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## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea: report of the First Committee (A/1770) .....	689
Budget estimates for the financial year 1951: statement by the President .....	696

*President: Mr. Nasrollah ENTEZAM (Iraq).*

**Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea: report of the First Committee (A/1770)**

[Agenda item 76]

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Before asking Mr. Thors, Rapporteur of the First Committee, to present his report on the only item on the agenda of this meeting, I should like to ask the Assembly whether it wishes to have a debate on the report of the First Committee.

*It was decided, by 32 votes to 5, not to discuss the report.*

*Mr. Thors (Iceland), Rapporteur, presented the report of the First Committee and the accompanying draft resolution (A/1770).*

2. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Before calling on those members who wish to explain their votes, I should like to draw your attention to the letter [A/1379/Add.1] which the Secretary-General has addressed to me as President of the General Assembly, and in which he informs me that the Security Council has decided to remove the item, "Complaint of aggression against the Republic of Korea", from the list of matters of which it is seized.

3. General ROMULO (Philippines): The views of the Philippine Government on the draft resolution before us were set forth during the debates in the First Committee<sup>1</sup> and I do not wish to repeat them here.

4. I feel, however, that we cannot allow to pass unanswered, in explaining our vote, the invidious claim of any delegation that it alone, together with those that share its views, was dedicated to the cause of peace, while the others which did not share those views were, by implication, committed to the disastrous course of war. For our part, we are ready to allow that our

colleagues from Asia and the Middle East are equally sincere in their devotion to peace. Though our approach has differed from theirs, our goal remains the same.

5. We shall vote in favour of this draft resolution, as we did in Committee, because we are convinced, more than ever, that of the two paths that were shown to us, this is the surer way to peace. It is the surer way to peace to the extent that it is based on the recognition, not the avoidance, of truth and on the affirmation, not the denial, of right principles. The Philippine delegation will vote, as it did in Committee, for the draft resolution.

6. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The discussion in the First Committee of the so-called question of the intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea has shown the whole world that the United States never intended to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the Korean question by means of negotiation.

7. Everyone knows of the exchange of telegrams which took place with the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China on the conditions for a peaceful settlement of Far Eastern questions. An analysis of these telegrams shows how, step by step, the Government of the People's Republic of China, in its desire for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and other Far Eastern problems, submitted proposals which might well have led to successful negotiations for the peaceful settlement of these questions and which offered a sound basis for general agreement.

8. The USSR delegation supported those proposals of the People's Republic of China as being most likely to ensure a rapid and peaceful settlement of the Korean question and of questions affecting the People's Republic of China and the Far East. Furthermore, it pointed out in the First Committee that such questions could not be discussed without the participation of representatives of the Korean and Chinese peoples.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, First Committee*, 408th to 438th meetings inclusive.

9. But it is obvious that the proposals which were submitted to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China from Lake Success were deliberately so worded as to be unacceptable to that government. The real purpose of those so-called proposals was to give the United States an opportunity to prolong the intervention of foreign troops in Korea, to gain time and to renew their attack in more favourable circumstances. This is particularly clear from the so-called five principles laid down in the supplementary report which was submitted by the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea on 11 January 1951, and which was subsequently transmitted to the Government of the People's Republic of China.

10. These so-called five principles took into full account the intention of the United States to prevent at any cost any possible agreement with the Government of the People's Republic of China. They were obviously unacceptable to the People's Republic of China, and the United States delegation, in voting for this proposal, counted on that fact.

11. These tactics of the United States were exposed in the American Press itself, as was pointed out before during the discussion in the First Committee. All this was fully confirmed by subsequent events. When the proposals of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the supplementary explanations supplied by it had created a favourable atmosphere in the First Committee, and when there arose a real opportunity of adopting a unanimous decision on this question, so vital to the promotion of world peace, the delegation of the United States, faced by such a "threat" to the aggressive plans of the United States in the Far East, was forced to cast aside its mask. On 20 January it submitted a draft resolution, the whole purpose of which was to prevent agreement on the conditions for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and other Far Eastern problems.

12. The kernel of that draft resolution was its third paragraph, which falsely and without any foundation accused the Government of the People's Republic of China of aggression. The United States needed that accusation as a springboard for the further extension of its aggression in Korea. The United States draft resolution contained a whole plan for the extension of United States aggression in Korea and against the People's Republic of China.

13. By submitting that draft resolution, the United States finally revealed itself to the whole world as opposed to a peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern questions by means of negotiation.

14. Having committed an act of aggression in Korea, the United States used all possible means of pressure, blackmail and threats to force the Security Council to adopt, *ex post facto*, an illegal decision designed to cover up its criminal aggression against the Korean people. In submitting its latest draft resolution, the United States was resorting to the same manoeuvre. Having committed acts of aggression against the People's Republic of China, the United States has used every possible form of blackmail and threats in its attempt to ensure the adoption of that draft resolution, so as to cover up, *ex post facto*, its aggression against the People's Republic of China.

15. As has been pointed out, the United States submitted its draft resolution just when it had become possible to reach agreement on the possible conditions and procedure for a settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern questions by means of negotiation. Alarmed at the possibility of such agreement, which, as is now clear to all, did not fall in with the plans of the United States ruling circles, the United States brought all sorts of means of pressure to bear on the United Nations and on individual Members of the Organization, so as to force them to follow the lead of the United States delegation in the First Committee and to support the United States draft resolution.

16. In order to facilitate the position of the United States delegation in the First Committee and the General Assembly, the United States House of Representatives and Senate came to its aid by adopting special resolutions. Those resolutions can be regarded only as an attempt by United States organs of government to exert heavy pressure on the United Nations so as to force the Organization to endorse the aggressive policy of the United States in this matter.

17. As is known, this pressure and these threats by the United States have had the desired effect on certain Members of the United Nations, and the voting machine, which seemed to have broken down, again began to work in favour of the United States, albeit somewhat creakily.

18. The discussion in the First Committee showed that there was definite opposition to the aggressive policy of the ruling circles of the United States, and this fact cannot be ignored, whatever the results of the vote on the United States draft resolution.

19. In this connexion, attention should be drawn to the efforts made by the delegations of twelve countries to find some measure of agreement for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question and other Far Eastern problems by means of negotiation; these attempts were unsuccessful, owing to the crude and flagrant pressure, blackmail and threats used by the United States against the countries which intended to support the efforts of those twelve countries. As a result of that pressure, many countries which are economically and otherwise dependent on the United States were obliged to fall into line and obey the orders of the United States delegation.

20. In conclusion, the USSR delegation feels obliged to point out once again that the purpose of the United States draft resolution, which has now been submitted to the General Assembly by the First Committee, is to extend the aggression perpetrated by the United States in Korea and against the People's Republic of China. By submitting that text, the United States has finally shown itself to be opposed to the peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern questions by negotiation; by means of this draft resolution the United States is trying to mask its continued aggression in Korea and its aggression against the People's Republic of China.

21. It is for these reasons that the delegation of the Soviet Union will vote against the draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly.

22. Mr. TSIANG (China): Before the vote is taken I should like to state that, in the opinion of my delega-

tion, the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee is only a half measure. It was regrettably weakened by the amendment of the delegation of Lebanon. Nevertheless, as the draft resolution is consistent with the principles of the Charter, my delegation will vote for it.

23. Mr. SHVETSOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): I should like to make a brief explanation of the vote which the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR is going to cast.

24. The General Assembly has to consider, at this meeting, a draft resolution which the United States delegation succeeded in foisting on the First Committee by means of diplomatic pressure, threats and other forms of persuasion. This draft resolution, which is directed against the People's Republic of China, is the logical outcome of the aggressive policy pursued by the United States in the Far East and its dictatorial and arbitrary policy in the United Nations.

25. The United States acted in the same way when, after preparing and provoking the attack launched by the Syngman Rhee armies against North Korea, and after embarking on open aggression against Korea, it accused the Government of North Korea of aggression and made the Security Council, at a time when the Council was illegally constituted, adopt a resolution to that effect, thus associating other nations in its crime.

26. Now, having committed a number of open acts of aggression against the People's Republic of China, and still engaged in a cruel war against the Korean people, who are fighting for their freedom, the United States is trying to accuse the People's Republic of China of aggression, and to make the General Assembly adopt a draft resolution designed to mask its further aggression in Korea and against the People's Republic of China. In submitting this draft resolution, the United States has finally shown itself to be opposed to the peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern questions by means of negotiation.

27. The whole course of the discussion of this question in the First Committee has shown that the United States, in keeping with its policy — the nature of which is only too clear from the vast programme initiated by the ruling circles of the United States in order to promote a war psychosis and to prepare and carry out other acts of aggression — not only does not wish for a peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict, but is seeking to prolong and extend its aggression in Korea and against the People's Republic of China.

28. That is why the United States delegation did all it could to prevent the peaceful settlement of the Korean question and of all other Far Eastern problems and to nullify all attempts to negotiate on such matters. That is why the United States delegation rejected all the proposals of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China for the rapid and peaceful settlement of the Korean question and of all questions affecting the People's Republic of China and the Far East. That is why the delegation of the United States submitted its draft resolution, the purpose of which was to prolong and extend United States aggression in Korea and against the People's Republic of China.

29. By foisting this draft resolution on the United Nations, the United States is using the Organization

both as a smoke-screen for its aggressive policy and as a tool of that policy.

30. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR, which expresses, in this Assembly, the will of the Byelorussian people, a people who aspire to peace and who are actively promoting peace and combating war, will vote against the draft resolution which has been submitted to the Assembly. For the purport and the contents of that draft are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and to the aspirations of hundreds of millions of people throughout the world, who yearn for peace and do not want war.

31. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): The Czechoslovak delegation stated in the course of the debate in the First Committee its reasons for supporting the peace proposals submitted by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and its opposition to the draft resolution proposed by the United States.

32. The proposals submitted by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China give expression to the sincere and insistent desire of the Chinese people for peace. They are an expression of a desire for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and all Far Eastern problems and for collaboration with all peace-loving nations so that peace may be secured and maintained.

33. The draft resolution submitted by the United States and approved by the so-called majority of the First Committee has nothing in common with peace or with the maintenance, strengthening and securing of peace. That draft resolution is but an expression of the war hysteria of the ruling circles of the United States and their lust for war, which they were already waging in June 1950.

34. During the debate in the First Committee, many phrases about peace, open doors, and willingness to negotiate were uttered by the delegation of the United States. What shallow, false and hypocritical phrases they were was revealed by the methods used by the ruling circles of the United States, both within the United Nations and outside, to secure the adoption of the draft resolution.

35. The statement made to the First Committee by the delegation of the United States to the effect that it would vote against the twelve-Power draft resolution regardless of any amendments, provides, in my opinion, further proof that the ruling circles of the United States never wanted and do not now want to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and other Far Eastern problems.

36. The methods used by the United States ruling circles outside the United Nations to bring about the adoption of their draft resolution are well illustrated by examples such as that of the two million tons of grain requested by India. May I be allowed to quote in this connexion an article by David Lawrence in today's *New York Herald Tribune*, in which he writes:

"The vote in the UN on the aggression resolution is in a proper sense a victory for the diplomacy of the United States and particularly for the ambassadors and ministers abroad who have been labouring so zealously in the last few weeks to explain to the different foreign offices of the world the true meaning of the American viewpoint in world affairs today."

37. And how the United States ambassadors and ministers abroad explained "the true meaning of the American viewpoint in world affairs" was divulged by the Foreign Minister of the Philippines, who, according to today's *New York Herald Tribune*, "told a Boston University audience he hoped that the United States would not discriminate in material assistance to Asian countries simply because most of them opposed the American UN resolution condemning Red China as an aggressor".

38. I said that the United States war draft resolution was approved by a so-called majority in the First Committee. And it is a fact that it was merely a so-called majority. When comparing the majority in that Committee with the number of people for whom it speaks, we arrive at the following conclusion: the 44 votes of the majority represent a mere third of the world population.

39. Two days ago, speaking on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation before the First Committee, I stated that the United Nations faced two alternatives: either to yield to the pressure of the United States and follow the war policy of the United States ruling circles, thus becoming involved in a possible catastrophe, or to decide to take the road of peace. The draft resolution submitted by the First Committee to the General Assembly, under unprecedented pressure on the part of the United States, is a draft resolution of the United States warmongers, the purpose of which is to enable the United States ruling circles to attain their aggressive and imperialist aims, to expand the war and to spread disaster and death. War, not peace, is the substance of the United States draft resolution.

40. The Czechoslovak delegation opposed the United States war draft resolution when it was voted on in the First Committee and whole-heartedly supported the peace proposals of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China desires peace; the United States ruling circles desire war. The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China wishes an end to the war; the United States ruling circles wish to spread the war. The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China wishes to work in peace for the rehabilitation of its country and thus contribute to the maintenance of peace in the whole world; the United States ruling circles want to destroy the world with atomic bombs.

41. The Czechoslovak delegation states again that the people of Czechoslovakia sincerely desire peace. The people of Czechoslovakia reject war. Therefore the Czechoslovak delegation will vote against the war draft resolution which is now before the General Assembly.

42. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): I have already, in Committee, given a full explanation of His Majesty's Government's views on the present draft resolution, and I now wish to give only a short explanation of the understandings which have enabled my government to instruct me to vote in favour of the draft.

43. In the first place, as you know, we attach primary importance to the work of the good offices committee, provision for which is made in the last paragraph of the draft resolution. My government has the utmost

confidence that the President will lose no time in appointing the two other members of the group, so that it may be able to start work forthwith and begin the task which, as we are only too well aware, is bound to be a very difficult one.

44. My government hopes that the first task of the group will be to study the various communications that have been received, through one channel or another, from the Peking Government, and see what light they throw on the possibilities of peaceful negotiation and what further clarifications seem to be required. This is obviously a most urgent and important task.

45. Secondly, as I have already made clear in Committee, my government attaches great importance to the ideas contained in the programme outlined to us in Committee by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs. This programme seems to us to contain many valuable ideas and, in the opinion of my government, might well form the basis of an eventual settlement.

46. It will not have escaped the President's notice that there are many points in this programme which seem to require urgent discussion; for instance, the composition of the conference which has been suggested and the manner in which it should proceed to organize the arrangements for a cease-fire if there appears to be any possibility of doing so — with due regard, of course, to the principles which we have already accepted. These questions clearly merit the urgent attention of the good offices committee.

47. I am sure that the President has fully in mind all these suggestions which have been made in the course of our debate, and, if I emphasize them at this moment, it is because of the confidence my government feels in the ability of the President and the other members of his committee to pursue these negotiations with the utmost devotion. It is only for that reason that my government has felt it possible to instruct me to vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole.

48. Finally, now that we have established our moral position by condemning the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China for engaging in aggression, the most important thing, as my delegation sees it, is to concentrate on the problem of a peaceful settlement — or, as I myself should prefer to say, of an agreed solution of the Korean question — rather than on the question of potential sanctions.

49. Apart from the fact that the consideration of sanctions should not even be started by the General Assembly for a long time yet, so as not to prejudice any hope of an agreed solution that may remain, my government quite frankly has the gravest doubts whether any punitive measures can be discovered which are not dangerous, double-edged, or merely useless, or any which will materially assist our brave troops now fighting in Korea. The group to be set up under the sixth paragraph of the operative part to study the question may well report in this sense, or it may report that certain minor measures could profitably be taken. But it is obviously doubtful how far its report, whether negative or mildly positive, can assist in the attainment of any agreed solution, on the one hand, or any imposed solution, on the other hand.

50. That is why my delegation, at any rate, would deprecate any haste in the presentation of the report of that group and, more particularly, any attempt on its part to force the hand of our own good offices committee.

51. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): My delegation will vote against the United States draft resolution which the First Committee has submitted today to the General Assembly. Our decision is motivated by the principles of the Charter, for we believe that the adoption of this draft resolution would, in the first place, constitute a defeat of the basic and fundamental principles of the Charter.

52. This draft resolution shows clearly that the United States has no intention of reaching a peaceful solution of the problem but that, on the contrary, it is minded to spread the war beyond Korea, to China and the whole continent of Asia, as part of a plan for United States world domination. This draft resolution establishes an immoral position in which it is made to appear that the United States aggressor is supported by a certain number of other nations. This draft resolution is the result of an enormous pressure campaign involving United States embassies in foreign capitals, as well as the United States Senate and House of Representatives.

53. Its adoption would mean a violation of the sovereignty of many nations which, through various means, have been forced to support it. This draft resolution would mean extending the war. Today, even before this draft resolution has been adopted, the Press is full of reports that the United States delegation has already prepared measures for further sanctions, the aim of which is only to clear the way for United States militarists in a war with the People's Republic of China.

54. The adoption of this draft resolution would not mean the defeat of any political tendencies which my delegation, or any other delegation which is against it, represents. It would not mean the defeat of China because, even though that great and courageous nation has been accused of aggression by the United States, China cannot be defeated, since no one can defeat a great nation which stands in the midst of the struggle for peace and security in the Asian continent and which today, after a victorious revolution, has attained, for the first time in its long history, full sovereignty and a government which represents the national interests of its people.

55. My delegation, in voting against the draft resolution, fully adheres to the principles of the Charter, according to which this Organization is the appointed guardian of peace. At the same time, our vote against it represents the peaceful tendencies of my country, which today is among those which strive for international peace. The adoption of this draft resolution would constitute a step towards the spread of war rather than towards any peaceful settlement.

56. The United States delegation, during the long hours of debate which preceded the climax, when its draft resolution was approved — a climax arrived at by exercising various kinds of pressure — made it clear that the part concerning negotiations was included solely for the purpose of creating unity among those countries which had some hesitations. At the same time,

that part provides an excuse for many governments which recognize the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, and which also recognize this draft resolution as unjustified, an excuse which they can present to the peoples they claim to represent.

57. I am sure that this draft resolution will be received by the whole world with indignation and protest. It will serve the cause of war, and the millions of persons of the peace-loving nations which signed the Stockholm Appeal, as well as those who supported the Warsaw Congress of the Partisans of Peace, will only increase their struggle for the defeat of the aggressive designs of those who wish to plunge the world into a new war. My delegation will continue to fight against everything that this draft resolution stands for.

58. Mr. DEMCHENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR feels obliged to explain the principles which will guide it in voting on the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee on the initiative of the delegation of the United States.

59. It is well known that during this session of the General Assembly, the United States delegation has made many attempts to use the United Nations in order to conceal and extend United States aggression in the Far East. That was the purpose of the slanderous accusation made by the United States in the General Assembly concerning the so-called intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea, and also of the resolution of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea which was foisted on the First Committee. That is also the purpose of the draft resolution which the United States delegation succeeded in forcing upon the First Committee by means of pressure, threats and blackmail, and which is now submitted to the General Assembly.

60. In demanding the adoption of this draft resolution, the United States has finally revealed itself as opposed to the peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern questions by means of negotiation, the intention being to conceal its further aggression in Korea and against the People's Republic of China.

61. The draft resolution calls upon the General Assembly to accuse the Central People's Government of China of committing an act of aggression against Korea. The whole world knows, however, that the Central People's Government of China has not committed and is not now committing any act of aggression, either against Korea, or against any other State.

62. The Central People's Government of China, like the Chinese people to a man, is seeking a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Proof of this lies in the peace proposals submitted repeatedly by the representatives of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations. All these proposals of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China were aimed at securing a rapid and peaceful settlement of the Korean question and of other questions affecting the People's Republic of China and the Far East.

63. By calling on the General Assembly to accuse the Central People's Government of China of not wishing to settle the Korean question by peaceful means, and by making other accusations, the United States is once

again attempting to mislead world public opinion and to distract its attention from the real armed aggression, the aggression perpetrated by the United States in Korea and against China. The United States ruling circles need these lying accusations against the People's Republic of China in order to prevent the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, to mask and to justify the United States occupation of the Chinese island of Taiwan, and to justify the bombing of Chinese territory, the military support afforded Chiang Kai-shek and the other acts of aggression committed by the United States against the People's Republic of China.

64. There is nothing new in this move of United States diplomacy. The United States is acting today just as it did in July 1950. At that time, the United States Government falsely accused the People's Democratic Republic of Korea of committing aggression and thus covered up its own aggression against the Korean people; it is now trying to conceal its aggression against the Chinese people in the same way.

65. Thus the text before us is intended to secure not the peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern questions, but the extension of United States aggression in the Far East under the aegis of the United Nations.

66. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR therefore protests against the adoption of this draft resolution by the General Assembly. In the interests of the maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations should reject the United States draft resolution which has been submitted by the First Committee and should take steps to secure a peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern questions.

67. Mr. LACOSTE (France) (*translated from French*): The French delegation has already said all it has to say concerning the circumstances in which — I might be tempted to say the conditions under which — it decided to support the United States draft resolution. I do not think it is necessary for me to mention them again. In the statement I made on 29 January, I gave all the necessary explanations. At that time I also explained why my delegation considered that the Assembly should first take a decision along the lines of the United States draft resolution, and in particular of the first paragraph of the operative part of that text, which described the intervention of Communist China in Korea, and that only then would it be possible to begin negotiations for peace.

68. I think it is even less necessary to reaffirm the fact that in this matter my delegation has no other object than peace. As to the choice of the path to follow, we have certainly not been in agreement with the view of some delegations here present, which proclaim their desire for peace, but our goal is the same — peace. And it is with the firmest hopes for success that we shall deploy all our efforts to that end.

69. Faris EL-KHOURI Bey (Syria): My government believes that the means for achieving a peaceful settlement have not been exhausted. It has participated in the efforts at conciliation made by the Asian and Arab nations since the beginning of this problem. It still entertains good and well-founded hopes that there

is a strong chance of arranging for a cease-fire, even at the first meeting of the seven-Power conference proposed by us in the draft resolution submitted by the Arab and Asian nations in the First Committee, thus putting a speedy end to the bloodshed in Korea. It is convinced that the draft resolution of the United States, approved by the First Committee, will not end war but will be more likely to extend it, and it notes that most of those who voted in favour of that draft are not willing to contribute substantial and material aid to the forces fighting in Korea, where the heaviest burden falls upon the shoulders of the United States. It fears that, in the case of an extension of the war, the United Nations would have to fight against a population of about 800 million.

70. In view, therefore, of the heavy responsibilities entailed in carrying out the provisions of this resolution, my government prefers to abstain so that it will remain able to continue its conciliatory efforts. However, in the First Committee, the draft resolution obtained 44 votes, while only 16 votes were cast against it. It is to be noted here that our abstention does not at all mean that we approve of the behaviour of the Central People's Government of China or that we oppose the draft resolution. We consider only that the draft resolution of the Asian and Arab nations ought to have taken precedence over the United States draft resolution so that the peaceful means could have been exhausted before condemnatory action was taken.

71. Sir Benegal RAU (India): I should like to explain very briefly the vote which my delegation is about to cast on this draft resolution. The draft was discussed at such length in the First Committee that no detailed explanation is necessary, and I shall therefore be very brief. My delegation will vote against this resolution for reasons which I shall enumerate.

72. First, in the opinion of my government, it will prolong hostilities in Korea indefinitely and may extend the area of conflict, and may even lead ultimately to global war.

73. Secondly, to combine a proposal for negotiations through the good offices of the President with a previous condemnation of the government with which the negotiations are to be conducted creates the impression that the United Nations is not serious about either. By this combination, the resolution deprives the condemnation of any moral force and, at the same time, deprives the negotiations of their best chances of success.

74. Thirdly, so many mistakes have been made against the Central People's Government of China during the last twelve months that the resolution does not seem to us to be quite fair in its condemnation.

75. Fourthly, as I explained in the First Committee, the issue of aggression is not so simple as it looks. One difficulty I have already mentioned. According to high authorities, condemnation of the Central People's Government as an aggressor implies the previous recognition of that government, and, since there has been no such recognition, there can be no such condemnation. Again, according to high authorities, the General Assembly, while it can make various recommendations under Articles 10 or 11 of the Charter, cannot make a finding or a determination as to an act of aggression.

This function, according to Professor Kelsen,<sup>2</sup> belongs to the Security Council, and only to the Security Council, under Article 39 of the Charter.

76. Finally, the draft resolution submitted by twelve Asian Powers in the First Committee would, had it been adopted, have produced a cease-fire, within perhaps a week, and a definite programme for the removal of various misunderstandings and for the solution of all Far Eastern problems. The present draft resolution does not appear to us to offer any prospect of an early end of hostilities, nor does it hold out any prospect of a solution of any of these other problems.

77. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt): On general principle, and, since it is my intention to take as little of the General Assembly's time as possible, I shall continue to resist all temptation to answer the — fortunately few — fallacious irrelevancies of some of those who have spoken before me, either today or previously.

78. Although I may know some of the good words and many of the bad ones, I shall also continue to resist the even more luscious temptation of commenting upon the equally few — and fortunately so — impatient gestures which occasionally flared up in the Committee. In doing this, I keep in mind that we are dealing here exclusively with opinions and that an impatient gesture is not an opinion. I take leave, however, to make an exception for the remark which was made this morning by my colleague and friend, General Rómulo, who referred to twelve of the Asian Powers in a rather impatient manner, which we are not accustomed to hearing from him.

79. I note that General Rómulo said that he could not "allow to pass unanswered . . . the invidious claim of any delegation that it alone . . . was dedicated to the cause of peace" and that the rest of them "were, by implication, committed to the disastrous course of war", and that he was — and, for my part, I add the word "generously" — willing to allow that his colleagues from Asia and the Middle East were "equally sincere in their devotion to peace".

80. I am trying to refresh my memory very carefully in this connexion, but I fail to find that any representative of the twelve Asian Powers to which General Rómulo referred accused anyone of insincerity or claimed for himself or his group a monopoly of sincerity or good intentions.

81. May I, in this connexion, refer to what I told the First Committee on 29 January, at which time I said that those who differed with us, though we considered them dangerously wrong, were sincere. Before that, on 25 January, I told the First Committee — I am reading from my statement and not quoting from memory:

"There has been a great area of agreement among all of us as to the basic nature of these questions, while there has been a lesser area of agreement as to the best approach to their solution . . . [Nevertheless] it remains true that we all — without exception, I submit — realize the seriousness and the hugeness of the questions we are facing, and we are quite con-

scious of the great moral, political and survival issues involved in these questions."<sup>3</sup>

82. I now submit that nothing in those words, and nothing that was said by the representatives of any of the eleven other countries which co-sponsored the draft resolution submitted to the First Committee, indicated anything of the kind to which General Rómulo so impatiently referred today.

83. I would have preferred not to go into this seemingly unnecessary digression, but I considered it inevitable in view of the serious accusation levelled at us by our friend, General Rómulo.

84. As to the position of my country with regard to the draft resolution approved by the First Committee, which is now before the General Assembly for consideration, I shall not weary the Assembly with any long explanation of my vote. I shall merely refer to the statements I had the honour to make previously on behalf of my delegation and country. I would sum up our position in the following way, and this is part of the statement I made on 29 January:

"No one here or elsewhere did or can validly argue against the duty of the United Nations to set up and maintain, and even put into action, the system of collective security as envisaged by the Charter. This is no reason, however, why anyone should overlook the other very essential concepts of the Charter, namely, that peaceful means of resolving questions must be resorted to and completely exhausted first."<sup>4</sup>

85. My government considered and still considers that the peaceful means envisaged by the Charter, which the twelve Powers — of which my country was one — tried to formulate in their joint draft resolution, have not been exhausted and that it is in accordance neither with the Charter nor with the dictates of wisdom to set out upon a road which leads elsewhere before completely exhausting the peaceful means stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations.

86. This has been and remains the position of Egypt on the matter.

87. Mr. CARIAS (Honduras): I do not wish to explain my vote. I merely wish to ask for a roll-call vote.

88. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The Israel delegation has requested that the sixth paragraph of the operative part of the draft resolution of the First Committee [A/1770] should be put to the vote separately. If there are no objections, I shall first put that paragraph to the vote, and then the remainder of the draft resolution. Finally, we shall take a roll-call vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

*The sixth paragraph of the operative part was adopted by 43 votes to 7, with 8 abstentions.*

*The remainder of the draft resolution was adopted by 44 votes to 7, with 8 abstentions.*

89. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I shall now put the draft resolution to the vote as a whole. A roll-call vote has been requested.

<sup>3</sup> For the summary of this statement, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, First Committee, 431st meeting.*

<sup>4</sup> For the summary of this statement, see *ibid.*, 435th meeting.

<sup>2</sup> See Kelsen, Hans, *The Law of the United Nations*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1950.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*The Dominican Republic, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark.

*Against:* India, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

*Abstaining:* Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan.

*When the name of Saudi Arabia was called, the following exchange of remarks took place:*

90. Mr. HALIQ (Saudi Arabia): I am not participating in the vote.

91. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): There is no such thing as non-participation in a vote. If a delegation does not participate in a vote, it thereby abstains.

92. Mr. HALIQ (Saudi Arabia): I repeat that my delegation is not participating in the vote.

93. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I am sorry, but the rules of procedure make no provision for non-participation. The ruling of the Chair is that Saudi Arabia abstained from the vote. It will be indicated in the record, however, that the representative of Saudi Arabia stated that he was not participating in the vote.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 44 votes to 7, with 9 abstentions.*

94. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Despite the condemnation of the aggressor and of the act of aggression, it appears both from the final paragraph of the resolution which the Assembly has just

approved and from the debate in the First Committee that the United Nations does not wish to close the door to negotiations or to a settlement of Far Eastern problems by peaceful means. Such, moreover, was the purport of the amendment submitted by the delegation of Lebanon in the First Committee and accepted by the delegation of the United States. I shall, in accordance with your decision, hasten to establish the good offices committee. It is now for the other party to the dispute to demonstrate its willingness to negotiate with the United Nations. I am certain that I express the feelings of all the representatives when I say that I hope these negotiations will be successful.

### **Budget estimates for the financial year 1951: statement by the President**

[Agenda item 39]

95. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Before adjourning the meeting, I have a brief statement to make. I wish to call the attention of the members of the General Assembly to document A/1734/Add.1, which was circulated on 21 December 1950. This document contains the text of the draft resolution on the emoluments of the judges and the registrar of the International Court of Justice, as proposed by the Fifth Committee. It is an integral part of the budget estimates for the financial year 1951 prepared by the Fifth Committee [A/1734]. On 15 December 1950 [326th meeting], when the General Assembly adopted the Fifth Committee's recommendations on this item of the agenda, the text of addendum 1 had not been circulated to the members of the Assembly. However, as it was obviously the intention of the Assembly on that date to approve the recommendations of the Fifth Committee in their entirety, I have decided that the draft resolution contained in the addendum should be considered, for the record, as having been adopted on the same date as the other draft resolutions contained in document A/1734.

96. If there are no objections, I shall consider that the Assembly approves my decision.

*It was so decided.*

*The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.*