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President: Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand).

AGENDA ITEM 24

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REPORT OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE (A/3729 AND CORR.1)
(concluded)

1. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from Russian): The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR considers that it must explain the reasons for the vote which it will cast on the draft resolutions concerning disarmament which we now have before us and on the relevant amendments. As our delegation had occasion during the general debate to set forth its views on the substance of this problem, my remarks will be brief.

2. The problem of halting the armaments race, outlawing atomic and hydrogen weapons and removing the threat of a new world war continues to be one of the most vitally important confronting mankind. It is, of course, a difficult and complex problem, but for that very reason the efforts of the United Nations to resolve it should be all the more persistent and energetic. Everyone knows how hard the Soviet Union has worked to try to remove the deadlock on disarma-

ment and to make a positive contribution to this great cause.

3. Without waiting for a general agreement on disarmament, the Soviet Union voluntarily reduced its armed forces by almost 2 million men. That act of good will is of historic significance and constitutes an exceptionally important step, which facilitates a practical settlement of the disarmament problem. The reduction of armed forces and armaments by each State individually, especially by the great Powers which have large armed forces and bear the main responsibility for the maintenance and preservation of peace throughout the world, would be of enormous significance for the achievement of general disarmament. It is high time that we abandoned fruitless discussions on disarmament and reached a practical solution, high time that we brought the continuing armaments race to a halt.

4. The Soviet Union's proposals of 18 March, 30 April and 29 July 1957 are well known [DC/112, Annexes 1, 7 and 12], as are the proposals it has made at this session concerning the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and the temporary discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests, proposals which embody a number of new provisions offering a basis for the settlement of controversial issues. These proposals are a major contribution to the cause of peace and open the way to a practical settlement of the disarmament problem.

5. That, however, cannot be said for the position of the Western Powers. No sooner had the Soviet Union accepted the proposal of the United States, the United Kingdom and France concerning disarmament in two stages and the fixing of ceilings for armed forces, than the Western Powers turned about and not only refused to accept the Soviet Union's specific proposals, but even repudiated their own proposals. The representatives of the Western countries, alleging that the Soviet proposals were too broad in scope, stated that a programme of partial measures of disarmament would have a greater chance of success. Accommodating itself to that view, the Soviet Union proposed that nuclear weapons tests should be temporarily discontinued for a period of two or three years and that such suspension should not be linked with other aspects of disarmament.

6. Unfortunately, the Western countries rejected that proposal. Today they have likewise turned down the Indian draft resolution providing for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests.

7. The draft resolution submitted by the USSR [A/L.230] to the General Assembly recommends the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission consisting of the eighty-two States Members of the United Nations. At the same time, it proposes the dissolution of the existing Disarmament Commission, in

which twelve States are represented, and of its Sub-Committee, consisting of the representatives of five States.

8. The Byelorussian delegation supports that proposal in the conviction that the work of the Disarmament Commission over the past ten years and of its Sub-Committee over the past four years have served no useful purpose and have brought the disarmament problem not a single step nearer to a solution. The discussion of the disarmament problem has, in fact, come to a dead end. The reason for that state of affairs is that the United States and the United Kingdom have been striving to prevent any real disarmament. All their efforts in the past ten years have in the last analysis been aimed at putting obstacles in the way of the attainment of agreement on disarmament. That has become particularly apparent in the past few years, when the Soviet Union has been submitting a number of constructive new proposals on this question.

9. The reasons why the Western Powers are pursuing that policy are well known. The armaments race has brought vast profits to the war-industry monopolies of those countries.

10. The unproductive utilization of resources for military purposes has meant that the peoples of the world have not yet been able to benefit fully from the great progress achieved in science and technology and that the armaments race has become an obstacle to the material and cultural advancement of mankind. The United Nations accordingly bears a heavy responsibility for the solution of the disarmament problem.

11. The Byelorussian SSR, fully recognizing that responsibility, has joined with other countries in waging a persistent and tireless struggle for disarmament. In these circumstances we consider that it is futile to expect the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission as at present constituted, to perform any useful work. My delegation therefore agrees with the Soviet Government that there is no point in continuing to take part in the work of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee as long as they retain their present membership.

12. The United States representatives are doing everything in their power to prevent the United Nations from formulating practical measures which could check the armaments race. Secrecy in disarmament negotiations is essential to them if they are to be able to pose as the champions of disarmament, to fool world opinion and to throw it off its guard. The procedure of the Sub-Committee is also unsatisfactory in that it makes it possible to hide from world opinion the truth about the course of the negotiations. Because the disarmament discussions have been carried on behind closed doors, seventy States Members of the United Nations have been kept in the dark, their opinion has been ignored and world public opinion has simply remained uninformed.

13. Many of the speakers who have preceded me have correctly pointed out that an increase in the number of States taking part in the disarmament negotiations would be an important contribution to the early attainment of the common goal of reaching an agreement to end the armaments race and eliminate the threat of war. The Governments of the smaller countries are showing great interest in the solution of the disarmament problem and have submitted various proposals

with regard to it. The open discussion and examination of these proposals might help to narrow the gap between the position taken by the Western countries and that of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the six-Power draft resolution [A/L.231/Rev.1 and Add.1] does not contribute to a settlement of the disarmament problem, because its acceptance would not essentially alter the composition of the Disarmament Commission, the majority of whose members belong to one or another aggressive military bloc or alliance.

14. In this connexion, we view with favour the Albanian amendment [A/L.236] to the six-Power draft resolution. That amendment, providing for the inclusion in the membership of the Disarmament Commission of Austria, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Finland, Indonesia, Romania and the Sudan, in addition to the fourteen countries already proposed, would improve the composition of the Disarmament Commission and is designed to convert it into an organ which could more successfully deal with the problem of disarmament. We would hope that the work of the Commission with its expanded membership would be more fruitful and realistic. At the same time, it should be recognized that even such an expansion of the Commission's membership would not entirely meet the requirements of the situation.

15. Matters would be even worse if the Disarmament Commission in its new form were to conduct negotiations on the basis of resolution 1148 (XII), originally sponsored by twenty-four Powers in the First Committee, which is not aimed at halting the arms race or solving the disarmament problem. That resolution cannot serve as the basis for negotiations in the Disarmament Commission with the expanded membership proposed in the Albanian amendment.

16. Taking all these considerations into account, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR considers that the Soviet Union's proposal for establishing an expanded and permanent disarmament commission is a timely step which merits general approval. The adoption of the USSR proposal would make it possible to overcome the serious difficulties inherent in the existing disarmament bodies. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR hopes that the Soviet Union's proposal for the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission consisting of the eighty-two Member States will ultimately command the support of all Members of the United Nations, for the establishment of such a body would facilitate the successful solution of the problem of disarmament.

17. Mr. TARABONOV (Bulgaria) (translated from French): We have before us two draft resolutions and an amendment on a matter that has an important bearing on the disarmament problem, the form of organization of the United Nations body which will be entrusted with the difficult task of laying the groundwork for the preparing acceptable solutions to the disarmament problem, the vital question of our times.

18. Only a few days ago, the General Assembly saw fit to vote on draft resolution I of the First Committee [A/3729 and Corr.1]. That draft, which turned on the substance of the disarmament question, had originally been submitted to the Committee by twenty-four Western Powers, and was a more or less exact repetition of the proposals submitted in London on 29 August 1957 [DC/5113 Annex] by the four Powers on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commis-

sion which belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and rejected as unacceptable by the Soviet Union.

19. This singular resolution 1148 (XII) obstructs and blocks the way to real disarmament, adds enormously to the difficulty of the future disarmament commission's work and further increases its responsibilities, since the conditions in which it will have to work have been artificially and dangerously complicated and aggravated.

20. That is why it is more necessary than ever to try to ensure that the composition and the terms of reference of the future disarmament commission are such as to enable it to overcome the genuine difficulties which already exist and to achieve positive results despite the obstacles artificially created by this resolution.

21. There are serious differences of opinion between the parties concerned with regard to the procedure to be followed in organizing United Nations work on disarmament. Nevertheless there is no doubt that all countries, large and small, can make substantial contributions to progress in the solution of this question of vital importance to all the peoples of the world.

22. In the circumstances, it is surprising that some delegations oppose the Soviet Union's proposal [A/L. 230] for the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission in which all States Members of the United Nations would participate. It has been claimed that such a commission would be too unwieldy and cumbersome to provide a forum for calm and fruitful discussion, that the commission would be under constant tension throughout its work and subject to the pressure of public opinion, that it would therefore merely provide a platform for propaganda speeches expressing the views of the various delegations and would not bring a solution any nearer.

23. It is surprising that anyone should object to the fact that world public opinion would be informed of the various proposals and opinions heard in the disarmament commission; it is astonishing that anyone should think that that would make it more difficult to solve the problem. In fact the reverse is true. If the attention of public opinion is steadily focused on so important a question as disarmament, all delegations will naturally do their best to try to achieve positive results.

24. Nor can any weight be attached to the objection that an eighty-two member commission would not permit constructive negotiation between the delegations of the great Powers on which the success of any measures to begin the process of disarmament primarily depends.

25. Far from hampering the work of small groups, the Soviet proposal provides procedures under which such groups could be organized and do constructive work. Paragraph 3 of the Soviet proposal provides that "a chairman and...vice-chairmen...will have the task of directing the current work of the commission and also of assisting States Members of the United Nations in organizing consultations, meetings and the like on disarmament problems."

26. What remains of the far-fetched objections and arguments of the opponents of a permanent disarmament commission? Absolutely nothing, other than the

strong desire of those opponents to conduct disarmament discussions behind closed doors and to avoid the vigilant scrutiny of public opinion. But ten years of work behind closed doors within the restricted framework of the Disarmament Commission and more particularly of the Sub-Committee consisting of four representatives of the military North Atlantic Treaty on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other have produced absolutely no constructive result in this field of vital importance to the future of the peoples of the world.

27. The peoples are now entitled to expect positive results in the solution of the disarmament question. Instead public opinion has been inadequately informed about the work of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. The representatives of the countries which belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which have for years continuously blocked the Sub-Committee's work by presenting unacceptable and contradictory proposals, and have deliberately transformed the discussions into futile conversations by using their majority in that body solely for propaganda purposes, naturally oppose the formation of a broad disarmament commission which would not meet behind closed doors.

28. Indeed, only a few days ago, we heard a speaker from this rostrum using the fact that a majority had been obtained for resolution 1148 (XII) solely for propaganda purposes and in order to camouflage a new armaments race. In passing, let us note that if we exclude China, whose vote in this Assembly is illegally usurped, that majority represented only a minority of the world's population.

29. The People's Republic of China has been excluded from participation in the work of the Disarmament Commission in an attempt to set aside the great moral influence of that great country. Tactics of this kind, however easy they may appear, certainly will not contribute to a positive solution of the disarmament problem.

30. A further attempt will no doubt be made to take advantage of a majority in this Assembly in the matter of the membership of the Disarmament Commission. Nevertheless, the fact is that the great majority of the men and women who will suffer from another war will not be duly represented on the Disarmament Commission.

31. The amendment submitted by Albania [A/L.236] seeks merely to redress this injustice and, at the same time, by providing for the presence of a great number of neutral countries, to create a climate more favourable to the work of the future commission. If this amendment is adopted, we shall vote in favour of the six-Power draft resolution [A/L.231/Rev.1 and Add.1]. While it does not offer a perfect solution of the procedural issues, the Albanian proposal is a compromise likely to facilitate the solution of the disarmament problem.

32. The Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee have been used as a convenient screen to conceal the absence of progress in the field of disarmament and have shown themselves to be incapable of working towards the achievement of the objectives for which they were created. The cloak of secrecy surrounding the work of the Commission and its Sub-Committee as at present constructed has enabled certain

people to abuse the trust of the people. The frequent reports in the Press regarding the sanguine views, optimism and confidence of this or that representative of the NATO countries have been used to conceal the fact that agreement was impossible of attainment because the proposals presented by the Western Powers were artificially linked to unacceptable conditions.

33. But there can be no question of continuing to follow that dangerous road. The peoples are weary of empty promises, of private meetings used as a front for an organized propaganda campaign to deceive public opinion. The world needs a body including representatives of all countries, the small as well as the great, a body which will remain in permanent session until the agonizing problem of disarmament is solved.

34. A permanent disarmament commission composed of representatives of all countries will have indisputable advantages compared to the existing limited bodies which are entrusted with the heavy responsibility of preparing the way for a solution to the disarmament question. The advantages will be these:

35. First, the convening of a permanent commission will not depend on the wish of one side or the other; the commission will be considered to be in permanent session whenever the General Assembly itself is not meeting. It will thus work unceasingly to solve the various problems involved in the disarmament question.

36. Secondly, in view of the possibility of organizing negotiations, contacts and consultations among groups of States within the commission itself, the parties will come to plenary meetings with specific proposals rather than with records of divergent opinions, as has become the practice in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission.

37. Thirdly, whenever it succeeds in achieving a positive result and whenever it considers it useful to do so, the disarmament commission will be able to request the convening of the General Assembly so that it can submit the results of its deliberations to the Assembly and request new directives from it.

38. Fourthly, in such a body, the suggestions and proposals of all States, great or small, will be presented in proper form—not through the post as has been suggested by one speaker—and will receive the commission's attention to the extent that they are capable of contributing to a solution of the disarmament problem.

39. There can be doubt of the advantages of a permanent disarmament commission consisting of all the Members of the United Nations. As the commission will devote continuous attention to the disarmament question, it will be able to take advantage of all contributions and will, we are certain, facilitate the solution of this problem, which is the most important of our time and of vital concern to all mankind.

40. For these reasons, my delegation will vote for the Soviet Union draft resolution.

41. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland): I should like to state briefly the position of my delegation concerning the documents that are now before us.

42. May I first state that the experience that we have had hitherto indicates that the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, in their present composition, are unsuitable for constructive and pro-

gressive work on the task assigned to them. It has become clear that a disarmament agreement cannot be reached in a body in which so great a majority represents only one point of view. At the same time, the conducting of the discussions of the Sub-Committee in secret have not permitted a proper appraisal of its proceedings, of the proposals discussed and of the extent of compromise endeavours, an appraisal not only by world public opinion but even by the United Nations General Assembly.

43. That is why it was already obvious at the last session of the General Assembly that a new approach to the issue of the composition of the Commission and the Sub-Committee should be attempted. At the eleventh session the suggestion was made to add to the membership of United Nations organs dealing with the problem of disarmament a few additional nations. As we all know, such a proposal was discussed, but no decision was reached.

44. The problem again arises at the present session in view of the fact that the recent London discussions of the Sub-Committee once more ended without any results. Many nations again expressed the view in the First Committee that a new representation in the disarmament negotiations could well foster a new climate conducive to progress towards disarmament.

45. The Polish delegation fully shares that opinion. That is why we have given our support to the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union [A/L.230] to establish a permanent disarmament commission consisting of all the Members of the United Nations.

46. We think that the Soviet initiative has many merits. We do not accept as valid the opinion of those who have restated from this rostrum their opposition to the Soviet proposal on the basis that negotiations involving complicated political and technological aspects of disarmament should be conducted only within a rather small group.

47. The discussions in the First Committee at the present session have shown that many representatives have contributed not only new ideas, but also expert scientific analysis, to the disarmament problem. At the same time, it has to be stressed again that the Soviet proposal, in paragraph 3 of its operative part provides for additional machinery for consultation outside the broad forum of the whole commission. The chairman and vice-chairmen of the commission, besides conducting the current activities of the commission, would, by this proviso, be entrusted with the task of assisting members in arranging negotiations in smaller groups. Thus the broad public discussions of different proposals in the main body of the commission could ensure favourable conditions for such consultative activities of individual members of the commission or of a group of members.

48. Now, in supporting the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union, the Polish delegation never excluded its readiness to cast its vote for any other draft resolution concerning a proper new machinery for United Nations disarmament. We were also ready to serve on a disarmament commission thus created provided, of course, that such a resolution and the composition of the commission were acceptable to all parties concerned, in particular to the major Powers, and did not constitute simply the expression of views of one side

only. We do therefore appreciate the conciliation efforts undertaken by India, our friends from Yugoslavia and others, to find a compromise solution on the future machinery for the disarmament negotiations.

49. It still seems that a solution acceptable to all could be found by adding the seven nations enumerated in the Albanian amendment [A/L.236] to the fourteen Member States suggested in the six-Power draft resolution [A/L.231/Rev.1 and Add.1]. The acceptance of these additional members of the Disarmament Commission would establish a proper balance between nations participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and related military blocs, between uncommitted nations and between socialist countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact.

50. We should have hoped that the Assembly would follow the wise Indian suggestion and adjourn its debate today so that all the delegations could have more time to give the Albanian initiative more thought. As matters now stand, it has to be stated that on the new machinery for disarmament discussions the General Assembly remains as divided as it was on the substance of directives to be given to the United Nations disarmament organ.

51. We face now the certainty that a disarmament commission not unanimously agreed upon will not be able to start its work and function properly. That is why the Polish delegation feels obliged to state in all frankness and respect that if the amendment submitted by Albania is rejected, we will not be in a position to participate in the work of the Disarmament Commission because it could serve no constructive purpose.

52. We feel that we shall all regret it if the present session of the General Assembly, instead of becoming the great disarmament session as so many speakers in the general debate expected it to become, ends in a deadlock which must seriously disappoint world public opinion and the millions of people throughout the world who long for peace, and which must seriously affect the whole international situation.

53. Mr. NAJIB-ULLAH (Afghanistan): I had the honour to explain the attitude of my delegation concerning the disarmament problem on 21 October in the First Committee [876th meeting] during the debates on that matter. Those of my fellow representatives who had the time and the interest in our declaration have already examined it. I hope that our suggestions, as well as our attitude, were received by them in the same spirit of sincerity and cordiality as they were offered.

54. I do not need to repeat my suggestions and the explanation of our attitude, except that we take the same stand as we did then and that we are more than ever convinced, due to the continuation of the debates on disarmament, that our attitude of the Afghanistan delegation was not only right, in our case, but also helpful to the development of the efforts of fellow Member States to pursue their task for the success of disarmament.

55. As I have explained, each of the draft resolutions proposed by the Member States of this Organization has been motivated by their sincere desire to reach a satisfactory solution for disarmament, and if we have not yet reached that stage, it is due to differences of a political order and the respective strategic positions of the great Powers. If today we do not reach the

desired goal, it does not mean that the future does not have possibilities of an agreement. As several representatives from both sides have declared, they are ready in principle to deploy all efforts in the future in order to reach an understanding.

56. We have three draft resolutions before us today. The draft resolution proposed by Japan, Canada, India, Paraguay, Sweden and Yugoslavia [A/L.231/Rev.1 and Add.1] is the best indication of the possibility of a compromise for the future of the Disarmament Commission. If agreement is not reached on the proposed composition of the Commission, we do not see the impossibility of some understanding in the future between the Powers concerned. In the name of the Afghanistan delegation, I consider it my great privilege to express our great appreciation and homage to the co-sponsors of that draft resolution for their initiative and efforts towards the success of a common goal.

57. The draft resolution submitted by India [A/L.232] is also indicative of the genuine and peaceful principles of that great country, which has never ceased to work for compromise among the Member States and for the peace of the world. There is no doubt that the cessation of nuclear tests is highly desirable.

58. Finally, the Soviet proposal [A/L.230] for the composition of a permanent disarmament commission is also motivated by the desire of that country, like the twenty-four-Power draft resolution on disarmament which was adopted recently by the First Committee and subsequently by this Assembly [resolution 1148 (XII)] to help the cause of disarmament and to reach an agreement among the great Powers directly interested in this matter.

59. If we do not reach a unanimous agreement on the proposals concerning the disarmament question, it is due to the existing political differences among the great Powers and their respective obligations and positions regarding the major problems of the world which are unsettled. We believe that the present atmosphere on the disarmament problem is created by the lack of confidence in the relationship of the great Powers and not by their lack of interest for the success of disarmament. We realize this situation from our long experience as a small and independent country situated between great Powers of different political conceptions and opinions, as well as from a sense of realism which has been developed within us due to that condition during more than a century.

60. In the hope that the disarmament problem will be dealt with in the future by the great Powers concerned and will be brought to a successful conclusion thanks to their objectivity, their sense of compromise and their sincere attachment to world peace, I conclude this clarification of my delegation's position by saying that we shall abstain from voting on any of the proposals before us today, as we did in the case of the Indian draft resolution [718th meeting].

61. Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan): I wish to say a few words at this stage concerning the amendment presented by Albania [A/L.236] to our draft resolution [A/L.231/Rev.1 and Add.1]. As this Assembly is well aware, the consultations between the interested parties all through last week, and indeed until this morning, have not produced a unanimous opinion as to the composition of the expanded Commission. Sincere efforts to reach agreement have been made in the most trying circumstances.

62. My delegation, judging from its experience, is of the view that the adoption of the Albanian amendment would only result in further delay, confusion and frustration. It would not serve any useful purpose at this stage and might further disappoint world public opinion. For this reason my delegation deeply regrets that it is unable to support or accept this amendment. We are very sad indeed to be forced to take this position because of the deep friendly feelings we entertain towards most of the countries on the list.

63. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria): The proposal presented by the Soviet Union [A/L.230] to form a permanent commission of the whole has, in our view, its merits. It ensures full representation, and gives real and complete expression to the concern about disarmament which all Member States share. It also tends to ensure that the effort for disarmament is generalized and rendered continuous. Yet my delegation did not vote for that proposal in Committee. We abstained then, and we will do the same in the Assembly.

64. The reason that motivates us is a practical one. It results from the fact that many Member States, by opposing this proposal, have indicated a lack of readiness to work for disarmament through a commission of the whole. The practical value of that proposal is thus impaired by this fact, as many of those who would form the commission implicitly intend to decline working through it, whatever their reasons may be. However, the principle indicated by this proposal is, in our view, one worthy of consideration in the future with a view to its application.

65. My delegation has expressed itself at various times as being favourable to the expansion of the Disarmament Commission to the widest possible extent. The practical composition—"practical" is the key word in our view—as we see it is that which would invite all the major powers to co-operate in the Commission particularly those Powers which possess nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. These weapons are indeed the principal object of any disarmament.

66. We find, therefore, that the six-Power draft resolution [A/L.231/Rev.1 and Add.1] as amended by Albania [A/L.236] has basic merits because it would create a reasonably balanced representation of opinion and interests. The principal consideration, however, is to see that the disarmament discussions are continued and become fruitful. We hope that this draft resolution as amended by Albania will be the one to be carried out.

67. We do not blame the Soviet and other delegations for taking their present position on the six-Power draft resolution without the Albanian amendment, as the Soviet attitude was taken after the voting on the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, which contained a basis agreeable to one side for the discussion of disarmament.

68. We do not at all want to make a derogatory reflection on the suggestions or opinions of other delegations. It is our plea, however, to other delegations to accommodate the Albanian amendment and to consider it as a constructive effort to bridge the gap so that the practical way to future disarmament discussions will be wide open to all.

69. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal): At this stage, we have three proposals before us dealing with the machinery for disarmament negotiations. We regard the agreement

between the Powers principally involved as the very essence of disarmament. We fully realize that the attitudes of the great Powers count more than the machinery for negotiation in the ultimate success and solution of this problem of disarmament. We were hopeful that conciliatory efforts made by various delegations would result in the production of a draft resolution on the future composition of the Disarmament Commission which would be acceptable to the Powers principally involved.

70. We are now very much concerned to find that even the enlargement of the Disarmament Commission along the lines suggested in the six-Power draft resolution [A/L.231/Rev.1 and Add.1] does not seem to satisfy the USSR. We would have very much liked to have a draft resolution that would have at least ensured the continuance of the negotiations on disarmament. But, as things stand, there seems to be no hope for that, and we are constrained to make clear our attitude toward the two draft resolutions and the amendment that are on the table before us. However, we still hope that the Government of the USSR will reconsider its decision and find its way to participate in the disarmament negotiations, to the relief of all concerned.

71. We do not feel convinced that the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission of the whole Assembly would, at this stage of the negotiations on disarmament, facilitate agreement between the Powers principally involved on the various aspects of the question. Therefore we shall abstain from voting on the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the USSR [A/L.230].

72. In the course of my intervention in the debate on disarmament in the First Committee, I supported the suggestion and the proposal for the enlargement of the Disarmament Commission. We are glad to find that this idea has subsequently found favour and acceptance with a large number of Member States. The six-Power draft resolution satisfies the principle of equitable distribution and, at the same time, reflects the voting position and the strength in the Assembly. We shall therefore support it.

73. Now I turn to the amendment submitted by Albania [A/L.236] to that draft resolution. We feel that the Disarmament Commission, as enlarged by the addition of some more countries, will not truly reflect the voting position and the strength of views in the Assembly. We believe that any commission to be set up by the Assembly on a subject of great importance and universal concern, such as disarmament, should seek to reflect the balance of views in the Assembly as far as possible.

74. That is our main objection to it, but, as so many uncommitted countries that believe in the same kind of foreign policy as we do are mentioned in it, we shall not oppose it but shall abstain from voting upon it.

75. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): The adoption a few days ago of a one-sided resolution on disarmament by which the Western Powers are trying to impose in ultimatum-line form such measures in the field of disarmament as suit only their own interests, constitutes a serious warning to the General Assembly not to deviate on to a road of one-sided actions but to adopt new and more efficient measures for the solution of the disarmament problem. Only in such a way

will the United Nations be able to fulfil the principal task that it faces, that is, to ensure international co-operation in the interests of peace and the security of nations. This should be primarily borne in mind now when we are discussing the draft resolutions relating to the organization of work for the further consideration of the disarmament question.

76. During the deliberations in the First Committee, a number of delegations pointed to the fact that both the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, notwithstanding the prolonged discussions on the question of disarmament, had failed to achieve any concrete results. Not one single agreement has been concluded that could lead to a reduction of armed forces and armaments or would contribute to relieving mankind of the threat of nuclear war. One of the underlying causes of this poor result is the fact that the disarmament talks have been confined to a small group of States which are members of the above-mentioned organs of the United Nations. In fact, there are only five States involved. The members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission are the Soviet Union on the one side and four members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the other.

77. The urgency of a solution to the disarmament problem is, in the present situation, of such paramount importance for the cause of peace in the world that we cannot permit any more undue delay in the discussion of this question by methods used to this end by the Western Powers in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. All States, all nations, have equal interests in a positive solution to the disarmament problem. Therefore, to make possible a successful solution to this question, it is indispensable to take into consideration the views of all Members of the United Nations and especially of those that are opposed to the armaments race and to the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons and that fight for the suspension of nuclear test explosions.

78. The Czechoslovak delegation welcomes, therefore, the submission by the Soviet Union to the General Assembly of a proposal [A/L.230] for the creation of a permanent commission on disarmament whose membership would include all States Members of the Organization. This permanent commission would discuss all proposals on disarmament, prepare recommendations to the General Assembly and at the same time mediate or facilitate direct negotiations between States or groups of States. The adoption of this proposal would also remove the existing practice of closed meetings of the Sub-Committee, which is the cause of world public opinion not being in fact informed of the actual situation in the disarmament negotiations. Negotiations within a broad and widely representative organ such as this permanent commission would stimulate the initiative of all Members of the United Nations in future negotiations and would at the same time increase their joint responsibility for the achievement of positive results.

79. We are convinced that the creation of this permanent commission would open wide the doors for a more successful development of our efforts in the negotiations on disarmament in the United Nations, and therefore my delegation fully supports the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union.

80. These days, intensive talks have been taking place among delegations with regard to the enlargement

of the present Disarmament Commission. There has plainly been an increasing awareness among delegations of the fact that one of the causes of the lack of success of the work of the Commission is its narrow and one-sided composition. However, if a satisfactory composition of the Disarmament Commission is to be achieved, it is necessary to touch upon the crux of the problem and in the first place to remove its one-sided character.

81. If the Commission's work is to bear fruit, it must not be composed predominantly of representatives of States mutually bound in military groupings as has been the case heretofore; it is necessary that adequate room be given for the voices of States which are not members of any aggressive military groupings. Unless due regard is paid to this aspect, any change in the composition of the Disarmament Commission can only have the former effect of creating an appearance that the General Assembly is undertaking effective measures while in reality nothing has been changed as regards the substance of the problem.

82. This is also true of the six-Power draft resolution [A/L.231/Rev.1 and Add.1]. For this reason, the Czechoslovak delegation will vote against this draft resolution.

83. In the view of my delegation, the amendment submitted this morning by the delegation of Albania [A/L.236] meets the requirement of a just and balanced composition of the Disarmament Commission. By adopting this amendment to the six-Power draft resolution, the General Assembly would create at least some prerequisites of an organizational nature which would be helpful for the future work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

84. If this amendment should not be adopted, the Czechoslovak delegation will be unable to support the six-Power draft resolution, and, in the event of the adoption of this draft resolution, it will not be in a position to participate in the work of the Disarmament Commission.

85. Mr. KOZACHENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from Russian): In the discussion of the draft resolution submitted by the United States and other countries, there has, it seems to us, been no lack of emotional statements, particularly on the part of the Western Powers. Yet, if we forego emotion and resist the temptation to hide a far from comforting reality under a cloak of glittering phrases, we must attempt a responsible appraisal of the situation confronting us, as we consider the USSR draft resolution [A/L.230] and the draft resolution submitted by Canada and Japan with the three-Power amendments [A/L.231/Rev.1].

86. What is the situation? Above all, we must ask ourselves: does the United Nations at the present time possess an organ in which disarmament negotiations could be continued? The existing organs have clearly exhausted their usefulness and cannot serve as machinery for disarmament negotiations.

87. If such negotiations are to be held, we must seek and find new types of organization, capable of making negotiation more fruitful by providing new opportunities for reaching agreement on disarmament. The organ dealing with this vital problem should be broadly representative. All the States Members of the United Nations, whether large or small, should take part in its

work, since they are all equally interested in the solution of the disarmament problem.

88. An organization of this kind is suggested in the Soviet proposal, which provides for the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission consisting of all the States Members of the United Nations. To that body would be assigned the task of examining all disarmament proposals submitted to the United Nations and of drafting appropriate recommendations for the sessions of the General Assembly. A Ukrainian amendment, proposed in the First Committee to the Soviet draft resolution and included in that draft, provides that all proposals submitted by States to the twelfth session of the General Assembly should be referred to the permanent disarmament commission. This provision would determine the general trend of the commission's work. The commission might begin its activities with a study and consideration of all proposals in order to submit agreed specific recommendations on disarmament to the General Assembly.

89. Too great a responsibility rests on the United Nations, now that there is a growing danger of an atomic war plotted by imperialist groups. Needless to say, this responsibility is shared by the States represented in the United Nations, irrespective of whether they are large or medium-sized, small or among the very smallest. None of us should allow himself to be beguiled by the number of votes collected in support of a resolution, particularly when the resolution tends to make the disarmament negotiations altogether futile.

90. Just as resolution 1148 (XII) does not and cannot provide a solution to the disarmament problem, since it reflects the aims of the aggressive North Atlantic bloc, so the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, as now constituted, can no longer be effective organs for disarmament negotiations.

91. The Soviet proposal has been opposed on the ground that a commission consisting of all the Members of the United Nations would be too cumbersome, but such objections carry no conviction. We should be guided by a different criterion, which is that participation in the commission by all Members of the United Nations and a change in its methods of work would strengthen the role of each State in the struggle for disarmament and increase the degree to which the overwhelming majority is able to influence the great Powers. In the modern world, with its spectacular scientific advances, particularly in the production of weapons of mass destruction, no Government is in a position to say to its citizens: "We are at the other end of the world. Whatever the future may hold, even if it is the very worst—war—it will not touch us".

92. Much, of course, depends on the great Powers, but even more depends on all the States, which is to say on all the peoples. In the present circumstances, to rely wholly on the great Powers' good will, on their decisions, when some of them, including the United States and the United Kingdom, follow an aggressive foreign policy, may, objectively speaking, increase the danger of war—whether we like it or not.

93. Our delegation therefore warmly supports the USSR draft resolution.

94. The expansion of the United Nations Disarmament Commission by the inclusion of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Tunisia

and Yugoslavia, as proposed in the six-Power draft resolution [A/L.231/Rev.1 and Add.1], does not and cannot alter the existing situation. Even if the General Assembly should adopt this draft resolution, the new composition of the Disarmament Commission would not properly reflect the various viewpoints. It would continue to labour under the handicap of political lopsidedness, which has never yet yielded positive results in any negotiations, least of all in disarmament negotiations.

95. The Albanian delegation has proposed [A/L.236] that Austria, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Finland, Indonesia, Romania and the Sudan should be added as members of the Disarmament Commission to the countries listed in the six-Power draft. The adoption of the Albanian amendment would improve the composition of the Disarmament Commission as regards both its representative character and its ability to discharge its duties. If the Albanian amendment is adopted, our delegation will be able to accept the composition of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Failing the adoption of the amendment, we shall vote against the six-Power draft resolution.

96. Mr. MATSCH (Austria): With regard to the question of enlarging the Disarmament Commission, the Austrian delegation deems it necessary to state the following.

97. The Austrian delegation did not participate in the relevant conversations held during the last week, nor did it seek to do so. When we were approached by some delegations, asking whether Austria would accept membership in the Disarmament Commission, we replied that the Austrian Government would consider such membership only if we were invited by all parties concerned, in particular by the four great Powers.

98. May I add that until this morning the Austrian delegation did not have any knowledge of the fact that Austria was to be included among the seven countries suggested by Albania as additional members of the Disarmament Commission. In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that one side has already declared that it would not accept any amendment to the six-Power draft resolution [A/L.231/Rev.1 and Add.1], the Austrian delegation will not be able to support the amendment presented by Albania [A/L.236].

99. Mr. WEI (China): For the past twelve years the question of disarmament has been discussed in various forums of the United Nations. Besides the General Assembly and its First Committee, the list of the forums includes the Atomic Energy Commission, the Commission for Conventional Armaments, the committee of twelve, the Disarmament Commission, the six-Power working body and the five-Power Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. With the exception of the Sub-Committee, my delegation had the honour of participating in all of these forums.

100. One lesson that we have learned is that the forum of negotiation has nothing to do with the lack of progress in our deliberations on disarmament. The cause of our long deadlock over disarmament lies in the disagreement on substance on the part of the major Powers for businesslike negotiations.

101. My delegation still believes that on this complicated question of disarmament a relatively small group of countries, including those principally concerned, would be the most effective forum for the

United Nations. In the First Committee I expressed our doubts and reservations regarding any change in the existing machinery for disarmament negotiations. Our position was shared by the majority of the members of the First Committee, so all proposals to modify the existing machinery were rejected by the Committee.

102. The Soviet Union continues to defy the decisions of the General Assembly. It insists on the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission consisting of all Members of this Organization. Yet at the same time it refuses to accept even as a basis for negotiation the resolution 1148 (XII) on disarmament recently adopted by the General Assembly after weeks of deliberations. We note that the General Assembly has the same membership as that proposed by the Soviet Union for the permanent disarmament commission. The Soviet proposal is impracticable. My delegation voted against it in the Committee. We will do the same in this meeting. The representative of the Soviet Union has again threatened to boycott the expanded Disarmament Commission which, as we all know, is the result of extensive consultation and reconciliation. It means that the only condition acceptable to the Soviet Union is the unconditional surrender of the General Assembly. My delegation condemns such a policy.

103. It is in a spirit of co-operation that my delegation will vote for the six-Power draft resolution [A/L.231/Rev.1 and Add.1]. The position of my delegation on the question of the machinery of negotiation remains unchanged, but because of the express wishes of the majority of the Assembly and the ardent appeal of many of my colleagues here, we are willing to give the new composition of the Disarmament Commission a fair trial. As a member of the Commission, my delegation pledges its full co-operation in carrying out the Commission's mandate from this General Assembly.

104. Mr. MAGHERU (Romania) (translated from French): The debate on the disarmament problem at the present session has clearly shown the concern of the great majority of delegations to put an end to the armaments race. More than once in the course of this debate speakers have laid stress on the danger to mankind that the lack of agreement in this sphere represents in an age of nuclear weapons. Most delegations have thus echoed public opinion in their countries and the anxiety of the peoples they represent. Conscious of the importance of the question and confident that this serious problem can be solved, the Romanian delegation has made its contribution to the debate.

105. Unfortunately, even now, when the whole world is agreed that the disarmament question has reached this critical stage, it has been unable to detect any real change in the position of the Western Powers. They still believe that a small group of Powers—as it happens, the principal members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—should impose their will on the other Powers, that is, on those representing the vast majority of countries.

106. No one denies that a final settlement of the disarmament problem requires, in the first place, an agreement between the great Powers. But it is obvious also that the United Nations body responsible for investigating the disarmament question can and should play an important part in the attainment of this agreement.

107. The problem of the composition and work of the United Nations body responsible for accomplishing disarmament calls for a discussion of the role the United Nations ought to play in the search for a solution to this question of fundamental importance to mankind. The Romanian delegation considers that the role of the United Nations is to facilitate the discovery of ways of securing the necessary agreement between the principal Powers concerned. In the first place, through the intermediary of the United Nations, all States, both large and small—for all are equally interested in the solution of the disarmament question—will be able to make their views known more easily; the voices of all the peoples which ask that practical measures should be taken without delay in the matter of disarmament could be heard more easily. That is why my delegation cannot accept the view that the composition of the United Nations body responsible for studying the disarmament problem cannot have much effect on the success of the disarmament negotiations.

108. My delegation considers that it is no accident that those who uphold that view are the representatives of the countries responsible for the failure of the London negotiations.

109. The General Assembly is confronted with the following situation: the activities of the Disarmament Commission, and more particularly of its Sub-Committee, have been demonstrably not only fruitless but even harmful in that they have allowed the Western Powers to create, or to attempt to create, in certain sectors of public opinion the misleading impression that the gap between the positions of the parties has been narrowed, whereas in fact the discussions have been marking time and the armaments race has intensified.

110. The General Assembly must find a new framework for disarmament discussions in order to prevent the recurrence of such a situation. It must find a framework which ensures an opportunity for all points of view on the subject of disarmament to be appropriately expressed.

111. The Soviet Union proposal [A/L.230] offers us the best solution to this problem, since it offers every State the opportunity of expressing its point of view to world public opinion at any time and since it also ensures to all States the possibility of keeping informed as to the main positions held and the progress made towards an agreement. The solution advocated in the Soviet draft resolution, which provides for the enlargement of the Disarmament Commission by the participation in it of the representatives of the eighty-two States Members of the United Nations, is a democratic solution and takes account of the interest shown by world public opinion, which is concerned over the manner in which the work on disarmament has proceeded. This solution offers a defence against the policy of dictatorship and disregard of the interests of the peoples of the world, who are anxious to preserve peace.

112. The Romanian delegation, for its part, believes that the voices of all the peoples threatened by the incessant preparations for war should be heard. All countries in the world which, in the event of a new war—whether they were belligerents or not—would be threatened by the existing means of destruction, have a right, therefore, to take a direct part in the negotiations and to unite their efforts in an endeavour to put an end to the armaments race.

113. For these reasons the Romanian delegation firmly supports the proposal for enlarging the Disarmament Commission and will vote for the Soviet Union draft resolution.

114. The argument that a permanent commission would be too cumbersome a body is not tenable, for negotiations between groups of Powers and in working groups could continue. Furthermore, these negotiations would be stimulated by discussion between a large number of countries and by the proposals put forward by so many participants. The General Assembly has shown that it is able to take decisions rapidly on particularly complex problems when all Member States, or the majority of them, firmly desire it.

115. If, however, the Members of this Assembly consider that this solution is not immediately acceptable and agree to establish for this year a smaller negotiating body, the problem before us will then be, not the arithmetical problem of carefully ensuring a majority for the NATO Powers, but the problem of creating a balanced body which will not work to obtain majority decisions that lead nowhere but will try to draft mutually acceptable solutions. In that case, only a balanced representation of all points of view can provide a forum in which fruitful discussion will be possible.

116. For these reasons, the Romanian delegation can support the six-Power draft resolution [A/L.231/Rev. 1 and Add.1] only if the Albanian amendment [A/L.236], which brings us nearer a fairer representation of all countries and points of view, is adopted.

117. Mr. MOCH (France) (translated from French): It is with some reluctance that I am briefly taking the floor once again. There is hardly any need to recall the French delegation's position. We said in committee, and have repeated here, that in such an important substantive debate each State must take an unequivocal position, that is to say, there must be clear-cut vote on the principle at issue. We added, however, that as soon as that decision had been taken, we would resolutely continue as before in our efforts towards a generally acceptable settlement and compromise.

118. From the beginning of the discussion on expanding the membership of the Commission, we have accepted the various suggestions that have been made. We have done so in order to comply with the wish expressed by various delegations to co-operate in the common task in the hope that they might bring some fresh ideas and practical suggestions to a reasonably enlarged Commission. Even though the Commission as thus constituted would not be ideally suited to negotiations among the Powers directly concerned with the initial stages of disarmament, it would, we felt, at least help to create a propitious atmosphere for discussions on such initial steps, for we believe in the efficacy of personal contacts, exchanges of opinion and negotiations. Even when negotiations do not progress as might be wished, the general atmosphere holds out the chance of effecting agreement as long as the discussion continues.

119. But a number of new facts have arisen. The Soviet Union proposed in London, at the beginning of September, that we should cease negotiations and appeal to this Assembly. I fully realize that the London talks were long and even fatiguing, but I do not pass as severe a judgement on them as that voiced today by the Soviet representatives and their supporters.

120. At times, in London, we had reason for hope, and I do believe that, there too, the continuance of the talks might have proved to be a signal factor in reaching agreement. But here again, the USSR, both last month in the First Committee and this month in the General Assembly, has adopted an inflexible position. It has presented us with a kind of ultimatum, requesting us first to transform this Assembly into a permanent disarmament commission of eighty-two members, failing which it would no longer remain a member of that body.

121. At the same time, there have been statements, the last of which was made this morning, containing terms unacceptable to us which I shall not bring up again. I have already said that the repetition of such statements does not lend them greater plausibility. The Soviet position is, in essence, that whoever pits his own ideas against those of Moscow is an enemy of peace.

122. Since I wish to speak in moderate terms, I shall merely say that it is an over-simplification to argue that all the wrong is always on the other side. I shall likewise not dwell upon the tenuousness of the results that might be achieved by a commission of eighty-two members.

123. While we, in a conciliatory spirit, were giving favourable consideration to a substantial enlargement of the Disarmament Commission, the USSR, realizing the weakness of its initial position, held to its ultimatum, but in a different form. As of this morning, the Soviet Union and its associates said that they would continue to participate in the work only if the amendment submitted by Albania [A/L.236] at the Soviet Union's request were accepted by us.

124. If we were to accept the proposal submitted by Albania, we would be establishing a commission whose membership would be the exact reverse of that of the Assembly. The Majority in the Assembly would become the minority in the commission, and even if no decisions were taken, a springboard would be provided for those who are in the minority here to express their views on behalf of a factitious majority.

125. We have in recent days been making one concession after another. We can go no further. We are seeking practical results, not propaganda effects. We do, of course, take the USSR threat seriously, but we believe that the successive positions which it has adopted, first in favour of an enlarged commission, then in favour of a body of eighty-two members and finally in favour of the Albanian amendment, evidences a desire that is out of keeping with the present debate.

126. We suppose that this threat is related to general policy considerations of the USSR and that it wishes, for reasons alien to our concerns, to postpone negotiations on disarmament for the time being. If this should prove to be the case, we should deeply deplore such an attitude.

127. As far as we are concerned, the basic problem has been and continues to be disarmament. Therefore whatever the attitude of the USSR may be during the months to come, we shall not relax our efforts towards conciliation. I repeat on behalf of the French delegation that our common duty is clear. It is to study the discussions which have just taken place and the recent developments in military technique. These developments may affect some of our views, just as

we have a moral obligation to weigh the arguments of those who do not think as we do and to determine what is legitimate in those arguments and what is exaggerated or erroneous.

128. The French delegation will apply itself to this task. It continues to hope that the Soviet delegation will not be responsible for a permanent blocking of negotiations when the Albanian amendment is rejected. It hopes that the Soviet side will display as much understanding of the Western position as France will endeavour to display for Soviet views, since disarmament will result only from mutual concessions, and not from threats, excessive demands or ultimatums.

129. Mr. PELAEZ (Philippines): After the disarmament question was debated in the First Committee, some Member States, genuinely concerned over the Soviet Union's announcement that it would not resume the disarmament talks if the Disarmament Commission were not enlarged to include in its membership all the eighty-two Members of the United Nations, moved to meet the Soviet desire for an enlarged Disarmament Commission. Earnest efforts were exerted to narrow down divergent views. The General Assembly postponed its meetings to give time for these efforts and negotiations.

130. The result has been the presentation of the six-Power draft resolution [A/L.231/Rev.1 and Add.1] which, in the belief of the Philippine delegation, represents a consolidation of several ideas broached by different groups of Member States. This draft, in our opinion, cannot conceivably be interpreted as representing the viewpoint of only one or two interested parties. It represents a reasonable compromise among several States and groups of States which have come forward with their ideas, motivated solely by a sincere desire to break the present impasse and to contribute to the cause of peace. It represents, in our opinion, a reasonable approach arrived at in a spirit of conciliation and accommodation.

131. This morning, however, we were confronted with an amendment presented by the delegation of Albania [A/L.236], which would add still more members to the Disarmament Commission. We must say in all frankness that we are surprised that this proposal was broached only this morning and not during the past days, when efforts were being made to take everyone's views into account. We are even more surprised by the announcement this morning by the representative of Finland, and this afternoon by the representative of Austria, to the effect that their countries had not been consulted on Albania's proposal to include them in the membership of the Disarmament Commission. These facts prove, to our mind, that the Albanian amendment was, at the very least, hastily prepared.

132. This morning, the Soviet representative followed up the presentation of the Albanian amendment with the threat—or the ultimatum, if you wish to call it that—that it would not participate in the work of the Disarmament Commission unless the Commission's membership were enlarged, this time pursuant to the Soviet-supported Albanian amendment.

133. The position, therefore, is the following. On the one hand, a group of Member States has earnestly and patiently laboured for days in order to find a solution, motivated by reason and a sincere desire to reconcile divergent views. On the other hand, we are

confronted by a hastily prepared amendment backed by still another Soviet threat of boycott.

134. To the Philippine delegation, the issue is clear. That issue is whether we should now vote for a proposal forged by the earnest efforts of disinterested States to produce a reasonable basis for resuming the disarmament talks, or whether we should vote for a hastily prepared amendment supported by new threats to disregard the processes and the moral authority of this Assembly. The Philippine delegation will vote for the product of reasonableness and the spirit of conciliation represented by the draft resolution sponsored by Canada, India, Japan, Paraguay, Sweden and Yugoslavia. It will vote against the Albanian amendment on the grounds that it does not commend itself to this Assembly and will not help to solve the problem before us.

135. Mr. NESBITT (Canada): I wish to add to my earlier remarks [718th meeting] a brief observation on the amendment submitted by Albania [A/L.236].

136. My delegation will vote against that amendment. I should like to say, however, that that vote will not imply a reflection of any kind on any of the countries listed in the amendment. We shall oppose the amendment because its adoption would upset the careful balance and change the character of the six-Power draft resolution [A/L.231/Rev.1 and Add.1].

137. As the representative of the Philippines has just said, the Albanian amendment was obviously hastily thought up, to say the least. It apparently represents the view of only one group within this Assembly; unlike the draft resolution of which Canada has the honour to be one of the sponsors, it is not a compromise view.

138. The machinery of the disarmament negotiations must not be too cumbersome to be workable. Moreover, under the six-Power draft resolution, States other than those listed in the draft resolution would have an opportunity to serve on the Commission after one year had passed. In our view, that argument applies to the Albanian amendment to add the States listed therein to the membership of the Commission.

139. If the Albanian amendment is adopted, we can see no end to this process of adding States to the membership of the Disarmament Commission. We think, as we have said, that such wholesale additions would make the Commission unworkable. We shall therefore vote against the Albanian amendment.

140. Mr. PRICA (Yugoslavia): In the course of the previous discussions of the disarmament problem, my delegation has emphasized the essential need to expand the United Nations disarmament bodies and thus to provide a generally acceptable framework for further disarmament talks. It has also called attention to the advisability of giving the non-committed countries as wide a representation on these bodies as possible, which, we feel, would facilitate efforts to arrive, through conciliation and compromise, at one or more agreements on initial measures in the field of disarmament.

141. The efforts which have been made during the last few days with regard to the expansion of the United Nations disarmament bodies are, in our opinion, evidence of the Assembly's general awareness of the essential need of such an expansion. Working on those lines, my delegation, together with the delegations of India and Sweden, submitted an amendment [A/L.234] to the draft resolution sponsored by Canada and Japan

[A/L.231]. Under that amendment, Egypt, Mexico, Norway and Poland were to be added to the list of countries in the draft resolution sponsored by Canada and Japan, and a disarmament commission of twenty-five members was to be formed—that is, there were to be fourteen new members on the commission, in addition to the eleven members of the Security Council. My delegation felt that a commission with that composition might assist in the creation of a favourable atmosphere for the consideration of this most urgent world problem.

142. It is precisely because we consider that the burden of the Commission's work should consist primarily not in seeking majorities, but rather in seeking a more propitious atmosphere and new approaches, that we are of the opinion that the proposed composition of the Commission offers by far the best prospects for the Commission's work.

143. Clearly, my delegation did not regard the proposed composition of the Commission as perfect. We are all aware that the machinery alone cannot have decisive significance as regards genuine progress. The formula at which we arrived, however, after the sponsors of the draft resolution had accepted the amendment, appeared to be best suited to what could be achieved under present conditions and to constitute a significant advance over what had been found so far. We were convinced that the adoption of the draft resolution might make it possible to continue disarmament talks on a new and more favourable basis and might prevent the discussion of the disarmament question at this session of the Assembly from ending in an impasse.

144. The delegation of Yugoslavia therefore found it possible, as did India, Sweden and Paraguay, to join the original sponsors in presenting a revised draft resolution [A/L.231/Rev.1 and Add.1].

145. All the efforts of my delegation and of other delegations were, I think, based on the conviction that the solution proposed could be generally accepted. The statement made this morning by the USSR representative, however, indicated that the proposed composition of the Commission was not acceptable to one party in the disarmament talks and could not, therefore, serve as a framework for further activities in the field of disarmament. My delegation cannot but note with regret that the solution proposed in the draft resolution of which my delegation is one of the sponsors has not been accepted and that the efforts at compromise have thus failed.

146. In these circumstances, my delegation completely disengages itself from further efforts at this stage. Consequently, it will not participate in the vote and will not continue to be one of the sponsors of the draft resolution.

147. I should like to end by saying once again that we note with deep regret that the proposed solution has not proved generally acceptable. We hope that further efforts will be made to continue the disarmament talks.

148. The PRESIDENT: If no other representative wishes to speak, I shall invite the General Assembly to proceed now to the vote. In accordance with the rules of procedure, the first draft resolution which I shall put to the vote is the Soviet Union draft resolution [A/L.230]. The Soviet delegation has requested a roll-call vote.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Turkey, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania.

Against: Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia.

Abstaining: Yemen, Afghanistan, Austria, Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Malaya (Federation of), Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand.

Yugoslavia did not participate in the voting.

The draft resolution was rejected by 46 votes to 9, with 24 abstentions.

149. The PRESIDENT: Before proceeding to the vote on the six-Power draft resolution [A/L.231/Rev.1 and Add.1], I shall, in accordance with the rules of procedure, ask the representatives to vote first on the Albanian amendment [A/L.236] to that draft. I understand that a roll-call vote has not been requested.

The amendment was rejected by 38 votes to 19, with 19 abstentions.

150. The PRESIDENT: I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by Canada, India, Japan, Paraguay, Sweden and Yugoslavia* [A/L.231/Rev.1 and Add.1]. A roll-call vote has been requested by the Canadian delegation.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Lebanon, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In Favour: Lebanon, Libya, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos.

Against: Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary.

Abstaining: Liberia, Malaya (Federation of), Morocco, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cuba, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Israel.

*See para. 146 above.

Yugoslavia did not participate in the voting.

The draft resolution was adopted by 60 votes to 9, with 11 abstentions.

151. Mr. LALL (India): The delegation of India feels that it should explain the votes which it has just cast on the three proposals on which the Assembly has taken decisions.

152. It has been the privilege of the delegation of India to be closely connected with the intense negotiations which have proceeded in the last few weeks for the purpose of trying to arrive at a solution of this matter of the composition of the Disarmament Commission. In doing so, my delegation has been actuated by its desire to find a generally acceptable forum in which discussions on disarmament can proceed. The delegation of India feels that any step of the positive character to reduce tensions and to reduce the awful possibilities of world war are steps which should be taken by this responsible Assembly. These were the motives, then, which actuated my delegation. Accordingly, at a certain stage we made concrete suggestions, with some other delegations, and those were incorporated in document A/L.231/Rev.1. We therefore voted for that draft resolution.

153. However, it is not the view of the delegation of India that there is any unique formula or any secret, inviolable truth about the composition of the Disarmament Commission. We cannot claim that a particular

document presents the only possible workable composition. We therefore felt that it would not be unwise—in fact, that it might in practice be the right thing to do—to vote even for a wide composition, and we accordingly cast our vote for the amendment submitted by the delegation of Albania.

154. I do not know yet whether we have reached a real impasse in this matter; but if we have, it would be the hope of the delegation of India that efforts will continue—and, in our view, they should continue—towards reaching a solution which will result in disarmament discussions going forward.

155. What seem to divide the Assembly are positions which derive from different ideologies. In the view of the delegation of India, much more important than differences of ideologies, much more fearful than any conquest of ideologies would be the outbreak of war, and therefore we hope sincerely that efforts will continue and that they will result in an arrangement by which disarmament discussions will be made possible under the aegis of the United Nations for the forthcoming year.

156. The PRESIDENT: The Assembly can take note, I think, of the fact that the delegation of Honduras, had it been present, would have voted against the Soviet draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.