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President: Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON
(Thailand).

AGENDA ITEM 55

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REPORT OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE (A/3559)

1. Mr. MATSCH (Austria), Rapporteur of the First Committee, I have the honour to submit to the General Assembly the report of the First Committee [A/3559] on the question of Cyprus. This report includes the draft resolution which, in a spirit of conciliation, was adopted by the First Committee by 76 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.
2. In the course of the debate on this delicate and complex problem, a number of aspects of the external and internal questions were presented, which helped to clarify the various points of view held on this matter. It was the First Committee's feeling that the General Assembly should try to open the way for further steps towards a satisfactory solution. Such a solution, the Committee believed, required an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression.
3. The draft resolution, by expressing the desire that a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter, and the hope that negotiations will be resumed and continued to this end, contains guiding elements and is therefore recommended to the General Assembly for adoption.

In accordance with rule 68 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the First Committee.

4. The PRESIDENT: I shall now put the draft resolution of the First Committee [A/3559] to the vote.

The draft resolution was adopted by 57 votes to none, with 1 abstention.

AGENDA ITEM 66

Question considered by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly from 1 to 10 November 1956 (*continued*):

5. Mr. RIFA'I (Jordan): Once again the General Assembly is meeting to consider the problem of Israel's aggression against Egypt. My delegation regrets that Israel's unyielding attitude has led the General Assembly to consume the entire period of its eleventh session in dealing with this problem. No one would have imagined that it would be necessary to spend such an amount of time, nor would anyone have conceived that Israel would exhibit such a flagrant defiance of the United Nations, the very Organization which created Israel, and would reject all the appeals calling on Israel to withdraw—especially the appeals of the country which has contributed to Israel's life and sustenance.

6. If this conduct on the part of Israel is to have any significance, its moral impact should have first consideration. The moral standards of nations are a heritage of a long history of nationhood, of a series of social and political developments, and of a sense of responsibility towards the world and the days ahead. These are the prerequisites of a disciplined and orderly life—both national and international—and the characteristics which distinguish a responsible individual or community from an irresponsible people.

7. Such is the basic distinction between a State that has enjoyed its statehood for more than 5,000 years of history and a State which is still in the process of formation. Such is the difference between Egypt and Israel. Patience, wisdom and sound reasoning have characterized the conduct of Egypt throughout the development of the present crisis. If the Egyptians had acted otherwise, they would have ignored their prestige and history. They belong to a country which has practised sovereignty and independence throughout the ages, a country which has shone in glory and civilization and which is today the centre of Arabic culture and Islamic jurisprudence. It has given leadership to the Arab world and, situated between the East and the West at the junction of three continents, it carries a heavy burden of responsibility.

8. The picture becomes more impressive when it is contrasted with that of Israel, which has failed to qualify for statehood. Its territory is internationally unrecognized. Its nation has a vague identity, once based on religious discrimination, once on race, and a

third time on Zionist fanatic doctrine. Its eight years of history is a chain of major violations, and its Government is established on a programme of expansion by aggression.

9. These are bitter facts, yet they are the foundations of the structure of Israel. In order to live and grow, it stretches its search for enrichment into other lands with pressing appeals for assistance and charity. It absorbs funds from one country, arms from another, and reparations and compensation from a third, and so it lives and exists. I would by no means discourage contributions and charities if made in the right direction and for the right purposes, but the aid and facilities which are granted to Israel are in fact given to an irresponsible Government which sets its policies with complete disregard of its international obligations. In the past, Israel's spokesmen have repeatedly declared the intention of their country to expand beyond the territory which it occupies, to open up outlets to the Red Sea by force, to annex the Gaza Strip, to conquer Jerusalem, to control the waters of Palestine, and to occupy the western bank of the Jordan river. These are the dreams that kindle the eyes of the Israelis at present, but their aims for the future are much wider.

10. The Arab representatives have never failed to draw the attention of the appropriate organs of the United Nations and of the Governments primarily concerned to the fact that assistance to Israel means an encouragement to aggression and expansion and even preparation for war. But world Zionism is so organized and so powerful in the Western world that it never misses an opportunity to exploit all possible means to assist and support Israel's plans and to place it in the headlines on every occasion. Thus aid continued to flow into Israel until it reached the saturation point and until Israel became able to threaten all the surrounding countries and to call them to war. The course of events has proved that Israel was heading towards invasion and occupation, and the facts now speak for themselves. We need not now express views or elaborate theories.

11. The question, the big question, is: on what does Israel depend in its stubbornness and arrogance? What is it that makes Israel disregard its obligations, defy United Nations resolutions and challenge the will of the whole world? If Israel were one of the big Powers, the kind of Power that makes history, one perhaps could find the answer, but since it is a State which has just come into existence and which lives on the charity of nations, we are faced with a real puzzle. In the ultimate analysis, however, we come to a sad though serious conclusion: Israel believes that its influence in the Western capitals, through Zionist organizations and propaganda, gives it immunity against any measures or penalties that might be imposed upon it by other States, even if such measures were contemplated by the highest executive authorities in such countries.

12. However, we should not put all the blame on Israel for this injurious conduct. Part of the blame should be sought in the past, when this conduct received encouragement to the extent that Israel became known as the "pampered child of the United Nations". But Israel's concept of its invincible influence in other leading countries does not reflect upon the reputation of Israel as much as it reflects on the prestige and honour of those big Powers. It is they whose reputation would be impaired if they were accused of Zionist influence permeating their communities and administration and controlling their Press and media of information, it

is they who should be faithful to the cause of honour and the principles of peace and justice.

13. As to Israel, it is concerned only about its own interest. It believes in the philosophy of force, disregarding the danger that lies in the days to come. It is diving in an ocean ridden by storms. If it does not ride with the wind, it will be overcome by the waves. A temporary gain through a military conspiracy is a permanent loss to it in the long run. Whether or not Israel appreciates these views is beside the point; but my point is the issue before us today.

14. Here is a case in which Israel defies the United Nations. It stands against seven consecutive resolutions, adopted by an almost unanimous vote, calling on Israel to withdraw unconditionally and immediately behind the armistice lines. It refuses to obey or to listen. It has decided to maintain its aggression on Egyptian soil. The issue is now, therefore, first, whether the General Assembly will accept this challenge to its authority and prestige; secondly, whether it will admit the continuation of aggression and, thirdly, whether it will allow aggression to dictate conditions. The question is how to save the future of the United Nations which is now at stake.

15. If we are faithful to the pledge which we undertook, we have to defend our Organization and safeguard its Charter. If we do not take effective measures immediately to prove our respect for the principles which we have all upheld, what a disappointment it will be, and what a collapse. Millions and millions of people are today looking to this Assembly to see what action it will take to remove aggression and curb the decision of Israel. Will the seventy-eight Member States retreat? Will they surrender to Israel's decision? Or will they stand firm in defending the cause of peace?

16. Israel does not estimate the serious outcome of its defiance. It does not calculate that the demonstrations which it organizes against the verdicts of the United Nations are expressions of political insanity. It does not see that if war breaks out again in the area because of its stubborn attitude, then nothing can stop such a war from following a wide course. If Israel cannot foresee the future, we, as Members of this Organization, should live up to our responsibilities and save humanity from the scourge of a third world war.

17. Should a country continue to be patient while a part of its territory is seized by an invader who is deaf to advice and blind to the consequences? Should the national pride of a State be the price of international equilibrium? Should Egypt bear the burden of maintaining peace in the Middle East while Israel is careless about it? The Arab States, the guardians of their own region, will have to decide how best to ensure peace and progress in their part of the world. Such a decision will definitely be affected by whatever action the General Assembly may take against Israel's aggression.

18. All representatives are aware of the efforts that have been made outside the United Nations to persuade Israel to withdraw unconditionally. They are also aware of Israel's persistent refusal to accede to such demands. In the latest rejection by the Israel Government, the Israel Prime Minister, Mr. Ben Gurion, expressed on 21 February his apology for refusal in the following terms:

"President Eisenhower's letter a fortnight ago, containing the same demand he uttered yesterday in his message to his people, placed me under a great

moral pressure, for I was keenly conscious of the personality and understanding of the writer.

"And if I was compelled to reply as I did, I did so only under a still stronger compulsion: the pressure of my conscience as a man and a Jew, the pressure of the justice for which my people was fighting . . ."

19. I am not questioning the conscience of Mr. Ben Gurion as a man and a Jew. But I question the justice for which his people fought; I question the justice of their establishing a State on the Arab soil of Palestine by invasion; of their occupying a territory of which 94 per cent does not belong to them; of their expelling one million Arab refugees, now suffering hunger and misery; of their denying all the rights of these destitute people. I am questioning the justice of the merciless atrocities perpetrated by Israel on innocent Arabs with the aim of terrorizing and intimidating them. I am questioning the justice of the Israel aggression against Egypt, thus pushing the Middle East into a flame of fire, and I am questioning the justice of allowing that aggression to pay dividends.

20. Is this the justice for which Mr. Ben Gurion's people fought? None of these tragic and terrible events seems to put pressure on Mr. Ben Gurion's conscience, to change his refusal and to make him accede to the will of nations in restoring order and peace in the Middle East.

21. Does not the following story—reported by a Jewish editor—put some pressure on the conscience of Mr. Ben Gurion as a man and a Jew? Mr. William Zuckerman wrote in the *Jewish Newsletter* of 4 February 1957 the following story:

"Uri Avneri, editor of the Tel Aviv tabloid picture newspaper *Haolam Haseh*, tells how he had once met an Arab child on a highway of Galilee and asked him where was the nearest village. He was horrified to see the child begin to tremble all over as if it were in a paroxysm of fear merely because a Jew had spoken to him. For me, it was a terrible experience. I did not relish the thought of belonging to a people who awaken convulsions of fear in the hearts of children."

22. The Israel rule in Palestine which horrifies the hearts of children on the highways is trying to expand now and to annex the territory of Gaza with its 300,000 Arab inhabitants. Here is what the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees reported on 11 February about conditions in Gaza, in his statement in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee:

" . . . a general economic depression persists in Gaza—there are fewer jobs and smaller incomes, and the citrus crop is not being fully marketed. Recent events also have had a deteriorating effect on morale. The people—both refugees and others—are in a disturbed state and feel very insecure, both at the present and for the future." [A/SPC/9, para. 36.]

23. Yet Israel continues to apply all sorts of delaying tactics, one time laying down conditions for withdrawal, and another time making proposals with the aim of maintaining conditions in the Gaza Strip acceptable to Israel and ensuring in the Gulf of Aqaba rights of free navigation to the Israel ships.

24. The Jordan delegation has stated on several occasions that the subject of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba is out of the context of the present debate and

that the General Assembly is not the organ which will decide on this matter. Moreover, we must not forget that conditions between the Arab countries and Israel are governed by an armistice system and armistice demarcation lines. There are no international boundaries between Israel and the surrounding countries. The problem is now to maintain quiet and order along the armistice lines, and not to discuss international territorial rights which are subject to various stipulations.

25. As to the Gaza area, we would never accept to venture into a discussion of proposals which might envisage a change in the *status quo* that prevailed in it prior to the Israel attack. The United Nations Emergency Force is charged with the task of separating the Egyptian and Israel forces on the armistice demarcation lines, which task would prevent incursions from one side of the line to the other. Therefore, any so-called proposals or plans which might contain some sort of preconditions for Israel's withdrawal are basically unjustified and totally unwarranted.

26. In transgressing beyond the armistice line into the Egyptian territory, Israel resorted to the use of armed force to achieve its objectives, in direct challenge to the provisions of the Charter which it is pledged to respect: the provisions which call upon all Members to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered, and the provisions which call upon all Members to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. Thus, by defying the resolutions which call upon it to withdraw unconditionally, Israel violates the very principles of the Charter which are embodied in those resolutions.

27. In order to face up to the present state of aggression, a number of Members of the General Assembly have sponsored a draft resolution [A/3557] which was introduced by the Foreign Minister of Lebanon at the last meeting of the General Assembly. The Jordan delegation strongly supports this draft resolution. We believe that the measures it contains are the least that should be applied against Israel for its continued violations and present aggression. This is an indispensable penalty and an imperative action for dealing with the situation.

28. Words and repeated appeals have proven to be ineffective. What is needed now, therefore, is real action. May we then, all of us, as Members representing the family of nations responsible to humanity and to future generations, stand by the cause of peace and protect the existence of this Organization.

29. Mr. PEARSON (Canada): We are now reaching, if indeed we have not already reached, the point of no return in our effort to deal with the problems arising out of a military intervention in the Suez area begun last October. So where do we go from here? Not, I venture to hope, in a direction which would tend merely to harden existing antipathy or, in the words of the Secretary-General, which would introduce merely new elements of conflict.

30. The Canadian delegation, like other delegations here, has tried to take an objective and impartial position in dealing with the problems which came to a head when Israel's military action in the Sinai peninsula began last October. We are not influenced by a desire to support either of the contestants at the expense of the other in our efforts to find a means of bringing to

an end a conflict which has been growing in intensity over a period of some years. We are concerned with finding the best policy to pursue in order to resolve a series of difficult problems by means which will bring peace and security to the people of both countries, and we have no other interest than this.

31. The problems with which we are dealing go deeper than the immediate issue of withdrawal of military forces. They have their roots in the past and are terribly difficult for both parties to the dispute. They are also fraught with danger to the peace of the world as well as to the peoples immediately concerned.

32. This Assembly has a duty to avert that danger and to insist that there shall be no return to violence which will be destructive in itself and leave the area open to forces of subversion from outside. We realize that the issues before us will never be truly solved if we are content to let our minds become submerged in tales of past tragedies. These, it is true, have given just cause for grief and bitterness on both sides, but we can scarcely hope for success if we allow ourselves to be persuaded that the record of violence in the past justifies the policy of violence today. We cannot, of course, ignore the past, for it is impossible to deal effectively with this problem unless we have thoroughly studied its origin from every point of view and with respect to the needs of all the people who are concerned with it. But if we allow our minds to be dominated by the unhappy precedents of violence and reprisal which have made up so much of the recent past in this area, then it is very hard indeed to see how we can devise any solution which will in the long run be satisfactory.

33. As I see it, the problem is basically one of fear, fear which breeds distrust and animosity and conflict. There has been fear on the one side of extermination by neighbours whose hostility to the creation and continued existence of the State of Israel has been strong and unremitting. It is difficult for people to act with the moderation and restraint through which wisdom expresses itself if they believe that they themselves live in the shadow of destruction and are uncertain about their very survival as a nation.

34. The fear from which the people of Israel suffer, the fear which explains the violence of reprisals which they have taken against their neighbours, will be on the way to elimination when the Arab States are willing to recognize Israel as a sovereign State and its right to national existence within accepted boundaries and under conditions of life tolerable to its people. There were some signs, a year or so ago, that we might at least be approaching a time when the Arab States would be willing to grant Israel this recognition. Unfortunately, the events of last autumn have reversed that trend. It must now be one of our major aims here to help set again in motion the forces which will lead to the early recognition of Israel in normal terms by its neighbours, and thus to the removal of fear.

35. On the other side, however, there is also fear which has led to extreme views, to extreme policies and to violence. Among the Arab States there is that deep and understandable apprehension that the displacement of population and the political tension already associated with the new State, most of whose citizens have come from abroad, a new State established in the midst of the Arab people, may be followed by still further dislocations owing to the pressure of immigration into Israel, backed as that State is by strong international pressures and international resources. There is a fear that Israel will yield to expansionist

ambitions, which is the counterpart of Israel's own fear of Arab intentions. That has bred in the Arab world animosity and violence towards Israel. When that fear is dissipated we may count on moderation in the attitude of Israel's neighbours towards that State.

36. As I see it, we cannot but agree that, if Israel has a right to live and prosper, free from the fear of strangulation by its neighbours, the Arab States also have a right to feel confident that Israel will not attempt to expand its territory at their expense, the right to be assured that if Israel, however, should at any time develop such ambitions, it will receive no encouragement but meet only opposition on both the official and the non-official level from the outside world, an opposition which would result in the isolation of the State itself from any international assistance or support.

37. It is in this shadow of the past and the present, the shadow of fear on both sides, that we have to consider the problem which is immediately before us. In my view, that problem is one of securing a fair and agreed basis for the withdrawal of Israel from those places which it still occupies beyond the armistice demarcation line; a basis which can be used to increase security and create conditions conducive to peace. If we do not secure such a basis, we may fail completely to bring about this withdrawal—with consequences which will be tragic for us all, and perhaps especially for Israel. As I have said before in this Assembly, it is not a question in our mind of rewarding or punishing or of laying down conditions or refusing conditions; it is a question of associating the withdrawal of Israel with arrangements which should remove the necessity, or at least minimize the possibility, of facing this same problem a year or two from now.

38. From the very beginning of the present crisis, the Canadian delegation has tried to keep in the forefront of its thinking on this question the importance of finding a solution not merely for the problem posed by military intervention, but for that posed by the conditions which brought about that intervention.

39. It was in that spirit that we advocated the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force. We felt that, by its action in bringing about an end of fighting, this Assembly was accepting responsibility for pursuing two related aims: the immediate aim of supervising and securing the cease-fire, and the longer-range objective of helping to create conditions in which it might be possible eventually to settle fundamental problems. We have insisted, even in the earliest days of this crisis, on our view that a return to stability would not flow merely from words or acts of condemnation; and that punishment was not in itself a substitute for progress towards peace.

40. Now, more than three months later, we are confronted with the need to strike a balance between the immediate and primary objective of securing the completion of Israel's withdrawal and that of achieving this in such a way that withdrawal will be accompanied by helpful and fruitful results. I repeat that, as far as our delegation is concerned, we refuse to consider these as unrelated objectives, even though priority in time must be given to the first, which is withdrawal. We still refuse to believe that these objectives cannot be achieved without adopting proposals for forms of pressure which would be an admission by the Assembly of complete and final failure to solve this problem constructively. Our delegation does not believe that we should yet admit any such failure.

41. We think that there is still a way of bringing about withdrawal by spelling out the detailed arrangements which would follow it, and which would strengthen security and prepare the way for pacification. In its resolution 1125 (XI) of 2 February, the Assembly indicated in general terms the necessity for such arrangements. In our view, we should now, before deciding on other measures, follow up that indication with something more concrete and specific.

42. We think that both parties should be willing to accept any recommendations to this end which are satisfactory to the great majority of the members of this Assembly. If Israel refuses to withdraw its forces immediately—not on the implementation but on the adoption of such recommendations by this Assembly—it would be taking on a very heavy responsibility indeed, and would forfeit our support and might provoke consideration of other measures by the Assembly.

43. The arrangements to follow withdrawal, which we should now agree on, are in essence, though not of course in detail, envisaged in the Secretary-General's reports of 24 January [A/3512] and 11 February [A/3527], the former of which has already been endorsed by this Assembly. If we could carry these arrangements into effect, it would ensure that such withdrawal would help to bring about conditions which promise greater security and stability, and these arrangements might, I suggest, include the following.

44. First, there should be a firm pledge by the Governments of Israel and Egypt to observe scrupulously the provisions of the 1949 Armistice Agreement. But when we talk about the scrupulous observance of the Armistice Agreement we should mean not some of the provisions, but all of them.

45. And what are they? First, the Armistice Agreement establishes an armistice demarcation line which is not a political or territorial boundary, but which cannot be changed except by agreement between the two parties. Also, the Agreement prohibits any form of aggressive action, war-like or hostile acts or, if you like, belligerent acts or resort to force by the land, sea or air forces of either side. It establishes the right of each side to security and freedom from fear of attack. It does not prejudice or confirm any political or territorial right or claim or boundary, but it does establish Egypt's administrative control over the Gaza Strip, without giving it any rights of territorial sovereignty there. It provides for the deployment in certain areas on both sides of the demarcation line of defensive forces only, and it defines what "defensive" means. Finally, it provides for the total exclusion of Israel and Egyptian armed forces from the El Auja demilitarized zone.

46. That, then, is what we should mean when we talk about scrupulous observance of the armistice.

47. The second stage in this programme would be arrangements for the United Nations Emergency Force. In this regard, we think that the Secretary-General and the Commander of that Force should make arrangements with the Governments concerned for the deployment of UNEF on the armistice demarcation line. This deployment, which should be made effective with the minimum of interference with civilian life and activity, would be for the sole purpose of putting the Force in a position: first, to assume certain duties of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization under the Armistice Agreement between the two States; secondly, to assist in the prevention of incursions and raids and retaliatory attacks across the armistice line

in either direction; thirdly, generally to maintain peaceful conditions along both sides of the line.

48. Thirdly, there is the question of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran. In our view, it should be agreed and affirmed by us that there should be no interference with innocent passage through or any assertion of belligerent rights in the Straits of Tiran.

49. Israel troops, on their withdrawal from the Sharm El Sheikh area, should, as the Secretary-General puts it in his report of 24 January, "be followed by the United Nations Emergency Force in the same way as in other parts of Sinai" [A/3512, para. 29], in order to assist in maintaining quiet in that area and in preventing conflict. Surely this would be in accordance with the purposes already laid down by this Assembly for that Force.

50. Fourthly, there is the problem of the Gaza Strip. This is perhaps the most complicated and difficult of the arrangements to be decided, as it has political, social, economic, and humanitarian aspects. We are dealing here with 300,000 people, not merely with territory. I should like, therefore, to go into this particular aspect of the problem in somewhat more detail.

51. The Gaza Strip was a part, as you know, of the mandated territory of Palestine. It is not Egyptian territory. Its indigenous population of 60,000 to 70,000 is Palestinian Arab, and is now greatly augmented by some 267,000 refugees, practically all of whom are Palestinian Arabs. It was occupied by Egypt immediately after the termination of the British Mandate in May 1948. And that occupation, pending final settlement of the area was acknowledged in the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement of 1949.

52. Egypt has not annexed this strip and claims to have no intention of doing so. The territory had never been occupied by Israel prior to 29 October 1956, and since then Israel has also disavowed any intention of annexing the strip, though measures and plans for the economic development of the area, taken or projected, may indicate an intention to open the territory to Israel settlement. Should this happen, and in view of recent developments it may well not happen, it would probably mean that most of the indigenous Arab inhabitants of the strip would be forced into dependence or destitution, as the territory cannot support now even the small normal Arab population.

53. Surely there would be little logic to an arrangement whereby Israel would assume responsibility for the administration of a territory not belonging to it, and where it remained in opposition to a decision of the United Nations General Assembly and against the wishes of the Arab inhabitants, for most of whom, as refugees, Israel in these new circumstances might also have to accept responsibility or some great measure of responsibility.

54. In the discharge of its responsibilities for refugees, the United Nations has not recently enjoyed satisfactory relations with the administration of this territory. That situation would be even more difficult, perhaps impossible, if Israel remained in control in the conditions I have just mentioned. The effect of a controversy of this kind would be disastrous for the Arab refugees in Gaza and serious for the Arab refugee problem as a whole. Nor could the United Nations, in my view, take on any new role for maintaining security in and against the Gaza Strip if Israel insisted on remaining there in spite of the Armistice Agreement and of repeated General Assembly resolutions urging it to withdraw.

55. Yet the key issue in this area from the Israel standpoint is security, we are told, against any resumption of incursions or raids into Israel from Gaza territory.

56. From the United Nations standpoint, a key issue also is how to provide security on both sides after Israel withdraws, on the basis of the Assembly's resolution [997 (ES-I)] of 2 November 1956, of later resolutions, as well as of the reports of the Secretary-General.

57. Continued occupation of the Gaza Strip by Israel armed forces or by Israel police and civilian administration after the withdrawal of its troops, and in the face of bitter Egyptian hostility, cannot, in my view, give the security sought, for the following reasons.

58. First, the prolongation of Israel occupation of non-Israel territory, in the face of our decisions to the contrary, and in violation of the Armistice Agreement, will only incite new provocations, perhaps of greater magnitude than any hitherto. The emotions aroused would be almost certain to increase the likelihood of a resumption of incursions and raids from outside the strip, even though the protection afforded against them might well be increased inside the strip.

59. Secondly, Israel occupation of Gaza would only shift a little to the south-west the line between Israel and Egypt across which the raids might come. Since there will always be a line or frontier between Egypt and Israel, the only sure way to stop the raids across the Egyptian-Israel line, wherever it may be, is by political action based on the sincere will of the Governments of Egypt and Israel, with United Nations assistance and supervision, to end such raids and incursions and to abide by the terms of the Armistice Agreement.

60. Assurance of this intention, given by the Government of Egypt, has been repeated by the Secretary-General in his last two reports. It seems obvious to me that continuing Israel occupation of non-Israel territory beyond the armistice line will nullify that assurance. It seems also equally obvious to me that such assurances, without any intervention by the United Nations to facilitate and ensure their actual fulfilment, are not likely to satisfy the Government of Israel. The problem is, therefore, twofold, and requires for its solution Egyptian, Israel and indeed United Nations action.

61. What then should be the nature of this action in respect of this Gaza territory? First, I suggest, in priority, and essential to all other steps, Israel should withdraw from the Gaza Strip in accordance with previous decisions of the General Assembly, and implicit in a return to the scrupulous observance of the Armistice Agreement. At the same time, this Assembly should now provide for effective United Nations action to ensure that the area would not be used as a base for raids and incursions in the future against Israel after its withdrawal.

62. I have just spoken about the deployment of UNEF along the demarcation line. In the Gaza Strip, this deployment would serve not only as an effective interposition of UNEF between the armed forces of Egypt and Israel, but as a screen against incursions, raids and retaliatory attacks across the line from either side.

63. Furthermore, in a transitional period, UNEF and other appropriate agencies of the United Nations would be given functions within the Gaza Strip which would contribute towards safeguarding life and property, would guarantee good civilian administration,

would assure the maximum assistance to the Palestine refugees there, and would protect and foster the economic development of the Gaza Strip and its people.

64. In this regard, we have all heard, I am sure with great interest, the expression of confidence by the Secretary-General [659th meeting] on the attitude of the Government of Egypt towards the necessary arrangements in Gaza after the withdrawal of Israel. Statements of this kind by the Secretary-General are obviously not to be taken lightly.

65. The military aspects of this withdrawal are relatively uncomplicated. Immediately the Israel forces leave, UNEF should enter. As the Armistice Agreement limits in any event Egyptian forces to "defensive" elements only, and as the UNEF will already be deployed along the armistice line, and as the strip is so very narrow itself, the Government of Egypt should not in our view envisage the return of its own armed forces to this area after the Israel troops have withdrawn.

66. So far as the civil administration of the territory is concerned, the position is more difficult and complicated. Legally, under the Armistice Agreement, the civil administration is to be Egyptian and not Israeli. But there are important practical considerations, I think, which qualify this legal position and which cannot be ignored in the replacement of the present administration.

67. It is perfectly clear that we should not simply command the Israel civil administration to depart in a night. Anyone who believes that this is possible should study carefully the special report of the Director of UNRWA [A/3212/Add.1] on the agency's operations in the Gaza Strip and ponder upon the situation which exists there.

68. We have here an extremely explosive situation which could very easily get out of control. In this tiny area are crowded 267,000 refugees and a much smaller native population. They are bitter and frustrated, administered by strangers; rebellious, riven by frictions, and in a mood, I have no doubt, to erupt in violence and bloodshed if firm control were removed.

69. There has already been more than enough murder in the Gaza Strip, and the United Nations cannot be indirectly responsible for more. We owe protection to the refugees and we certainly owe protection to the servants of UNRWA who have been carrying on so heroically in the face of such great obstacles, difficulties and dangers in that strip.

70. Therefore provision must surely be made for a peaceful transition from the administration of Israel to something no less strong and effective and at the same time more generally acceptable. Such a transition can be effected only by negotiation, and such negotiation, which should be both speedy and thorough, can only be conducted by direct agents of the United Nations. There is no sense in pretending that, under present circumstances, it could be undertaken between Egyptians and Israelis alone. The good offices of a third party must be interposed, and this, in our view, can only be the United Nations.

71. This is all the more desirable because, after Israel's withdrawal, the United Nations should, in our view and by agreement with Egypt, accept responsibility to the maximum possible extent for establishing and maintaining civil administration in the territory; for fostering economic development and social welfare, for maintaining law and order. The United Nations Relief and Work Agency is already there, with an experienced and efficient administrative nucleus. The

United Nations could also provide other help through the United Nations technical assistance machinery, the resources of its Secretariat, and expert consultants recruited for specific purposes. In this way there would be built up in Gaza, in co-operation, I hope, with Egypt and with Israel, a United Nations civil administration.

72. To co-ordinate and make effective arrangements to this end, the Secretary-General might decide to appoint a United Nations Commissioner for Gaza. Working with the Commander of UNEF and the Director of UNRWA, and after consultation with Egyptian and Israel representatives as well as with refugee and other local Arab leaders, he could arrange to bring about with all possible speed the replacement of the present Israel civil administration of the area.

73. In this way, and perhaps in this way only, we should be able to effect the withdrawal of Israel, with order and speed, and in such a manner as to protect the interests of the inhabitants, and of both Egypt and Israel as well.

74. After the replacement was completed, this United Nations Commissioner should, in my view, remain in Gaza where he would have chief responsibility for all United Nations activities there, including those of UNEF inside the strip. He would be concerned with the supervision of the Armistice Agreement, including maintenance of the cease-fire observers' functions and checking and reporting on alleged incidents of violation. In discharging these responsibilities, he would work through UNEF rather than the Truce Supervisory Organization, though this would be without prejudice, of course, to the role of that organization in the other three armistice agreements.

75. In view of the status of the Gaza Strip, however, as an area not belonging to the sovereign territory of any neighbouring State, any arrangement for the administration of the territory such as that which I have ventured to outline must be considered as an interim measure pending final agreement as to the proper disposition of the territory. On that, final agreement remains the responsibility of the United Nations, and it should be discharged after these interim arrangements have been completed.

76. I venture to submit these proposals to the Assembly because I believe they will provide a basis not only for the essential and prior withdrawal of Israel forces, but for a better and more peaceful state of affairs than that which has existed previously. They may not constitute a perfect programme, and I realize that they will not fully meet the wishes of the two parties to this conflict. This programme is, admittedly, a compromise, as any resolution based on it would be a compromise, but it is meant to be a constructive compromise which may lead to further steps that will make for lasting peace. In that spirit it is submitted to the Assembly.

77. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The General Assembly has been compelled to take up once again the question of the Israel Government's failure to comply with the demands of the United Nations for the immediate and complete withdrawal of Israel's armed forces from Egyptian territory.

78. It would have been natural to expect that after the cessation of hostilities in Egyptian territory the United Nations would do everything possible to liquidate the consequences of the aggression committed against Egypt, and that it would countenance no further

intervention in the internal affairs of the Arab States. The peoples of the Arab countries, like the peace-loving peoples everywhere, cherished the legitimate hope that henceforward peace in the Near and Middle East would be maintained and consolidated. They hoped that the policy of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the countries of that area would be brought to an end and that Egypt would be given disinterested assistance in its efforts to overcome the consequences of the act of aggression of which it had been the victim.

79. However, the Government of Israel, as the Secretary-General's report of 11 February [A/3527] makes clear, has not only persisted in maintaining its forces in Egyptian territory but is also constantly putting forward new demands whose real purpose is to cover up its failure to comply with the General Assembly's decisions, and to gain certain benefits for itself. In particular, the Secretary-General's report shows that the Israel Government is trying to have the Gaza area allotted to Israel and other important strategic areas in Egyptian territory occupied indefinitely by United Nations armed forces. And to add to that, Israel is now demanding as a condition for the withdrawal of its forces from Egyptian territory a guarantee of free passage for its ships through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba.

80. To bow to these demands of Israel by way of "compensation" for the withdrawal of Israel forces from Egyptian territory would be tantamount to setting the seal of United Nations approval on the aggression committed by Israel, with the United Kingdom and France, against Egypt. To accept any of these conditions, in the present circumstances, would simply be to connive at Israel's aggression and to encourage new hostile acts by Israel against Egypt and other Arab countries.

81. It is perfectly clear that if the United Nations places any value on its own authority it cannot agree to such a course; for to do so would be to violate the principles of the Charter and to flout the demands of the majority of the peoples of the Member States.

82. Why then, it may be asked, is the Israel Government challenging the United Nations and persisting in its aggressive actions against Egypt? Everyone knows that Israel would never have dared to launch an aggressive war against Egypt, and would not be sabotaging the General Assembly's decision for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel forces from Egypt, if it were not supported by protectors that are not only encouraging Israel's aggression but are themselves pursuing a policy hostile to Egypt and the other Arab countries.

83. It cannot be overlooked that the aggression against Egypt was committed not by Israel alone but also by the United Kingdom and France, which used Israel as the spearhead of their military adventure against the Egyptian State.

84. The point, however, is not merely that Israel feels it has the support of accomplice aggressors among the Western Powers. The fact is that this policy of Israel's is useful to a certain State in its efforts to carry out its own dangerous manoeuvres in the Middle East, to bring the Eisenhower doctrine to fruition as quickly as possible and to interfere in the affairs of Egypt and the other Arab countries. In all its actions, the Israel Government leans on the support of ruling groups in the United States, in particular, the influential groups which are interested in establishing United States mili-

tary and economic influence in the Near and Middle East.

85. There is no escaping the fact that a carefully planned operation is being played out before the eyes of the entire world. In that operation, the role of Israel, the aggressor, is to show stubbornness and indeed to make ever-increasing demands on Egypt and the United Nations, while the United States is allotted the role of "peacemaker" and ostensibly helps the United Nations to overcome Israel's stubbornness, while in reality entrenching itself in the Middle East either directly or, as a beginning, under cover of the United Nations forces.

86. It is common knowledge that the Eisenhower doctrine, which reflects the intention of the United States to carry through in the Near and Middle East a policy of broad economic expansion and direct military aggression, and which represents an attempt to subject the peoples of the area to a new colonial yoke, has been emphatically repudiated by the peoples of the Arab countries, as also of other countries of the world. The peoples have rightly recognized that the success of these efforts would constitute a real threat not only to the independence of the peoples of the Near and Middle East but also to peace everywhere. Indeed, the Eisenhower plan for military and economic expansion has been subjected to merciless criticism by a wide variety of groups in the United States itself, not excluding Congress.

87. Accordingly, the United States Government, with the Government of Israel, is playing a subtle game, seeking to take advantage of the present situation in order to arrogate to itself, on its own initiative, the role of "arbiter" and "guarantor" in the Middle East, and thus to establish its influence in the area. In view of the fact that the aggressor has been condemned by all peace-loving peoples, the ruling groups in the United States prefer to play a double game, to make speeches calling for the withdrawal of Israel troops from Egyptian territory, while in actual fact they do everything in their power to prevent such a withdrawal and to support the aggressive policy of extremist circles in Israel. At the same time, the makers of United States foreign policy declare that the United States Government is prepared to "guarantee" freedom of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba if Israel will agree to withdraw its troops from Egyptian territory.

88. The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, was reported in the Press on 12 February as having said, after some references to the preparation of "a compromise solution for the Arab-Israel crisis in the Middle East", that the United States Government would "undertake to support the principle of free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba if this principle were violated". What the United States has in mind, as has been explained in the American Press, is to establish its control in the area by "effective means" that is, by using its naval and other armed forces. Mr. Dulles openly declared on 19 February that the United States intended to sail its ships through the Gulf of Aqaba in order to "impress upon that body of water an international character", and was ready to use force in that area. Thus the United States proposes to set itself up, unilaterally, as an international guarantor, or rather an international policeman, for the Near and Middle Eastern countries.

89. These intentions on the part of the United States reveal the true meaning of the Eisenhower doctrine. As we know, the authors and supporters of this policy are trying to convince the Arab countries, and others

too, that it is aimed against what they like to call "Communist penetration". However, the case we are now considering makes it abundantly clear that the sharp edge of the Eisenhower doctrine is directed primarily against an Arab country, namely, Egypt, which was made the victim of aggression because its policy did not suit imperialist circles in the Western countries. This is a living, eloquent example of the Eisenhower doctrine in action. Moreover, the armed forces of the United States are preparing to go to the aid not of the victim of aggression, Egypt, but of the aggressor, Israel.

90. The latest Press reports indicate that the United States is drawing its partners in the North Atlantic bloc into its dangerous game in the Near East. According to these reports, the United States Government is already discussing with them a draft joint statement declaring the Straits of Tiran to be an international waterway.

91. Thus the United States Government is assuming the right to dispose of the territorial waters of the Arab States as though they were its own territorial waters. Surely the United States Government is taking too much upon itself. And what view will be taken of this policy by the peoples of the Arab countries involved, whose interests are being wholly ignored?

92. In brief, the United States Government proposes to reward Israel generously for its aggression against Egypt by making a deal with it at the expense of the victim of aggression. And all this is being presented to us as neither more nor less than a contribution to the cause of peace.

93. It has already been reported in the American Press, for example, that the United States intends to help Israel to annex the areas it seized from Egypt, with a view in particular to the construction of military bases in those areas. References have been made to bases in Eilat.

94. According to these reports, Israel is to receive liberal assistance from the United States under the Eisenhower doctrine; a figure of \$122 million has been mentioned, of which \$96 million is to be granted in the form of arms and military equipment.

95. Everyone knows that Israel would never have dared to launch an aggressive war against Egypt, much less to flout the General Assembly's demands for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from Egyptian territory, if it had not been backed by protectors who were encouraging its actions in order to carry through their own plans with regard to Egypt and the other Arab countries.

96. The interest shown by the United States in establishing its supremacy in this area is by no means fortuitous. It is stimulated by the oil in which the subsoil of the Arab countries abounds. Only in conditions of tension can the United States hope to see its plan meet with any success, and Israel's stubbornness, dictated by the American oil companies, is a veritable godsend to it in that connexion.

97. It is clear that the recent actions of the United States partners in the North Atlantic bloc—the United Kingdom, France and other countries—are also intended to aggravate the situation in the Middle East. We all know that the United Kingdom and France, after committing an act of aggression against Egypt and trying to seize the Suez Canal by force, are now engaged in a new attempt to establish their control over the Canal.

Together with the United States and Norway, they have proposed to Egypt, in the form of an ultimatum, an "interim agreement" under which the Suez Canal would in fact be withdrawn from the sphere of Egyptian sovereignty and placed under the authority of some international organ headed by the Western Powers.

98. The proposed agreement includes provisions under which Canal tolls would be payable not to Egypt but to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Fifty per cent of their amount would be remitted to Egypt for the operation of the Canal, while the remaining 50 per cent would be withheld pending a final settlement of the Canal's status, *i.e.*, in actual fact retained as a means of exercising pressure on the Egyptian Government in that connexion.

99. This draft agreement is essentially nothing other than the familiar Dulles plan presented at the London Conference in 1956 and rejected at the time by the Egyptian Government. The same fate awaits the so-called new plan of the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

100. There is no question but that this policy of the United States and the actions of the United Kingdom and France, its partners in the North Atlantic bloc, are serving to whet the predatory appetite of Israel.

101. As for the Government of Israel, it is playing a dangerous game. As we know, it was that Government that initiated the aggression against Egypt, in order to give the United Kingdom and France a formal pretext for engaging in hostilities against Egypt. And now Israel, by refusing to withdraw its forces from Egyptian territory, is trying to create favourable conditions for intervention in the affairs of the peoples of that area by the rulers of the United States, who, while condemning Israel's policy in words, are in reality inciting Israel to maintain that policy because it creates opportunities for penetration into the Near and Middle East.

102. The Soviet delegation wishes to emphasize the importance of the maintenance of security in the Near East. Today, after the aggression perpetrated by the United Kingdom, France and Israel against Egypt, and after the promulgation of the Eisenhower doctrine, that question has become urgent.

103. It was because of its realization of the need for ensuring a lasting and stable peace in the Near East that the Soviet Government proposed to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France on 11 February that they should assume the obligation to base their policy in relation to the Near and Middle East on the following principles: first, the maintenance of peace in the Near and Middle East through the settlement of outstanding differences by peaceful means alone, on the basis of negotiation; secondly, non-intervention in the internal affairs of the countries of the Near and Middle East and respect for their sovereignty and independence; thirdly, renunciation of all attempts to draw those countries into military blocs in which the great Powers participate; fourthly, liquidation of foreign bases and withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of the countries of the Near and Middle East; fifthly, mutual agreement to refrain from supplying arms to the countries of the Near and Middle East; sixthly, assistance for the economic development of the countries of the Near and Middle East without any political, military or other conditions incompatible with the dignity and sovereignty of those countries.

104. The Government of the Soviet Union proposed to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France that the foregoing six principles should be proclaimed in a joint declaration or in statements issued individually. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, the adoption of such a declaration at the present time would rule out the possibility of dangerous unilateral action by any of the great Powers in connexion with the countries of the Near and Middle East, it would contribute to the strengthening of peace and security in that vital area, and would promote the development of the national economies of the countries concerned and the consolidation of their independence. The six points put forward by the Soviet Government make up a realistic and constructive programme for peace in the Near and Middle East.

105. As regards the liquidation of the consequences of the aggression committed against Egypt, I have already pointed out that the most urgent issue at the present time is the withdrawal of Israel forces from Egyptian territory.

106. The representative of Canada tried in his statement today to place Egypt, the victim of aggression, and Israel, the aggressor whose armed forces invaded Egyptian territory, on the same footing. To take that line of reasoning is to adopt a position of complicity with the aggressor. Obviously the General Assembly, if it values its prestige, cannot take the course which is being urged upon it by the Canadian representative.

107. The Soviet Union fully supports the legitimate demand that Israel forces should be unconditionally and immediately withdrawn from Egyptian territory in the Gaza area and along the shores of the Gulf of Aqaba.

108. If Israel, despite the General Assembly's repeated demands, refuses to withdraw its troops from Egyptian territory, then the United Nations will be justified in taking drastic measures against Israel in accordance with the Charter, including if necessary the application of sanctions.

109. In view of the fact that the application of such measures would necessitate certain action on the part of Member States and of the Organization itself, the Soviet delegation would prefer the decision on the matter to be taken by the Security Council, since under the Charter such a decision would be binding upon all States, whereas a decision of the General Assembly would be merely a recommendation.

110. At the same time it must not be forgotten that the adoption of a similar decision regarding Israel has already been prevented in the Security Council. As we know, in November 1956 the United Kingdom and France, Israel's partners in aggression, prevented the Security Council from adopting a resolution providing for economic sanctions against Israel.

111. Accordingly, the Soviet delegation will support the draft resolution submitted by six delegations [A/3557], under which the General Assembly would call upon all States to deny all military, economic or financial assistance and facilities to Israel in view of its continued defiance of previous General Assembly resolutions.

112. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria): The present features of the situation now facing the United Nations have been developing for some time. Today, the main features of this situation have become unmistakably clear. It therefore befits us, in analysing the present position, to recall these main features.

113. I should have liked to make my analysis brief. In view, however, of the statements which have been made this morning by the representative of Canada and other representatives, I feel that I should go more deeply into this question than I had originally intended to do.

114. In our view, today the main features of the situation are the following.

115. First, the act of aggression now under consideration was perpetrated and carried out jointly by the United Kingdom, France and the world Zionist movement, acting through Israel in the Middle East and through Zionist organizations everywhere. This Zionist movement is not only to be found in Israel. Israel is only part of the movement. The main centre of the Zionist movement, as regards the formulation of policies and the preparation of action, is not Tel Aviv or Jerusalem: I would say that it is New York.

116. Today, Israel persists in retaining the objectives of its aggression. The United Kingdom and France persist in supporting Israel in that respect. The community of interests among the three allies—and this is important—has not been broken by the withdrawal of the two Powers, on the one hand, and the refusal of Israel to withdraw, on the other.

117. Secondly, the act of aggression was committed in utter disregard of the Charter. The pretext that was used was that this was a police action undertaken by the three nations for the good of the world community. This pretext is so transparent that it cannot disguise the ugly nakedness of that aggression. Nevertheless, that pretext and others continue to be used to support Israel's policy. Today, the representative of Canada spoke of Israel, the aggressor, and Egypt, the victim, as contestants on an equal footing. This pretext and similar ones continue to serve the purpose of this same policy in respect of Gaza, Sharm El Sheikh, Suez and related matters.

118. Furthermore, if the views of some persons were to be adopted, the international Force originally suggested by Canada would be used in such a manner as to serve the very purposes of aggression. Not only did the three aggressors act together, but they are being helped to utilize the United Nations and its force for the purposes of their aggression.

119. Israel has aggravated the position. In the first place, Israel was the active instigator of the joint colonialist-Zionist action against Egypt. In the second place, Israel not only contravened the Charter by its actions, but also contravened a special agreement to which Israel was a party, namely, the Armistice Agreement with Egypt. That Armistice Agreement was concluded at the behest of the Security Council, and, even more, at the insistence of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. The Agreement was solemnly recognized by the Security Council as a means to end the hostilities. No one was more articulate in stressing the value of the Armistice Agreement than the three Powers to which I have referred, and no one was more insistent that the Agreement should be concluded.

120. Subsequently, that is, in May 1950, the three Powers—the United States, the United Kingdom and France—made their tripartite declaration to the effect that they would act within the United Nations or outside the United Nations to stabilize the situation produced by the armistice, and thus would oppose by all means, and on their own if need be, any attack from either side of the armistice lines. We were told that that tripartite declaration would serve as a guarantee

by these powerful nations to the people of the area against any attack from any direction.

121. The value of the tripartite declaration as a guarantee has been clearly revealed. Two of the guarantors joined the aggressor in committing the aggression. On the other hand, the attitude of the United States is well known. But today, even at this juncture, the representative of Canada tells us that we should oppose Zionist expansionism by trying to make Israel's aggression pay. This is another aspect of the continuation of the same policy, as expressed today by the representative of Canada. The true value of this tripartite declaration made outside the United Nations has been revealed. In our view, such declarations hardly hold water and provide no true guarantees.

122. But something far more important has happened, something with which we are faced today. The objectives of the positions of the United Kingdom, France and Israel and the position of the United States as regards the future of the Gulf of Aqaba and Suez are practically unified objectives—although the United States position on the question of Gaza is substantially different from that of the other countries.

123. This reveals to us the true meaning and value of the policies which we have been witnessing during the last few weeks and days. The United Kingdom position is today firmly supported by some countries of the Commonwealth—and particularly Australia, Canada and New Zealand. We are aware of the solidarity of the Commonwealth and of the solidarity of some alliances which tend to generalize the support for the position of the United Kingdom and Israel and, consequently, to oppose or frustrate any real efforts towards withdrawal.

124. In the eyes of these Members, the question is no longer how to achieve Israel's withdrawal after the aggression, but how to ensure, as a result of the aggression, some advantages and changes which Israel and these Powers are interested in obtaining. In other words, Israel is to be made a link in their system between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, and, to that end, the following steps are to be taken: first, the Gulf of Aqaba is to be internationalized, but the route between the gulf and the Mediterranean, through Israel, and the railroad and pipelines which are to be built are not to be internationalized, being kept under Israel operation and control; secondly, the operation and control of the Suez Canal, in Egyptian territory, are to be internationalized—and this is called impartiality and an effort aimed at withdrawal.

125. Thus Israel is to receive a new function in the system of these Powers in the Middle East. Israel is to serve the purposes of those Powers as well as its own purposes. This—at least in the minds of some Member States—is the real issue before us, rather than the issue of withdrawal.

126. The attitude of these Powers is not influenced solely by the need to ensure withdrawal, it is influenced by the need of the Powers concerned to create a new situation in the Middle East that would be to their advantage and serve their interests. Therefore they have been able to reconcile their position in many respects with that of Israel in order to make Israel a communication link between the two seas.

127. The third picture of the situation that we have before us appears to me to be the following: the varied and reiterated resolutions of the General Assembly have had some effect upon the United Kingdom and France, to the extent that they withdrew their forces

from Egypt, although some French forces still remain in Israel and substantial British forces continue to be concentrated in Cyprus, perhaps with a view to further police action in the Middle East. In analysing the situation before us, a relevant and basic question comes to one's mind: why did the General Assembly resolutions have some effect upon the two great Powers, the United Kingdom and France, while they remained practically with no effect upon Israel?

128. A correct answer to this question, in our view, would indicate the way in which the United Nations should now act in the circumstances. In our view, the resolutions had some effect on the two Powers because they were accompanied by actions by some Member States. To be noted among such actions which assisted the implementation of the resolutions are the following.

129. First, there was the action of the Soviet Union in its memorable notification to the United Kingdom and France of 5 November 1956, requesting them to withdraw or face the consequences which non-withdrawal would necessarily involve. That notification is indeed remembered by the Arabs, and we are sure that neither the United Kingdom nor France will be able easily to remove it from their minds.

130. Secondly, another such action was the support given to the General Assembly resolutions by the United States. The United States expressed its displeasure, even its censure, at the action undertaken in late October and early November 1956, and the two allies, though they are great Powers, depend so much upon the United States that they could not but take heed of its appeal, since they cannot proceed with their policies without the support of the United States.

131. Thirdly, the United Kingdom and France have many important interests in the Arab East, and those interests were all endangered by the action of the two Powers against Egypt. It should have been clear to the United Kingdom and France that a continuation of their action in Egypt in early November would arouse all the peoples of the Arab East in a movement of resistance to their colonial policies and interests. They would have had to face the determined resistance of the Arab nations, in addition to the determined resistance they encountered in Egypt.

132. It is clear, therefore, that the attitudes and actions of the Soviet Union, the United States and the Arab countries in early November, at the time when the General Assembly resolutions were adopted, substantially helped to make those resolutions effective and respected by the United Kingdom and France. The efficacy of the United Nations does depend greatly upon the attitude of and the measures taken by Member States. But it is also fair to say that the United Kingdom and France are sensitive to the public opinion of the world, sensitive to some extent to their international responsibilities, and the public opinion of the world, including a large sector of responsible opinion in the United Kingdom and France, was shocked by the actions of the two Governments. The two Governments, sensitive of their reputation, had to listen to the opinions of the world at large.

133. The two countries have also shown an innate sense of responsibility, more marked in the case of the United Kingdom than in the case of France. Although the resignation of the British Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, was motivated by reasons of health, politically it was nevertheless a timely act and one which occurred in a manner which conformed to the sense of international responsibility of the British people.

134. There remains the second part of the question, the more important part: why does Israel, on the other hand, refuse to heed the General Assembly resolutions? The reasons for the attitude of Israel appear to us mainly to be the following.

135. Firstly, despite its act of aggression, Israel continues to receive that financial, political and military help on which it almost completely depends. Instead of that help diminishing as a result of aggression, it has increased about twofold financially, and it has also increased militarily and politically. Thus, instead of complying with the General Assembly resolutions, Israel could defy them and could do so with increased help and support from many Member States. Furthermore, Israel finds that its position in Sharm el Sheikh and on Suez is supported more now by many Governments than it was before its aggression, and Israel expects that these Governments, with their interests in the region, will continue to support the Israel aggression by supporting its consequences.

136. Secondly, unlike opinion in the United Kingdom and France, Zionist opinion in the world completely favoured the act of aggression committed by Israel. It could not be otherwise, because the Zionists hold that Israel is a State with most of its people outside that State. The Israel people, together with the Zionists from other countries, formulate the policies and actions that Israel carries out in the Middle East, and that Zionist opinion, bred upon Zionist philosophy, favours the expansion of Israel by violence or by any other means. In fact, the basic tenets of Zionism make it almost similar to nazism, for the tenets of Zionism and nazism are similar. Both hold to the concept of race. Both Zionism and nazism hold to the concept of the Nazi superman or of the Zionist chosen people. Both Zionism and nazism hold to the concept of *Lebensraum* and to the Zionist conception of space to be made for the gathering in of exiles from all over the world into the Palestine area and to expansion for that purpose.

137. But the Zionists excel in one way in comparison with the Nazis. It is true that the Nazis had a fifth column, but the Zionists have their organizations all over the world. Wherever these organizations are, they form themselves into pressure groups in order to try to sway the policies of the countries in which they are from the national interests of those countries into the direction of the interests of Israel. Lately, we have seen these Zionist organizations all over the world on the move trying to make Mr. Ben Gurion measure his power in many countries against the power of the Governments of those countries and trying to sway the policies of those countries in the direction of Israel. Sometimes one is prone to believe that the will of certain Governments might be paralysed by the action of the Zionist organizations, and sometimes one hopes that certain countries which in the past have liberated themselves from colonialism will find the time fit to liberate themselves from the Zionist influences which are detrimental to their best interests and to world peace.

138. The third reason for the Zionist attitude, in our view, is this. Zionism in the Middle East, as representatives are aware, started from very humble beginnings and has developed within three or four decades into its present shape. At first, the Zionists came with a humble demand to allow the Jews to immigrate into Palestine. That was the limit of Zionist demands at that time. Later the Zionists asked only for a kind of home for the Jews in Palestine, without detriment to

the rights of the Arab people. At one time, that was the limit of their demands. That home was established through the British colonial mandate and was implemented by the United Kingdom through its policy in Palestine during approximately twenty years. Later, Zionism requested a State, and that State was established by the United Nations.

139. But then, Israel proceeded further and expanded that State, and now what we see is a still further expansion carried outside Palestine into Egypt; for Sharm el Sheikh is not in Palestine, nor is the Suez Canal in Palestine. Nor is the question of Gaza—and I appeal to the representative of Canada—a question to be settled, because it has already been settled by the Armistice Agreement, to which Israel is a party.

140. All through these developments Israel has pursued one method: to try at every stage to arrange what it calls accomplished facts, and then to use those accomplished facts as stepping-stones for further accomplishments, in a ceaseless process of continued expansion until, from its humble beginnings, it has now developed into a danger for the Middle East, putting to the Arab people the question: to be or not to be?

141. Our answer to this question is definite and clear. We want to be and we want to continue to exist.

142. But Israel also puts a question to the world: to safeguard peace and stability, or to disrupt peace and stability in the Middle East and, from the Middle East, to the countries beyond?

143. This method which Israel has developed in its thinking and actions has become a sort of habit. That habit is dangerous and is something which the United Nations should use all its power and its resources to change. Otherwise, the situation in the Middle East will be really sad and disastrous.

144. The continuation of assistance to Israel following its aggression is the crux of the matter. The increase in such assistance, together with the Zionist philosophy and movement and the state of mind of Israel, its pattern of thought and action, have all been factors contributing to Israel's defiant stand in the United Nations.

145. But what has the United Nations been doing during the last weeks while Israel has been defying its resolutions? And where do we stand today? Two methods, as we are all aware, have been employed in attempting to bring about a withdrawal of Israel forces. One method was that followed by our Secretary-General. It consisted of trying to convince Israel of the advisability of withdrawing. The other method was quite different. Let us examine first the first method.

146. Our Secretary-General, on whom fell the main responsibility of implementing the United Nations resolutions, utilized all possible arguments in order to convince Israel. He met with no results. His efforts with Egypt went on smoothly, followed finally by mutual comprehension. To get Israel's agreement to withdraw from the Sinai peninsula—a desert—constituted no issue, because Israel at no time wanted to keep the desert. The question was to get Israel's agreement to withdraw from the Sharm el Sheikh area and the Gaza Strip. All the convincing arguments of our Secretary-General went unheeded. He could well say that the resolutions were clear and emphatic, making withdrawal unconditional, complete and without delay. But Israel evaded the convincing efforts of the Secretary-General. In fact, it did not even listen to him,

because its mind was definitely set in another direction—that of expansion and holding to the results of expansion.

147. The efforts of the Secretary-General having failed, the United Nations was brought into a position of awaiting the answer of Israel. Time after time the meetings of the General Assembly were postponed in order to hear what the aggressor would like to say. Time after time the General Assembly has been obliged to cease its action in order to await the words of wisdom from the oracle of the aggressor. That is the position in which the United Nations found itself in its earnest desire for delay in order to meet some of the requirements which might convince Israel with regard to withdrawal.

148. There was another method which was followed, and during the last two weeks the principal actor in that method has been the United States. It has lately taken the lead not only in urging Israel to withdraw, but also in inducing Israel to withdraw. In the matter of inducement, the United States has seen fit at this juncture to state, or restate, its position concerning the Gulf of Aqaba and the internationalization of the Suez Canal, a position which should give full satisfaction to Israel. Instead of dealing with the matter through the United Nations, the question of withdrawal was removed from the Organization and became a sort of dialogue between Israel and the United States, with the laudable intention of ensuring withdrawal. Again and again Israel demands and United States clarifications alternated, while delays in this Assembly ran parallel. The aggressor was no longer an accused, to be tried in the United Nations; rather, the aggressor became the object of solicitude and inducement.

149. And that is where we stand now. The last actions which have taken place were actions which we agreed to in a zealous desire to see a solution by means of peaceful and non-coercive measures. But the issue has become focused more and more on the matter of appeasing the aggressor.

150. The situation as it reveals itself today has other dangerous aspects. The policy to satisfy the demands of Israel aggression on Sharm el Sheikh and Gaza, as well as on the question of the Suez Canal, is a policy linked to a policy of forgetfulness towards the basic issues of the Palestine problem, which is still unsettled. Representatives are aware that the Palestine problem is far from settled because the decisions which the United Nations has taken in the past regarding its settlement have not been implemented. Rather, the attention of the General Assembly has been turned towards the particular problems which are of interest to Israel, the United Kingdom and France.

151. What are the basic elements of the Palestine problem to which I am referring and which are unsettled?

152. First, there is the question of the repatriation of refugees to their homes, as recognized by the United Nations.

153. Secondly, there is the question of compensation to these refugees, for 94.6 per cent of the land of Israel belongs in full, as regards property and ownership, to these refugees who are now destitute and dispersed under every clime.

154. Thirdly, there is the question of the occupation of territory by Israel, not that of Gaza only, but of territory beyond the partition scheme and beyond the cease-fire lines that have been agreed upon by the

Security Council, and beyond the armistice agreements themselves, to say nothing of the essence of the situation which makes Israel itself an act of aggression.

155. Fourthly, there is the question of the right of the Arabs in the Jewish State, and the international guarantees given to them by the United Nations to ensure their safety and their life within their own homes.

156. Fifthly, there is the right of self-determination of the Arab people, which has been denied to them as no other people in the world.

157. There is also the question of the confiscation of pious foundations, of mosques and of churches, and their desecration.

158. Lastly, there is the question of the internationalization of Jerusalem.

159. These and other similar issues are basic elements of the Palestine problem, and all of them are now going to be ignored in the United Nations or bypassed because Israel does not like to deal with them. Among the various issues of the Palestine problem to be remembered is not only the question of Sharm el Sheikh, which is not in Palestine; the question of Gaza, which is settled by the Armistice Agreement, and the internationalization of Suez. To ignore the basic elements of the Palestine problem is a means of diverting attention from the basic issues to other matters in a direction which would help to follow the line of Israel's policy.

160. The President of the United States used his exalted office, his prestige and the leadership of his person and country in an appeal to Mr. Ben Gurion, asking him to withdraw his forces. But what was Mr. Ben Gurion's answer? After referring to the compulsion of the President's words, he explained his refusal of the plea as follows:

"I did so under a still stronger compulsion: the pressure of my conscience as a man and a Jew, the pressure of the justice for which my people are fighting."

161. It seems that the aggressor is taking the liberty of saying that his conscience would ache if he were to end aggression. The justice for which his people are fighting by committing aggression would be jeopardized by listening to the President of the United States. This clearly represents Zionist mentality. What justice was Mr. Ben Gurion referring to? Is it the justice that would make the Arab refugees destitute? Is it the justice of internationalizing Jerusalem? Is it the justice of confiscating the property of the Palestine Arabs? Is it the justice of expanding? Is it the justice of desecrating churches and mosques and destroying pious foundations? Is it the justice of a Zionist theory based upon discrimination as to race and religion, in contravention of the very basis of the Charter of the United Nations? Or is it the justice of adhering to the principles of the United Nations now and to the resolutions which it has adopted, for its authority and prestige?

162. No, Mr. Ben Gurion and his people were not fighting for any justice; indeed, they were fighting to maintain previous injustices, with a view to committing further injustices in the future. If his conscience aches because he has to withdraw under the compulsion of the moral authority of the United Nations, then there is in his injustice a real sense of ingratitude, for Israel is strongly indebted to the United Nations for its creation and, if it is indebted to anybody, Israel is primarily indebted to the United States for its

existence, as well as to aid for the possibilities of its expansion.

163. That Zionist mentality, as expressed by Mr. Ben Gurion, and his latest declarations to the Knesset, make it clear that it is impossible, either by the method of convincing Israel or the method of inducing Israel, to obtain any results. In these circumstances, the question arises, what should the United Nations now do?

164. The representative of Canada told us that we had attained the point of no return. It is clear that we are at a crossroads: either the United Nations should prevail or Israel, with its aggression, should prevail. In our view, the following elements should be considered.

165. First, the issue should again be brought to the United Nations, and in full, and all efforts of trying to induce Israel to withdraw should be dropped, no matter how laudable the intentions of those efforts may be. This problem should not be dealt with outside the United Nations. It should be considered and dealt with in the framework of the United Nations. If the problem continues to be dealt with outside the United Nations, then other Member States interested in this problem will seek means to deal with it also outside the United Nations, and by other means.

166. Secondly, the United Nations cannot be satisfied with stating the defiance of Israel. Of course, it could also condemn that defiance. But that condemnation would in itself be a mere repetition of previous condemnations. Israel has already been condemned four times by the Security Council, and condemnation for Israel is not a novelty but almost a commonplace affair.

167. We think that the United Nations can proceed along the lines of the six-Power draft resolution [A/3557] because that draft is limited in scope to the strict necessity of the present moment. It only asks the United Nations to act in a manner called for by the present circumstances and also, within great limitations, by what is required of Member States of the United Nations.

168. The draft resolution does not ask the Member States to undertake full-edged and real sanctions as provided for by the Charter against aggression. It does not even ask them to penalize Israel for what it has done. It does not ask them to send their sons and their forces to fight aggression, either through a decision on sanctions or in response to a call under the right of legitimate defence, although the conditions for sanctions are there and the conditions for a call under the right of legitimate defence are there too. All that the draft resolution asks for is to have the Member States and other States omit extending help to the aggressor or, in other words, stop offering aid and facilities to the aggressor and in that way helping him to frustrate the efforts of the United Nations. Thus this draft resolution is one which aims only at what is reasonable and necessary.

169. We do not think that this draft resolution in itself is adequate. It may be that in the future other States may have to be condemned, but in the present instance we believe that such a move on the part of the United Nations and the right response from the Member States and other States might help to solve the issue. Therefore, with such a decision and with such a response, we can look forward to peace in the Middle East. Without such a decision and without the right response from Member States and other

States, peace in the Middle East would be a forlorn hope.

170. The choice before us, therefore, is clear: either a policy as expressed by this draft resolution is acted upon by the United Nations; or, if not, there will be war and trouble in a Middle East disrupted by the continuation of present aggression.

171. Before resuming my place, I would like to call attention to some of the remarks made this morning by the representative of Canada. For ten years, now, this Palestine problem has been before the United Nations. Its distinctive characteristic, it seems to me, is that every time a solution is found it simply creates new problems. This is a problem whereby solutions tend to increase the problem and create new problems; this is because all through the years this problem has been dealt with in a very abnormal manner. And for ten years the representative of Canada and the Canadian delegation have been working upon solutions which tend to create an ever-increasing number of new problems.

172. Today the representative of Canada told us that he took an objective stand, an impartial stand, and he ended by saying that his suggestions were admittedly a compromise. Was that intended to set our minds at ease with regard to the suggestions he made, or was it intended to pave the way for their acceptance, although in substance they do not differ in the least from the Israel and Zionist proposals? Was Canada speaking for itself or was Canada speaking for Zionism on this rostrum, because the very meaning of the two is exactly and substantially the same?

173. I venture to say, with all due respect to any opinion expressed, that one should try to express a truly objective opinion; and the question may be asked in some circumstances: do we use our eloquence here in order to express our opinions, or is the tongue to be used in certain instances to conceal our opinions and divert the attention of the Assembly from certain basic questions under the guise of objectivity or compromise or otherwise?

174. I do not want to go into details on the Canadian proposals. They are in substance the same, as I said, as the Zionist proposals themselves, and all I want to do—and I say it frankly and emphatically—is to unveil this so-called objectivity whereby the representative of Canada is trying to show various faces in various directions, and to state our opinion clearly, not only for him to hear but for the world to understand. And that opinion is this, that Canada is definitely supporting the Zionist policy, has been doing so all through and is trying at the present moment to utilize the United

Nations Emergency Force in a direction contrary to its purposes and to help the continuation of Israel aggression by trying to continue its consequences.

175. I do not think that I could be more frank. But this frankness is necessary so that everybody may know where he stands and where we stand. Does the Canadian delegation or other delegations here have any axe to grind? Many of them do not; some of them do because their position is to try to create an Israel link between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, an internationalization of the Gulf of Aqaba—national within Israel—but all the time a link in the system of their policy. That is why they take some of their stands, and we are in the position where there is a fire in the Middle East and, instead of people coming to help, we find some people prepared to run to it just in order to warm their hands and gain certain advantages for themselves.

176. We believe that, in view of the continuation of Israel defiance, we have come to the point where we have to take action, either in the United Nations or outside, if that is necessary. In order to discourage aggression by not allowing aggression to receive rewards, in order to discourage that fighting spirit for justice that Mr. Ben Gurion spoke about—that is, fighting for injustice and acting in a spirit of ingratitude—and in order to discourage those who are trying to support aggression by Israel while at the same time trying to present a different appearance, we have to act and to act within the United Nations.

177. Let us therefore take this first, initial and necessary step by supporting fully the draft resolution presented to us. If we do that, and if the Member States respond to it, then we shall have really served the purposes of peace in the Middle East. Then we shall be able to look forward to some stability and tranquillity in our area and to exert our best efforts towards the development of our material and spiritual resources. Then the peoples of the Middle East will be able to concentrate on national development and the effort to contribute to world culture and civilization, as they have done for many centuries past. Then we can look to the United Nations as being a real bulwark of peace, an instrument of order in this world. We take our stand, and take it firmly, with malice towards none but solely with a view to trying to serve the purposes of the world community.

178. The PRESIDENT: Before we adjourn, I am requested to announce that Lebanon and Portugal would have voted affirmatively on the draft resolution on the question of Cyprus.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.