



Wednesday, 9 June 1982,
at 10.55 a.m.

President: Mr. Ismat KITTANI (Iraq)

AGENDA ITEM 8

General debate (continued)

1. Mr. CASTAÑEDA (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Sir, last September I congratulated you on your assumption of the presidency of the General Assembly, and I should like now to congratulate you once again on the way in which you have been guiding its proceedings.
2. The international community is living through difficult days—days of crisis and despair. Regional conflicts threatening to assume world-wide proportions have proliferated. To the wars being waged in Asia and the Middle East has now been added the one in the South Atlantic. From an economic standpoint, there is no sign of a solution to the desperate situation of the majority of the inhabitants of the earth. The global negotiations, which are so much desired as a way to narrow the gap between rich and poor, have stalled because of the intransigence of certain developed countries.
3. For the second time in four years the General Assembly is meeting to discuss only questions relating to disarmament and international security. On the first occasion the Final Document [*resolution S-10/2*] was adopted by consensus, which many of us believed could be the starting point for a new and different stage in the history of disarmament negotiations. This Document constitutes a solemn pronouncement by the international community proclaiming principles, defining objectives, establishing priorities and strengthening the machinery and procedures for disarmament negotiations. Unfortunately, what seemed to be an augury of better times four years ago has become yet another link in the chain of failed efforts to achieve concrete disarmament measures around the world.
4. Disarmament is an imperative if we are to ensure the survival of mankind. It is an imperative which, like the establishment of a new and more equitable international economic order, is testing mankind's wisdom and, indeed, its own instinct for self-preservation. It is also testing the ability of the United Nations to resolve the key problems of our age.
5. The arms race is completely at variance with economic and social development. Time and time again experts from around the world have shown that one cannot continue to spend astronomical sums on armaments and, at the same time, proceed towards stable and equitable development.
6. As responsible members of the international community, we must do everything we can to ensure that the United Nations becomes the appropriate forum for achieving real disarmament.
7. Over the last four years there has been an accelerated increase in military expenditures and a considerable expansion in nuclear arsenals. Between 1978 and 1981 military spending rose by more than 60 per cent; from \$US 360 billion to approximately \$US 600 billion in real terms. The sale of weaponry is today a gigantic business of more than \$US 120 billion a year. The total of nuclear warheads is today reckoned to be nearly 54,000, of which approximately one third consists of so-called strategic weapons and the remainder of what is usually referred to as tactical weapons. At the same time, new generations of nuclear weapons have been developed, and doctrines have arisen such as that which claims to render credible the illusory possibility of a limited nuclear war, which entails the danger, a very real one, of making the possibility of a world nuclear war that could very well involve the very extinction of the human race not remote but "thinkable".
8. Doubtless it is a set of factors such as those I have just mentioned which rise to the feelings of profound concern and alarm, not to say indignation, which have recently resulted in public protests around the world. The moral repugnance at these weapons is so strong that various non-governmental organizations of considerable prestige have stated that the mere possession, and not just the use, of nuclear weapons should be considered a crime against humanity. It is these feelings which this second special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament is duty bound, we believe, to satisfy with all the elements at its disposal, not with speeches but with decisions and facts.
9. Over the past 37 years people have attempted to convince us, with warlike rhetoric and propaganda concerning an alleged enemy, of the good side to nuclear weapons and the irreversible nature of the armaments process. We have become conditioned to accept a philosophy based on fear, to accept the theories of deterrent capacity and the balance of terror and hence to accepting the presence on the earth of increasingly numerous and powerful nuclear weapons. The degree of conditioning is such that those propagandizing for the nuclear-arms race have almost succeeded in making us forget the immorality entailed in the very existence of nuclear devices.
10. The argument that the atom bomb has helped to strengthen the national security of those who possess it is totally fallacious. Who can deny that at the end of the Second World War the United States of America was the most secure country in the world? It had not

suffered the devastation of war on its own territory; its military might, including a monopoly of the atom bomb, was unparalleled in history; and its geographical situation rendered it immune to any attempted invasion by conventional armies. In 1945 there was no more secure nation. In 1982, thanks to the development of colossal nuclear arsenals, it has lost that security to an equal degree.

11. We are told that the so-called deterrent capacity of nuclear weapons has enabled the United States and its European allies to live in peace within their territory for more than three decades. From a strictly formal point of view some apologists for the strategy of nuclear deterrents have referred to a "generation of peace" in Europe. However, the so-called power relationships based on the accumulation of immense nuclear arsenals has not helped to prevent military conflicts in the rest of the world. Since 1945 more than 120 civil or international wars have been waged in the territories of more than 70 countries, mostly in the third world, in which the armed forces of more than 80 nations have taken part.

12. Those who extol deterrents, the "credible response" and the balance of terror, with the phantom of assured mutual destruction, have attempted to lead us to believe that these have served to stabilize East-West relations. They slyly forget that, in order to maintain the so-called strategic balance between the great Powers, it was necessary first to limit the number of players so as to avoid others coming along to destabilize things and, secondly, to find a way to institutionalize this strategic balance. Hence the activities leading to the production of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII)*], which pursued a positive end and which Mexico warmly supported; hence also, the year after the signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the start of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [*SALT*], the primary objective of which was the institutionalization and control of the nuclear arms race. But the most important consideration which should be borne in mind is that, in exchange for their commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty required the two great nuclear Powers to proceed to reduce their arsenals with a view to general and complete disarmament.

13. What has been the result? After more than 10 years of negotiations the super-Powers have not eliminated a single nuclear warhead from their respective arsenals. The only thing they have done is to transform the nuclear-arms race, chaotic and unpredictable in the 1950s and 1960s, into a more orderly and controlled arms race. The Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in 1980, made clear the growing disagreement and mistrust felt by non-nuclear-weapon States.

14. One of the few sources of encouragement since 1978 has been the rebirth of a pacifist anti-nuclear movement, above all in Western Europe. It is no accident that that movement has taken on gigantic proportions precisely in those European countries where the siting of the bulk of the nuclear weapons has been permitted. This is strengthened by the solidarity shown by the mass demonstrations orga-

nized in the streets adjacent to this building. The representatives of responsible Governments can only support such demands. It is essential and urgent to seek an immediate halt to the nuclear-arms race, but for now we can support the so-called "nuclear freeze" as an initial measure.

15. However much it has been argued that it is impossible to freeze the development and improvement of nuclear weapons without being certain that there is a balance between the two great Powers, it is impossible to seek perfect nuclear symmetry given the dynamic of the development of new nuclear weapons. The important thing is to accept that there is a parity in over-all terms and move on to put a halt to the development of new weapons systems such as the United States MX and cruise missiles and the Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 missiles. The argument of the "missile gap" was discarded 20 years ago. We therefore find totally unacceptable the argument that it is necessary to arm oneself in order then to be in a position to negotiate disarmament measures.

16. Recognition of this global parity began to develop after the two super-Powers developed the thermo-nuclear bomb at almost the same time in the mid-1950s. Over the 30 years since then a revealing and significant phenomenon has arisen: this parity has been maintained and indeed improved. Each step forward by one of the parties—whether a weapon, a vehicle or a new system—has given rise to a further effort by the other party to catch up with the first, always successful. I do not think that the Power which was lagging behind has ever failed to catch up three or four years later.

17. What conclusions can be drawn from this historic experience? In the first place, no breakthrough by one party is going to give it greater security. The only thing that has occurred over the last 30 or 40 years is that the same parity, the same basic equality is quickly restored but at a higher level, in other words a more costly, more dangerous level that is more difficult to control and therefore more difficult to negotiate about. Secondly, parity is the key factor in disarmament. It cannot be avoided and must be faced. All disarmament has to start from that premise. The two super-Powers have verbally recognized it, although their actions, particularly those of recent date, indicate the contrary.

18. The existence of military forces and nuclear weapons is justified with reasons of national security. The very use of nuclear weapons by a country would involve incalculable risks for the lives of their own nationals, since it would provoke a similar response by the supposed enemy. Hence the use of nuclear weapons is rightly considered to be contrary to the defence of the national security of a country, and hence China some time ago committed itself to not being the first to use nuclear weapons. The other nuclear Powers should adopt a similar policy and make declarations to this effect. A curious and very significant phenomenon has arisen: the "Stockholm appeal", which so moved the world some 30 years or more ago, has now taken on new life in the very country which was then most opposed to the famous appeal.

19. Paradoxically, the sole positive conclusion about the nuclear-arms race consists in the fact that today nobody doubts the lethal dangers for our civilization involved in the very existence of the nuclear arsenals.

20. Therefore we must spare no effort. We must support and contribute to the World Disarmament Campaign, towards which I am pleased to announce here that a contribution by Mexico will be made within the limits of its resources. We must plead for a comprehensive disarmament programme that will start an irreversible process in negotiations aimed at reducing the military arsenals of all countries, beginning with those which possess nuclear weapons. The initial immediate measure would be to prohibit the testing of nuclear weapons, a goal that has been vainly sought for more than 20 years now. The great Powers could make a convincing contribution if during this session of the Assembly they were to declare long, unilateral moratoriums. Another measure would be for the United States and the Soviet Union, acting within the context of what was agreed in the SALT II treaty, signed in 1979, to continue their negotiations to bring about substantial reductions and sizeable, qualitative limitations of strategic weapons. We heard with pleasure the announcement that at the end of the month the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks would begin.

21. On the other hand, besides the threat represented by strategic nuclear weapons, we must bear in mind the great danger represented by the intermediate or medium-range nuclear weapons. If prompt agreement is not reached between the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [*NATO*] and those of the Warsaw Pact, then next year nearly 500 Pershing II and cruise missiles will be deployed in Western Europe, and furthermore, there will be no elimination or reduction in the number of Soviet SS-20 missiles. A factor which has complicated those negotiations is the numerical superiority in conventional weaponry of the Warsaw Pact countries compared to *NATO*.

22. Lastly, we reiterate that another important measure, although not strictly a disarmament measure, would be the freezing of the production, development and deployment of nuclear weapons and launching vehicles.

23. Man is indeed an endangered species. We are all aware of the threat represented by nuclear arsenals to human life. Nuclear disarmament is the only way open to us to avoid extermination. It would be unnatural to think that there may be States which, in order to strengthen what they consider to be their own security, threaten the security of everybody else.

24. For years we have lived almost paralysed by the constant impact of warlike theories which have been used only to justify the acquisition of new and better nuclear weapons. We must examine our conscience and shake off the "anaesthetic fog" which blinds and lulls us. Together with all citizens of the world let us break through a silence that could otherwise be interpreted as consent.

25. Until today the efforts of the Organization in the area of disarmament have not borne fruit. We cannot continue to hide the truth by adopting by consensus documents which will subsequently turn out to be a

dead letter. Let us leave aside the silent pantomime of our past efforts and begin to act energetically, endorsing the concerns of the new anti-war generation. Let us lay the foundations to ensure that it will not be the last generation in the history of mankind.

26. Mr. PANUPONG (Thailand): I should like to take this opportunity to extend, on behalf of the Thai delegation and on my own behalf, my sincere congratulations to you, Sir, on your unanimous election to the presidency of this important special session. We have witnessed your admirable skills in presiding over the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, and we are confident that under your proven leadership the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will achieve its objectives, which concern the very basic question of the survival and well-being of all mankind. Our sincere congratulations go also to the other officers for their unanimous elections to their high offices. The Thai delegation looks forward to co-operating closely with you, Mr. President, and with all the officers of the Assembly for a successful outcome to this special session.

27. The world today is still confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extermination arising from the continued accumulation of nuclear and other destructive weapons. The situation has led to a further aggravation of international tensions and the sharpening of conflicts in different regions of the world, thus heightening the sense of insecurity among all States, in particular among the non-nuclear and less militarily powerful States. In these circumstances, many countries spend billions of dollars annually to increase and improve their destructive arsenals. Some countries divert much of their resources needed for economic and social development to military efforts in order to impose their will on other countries, while others have to sacrifice important developmental efforts in order to arm themselves sufficiently for the purposes of self-defence. There is, therefore, a linkage between disarmament and development. The Thai delegation believes that the resources released by disarmament by all countries, large and small, should be used instead to promote the well-being of their own peoples as well as to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.

28. Disarmament has now become an imperative and urgent task for the international community, which has looked to the United Nations to play the catalytic role in regard to the achievement of general and complete disarmament. The convening of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first devoted to disarmament, in 1978 was indeed historic in the sense that it created significant public interest and awareness regarding this important issue of concern to all mankind. This momentum should continue to be kept alive during the second special session devoted to disarmament. In this regard, Thailand is proud to have contributed in its small way by being the site of the disarmament seminar for the non-governmental organizations in the Asian and Pacific region earlier this year.

29. In 1978, at the first special session on disarmament, the Final Document [*resolution S-10/2*] was adopted, with many important recommendations in the Programme of Action [*ibid.*, *sect. III*] enumerating

specific disarmament measures which should be implemented, as well as machinery to be established to pave the way for future negotiations and to bring about general and complete disarmament. Priorities in disarmament negotiations were also agreed upon, as follows: nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which might be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces.

30. The Thai delegation fully shares the view expressed in the Final Document that, while the final objective should be general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the immediate goal must be the elimination of the danger of nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race. The decisive factor in our disarmament efforts remains the necessary political will of States, particularly those which possess the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenals, to respond positively to the concern of the international community. At the same time, the need to find appropriate machinery, such as deliberative and negotiating organs, has been partly answered by the establishment of the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament, respectively.

31. It is regrettable to note that, despite the efforts made at the first special session, the provisions of the Final Document have not been adequately complied with. Since the time of the first special session world military expenditure has been increasing at a most alarming rate. Indeed, there is a general consensus that there exists an urgent need for all States, particularly those which possess nuclear weapons, to halt the massive buildup and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons, and, indeed, there have been some initiatives on the part of the super-Powers to curb the nuclear arms race. However, proposals put forward thus far seem to have been turned down by one side or the other in an apparent attempt to establish or maintain nuclear superiority over the other. In such a situation, one should not find fault with the Final Document. What is lacking is the political will, which continues to be the determining factor for success or failure in disarmament efforts.

32. The Thai delegation also notes with regret the marked deterioration in the international situation within the past four years, in open violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. This development has dealt severe blows to the very basis and efficacy of the disarmament efforts, not to mention world peace in general. The resort to armed force and the continued illegal occupation by foreign forces in many regions of the world clearly demonstrate that certain countries still prefer to achieve their political objectives and to impose their will on others through military might at the risk of escalation of the arms race. Such military interventions have seriously undermined mutual trust in those regions, to the detriment of the confidence-building process in general. My delegation recognizes the importance of confidence-building measures in furthering the goals of disarmament, but we also firmly believe that any confidence-building measures in the face of military *faits accomplis* in countries or territories being oc-

cupied by foreign forces are unrealistic and bound to fail.

33. The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world is recognized in the Final Document as an effective measure which could contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole. In that regard, Thailand and other States members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations [ASEAN] have since 1971 called for the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia. In their Declaration of 27 November 1971, the five ASEAN Foreign Ministers reiterated that

“the countries of South-East Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples”.¹

Today, almost 11 years after that Declaration, Thailand and the ASEAN countries as a whole remain firmly committed to the concept. The Thai delegation hopes that the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia will take place in the foreseeable future. In this connexion, it is regrettable to note also that the proposed conference on the Indian Ocean has to be further postponed. Thailand, as a member of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, supports an early convening of the conference in Colombo, Sri Lanka. Recent developments in the area have further exacerbated mistrust and tension. Such developments, therefore, have heightened the need for an early convening of the conference.

34. My delegation has been following with serious concern the news reports on increasing evidence of the use of chemical and biological weapons in several areas of the world, including some countries on Thailand's eastern border. The Thai delegation wishes to reiterate that Thailand has consistently opposed the development, production, deployment, stockpiling and use of those weapons by any country. The Thai Government has co-operated closely with the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons sent to Thailand toward the end of 1981 to verify the use of those deadly weapons in neighbouring countries. The Thai Government will continue to render whatever assistance and co-operation is necessary to the United Nations in this effort. In this regard, my delegation notes that the existing treaties on chemical weapons—the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction—contain no provisions on verification methods or procedures. My delegation believes that it is time that the international community devoted its efforts to negotiating and agreeing upon an acceptable veri-

fication procedure or arrangement if it hopes to make progress in the effective prohibition of such weapons.

35. The Thai delegation welcomes the important decision taken at the 173rd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, held on 21 April, to set up a working group on verification measures in connexion with the comprehensive test-ban agreement [*see A/S-12/2, para. 38*]. Verification constitutes an important cornerstone for progress in disarmament and arms control, and this development in the Committee on Disarmament indeed represents an important breakthrough in the light of the differences of views and the inability to reach any agreement on this important issue over the past several years.

36. The Preparatory Committee, under the guidance of Mr. Oluyemi Adeniji of Nigeria and his able team, has admirably carried out its task of paving the way for convening the twelfth special session. For this, we all owe him and the members of the Preparatory Committee special thanks and appreciation. My delegation also wishes to commend the Committee on Disarmament, which for the past few years has untiringly devoted its efforts to the achievement of substantive progress in the field of disarmament. My delegation is gratified to note that the problem of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament remains a priority issue of the Committee and that an *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons has been set up to elaborate a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

37. My delegation also notes with gratification that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group to initiate negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament envisaged in paragraph 109 of the Final Document was set up under the able leadership first of Mr. Oluyemi Adeniji and later of Mr. Alfonso García Robles. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group has now presented for our consideration a very important draft document, the adoption of which will indeed be a significant milestone in the efforts of the international community in the field of general and complete disarmament. Important pending issues in the draft document are the questions of the timetable for the implementation of the programme and its legal nature. My delegation believes that those two important issues could satisfactorily be resolved once negotiations on the elements contained therein are completed.

38. It would be unrealistic to expect the second special session devoted to disarmament to arrive at an all-embracing international disarmament treaty or to achieve an instant solution to this vast and complex problem, which has been the question central to mankind's very survival over the past decades. Nevertheless, the second special session provides all of us with another opportunity to take another step forward on the difficult road towards improving international security and the well-being of all peoples through general and complete disarmament. In this regard, my delegation pledges to you, Mr. President, its full co-operation for the successful outcome of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

39. Mr. PAHR (Austria): Allow me, Sir, at the outset to congratulate you warmly on your election to the post of President of this special session. Your well-known personal authority, skills and impartiality will greatly contribute to a constructive atmosphere at this important session. I should also like to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, for the manner in which he carried out the functions of his office in these particularly difficult days of mounting tensions and conflicts in many parts of the world.

40. The Final Document of the first special session on disarmament states, in paragraph 13, "Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority."

41. The essence of that statement, the fact that there can be no lasting, secure and stable peace without disarmament, is as true today as it was four years ago. It is disturbing, however, to note that nothing has been done to translate this idea into reality.

42. There has been no disarmament; quite to the contrary, not only has the military buildup continued, but we now even face the danger of an accelerated arms race. The debate concerning the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe is an example of this trend. In addition, we note a growing tendency to resort to the use of force. Increasing terrorism, the war between Iran and Iraq, the conflict in the Falklands and the deplorable events in Lebanon are just a few manifestations of this fact.

Mr. Anwar Sani (Indonesia), Vice-President, took the Chair.

43. We may differ among ourselves as to the causes of these developments, but we all share the feeling of deep disappointment at the fact that the firm commitment to the goal of disarmament which we made four years ago, and have repeated since then, has remained without any effect whatsoever.

44. Any use of force, any war, any invasion, and any failure to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council: any one of those violations of the fundamental tenets of international peace and security undermines the peaceful world order we all claim to support.

45. As disappointed as we are by these developments, we must not capitulate. On the contrary, this deplorable state of affairs should incite us to increase our efforts.

46. In our endeavours to promote disarmament we must keep in mind that a State will be prepared to reduce its military strength only if such action does not jeopardize its security. As a point of departure it will be necessary to analyse the means that might lead to real security. By far the most common way to pursue this end has been, and still is, the buildup of military strength.

47. This approach has proved ineffective. In Europe it has resulted in two wars in this century, both of which, following the logic of violence, escalated into world wars.

48. One of the main reasons why reliance on armament had to fail is the fact that military strength on the part of one State leads to insecurity and fear among other States; those States, in turn, feel forced to strengthen their military arsenals. Armament, by its nature, generates fear, and fear generates armament; there is no escape from this vicious circle, which leads to war, destruction, misery and suffering.

49. Military strength is not at all the way to ensure real and lasting security. Indeed, if we sincerely strive for an end to the arms race, or even for a reduction of the level of armaments, we shall have to seek other ways to give States a legitimate sense of security. In this respect, two methods come to my mind which I consider particularly worth mentioning: first, stronger co-operation among States in all conceivable areas, and, secondly, the slowly emerging "technology of peace".

50. Co-operation creates confidence and mutual dependence. Both lead to security. The developments in Western Europe after the Second World War are proof of that fact. Traditional enemies were brought together in a comprehensive system of co-operation which transcends the economic sphere and creates manifold ties between peoples. Today, war among these nations has become unthinkable as a consequence of this Western European co-operation, which has found its institutional expression in the European Community and the Council of Europe. We can all learn from that experience.

51. For the entire European continent, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on 1 August 1975, and the policy associated with that document constitute a genuine attempt to create a platform of co-operation and coexistence, also among States with different political, social and economic systems. This platform provides for co-operation in many areas, such as trade, science, culture and education, human contact, and information, and also in such basic fields as security and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. As a programme for co-operation, this platform needs further development. It is far from being fully realized. Again and again, setbacks, even severe ones, occur in its implementation.

52. In our view, this does not detract from its political importance. For us and for other neutral and non-aligned countries in Europe, the Helsinki process is an essential means for moving away from confrontation towards co-operation and coexistence and is a valid approach towards more security. Co-operation leads to confidence and mutual dependence; mutual dependence and confidence in turn create security.

53. The second method I mentioned to achieve more security, namely, the development of a "technology of peace", is, I admit, at present in a very early stage. I am referring here to the development of purely defensive electronic warning, detection and protection systems. In optimal circumstances, and at an advanced stage of development, such systems may ensure a high degree of territorial integrity and security against any attack from the outside. If such a concept of an electronic fortress becomes reality—and this may be less Utopian than one might believe—States would be able to guarantee their security with a mere

fraction of present-day expenditures for arms technology. The "technology of peace" would thus prevail over war technology, with all the positive consequences such a development would entail for the strengthening of a peaceful world order.

54. The fact is that the world of today is far away from such approaches. Confrontation, not co-operation, is clearly the growing trend. Instead of promoting the technology of peace, tens of thousands of scientists and billions of dollars are committed world-wide to the continued development of technologies of war. It should therefore be one of the main tasks of the Organization, the United Nations, to promote security through co-operation and through the development of purely defensive peace technologies. These efforts should be pursued in parallel with intensified endeavours to reduce the present level of armaments, which constitutes in itself an immense danger to mankind.

55. In spite of the tragic consequences of the world wars, and in spite of the unimaginable destructive power of already existing arsenals, the arms race continues.

56. Austria, a neutral country located in the centre of the most heavily armed area in the world, between the two major military alliances, has a vital interest in disarmament. We are aware that our own security is directly dependent on the stability of both the regional and the global balance of power. A balance at the lowest possible level of armaments must therefore be the primary objective of any disarmament policy.

57. At this special session my delegation will endeavour to contribute to the disarmament efforts of the international community. We expect this session to produce concrete results, in particular a realistic and comprehensive strategy for future disarmament efforts, in the form of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

58. I feel that the time has come to co-ordinate all existing and envisaged disarmament negotiations on various weapon systems and different regions in one integrated programme. Although disarmament efforts are carried out in different forums and relate to different weapons and various regions, the results of all these efforts are closely interrelated.

59. The ultimate goal of disarmament, a genuine balance at the lowest possible level of armaments, will be reached only if disarmament efforts take equally into account all regions and all weapon systems. We understand by the concept of balance the avoidance of any advantage to one party at any point in time and in relation to any weapon system, including nuclear and conventional weapons.

60. In view of the wide range of distrust in the world today, we consider verification an important and necessary element of disarmament.

61. In the framework of our extended concept of disarmament we also attach particular importance to measures which would reduce the danger of surprise attacks or misperceptions by potential adversaries. Such confidence—and security-building measures, among which I include objective information on

militarily relevant facts, could without doubt contribute to security.

62. Turning now to the reality of the world-wide arms buildup, we can only reaffirm that the catalogue of priorities for disarmament measures laid down in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament has lost none of its validity. That is true in particular with regard to the special urgency of nuclear disarmament.

63. We note with satisfaction that for some time negotiations have been taking place at Geneva on a highly controversial component of the nuclear arsenals of the two super-Powers, namely, intermediate-range nuclear weapons, some of which are a particular danger to stability because their location and speed drastically reduce the warning time in case of attack.

64. We also welcome the imminent resumption of the negotiations on strategic systems, a necessary complement to the current Geneva talks. We expect of these negotiations substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals and significant limitations on their qualitative improvement.

65. I would point out in this connexion that in our view an appropriately prepared meeting of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union could favourably influence the course of these efforts.

66. In a world threatened by nuclear weapons it is essential to strengthen the régime based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to intensify the efforts to achieve universal adherence to that Treaty. States, in particular those which have a potential nuclear capability, must weigh the possible short-term advantages of possessing nuclear weapons against the disastrous consequences for the international community as a whole of the further spread of nuclear weapons. At the same time we must recall, however, that nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty are legally bound to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures leading to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would impede both the further development of existing nuclear capabilities and the emergence of additional nuclear-weapon States.

67. In addition to nuclear disarmament, which is so urgently needed, comprehensive disarmament includes a reduction in arsenals of conventional weapons. A regional framework, such as was chosen for the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of military forces in Europe, would appear to be particularly promising in this regard. We attach special importance to those negotiations.

68. We shall also continue our efforts for the convening of a European conference for confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, as part of a substantive and balanced conclusion to the Madrid meeting of representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The convening of such a conference would undoubtedly have a positive influence on the political climate and would strengthen co-operative elements in Europe.

69. The threat of the increasing military use of outer space is a further cause of serious concern. Both of the leading space Powers are pursuing research programmes in the field of anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile technology. A continuation of those efforts could lead to a wasteful and destabilizing arms race in an area which has been designated by the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [*resolution 2222 (XXI), annex*], for peaceful co-operation in the interests of all mankind. Since none of these weapon programmes seems to be fully operational at the present time, there is still hope of countering this trend. We therefore call for urgent negotiations on measures to prevent the deployment of anti-satellite weapons and other forms of the further militarization of outer space. We hope that awareness of the enormous risks and costs of an arms race in outer space will lead to a political understanding between the space Powers, which alone could be the basis for further legislative measures. In this context it might be necessary to give more attention to efforts to find an appropriate legal framework for international satellite monitoring.

70. We are all aware of the inseparable link between problems of security and problems of development. There is no doubt that enormous military expenditures are an important reason for the steadily declining willingness to provide appropriate resources for development. Reallocating funds from military budgets to programmes of economic co-operation among industrialized and developing countries would eliminate sources of conflict. It would help to surmount economic stagnation and contribute to the lessening of tensions in the world. It would improve the prospects for people in all continents to enjoy life in dignity and freedom.

71. In this context, I would refer to the statement by the Holy Father on the occasion of his recent meeting with President Reagan, when he pointed out that constructive negotiations aimed at ending the arms race could liberate immense resources that might be used to alleviate misery and feed millions of hungry human beings.

72. I should like to offer some additional remarks on an idea which I have already had occasion to voice, at the regular session of the General Assembly last year. On that occasion I expressed the belief that uncertainty concerning the true military strength of States was one of the main reasons for the continuing arms race and the failure to achieve balanced disarmament. I therefore proposed the creation of appropriate mechanisms for the establishment and evaluation of the actual state of armaments on an objective basis.

73. Inadequate information is indeed one of the main obstacles to efforts to bring the arms race under control. Militarily significant agreements on the limitation or reduction of weapons and forces presuppose an understanding of the actual state of armament. This is extremely difficult to obtain when no reliable information is available. We therefore need both a higher degree of openness regarding military data and objective mechanisms for the assessment of military capacities. Such evaluations, under-

taken by independent and competent organs, could in specific situations contribute to defusing international tensions, build confidence, promote peace and pave the way to arms limitation. Such mechanisms could be usefully employed on regional, interregional or global levels to establish an objective data base on specific types of weapons systems and military forces and their comparability as a step towards disarmament agreements. The United Nations would have to play a leading role in this context. The Security Council and the General Assembly could adopt decisions concerning the development and application of such measures. The experience gained with fact-finding methods and study groups could provide valuable guidance.

74. A greater degree of openness in the military sector is not merely an imperative necessity but seems to correspond to an actual trend in international relations. In fact, satellite monitoring provides the major Powers in particular with an unprecedented amount of information on military matters. Some of this information has been disclosed to the public—of course, in most cases for the purpose of influencing public opinion.

75. We also welcome the report on common security published by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues,² under the chairmanship of Mr. Olof Palme. This Commission is of great significance, in particular because its members come from the most diverse regions of the globe and because of its high competence in this field. Its report also deserves special attention, since it has been adopted unanimously by all the members of the Commission.

76. The recommendations of the Palme Commission provide a much needed impetus for reflection and constitute an important model for our efforts for peace and stability in the world. We fully concur with the report's conclusions that we cannot achieve security against one another but that we can do so only with one another precisely through a concept of common security.

77. The idea of nuclear disengagement in central Europe is of particular interest to us. The proposal for a zone free of tactical nuclear weapons on both sides of the border between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization deserves serious consideration. We hope that the General Assembly will at this special session give careful attention to the report of the Palme Commission and its recommendations.

78. The support of world public opinion is essential for the success of disarmament. We therefore welcome the increasing popular awareness of the dangers of the continuing arms race. We share the basic concerns and hopes of the movements for peace and disarmament. Indeed, we believe that genuine peace movements which are not themselves instruments of propaganda and confrontation have a crucial role to play in preparing the ground for the political will essential for disarmament.

79. We are assembled here at a time of mounting threats to international peace and security. Armed conflicts are raging in many parts of the world. Every day brings more human suffering and bloodshed. We cannot close our eyes to this tragedy. It is our responsi-

bility to stop this dangerous circle of violence and destruction. Every day of inaction brings us closer to catastrophe.

80. We must not lose time. Words are not enough. Deeds are needed to set in motion a true process of peace. There is no remedy for war but our own will and our own determination. Let us therefore take concrete action in order to overcome war and provide security and freedom and a better life for all.

81. Disarmament is a crucial element in any strategy of peace. It may well be the touchstone of our resolve to reach our ultimate objective: universal peace in the world.

82. Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Sir, I should like to express my delegation's satisfaction at the unanimous selection of Mr. Ismat Kittani for the important and challenging task of presiding over the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. His personal qualities of experience and statesmanship guarantee his wise guidance of our deliberations.

83. Four years ago the nations here represented adopted a document which raised the hopes of the world as to the prospects for building a more peaceful international society for the generations to come. As we gather once again to consider the extent to which the contents of that document have been translated into concrete measures, it is our duty not to be deceived by our intentions and to face the frightening reality before us. Four years after the adoption of the Final Document, the nuclear arms race proceeds unabated, the threat of nuclear war looms ever more ominously over mankind, billions are spent on the improvement and the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction, and vital non-renewable resources are squandered.

84. If efforts to curb the arms race have so far been fruitless, in spite of the existence of multilateral forums where lengthy meetings have been devoted to the attainment of this objective, the second special session on disarmament can only take on greater significance. Since military expenditure continues to increase at the expense of long-awaited progress in the improvement of the living conditions of the less developed countries and the creation of a more equitable international society, the current special session is faced with a formidable challenge indeed.

85. It is the duty of the Assembly at the second special session on disarmament to lead away from confrontation and back to constructive negotiation. But beyond that, it is the special session's task to build upon decisions and recommendations reached four years ago, as embodied in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. This is a point to be stressed, for we consider that under no circumstances should the Assembly go back on the contents of the Final Document, which in our view remains the basic framework within which our discussions must evolve.

86. The General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament recognized, with the support of the major Powers, that the arms buildup represented a threat to international peace and security, as well as to the survival of mankind. However, we have come to

observe increasing tension between these very Powers, both in the bilateral and multilateral spheres.

87. This tension between the super-Powers has gradually increased in recent years, as new areas of antagonism have been added to already existing ones. The tendency to link the conduct of substantive negotiations with progress in finding solutions for these conflicts has been openly expressed on various occasions.

88. We do not side with that view. Neither do we believe that the breaking out of new areas of tension should prevent disarmament negotiations from proceeding. On the contrary, it is our conviction that only through sustained negotiating efforts will these areas of tension tend to diminish; only through the adoption of significant agreements will the arms race come to a halt.

89. We could add that progress in the field of disarmament will undoubtedly be beneficial to other spheres in the relationship among nations. We believe in particular that effective disarmament measures can bring significant social and economic benefits to the developed and developing countries alike. The special session will have before it a study on the relationship between disarmament and development which supports that view. It is our hope that the conclusions and recommendations of this study will be actively dealt with during the course of our proceedings.

90. Let us recall in this connexion the following words of the Brazilian Minister of External Relations during the general debate at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly:

“Hundreds of billions are spent on activities which are at best unproductive. International co-operation to improve living conditions and to create a more equitable international society receives a lesser priority, as if the problems of development should, or even could, wait for a better opportunity.” [5th meeting, para. 9.]

91. The review and appraisal of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted at the first special session will unequivocally demonstrate that no substantial progress has been possible since then. The fact that no instrument on international multilateral disarmament has been signed in the interval between the two special sessions cannot be overlooked. Bilateral initiatives during this period were also unproductive. We cannot afford to be discouraged by this state of affairs, for there is no possible alternative for the peace-seeking nations of the world than to proceed in their attempts to devise ways of removing the obstacles which have prevented the adoption of relevant disarmament measures in these four years. We shall have to bear this perspective in mind when we examine the current stage of negotiations and deliberations in the Committee on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission respectively.

92. Disarmament has become an international concern and is not to be seen in the narrow perspective of the relationship between the nuclear Powers. Disarmament does not mean the management of the arms race according to the ups and downs of that relationship, nor should it be downgraded to reflect

the immediate political expediency of leaders in regard to their constituencies. Disarmament, as envisaged in the Final Document, encompasses a wider array of political realities on the national, regional and world-wide scales. It must be viewed in such a broad perspective if it is to have any chance of becoming a reality. The ideals and aspirations of the world community cannot be equated with an accommodation of selfish interests among the powerful, nor should they be left at the mercy of the changing winds of alliance rivalries.

93. The adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament is viewed by the Brazilian delegation as a major undertaking in the field of disarmament. Those who participated in the preliminary drafting which took place in the Committee on Disarmament know that Brazil has not adopted a rigid position on the matter. It is our understanding, nevertheless, that the comprehensive programme of disarmament must contain a firm commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to begin negotiations without further delay on nuclear disarmament questions. A commitment on this point as well as on other aspects of the programme does not, of course, transform the comprehensive programme of disarmament into a substitute for disarmament treaties. Moreover, the comprehensive programme of disarmament cannot be perceived as a mere guide for future agreements or as a listing of issues to be dealt with by specific organs. We therefore see this commitment as an obligation to begin negotiations soon on the various aspects of disarmament included in the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

94. The comprehensive programme of disarmament should commit nations to engage in substantial negotiations on disarmament issues in accordance with the priorities set out in the Final Document. Given the nature of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, it would be difficult to determine in advance the precise time-frames within which those negotiations should begin or come to a conclusion. The total absence of some form of temporal indicator, on the other hand, would only place the comprehensive programme of disarmament among the innumerable abstract documents that do no more than increase our frustration.

95. If we succeed in elaborating a document which will help nations, particularly those capable of threatening the survival of mankind, overcome their doubts, outgrow their fears and recover the courage required for the construction of a peaceful world, this session will have served its purpose. There can be no misunderstanding on this point: the results of our efforts will not be detrimental to any State; on the contrary, they will only bring benefits to all nations here represented.

96. I should like to refer briefly to another issue to which the Brazilian delegation ascribes great importance, namely, enhancing the effectiveness of machinery in the field of disarmament and strengthening the role of the United Nations in this respect. The main causes for the disappointing performance of the machinery created by the first special session on disarmament seem clear to us. The lack of political will by the super-Powers must be blamed for preventing these organs from adequately fulfilling their

mandate, and in some instances from functioning at all. We are hoping, nevertheless, that a new commitment to dialogue and negotiation, particularly by the nuclear-weapon States, will emanate from this session.

97. At the second special session on disarmament the General Assembly will have to undertake in this connexion a thorough appraisal of the role attributed to the Committee on Disarmament, with special attention to the eventual adoption of guidelines that can pave the way towards fruitful negotiations on nuclear disarmament in its future work. The decision reached at the end of this year's spring session of the Committee on Disarmament regarding the establishment of a working group on a comprehensive test ban [*see A/S-12/2, para. 38*] must be welcomed as an initial step in that direction. The agenda of the Committee on Disarmament should remain restricted, as far as possible, to the priority items on which treaties or other international instruments are to be negotiated.

98. With regard to the Disarmament Commission, a similar assessment will be necessary so that its deliberations can be rendered more practical. One possibility should be to ascribe to the deliberative organ competence to examine the implementation of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the First Committee. The Disarmament Commission could also supervise the implementation of recommendations of study groups established by the General Assembly to carry out specific tasks. It could, on the other hand, undertake a first reading of the reports to be presented to the General Assembly, either by such study groups or by the Secretary-General, or even submit draft resolutions for consideration by the First Committee. The Disarmament Commission would, in this way, be assigned a role somewhat comparable to the one performed by the Economic and Social Council with respect to other Committees of the General Assembly.

99. The Brazilian general outlook on disarmament questions does not differ substantially from that of most non-nuclear countries. It is in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document. Our insistence on the importance of nuclear disarmament should therefore not come as a surprise; a considerable number of documents and resolutions adopted by this very Organization has so insisted. Our attitude, however, cannot be limited to the participation in consensus and majorities. We must strive for action and concrete results as well. To work in any other direction would be tantamount to encouraging a crime, for let us not forget that the use of nuclear weapons has been declared a crime against humanity by the United Nations. We must go beyond declarations at this point. The threat of a nuclear war must be removed now; a task of such urgency cannot await ideal political conditions or dramatically irreversible situations. The very existence of such weapons is incompatible with any prospect for peaceful coexistence among nations, and no Member of the Organization can work against this prospect without flagrantly violating the provisions of the Charter.

100. Recent events have shown that public opinion can play an important, if not a decisive, role in the halting and reversal of the arms race. Initiatives for negotiations on medium-range and strategic weapon systems between the super-Powers are under way.

We welcome those initiatives and we look forward to their successful outcome. At the same time we know that the bilateral negotiations already engaged in or about to be started will not yield concrete results in the near future. Interim measures of a most pressing nature are urgently required and should be considered without further delay. On the basis of specific proposals presented in the appropriate forums, comprehensive studies and practical suggestions on some of them have already been prepared and put forth by the United Nations and private institutions.

101. Let me enumerate a few: a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban; a freeze on the production of nuclear weapons, of their delivery systems and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes; a total ban on the use of nuclear weapons and, pending its achievement, a legally binding commitment, without any qualification, by the nuclear-weapon Powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries that do not possess them; and last, though not least, an effective arrangement for the prevention of nuclear war.

102. If we assume that the bilateral negotiations between the super-Powers will proceed in good faith and sincerity, there is no possible explanation why we, assembled here as representatives of the international community, should not start now by concentrating on these other important matters that concern us all.

103. The Assembly at this special session will examine the views, proposals and practical suggestions received from Member States in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 36/81 B. We are glad to note that one nuclear-weapon State has submitted a reply. We regret that the others have not yet done so. In any case we sincerely hope that the concern voiced through resolution 36/81 B, which was adopted by consensus, may be dealt with at this session and that our attempts at preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war may render current attempts to justify the possible use of nuclear weapons, as if it were possible to employ them with limited results.

104. Nuclear disarmament agreements must be reached with the shortest possible delay if international order and stability are to prevail over the periodic outbreaks of tension which intermittently place humanity on the brink of disaster. Although it has been our stated opinion that no items on the disarmament agenda should compete with nuclear-disarmament items in terms of priority or urgency, we will continue to lend our support to the early conclusion of agreements banning chemical or other existing weapons of mass destruction.

105. We have, however, come to interpret the emphasis placed by certain military Powers and their allies on conventional disarmament or on a regional outlook as a disguise for a lack of political will to negotiate on issues of greater priority. This situation can be modified only through a renewed expression by the super-Powers of their determination to resume negotiations on nuclear arms and disarmament agreements.

106. The second special session devoted to disarmament is seen by the Brazilian Government as an occasion to be seized lest the prospects for the survival of mankind be further damaged. The inscription

of the names of more than 70 non-governmental organizations and research institutes which wish to take part in the debate is in itself revealing, for it is evidence of the fact that ever larger segments of world public opinion are becoming engaged in activities directed at reversing the arms race and removing the threat of nuclear war. Respect for the guidelines contained in the Final Document adopted at the first special session devoted to disarmament and the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament may provide the basis for future constructive action in the field of disarmament. Failure to meet

these minimum requirements will only postpone the adoption of indispensable measures until it is perhaps too late.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

NOTES

¹ A/C.1/1019, p. 2.

² A/CN.10/38. See also A/CN.10/51.