

[Disease-related examination]

34. Appropriate members of the investigation team shall have the right to conduct medical examinations, with informed consent, on persons affected, as well as on animals and plants affected, in order to be able to make a diagnosis and enable the investigation team to determine whether victims have in fact been affected and what they have been affected by.

35. The investigation team may, where necessary and applicable, with the necessary consent by the investigated State Party, and the written consent of the patient, take body samples in order to diagnose or confirm a clinical diagnosis of the disease or intoxication.

36. The investigation team may conduct post mortem examinations where relevant, with the necessary consent by the investigated State Party and the written consent by the family or the legal representative.

37. The investigation team may when necessary have access to [other] medical, veterinary or agricultural information relevant to the investigation, such as records, and may request the examination of laboratory animals or samples.

38. Whenever consent for an examination, sample collection or post mortem is refused, written explanation will be provided.

39. All medical information, excluding samples and other material taken from humans shall be accorded the most stringent protection measures by the]

Sampling and identification

[40. The investigation team shall have the right to take and evaluate, where appropriate, environmental samples, samples of affected plants, samples of munitions and devices or remnants of munitions and devices in order to conduct tests for the presence of specific [listed] pathogens or toxins.]

41. The investigation team may take samples itself in the presence of a representative of the investigated State Party. If the investigation team deems it necessary, they may request the investigated State Party assist in the collection of samples under the supervision of members of the investigation team. [The investigation team may also request the investigated State Party to take appropriate control samples from areas neighbouring the areas under investigation.] The investigated State Party shall receive duplicate samples, for its own analysis. The investigation team may test samples using any methods specifically designed or approved for use in such investigations, and available to the investigation team. At the request of the investigation team, the investigated State Party shall to the extent possible provide assistance for the analysis of samples, using locally available resources. Should it be negotiated that the investigated State Party itself performs analyses, the investigation team may request that this be done in the presence of members of the team. If the State Party itself performs analyses the investigation team or some member especially assigned by the team leader shall be present during all analytical processes. All sampling [shall be conducted according to agreed procedures and methods and] transport shall be performed according to the required safety standards.

[42. Where the investigation team deems analysis on the territory to be impossible, it may remove samples for analysis in designated laboratories, [with the approval of the investigated State Party] [if it deems it necessary]. Representatives of the investigated State Party shall have the right to accompany all samples and observe any analysis and the subsequent destruction. [Any samples remaining after analyses that have not been destroyed shall be returned to the State Party of origin.]

[43. Analysis shall be carried out in the territory of the State Party where the investigation is being made and only in the presence of a representative of the State Party].

[44. Where applicable, the investigated State Party shall, in accordance with the principles of managed access, have the right to take measures to protect national security and confidential proprietary information such as requiring the use of specific tests or on-site analysis or, if necessary, to refuse a sample. In the latter case the investigated State Party shall be under the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate that the requested sample concerned is unrelated to the investigation mandate.]]

[Collection of background information and data

45. The investigation team shall have the right to collect and interpret background data necessary for the investigation. Background data may include normal and epidemic disease incidence and/or prevalence, demographic data [and data on the use of vaccines] [and vaccine production/purchase or usage]. [Only data that may have a direct effect on the investigation may be collected.]]

Communications

46. The members of the investigation team shall have the right at all times during the investigation to communicate with each other [and with the [[Technical] Secretariat].] For this purpose they may use their own duly approved and certified equipment with the consent of the investigated State Party, [to the extent that the investigated State Party does not provide them with access to other telecommunications.]

[Observer

47. In accordance with Article III section F paragraph... the requesting State Party shall the requesting State Party shall liaise with the Technical Secretariat to coordinate the arrival of the observer at the same point of entry as the investigation team within a reasonable period of the of the investigation team.

48. The observer shall have the right throughout the period of investigation to be in communication with the embassy of the requesting State Party located in the investigated State Party, or in the case of absence of an embassy, with the requesting State Party itself. The investigated State Party shall provide means of communication to the observer.

49. The observer shall have the right to arrive at the investigation area and to have access to and with in the investigation area as granted by the investigated State Party.

50. The observer shall have the right to make recommendations to the investigation team, which the team shall take into account to the extent it deems appropriate.

51. Throughout the investigation, the investigation team shall keep the observer informed about the conduct of the investigation and the findings.

52. Throughout the investigation, the investigated State Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities necessary for the observer similar to those enjoyed by the investigation team as described in paragraph... All costs in connection with the stay of the observer on the territory of the investigated State Party, shall be borne by the requesting State Party.]

Expansion of the investigation team

53. If the investigation team deems that it lacks specific expertise necessary to conduct the investigation, it shall immediately notify the Director-General and the investigated State Party. [The Director-General shall [, with the agreement of the investigated State Party,] augment the team as appropriate from the fulltime [or part time staff] [of the [SSC] [[Technical] Secretariat]] [or list of qualified experts], who shall be dispatched as soon as possible after the notification.]

Extension of investigation area

[54. If the investigation team during an investigation deems it necessary to extend the investigation onto the territory of a neighbouring State, the Director-General shall [, with the agreement of the investigated State Party] notify that State about the need for access to its territory and request and confirm arrangements for the safe reception of the team.]

[55. If, during an investigation, the team considers it necessary to extend the investigation to a neighbouring State, the investigation should be conducted in accordance with the uniform procedures of initiation and conduct of investigations and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the applicable rules of international law. The Secretary-General of the United Nations or other appropriate persons/organizations could notify the State Party of the need for access to its territory. The consent of the other State Party would be required. The extent of any such access would be agreed between the parties involved.]

Extension of investigation duration

56. If the investigation team deems that safe access to a [specific area relevant to the investigation] [an area specified in the investigation plan] is not possible, the requesting State Party shall be informed immediately. If necessary, the period of investigation shall be extended [with the agreement of the requesting State Party] until safe access can be provided and the investigation team will have concluded its mission.

(E) POST INVESTIGATION [ACTIVITIES] [PROCEDURES]

[Preliminary findings and evaluation] [Initial Report]

57. The [preliminary findings and evaluation] [initial report] shall summarise in a general way the activities conducted by the investigation team, [particularly with regard to the possible non-compliance concern cited in the investigation mandate] [and shall be limited to information directly related to the Convention.]

[58. No later than [...] hours after the completion of an investigation, the investigation team shall meet with representatives of the receiving State Party with a view to examining the team's initial report and clarifying any remaining ambiguities. The team shall provide its initial report in written form, together with a list of the information, data and other material which it is intended to take outside the State. This document shall be signed by the team leader. In order to indicate that the representatives of the receiving State Party have been given sight of the contents of the initial report, the representatives of the receiving State Party shall countersign the report.]

[59. In accordance with the applicable principles of managed access and without prejudice to the obligation of the receiving State Party to allow the investigation team to fulfil its mandate, the receiving State Party may place restrictions on request that restrictions be placed on or deny altogether the removal of documents or other materials if it deems this necessary to protect commercial proprietary or national security information. The receiving State Party shall have the right to request the removal from the initial report of any information unrelated to the investigation mandate.]

Departure

60. Upon completion of the post investigation [procedures] [activities], the investigation team and the [observer] shall leave the territory of the investigated State Party as soon as possible. The investigated State Party shall do everything in its power to provide assistance and to ensure the safe conduct of the investigation team, equipment and baggage to the point of exit. Unless agreed otherwise by the investigated State Party and the investigation team, the point of exit shall be the same as the point of entry used.

[61. Following completion of the investigation, the team shall depart from the territory of the receiving State Party in the minimum time possible via the point of entry.]

[Interim investigation of alleged use of BW report

62. The interim Investigation of alleged use of BW report shall summarize the factual findings of the investigation, [particularly with regard to the alleged incident of release or exposure to BW cited in the investigation request]. In addition, the report shall include a description of the investigation process, tracing its various stages, with special reference to :

(a) The locations and times of any sampling and on-site analysis;

(b) Supporting evidence such as the records of interviews, the results of disease related examinations and epidemiological and scientific analyses, and the documents examined by the investigation team;

- (c) An account of the assistance and its timeliness, provided by the host State Party,
- (d) The result of any completed laboratory investigations and sampling and identification;

[(e) An [assessment] by the investigation team of the degree and nature of access and cooperation granted by the investigated State Party and the extent to which this enabled the investigation team to fulfil its mandate.]]

[Initial laboratory report

63. The initial laboratory report shall contain initial diagnoses if available or at least a differential diagnosis as well as a plan for the conduct of further investigations and tests.]

[Intermediate laboratory report

64. The interim laboratory report shall contain details of progress of work and a preliminary diagnosis or identification and the final plan for future work.]

[Final laboratory report

65. The final laboratory report shall contain a description of the work done and a complete diagnosis or identification of an agent or agents. If it was not possible to make a positive diagnosis or identification, the report shall state that fact and give an explanation as to why it was not possible to make a final diagnosis or identification.]

Final report

[66. The final report shall contain all the detail contained in the interim Investigation of alleged use of BW report, the final laboratory reports as well as any other information it obtained after the initial Investigation of alleged use of BW report was made.]

[67. The final report shall also [include any] [integrate in a logical manner all] information the investigation team in the course of its investigation collected that might serve to [identify the origin of any biological agent or toxin found during the course of the investigation. Such evidence may include, *inter alia*, chemical composition and the presence of inert materials in the case of possible toxin weapons, and serological or molecular sequence evidence in the case of infectious agents. In either case, the report shall present such environmental and historical information as is available on the previous presence of the alleged agent in the region] [address the concerns expressed in the investigation mandate.]

[68. The report shall summarize the activities conducted by the investigation team and its factual findings, particularly with regard to the concern regarding probable use of BW against the State Party that requested the investigation. It shall also include an assessment by the team of the degree and nature of access and cooperation granted to the team and the extent to which this enabled it to fulfil the investigation mandate.]

[69. The final investigation report shall immediately be made available to the receiving State Party. There shall be attached to it any written comments that the receiving State Party may at once make concerning the findings contained in it. The final report, together with the attached comments by the receiving State Party, shall be transmitted to the Technical Organ no later than [...] days after the completion of the investigation.]

[70. In the event that uncertainties identified by the investigation team persist or that the cooperation afforded by the receiving State Party is considered not to have met the required standards, the Technical Organ shall promote the holding of consultations for the purpose of obtaining further clarifications.]

[71. If the uncertainties cannot be removed or if the established facts are of a nature to imply that there was use of BW, the Technical Organ shall convene the Consultative Council to examine the final report.]

[[III. FACILITY INVESTIGATIONS]

(A) INVESTIGATION REQUEST

Information to be submitted with a request for a Facility Investigation¹⁰⁷

1. Information to be submitted with a request for a facility investigation:

[(i) [Name of the State Party in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction or control the non-compliant activity has allegedly taken place;] [The State Party to be investigated;]]

(ii) Information, [to the extent possible,] on the [use] [research], development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention [indicating specifically] [which prohibited activity took place] [the specific event, or series of events, which gave rise to a non-compliance concern] of

(a) microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;

(b) weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict;

(iii) The location [and area] of any alleged non-compliant activity. This shall include as much detail as possible including a description, the location, boundaries and geographic co-ordinates, specified to the nearest second, if possible;

(iv) The approximate period during which the non-compliant activity or event is alleged to have taken place;

[(v) Information from and/or the outcome or results of [any] prior consultations / clarifications [or prior field investigation] [or prior investigation of the alleged use of biological weapons] relevant to the request;]

[(vi) Information to demonstrate that the non-compliance concern is not a natural outbreak of disease.]

107 Article III, Section F, Subsection III, paragraph 18 (i) to (x) text duplicated.

2. The following other types of information could also be important:

(vii) Whether any facility concerned has been declared under the Protocol; and any information included in or absent from the declaration return relevant to the allegations;

(viii) If not, any information to suggest that the facility concerned should have been declared under the Protocol;

(ix) Details of the ownership and/or operation of the facility concerned;

(x) Any additional relevant information, e.g. on extent and nature of the alleged non-compliant activity;

[(xi) Requests for specific assistance, if applicable.]

Investigation mandate

3. The mandate for a facility investigation shall contain at least :

(a) The name of the State Party or Host State Party on whose territory the investigation will take place;

(b) The non-compliance concern that gave rise to the investigation request;

(c) The location and requested perimeter of the investigation site specified on a map, taking into account all information on which the request was based;

(d) The names of the leader of and of the other members of the investigation team;

[(e) The name of the proposed observer if any;]

(f) The list of approved equipment to be used on the investigation [site] [area];

(g) Any specific operational instructions;

[(h) The decision of the [Executive Council][politically representative body of States Parties] on the investigation request;]

(i) Point of entry to be used by the investigation team.

Notification of investigation

4. The notification made by the Director-General pursuant to Article III paragraph 32 shall include, *inter alia* :

- (a) Name of the State Party or Host State Party on whose territory the facility investigation will take place;
- (b) The name and location of the facility to be investigated;
- (c) The point of entry where the investigation team will arrive as well as the means of arrival,
- (d) The date and estimated time of arrival of the investigation team at the point of entry,
- [(e) If appropriate, the standing diplomatic clearance number for non-scheduled aircraft,]
- (f) The names of the leader and of the other members of the investigation team,
- [(g) The investigation mandate.]

Duration of an investigation

5. The period of the investigation shall not exceed [84] hours, unless extended by agreement with the investigated State Party.

(B) PRE-INVESTIGATION [PROCEDURES] [ACTIVITIES]

Appointment of investigation team

[6. Upon receipt of a request for a facility investigation by a State Party, the Director-General shall [request the [SSC] [[Technical] Secretariat] to] identify members for appointment to the investigation team according to the specific nature of the facility and the nature of the non-compliance concern to be investigated [for possible dispatch within 24 hours]. The size of the investigation team shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the proper fulfilment of the investigation mandate, [but shall not in any event exceed [...] persons.]

[7. The Director-General shall appoint the leader of the investigation team from the permanent staff of the [SSC] [[Technical] Secretariat], other members of the investigation team shall be appointed by the Director-General and may be drawn from the permanent staff [as well as the part

time] staff of the [SSC] [[Technical] Secretariat] as designated according to the procedures set out in Annex D para 1 to 12.]

[8. The Director may extend the size of the investigation team when necessary and in agreement with the investigated State Party.]

Monitoring of site

9. Procedures to monitor a site may include the identification of vehicular entry and exits, the making of traffic logs, the taking of photographs, and the making of video recordings of entrance and exit traffic by the investigation team in accordance with paragraph... Article III Section F Subsection III.

(C) ACTIVITIES UPON ARRIVAL OF INVESTIGATION TEAM

[Alternative determination of final perimeter

10. The alternative perimeter shall be designated as specifically as possible in accordance with paragraph 15. It shall include the whole of the requested perimeter and shall, as a rule, bear a close relationship to it, taking into account natural terrain features and man-made boundaries. It shall normally run close to the surrounding security barrier if such a barrier exists. The investigated State Party shall seek to establish such a relationship between the perimeters by a combination of at least two of the following means:

- (a) An alternative perimeter that does not extend to an area significantly greater than that of the requested perimeter;
- (b) An alternative perimeter that is a short, uniform distance from the requested perimeter;
- (c) At least part of the requested perimeter is visible from the alternative perimeter.

11. If the alternative perimeter is acceptable to the investigation team, it shall become the final perimeter and the investigation team shall be transported from the point of entry to that perimeter. If the investigated State Party deems it necessary, such transportation may begin up to [...] hours before to the expiry of the time period specified in paragraph 24 for proposing an alternative perimeter. Transportation shall, in any case, be completed not later than [...] hours after the arrival of the investigation team at the point of entry.

12. If a final perimeter is not agreed, the perimeter negotiations shall be concluded as early as possible, but in no case shall they continue for more than [...] hours after the arrival of the investigation team at the point of entry. If no agreement is reached, the investigated State Party shall transport the investigation team to a location at the alternative perimeter.

13. If the investigated State Party deems it necessary, such transportation may begin up to [...] hours before the expiry of the time period specified in paragraph for proposing an alternative perimeter. Transportation shall, in any case, be completed not later than [...] hours after the arrival of the investigation team at the point of entry.

14. Once at the facility, the investigated State Party shall provide the investigation team with prompt access to the alternative perimeter to facilitate negotiations and agreement on the final perimeter and access within the final perimeter.

15. If no agreement is reached within [...] hours after the arrival of the investigation team at the facility, the alternative perimeter shall be designated the final perimeter.]

Inspection of approved equipment

16. The investigated State Party shall have the right to inspect the equipment of the investigation team, [without prejudice to the prescribed time frames] to ensure that it is properly sealed, appears on the approved list of equipment and conform to the standards as set out in Appendix The investigated State Party may exclude equipment that is not in [conformity with the investigation mandate or] that has not been approved in accordance with ...¹⁰⁸

Pre-investigation briefing

17. The investigated State Party shall provide a preinvestigation briefing to the investigation team prior to granting it access, which shall not normally exceed [three] hours [The briefing shall include information concerning the safety regulations in force, including rules of observation and quarantine, [a medical examination of the members of the investigation team and documentary evidence that they have been vaccinated.]] [The briefing should wherever possible include a tour of the [investigated] site]. It shall include the scope and a general description of activities of the facility, details of the physical layout and other relevant characteristics of the site, including a map or sketch showing all structures and significant geographic features, [and details of the availability of facility personnel and records]. It may also include an indication of areas the investigated State Party considers sensitive or not related to the purpose of the Convention.]

108. A reference to the relevant paragraphs in the General Provisions section of Annex D will be inserted here.

Time frames for activities

18. The following time frames for specific activities upon arrival of the investigation team shall apply :

- (a) Inspection of equipment - not more than [...] hours;
- (b) Pre-investigation briefing - not more than [3] hours;
- [(c) Investigation Plan - not more than [...] hours;]
- [(d) Perimeter negotiations - not more than [...] hours.]

19. Activities upon arrival of the investigation team shall not exceed [...] hours.

(D) CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATION

20. The investigated State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the obligation to demonstrate compliance and the right if necessary to protect sensitive information, as set out in paragraphs ... to ... of Article III, Section F, Subsection III, to take specific measures which may include but are not limited to the following:

- (a) Removal of sensitive papers from direct view;
- (b) Shrouding of sensitive displays, stores, and equipment;
- (c) Shrouding sensitive pieces of equipment, such as computer or electronic systems;
- (d) Logging off of computer systems and turning off data indicating devices;
- (e) Using random selective access techniques whereby the team is requested to select a given percentage or number of buildings of their choice to investigate; the same principle can apply to the interior and content of sensitive buildings or documents;
- (f) In exceptional cases, limiting the number of team members who have access to certain parts of the site; and limiting the viewing angle;
- (g) Limiting the time investigation team members may spend in any area or building, while allowing the team to fulfil its mandate;

(h) The investigated State Party may at any time during the investigation notify products and processes in which it has a proprietary interest in order to help the team respect the investigated State Party's right to safeguard proprietary information. It may request that if a specific piece of information is released to the team, it should be accorded the most stringent protection measures with the Organization.

Implementation by the investigation team of specific on-site activities

21. The investigation team may conduct any of the following activities, in accordance with the principles of managed access set out in paragraphs ... to ... Article III, Section F, Subsection III, if necessary to protect sensitive information.

Interviewing

[22. The investigation team shall have the right to interview any relevant personnel in the presence of representatives of the investigated State Party, with the purpose of establishing relevant facts. These may include a legal adviser and a senior member of the facility staff. They shall only request information and data which are necessary for the fulfilment of the investigation mandate. They may make use of, but shall not be limited to, questions related to declarations and agreed lists where relevant.

23. The investigated State Party shall have the right to object to questions posed to the facility personnel if it deems that those questions are not relevant to the investigation or impinge on sensitive national security or commercial proprietary data. If the investigation team leader nonetheless continues to believe that these questions are relevant and should be answered, he may submit them in writing to the investigated State Party for reply, together with an explanation of their relevance to the investigation. The investigation team may note in its report any refusal by the investigated State Party to permit interviews or to allow questions to be answered and any explanations given.

24. Interviews shall be conducted in such a way as to avoid unduly hindering the work of the facility. The investigation team shall give advance notice of interview requests.]

Visual observation

[25. The investigation team shall have the right to observe visually and investigate any part of the investigation site relevant to its investigation mandate. The items to be so observed shall be chosen by the investigation team.

26. If direct visual observation is not possible because of national security, commercial proprietary or health and safety considerations, the investigated State Party shall provide other means to demonstrate that the area and objects concerned are not used for purposes related to the possible non-compliance concerns raised in the investigation request. These may include, for example, the use of a video camera, photographs or drawings.]

Identification of key equipment

[27. The investigation team shall have the right to investigate and identify equipment at the investigation site. In identifying key equipment, the investigation team shall make use of, but not be limited to, questions related to agreed lists of equipment [or to other agreed criteria for determining the relevance of equipment to strengthening confidence in compliance].

28. The investigation team may also note the size and quantity of equipment on the site, or the absence of any equipment, and compare this with information provided in facility declarations where appropriate.]

[Auditing]

[29. The investigation team shall have the right to examine documentation and records they deem relevant to the conduct of their mission.

30. The investigated State Party shall have the right, in accordance with managed access procedures, to protect documentation and records which it considers confidential for reasons of national security or commercial sensitivity.

31. The investigation team shall have the right to request copies of documentation or print-outs of records. Documents and print-outs shall be removed from the site only with the permission of the investigated State Party.

32. The investigation team and the organization shall treat as confidential all documents and print-outs or records and any other information obtained as a result of access to documentation and records, and shall handle them accordingly.

33. Auditing shall be conducted in such a way as to minimise disruption to the normal work of the facility.

34. The investigated State Party shall provide the investigation team with any information, such as details of national procedures/financial regulations, which may be relevant to the investigation of documents and records.

35. If issues remain unresolved after an investigation which in the opinion of the investigation team could be addressed by specific off-site auditing, the organization shall have the right to take the matter up with the investigated State Party with a view to exploring means for implementing this measure.]

[Medical examination]

Sampling and identification

[36. The investigation team shall have the right to request samples and test these for the presence of specific pathogens or toxins in order to address a specific non-compliance concern.

37. Sampling shall only be used where there is other evidence acquired during the investigation or otherwise available to the investigation team which suggests that sampling might provide significant information. Where possible, specific tests shall be used to focus on specific agents, strains or genes. The intention to conduct such tests shall where possible be included in the investigation mandate.

38. The investigated State Party shall, in accordance with the principles of managed access, have the right to take measures to protect national security and confidential proprietary information such as requiring the use of specific tests or on-site analysis or, if necessary, to refuse a sample. In the latter case the investigated State Party shall be under the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate that the requested sample concerned is unrelated to the non-compliance activities specified in the investigation request.

39. Representatives of the investigated State Party shall take samples at the request of the investigation team and in their presence. If so agreed, the investigation team may take samples itself. Where possible, samples shall be analysed on-site. The investigated State Party shall receive duplicate samples, for its own analysis. The investigation team may test samples using any methods specifically designed or approved for use in such investigations, and brought to the facility by the investigators. At the request of the investigation team, the investigated State Party shall to the extent possible provide assistance for the analysis of samples on-site, using locally available resources. Should it be negotiated that the investigated State Party itself performs analyses, the investigating team may request that this be done in the presence of investigators.

40. If it deems on-site analysis impossible, the investigation team shall have the right to request the removal of samples for analysis in designated laboratories. If the removal of samples is agreed, the investigated State Party shall have the right to accompany the sample and observe any analysis and its subsequent destruction.

41. An investigated State Party shall have the right to offer a reliable sample at any time in order to help resolve a non-compliance concern or any other ambiguity which may arise in the course of the investigation. If it is agreed that such a sample may be removed from the site for analysis in a designated laboratory, a representative from the investigated State Party shall have the right to accompany the sample and observe any analysis and its subsequent destruction.

42. Any sampling and analysis shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize disruption to the normal work of the facility and any consequent loss of production.]

Communications

43. The members of the investigation team shall have the right at all times during the investigation to communicate with each other and with the Technical Secretariat. For this purpose they may use their own duly approved and certified equipment with the consent of the investigated State Party, to the extent that the investigated State Party does not provide them with access to other telecommunications.

[Observer

44. In accordance with Article III section F paragraph...., the requesting State Party shall liaise with the Technical Secretariat to coordinate the arrival of the observer at the same point of entry as the investigation team within a reasonable period of the investigation team.

45. The observer shall have the right throughout the period of investigation to be in communication with the embassy of the requesting State Party located in the investigated State Party, or in the case of absence of an embassy, with the requesting State Party itself. The investigated State Party shall provide means of communication to the observer.

46. The observer shall have the right to arrive at [the alternative or final perimeter of] the investigation site, wherever the investigation team arrives first, and to have access to the investigation site as granted by the investigated State Party.

47. The observer shall have the right to make recommendations to the investigation team, which the team shall take into account to the extent it deems appropriate.

48. Throughout the investigation, the investigation team shall keep the observer informed about the conduct of the investigation and the findings.

49. Throughout the investigation, the investigated State Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities necessary for the observer similar to those enjoyed by the investigation team as

described in paragraph.... All costs in connection with the stay of the observer on the territory of the investigated State Party, shall be borne by the requesting State Party.]

(E) POST INVESTIGATION [ACTIVITIES] [PROCEDURES]

[Preliminary findings and evaluation] [Initial report]

Departure

Final Report

[Further clarification]

**[[III. INVESTIGATION OF ANY OTHER ALLEGED BREACH OF
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION]]**

(A) INVESTIGATION REQUEST

Information to be submitted with a request for an Investigation¹⁰⁹

1. Information to be submitted with a request for an investigation of any other breach of obligations under the provisions of the Convention:

(i) [Name of the State Party in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction or control the non-compliant activity has allegedly taken place;] [The State Party to be investigated;]]

(ii) Information, [to the extent possible,] on the [use] [research], development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention [indicating specifically] [which prohibited activity took place] [the specific event, or series of events, which gave rise to a non-compliance concern] of

(a) Microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;

(b) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict;

(iii) The location [and area] of any alleged non-compliant activity. This shall include as much detail as possible including a description, the location, boundaries and geographic co-ordinates, specified to the nearest second, if possible;

(iv) The approximate period during which the non-compliant activity or event is alleged to have taken place;

[(v) Information from and/or the outcome or results of [any] prior consultations / clarifications [or prior field investigation] [or prior investigation of the alleged use of biological weapons] relevant to the request;]

109. Article III, Section F, Subsection III, paragraph 18 (i) to (x) text duplicated.

[(vi) Information to demonstrate that the non-compliance concern is not a natural outbreak of disease.]

2. The following other types of information could also be important:

(vii) Whether any facility concerned has been declared under the Protocol; and any information included in or absent from the declaration return relevant to the allegations;

(viii) If not, any information to suggest that the facility concerned should have been declared under the Protocol;

(ix) Details of the ownership and/or operation of the facility concerned;

(x) Any additional relevant information, e.g. on extent and nature of the alleged non-compliant activity.

Investigation mandate

3. The mandate for an investigation of any other breaches of obligations under the Conventions shall contain at least :

(a) The name of the State Party or Host State Party on whose territory the investigation will take place;

(b) The non-compliance concern that gave rise to the investigation request;

(c) The location and requested perimeter of the investigation site specified on a map, taking into account all information on which the request was based;

(d) The names of the leader of and of the other members of the investigation team,

[(e) The name of the proposed observer if any;]

(f) The list of approved equipment to be used on the investigation [site] [area];

(g) Any specific operational instructions;

[(h) The decision of the [Executive Council] [politically representative body of States Parties] on the investigation request];

(i) Point of entry to be used by the investigation team.

Notification of investigation

4. The notification made by the Director-General pursuant to Article III paragraph 32 shall include, *inter alia*:

- (a) Name of the State Party or Host State Party on whose territory the facility investigation will take place;
- (b) The name and location of the facility to be investigated;
- (c) The point of entry where the investigation team will arrive as well as the means of arrival;
- (d) The date and estimated time of arrival of the investigation team at the point of entry;
- [(e) If appropriate, the standing diplomatic clearance number for non-scheduled aircraft;]
- (f) The names of the leader and of the other members of the investigation team;
- [(g) The investigation mandate.]

Duration of an investigation

5. The period of the investigation shall not exceed [84] hours, unless extended by agreement with [the investigated State Party].

(B) PRE-INVESTIGATION [PROCEDURES] [ACTIVITIES]

Appointment of investigation team

[6. Upon receipt of a request for an investigation of any other breach of obligations under the Convention by a State Party, the Director-General shall [request the [SSC] [[Technical] Secretariat] to] identify members for appointment to the investigation team according to the specific nature of the facility and the nature of the non-compliance concern to be investigated [for possible dispatch within 24 hours]. The size of the investigation team shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the proper fulfilment of the investigation mandate, [but shall not in any event exceed [...] persons.]

[7. The Director-General shall appoint the leader of the investigation team from the permanent staff of the [SSC] [[Technical] Secretariat], other members of the investigation team shall be

appointed by the Director-General and may be drawn from the permanent staff [as well as the part time] staff of the [SSC] [[Technical] Secretariat] as designated according to the procedures set out in Annex D, paragraphs 1 to 12.]

8. The Director may extend the size of the investigation team when necessary and in agreement with the investigated State Party.]

Monitoring of site

9. Procedures to monitor a site may include the identification of vehicular entry and exits, the making of traffic logs, the taking of photographs, and the making of video recordings of entrance and exit traffic by the investigation team in accordance with paragraph... ,Article III, Section F, Subsection III.

(C) ACTIVITIES UPON ARRIVAL OF INVESTIGATION TEAM

[Alternative determination of final perimeter

10. The alternative perimeter shall be designated as specifically as possible in accordance with paragraph 15. It shall include the whole of the requested perimeter and shall, as a rule, bear a close relationship to it, taking into account natural terrain features and man-made boundaries. It shall normally run close to the surrounding security barrier if such a barrier exists. The investigated State Party shall seek to establish such a relationship between the perimeters by a combination of at least two of the following means:

- (a) An alternative perimeter that does not extend to an area significantly greater than that of the requested perimeter;
- (b) An alternative perimeter that is a short, uniform distance from the requested perimeter;
- (c) At least part of the requested perimeter is visible from the alternative perimeter.

11. If the alternative perimeter is acceptable to the investigation team, it shall become the final perimeter and the investigation team shall be transported from the point of entry to that perimeter. If the investigated State Party deems it necessary, such transportation may begin up to [...] hours before to the expiry of the time period specified in paragraph 24 for proposing an alternative perimeter. Transportation shall, in any case, be completed not later than [...] hours after the arrival of the investigation team at the point of entry.

12. If a final perimeter is not agreed, the perimeter negotiations shall be concluded as early as possible, but in no case shall they continue for more than [...] hours after the arrival of the investigation team at the point of entry. If no agreement is reached, the investigated State Party shall transport the investigation team to a location at the alternative perimeter.
13. If the investigated State Party deems it necessary, such transportation may begin up to [...] hours before the expiry of the time period specified in paragraph for proposing an alternative perimeter. Transportation shall, in any case, be completed not later than [...] hours after the arrival of the investigation team at the point of entry.
14. Once at the facility, the investigated State Party shall provide the investigation team with prompt access to the alternative perimeter to facilitate negotiations and agreement on the final perimeter and access within the final perimeter.
15. If no agreement is reached within [...] hours after the arrival of the investigation team at the facility, the alternative perimeter shall be designated the final perimeter.]

Inspection of approved equipment

16. The investigated State Party shall have the right to inspect the equipment of the investigation team, [without prejudice to the prescribed time frames] to ensure that it is properly sealed, appears on the approved list of equipment and conform to the standards as set out in Appendix The investigated State Party may exclude equipment that is not in [conformity with the investigation mandate or] that has not been approved in accordance with ...¹¹⁰

Pre-investigation briefing

17. The investigated State Party shall provide a preinvestigation briefing to the investigation team prior to granting it access, which shall not normally exceed [three] hours [The briefing shall include information concerning the safety regulations in force, including rules of observation and quarantine, [a medical examination of the members of the investigation team and documentary evidence that they have been vaccinated.]] [The briefing should wherever possible include a tour of the [investigated] site]. It shall include the scope and a general description of activities of the facility, details of the physical layout and other relevant characteristics of the site, including a map or sketch showing all structures and significant geographic features, [and details of the availability of facility personnel and records]. It may also include an indication of areas the investigated State Party considers sensitive or not related to the purpose of the Convention.]

110. A reference to the relevant paragraphs in the General Provisions section of Annex D will be inserted here.

Time frames for activities

18. The following time frames for specific activities upon arrival of the investigation team shall apply :

- (a) Inspection of equipment - not more than [...] hours;
- (b) Pre-investigation briefing - not more than [3] hours;
- [(c) Investigation plan - not more than [...] hours;]
- [(d) perimeter negotiations - not more than [...] hours.]

19. Activities upon arrival of the investigation team shall not exceed [...] hours.

(D) CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATION

20. The investigated State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the obligation to demonstrate compliance and the right if necessary to protect sensitive information, as set out in paragraphs ... to ... of Article III, Section F, Subsection III, to take specific measures which may include but are not limited to the following:

- (a) Removal of sensitive papers from direct view;
- (b) Shrouding of sensitive displays, stores, and equipment;
- (c) Shrouding sensitive pieces of equipment, such as computer or electronic systems;
- (d) Logging off of computer systems and turning off data indicating devices,
- (e) Using random selective access techniques whereby the team is requested to select a given percentage or number of buildings of their choice to investigate; the same principle can apply to the interior and content of sensitive buildings or documents;
- (f) In exceptional cases, limiting the number of team members who have access to certain parts of the site; and limiting the viewing angle;
- (g) Limiting the time investigation team members may spend in any area or building, while allowing the team to fulfil its mandate;

(h) The investigated State Party may at any time during the investigation notify products and processes in which it has a proprietary interest in order to help the team respect the investigated State Party's right to safeguard proprietary information. It may request that if a specific piece of information is released to the team, it should be accorded the most stringent protection measures with the Organization.

Implementation by the investigation team of specific on-site activities

21. The investigation team may conduct any of the following activities, in accordance with the principles of managed access set out in paragraphs ... to ... Article III Section F Subsection III, if necessary to protect sensitive information.

Interviewing

[22. The investigation team shall have the right to interview any relevant personnel in the presence of representatives of the investigated State Party, with the purpose of establishing relevant facts. These may include a legal adviser and a senior member of the facility staff. They shall only request information and data which are necessary for the fulfilment of the investigation mandate. They may make use of, but shall not be limited to, questions related to declarations and agreed lists where relevant.

23. The investigated State Party shall have the right to object to questions posed to the facility personnel if it deems that those questions are not relevant to the investigation or impinge on sensitive national security or commercial proprietary data. If the investigation team leader nonetheless continues to believe that these questions are relevant and should be answered, he may submit them in writing to the investigated State Party for reply, together with an explanation of their relevance to the investigation. The investigation team may note in its report any refusal by the investigated State Party to permit interviews or to allow questions to be answered and any explanations given.

24. Interviews shall be conducted in such a way as to avoid unduly hindering the work of the facility. The investigation team shall give advance notice of interview requests.]

Visual observation

[25. The investigation team shall have the right to observe visually and investigate any part of the investigation site relevant to its investigation mandate. The items to be so observed shall be chosen by the investigation team.

26. If direct visual observation is not possible because of national security, commercial proprietary or health and safety considerations, the investigated State Party shall provide other means to demonstrate that the area and objects concerned are not used for purposes related to the possible non-compliance concerns raised in the investigation request. These may include, for example, the use of a video camera, photographs or drawings.]

Identification of key equipment

[27. The investigation team shall have the right to investigate and identify equipment at the investigation site. In identifying key equipment, the investigation team shall make use of, but not be limited to, questions related to agreed lists of equipment [or to other agreed criteria for determining the relevance of equipment to strengthening confidence in compliance].

28. The investigation team may also note the size and quantity of equipment on the site, or the absence of any equipment, and compare this with information provided in facility declarations where appropriate.]

Sampling and identification

[29. The investigation team shall have the right to request samples and test these for the presence of specific pathogens or toxins in order to address a specific non-compliance concern.

30. Sampling shall only be used where there is other evidence acquired during the investigation or otherwise available to the investigation team which suggests that sampling might provide significant information. Where possible, specific tests shall be used to focus on specific agents, strains or genes. The intention to conduct such tests shall where possible be included in the investigation mandate.

31. The investigated State Party shall, in accordance with the principles of managed access, have the right to take measures to protect national security and confidential proprietary information such as requiring the use of specific tests or on-site analysis or, if necessary, to refuse a sample. In the latter case the investigated State Party shall be under the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate that the requested sample concerned is unrelated to the non-compliance activities specified in the investigation request.

32. Representatives of the investigated State Party shall take samples at the request of the investigation team and in their presence. If so agreed, the investigation team may take samples itself. Where possible, samples shall be analysed on-site. The investigated State Party shall receive duplicate samples, for its own analysis. The investigation team may test samples using any methods specifically designed or approved for use in such investigations, and brought to the

facility by the investigators. At the request of the investigation team, the investigated State Party shall to the extent possible provide assistance for the analysis of samples on-site, using locally available resources. Should it be negotiated that the investigated State Party itself performs analyses, the investigating team may request that this be done in the presence of investigators.

33. If it deems on-site analysis impossible, the investigation team shall have the right to request the removal of samples for analysis in designated laboratories. If the removal of samples is agreed, the investigated State Party shall have the right to accompany the sample and observe any analysis and its subsequent destruction.

34. An investigated State Party shall have the right to offer a reliable sample at any time in order to help resolve a non-compliance concern or any other ambiguity which may arise in the course of the investigation. If it is agreed that such a sample may be removed from the site for analysis in a designated laboratory, a representative from the investigated State Party shall have the right to accompany the sample and observe any analysis and its subsequent destruction.

35. Any sampling and analysis shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize disruption to the normal work of the facility and any consequent loss of production.]

Communications

36. The members of the investigation team shall have the right at all times during the investigation to communicate with each other and with the Technical Secretariat. For this purpose they may use their own duly approved and certified equipment with the consent of the investigated State Party, to the extent that the investigated State Party does not provide them with access to other telecommunications.

[Observer

37. In accordance with Article III section F paragraph...., the requesting State Party shall liaise with the Technical Secretariat to coordinate the arrival of the observer at the same point of entry as the investigation team within a reasonable period of the investigation team.

38. The observer shall have the right throughout the period of investigation to be in communication with the embassy of the requesting State Party located in the investigated State Party, or in the case of absence of an embassy, with the requesting State Party itself. The investigated State Party shall provide means of communication to the observer.

39. The observer shall have the right to arrive at [the alternative or final perimeter of] the investigation site, wherever the investigation team arrives first, and to have access to the investigation site as granted by the investigated State Party.

40. The observer shall have the right to make recommendations to the investigation team, which the team shall take into account to the extent it deems appropriate.

41. Throughout the investigation, the investigation team shall keep the observer informed about the conduct of the investigation and the findings.

42. Throughout the investigation, the investigated State Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities necessary for the observer similar to those enjoyed by the investigation team as described in paragraph.... All costs in connection with the stay of the observer on the territory of the investigated State Party, shall be borne by the requesting State Party.]

(E) POST INVESTIGATION [ACTIVITIES] [PROCEDURES]

[Preliminary findings and evaluation] [Initial report]

Departure

Final Report

[Further clarification]

**[[IV. INVESTIGATIONS WHERE THERE IS A CONCERN THAT
A TRANSFER HAS TAKEN PLACE IN VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE III OF THE CONVENTION]]**

- (A) INVESTIGATION REQUEST**
- (B) PRE-INVESTIGATION [PROCEDURES] [ACTIVITIES]**
- (C) CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATION**
- (D) POST INVESTIGATION [ACTIVITIES] [PROCEDURES]]**

E. CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE HANDLING OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

(A) THE NEED-TO-KNOW PRINCIPLE

1. [The Organization] shall require only the minimum amount of information and data necessary for the timely and efficient carrying out of its responsibilities under [this Protocol] and shall avoid any access to [confidential] information and data not related to the aims of this Protocol. [The Organization] shall develop agreements and regulations to implement the provisions of this Protocol and shall specify as precisely as possible the information to which [the Organization] shall be given access by a State Party. Confidential information shall only be disseminated within the Organization in accordance with paragraph 5.

(B) THE CONFIDENTIALITY REGIME

2. In order to establish the regime governing the handling of confidential information pursuant to Article IV (hereinafter referred to as the Confidentiality Regime), an appropriate unit of [the Secretariat] (hereinafter referred to as the Confidentiality Unit) [shall][may] be charged with overall supervision of the administration of confidentiality provisions.

3. [As the objective of the Confidentiality Regime is the protection of the rights of the States Parties providing the information,] the regime shall be considered and approved by [the Conference of the States Parties]. The approval of the regime by [the Conference] shall be mandatory prior to initial processing, further handling and authorized distribution of the information and data the States Parties have passed on to [the Organization] in confidence ¹¹¹ ¹¹²

4. Subsequently, the [Director-General] shall report [annually] to [the Conference] [the Executive Council] on the implementation of the regime governing the handling of confidential information by [the Secretariat].

111. This provision is without prejudice to further discussion on the availability to States Parties of initial and annual declarations made under Article III.

112. "[The Organization] shall not process, handle or distribute information or data supplied to it in confidence by States Parties until the regime has been approved by [the Conference]" is a possible alternative formulation for the sentence

(C) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

5. The [Director-General] [head of the Confidentiality Unit] or persons to whom such authority was delegated shall have the authority to classify information and data [submitted by States Parties] [information generated by the Organization in the implementation of its duties] according to a classification system [evaluated by States Parties] [which is to be introduced by the [head of the Confidentiality Unit]] [unless such information and data have been already classified by the States Parties]. The classification system shall provide for clear criteria ensuring the inclusion of information into appropriate categories of confidentiality and shall be considered and approved by [the Conference].

6. [All data and documents obtained by [the Secretariat] shall be evaluated by the Confidentiality Unit in order to establish whether they contain confidential information. If confidential information is contained, the Confidentiality Unit shall classify this information according to the classification system [provided that the State Party of which the information was obtained has not already classified that information].]

[(D) CRITERIA FOR CONFIDENTIALITY

7. Information shall be considered confidential if:

(i) It is designated to be confidential by the State Party from which the information was [received] [, and to which the information refers]; or

(ii) In the judgement of [the Director-General or] [the head of the Confidentiality Unit], its [unauthorized] disclosure could reasonably be expected to [either] cause damage [to the State Party to which it refers or] to the implementation mechanisms of this Protocol.]

(E) OBLIGATIONS FOR HANDLING OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

8. Each access by a staff member of [the Secretariat] to [a physical medium holding] confidential information shall be regulated in accordance with its classification and shall be granted only on a need-to-know basis. [Each access to confidential information of [(level) to be specified] shall be recorded on file when accessing and exiting. This record shall be retained for [(time period) to be specified]].

9. [Wherever possible] [the Secretariat] shall avoid the transmission of [(level) to be specified] confidential information in telephone conversations, by electronic means or fax/telex to or from locations outside of [the Secretariat] [unless it is enciphered (coded) (scrambled)].

10. Each State Party shall protect information which it receives from [the Organization] at the same level of confidentiality established for that information. Upon request, a State Party shall provide details on the handling of information provided to it by [the Organization].

(F) OBLIGATIONS FOR INTENDED RELEASE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

11. No confidential information obtained by [the Secretariat] in connection with the implementation of this Convention shall be published or otherwise released, except under at least one of the following conditions:

(i) The information is summarized in a way that the resulting information is no longer of a confidential nature [with the consent of the State Party concerned];

(ii) All States Parties directly concerned explicitly agree to the publication/release;

[(iii) The information is - in accordance with the provisions set forth in [this Protocol] - required by the States Parties to be assured of the continued compliance with this Convention by other States Parties [. This information shall include declarations made under Article ... of this Protocol.];]

[(iv) [After carefully weighing up,] [in the judgement of the Director-General] the release is necessary to fulfil [the Organization's] obligations under this Protocol.]

[12. [If necessary to fulfil its obligations under this Protocol,][the Secretariat] may grant access to information and data classified as confidential to entities or individuals not staff of [the Secretariat] only on specific approval by [the Director-General] [the head of the Confidentiality Unit]. [The Secretariat] shall notify a State Party [at least 30 days] before any such access is intended.]

(G) HANDLING OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION ON THE PREMISES OF STATES PARTIES

13. [The Secretariat] shall at the request of the States Parties [be prepared to] examine information and data which the States Parties regard as being of particular sensitivity in a special manner. Such information and data would not [in any case] have to be physically transmitted to [the Secretariat], provided that it remained available for ready further examination by [the Secretariat] on premises of the States Parties.

**F. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGE FOR
PEACEFUL PURPOSES AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION**

G. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

I. SURVEILLANCE OF PUBLICATIONS

1. Collection and survey of relevant information on publicly available printed matter and the media with special attention to activities directly related to the BTWC and its Protocol.
2. Collection
 - 2.1 States parties and international organizations (WHO, FAO, IOE, ...) are requested to provide relevant information.
 - 2.2 BTWC organization is to collect relevant information from publicly available sources (paragraph 4).
3. Survey
 - 3.1 Management, categorization and synthesis.
 - 3.2 To be carried out by personnel with specific expertise, relying on information technology.
 - 3.3 Survey will have to be focused (paragraph 5).
4. Sources of information
 - 4.1 Scientific publications.
 - 4.2 Scientific journals.
 - 4.3 Specific statistical data.
 - 4.4 Relevant press data bases.
 - 4.5 Scientific data bases.
 - 4.6 Records and reports of scientific meetings and congresses.
 - 4.7 Information on vaccine-programmes, other programmes and research concerning pathogenic organisms and toxins directed under high-containment conditions.
 - 4.8 Information on new market products related to rapid identification of toxins and microbial pathogens including WHO risk groups III and IV.

5. Information to be collected and surveyed
 - 5.1 Key identifiers (triggers) should be used.
 - 5.1.1 Same triggers as for declarations (compliance measures).
 - 5.1.2 Possibility of combining triggers.
 - 5.1.3 Other possible triggers (source of information linked to triggers).
6. Activities to be covered
 - 6.1 Unclassification of basic research and applied research in biosciences; biological research publication policy; scientific publications (1991 CBM "C" approach).
 - 6.2 All compliance relevant activities (as defined by triggers).
7. Modalities
 - 7.1 States Parties and international organizations are requested to provide information on an annual basis.
 - 7.2 Organization is to collect and survey information continuously.
 - 7.3 Information is to be provided:
 - 7.3.1 In one of the UN official languages.
 - 7.3.2 With a short resume of publications.
 - 7.3.3 Preferably in computerized format (floppy disk).
 - 7.4 Information collected can be accessed by States Parties.

II. SURVEILLANCE OF LEGISLATION

1. Collection and survey of information with regard to legislation that is directly related to the BTWC and its Protocol. (Existence or absence of legislation may not be an indication of compliance or non-compliance).
2. Collection
 - 2.1 States Parties are requested to provide relevant information.
 - 2.2 BTWC organization is to collect, as appropriate, relevant information
3. Survey
 - 3.1 Management, categorization and synthesis.
 - 3.2 To be carried out by personnel with specific expertise, relying on information technology.
 - 3.3 Survey will have to be focused.
4. Sources of information
 - 4.1 Legislation directly related to the BTWC and its Protocol.
 - 4.1.1 Enabling legislation with regard to the BTWC and its Protocol.
 - 4.2 Regulations related to activities / facilities / programmes / agents covered by the BTWC and its Protocol.
 - 4.3 Other measures related to activities / facilities / programmes / agents covered by the BTWC and its Protocol.
 - 4.4 Legislative, regulatory and relevant statistical data bases
5. Information to be collected and surveyed
 - 5.1 Besides legislation directly related to BTWC and Protocol (enabling legislation) key identifiers (triggers) should be used.
 - 5.1.1 Same triggers as for declarations (compliance measures)
 - 5.1.2 Possibility of combining triggers.
 - 5.1.3 Other possible triggers.

6. Activities to be covered

- 6.1 Development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I; export of micro-organisms and toxins; imports of micro-organisms and toxins (1991 CBM, "E" approach).
- 6.2 All activities covered by BTWC and Protocol and activities related to triggers.

7. Modalities

- 7.1 States Parties are requested to provide baseline information.
- 7.2 States Parties are requested to provide information on an annual basis about changes.
- 7.3 Organization is to collect and survey information continuously.
- 7.4 Information to be provided.
 - 7.4.1 Copies of legislation in original languages if possible with unofficial translation in one of UN official languages.
 - 7.4.2 A short resume in one of the UN official languages.
 - 7.4.3 Preferably in computerized format (floppy disk).
- 7.5 Information can be used to provide, as appropriate, "model" legislation.
- 7.6 Information can be accessed by States Parties.

III. DATA ON TRANSFERS AND TRANSFER REQUESTS AND ON PRODUCTION

As this measure is under consideration as a mandatory one in the Compliance Measures FOC discussions, it should be further studied in the light of the outcome of those discussions.

1. Collection and survey of national export and import data (e.g. government and industrial production statistics, culture collection records and other relevant information going beyond declaration requirements and to be provided voluntarily by States Parties).

2. Collection

- 2.1 States Parties are requested to provide relevant information.
- 2.2 BTWC organization is to collect relevant information from publicly available sources.
- 2.3 Confidentiality concerns need to be considered.

3. Survey

- 3.1 Management, categorization and synthesis.
- 3.2 To be carried out by personnel with specific expertise, relying on information technology.
- 3.3 Survey will have to be focused.

4. Sources of information

- 4.1 Trade publications.
- 4.2 Specific statistical data.
- 4.3 Regulations and other measures (including control).

5. Information to be collected and surveyed

5.1 Key identifiers (triggers) should be used.

- 5.1.1 Same triggers as for transfer and production declarations.
- 5.1.2 Other possible triggers (e.g. for data collection under paragraph 2.2).

5.2 Information on

- 5.2.1 Suppliers and recipients.
- 5.2.2 Agents.
- 5.2.3 Equipment.

6. Modalities

- 6.1 States Parties are requested to provide information on an annual basis (collection of national data might require national regulation).
- 6.2 Organization is to collect and survey information continuously.
- 6.3 Information is to be provided
 - 6.3.1 In one of the UN official languages.
 - 6.3.2 In accordance with agreed format.
 - 6.3.3 Preferably in computerized format (floppy disk).

IV. MULTILATERAL INFORMATION SHARING

1. Sharing of information including electronic networking on issues relating to materials and activities of potential relevance to and in harmony with the BTWC and the legally binding measure.
2. Sharing of information
 - 2.1 Between States Parties (with the assistance of the BTWC organization).
 - 2.2 Between the organization and international organizations.
 - 2.3 The organization is to collect information from non-governmental organizations and programmes / initiatives.
3. Areas which could be covered
 - 3.1 Confidence building measures reports (as agreed in 1991).
 - 3.1.1 Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories.
 - 3.1.2 Exchange of information on national biological defence research and development programmes.
 - 3.1.3 Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins.
 - 3.1.4 Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge.
 - 3.1.5 Active promotion of contacts.
 - 3.1.6 Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures.
 - 3.1.7 Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes.
 - 3.1.8 Declaration of vaccine production facilities.
 - 3.2 Consultation in completing CBM requirements and reporting obligations.

3.3 Surveillance of disease outbreaks and unusual disease outbreak reports.

3.3.1 Surveillance of human disease outbreak and unusual disease outbreak reports.

- 3.3.1.1 WHO Weekly Epidemiological Record (on World Wide Web), containing information on disease events obtained through the implementation of the International Health Regulations, from the WHO communicable disease and antimicrobial resistance monitoring systems, and from country experiences in disease surveillance and control.**
- 3.3.1.2 WHO EMC's (Division of Emerging and other Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Control) electronic distribution system providing regular updates on epidemics of international importance, communicable disease and global surveillance (on World Wide Web).**

3.3.2 Surveillance of animal disease outbreak reports.

- 3.3.2.1 IOE Disease Information, a weekly collection of reports of animal diseases for urgent dispatch (on World Wide Web).**
- 3.3.2.2 IOE Bulletin, a monthly publication which describes the course of the most contagious animal diseases.**
- 3.3.2.3 IOE World Animal Health, an annual review of worldwide status regarding IOE List A and B diseases.**
- 3.3.2.4 FAO/IOE/WHO Animal Health Yearbook containing the data received in the joint FAO/IOE/WHO questionnaires.**
- 3.3.2.5 IOE HandiSTATUS, an electronic information program containing data related to IOE and FAO/IOE/WHO questionnaires**

3.3.3 Surveillance of plant disease outbreak reports.

- 3.3.3.1 Joint FAO/IOE/WHO questionnaire sent out by FAO.**

3.4 Information on pharmaceutical and vaccine production, good manufacturing practices, biosafety capabilities and procedures.

3.4.1 ICGEB net. Information, clearing house mechanism on biotechnology, genetic engineering and biosafety.

3.4.2 BINAS (Biosafety Information Network Advisory System developed in conjunction with UNIDO and ICGEB).

3.5 Information concerning research and exchange programmes covering areas related to the BTWC and the Protocol.

3.6 Information related to obligations under the BTWC, e.g. information that may be related to the production, development, stockpiling or means of delivery of pathogens and toxins for hostile purposes.

4. Possible forms of information sharing

4.1 Between States Parties (organization as "hub") and between States Parties and international organizations (WHO, FAO, IOE, ICGEB, UNIDO, etc)

4.1.1 Creation of a computer network to integrate through INTERNET connectivity databases covered in paragraph 3. (via secure World Wide Web page access)

4.1.2 INTERNET connectivity and video conferencing connectivity/network to support information sharing (vaccines, GMP, biosafety, etc).

4.1.3 "Virtual" attendance at scientific conferences. Consultation and training in relevant areas.

4.2 Between the organization and non-governmental organizations and programmes / initiatives.

4.2.1 INTERNET connectivity with PROMED, NEED, OUTBREAK, MEDSCAPE, on relevant disease outbreaks.

4.2.2 INTERNET connectivity with national and international databases of relevance for the BTWC and the Protocol (CDC Reports, MEDLINE, GENE BANK, etc.).

- 4.3 Possible contribution from international organizations (WHO, etc.).
 - 4.3.1 Communication of information technically validated by staff in the field as part of a global alert system both on general and protected basis.
 - 4.3.2 Provision of technical expertise through WHO's network of Collaborating Centres for the investigation of disease outbreaks and the confirmation of diagnosis.
 - 4.3.3 Liaison with health authorities in developing countries through WHO staff and Collaborating Centres.
 - 4.3.4 Liaison with military communicable disease surveillance and laboratory facilities.
 - 4.3.5 Provision of information on national vaccination practices and coverage.
 - 4.3.6 Guidelines on containment of specific pathogens in public health and laboratory settings.
 - 4.3.7 Providing a focal point for global data and information exchange.
 - 4.3.8 Revision of the International Health Regulations to provide a common policy for strengthening surveillance and reporting.

V. EXCHANGE VISITS (INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND OFF-SITE VISITS)

1. Visits of experts arranged for scientific purposes by a State Party to comparable facilities (for off-site visits: to facilities of potential relevance for the BTWC and the Protocol) of another State Party.

2. Visits

2.1 Visits would be under bilateral and/or multilateral agreement.

2.2 On a voluntary and/or reciprocal basis.

2.3 Visits should be in harmony with the provisions of the BTWC and the Protocol

3. Experts will have expertise in areas relevant for the BTWC and the Protocol (illustrative list)

3.1 Administrators with expertise in science administration and related matters

3.2 Agriculture.

3.3 Bacteriology.

3.4 Biochemistry.

3.5 Biological defence experts.

3.6 Biosafety.

3.7 Biotechnology.

3.8 Engineers of fermentation technology, equipment, buildings, etc .

3.9 Entomology.

3.10 Epidemiology.

3.11 Immunology.

3.12 Medicine.

3.13 Pharmaceutical sciences (antibiotics and other ethiotropic drugs)

3.14 Quality control experts.

3.15 Toxicology.

3.16 Veterinary science.

3.17 Virology.

4. Scope

- 4.1 Bilateral/multilateral exchanges (for international arrangements: long-term scientific exchanges) made in selected programme areas where common interest exists between countries.
- 4.2 Bilateral/multilateral exchanges (for international arrangements: long-term scientific exchanges) covering all areas directly related to the BTWC and the Protocol.
- 4.3 Bilateral/multilateral long-term scientific exchanges covering all areas of potential relevance for the BTWC and the Protocol (not restricted to declared facilities).

5. Modalities

- 5.1 Could be negotiated through bilateral and/or multilateral agreements.
- 5.2 For the selection and/or appointment of experts, help may be sought from specialized UN agencies (WHO, FAO, IOE, UNDP, etc.) and international organizations (ICGEB).
- 5.3 Arranged with mutual agreement on the
 - 5.3.1 Areas of interest.
 - 5.3.2 Selection of personnel.
 - 5.3.3 Length of the scientific exchange.
 - 5.3.4 Costs.

VI. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING VISITS

1. A coordinated set of visits with voluntary participation to promote confidence between States Parties, as well as in a future BTWC Organization.
2. Advantages of confidence building visits
 - 2.1 Regular contact could help developing confidence among States Parties to the BTWC.
 - 2.2 Such visits might help States Parties to demonstrate transparency in matters related to the BTWC.
 - 2.3 Confidence building visits could be means of establishing open communication channels between similar institutions in different countries and could contribute to create the climate for the interchange of information and technology. As such, these visits could also be a further step towards the implementation of Article X of the Convention.
 - 2.4 The contacts established between international experts could assist with the interchange of information and establish networks of expertise which will be beneficial to all States Parties participating.
 - 2.5 Confidence building visits would not be intrusive.
3. Visits
 - 3.1 Visits could be coordinated through bilateral and/or multilateral arrangements
 - 3.2 Participation in the visits should be voluntary.
4. Participation
 - 4.1 The persons participating in the visits (confidence building visit teams) could be nominated from the States Parties who are participating in the confidence building measures.
 - 4.2 States Parties participating in the confidence building visits could annually update their list of experts who are available for participation in confidence building visit teams.
 - 4.3 Experts would need to be available for periods of no longer than 2 to 3 weeks per year.

5. Potential Scope

5.1 Each participating State Party could on a voluntary basis make available a list of facilities which the confidence building visit team could visit, including

5.1.1 Facilities which are to be declared in terms of other measures developed to strengthen the BTWC.

5.1.2 Facilities not to be declared (commercial, teaching and research facilities).

5.2 Each participating State Party could on a voluntary basis include additional facilities in the list of facilities which the confidence building visit teams could visit.

5.3 Visit at each facility might include

5.3.1 Review of declared, planned and other activities.

5.3.2 Visual overview of current activities.

5.3.3 Discussion of any anomalies.

5.3.4 Discussion of latest trends in safety, containment, quality control, etc. as relevant.

5.3.5 Scientific exchanges.

6. Potential Modalities

The potential modalities could be arranged on a bilateral and/or multilateral basis. Such modalities could include

6.1 Measures to protect commercial and other information.

6.2 Frequency and duration of visits.

6.3 Adequate notification of visits.

6.4 As appropriate, cooperation with a future organization.

6.5 The funding of visits and the arrangements thereof.

[¹¹³(A) PURPOSE

1. The Technical Secretariat of the Organization shall coordinate a system of voluntary confidence building visits between State Parties with the aim to promote confidence between States Parties.
2. Confidence building visits shall be arranged through bilateral agreements between State Parties or between State Parties and the Organization.
3. A State Party may initiate a confidence building visit to obtain assistance from the Technical Secretariat in specific areas related to the Convention. These areas may include *inter alia*, fulfilment of declaration obligations, biosafety standards and good laboratory or manufacturing practices.
4. Participation by State Parties in confidence building visits shall be voluntary.

(B) INITIATION

5. The Technical Secretariat may request a State Party to conduct a Confidence building visit at a facility on the territory or under the jurisdiction of the State Party.
6. Any State Party may invite the Technical Secretariat and or other State Parties to conduct a confidence building visit at a facility on its territory or under its jurisdiction.
7. The Technical Secretariat or another requesting State Party shall arrange the details of the visit with the visiting State Party(ies) before dispatching the visiting team.
8. The Technical Secretariat shall notify all other State Parties of the visit
9. The duration of each confidence building visit shall be subject to agreement between participating State Parties and/or the Technical Secretariat.
10. There shall be no more than [2] confidence building visits per annum per participating State Party.
11. Each participating State Party shall, on a voluntary basis, make available to the Technical Secretariat a list of facilities which may be subjected to confidence building visits. These facilities shall include:

113. It was proposed to include this element in Article VIII

(i) Facilities which are to be declared in terms Article III of this Protocol;

(ii) Facilities which are not to be declared in terms of Article III, including commercial, teaching and research facilities.

12. Each participating State Party may on a voluntary basis include additional facilities in its list of facilities which may be subjected to confidence building visits.

(C) PRE-VISIT ACTIVITIES

Visit mandate

13. The Director-General shall issue a visit mandate for the visit. The visit mandate shall be compiled with the co-operation of the Visited State Party(ies).

14. The leader of the visiting team will make available the mandate to the Visited State Party upon arrival at the point of entry.

Appointment of the visiting team

15. State Parties participating in confidence building visit system may nominate experts who could be available for participation in non-permanent confidence building visit teams. States Parties may annually update their list of experts.

16. The Director-General shall determine the size of a confidence building visiting team visiting a participating State Party taking into account the circumstances of the particular visit. The size of the visiting team shall be kept to a minimum necessary for the proper fulfilment of its mandate. No national of the State Party subject to a confidence building visit shall be a member of the visiting team.

17. Nominated experts from participating State Parties shall not be utilised for longer than 3 weeks per annum.

18. The costs for a confidence building visit shall be borne by all parties involved in such visit.

Briefing

19. Upon arrival at the facility to be visited and before the commencement of the visit, the visiting team shall be briefed by a facility representative on the facility and the activities carried out there.

20. When the visit takes place on request of the visited State Party, the visiting team shall also be briefed by a representative of the visited State Party on the details of the request and the support required.

21. After the briefings the visiting team and representatives of the visited State Party and facility shall prepare a visit plan.

Conduct of visits

22. Representatives of the Visited State Party and of the facility shall accompany the Visit Team throughout the duration of the visit to the facility.

23. The visit shall be carried out according to the Visit Plan and in the least intrusive manner possible. The Visited State Party shall cooperate with the Visit Team in the achievement of the objectives of the mandate.

24. The Visit Team shall collect only that information necessary to carry out its mandate.

25. The duration of the visit shall be no more than [...] days unless extended by agreement of the Visit Team and the Visited State Party.

26. Visits may include *inter alia* the following activities in accordance with the agreed visit mandate :

- (i) Review of declared, planned and other activities;
- (ii) Visual overview of current activities;
- (iii) Discussion of any anomalies;
- (iv) Discussion of latest trends in safety, containment, quality control, etc. as relevant;
- (v) Scientific exchanges;
- (vi) Any support activities as required by the visited State Party.

Managed access

27. All the rules concerning managed access described in this Protocol shall apply to confidence building visits.

Reporting

28. A joint report by both participating State Parties and/or the Technical Secretariat shall be submitted to the Director-General and shall be made available to all States Parties.
29. The report shall summarize the general activities undertaken during the visit and the factual findings of the Visit Team.
30. The report may make recommendations as appropriate and in cooperation with the facility representatives, in such areas as the fulfilment of declaration obligations, bio-safety standards, and good laboratory or manufacturing practices.]

[H. THE [TECHNICAL] SECRETARIAT

(A) STRUCTURE

The Director-General

1. The Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference upon the recommendation of [the Executive Council] for a term of four years, renewable for only one further term.

[Scientific Support Centre

Permanent staff

2. The Scientific Support Centre shall consist of a small permanent staff component which may be adjusted by the Director-General upon approval by the Executive Council, depending on the demands and workload which may develop with time. Staff numbers shall be kept to the minimum, provided that the required skills are provided and that continuity is maintained. The Director-General may redefine the posts and skills which are necessary to perform the functions of the SSC.
3. The Head of the SSC shall be appointed by the Director-General and shall be scientifically well qualified with sufficient experience to manage the Centre in a cost effective manner. The Head of the SSC shall be responsible for selection and management of staff and to make presentations to international and national bodies. [The head of the SSC shall liaise with other international organizations such as the WHO, FAO, OAE, and establish links to create an international epidemiological network.] The Head of the SSC shall report to the [Director-General][Organization].
4. The permanent staff component shall comprise of scientists and technical support staff nominated by States Parties and appointed by the Director-General with knowledge of and experience in, *inter alia*, the following disciplines :

Scientists

- (a) Medical and veterinary microbiology, pathology and toxicology;
- (b) Medical and veterinary infectious diseases;
- (c) Medical and veterinary epidemiology;
- (d) Plant virology, pathology, entomology, phytobacteriology;
- (e) Biological weapons defence, weapons systems and munitions;

- (f) Bio-production technology;
- (g) Microbial genetics and DNA identification techniques.

Technical support staff

- (a) Microbiology: sampling, isolation, identification;
- (b) Clinical pathology;
- (c) Sample preparation and preservation (biohazard techniques);
- (d) Electrophoretic techniques;
- (e) Data storage & analysis;
- (f) Cartographic analysis;
- (g) Computer and other communications systems;
- (h) Laboratory management and documentation;
- (i) Immunological techniques.

[Part time staff

5. The part time staff component of the SSC shall consist of a panel of experts nominated by States Parties from which investigators and investigation assistants shall be selected in accordance with the provisions and procedures set out in Article III and Annex D [and paragraph 47 of Article IX].

6. State Parties may nominate to the Director-General, suitably qualified and experienced experts in, *inter alia*, the following fields which would be made available to serve on the panel of experts on a part time basis:

- (a) Medical and veterinary infectious diseases;
- (b) Medical and veterinary epidemiology, microbiology, virology, pathology, toxicology, toxinology and immunology;
- (c) Plant microbiology, virology, pathology, phytobacteriology and mycology;
- (d) Invertebrate biosystematics;
- (e) Biological weapons defence, weapons systems and munitions;
- (f) Aerobiology;
- (g) Interpreters;
- (h) Advisors on cultural background of the area to be investigated.]

Laboratories

7. A system of support laboratories, including organizational, local and accredited laboratories shall provide the necessary laboratory functions in support of the activities of [the Organization]:

[Organization Laboratory

8. A small laboratory, as part of the Scientific Support Centre, shall be established and maintained by the Organization and shall be capable of performing basic laboratory functions.
9. The laboratory staff shall be drawn from the permanent staff component of the SSC and shall consist of scientist representing the essential medical, veterinary and botanical fields supported by a small staff of experienced, technologists in these fields.
10. The laboratory shall be adequately equipped to conduct its work. A list of laboratory equipment is set out in Appendix [...].]

[Field laboratory

11. The Scientific Support Centre shall maintain equipment to establish a basic field laboratory that may be used during an investigation in the field, to do necessary basic analyses and testing on site in order to support the investigating team in its work.
12. The field laboratory shall be staffed by personnel from the SSC.
13. The field laboratory shall be adequately equipped with the necessary mobile equipment for use during investigations. A list of mobile laboratory equipment is set out in Appendix [...].]

Local laboratories

14. During an investigation, maximum use shall be made of local laboratories to perform, where possible, the necessary analyses and testing.

Accredited laboratories

15. A number of specialised laboratories within States Parties covering all the necessary laboratory functions (including BL4 facilities) shall be accredited to the Technical Secretariat according to procedures set out in [paragraph ...][Annex ...][Appendix ..]. These laboratories shall conduct all specialised functions which may not be regularly available to the Technical Secretariat. These laboratories may also be utilised as reference laboratories for the Technical Secretariat.]

Budget and Administration

[...]

[(B) FUNCTIONS¹¹⁴

Director-General

16. The Director-General shall be responsible to the Conference and [the Executive Council] for the appointment of the staff and for the organization and functioning of the [Technical] Secretariat.

[17. The Director-General shall be responsible for the organization and functioning of the Scientific Advisory Board referred to in paragraph The Director-General shall, in consultation with States Parties, appoint members of the Scientific Advisory Board, who shall serve in their individual capacity. The members of the Board shall be appointed on the basis of the expertise in the particular scientific fields relevant to the implementation of this Convention [and equitable geographical distribution]. The Director-General may also, as appropriate, in consultation with members of the Board, establish temporary working groups of scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific issues. In regard to the above, States Parties may submit lists of experts to the Director-General.]

Scientific Support Centre

18. The functions of the [Technical] Secretariat with regard to [verification of] compliance with the Convention and this Protocol [as performed by the Scientific Support Centre] shall, in accordance with Article III and the Annexes, include, *inter alia*:

19. **Routine and ongoing functions**

(a) Receiving and processing of declarations submitted by the States Parties to the Organization in accordance with the provisions of Article III, Part D;

(b) Receiving, collecting, processing, analysing and storing data and all relevant information relating to the appearance of unusual pathologies or epidemics supplied by States Parties and existing international organizations, such as the WHO, FAO, OIE and OPCW;

(c) Establishing on the basis of information supplied, epidemiological data bases for various geographical zones;

114. This section has to be discussed in the light of the outcome of further work on other parts of this Protocol.

(d) Supplying, at the request of the Organization or any State Party, any relevant information drawn up on the basis of collected and processed data, *inter alia*, to help distinguish pathologies and epidemics deemed to have a natural cause from pathologies and epidemics which might be the result of a violation or attempted violation of the BTWC;

(e) Assisting [the Executive Council] in facilitating consultation and clarification among States Parties;

(f) Provide training and guidance for investigators;

(g) Evaluation for accreditation of specialist laboratories or other research facilities;

(h) Managing the Organizational Laboratory including preparation and preservation of samples and reference materials and maintaining the equipment for use in field a laboratory,

(i) Assisting the States Parties through their National Authorities on other issues of [verification under] [implementation of] this Protocol;

(j) Negotiating agreements or arrangements with States Parties, other States and international organizations and concluding, subject to prior approval by [the Executive Council], any such agreements or arrangements relating to [verification] activities with States Parties or other States;

(k) [Develop and maintain, subject to approval by [the Executive Council], operational manuals to guide the operation of the various components of the [verification] [compliance] regime, in accordance with Article III and the Annexes. These Manuals shall not constitute integral parts of this Protocol or the Annexes and may be changed by the [Technical] Secretariat subject to approval by [the Executive Council]. The [Technical] Secretariat shall promptly inform the States Parties of any changes in the Operational Manuals.]

20. Visits and Investigations

(a) Receiving and processing requests for [investigations to address a non-compliance concern][field and facility investigations][challenge inspections];

(b) Making a technical evaluation of information supplied with a request for an investigation of a non-compliance concern and prepare a report to the Director-General for submission to the Executive Council;

- (c) Initiate and perform investigations of non-compliance concern in accordance with Article III and Annex D;
- (d) Assemble and co-ordinate investigation teams in accordance with Article III and Annex D;
- (e) Provide guidance and support for investigation teams;
- (f) Collect samples of materials which may have a bearing on alleged non-compliance with the BTWC;
- (g) Preparation, storage and analysis of samples collected during an investigation;
- (h) Analyze samples or arrange for analyses to be carried out in accredited facilities;
- (i) [Conducting [[Non-Challenge] [Random] Visits] [and] [Clarification Visits] [Request Visits] [Confidence-Building Visits] [Voluntary Visits] in accordance with the provisions of Article III, Part F and of Annex G.]

21. Reporting

- (a) Collate data and prepare evaluations, advice and reports to the Director-General and the Organization;
- (b) Prepare and draft expert report of findings of Investigations of non-compliance concerns;
- (c) Generate reports on [[Non-Challenge] [Random] Visits] [and] [Clarification Visits] [Request Visits] [Confidence-Building Visits] [Voluntary Visits] in accordance with the provisions of Article III, Part F and of Annex G.]

Support Laboratories

22. The functions of laboratories in support of investigations of non-compliance concern shall, *inter alia*, include:

Organization Laboratory functions

23. The Organization Laboratory shall have the following specific functions:

- (a) Prepare and preserve samples and reference materials;
- (b) Acquisition of materials which may have a bearing on alleged cases of non-compliance;
- (c) Preparation and storage of samples collected during an investigation;
- (d) Analyze samples or arrange for such analysis to be carried out in accredited facilities,
- (e) Collate data and prepare evaluations, advice and reports to the Organization,
- (f) Provide and maintain field laboratory facilities for use by investigation teams

General laboratory functions

24. Depending on the nature of the investigation, organizational, field, local and accredited laboratories used in support of such investigation shall, *inter alia*, be capable of performing the following functions:

(a) **Microbiology**

- Bioassay (culture, identification and testing) of live bacteria, protozoa, fungi and viruses;
- Molecular biological and immunological assay to determine the specific identity of a micro-organism or toxin;
- Special capabilities may be necessary to investigate aerosol samples, to detect and identify pathogens in water, soil and plant samples; and to examine possible delivery devices (weapons) and analyze samples from such devices.

(b) **Medical and related functions**

- Diagnostic functions such as haematology, biochemistry, immunology and microbiology with access to laboratory animals to enable detection and identification of pathogens from body samples in order to make or confirm the diagnosis of the disease under investigation. Bacteria, viruses, fungi and toxins must be detected and identified;

- Anatomical/forensic pathology to conduct post mortem examinations and histology to analyze histological samples in order to make or confirm a diagnosis.

(c) Genetic analysis

- Genetic analysis to investigate the possibility of genetic modification of the suspect organism, or to detect a specific organism in a mixed background.

(d) Biochemistry

- Specialized molecular tests, electron microscopy, toxicology and analytical chemistry.

(e) Biohazard facilities capable of working with highly dangerous pathogens

- Handling highly dangerous and exotic organisms such as haemorrhagic fever viruses i.e. BL4 (as defined by WHO).

(f) Veterinary

- The same or similar capabilities as for medical functions (b).

(g) Botanical

- Diagnostic laboratories with the capability to diagnose pathogenic plant viruses, viroids, phytoplasmas, fungi and bacteria by serological, molecular, electron microscopy and biological assays, including, *inter alia*, host pathogen interactions, indexing and transfer to indicator plants by mechanical grafting and insect vectors. These tests are based on the living pathogens and necessitates the availability of suitable quarantine facilities;
- Equipped to determine morphological, histological and biochemical characteristics;
- Biosystematics capability for insects, arachnids, nematodes and fungi is a prime requirement for the identification of possible vectors;
- Capable to conduct laboratory work in the field;
- Collect, preserve and dispatch samples for off-site analysis;
- Basic diagnostic work such as serology, microscopy, microbiological and other diagnostic tests;
- Biohazard sample handling;
- Collecting and preparation of munition samples.]

Scientific and Technological Exchange Functions

25. The functions of the [Technical] Secretariat with regard to scientific and technological exchange and technical cooperation for peaceful purposes shall, in accordance with Article ..., include, *inter alia*:

- (a) Administer the voluntary fund referred to in ...;

[...].

Administrative Functions

26. The functions of the [Technical] Secretariat with respect to administrative matters shall include:

- (a) Preparing and submitting to [the Executive Council] the draft programme and budget of the Organization;

- (b) Preparing and submitting to [the Executive Council] the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Protocol and such other reports as the Conference or [the Executive Council] may request;

- (c) Providing administrative and technical support to the Conference, [the Executive Council] and other subsidiary organs;

- (d) Addressing and receiving communications on behalf of the Organization relating to the implementation of this Protocol;

- (e) Carrying out the administrative responsibilities related to any agreements between the Organization and other international organizations; and

- [(f) Implementing training programmes in order to facilitate the Director-General's responsibilities with regard to paragraph]]

APPENDICES¹¹⁵

115. The draft text in Appendices A - D reproduces without change, the draft text in Appendices A - D of BWC/AD HOC GROUP/35. At this stage, no proposals for changes to the text were proposed. Initial discussions on Declaration Formats made clear that further consideration of the issues involved was necessary. Following these initial discussions, the Friend of the Chair tabled BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.185 to offer a basis for this further work.

APPENDIX A

[INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED IN DECLARATIONS OF [BIOLOGICAL] DEFENCE PROGRAMMES [AGAINST BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS]

1. State the objectives and funding of the programme and summarize the principal research, development, testing, production and evaluation [give a general description of the objectives and main elements of] activities conducted in the programme. Areas to be addressed shall include: prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination and other related research.

2. State:

- The total funding for the programme and its sources [(military, government, private)];
- [- The total number of staff employed, including those contracted for less than six months;
- Details in the following categories:
 - Military: scientists, technicians, engineers, medical, weapons experts, support and administrative;
 - Civilian: scientists, technicians, engineers, medical, support and administrative;
- The discipline of the scientific and engineering staff;
- All [listed] agents they keep and work with;
- Production of and stockpiling of [listed] agents in the programme including amounts of each [listed] agent;
- All [listed] agents on which genetic modification is being done.]

3. Are aspects of this programme conducted under contract with industry, academic institutions, or in other non-defence facilities?

Yes / No

4. If yes, what proportion of the total funds for the programme is expended in these contracted or other facilities?
5. Summarize the objectives and research areas of the programme performed by contractors and in other facilities with the funds identified under paragraph 4.
6. Provide a diagram of the organizational structure of the programme and the reporting relationships (include individual facilities participating in the programme).
7. Provide a declaration in accordance with Annex B for each facility [both governmental and non-governmental, which has a substantial proportion of its resources devoted to the national biological defence research and development programme, within the territory of the reporting State, or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere] [which participates in the biological weapon protection programme and carrying out work on any micro-organisms or toxins, as well as materials imitating their properties].]

APPENDIX B

INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED IN DECLARATIONS OF FACILITIES TAKING PART
IN [BIOLOGICAL] DEFENCE PROGRAMMES [AGAINST BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS]

[In shared facilities, provide the following information for the biological defence research and development portion only.

1. What is the name of the facility?
2. Where is it located (include both address and geographical location)?
3. [Number of rooms and] floor area of laboratory areas by containment level:

BL2 _____ (m²) [_____ rooms]

BL3 _____ (m²) [_____ rooms]

BL4 _____ (m²) [_____ rooms]

or highest level of containment
if none of the above _____ (m²) [_____ rooms]

Total laboratory floor area _____ (m²)

[Aggregate fermenter capacity on site _____]

4. The organizational structure of each facility.

(i) Total number of personnel _____

(ii) Division of personnel:

Military _____

Civilian _____

(iii) Division of personnel by category:

Scientists _____

Engineers _____

Technicians _____

Administrative and support staff _____

(iv) List the scientific disciplines represented in the scientific/engineering staff.

(v) Are contractor staff working in the facility? If so, provide an approximate number.

(vi) What is (are) the source(s) of funding for the work conducted in the facility, including indication if activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence?

(vii) What are the funding levels for the following programme areas?

Research _____

Development _____

Test and evaluation _____

(viii) Briefly describe the publication policy of the facility.

(ix) Provide a list of publicly-available papers and reports resulting from the work during the previous 12 months. (To include authors, titles and full references.)]

5. Briefly describe the [biological defence work] [the work carried out at the facility as part of the [biological] defence programme [against biological weapons]] including type(s) of micro-organisms¹¹⁶ and/or toxins studied, as well as outdoor studies of biological aerosols [any work with biological aerosols, including open-air test ranges, aerosolisation activities, work with test chambers].

116. Including viruses and prions.

[The initial and subsequent annual declarations¹¹⁷ of facilities participating in the biological weapon protection programme and carrying out work on any micro-organisms or toxins, as well as materials imitating their properties should include the following information:

- Name.
- Location.
- Ownership (government department or company).
- List of biological agents and toxins on which work is being carried out
- Main areas of activity (development of preventive agents and methods, observation, identification; genetic manipulation; aerobiology; toxinology; disinfection and other activities related to the purposes of the Convention.
- The existence of premises with a BL-4 level of biosafety.
- The presence of types of key equipment.]

117. The initial declarations should comply with the agreed format for declarations. Subsequent declarations should contain only necessary refinements of the initial information or an indication that there are "no declarable changes".

APPENDIX C

**INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED IN DECLARATIONS OF PAST
BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN OFFENSIVE AND/OR DEFENSIVE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES**

1. **Date of entry into force of the Convention for the State Party.**
2. **Past offensive biological research and development programmes**
 - **Yes / No**
 - **Period(s) of activities.**
 - **Summary of the research and development activities indicating whether work was performed concerning production, test and evaluation, weaponization, stockpiling of biological agents, the destruction programme of such agents and weapons, and other related research.**
3. **Past defensive biological research and development programmes**
 - **Yes / No**
 - **Period(s) of activities.**
 - **Summary of the research and development activities indicating whether or not work was conducted in the following areas: prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination, and other related research, with location if possible.**

APPENDIX D

[INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED IN DECLARATIONS OF OTHER FACILITIES

1. General Information

- Name of facility.
- Location (postal address).
- Sources of funding (military, government, private).
- A general description of the objectives and main elements of activities such as work in studies of pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination. Other related activities including whether the facility was ever involved in a past or present BW programme, details of any open source publications on the work of the facility.

2. Activities, including

- Work with listed agents.
- Production, stockpiling of and work with listed pathogens or toxins.
- Work on genetic material [derived from listed pathogens].

3. Equipment

- Indicate whether any of the pieces of listed equipment are present on site [and quantity of each].

4. Quantitative data (using, as appropriate, laboratory records)

- Number of rooms, laboratories at BL3/BL4 or equivalent, or highest level of containment.
- Aggregate fermenter capacity on site (the facility to declare which of various ranges is most accurate).
- Total number of staff employed, including those contracted for more than six months.

- Numbers of staff working in the following categories: civilian, military, scientific, technician/engineers, support and administrative staff, contractor staff.

5. Cooperative activity

- Information on any cooperative activities in which the facility is involved e.g. between it and other international organizations.

[For vaccine production facilities:

- List of vaccines produced including average quantities produced the previous year.]

[For facilities producing vaccines and/or anatoxins to protect humans and animals against biological agents and toxins included in the list:

- Name.
- Location.
- Types of vaccines being produced.]

[For facilities with BL4 protected areas:

- List all the agents contained in the area, and production, stockpiling of, work with and genetic modification of agents contained in the area.]

[For facilities that work with listed organisms and have a production capability on-site and other production facilities not necessarily working with listed agents:

- List of products including average quantities produced the previous year]

[For facilities (except for diagnostic facilities) at which work is carried out on biological agents and toxins included in the list:

- Name.
- Location.
- Ownership (government department or company).

- **List of agents and toxins on which work is being carried out.**
- **Main areas of activity (development of preventive agents and methods, observation, identification, genetic manipulation, aerobiology, toxinology).**
- **Disinfection and other activities related to the purposes of the Convention**
- **The existence of premises with a BL4 level of biosafety.**
- **The presence of types of key equipment.]]**

[APPENDIX E

INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED IN DECLARATIONS OF FACILITIES¹¹⁸

Declarations should be annual, and due [...]. The initial declaration for each facility should cover the previous period of [...] years. Subsequent annual declarations may indicate only changes in the information declared.

For the purpose of declaration, the facility is considered to be the functional unit in which the functions triggered for declaration are integrated with other scientific and technical functions essential to the day to day running and the aims and objectives of the unit.

118. This work was presented by the Friend of the Chair for Compliance Measures as an interim step in the design of future declaration formats, in particular addressing whether formats need to differ according to the type of declaration trigger. In the view of the FOC, it may be useful for the present to consider two broad categories of trigger, referred to in earlier work of the Group as stand-alone triggers and combination triggers, because there may be different practical considerations in ensuring that these two categories of trigger achieve an appropriate focus in a facility declaration. This dichotomy is suggested by the FOC as a temporary expedient to aid the work of the Group, with the ultimate objective of declaration format(s) based on a simple, uniform relationship between the trigger and the focus of information required.

Notwithstanding present uncertainties about the definition of the term 'facility' in the context of specific measures, many delegations felt that the declaration of a facility should reflect scientific and technical functions rather than geographic relationships. In the light of this, some felt that formats may have to treat certain *combination* triggers differently from *stand alone* triggers in order to avoid confusion about what information should be required for very large, multi-disciplinary facilities. To stimulate further consideration of this, the following suggests different approaches for these two trigger categories. It is clear that, until triggers are decided on by the Ad Hoc Group, and while such a range of options of *stand alone* and *combination* triggers exist, a simple and unequivocal declaration format cannot be attempted.

Many delegations also felt that more information should be provided in declarations of biodefence facilities than in declarations of other facilities. There was a view that declaration formats for such 'other' facilities should be tailored to reflect the particular trigger especially in respect of equipment declared. To assist further consideration, the following draft formats contain options for equipment questions which the Ad Hoc Group could choose between in deciding on the final format.

It was suggested that any information required on the existence and content of national regulations/guidelines relating to health & safety, including for work involving genetic modification, or relating to good laboratory practice or good manufacturing practice, should be provided as a national declaration by the State Party rather than in the declaration return for a declared facility.

Declared information will be passed to all States Parties to the Protocol. Accordingly, the design of the declaration formats is intended to avoid reference to confidential proprietary information or national security information. [However, procedures need to be developed for handling and protecting such information should the need arise.]

A list of equipment is being developed by the Friend of the Chair on Definitions of terms and objective criteria in the context of declaration formats.

For facilities where *stand alone* triggers apply, complete Part A. In Part A, complete the section on General Information, and when more than one trigger applies return separate copies of the Fields of Activity questions 10-12 for each trigger.

Certain *combination* triggers specify two or more functions in a facility that do not have direct scientific or technical links. When such triggers apply answer the questions in Part B.

For [facilities] [taking part in] [military] [civilian] [national] [biological] defence [facilities taking part in] programme(s) [against biological and toxin weapons], answer the additional questions in Part C.

PART A

GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Name and postal address.
2. Location (longitude, latitude).
3. Scale map of the locality, showing the facility.
4. Owner(s). Specify if Government departments / organizations / agencies, or companies. Indicate any that have defence responsibilities.
5. Operator(s). Specify if Government departments / organizations / agencies, or companies.
6. List sources of funding that are Government departments / organizations / agencies, other than to support the part/full time education of personnel.
7. Staff resources. Numbers of scientific/technical/ medical/veterinary staff and contractors in specified ranges [.../.../...].

Numbers of military staff in specified ranges [0/.../.../...].
8. Are there other essential scientific and technical functions integrated with the triggered function(s) but at a different location? An example may be an animal holding unit.

Yes / No

If Yes, specify: type of function, location and address for each.

9. General description of type of work. For example, specify if: military (oriented) R & D, testing or evaluation / other military / commercial R & D / commercial production / university / other educational / other non-profit.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DETAIL

INFORMATION FOR THE FUNCTIONS OF THE FACILITY THAT ARE DECLARED

Fields of activity

If more than one function at the facility is triggered for declaration, return separate answers to questions 10 and 11 for each function

10. Trigger: Specify which trigger applies.

11. Is this triggered function associated with work in any of the following areas? Areas may include work that is *inter alia* research, development, testing, evaluation or production, other than purely diagnostic work for example in a medical, veterinary or food hygiene context.

(Answer Yes or No for each)

- Vaccines
- Other prophylaxis or therapy techniques for humans or animals
- Plant inoculants
- Pathogenicity, virulence, infectivity or stability in the environment of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, or resistance to antimicrobial agents
- Toxicity
- Studies involving genetic modification
- Aerobiology
- Detection, identification or diagnostic techniques
- Physical protection techniques
- Decontamination/disinfection techniques
- Insect/pest control techniques for use in agriculture/horticulture
- Production using fermenters
- Production of microbial or other biological agents or toxins other than in fermenters

12. If the declaration was triggered because of work with biological agents or toxins on the list at Annex, specify the agents worked with.

INFORMATION FOR THE FACILITY AS A WHOLE

13. Does the facility as a whole perform any of the above studies other than those already specified in the answers to questions 10-12 above as associated with a trigger function?

Yes / No

If Yes, specify.

14. If vaccines are produced, list them.

15. Does the facility carry out production of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, other than as vaccines?

Yes / No

If Yes, specify the type(s) of product: antibiotic / pesticide / insecticide / plant inoculant / human or animal foodstuff / human or animal food additive / enzyme or enzyme source / fine chemical or fine chemical source / other (specify).

16. Containment areas.

(a) Does the facility have rooms/other enclosures with a maximum level of biological containment for human or animal pathogens, BL4 as specified in the 1993 WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual) or equivalent?

Yes / No

If Yes, specify the floor area in ranges [up to 30 sq.m. / 31-100 sq.m. / over 100 sq.m.].

(b) Does the facility have rooms/other enclosures with a high level of biological containment for human or animal pathogens, BL3 (as specified in the 1993 WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual) or equivalent?

Yes / No

If Yes, specify the floor area in ranges [up to 30 sq.m. / 31-100 sq.m. / over 100 sq.m.].

(c) Does the facility have rooms/other enclosures with a high level of biological containment/quarantine for plants or plant pathogens?

Yes / No

If Yes, specify the floor area in ranges [up to 30 sq.m. / 31-100 sq.m. / over 100 sq.m.].

Equipment

OPTION A

Indicate any of the specified types of equipment that are present in the facility, regardless of whether or not the equipment is operational. For each item, indicate Yes or No, or indicate the range that applies, as appropriate.

OPTION B

Facility equipment information should be provided according to the trigger(s) that applies:

When the trigger ... applies, answer equipment questions only

When the trigger ... applies, answer equipment questions only

When the trigger ... applies, answer equipment questions only etc.

Other indicators of scale of activity

17. Scale of use of tissue culture media.

State volume of tissue culture media used in ranges [0/.../.../...].

18. Scale of use of inoculated eggs for growth of microorganisms.

State number of eggs used in ranges [0/.../.../...].

19. Chemical reactors above 100 litres in capacity.

State aggregate reactor capacities, in ranges [101-1000 litres / over 1000 litres]

[Vaccination requirements

20. Are there any areas which can only be entered by personnel who have been vaccinated?

Yes / No

If yes, are these areas in laboratories / production areas / downstream processing areas / other (specify).]

[International collaboration / co-operation

21. List any projects / activities funded or supported in any way by international organizations.]

PART B¹¹⁹

Certain combination triggers specify two or more functions in a facility that do not have direct scientific or technical links. If such a trigger applies, answer the following questions:

GENERAL INFORMATION

Questions 1-3 in Part A are appropriate.

Questions 4-9 in Part A should be answered but in this case in respect of the functional areas at the facility that correspond to the trigger.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DETAIL

When a facility is declared under a *combination* trigger, separate answers to questions 10 to 12 should be returned for each of the functional areas in the facility that correspond to the trigger:

10-12. As in Part A.

Questions 13-14 in Part A are not appropriate.

Questions 15-21 in Part A should be answered but in this case in respect of the functional areas at the facility that correspond to the trigger.

119. To save paper in the work of the Group, this text of this draft is not provided in full, but differences from the format for single triggers are indicated.

PART C

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR [FACILITIES] [TAKING PART IN] [MILITARY]
[CIVILIAN] [NATIONAL] [BIOLOGICAL] DEFENCE [FACILITIES TAKING PART IN]
PROGRAMME(S) [AGAINST BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS]

1. State the aims and objectives of the [military] [civilian] [national] [biological] defence programme(s) [against biological and toxin weapons] work at the facility.
2. What are the funding levels for the [military] [civilian] [national] [biological] defence programme(s) [against biological and toxin weapons] work at the facility. If (parts of the) programme has shared objectives, for example shared with chemical defence, indicate approximate proportion of the funding that is shared.
3. What is the publication policy for the [military] [civilian] [national] [biological] defence programme(s) [against biological and toxin weapons] work at the facility?
4. Briefly describe the [military] [civilian] [national] [biological] defence programme(s) [against biological and toxin weapons] work at the facility.
5. Indicate on the list of biological agents and toxins at Annex, any agents or toxins worked on at the facility.
6. Does the facility include laboratory activities involved in routine medical / veterinary / phytopathology diagnosis?

Yes / No

7. List of published papers, in scientific/ technical/medical/veterinary journals or in conference proceedings.]

ANNEX II

INDICATIVE PROGRAMME OF WORK FOR THE NINTH SESSION

(5 January to 23 January 1998)

First Week: 5 - 9 January 1998.

	5	6	7	8	9
AM	AHG + ORG/IA	ART.X	INV ANN	ART.X	CM
PM	CM	CM	CM	CONF	INV ANN

Second Week: 12 - 16 January 1998.

	12	13	14	15	16
AM	CM	CM	DEF	ART.X/ NAT	CM/DEF
PM	INV ANN	DEF	DEF/LEG	INV ANN	DEF

Third Week: 19 - 23 January 1998.

	19	20	21	22	23
AM	CM + DEF	DEF	INF CONS	INF CONS	AHG
PM	CONF	ART.X	NAT	AHG/CM	AHG

- AHG - Ad Hoc Group Meetings
- INF CONS - Informal consultations
- CM - Measures to Promote Compliance (FOC)
- INV ANN - Investigations Annex (FOC)
- DEF - Definitions of Terms and Objective Criteria (FOC)
- ART.X - Measures related to Article X (FOC)
- LEG - Legal Issues (FOC)
- ORG/IA - Organization/Implementational Arrangements
- CONF - Confidentiality (FOC)
- NAT - National Implementation and Assistance (FOC)

ANNEX III

LIST OF DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED AT THE EIGHTH SESSION

<u>Document symbol</u>	<u>Title</u>
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.182/ Add.1	Working paper submitted by Cuba - Considerations on a list of biological agents and toxins
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.195/ Rev.1	Working paper submitted by Japan - Proposed language on Privileges and Immunities
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.198.	Working paper submitted by South Africa - Confidence building visits
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.199	Working paper submitted by South Africa - Language for inclusion in Annex D - Facility investigations and field investigations
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.200	Working paper submitted by South Africa - Language for inclusion in Annex D - Field investigations
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.201	Working paper submitted by South Africa - Language for Annex D (Field Investigations) - (E) Post investigation
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.202	Working paper submitted by South Africa - Organization of the technical secretariat
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.203	Working paper submitted by South Africa - Definition for plant quarantine capability
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.204	Working paper submitted by South Africa - For inclusion in Article III of the rolling text
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.205	Working paper submitted by South Africa - Proposed changes to language and insertion of language in Article III of the rolling text

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- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.206 Working paper submitted by South Africa - Language for insertion into the rolling text Article III section F
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.207 Working paper submitted by South Africa - Language for inclusion in Article III
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.208 Working paper submitted by South Africa - Language for inclusion in Annex D of the rolling text
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.209 Working paper submitted by South Africa - For inclusion in Annex D (Field investigations)
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.210 Working paper submitted by South Africa - Language for inclusion in Annex D - Field investigation
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.211 Working paper submitted by South Africa - Language for Annex D - Field investigations
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.212/
Rev.1 Working paper submitted by Japan - Proposed language on Access/Conduct of investigations including measures to guard against abuse
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.213 Working paper submitted by Japan - Proposed language on Designation of investigators and investigation assistants of investigation team
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.214 Working paper submitted by the Friend of the Chair on Compliance Measures
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.215 Working paper submitted by the Friend of the Chair on Compliance Measures - Declaration formats: the relationship between facility and site

- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.216 Working paper submitted by Argentina - A method for assessing the useability of biological agents
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.217 Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation - Investigations of the alleged use of biological weapons
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.218 Working paper submitted by Japan - Proposed language on Article IV Confidentiality Provisions
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.219 Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation - Formats for mandatory declarations
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.220/
Rev.1 and Corr.1 Working paper submitted by the Friend of the Chair on Confidentiality - Article IV Confidentiality Provisions
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.221
and Corr.1 Working paper submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - List of agents and toxins under discussion in the Ad Hoc Group
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.222 Working paper submitted by the Republic of Korea - Measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.223 Working paper submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - The role and importance of auditing in on-site activities
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.224 Working paper submitted by the Friend of the Chair for Legal Issues - Article V - Measures to redress a situation and ensure compliance

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- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.225 Working paper submitted by the Friend of the Chair on National Implementation Measures - Article X - National Implementation Measures
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.226 Working paper submitted by the Friend of the Chair on Assistance - Article VI Assistance and protection against biological and toxin weapons
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.227 Working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran - Declaration on the implementation of Article X of the Convention
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.228 Working paper submitted by the Friend of the Chair on Definitions - Article II
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.229 Working paper submitted by the Friend of the Chair on Definitions - II Lists and criteria (Agents and toxins)
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.230 Working paper submitted by the Friend of the Chair on Definitions - III List of equipment
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.231 Working paper submitted by the Friend of the Chair on Confidentiality - Article IV: Confidentiality Annex
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.232 Working paper submitted by India, Indonesia and Mexico - Measures to strengthen the implementation of Article III of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
- BWC/AD HOC GROUP/L.1 and Adds. 1 to 30 with corrigenda Nos. 1 to 10 Draft Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

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Note by the Secretariat

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Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

BWC/AD HOC GROUP/INF.11

List of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

BWC/AD HOC GROUP/INF.12

List of participants

BWC/AD HOC GROUP/Misc.2

Provisional list of participants
