



President: Mr. Lazar MOJSOV (Yugoslavia).

AGENDA ITEM 8

General debate (continued)

1. Mr. ADRIÁZOLA VALDA (Bolivia) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Once again it is my pleasant duty to express to you, Mr. President, the satisfaction it gives me to see you presiding over our work. Although it would be redundant to repeat the very justified and unstinted praise showered on you, allow me at least to reiterate the admiration of my Government and of the delegation of Bolivia for the tact and skill displayed in the exercise of the presidency, which has been characterized not only by the number of sessions of the General Assembly but also by the variety of items dealt with, all of them of acute and vital interest for the purposes of the Organization.

2. I wish to place on record also my sincere appreciation of the efforts and ability displayed by Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas in guiding the work of the Preparatory Committee for this special session. While his gifts as a skilful diplomat and negotiator are well known to us, the convening of this session and the quality of the report he has submitted [A/S-10/1] show him to be a statesman of great worth, whose spirit is at the service of peace and of the essential purposes of the United Nations.

3. In referring to those who have worked with so much devotion for the cause of disarmament, which is the cause of peace, it would be an unwarranted omission not to mention with gratitude the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, and his tireless efforts to establish peace whenever it has been breached.

4. Bolivia, a country in which with profound faith we nourish the hope that men and nations will be able to move forward to their destinies in an atmosphere of stable peace, strengthened by understanding and justice, is most pleased to attend this lofty universal encounter. It has been convened for the noble purpose of achieving, through solidarity and action, the fundamental agreements and categorical responses which mankind awaits with justified anxiety in order to be able to direct its evolution and constant improvement, in freedom from the fear of a holocaust.

5. The representatives of the Powers, and of large and small countries alike, have responded to the call by the United Nations, no doubt convinced that the supreme task of preserving peace and security requires decisive and unanimous participation.

6. Heads of Government have come from various parts of the world with a solemn mandate from their respective peoples to strive to ensure that from the present deliberations there will emerge a clear prospect of peace and co-operation, of brotherly understanding and shared well-being.

7. Entire nations have placed in our hands their aspirations and the choice of doing away with the threat of a generalized conflict and of mass destruction.

8. Whether or not we disappoint immense populations who have placed their confidence in us will depend on our intelligence, imagination and sincere political will.

9. This then is a commitment of exceptional historical significance. We are faced with the need which will brook no delay to agree on the foundations to build a different world, at a time when, as the President of France so rightly described [*3rd meeting*], we face the "dawn of the third millenium" of mankind, a world in which there is no room for the mistakes of the past, a world capable of renouncing armed confrontation and in which from day to day the ideas of an increasingly harmonious and constructive coexistence will become tangible realities.

10. The welcome presence in this universal forum of high State officials ensures that new and painful conflagrations will not be due to indifference.

11. We have spoken of small and large countries because that is the characteristic of our international community and because it determines the existence of different priorities, needs and consequently of interests and options which are also different, in order to face the challenge of our times.

12. Bolivia, as a founding Member of the United Nations, from the outset shared the just concern aroused in the international community by the stockpiling of weapons. We have watched with a heavy heart how a major part of scientific and technological advances is allocated to create and manufacture instruments of war of incalculable destructive capacity.

13. Hence from our modest sphere of influence, we have never spared our most resolute support for every effort made within the Organization or outside it, to halt the enormous expenditure represented by existing arsenals, to limit the possession of weapons to logical defence needs and to put an end to the nuclear race to which the great Powers are committed. We have done so because we believe that the possession of increasingly sophisticated and

costly instruments of destruction is a grave threat not only to the peace of the world but to the very future of the human race.

14. Indeed, we know well that peaceful coexistence can only be achieved with the whole-hearted support of every nation constituting the world community. Nevertheless, we are bound to recognize that the vast majority of countries do not have the same ability to help to achieve so lofty a goal. It is the great Powers which possess the tools likely to have the greatest impact on the decisions determining the march of mankind; they are, therefore, called upon to shoulder a greater burden of responsibility in maintaining international peace and security.

15. I said earlier that we face a commitment of exceptional significance because of the pressing need to halt the boundless expansion of the arms race. We have decided upon the implementation of a vast plan for general and complete disarmament. Nevertheless, I believe it appropriate to emphasize that there will be insurmountable obstacles to that plan, unless we first establish a commitment of truly historical scope. Such a world consensus of far-reaching projections is essential if an atmosphere of mutual confidence through frank and unconditional co-operation is to be restored.

16. The various degrees of progress to which I have already referred, furthermore, prevent us from attempting to achieve the solutions we are seeking through a common approach.

17. No pressure or circumstances can compel the States of the developing world to stand by impassively while measures are taken which delay their economic growth, prolong their state of dependency, restrict their access to markets, and prevent them from controlling their trade in raw materials, in other words, which make technological know-how an exclusive heritage and the new instrument of domination.

18. The mistrust engendered by these conditions is aggravated by the unbridled arms race, the annual cost of which, according to the latest data confirmed here, amounts to \$400,000 million, while the majority of mankind suffers from poverty, hunger, epidemic disease and illiteracy.

19. This horrifying situation aggravates the maladjustments and inequitable treatments in international economic relations and brings with it the contradiction which threatens to worsen the imbalances, creating a state of permanent confrontation between the industrialized nations and the developing countries.

20. Therefore, as we see it, it is essential to go beyond a programme for the systematic reduction of armaments or the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

21. It is vital that the great Powers define permanent criteria with a view to reconciling their respective interests without ignoring the aspirations of the less advanced countries. Only a universal consensus of these practical and

moral dimensions can guarantee the success of the efforts we are making today.

22. The two great Powers bear a heavy responsibility. Willingly or not, they have taken on the highly dangerous role of becoming the guardians of a peace based on coercion and the threat of the most powerful. An armed peace, full of risks, for which they are sacrificing their own peoples and depriving them of the great and noble task of building a shared universal prosperity, an order based on equality that would eliminate differences dividing peoples into rich and poor, prosperous and dispossessed, at a time when the development of science and technology could contribute to bring about a human race worthy of the destiny for which it was created, in a society made up of all the peoples and nations of the world, in an open and complete co-operation that could make good any short-coming or lack that it might suffer.

23. Otherwise, no plan of action will be valid. We do not question the wisdom that will be reflected in the principles proposed, but the transition from theory to deeds of positive benefit can only be achieved with the full co-operation of the political will of the international community on the basis of the rules they have adopted to improve the coexistence of nations. Were this not to be done we would once again suffer a loss of faith in the mechanisms of co-operation, with very discouraging results.

24. To forestall these dangers it would be appropriate to consider a set of practical measures embodying a strong element of solidarity.

25. It would be really significant, for example, if countries with high military budgets could allocate a percentage of those resources to a fund to be administered by the United Nations, to be used solely to support the efforts of developing nations to improve the living conditions of their respective peoples, particularly for food and health projects.

26. The generosity of such a gesture would lead to a new era of brotherly co-operation among the affluent and poor peoples.

27. The special session that we are holding already has valuable material contained in the various proposals submitted by the Preparatory Committee.

28. I consider that we should support the proposal for a study, to be prepared without delay, on the relationship between disarmament and development.

29. Bolivia, which has been the victim of armed aggression, also has a keen interest in strengthening the machinery for a satisfactory collective security and for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

30. We consider as basic the proposals urging a joint endeavour in the elimination of hotbeds of tension or possible conflicts.

31. Unsatisfied aspirations, and plans to maintain unjust

situations indefinitely sometimes make unbridgeable gaps between neighbouring nations, fomenting suspicion and distrust. Such situations must lead to an escalation of arms, thus diverting resources that should be allocated to progress, and delaying the solution of socio-economic problems in depressed areas.

32. My country, determined in its devotion to peace, has always rejected any warlike methods despite the humiliating limitations imposed upon it 100 years ago by an unjust war when it was deprived of its own outlet to the Pacific Ocean.

33. Being land-locked, Bolivia has been enormously handicapped in its economic and social development, and therefore, in 1975, despite the historical, legal and moral background of the problem, we proposed a formula for peace, integration and development for the southern Pacific that would at the same time allow us to have a sovereign outlet to the sea.

34. The United Nations was fully aware of the efforts made by Bolivia to arrive at an appropriate settlement. Unjust conditions and inflexible positions banished any prospects of such a dialogue, in conjunction with the withdrawal of the goodwill that originally justified the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Republic of Chile.

35. Bolivia, and no other country, submitted a constructive plan for creating a major development zone in the area covered by the proposed agreement. We wished in this way to restore our sovereign outlet to the sea by peaceful means, at the same time offering an opportunity for development of the areas adjacent to Bolivia's coastal territory. To reject such a lofty show of selflessness amounts to an aggression against the good faith of a State, an aggression that is undoubtedly one of the most serious that can occur at the level of relations between States. Despite these adverse factors we shall not lose faith in the possibilities of a dialogue, when new and more favourable circumstances open the way.

36. In our opinion the arms race is a distortion of the creative powers of man. Any human endeavour that is the result of superior values should be carried out for an ethical purpose. It is therefore inadmissible that the limitless resources of human intelligence should be placed at the service of irrational destruction.

37. In a world where man astounds himself; where, because of his inventiveness, the mysteries of space are being solved; at a time when incredible technological progress at times makes reality resemble science fiction, we cannot accept the fact that violence, intimidation and insecurity continue to cast shadows on the future of mankind.

38. As signatories to the Treaty of Tlatelolco,¹ we cannot fail to express our great satisfaction that both the United States of America and the Soviet Union have acceded to it.

¹ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 326).

It is, of course, encouraging that these Powers recognize the will for peace shown by Latin America in that instrument. The effort to safeguard that region of the planet from the risks of a nuclear war also represents a sound model from which other regions have drawn inspiration in declaring zones of peace, through the decision of their Governments and peoples reflecting their absolute repudiation of war and their solemn profession of peace.

39. In this respect, we believe that Latin America has demonstrated its political maturity and made an important contribution to peace. We are confident that this same maturity, which is to our honour, will inspire new regional contributions to the problems being debated in the world today.

40. Bolivia, as a living part of America and of the developing world, could bring to a debate such as this no other message than that of its faith that reason will prevail over fear and that peace based on understanding and justice will ultimately reign.

41. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Mr. President, on behalf of the delegation of the Soviet Union, I should like to congratulate you on the occasion of your election to the presidency of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I wish you all success in the performance of that most responsible task.

42. There is no problem in international politics today which is more important and urgent than that which has brought together in this hall the representatives of 149 States of the world. To stop the arms race and to achieve real disarmament—such is the challenge of the entire course of world developments. The meeting of that challenge will affect the destiny of every man on earth.

43. The problem of disarmament is the focus of attention of the United Nations, and rightly so. Indeed, compliance with the principal requirement of the Charter of the United Nations, which is "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", means, above all, especially in the present circumstances, to seek to curb the arms race. The very convening of this special session of the General Assembly attests to this.

44. Following consistently its fundamental line with regard to disarmament questions, the Soviet Union has come to the current session with the firm intention of contributing to its success. The session will live up to the expectations of all peace-loving peoples and States if it helps to bring closer the end of the arms race, and disarmament. It is our firm conviction that the core of the whole problem lies in moving from good intentions and non-committal recommendations, vague in practical terms, even if useful, to concrete—and I stress "concrete"—steps along this main avenue of world politics to lasting peace. As long as half a century ago the founder of the Soviet State, V. I. Lenin, referring to the verbal pacifism of certain countries which were much less ready to take effective action to ensure peace, said that:

"We would prefer, on this and similar issues, to hear the fewest possible general statements, solemn promises

and pompous phrases, and to see as many as possible decisions and measures which were genuinely simple and clear and would really lead to peace, not to mention the complete elimination of the risk of war.”

45. War preparations in the world are assuming too dangerous a character for the alarm not to be sounded. In the arsenals there has already been accumulated a destructive potential of such magnitude that, if activated, it could jeopardize the very survival of man on earth. Is that not enough? Yet that potential continues to grow.

46. In the course of the celebrations marking the sixtieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, characterizing the essence of the current world situation, said:

“International relations are now at a crossroads, as it were, which could lead either to a growth of trust and co-operation or to a growth of mutual fears, suspicion and stock-piles of arms; a crossroads leading ultimately either to lasting peace or, at best, to balancing on the brink of war. Détente offers the opportunity of choosing the road of peace. To miss that opportunity would be a crime. The most important, most pressing task now is to halt the arms race which has engulfed the world.”

47. We must realize the stark truth: if we miss this chance, in certain highly important areas, we could reach a point beyond which any possibility of concluding appropriate agreements would be altogether non-existent—and for obvious reasons, since certain types of weapons which are being developed simply do not lend themselves to joint control over their quantity or qualitative characteristics.

48. Unfortunately, scientific and technological progress, meant to serve exclusively the good of mankind, is being used in no small measure to create ever newer means of destruction. The pace of their development far outstrips the progress of international talks on arms limitation. No sooner has an understanding, limited though it may be, been reached on one type of weapon than two or three new types, often even more sophisticated and dangerous, immediately emerge.

49. And what about the huge material and intellectual resources of mankind spent so unproductively on the manufacture of means of annihilation? Over \$1,000 million a day are spent on armaments—I stress this—a figure which cannot even be imagined by a normal person. How much faster the peoples would advance along the road of socio-economic development if they were not saddled with the enormous burden of huge military expenditure.

50. We have witnessed a dramatic aggravation of such problems of global dimension as those of providing people with food, medical assistance and housing and supplying industry with raw materials and energy. The environment of this planet may be threatened, and in a very real way. To postpone the solution of such problems would only exacerbate the situation. Yet the funds needed for this are still being devoured by the Moloch of armaments.

51. From any viewpoint, mankind is facing an immedi-

ate choice between halting and subsequently reversing the arms race, ending the madness imposed on the world and thus ensuring lasting peace and the possibility of solving the problems of economic development, and allowing the machine of material preparations for war to continue to gain speed, deprive the peoples—or, to be more precise, rob them—of their national wealth and push the world towards catastrophe.

52. The peoples' choice is perfectly clear. If we look at the voting record of the United Nations, which is a sort of mirror image of world politics, even if not always accurate, we see that decisions in favour of peace, détente and disarmament are carried by an overwhelming majority of States.

53. Why then are more and more twists being added to a spiralling arms race? There can be but one answer. The crux of the matter lies in the policy being pursued by certain States, which disregard both the will of the peoples and the decisions of the United Nations, even when they join in taking these decisions.

54. Coinciding with the work of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in New York, another kind of session will be held not far from here, that of the NATO Council. Represented at that session will be a number of States on whose behalf statements are being made here in favour of disarmament. What are the items on the agenda of the NATO session? There is no secret about it; they deal with a further build-up of military preparations as projected into the 1980s.

55. One is prompted to ask what is basic to the policy planning of those States: the continuation of the arms race or the possibility of disarmament?

56. Thus we see how some Governments display inconsistency in yielding to the pressure of those quarters which have thrown in their lot with military production, amassing fabulous profits from arms manufacture.

57. In order to befuddle people, to whip up the arms race they deliberately create myths or, at worst, keep harping on old stories like that of a “Soviet military threat”.

58. Every unbiased person knows that whenever the Soviet people have had to go to war it was to repel the aggressors, for wars have been imposed on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has never unleashed war, and it will never do so.

59. It has been claimed from this rostrum in a somewhat suggestive manner that the Soviet missiles termed SS-20 in the West are not aimed in one particular direction but can be turned to aim at any part of the world. In a word, that argument is introduced to confuse the issue by invoking the same trumped-up “Soviet threat”. Is it not time American nuclear and missile weapons can be turned in various directions? Yet first and foremost they can be turned in the easily predictable direction. Also, we may ask, why are they deployed in Europe at all?

60. Many of those present must have noticed that repre-

representatives of some countries generally find it difficult even to pronounce the word "disarmament"; they would rather speak of control. Control over what? Control over armaments; they say it openly, in so many words. But the volume of armaments in the world can be increased to five times the present level even if they are under control. But is that the road to peace? I must remind representatives that this special session has been convened to promote disarmament, and not to whip up the arms race. Therefore, the causes of the continuing arms race are well known to us, and not only to us.

61. We realize full well how many complications and obstacles there are on the road to disarmament. Nevertheless, our Party, our State, the socialist community, are all decisively opposed to any feelings of despair. Peoples, States and responsible Governments are capable of changing this situation if they go about it in the right way instead of pursuing a policy designed to deceive the peoples.

62. No small body of experience has already been accumulated in containing the growth of armaments in a number of areas. Bilateral and multilateral agreements, over 20 in number, have made it possible to close certain channels for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to narrow other channels. Is not the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] indicative of that? Therefore, it is possible to continue advancing beyond the ground gained.

63. Despite all its ups and downs, the current international political climate, of which détente has been a dominant feature for several years now, is favourable to serious arms limitation efforts. There has been no such precedent in the history of the interrelationships between the two world social systems. Some degree of international trust has been created, though still, of course, insufficient. A powerful impetus to all these processes was given by the recent talks of Mr. Brezhnev with the leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany.

64. It is essential to make full use of the favourable conditions obtaining at present. Political détente should merge with military détente, otherwise the positive gains in international relations achieved through the years of hard effort by many peoples and States may well vanish. To admit that there is no reasonable alternative to the policy of détente, which is actually the case, means admitting that there is no reasonable alternative to disarmament.

65. There is yet another factor which favours disarmament. The reality of the present situation is such that approximate equality or parity exists in the military field, sufficient to ensure defence, and that is recognized by both sides. However, the existing balance of military power is somewhere at the level of the Mont Blanc. As things are going, it may soon reach still greater heights. To halt the build-up of armaments and then to reduce their level without upsetting the established correlation of forces, that is, without prejudicing the security of anyone, is an opportunity which must absolutely not be missed.

66. On behalf of the Soviet Union, the delegation of the

USSR is able to say quite clearly that, if other States are prepared to disarm, the Soviet Union will not be found amiss. Military superiority is not our goal. There is not a single objective which our country intends to attain by military means. We perceive the security of our State and international peace in general through the prism of curbing the arms race, and of agreements on disarmament, agreements concluded in good faith, accommodating equally the interests of all contracting parties.

67. We do not claim to have exhaustive answers ready for all the questions arising with respect to disarmament, which is a vast problem not easy to solve. However, we have our own clear ideas in that respect. The call for disarmament has been inscribed on the banner of our socialist State since the very moment it was hoisted over the world. Concrete initiatives in this field have been tried and tested in the course of the long struggle for disarmament waged by the Soviet Union and fraternal socialist States. The limitation of armaments, disarmament measures, are an integral part of the programme of struggle for peace, international co-operation and for the freedom and independence of peoples put forward by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at its twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth Congresses.

68. From the high rostrum of the General Assembly in this special session on disarmament, our country urges all participants and all the States of the world to agree on a number of immediate steps capable of halting the arms race, and to do so without delay.

69. What then is to be done in the first place?

70. We believe that the time has come to raise the question of the complete cessation of a further quantitative and qualitative build-up of arms and armed forces of States with large military potentials.

71. More specifically, and taking into account the fact that military arsenals consist of various components of armaments, the Soviet Union proposes that the following measures be implemented: cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons; cessation of the production and prohibition of all other types of weapons of mass destruction; cessation of the development of new types of conventional armaments of great destructive capability; the renunciation of the expansion of armies and the building up of conventional armaments of the permanent members of the Security Council and of the countries which have military agreements with them.

72. Thus, appropriate measures which would radically alter the current most alarming situation and put an end to the frenzy of armaments would cover all the components of existing arms and armed forces. Such measures, if implemented, would not upset the present-day correlation of forces of States. No one stands to lose, while the gains for the cause of peace would be enormous.

73. Is it a simple thing to agree on such measures? Of course not. The Soviet Union is prepared to discuss all these measures in their totality, and, of course, it is pre-

pared not only to discuss them but also to implement them within a specified limited period of time. To make a start, we are even prepared to take up any of these measures. Since the main danger stems from the accelerating nuclear-weapons race specifically, priority could be given to the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons.

74. From the moment the atomic bomb was developed, the Soviet Union proposed that it be banned. At that time our proposal was not accepted. Today it is much more difficult to solve the formidable problem of nuclear arms. Yet it can be solved. A fatalistic approach to this undoubtedly most complex problem is alien to us.

75. Seeking to put the matter on a practical plane, the Soviet Union proposes that talks on the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of their stockpiles up to their complete destruction should get under way.

76. How do we visualize such talks?

77. Of course, all the nuclear Powers must take part in them. Such a complex problem cannot be solved on a selective basis. Evasion by any Power would place a heavy burden on its policy. That does not mean that the number of participants would be limited to just five. It would be useful if a certain number of non-nuclear States also joined in the talks.

78. Precisely how many and who will participate could be agreed on, for instance, within the framework of an appropriate preparatory committee. The same procedure could be followed in working out the agenda for the talks and in determining the specific questions to be discussed and acted upon.

79. No one should nurture any illusions since the problem is exceedingly complex in purely technical terms as well. But what is much more important is the political aspect. Unless we approach the matter in a practical manner it will not budge an inch.

80. It goes without saying that the elaboration and implementation of measures to end the production of nuclear weapons and gradually destroy their stockpiles should go hand in hand with and be inseparable from the strengthening of international legal guarantees for the security of States. It is not fortuitous that the General Assembly adopted some time ago the well-known decision on the non-use of force in international relations along with the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons [*resolution 2936 (XXVII)*]. The conclusion, in accordance with United Nations decisions, of a relevant world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations would be a major step forward in that direction.

81. We suggest that, at the current special session, the General Assembly should adopt a decision of principle to start negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on the question of the non-use of force. What is more, it should establish a procedure for their preparation and set a date for their beginning. That would reveal in deeds rather than in

words those who intend firmly to do their utmost to relieve mankind from the threat of nuclear war and those who would rather do the opposite.

82. Another major question which we are emphasizing in the context of slowing down the nuclear arms race is the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. The relevant treaty has played and continues to play a very useful role in this respect. However, further efforts are required.

83. This, like many other international issues, requires unilateral, bilateral and multilateral actions by States. For its part, the Soviet Union is undertaking such an action. I believe it would not be an exaggeration to say that it is a significant action.

84. From the rostrum of the special session our country declares that the Soviet Union will never use nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories.

85. We are aware of the responsibility which would thus fall on us as a result of such a commitment. But we are convinced that such a step to meet the wishes of non-nuclear States to have stronger security guarantees is in the interests of peace in the broadest sense of the word. We expect that the goodwill evinced by our country in this manner will lead to more active participation by a large number of States in strengthening the non-proliferation régime.

86. The Soviet Union is prepared to enter into an appropriate bilateral agreement with any non-nuclear State. We call upon all the other nuclear Powers to follow our example.

87. Nuclear weapons, should they find their way into the hands of States in conflict with their neighbours, could trigger an all-out nuclear conflagration. We never fail to draw attention to this danger to world peace. Here, a single mistake would be one too many. Incidentally, this is one of the main reasons why plans to develop nuclear weapons in the Republic of South Africa and in Israel cause such great concern. Everything must be done to prevent these plans from being carried out.

88. We must support in every possible way the desire of States to see certain geographical areas free of nuclear weapons. That is precisely the attitude of the Soviet Union.

89. A few days ago, during the visit to Moscow of the President of Mexico, Mr. López Portillo, our country signed Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America—the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

90. Honestly speaking, we had some doubts on that score because of some well-known short-comings and weak points in that Treaty. Nevertheless, we decided to assume the obligation to respect the denuclearized status of the Latin American continent. We proceed from the premise that such an obligation will remain valid only if the

other nuclear Powers respect the status of that zone and if its participants ensure a truly nuclear-free régime for it.

91. The Soviet Union will continue through practical action to contribute to the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. In other words, here, too, our aim is the same: to reduce the threat of a nuclear conflict. It is of course important that they be truly nuclear-free zones.

92. Sometimes we hear it said: we too favour non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but wonder if it would not harm international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. The answer is no; it would not harm it. It is possible, without infringing upon the interests of non-nuclear countries in this field, to preclude at the same time the possibility of someone—let us say in the deserts or jungles of Africa or Latin America—from trying to find some roundabout way of manufacturing nuclear weapons.

93. The Soviet Union has for many years now been helping a number of countries to have their natural uranium enriched at Soviet facilities. We have always been engaged in other forms of co-operation in this field. And this does not lead to a greater nuclear threat.

94. There is yet another way of preventing nuclear weapons from proliferating all over the globe—that of limiting the number of territories on which they are stationed. The Soviet Union submits for discussion by the participants in this special session the question of not stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of State where there are no such weapons at present. In fact, there is no technical difficulty that could stand in the way of its solution. All that is required is the political will on the part of nuclear and non-nuclear States. Indeed, some non-nuclear countries have already declared that they will not condone the emplacement of nuclear charges on their territories. This practice could well become universal.

95. For their part the nuclear Powers would undertake not to station nuclear weapons—warheads, bombs, shells, mines—in those countries where there are no such weapons at present. As a result, we would thus be able to erect yet another obstacle in the way of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to prevent a possible destabilization of the strategic situation.

96. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is ready to assume an obligation to this end, and we call upon the other nuclear Powers to do the same. If they agree not to station nuclear weapons in areas where there are none at present, we believe that it would then not be difficult to couch such an agreement in treaty language.

97. Quite recently at the very highest level, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and President of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Leonid Il'yich Brezhnev, declared:

“We are against the use of nuclear weapons; only extraordinary circumstances—aggression against our

country or its allies by another nuclear Power—could compel us to resort to this extreme means of self-defence.”

If this attitude met with the support of all the other nuclear Powers, the situation in the world would become much calmer.

98. It is useful to recall in this connexion that the socialist countries of Europe addressed a proposal to all participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to sign a treaty on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other. That proposal still stands and awaits implementation.

99. The specific feature of the arms race today is that it is becoming increasingly qualitative in character. Hence, it is particularly imperative to prevent the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. This is another problem that could well have been tackled a number of years ago.

100. Unfortunately, the pace of talks on that subject has been slow. We favour redoubled efforts in order to reach agreement at last. Prototypes of new lethal and merciless weapons developed in laboratories and design offices must not be allowed to reach the mass production lines.

101. All that is happening now in connexion with neutron weapons proves how much more closely they threaten humanity. Some people express surprise at a powerful wave of protests on the European continent and throughout the world against plans to produce these weapons in the United States and subsequently to station them in Western Europe. But the peoples and the world public have been quick to realize that this is a particularly vicious and cruel means of mass destruction intended specially to annihilate all living things.

102. The Soviet Union favours a complete prohibition of neutron weapons—not because we would be unable to meet this challenge in an appropriate way. What happened in the case of atomic and then thermonuclear weapons bears that out. As a matter of principle we are against adding a new dimension to the arms race.

103. We propose that agreement be reached on the mutual renunciation of the production of nuclear neutron weapons before it is too late. Last March, jointly with other socialist countries, the Soviet Union submitted a draft convention on the subject² to the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. We expect a clear and unambiguous reply to that proposal.

104. The Soviet Union does not intend to begin the production of neutron weapons unless the United States or any other States does so. Our country declares this in the clearest possible fashion. Neutron weapons must be banned once and for all. We say clearly to the peoples of certain countries where sometimes support is voiced for neutron

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27, vol. II, document CCD/559.*

weapons: beware lest you be deceived; be on your guard; it is reason rather than folly that must triumph.

105. A fresh impetus to the disarmament negotiations now under way in various international forums or on a bilateral basis could be one of the concrete results of this special session. In a number of cases a considerable amount of work has already been accomplished, and that strengthens the conviction that the arms race can be curbed.

106. Let us first turn to the Soviet-American talks on limiting strategic offensive arms. These talks arouse particular interest all over the world and the reasons for that are, we believe, understandable. Too much is at stake.

107. During all the years that those talks have been going on, the Soviet Union has consistently been seeking a mutually acceptable understanding. And we cannot be held responsible for the fact that the talks have dragged on for so long. But I do not wish to dwell on that here.

108. Now, many of the difficulties in the talks have been overcome. As we see it, possibilities exist for resolving the remaining issues as well. Indeed, they exist objectively. We proceed from the premise that mutual efforts can make it possible to arrive at an agreement which would accommodate equally the interests of the security of both sides and serve the broad interests of a stronger peace.

109. Immediately after signing the agreement which is now being prepared, the Soviet Union would be ready to enter into negotiations which should lead, with all the necessary factors being taken into account, to a substantial reduction—I repeat “reduction”—of the levels of strategic arms and to a further limitation of their qualitative improvement.

110. It seems that there are grounds for expecting a successful completion of the talks on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This is an area of curbing the arms race on which the efforts of many States have been concentrated for several years now. The role of our country in this is well known. What is required now is to bring the matter to a conclusion—to ban tests in all the environments, that is to say, to ban underground tests as well.

111. Clearing the path towards constructive agreement, the Soviet Union has travelled its part of the way to meet its partners in the negotiations—the United States and Great Britain—and has done so on the issues that presented the greatest difficulties. We have agreed to verification on a voluntary basis, to a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions and to the entry into force of the treaty—even if initially not all the five nuclear Powers become parties to it, but only the USSR, the United States and Great Britain.

112. But it is not only important to ensure an early signing of the treaty. It is no less important that the example set by the three Powers with respect to the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests be convincing

enough to be followed by others. An end must be put to nuclear-weapon tests in all environments and by all those who conduct them.

113. It is necessary to complete in the near future the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. What is needed is a decisive spurt—as they say—and that is what we are calling for. The problem of control which has arisen can be resolved on the basis of national means of verification supplemented by well-considered international procedures.

114. Another type of weapons of mass destruction—radiological weapons—must be banned. Those are weapons known to affect living organisms by non-explosive radioactive emanation. An agreement can be said to be in the offing; a relevant draft convention has already been partly agreed upon. Here again, we stand for a speedy completion of that work.

115. The Soviet Union believes that it is an important and positive factor of the international situation today that the talks in progress cover not only types of weapons of mass destruction but also armed forces and conventional armaments.

116. It is an established fact that 80 per cent of the world's military expenditures go for conventional armaments. A great number of people in the post-war period alone have fallen victim to weapons called “conventional” but which now, as a result of their amazing accuracy and complete coverage of large areas, have a most devastating power.

117. The talks being held at Vienna dealing with the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe are highly important in that respect.

118. In that area the two most powerful military and political alliances confront one another. But here, too, an approximate military parity has been reached between them. Therefore, through agreed measures it is possible to reduce the level of that equilibrium without upsetting it in anybody's favour, without prejudicing anyone's security.

119. Such is our approach to those talks. Unlike the NATO countries, we have not expanded our armed forces in central Europe for a long time, nor do we intend to increase them in the future by one single soldier, by one single tank. Our approach is also shown in our desire to do our utmost to find mutually acceptable solutions; but far from everything depends on us.

120. We continue to hope that the talks will be concluded successfully, that the other side will abandon its desire to secure unilateral advantages for itself and to change the correlation of forces. Military détente on the European continent can and must make substantial headway.

121. The talks on the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean are now in progress between the USSR and the United States. But it is clear that the parties directly involved are not the only ones

interested in their success; so, too, are many unilateral States. It can even be said that an agreement on the limitation of armaments in such a vast part of the world would have a noticeable effect on the international situation as a whole.

122. So far, the discussions concern "freezing" military activities in the Indian Ocean at the present levels. Of course, this is only a beginning. Later on we are prepared to seek ways of drastically reducing such activities, including the dismantling of foreign military bases. Thus, the idea of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, put forward by littoral States and supported by the majority of States Members of the United Nations, will take a more definitive shape.

123. As you can see, talks on various aspects of disarmament cover a broad spectrum of problems. I shall also mention here the Soviet-American consultations on the limitation of international trade and transfers of conventional armaments. This is, of course, an urgent problem, but a clear-cut political approach must underlie its solution. One cannot place on the same footing the aggressor and his victim; one cannot allow any encroachment on the rights of peoples waging a legitimate struggle for their liberation from colonial and racist oppression.

124. The strengthening of international treaties and agreements in force in the field of disarmament would be a significant lever for ending the arms race.

125. Why is it that about one third of the States Members of the United Nations still have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons? Why is it that almost one third of the States Members of the United Nations are not parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water?³ Why is it that more than half of them are not parties to the convention banning bacteriological weapons,⁴ or to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof? [resolution 2660 (XXV), annex] Can one consider this situation as normal?

126. It is a situation which calls, purely and simply, for accession to existing treaties and agreements rather than general statements on the desirability of disarmament. No excuse sounds convincing here.

127. We hope that the special session on disarmament will have its authoritative say and will strongly urge States to make their contribution to strengthening the international treaties in force.

128. Before concluding, mention should be made of yet another practical step which could scale down the arms race and at the same time release additional funds for development needs. That step is the reduction of the military

budgets of States. This is not a new problem for the United Nations. Yet, despite all the resolutions adopted on that score, there has been no progress towards its solution.

129. The Soviet Union takes the initiative in order to get things moving. We propose that the States having large economic and military potential—and in the first place the countries that are permanent members of the Security Council—should agree to reduce their military budgets, not in terms of percentage points, but in absolute figures. Of course, the idea still stands that part of the amount thus freed would be diverted to meet the needs of developing countries. In other words, if that helps, we are prepared, along with others, to reduce our military budget on such a basis.

130. Such is the general outline of our approach to the problem of the arms race and disarmament. This is the essence of the document entitled "Practical measures for ending the arms race: proposals of the Soviet Union" which we are submitting for consideration by the special session of the General Assembly [A/S-10/AC.1/4].

131. The Soviet Union believes that the steps proposed are essential if we wish to halt the arms race. They could actually lead to a break-through in achieving military détente and lead to a radical lessening of the threat of war.

132. At the same time, all these steps are feasible in practice. They take into account the present balance of forces in the world. Their implementation will not result in unilateral advantages for anyone.

133. The special session of the General Assembly can realistically, without going to extremes, assess the state of affairs in the field of disarmament in the world. It must explicitly speak out on the objectives and priorities in this field, confirm, on the basis of the collective experience of States, the well-considered and fundamental approaches to the problem of disarmament. But what is required is that all participants display a genuine desire for peace, free from the risk of war and armed conflicts. The responsibility of all—practically of every country—for the present and the future of the peoples of the world is too great today for them not to co-operate in good faith in meeting the truly historic challenge of disarmament.

134. The more concrete the programme of action in the field of disarmament worked out at the session, the more clear-cut and definite its decisions, the greater will be its effectiveness. It is obvious that such decisions will be recommendations, but they will be recommendations in favour of peace and against the danger of war.

135. The Soviet Union, and we are not alone, favours the holding of a world disarmament conference, the forum which would be in a position to adopt at once effective decisions truly binding on all States. The success of the special session should help in convening such a conference. That means that we should give serious thought to a specific and early date for the holding of this world conference.

136. A few words concerning yet another item on the

³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

⁴ Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex).

agenda of the special session: the international machinery for disarmament negotiations. We are convinced that here a great degree of circumspection should be displayed. It is easy to dismantle the well-adjusted machinery. But would that be beneficial for disarmament, or could it possibly play into the hands of those who actually oppose disarmament?

137. We see no need to give up the existing negotiating channels or to restructure them radically. Of course, the existing bodies should produce more results than has been the case so far; we are in favour of that. Indeed, any machinery, any subsidiary body or its work, can only be as good as the policies of the States represented on it. Changing the names or the signboards of such bodies would make little difference.

138. The Soviet Union will do everything in its power so that decisions of the special session of the General Assembly and the document it adopts serve as real guidelines for States in their advance towards the radical solution of the problem of disarmament, up to general and complete disarmament, and to removing the very material basis of war. It goes without saying that, as always, we shall give thorough consideration to any constructive proposals in that direction which may be made here.

139. Both within the United Nations and outside it we are prepared to co-operate constructively with all those who actually strive for disarmament. There exists in particular a natural and organic foundation and basis for co-operation between socialist countries and non-aligned States which contributes in no small measure to the strengthening of international security, freedom and the independence of peoples.

140. The socialist countries, welded together by unity of purpose and ideals, both in the field of domestic policies and in their international activities, will continue to use all their influence and all their prestige to ensure peace.

141. One would wish that the loud appeals for peace and the denunciation of war, heard from this high rostrum, would reach the remotest corners of the world and shake it so mightily that the voices of the advocates of the arms race, uniformed or not, would be drowned by the powerful voices of the peoples themselves, who long to live in conditions of lasting peace and reliable security.

142. Mr. MONTES (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): For my delegation it is a particular pleasure to take part in this general debate, Mr. President, under your skilful and efficient guidance. In the course of the last three sessions you have set an outstanding example of skill and competence in conducting the proceedings of the General Assembly, thus contributing to the successful outcome of the Assembly's debate on the delicate questions before it.

143. I should like to add the gratitude of the Government of Argentina to the many expressions extended to you by many other delegations. In so doing we wish to assure you of our conviction that on this occasion too, so important for the cause of disarmament, we shall, thanks to your re-

newed efforts, be able to conclude successfully the arduous work that lies before us.

144. It is a coincidence that augurs well that the President of this session of the Assembly should happen to be a citizen of a country which has made such a signal contribution in the field of disarmament, characterized by an independent political approach and constructive ideas, among which it is fitting to mention its decisive support for the non-aligned initiative for the convening of this self-same session.

145. It is no exaggeration to affirm that this special session which has just begun may well become an historic landmark. The United Nations, for the first time since it came into being, has decided to devote its undivided attention to a comprehensive consideration of all the aspects of the problem of disarmament. This is the first time that this universal body has brought together such high-level political representatives, including the prestigious participation of many heads of State and Government, for the sole purpose of making an in-depth evaluation of the grave situation created by the arms race, for laying the foundations for promoting negotiations which will make it possible to halt it and initiating a process of genuine disarmament, as well as examining the significance which disarmament might have in terms of contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security and to economic development. It is also the first time that such a comprehensive meeting on this subject has been given such thorough, careful and lengthy preparation.

146. In other words, this event is attended by so many favourable circumstances that it may very well mark the beginning of a promising stage on the difficult and tortuous road to the final objective of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

147. We should avoid arousing false hopes by shutting our eyes to the facts which we have to face, but that does not mean that we should allow those facts to feed a paralysing scepticism that would dismiss out of hand any possibility of change.

148. In disarmament, as in all other human endeavours, there are no insuperable obstacles provided there is the will and determination to overcome them, particularly when the very physical survival of the human race and of our civilization is at stake. This is therefore no mere moral option: it is nothing less than an inescapable moral imperative.

149. The time is right for us to halt and think matters over. The Disarmament Decade proclaimed by this very General Assembly is about to come to an end without so far having lived up to any of the justified expectations of world public opinion. On the contrary, the spiralling arms race goes on at an even higher rate of escalation, and has reached unimaginable extremes, in terms of quantity, destructive power and danger of weapons as well as in terms of the increasing resources devoted to arms production.

150. When statistics show that the world is spending more than \$1,000 million a day on weapons and there are

immediate prospects of substantial increases in this sum, one does not require a particularly fertile imagination to understand the seriousness of the situation. At the present time, nuclear arsenals are 8 million times more powerful than those used to obliterate Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. In other words, these stockpiles are capable of annihilating more than 12,000 million human beings, that is to say, approximately four times the present world population.

151. The super-Powers alone enjoy the doubtful privilege of possessing armaments many times more powerful than what is needed for their mutual destruction and, incidentally, to destroy every vestige of life on this planet.

152. This means that in any generalized nuclear conflict between the two super-Powers there would be no possibility for any nation to proclaim itself neutral, or for innocent peoples to remain passive spectators. They would all, without exception, willingly or not, find themselves involved in the holocaust and suffer its consequences.

153. It is precisely this common destiny which faces mankind in the not at all unlikely presumption of a nuclear war which creates a factor of interdependence among all countries and renders indispensable their participation in efforts to call a halt to the arms race and to introduce a minimum of security in international relations.

154. Disarmament must therefore be a collective effort. Nevertheless, it goes without saying that those nuclear States with a nuclear arms monopoly, and hence the capacity for total destruction, bear a relatively far greater responsibility.

155. Any arbitrary attempt to shift this responsibility to the vast majority of countries which maintain only a minimum level of armaments compatible with defence requirements would not fail to be interpreted as a subterfuge designed to give primacy to collateral questions of disarmament and to avoid the adoption of concrete measures in the field of nuclear weapons.

156. We are fully aware of the difficulties of every kind involved in the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, we believe it to be an urgent and immediate necessity to take genuine steps in that direction. Setting limits to deterrence levels, which are in any case extremely high, is not enough. A start must be made as soon as possible on the gradual and balanced, but effective, reduction of these weapons.

157. Nor should the categorical reaffirmation of the priority of nuclear weapons, so often proclaimed in General Assembly resolutions, be allowed to detract from the importance of devoting attention at the same time to other weapons systems.

158. In this context, the delegation of Argentina regrets that the current negotiations have not yet produced a draft treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. We should like to think that this delay is due to the laudable desire to consider all the precautions and safeguards which

are essential for all nuclear-weapon Powers to sign such a treaty, and similarly to prevent vertical proliferation.

159. Similarly, we would have welcomed a treaty on chemical weapons. Once again, we should like to express our confidence that after such substantial and prolonged preparation, the scope of the prohibition will be complete and not partial, to avoid the repetition of similar errors contained in other instruments which reduced their acceptability.

160. Along the same lines, the delegation of Argentina believes that this special session of the General Assembly should reach an agreement to promote without delay negotiations designed to prevent the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as an agreement to prohibit those weapons which cause unnecessary to indiscriminate suffering.

161. The final document to be submitted for our approval should, in the part devoted to the programme of action, include clear provisions on these points.

162. I shall now turn to a subject which is being debated with increasing intensity in various international forums: the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Our position in this respect has been repeatedly explained, but I should like to avail myself of this forum and this opportunity to make it absolutely clear.

163. My Government whole-heartedly endorses the objective of avoiding the spread of those weapons. Argentina is not only concerned with the undeniable risks inherent in such a proliferation, but over and above that, we declare our opposition to nuclear arms as such wherever they may exist and whoever may possess them. Unreservedly we declare here once again that they must be totally eliminated forever and as soon as possible.

164. In stating our views we believe it essential to add equally clearly that the danger of horizontal proliferation is intimately linked with the more serious and immediate danger of uninterrupted vertical proliferation. We fail to understand the selective thinking of those who evince constant concern at horizontal proliferation but at the same time continue to manufacture ever more devastating and sophisticated nuclear weapons and display a persistent unwillingness to reduce their number or to embark resolutely on nuclear disarmament.

165. We have also maintained that there should be no confusion between ends and means. The objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, both horizontally and vertically, should have the unrestricted and unreserved support of the entire international community. The proper means to attain this goal, in the view of the Government of Argentina, is not the non-proliferation treaty.

166. We respect the motives of the many countries which have acceded to the treaty, and thus consented to limitations to their sovereignty, in the conviction that this was the only way to avert a nuclear threat and to ensure for their peoples the benefits of the peaceful uses of this technology.

167. For our part, we rejected the treaty from the very beginning because it is clearly discriminatory in nature inasmuch as, for the first time in history, it legitimizes a division of the world into two categories of countries: those who are to be given a completely free hand in the nuclear field and those who are to be subject to restrictions.

168. Furthermore, we were convinced that it could not be applied in practice, since it did not impose on the nuclear Powers clear-cut obligations to disarm in this area, that is to say, it did not require the elimination of vertical proliferation as an acceptable *quid pro quo* for the prevention of horizontal proliferation.

169. We regret to note that events have vindicated us. The treaty was not only discriminatory in principle, but also proved to be so in practice. In 1968, the year in which it was opened for signature, the Soviet Union possessed 1,100 strategic nuclear warheads, and the United States 4,200. In 1977, seven years after the treaty entered into force, they possessed 4,000 and 8,500 respectively. Thus, instead of complying with the commitment freely entered into to initiate nuclear disarmament in good faith, they continued to intensify their arms rivalry.

170. Moreover, the promises of technological assistance for nuclear development for peaceful purposes were also not followed by the results expected, as is shown by the records and documents of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons held in 1975.⁵

171. Yet, despite the serious shortcomings I have mentioned, the fact that so many countries failed to sign the non-proliferation treaty gave rise to unjustified suspicions which mar international relations and impede the unquestionable right of all to make the fullest use of the peaceful applications of atomic energy. A series of restrictive and discriminatory measures, which in some cases disregarded contractual obligations formally entered into, has compounded the difficulties encountered by many States in their attempts, made at great cost to themselves, to diversify their sources of energy.

172. To equate arbitrarily the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with the presumed possibility of producing nuclear weapons, and therefore to impose unjustified limitations on the transfer of technology and nuclear material, is tantamount to an attempt to perpetuate the scientific and technological oligopoly of a handful of industrialized States, to the direct detriment of the interests of the developing countries. The situation becomes even more serious in the case of restrictions that involve non-proliferating technologies, thus nullifying the focal concepts of international co-operation in this field.

173. At the risk of repetition, we should like to stress that we shall unreservedly support any fair and appropriate initiative to prevent any type of proliferation and that we shall continue to co-operate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, as we have always done, in laying down

and observing the respective safeguards. However, with equal firmness we must stress that we shall exercise to the full our inalienable right to acquire, refine and apply advances in nuclear technology for the benefit and progress of the Argentine people.

174. My country, together with other Latin American republics, took an active part in the negotiating process which culminated in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, better known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Treaty was opened for signature in 1967, and Argentina signed it in the same year, seeing it as an instrument that was entirely in keeping with the objective of prohibiting the acquisition, manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear arms in the area and of ensuring respect for its prohibitions by nuclear-weapon Powers, both inside and outside the continent.

175. Unlike the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty of Tlatelolco recognizes no category of privileged countries. All the sister States of Latin America are placed on a precisely equal footing in assuming the obligations it lays down. By creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the Treaty makes a genuine contribution to nuclear disarmament while providing due protection for nuclear development for peaceful purposes.

176. I have great satisfaction in announcing here that the Government of Argentina, in strict compliance with its principles, has initiated the procedures necessary for the ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We do so in the confidence that it will be signed by those nuclear-weapon Powers which have not yet done so, thus enabling it to enter fully into force.

177. This decision is a further demonstration of the spirit of peace and harmony underlying our policy and of our unstinting support for the idea of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons when this goal is sought by appropriate and equitable measures.

178. My Government, in order to demonstrate its devotion to the cause of disarmament, has also initiated proceedings for the ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and also on the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, which we signed in 1972 and 1971 respectively.

179. Argentina sees disarmament as a common endeavour of all the Members of this Organization. No self-respecting country which wishes to preserve its national identity can fail to participate in taking decisions liable to affect, directly or indirectly, interests vital to its security, sovereignty or future as an independent State. We therefore believe that the United Nations today, having become an almost completely universal body, should be more active in playing the leading role in the field of disarmament assigned to it by the Charter.

⁵ See NPT/CONF.35/I-III.

180. Under the Charter, the General Assembly, made up of the 149 Member States, is the deliberative body that is competent to determine the principles, procedures and priorities of disarmament, and to discharge the function of supervising the application of agreements that may be arrived at pursuant to its recommendations.

181. The First Committee of the General Assembly could be instructed to devote itself exclusively to examining disarmament questions at its annual meetings and to establish a subsidiary body that would have the task of preparing the comprehensive disarmament programme.

182. Argentina commends the initiatives along these lines that have been put forward. We also support the idea of convening a second special session within three or four years with the object of reviewing and evaluating progress on all the points we may agree upon on this occasion, and also in drawing up the programme mentioned.

183. These are activities which are particularly appropriate to deliberative bodies, in which all States should be represented so that they can make known their positions and thus contribute to a clear definition of the views and general will of the community of nations. It is obvious, however, that no effective disarmament measure can be imposed by a majority of votes. Every measure requires first a process of negotiation, which is almost always slow and detailed because of the complexity of the issues involved, and in which due account must be taken of the different interests involved, with an appropriate balance of rights and duties and also of effective methods of verification.

184. In turn, all concrete measures presuppose the participation in the relevant negotiations of all militarily significant States, whose consent is indispensable if those measures are to be put into effect. It is hardly necessary to point out that this applies particularly with regard to nuclear disarmament. No one can seriously imagine that certain nuclear Powers are going to subscribe tamely to instruments produced by other nations without their participation or without their wishes having been taken into account. Measures arrived at in this way would be doomed to failure, or at best would be only partially effective—which in the field of nuclear disarmament would provide no guarantees.

185. This suggests some ideas which I should like to voice on the item relating to disarmament negotiating machinery. Argentina has the privilege of being a member of that negotiating organ *par excellence*, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which meets at Geneva. Ever since it became a member in 1969, Argentina has cooperated resolutely in ensuring that the Conference discharges its specific function of producing genuine disarmament agreements and not mere collateral "non-armament" measures.

186. We believe that it was loyalty to the objectives of the Conference that explained the voicing in some cases of constructive criticisms designed to improve its functioning. We have said on various occasions that basically the Conference has all the necessary ingredients for successful

work. But, with equal candour, we have expressed our doubts as to the scope of the instruments it was negotiating in the absence of France and the People's Republic of China.

187. In this connexion, we have maintained for some years now that the Conference should rid itself of those features which constitute an obstacle to the participation of those two nuclear Powers since no one State can be made to join a body which it does not find satisfactory. In its note to the Secretary-General dated 11 May 1977, the Argentine delegation proposed that the General Assembly should consider at its special session: "The possibility of improving the structure and working procedures of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. In this connexion, it would be necessary to revise the composition of the Conference, to grant *de jure* membership to all nuclear-weapon States and to change without delay the present system of co-chairmen." [See A/S-10/1, vol. III, document A/AC.187/48.]

188. Among the very interesting initiatives submitted by France to the Preparatory Committee, which Argentina has studied with care and enthusiasm, there is the proposal to replace the Conference by a new negotiating body with closer links with the United Nations [*ibid.*, vol. VI, document A/AC.187/105]. We note that the French proposal, apart from revealing an encouraging change in attitude, has many points in common with similar concerns expressed by other countries and in particular with the most recent document from the group of 15 in the Conference.⁶ We are convinced, therefore, that at this special session we have a real possibility of working out an understanding which will accommodate the different viewpoints and make it possible for France to become a member of a negotiating body.

189. We sincerely trust that the People's Republic of China will adopt a similar attitude, since its participation would undoubtedly give new momentum and meaning to the disarmament negotiations.

190. We also believe that the French suggestion concerning the establishment of a satellite monitoring agency under United Nations jurisdiction and international control should be examined at this session with a view to giving it immediate concrete expression, since this would constitute a distinct advance in the field of disarmament verification.

191. In the fourth part of the draft final document prepared by the Preparatory Committee [*ibid.*, vol. I] the Assembly has a series of viable options with regard to disarmament negotiating machinery. In our view, there are no irreconcilable differences among them and with a minimum of flexibility and a spirit of compromise they can be reconciled. It is our bounden duty to reach a consensus on this point because the political will of States is just as important for the future of disarmament as are structures and carefully adjusted procedures which would make possible the equitable negotiation of the various agreements.

⁶ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27, vol. II, document CCD/563.

192. I should like now to say a few words about the work done by the Preparatory Committee for the special session. It was a great honour for my country that an Argentine citizen should have been unanimously elected to preside over its proceedings. In approving this appointment, my Government was particularly mindful of the delicate responsibility involved in the discharge of this function and of the need to make a contribution to the constructive performance of the Committee's task with all the guarantees necessary for impartiality in the conduct of its work. It is not for me, of course, to appraise the performance of Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, but I should like to place on record the satisfaction felt by the Argentine delegation at the efficient, positive and particularly harmonious way in which the Committee carried out the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly. Thanks to the dedicated work of all its members and the Secretariat, a climate of sincere co-operation was established which made it possible for all decisions to be adopted by consensus and led to the successful preparation of this session.

193. It is true that appreciable differences still exist in certain parts of the draft final document, but there is no doubt that the Preparatory Committee went as far as it possibly could in resolving them. It is now for this Assembly to take up the challenge and resolve the differences still outstanding. I am convinced that in the next few weeks we shall find the right solutions to the problems that remain.

194. The current state of international relations is particularly delicate. The easing of political tensions which has been much in evidence in recent years has been severely tested by the emergence of new hotbeds of armed conflict. There are also indirect and more subtle methods of aggression, which encourage terrorist violence in order to channel ambitions for domination in various countries. This state of affairs is disquieting because if it persists it will inevitably have the effect of reviving latent suspicions and antagonisms, and this in turn will give additional impetus to the arms race.

195. Accordingly, if disarmament is really the aspiration of us all, in addition to the principles, priorities and measures which we may determine here, it is our bounden duty to buttress with deeds, not mere declarations, policies designed to strengthen peace, security and confidence among nations. Only in this way shall we be able to give this first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament genuine content and real prospects of success.

196. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker in the general debate is the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. I have great pleasure in welcoming His Excellency Mr. Helmut Schmidt and in inviting him to address the General Assembly.

197. Mr. SCHMIDT (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, I consider it a particular privilege to address this august assembly today under your distinguished presidency. Our two countries enjoy cordial and friendly relations and we are happy to see you at the helm of the important work of the General Assembly, already for the third time this year. My delegation is therefore confident

that this special session will come to a mutually agreed and satisfactory close.

[The speaker continued in German.]⁷

198. On behalf of my country and its people I wish to say that it is our desire—and we are going to do everything in our power to make it come true—that the nations of the earth will find their way to lasting peace. We sincerely wish for peace because we have experienced two world wars which claimed millions of victims. We also wish for peace because we are most directly affected by the fact that large areas of the world are suffering from military conflicts.

199. The Federal Republic of Germany, therefore, welcomes the fact that the United Nations, by convening this special session of the General Assembly, is making the world more deeply aware of the dangers of the arms race. We have supported the initiative of the non-aligned countries from the very beginning. The United Nations is thus intensifying the efforts to achieve disarmament and arms control, subjects which have been on the agenda of this Organization for the past 32 years.

200. I am speaking on behalf of a country that cannot and will not act as a big Power. My country, however, is aware of its share of the responsibility for peace. The treaties that we have concluded have, in many ways, made manifest our renunciation of force in a binding form as far as international law is concerned, and will continue to be our guidance.

201. With the invention of nuclear weapons, mankind has entered a new age. It is fundamentally different from all previous ages. The revolution in military strategy brought about by nuclear weapons has created new conditions for war and for peace. Every conflict between States or alliances equipped with nuclear weaponry therefore implies a risk that has no equivalent in history. Nor is that risk confined to parties to a conflict; it threatens their neighbours and whole continents and, in the extreme case of a global war with nuclear means of mass destruction, the entire planet—with predictably catastrophic consequences for several generations.

202. Ever since, we have lived with a system of mutual nuclear deterrence of the super-Powers. Three and a half decades of nuclear peace have not yet given a final answer, however, to the question of how peace without fear can be achieved. That is too short a span of time to make it possible yet to draw conclusions of historical significance. Armed peace has lasted since 1945 in an epoch that has abounded with profound differences and conflicts of interest between those who hold nuclear power. The efforts since the Second World War to achieve disarmament and arms control, which began with the Baruch Plan, have, however, fallen short of the original expectations of the peoples. Nevertheless, several important results have been achieved in connexion with the partial nuclear test ban, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the limitation of

⁷ The English version of this part of the statement was supplied by the delegation.

strategic nuclear weapons. The Disarmament Decade [resolution 2602 E (XXIV)] proclaimed by the United Nations at the beginning of this decade has not been without positive results. At the same time, the results of efforts to reduce conventional sources and armaments have so far been disappointing.

203. Outside the system of deterrence and the alliances protected by nuclear weapons, political conflicts since 1945 have led to a number of wars in many parts of the world that have been fought with modern, non-nuclear weapons with great destructive power. In the interests of peace today, we need a comprehensive political partnership for security. Only in this way will it be possible to set in motion a process of genuine arms limitation and reduction. At this juncture, I wish to pay my respects to President Carter for the energy and force of conviction with which he has promoted this process.

204. I believe that the concept for a more stable peace consists of four elements: first, a policy of political, strategic and military balance; secondly, a policy of détente, of conflict containment and of reconciliation of interests; thirdly, the capacity for effective crisis management; and fourthly, the predictability and the calculability of political and military conduct.

205. We know from experience, however, that in a world full of mistrust and radical conflicts there is no simple or quick recipe for achieving these four basic elements of solidarity to establish security on a stable basis. Disarmament can be brought about only where trust prevails, and trust will develop only where there is security.

206. The policy of security as a policy for peace must today be global in scope if it is to be successful. Events in the Middle East, in the eastern Mediterranean, in Africa or in south-east Asia concern all of us because they may hamper—indeed, place gravely in jeopardy—the process of détente and mutual trust which is growing slowly.

207. It is not enough to give our attention exclusively to nuclear weapons. World-wide agreements among the nuclear Powers themselves cannot prevent the outbreak of conventional regional wars. Such wars can escalate and culminate in a clash between the big Powers. The prohibition of the use or threat of force embodied in the Charter of the United Nations must therefore apply to all weapons, both nuclear and conventional. Whoever is the first to take up arms of whatever kind and to resort to or threaten military attack violates this prohibition. This prohibition is comprehensive; either it applies totally or not at all. Those who try to restrict it to the first use of certain weapons must ask themselves whether they would consider an attack launched with other weapons less prohibited. Should a country which is threatened by a neighbour heavily armed with conventional weapons be less protected than others by the prohibition of the use of force?

208. Regional agreements on conventional forces and armaments must therefore be sought on a par and simultaneously with efforts to limit armaments in the nuclear sphere; not only at home in Europe but in all regions.

209. The balance which I have just mentioned seems to me to be the most important principle from which all efforts to achieve arms control and disarmament must start. For so long as a world Government with a world police force and monopoly of weapons appears Utopian, the stabilization of balance will remain our principal task. Balance is today an indispensable element of a strategy for safeguarding peace.

210. Attempts to reach agreement on arms limitations that are not aimed at establishing a stable balance offer little prospect of lasting success. Arms limitations must therefore serve to create a stable balance of forces at a lower level.

211. Though progress towards arms limitation has up to now been modest, it has at least brought one important strategic result: the super-Powers have redefined their own security requirements. They no longer automatically regard the unilateral growth of nuclear power as an increase in their own security. I consider that to be major progress.

212. Insecurity will be generated if one side exposes a potential adversary to growing uncertainty. Concern about increasing inferiority or imponderabilities, fear or political miscalculation could lead a State that, rightly or wrongly, feels inferior, to panic and act irrationally. The more the awareness of this risk spreads and encourages Governments to draw appropriate conclusions in the field of armaments the more will it be possible to gain the necessary recognition for the principle of a balance of forces.

213. Balance is definitely not a one-time but a continuous task. Economic and social changes also can create instability and hence new dangers. That aspect must not be neglected.

214. Military balance need not necessarily take the shape of total arithmetical identity of all kinds of armed forces and weapons. But an over-all parity in terms of security policy must be established. This must also be understood and accepted psychologically by those concerned.

215. A policy of balance can by no means be confined to the military sphere. Balance must rather be sought in foreign policy and in the economic and social fields, for the sake of domestic and international peace.

216. A fruitful policy of détente and the containment of political conflicts presupposes the existence of a considerable degree of balance in terms of security policy, or at least it goes hand in hand with the establishment of such a balance.

217. In Europe we have learned that there is a very close link between military security and détente. Since the Western alliance formulated its strategy for defence and détente a decade ago in the Harmel Report,⁸ encouraging results have been achieved on the road to détente in Europe.

⁸ Report on the future tasks of the Alliance, approved at the first Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at Brussels on 13 and 14 December 1967.

218. On this basis the German *Ostpolitik* has, since 1969, fundamentally improved the relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and its Eastern neighbours in a process of normalization and reconciliation. It has also been possible to stabilize the situation in and around Berlin.

219. Such efforts to reduce political conflicts must be intensified and must be extended to other regions. The fear that the other side always wants arms limitation only in order to secure a political advantage for itself can only be overcome in a long confidence-building process.

220. Even given the mutual will for balance and détente, acute, unforeseen conflicts can bring on a crisis situation. That is why the capacity for effective crisis control is necessary. It presupposes first of all that communication between the parties to a conflict is not broken off at any time. The world's statesmen must talk to one another, listen to one another and, therefore, know one another.

221. Crisis control demands the political will, first, to avoid provocations; secondly, to make one's own options unmistakably clear; thirdly, to defuse dangerous situations through readiness for compromise; and fourthly, to enable those concerned to save face.

222. Recent history has furnished several examples of successful crisis control. I recall, for example, the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuba crisis of 1962.

223. The mastering of those serious crises has, by the way, had a long-term effect. It has initiated the process of rethinking by the big nuclear-weapon Powers and created the psychological bases for the policy of détente and disarmament. Without the experience gained in these crises, which had led for the first time to the direct confrontation of the nuclear Powers, the partial test-ban treaty,³ the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the strategic arms limitation talks would have been difficult to achieve. The Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 should also be numbered among those agreements. I welcome the fact that the Soviet Union, too, has now acceded to Additional Protocol II of this Treaty.

224. Because even the most successful peace policy can never entirely rule out sudden conflicts, we must all, by means of constantly improving methods of crisis control, ensure that conflicts remain manageable.

225. The greater the calculability of the political and military conduct of those involved, I should like to add, the less the danger of acute crises, and the prime condition of calculability is a frank and open attitude.

226. The anxiety caused by unpleasant or dangerous surprises can be considerably allayed by greater frankness regarding military capacities and arms production. The fact that in the meantime concrete data of the military potential on both sides are being disclosed in the strategic arms limitation talks and at the Vienna negotiations is a big step forward in building mutual confidence.

227. The disclosure of such data by those concerned will

make possible a reliable assessment of the military options of the other side and of its capabilities.

228. An unequivocal data base can generate or strengthen the confidence which in due course should make a verified and balanced reduction of military spending possible. My country has made its contribution to the preparatory work undertaken by the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding the comparability and disclosure of military budgets.

229. The same frankness must characterize the observance of agreements. In this way, each country's security is enhanced when the security requirements of others are respected. My country has, in major treaties, agreed to act with frankness and to submit to international inspection. This concept, which is supported by our people, will remain our policy.

230. If, however, in the name of peace, arms control were to be abused for hegemonic power politics or for the purpose of creating a discriminatory class system of international law, it could not meet with approval. Attempts to impose restrictions on nations which had no part in bringing them about would not meet the requirements of peace.

231. The element of predictability, necessary for security and peace, must go far beyond frankness concerning military capabilities. It must apply above all to the basic concept and the objectives of political strategies. The better future developments can be predicted, the less the danger of surprise and, as a consequence, the greater the prospects for international security. Anyone who acts unpredictably is liable to create hazards.

232. The agreement following the first round of the strategic arms limitation talks was the first effective limitation of nuclear arms. This limitation became feasible only because, owing to the existence of satellites, the problem of international verification could be left aside. We in the Federal Republic of Germany hope that the second round of the strategic arms limitation talks will soon be brought to a successful conclusion.

233. In the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, too, the two great Powers have explicitly undertaken to reduce their nuclear armaments, and we must take them at their word.

234. The Treaty has definitely proved valuable in limiting nuclear armaments. On the whole, it has so far halted the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

235. On the other hand, non-proliferation policy must not become an obstacle for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. So many countries not possessing sufficient sources of energy, nuclear power is indispensable. Article IV of the Treaty gives the signatory States explicit assurance on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This assurance in the Treaty was the determining factor for ratification by our Parliament, and it must be upheld without subtracting from it.

236. The growing use of nuclear energy makes it neces-

sary, however, to strengthen international measures to prevent its misuse, and this is especially true for the use of plutonium. For this purpose, effective improvements of the present non-proliferation régime must be borne by a broad international consensus. This Treaty—an important instrument of the non-proliferation policy—might otherwise be jeopardized.

237. In acceding to the Treaty, over 100 countries have undertaken an internationally binding commitment to renounce nuclear weapons and thereby made a substantial contribution to international security. By so doing they have acquired rights which must be respected.

238. In Europe, détente has progressed considerably in the course of this decade. The treaties concluded by the Federal Republic of Germany and the countries of Eastern Europe, the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin signed on 3 September 1971 and the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe signed on 1 August 1975 have given concrete expression to the prohibition of the use or threat of force embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Today there exists a greater measure of mutual trust in Europe than at any time in the past decades. This is, I hope, an encouraging experience for other regions as well. It is the result of a joint endeavour in which, apart from the two great Powers, all members of the two alliances as well as the neutral and non-aligned countries of Europe have constructively participated.

239. Yet the fact remains that in Europe the biggest accumulations of arms and armed forces confront each other. What now needs to be done is to establish a military balance at a lower level, thus making security more stable.

240. At the negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments which began at Vienna five years ago, we aim, together with our allies, to establish parity by means of balanced reductions. The result of the negotiations should be common collective ceilings on both sides.

241. During the recent visit to my country by Mr. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, both sides stated for the first time in a joint East-West declaration that they deemed it most important that neither side should seek military superiority and that approximate equality and parity sufficed to safeguard defence. I agree with Mr. Gromyko; we, too, consider this declaration a major conceptual contribution to the safeguarding of peace, all the more so because the Soviet Union has shown in this declaration its willingness to discuss weapons up to now not covered by the strategic arms limitation talks, such as medium-range missiles.

242. Owing to their huge destructive power, these weapons are as lethal a threat to Europe and other regions as are the strategic intercontinental weapons to the super-Powers. They therefore cannot be ignored in a system of military balance. It is under this aspect also that we are looking with great interest at the proposals made by President Giscard d'Estaing [*3rd meeting*].

243. Considering the devastating consequences which the Second World War, unleashed by Hitler, had for our people and many other European peoples, no one can doubt our vital interest in arms control and disarmament.

244. That is why, as long ago as 1954, my country renounced the production of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. We agreed then that the observance of this pledge should be subject to international verification.

245. The Federal Republic of Germany considers the conclusion of a convention providing for an effective and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons to be particularly urgent. It therefore welcomes the ongoing bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States which aim at a joint initiative.

246. We are convinced that it is possible to work out an international verification system, including on-site inspection, which would not prejudice the legitimate interests of civil industry and research. Our experience as a country which has renounced the production of chemical weapons and submitted to international control shows that such controls can indeed be effective and without economic harm and that their cost can be reasonable.

247. We are ready to make our experience in this field generally available. Therefore, I invite all interested States to come to the Federal Republic of Germany and see for themselves that adequate verification of a ban on production is possible.

248. The Federal Republic of Germany hopes that it will soon be possible to draft a convention prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests. We are ready to participate in the seismological verification of a comprehensive test ban and to make our institutions available for this purpose.

249. From what I have just said, it can be seen that my country has served the aim of maintaining stability and security through arms limitation by a broad range of different treaty commitments and that it is determined to continue to do so.

250. The defence contribution which the Federal Republic of Germany makes to the North Atlantic Alliance as one of its members serves the aim of security through balance. This collective defence alliance is—in view of the over-all situation in Europe—indispensable for the security of my country. I wish to emphasize that my country has integrated its armed forces fully into the joint organization of the Alliance.

251. The North Atlantic Alliance is exclusively oriented to collective defence. A few days from now it will again demonstrate its will to secure balance and to maintain collective self-defence but, equally, its will for détente and arms limitation. It is a reliable factor in the international partnership for security which I mentioned earlier on. The European Economic Community, too, is a partner, in particular where political and economic stability are concerned. Its establishment is a regional answer to historic experience and to the challenges of the present. From the

outset its establishment was always one of the political aims of my country.

252. In view of the obstacles in the way of rapid progress towards internationally agreed arms limitation, I think a confidence-building offensive is called for, and it is quite feasible.

253. The confidence-building measures contained in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference have proved valuable. In my opinion, they should be made binding upon all States in Europe as from now. We therefore welcome the proposals in this direction made by the French President. Over and above this, confidence-building measures in all parts of the world could serve to improve the political climate for disarmament and arms control. They should in each case make allowance for regional conditions. Consideration should be given in this connexion to the notification of military exercises, exchange visits of members of the armed forces, and invitations to Governments to send observers to military exercises. Such regional agreements could form the basis for a future world-wide convention on confidence-building measures. We welcome the fact that confidence-building measures are contained in the draft joint programme of action [*see A/S-10/1*].

254. The growth of confidence cannot, of course, I should like to add, be confined to the sphere of military security. The elimination of mistrust, fear and hostility is an all-embracing, universal task. This is a perspective which extends into the future and which concerns young people. It is up to the older generation to make the younger generation in our countries more appreciative of this perspective. This is a task of great consequence which the United Nations should take upon itself. We are willing to make a material contribution to a new United Nations programme aimed at fostering understanding among the young generation of all nations. In the course of this year, on the basis of our bilateral experience we shall present a proposal for such a programme.

255. In connexion with this special session of the General Assembly, many references have been made to the disproportion between expenditures for military purposes, on the one hand, and for agricultural, infrastructural and industrial development purposes by the great majority of nations, on the other. Those references are justified; the facts give just cause for concern. There are, indeed, highly productive countries which have a large military potential and which make exceptionally heavy financial outlays for it, but which at the same time make a totally inadequate contribution to the transfer of capital and technology to developing countries.

256. Weapon supplies are no substitute for economic development; on the contrary, the transfer of weapons has assumed proportions that have made it one of the most serious international problems. It is to President Carter's credit that he already drew attention to this with great urgency last year. Regulating the international transfer of armaments must feature prominently in our efforts to achieve arms limitation—and I wish to express my full agreement with Vice-President Mondale [*2nd meeting*].

257. Initiatives in this direction will bear fruit if both suppliers and recipients agree to exercise restraint. With this aim in mind we support the proposal embodied in the programme of action for a study of the related problems. In particular, I would very much like all countries which export armaments to undertake to disclose their supplies.

258. However, dangers arise not only from arms supplied by Governments but also from the commercial exploitation of discarded military equipment. Consequently, the study must also cover the possibilities of controlling private trade in military equipment.

259. I should like to take this opportunity to outline my own country's policy in this field. We refuse, as a matter of principle, to grant aid for the export of weapons. Only in exceptional and, on the whole, very limited cases do we allow any weapons at all to be supplied to countries outside our own alliance. According to analyses prepared by the Swedish International Peace Research Institute, German supplies of weapons to the third world account for only three hundredths of 1 per cent of our gross national product. According to our estimates, that is the equivalent of two tenths of 1 per cent of our total exports. I should like to add that we strictly forbid weapons to be exported to areas of international tension.

260. On the other hand, we have massively increased our development aid budget, so that it is now the equivalent of more than one tenth of our defence effort. If every country in the world could say that of itself, many people in the developing countries would be better off. Those who build up their armaments beyond what is needed for their defence are limiting their capacity for material aid to others.

261. Material want, hunger and poverty are intolerable in many places. Only healthy economic and social development serves the cause of peace. Social justice is not merely a domestic but just as much an international necessity. If we succeed in limiting armaments and cutting our military expenditures we shall be releasing funds which can be used to make additional transfers to the developing countries.

262. My country will continue to increase the scope of its development assistance—although I prefer to speak of economic co-operation rather than aid, since we are all dependent on one another. That is why we expect solidarity to be reciprocated with solidarity—solidarity in a two-way form.

[The speaker continued in English.]

263. Mr. President, let me sum up in a language which is more widely understood in this chamber than my own.

264. The task, as we see it, with regard to armaments—nuclear and other weapons alike—is to bring about balanced and verifiable limitations, to effect specific and balanced reductions and, it is to be hoped, one day to bring about the total elimination of arms. Complete and internationally controlled disarmament remains the goal.

265. If it is to be successful, that process requires a com-

prehensive security policy, based on four guidelines: first, political, strategic and military balance; secondly, détente, containment of conflicts and reconciliation of interests; thirdly, capacity for effective crisis control; and, fourthly, predictability and calculability of political and military conduct. With those guidelines in mind, we are co-operating in the talks at Geneva and Vienna with a sense of commitment and initiative.

266. This special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is an opportunity to demonstrate the credibility of international efforts in the field of disarmament and arms control. We hope the Assembly at this special session will avail itself of this opportunity. To this end it is necessary that we be able to discuss the existing problems frankly but without polemics, and to reach our decisions by consensus. That would be a demonstration of our ability to work together in a global framework to strengthen peace and security.

267. With that aim in mind, I put forward the following proposals: first, our experience with the verification of our commitment not to produce chemical weapons is at the disposal of other nations; secondly, we shall make available our seismological facilities for the verification of a comprehensive test ban; thirdly, we support restrictions on the international transfer of conventional arms; fourthly, we support efforts to increase confidence through a greater degree of frankness as regards military expenditures and activities; and fifthly, we shall have reached our goal only if the nations succeed in trusting each other. Here much will depend on the young people. This is why we are in favour of the United Nations considering specific ways of bringing the youth of different nations into closer contact.

268. It has been the general experience that all-embracing, new, dramatic concepts for global disarmament hold out no prospect of success. What we need in-

stead are many individual advances, step-by-step progress, each step taken with the determination to harmonize conflicting interests.

269. Anyone who dismisses the idea of compromise in principle is not fit for peace. If he is not prepared to meet others half way he cannot expect them in turn to move towards him. Anyone who cultivates enemy stereotypes and prejudices will himself be regarded as an enemy.

270. There is far too much enmity in this world. What we need instead is a spirit of solidarity, which must ensue from the recognition that no one can guarantee his own security and peace alone.

271. The historical experiences of nations differ from one another, and their ideologies differ even more. My personal experience of the Second World War made me a committed member of a political party and movement in my country which has fought for arms limitation for the past 115 years. For the past 20 years I have devoted my energy to this cause with determination, with realism and with a sense of commitment.

272. I have done so because I know that the horrors of the past must not be repeated. We Germans know that preventing this is to a large extent our task.

273. The world can be confident: we Germans will live up to that task.

274. The PRESIDENT: On behalf of the General Assembly, I wish to thank the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany for the important statement he has just made.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.