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President: Mr. Nasrollah ENTEZAM (Iran).

Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions: report of the Fifth Committee (A/1669 and Corr.1)

[Agenda item 40]

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Two documents are before the Assembly, namely, the report of the Fifth Committee [A/1669 and Corr.1], containing a draft resolution, and an amendment [A/1670] to that draft submitted by the Soviet Union. Under that amendment, the following text would be substituted for paragraph 1 of the draft resolution:

"1. That the present scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations shall continue to apply in 1951."

2. I put that amendment to the vote.

The amendment was rejected by 21 votes to 5, with 8 abstentions.

3. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in the report of the Fifth Committee [A/1669 and Corr.1].

The draft resolution was adopted by 41 votes to 6, with 2 abstentions.

4. Mr. PODTSEROB (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Both in the Fifth Committee and in the General Assembly the USSR delegation voted against the draft resolution on the scale of assessments for 1951 which provides for changes in the percentage contribution of twenty-three countries. It considers that there is no sufficient justification for making such material changes in the existing scale and increasing the contributions of a number of States, including that of the Soviet Union.

5. In determining the scale of contributions on the basis of the national revenue and the *per capita* income, the following two factors are particularly important: the extent of the damages suffered by individual Member States of the United Nations as a result of the Second World War, and the ability of a given Member State to procure the foreign currency in which the contributions to the Organization are made. The Committee on Contributions and the Fifth Committee disregarded both these factors when they drew up the scale of assessments for 1951 which the Fifth Committee then submitted to the General Assembly in a draft resolution.

6. Yet it is a known fact that the USSR suffered great losses in the war against the Hitlerite bloc. The war against Germany and Japan cost the Soviet Union

the enormous sum of 357,000 million dollars. Furthermore, it is necessary to take into account the damages suffered by our State during the war years from the vast destruction and plunder of State, co-operative and private property in that part of the territory which was occupied by the enemy.

7. The Committee on Contributions did not take into account, or attach sufficient importance, to the above factors when it recommended a 10 per cent increase in the contribution of the USSR, which is already very considerable.

8. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has been faced with additional, artificially created difficulties owing to the fact that it is being discriminated against economically in flagrant violation of the basic principles of the United Nations.

9. Consequently, the increase in the share of contributions of the USSR can in no way be considered equitable.

10. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): The Czechoslovak delegation does not and cannot agree with the resolution which has just been adopted by the General Assembly. That resolution, the text of which was submitted to the General Assembly by the Fifth Committee on the recommendation of the Committee on Contributions, changes the rates of contributions for 1951 for twenty-three Member States. According to the proposal of the Committee on Contributions, the contributions of nine States are being reduced while those of fourteen other States are being increased. Among the latter is my country, Czechoslovakia.

11. My delegation, after thoroughly examining the recommendations of the Committee on Contributions, arrived at the opinion that that committee, in formulating its proposal, had deviated from the basic principle established in 1946 [resolution 14(I)]. In that year the General Assembly decided that the scale of assessments should be based on the principle that the expenses of the United Nations should be apportioned broadly according to capacity to pay. The recommendation of the Committee on Contributions reveals that that committee did not adhere to that principle in its consideration of the question, regardless of certain historical as well as present facts.

12. Allow me to remind the General Assembly of those facts. Czechoslovakia was the first country to fall victim to German nazism and its imperialistic designs for the domination of Europe and of the whole world. For the period of an entire year before the outbreak of the Second World War my country was subjected to looting and devastation by Hitler's war machine, and that looting became even more extensive in the course of the war, which brought to my country additional destruction and loss. Only a figure of hundreds of billions of Czechoslovak crowns would be capable of expressing the damage and loss which my country suffered from Hitler's war machine.

13. Since 1945 my countrymen have been working hard to replace the war losses and to build up again what was destroyed during the nazi occupation. Ever since that time the people of Czechoslovakia have been making every possible effort to repair the damages caused by Hitler's fascist war machine and have also been working hard to prevent the outbreak of a new

war which is so much desired by the capitalist rulers of certain countries.

14. It is those very same people who consistently wish to obstruct the peaceful building up of Czechoslovakia, and the fact that the United States discriminates against my country in foreign trade is a typical example. In spite of this, according to the resolution which has just been adopted, the rate of contribution of the United States is to be reduced while the rate of contribution of Czechoslovakia is to be increased.

15. I have disclosed a number of facts which prevent my delegation from agreeing with the resolution which has just been adopted; because of those same facts, my delegation voted in favour of the Soviet Union amendment.

16. Mr. DEMCHENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The resolution which the General Assembly has just adopted on the basis of the Fifth Committee recommendation provides for considerable changes in the scale of contributions for 1951.

17. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR pointed out in the Fifth Committee that there was no justification for effecting such changes and for increasing by 10 per cent the contributions of a number of Member States, including the Ukrainian SSR.

18. In determining the share of contributions to be paid by the Ukrainian SSR in 1951, the Committee on Contributions and the Fifth Committee did not take into consideration the fact that the Ukrainian SSR had suffered great material losses during the war against Hitler's armies and as a result of the enemy occupation of its territory, from which it has not yet completely recovered. None of these factors was taken into account when the scale of assessments was determined, and consequently one of the basic criteria which should guide the United Nations in determining the amount of the contribution of the Ukrainian SSR was not applied.

19. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR cannot agree with such an approach, which it considers wrong. That is why it voted against the draft resolution submitted by the Fifth Committee, and supported the USSR amendment which provided that the scale of assessments for 1951 should be maintained at the present level, without any changes.

20. Mr. SHVETSOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR feels it necessary to explain its vote.

21. The Fifth Committee, in its report on the scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations for 1951, proposed an increase in the contributions of fourteen States, including the Byelorussian SSR.

22. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR voted against that proposal because, in proposing a change in the scale of assessments, neither the Committee on Contributions nor the majority in the Fifth Committee had regard to the chief criterion for the assessment of contributions, namely, the extent of the damage suffered by States during the Second World War and their sacrifices in men and materials in the common struggle against Hitlerite fascism.

23. Everyone knows that the whole territory of the Byelorussian SSR was occupied by the nazi hordes, that the fascist barbarians lorded it over Byelorussian soil for over three years and that, as a result of bitter fighting, barbarous destruction and pillage, our prosperous land was laid in ruins. When the scale of contributions was drawn up in 1946, that fact was taken into account. This year, however, the Committee on Contributions decided to increase the contribution of the Byelorussian SSR by 10 per cent.

24. The principal criterion for assessing contributions has thus been disregarded. The Committee on Contributions did not take into account the enormous resources and efforts which the people of the Byelorussian SSR are devoting to the rehabilitation of their national economy and to the reconstruction of the towns and villages destroyed during the German occupation.

25. For these reasons, our delegation voted against increasing the contribution of a whole group of States, including the Byelorussian SSR.

Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly: reports of the Fifth Committee (A/1671, A/1672, A/1673, A/1674 and A/1675)

[Agenda item 43]

26. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I put to the vote the draft resolutions contained in the reports of the Fifth Committee [A/1671, A/1672, A/1673, A/1674 and A/1675].

The draft resolutions were adopted unanimously.

Status of budgetary authorizations for the financial year 1950: (d) supplementary estimates for 1950: report of the Fifth Committee (A/1677)

[Agenda item 38]

27. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I put to the vote the draft resolution contained in the report of the Fifth Committee [A/1677].

The draft resolution was adopted by 48 votes to 5.

Priority to be accorded to the discussion of a particular agenda item

28. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call upon the representative of Egypt on a point of order.

29. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt): We have, as the eleventh item on our agenda for today, a matter of extreme urgency. With respect to that matter we have a report from the First Committee [A/1717] which deals, among other things, with the draft resolution approved by the Committee; the principal aim of that draft is to secure a cease-fire in Korea. I do not need to dwell at length upon this point and upon the urgency of this question. I submit that we should give priority to this item before we pass on to deal with any other item. I hope there will be approval of this suggestion.

30. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The representative of Egypt proposes that the As-

sembly should give priority to the eleventh item on the agenda for this meeting [item 76].

31. If there are no objections to that proposal, it will be so decided and the Assembly will proceed immediately to the consideration of that item.

It was so decided.

Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea: report of the First Committee (A/1717)

[Agenda item 76]

32. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I must ask the Assembly whether it wishes to have a discussion on this item of the agenda.

It was decided not to discuss the item.

33. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The First Committee has submitted an interim report which contains a draft resolution [A/1717]. Generally, I call on members of the Assembly who wish to explain their votes after draft resolutions have been voted upon. In the present case, however, the question is a very important one and if delegations wish to explain their votes, I shall call on them to speak immediately.

34. I call upon the representative of the Soviet Union for an explanation of his vote.

35. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The USSR delegation deems it essential to make the following statement in explanation of its vote.

36. As we know, the question of the alleged intervention of China in Korea, submitted by the delegation of the United States and several other delegations, was included in the agenda of the First Committee as item 76. The Committee proceeded to consider that question, having, on the insistence of the Anglo-American bloc, interrupted its consideration of the question of United States aggression against China, submitted earlier by the USSR delegation.

37. In the course of the debate,¹ several draft resolutions were submitted with regard to the question which the United States delegation had submitted to the First Committee. The delegation of the Soviet Union, for its part, submitted a draft resolution [A/C.1/640] recommending the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and that the settlement of the Korean question should be left to the Korean people themselves.

38. Having forced the First Committee to engage illegally in the consideration of this question, the Anglo-American bloc then did its very utmost to obtain priority of consideration for another draft resolution [A/C.1/641], in spite of the fact that it had been presented later than the USSR draft resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.

39. The delegation of the Soviet Union urged that its draft resolution should be considered and put to the vote, but owing to the efforts of the Anglo-American bloc, the First Committee proceeded to approve the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/641. It then interrupted its work and postponed consideration

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, First Committee*, 408th to 417th meetings inclusive.

of the USSR draft resolution and other draft resolutions on the pretext that the draft resolution approved by the First Committee had to be sent to the General Assembly for consideration.

40. The USSR delegation considers this procedure irregular and takes exception to such a strange method of work. We protest against the consideration by the General Assembly of the text submitted to it by the First Committee before that Committee has examined and taken a decision on the draft resolution of the Soviet Union and the other draft resolutions which have been submitted to it on the same question.

41. As to the text now before the Assembly, the real purpose of the measures proposed in it is to enable the United States armed forces in Korea to continue their armed aggression. This is clear from the statements made by the United States and United Kingdom representatives in the First Committee on 12 December, when the draft resolution set forth in document A/C.1/641 was discussed.

42. The United Kingdom representative, Mr. Younger, speaking of the substance of the draft resolution, said that the proposal for a cease-fire contained in the draft was merely a temporary measure strictly limited in scope. He further stated that he supported the draft resolution on that practical, strictly limited basis, which would ensure the safety of United States and United Kingdom troops in Korea. The United States representative, Mr. Austin, took a similar position.

43. The statements of the United States and United Kingdom representatives in the First Committee show that they oppose the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea because they are seeking thereby to continue United States armed intervention in Korea and aggression in the Far East, whereas a proper solution of the Korean question is possible only if foreign troops are withdrawn from Korea and the Koreans themselves are allowed to settle the questions which concern their country.

44. It was precisely on those grounds that the USSR delegation submitted its draft resolution to the First Committee, recommending, as I have already said, that all foreign troops should be immediately withdrawn from Korea and that the decision on the Korean question should be entrusted to the Korean people themselves.

45. The delegation of the Soviet Union insists on the adoption of that draft resolution; it therefore voted in the First Committee against the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/641 and will vote against that text in the General Assembly.

46. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR fully associates itself with the statement of the USSR delegation concerning the irregular procedure which has lately been adopted by United Nations organs for the consideration of certain questions.

47. The fact that the General Assembly now has before it the draft resolution which was originally submitted in the First Committee as document A/C.1/641 is a consequence of the irregular procedure which the United States delegation has shamelessly foisted upon

the United Nations. In its endeavour to induce the General Assembly to adopt a resolution on item 76 of the agenda which would meet with the approval of the ruling circles of the United States, the United States delegation twice forced the First Committee to interrupt the consideration of certain questions and draft resolutions which it was discussing in order to consider other questions or other draft resolutions to which the United States delegation had decided to give priority.

48. That is what happened to the Soviet Union complaint regarding United States aggression against the People's Republic of China; the consideration of that item was deferred at the instance of the United States representative, Mr. Dulles, and for more than two weeks now it has been impossible to resume the discussion.

49. The same thing has now taken place in the case of the draft resolutions submitted by the USSR and other Powers concerning item 76 of the agenda; the consideration of those drafts too has been deferred by the First Committee, although they concern item 76 no less than does document A/C.1/641.

50. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR considers this new "procedure" irregular and injurious to the cause and the prestige of the United Nations. The First Committee had no business to discuss the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/641 before considering the draft resolution of the Soviet Union on item 76 of the agenda, the latter draft having been submitted to the First Committee before the former; for the same reason, the Assembly has no business to discuss the draft submitted to it.

51. With regard to the substance of that draft, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR shares the opinion of the USSR delegation that the real purpose of the measures proposed therein is to enable United States armed forces in Korea to continue their armed intervention.

52. For this reason, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR will vote against the draft resolution before the Assembly.

53. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) (*translated from Russian*): A few days ago the First Committee decided, in spite of the opposition of a number of delegations, to include in its agenda the United States charges concerning the so-called intervention in Korea of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.

54. The purpose of the United States complaint was to relegate to the background another question, a question in which the United States was the accused, namely, the complaint of the Chinese People's Republic that the United States had violated the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Chinese People's Republic, that it had carried out barbarous air raids over Chinese territory, and that it had committed aggression against the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. I must say that the astonishing procedural manoeuvres which we witnessed during the consideration of matters connected with the Far Eastern situation are unparalleled in the history of the United Nations.

55. It all began when the United States submitted the question of Formosa for inclusion in the agenda in violation of existing international declarations and the principles of the Charter. Yet when it came to the con-

sideration of the question, the United States representative, who had previously insisted that the question should be included and given priority over other items of the agenda, argued with the same eloquence and energy for postponing the discussion and placing the item last on the agenda.

56. When the next item, the complaint of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China concerning United States aggression in the Far East, came up for discussion, it was generally felt that in view of the seriousness of the situation, the First Committee would discuss the question exhaustively and seek ways of preventing the conflict from spreading.

57. In order to obtain a full picture of the situation, the First Committee decided by a tremendous majority to invite a representative of the Chinese People's Republic to take part in the consideration of the question.

58. After the representative of the USSR had made a detailed statement substantiating the charges against the United States, the Committee, at Mr. Dulles' request, decided to adjourn the meeting in order to give the United States Government time to prepare its reply. The Committee did not meet for several days, and when finally it met, representatives learned to their surprise that a proposal had been made to the effect that the consideration of that question should be postponed and that another item of the agenda should be taken up. When the consideration of that question was at last resumed, there was a new procedural manoeuvre in the form of a proposal that priority should be given to one of the draft resolutions before the Committee. And finally, when that draft resolution was approved, the discussion in the Committee was again suspended.

59. These procedural manoeuvres are clearly a reflection of the political manoeuvres which are taking place in the United Nations. The Polish delegation will always protest in the most determined manner against such unscrupulous schemes.

60. The mere fact that two draft resolutions were introduced shows the real intentions of the United States. Using the Philippines as its instrument, the United States succeeded in having the draft resolution concerning a cease-fire considered first; that draft is very much to the advantage of the United States at a time when its armed forces are suffering defeat and retreating in Korea. Mr. Austin openly admitted that fact in a statement he made yesterday at a meeting of the *Kappa Sigma Fraternity*.

61. According to Mr. Austin, the resolution calling for a cease-fire will serve the interests of the United States in any event. If the other party agrees to the cease-fire, the United States forces will have a chance to regroup. If the other party rejects it, the United States, according to Mr. Austin, can use that as a powerful propaganda weapon to mislead the people who are longing for peace; for a cease-fire does not mean the ending of hostilities, which we have been requesting for the past six months and which we shall go on requesting.

62. Naturally I am not surprised at Mr. Austin's approach to the question. I also understand the part played by the Philippines. It is, however, difficult to understand how twelve Asian countries which, by virtue of their geographical situation, should have given more

serious consideration to the question, fail to see that their desire to settle the conflict is being exploited for purposes which do not serve the cause of peace and cannot lead to a prompt settlement of the conflict.

63. A solution of the Korean problem is not possible so long as it is not clearly understood that that problem is a consequence of United States aggression against the freedom and independence of Korea, and that United States intervention in the Korean civil war, which was brought on by the Syngman Rhee régime, constituted an illegal act. The so-called police action for the purpose of re-establishing the *status quo* was but the first stage in the military plans of General MacArthur. The second was to have involved North Korea, the third, China. Carried away by temporary successes, MacArthur and his henchmen proceeded to the third stage, by bombing China and seizing Taiwan.

64. It was only when the Korean people's army, regrouped and reinforced by Chinese volunteers, launched a counter-offensive and inflicted a number of defeats upon the enemy and forced him to retreat—it was only then that the question of a cease-fire was raised.

65. The United States, which bears the responsibility for the aggression in Korea and which has not scrupled to use the most brutal methods, wiping out Korean towns, destroying Korean industry and dropping thousands of bombs upon civilian objectives, is now saying that further bloodshed must be prevented.

66. The United States representative listened with stolid indifference in the Security Council and in the First Committee to the complaints of the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic. Those complaints contained descriptions of the immense destruction and unbelievable suffering which the air, land and sea forces of the United States had inflicted upon the Korean people. Instances were cited of atrocities committed by United States troops and the Syngman Rhee régime against the inhabitants of the occupied territory. At that time the United States representative said nothing about human sacrifices or devastation, although the American Press was full of photographs of shootings, of prisoners of war being tortured, of battle-fields covered with the bodies of the dead, of Korean towns in ruins. The United States representative and, incidentally, several other representatives, were completely indifferent to the draft resolution calling for the cessation of the bombing of towns and civilians.²

67. Now, however, that United States forces are retreating along the entire line and that they need a breathing spell in order to regroup and continue their aggression, the United States representative speaks of human sacrifices, devastation, etc.

68. I do not question the sincerity and good intentions of most of the twelve Asian countries which sponsored the draft resolution of the First Committee. They must, however, realize what use is being made of their initiative, and what plans the United States aggressors have in connexion with their proposal.

69. During the discussions in the First Committee, it was repeatedly emphasized that a dangerous situation had been brought about in the Far East. It is impossible

² See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year*, No. 26, document S/1679, page 20.

not to agree with that appraisal of the situation, since we have witnessed within a relatively short time two acts of aggression in the Far East—United States aggression against Korea and against the People's Republic of China.

70. There can be no doubt but that it is the duty of the United Nations, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, to maintain peace and security and, to that end, to endeavour to resolve conflicts, prevent aggression and seek the peaceful settlement of disputes.

71. The draft resolution which has been submitted to us does not, however, serve that purpose and actually is more likely to help the aggressor by enabling him to hide his guilt and to encourage him to commit further acts of aggression. The Polish delegation therefore will vote against that draft.

72. I should like to add that the Polish delegation has continuously tried to achieve an equitable settlement of the Korean question on the basis of the principle of the self-determination of peoples. That is evidenced by the draft resolution [A/1426] which it submitted a few weeks ago together with four other delegations, which called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a unified and democratic Korea. We were guided by the principle that the first step towards the solution of the Korean problem must be the withdrawal of foreign troops.

73. Six months of fighting in Korea and the developments in the Far East have fully confirmed the soundness of our point of view. Only if foreign troops are withdrawn can peace be re-established in Korea. Only then will the Korean people be in a position freely to settle their own destiny.

74. Such a settlement of the Korean question would contribute to the maintenance of peace in the Far East. Those principles are enunciated in full in the draft resolution [A/C.1/640] which the USSR delegation submitted to the First Committee. That draft sets out the only correct and constructive approach to the question, and the Polish delegation wholeheartedly supports it.

75. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): My delegation considers it necessary to make a statement in explanation of its vote on the draft resolution before the Assembly.

76. In the First Committee, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR objected to a procedure whereby the General Assembly would consider this draft separately and before other draft resolutions on the same item. But, owing to the pressure exerted by the Anglo-American bloc, the majority in the First Committee decided to submit it for the consideration of the Assembly entirely out of turn; other draft resolutions, including the USSR draft calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, have thus been disregarded.

77. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, speaking in the First Committee, strongly supported the draft resolution which is now before the Assembly. This draft, which ostensibly calls for a cease-fire, is really designed to enable the United

States forces in Korea to continue their armed intervention. The General Assembly would be wise to decide to call for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and to give the Korean people themselves an opportunity of settling questions affecting their own country.

78. The Anglo-American bloc, however, has preferred to postpone this extremely urgent and important question by claiming that the draft resolution before us has priority.

79. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR will vote against the draft resolution approved by the majority in the First Committee.

80. Mr. HAJDU (Czechoslovakia): The Czechoslovak delegation will vote against the draft resolution of the First Committee, which was sponsored by thirteen Powers, for reasons that it made plain in the Committee.

81. We base ourselves on the facts and the events that have taken place since the conflict began. Let us recall those facts and those events, and we shall see that there is only one outstanding factor in this whole question and in the whole Korean conflict, this factor being an undoubted aggression on the part of the United States. As we all know, the United States thoroughly prepared the South Korean army for the purpose of launching an attack against North Korea. That attack was launched on 25 June. In a very short time, United States forces intervened on the side of the South Korean forces against the Korean people. That intervention, as well as the attack of the South Koreans, was planned beforehand by the United States. That United States aggression was subsequently sanctioned by two illegal decisions of the Security Council.

82. Nevertheless, in spite of these preparations, the heroic fight of the Korean people threw back the aggressors. All the military might of the United States was concentrated against the Korean people. Everybody knows about the savage bombardments and the razing of whole Korean villages and towns to the ground. With that military might the United States forces began to push back the heroic defenders of Korea.

83. In the meantime the United States used the Korean conflict as a pretext to commit aggression against China. As we all know, under this pretext it occupied an integral part of the Chinese territory, Taiwan, and also bombarded the Chinese mainland one hundred times. Besides these preparations for all-out aggression against China, United States forces began to approach Chinese territory itself, and they were nearing—and I think already reaching—the Chinese frontier at the Yalu river.

84. The Czechoslovak delegation, together with the Soviet Union and three other delegations, threw every effort into the balance during this fight to end the bloodshed and to end the Korean conflict, as the USSR is doing now. Our calls for peace and our warnings were heeded neither by the United States aggressors nor by the majority of the members of this Assembly. On the contrary, they again sanctioned, *post factum*, the crossing of the 38th parallel, instead of putting an end to the fight. Our proposal [A/1426] was intended to settle the whole issue peacefully for the benefit of the Korean people. The resolution adopted by the

General Assembly on 7 October [294th meeting], on the contrary, extended the hostilities and prolonged the fight. So there was no peaceful settlement.

85. The Chinese patriots were aroused by these aggressive acts on the part of the United States; they were aroused not only by suspicion, as previously, but now by clear facts, the facts being the aggression against Taiwan and the bombardment of Chinese territory. Their justifiable fears were increased many times by the approach of the United States armies to their borders. They therefore fulfilled their duty towards their motherland and volunteered *en masse*, in accordance with international law, to fight the armies approaching their borders and threatening their motherland. There was therefore no problem in this connexion for the Assembly to consider. The heroic people of Korea, with the help of the Chinese volunteers, turned the tide of battle. The advancing enemy was routed and military disaster fell upon him.

86. Suddenly the humanitarian feelings of the majority in the Assembly were aroused. They at once began to try to save the United States armies from disaster and to save United States prestige; they tried to secure for the United States at least a foothold so that it could launch aggression again in the future against the Korean people. Thus we were seized of a curious document [A/1618] calling for the inclusion in the agenda of an item entitled "Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea", an item whose inclusion Czechoslovakia opposed. That document was subsequently superseded by a still more curious one, the draft resolution we are now to vote upon. Speaking in the First Committee, the majority of the members of the General Assembly put forward arguments which they themselves had rejected two months earlier.

87. I do not intend to scrutinize the intentions of the authors of this draft resolution. Many of them certainly have honest intentions, but the wording of the draft is hypocritical and the effect of its adoption would be bad. Its adoption, as I said before, would result in an attempt to save the United States forces from disaster and to give them the possibility, after they had consolidated their ranks and renewed their armaments, of launching an aggression in the future under better conditions. My delegation is sure that the Korean question would not be settled by the adoption of this draft because the United States forces of aggression would be able to remain in Korean territory.

88. My delegation is persuaded that only by adopting the draft resolution [A/C.1/640] which the Soviet Union submitted in the First Committee can we put an end, immediately, to the hostilities. Only by adopting that text can we settle the problem of Korea for the benefit of the Korean people, because that text not only provides for the removal of any possibility of an immediate or future conflict—whereas the other draft does no such thing—but also safeguards the interests of the Korean people by allowing them to settle their own affairs and their own future. The Czechoslovak delegation therefore supports the USSR proposal and will vote against the draft resolution of the First Committee.

89. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt): I had no intention of speaking on this matter, but I feel impelled to

say at least a few words, which you can call an explanation of my vote. I can hardly call it that considering that my country was one of the sponsors of the draft resolution which, by the large majority of 51 votes, the First Committee approved yesterday, and which favours the making of an endeavour to secure a cease-fire in Korea.

90. I must confess my sense of—shall I say—frustration at the unjust criticisms which were levelled by various delegations against this endeavour both yesterday and today. I had hoped that our attempt to work out a cease-fire in Korea would be subscribed to by each and every delegation present here or each and every delegation which was present yesterday in the First Committee; however, that was not the case. I realize—and I should be grateful for it—that the speakers who today and yesterday criticized this draft resolution, admitted the sincerity of its sponsors. I should have liked—and I still should like—them to follow this up with the next logical step, namely, to vote for the draft resolution and to work in support of it. It is not enough merely to say that such and such motives can be imputed to the draft resolution and to take that as an excuse not only for not voting for it but for voting to oppose the attempt to attain a cease-fire in Korea.

91. Let me recall that this is not by any means the first time that we have been working for a cease-fire in Korea. Since only a few hours after the fighting started there, we have been working for a cease-fire. We even met on a Sunday, the memorable Sunday, 25 June, and we adopted a resolution in favour of a cease-fire in Korea.⁸ Nobody could then attribute mysterious or partial motives to our action, and I do not think that anybody is now entitled to attribute anything but good motives to our action today.

92. What in fact does the draft resolution ask for? It asks that ways and means should be sought to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cessation of hostilities in Korea can be arranged and that recommendations should be made to the General Assembly as soon as possible. Could there be anything wrong in that? On the contrary, there would be everything wrong if we failed to do so, if we failed to try to establish a cease-fire in Korea. We are trying to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire can be arranged.

93. How can anybody, in logic or in fairness, challenge such a stand? I should like at the same time to point out that when we worked with this objective in view, we did so having in mind our responsibility as Members of the United Nations and not only our interests as peoples living in important countries of the world. I should add to that that my country is at the cross-roads of the mighty whenever any war takes place. We have nothing to gain from war, and we have everything to gain from peace. It is almost a sarcasm of fate that the time has come when one has to point out such a plain fact, to which the man in the street and every other person should unhesitatingly subscribe and accept as the reality. Nobody can gain anything from war, neither the victor nor the vanquished, and we who live at the cross-roads of the mighty whenever they disagree and whenever they start war have every right to ask that this madness of successive wars and preparations for wars should be stopped. It is high time to do it.

⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 15.

94. I trust that the world will realize its responsibilities to work for the maintenance of peace and security not only in speeches and articles and propaganda material but in reality, in fact, in action, by refusing to work for war and insisting upon working each and every day, each and every hour and minute, for peace. We have no right to think differently. Neither propaganda material nor bright speeches will serve as an alternative to peace and tranquillity or to the service of the human race.

95. We have so far failed to agree upon so many matters, including only yesterday the question of the control and reduction of armaments, which weigh so heavily upon the economy, the social life and the prosperity of the human race. We shall continue so to fail to agree as long as there are people who are hesitating to work for peace and to build up the structure which is necessary for peace in the world. I hope that those who are hesitating to subscribe to our attempt in favour of peace will realize, and will realize soon, that there is growing and building up, spiralling and snowballing, a world public opinion which determinedly refuses to be driven to war. We must pay heed to that public opinion. We must not continue to think of people as cattle who can be driven to war and to massacre at the whim of those who cannot think of anything else.

96. The world is waiting for our action and I submit that we should lose no more time. We should insist on acting, and we should act for peace, and then the time will come when everyone will know who is building up and who is tearing down the structure of human civilization.

97. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): So far, I have allowed those who have spoken on this subject to exceed the prescribed time limit of seven minutes. The question is so important, its gravity is such, that I really have not presumed to insist on strict adherence to the rule. I hope, however, that explanations of votes on other items will not take more than seven minutes.

98. I shall now put the draft resolution of the First Committee [A/1717] to the vote. A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

India, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland.

Against: Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

Abstaining: China.

The draft resolution was adopted by 52 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

99. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I do not wish to say anything at this moment, but you will understand what responsibilities you have placed on me and on the two persons whom I am to select. I should like to appeal to all parties, to all the representatives. We need their support in order to be able to save the world from the danger which threatens it.

100. Before proceeding to the next item, I must ask the Assembly whether it wishes to open a debate on the fourth to the seventh and on the fifteenth to the eighteenth items on the agenda for this meeting [*place of meeting of the sixth session and items 12, 30, 67, 59, 21(f), 20 and 21*].

It was decided not to discuss those items.

Place of meeting of the sixth session of the General Assembly: report of the Fifth Committee (A/1714)

101. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): We have before us a draft resolution submitted by Bolivia, Colombia and Peru [A/1593] and the report of the Fifth Committee [A/1714].

102. The representative of Pakistan wishes to explain his vote.

103. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan): On behalf of Pakistan, I am compelled with great regret to raise a voice against the draft resolution on this item which has been submitted to the General Assembly by Bolivia, Colombia and Peru.

104. The draft resolution is brief. It bases its recommendation to the effect that the sixth session of the General Assembly should be convened in Europe on two considerations: first, "that the building intended for the holding of the General Assembly will not be completed until 1952" and, secondly, "that in these circumstances there may arise technical difficulties liable to impede the normal functioning of the Assembly and the convenience of its deliberations".

105. Any difficulties that are contemplated in the draft resolution cannot be new ones. In previous years, the session had been held at Lake Success and at Flushing. Committees sat at Lake Success and the full Assembly sat at Flushing. We are assured that if the session were held at Headquarters in 1951, Committees could be convened at the Headquarters building in Manhattan, though the Assembly would still have to hold its meetings at Flushing. Surely that will reduce the technical difficulties and the inconveniences that have hitherto been experienced in that the sessions of the Committees will be held in New York. It will not add to the inconveniences. With regard to the Committees, two hours' additional work could most certainly be done each day with the journey to and from Lake Success eliminated.

106. Let us compare that with our experience in 1948 in respect both of the normal functioning of the Assembly and of the convenience of its deliberations. I have no right to speak on behalf of other delegations, but I can say with confidence that our own experience was that, with regard to the transaction of the business of the Assembly, we were put to a great deal of incon-

venience, and that to our minds, and in our judgment, the functioning of the General Assembly was not nearly so efficient as it was at the temporary headquarters, even with the division between Lake Success and Flushing. And the greater part of that inconvenience will disappear next year.

107. In any case, there is one criterion by which we can judge the convenience of the Assembly's deliberations and the efficiency of its functioning. In Paris, we were functioning under the best conditions that could be provided in Europe inasmuch as after a consideration of every other venue, the Secretary-General came to the decision that the most convenient place was Paris. So it was the most convenient place at which the Assembly could have sat in 1948. The very best arrangements were actually made in Paris so that we were working under the most ideal conditions that could be provided in Europe. Yet what was the progress of business? We sat until 12 December. We then had to adjourn until 5 April following, and we had to sit for six weeks in New York to conclude our business. It might be contended that perhaps the agenda was extraordinarily long. I believe it was a shorter agenda than we had last year and than we have this year.

108. Compare that with working at the temporary headquarters where, as I have said, we have been working under the handicap that the Committees have had to be convened at Lake Success, a distance of about 50 minutes to one hour from New York, which entails a journey in the morning and one in the afternoon back again. Sometimes representatives have had to attend meetings at Lake Success and also at Flushing. A great amount of that will be eliminated altogether when Committees alone are sitting. No journeys outside Manhattan will be necessary. Therefore, from the point of view of the efficiency of working and functioning of the General Assembly and the speed with which we can dispose of our agenda, there will be a saving of at least two hours in respect of every Committee that sits each day and the progress will even be faster. Under the best conditions in Europe, it will be no faster than in 1948 and, owing to certain factors, it may even be slower.

109. With all due respect, we are of the opinion that the two considerations set out in support of the draft resolution do not hold water. On examination they cannot be substantiated. But there is also the question of expenses to consider. The report of the Fifth Committee [A/1714] indicates that if the session is held in Paris, there will be a minimum additional expense of \$1,750,000 which all of us, of course, will have to provide. Of course, we do not provide it directly, but we provide it through our contributions. If the session is held in Geneva, there will be an additional expenditure of \$1,600,000.

110. That is not the whole story though, because the report, in paragraph 3, states the following: "The Secretary-General in his report drew attention to the assumptions on which his estimates had been prepared, including, in particular, the assumption that the host government would provide, without charge to the United Nations, a General Assembly hall, conference and office space, buildings, maintenance services, utilities, telephonic and telecommunications installations,

external and internal security services, ushers and telephone operators, and office furniture and furnishings, and that maximum co-operation would be offered in connexion with the necessary procurement of supplies and services. The Committee was informed, in the course of its discussion of the Secretary-General's estimates, that, in the event of the above facilities not being furnished by the host government"—and we have no definite assurance with regard to that as that will of course depend upon the place selected—"it would cost the United Nations approximately a further \$3 million."

111. Now the \$1,750,000 which we are sure to incur may easily go up to \$2 million or \$2,500,000. In addition, there is this \$3 million which will be incurred in case the host government is not prepared to invest that amount, because the cost will be the same whether it is the host government that provides these facilities or whether the United Nations provides them. Therefore the holding of the session in Europe will have to cost somebody money, and may cost the United Nations an additional \$5 million.

112. What would be the advantage in return for which we were willing—lightheartedly I am constrained to say—to vote an additional \$5 million? The most important would be the political advantage which, it is true, in normal circumstances may well justify the expenditure of \$5 million. But again I venture to submit that the political conditions are such that it is quite possible that after the greater part of this expense has been incurred, we may not be able to hold the session in Europe. There is no certainty, in spite of all the preparations and expense, that we shall be able to hold the session in Europe and to carry it through even if it is convened in Europe. The political advantage, in the circumstances, is problematical.

113. It is true most of us were delighted to be in Paris, for considerations which had nothing to do with the efficient functioning of the Assembly or the transaction of business, and of course the ladies were enchanted to be in Paris. We should again be delighted to be in Paris and have the ladies enchanted to be in Paris, but are we prepared, as serious men, having regard to the responsibilities that we carry with regard to the United Nations and also to our respective governments, to adopt a resolution which will certainly entail an additional expenditure of \$5 million?

114. Individual delegations may feel that they might make some saving either in the over-all expenditure if the session were held nearer to our homes, or possibly might make some saving in hard currency. But the great part of this we shall have to provide in hard currency through our contributions.

115. For all these reasons I earnestly submit to the Assembly that it would not be wise, certainly for 1951, to vote for the holding of the session in Europe. It is possible that in 1952, owing to other considerations, in addition to the political advantage that we might then feel would be derived for the session being held elsewhere than in New York, it may be desirable that we should adopt that course. And one of those considerations may be that 1952 will be a presidential election year in the United States. But that we shall consider when the question has to be considered at the next session.

116. I do hope that having regard to these considerations and other considerations that could be cited—but I shall not weary the Assembly by citing them—we shall come to whatever decision that is necessary with great deliberation.

117. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call upon the representative of Bolivia on a point of order.

118. Mr. COSTA du RELS (Bolivia) (*translated from French*): Although the General Assembly decided not to have a discussion on this question, the representative of Pakistan has in fact opened the debate.

119. As a sponsor of the draft resolution, I am not entitled, under rule 88 of the rules of procedure, to explain my vote. Nevertheless, with the President's permission, I shall ask the Assembly to give me its attention, as I should like to put forward certain arguments. In the Fifth Committee, only the budgetary implications of the question were discussed. It is on the political aspects of the question that I should like to comment here, provided of course that the Assembly is prepared to listen to me.

120. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): It seems to me that the first comment just made by the representative of Bolivia was justified. The representative of Pakistan cannot have understood me when I said that there would be no discussion on the question and that the time allowed each speaker to explain his vote would be limited to seven minutes, but it was obviously difficult for me to interrupt him.

121. As the representative of Bolivia said, rule 88 of our rules of procedure specifies that "the President shall not permit the proposer of a proposal or of an amendment to explain his vote on his own proposal or amendment".

122. Only one member of the Assembly has requested to speak in explanation of his vote. It is the representative of Australia, whose remarks are always very brief and very relevant. After hearing him, we can proceed to the vote and no discussion of the question will take place in the Assembly.

123. Sir Keith OFFICER (Australia): Like the representative of Pakistan, my delegation will vote against the joint resolution. We believe that the grounds on which the proposal for holding the session in Europe is put forward, namely, administrative considerations and the difficulty of holding the session in New York, are ill-founded.

124. There is apparently no doubt as to the availability of facilities here, next year, at least as adequate as those we have enjoyed at this session. On the contrary, we have no guarantee whatever that if we go to Europe the facilities will be anything near as good as they can be here. Apparently, next year, according to the assurance we have obtained, four committee rooms will be available in Manhattan, so that there will be no need to make the journeys to and from Lake Success. The building at Flushing will be available for plenary meetings. I can only say that when the question was discussed in the Fifth Committee,⁴ an assurance was

given to that effect. It seems to us that that should be quite conclusive as regards facilities. The facilities will be adequate here and probably better than they are this year and better than anything we can get in Europe.

125. But the main reason for our vote is the financial one. The Fifth Committee was told that the additional cost would be \$1,600,000 if the session were held in Geneva and \$1,750,000 if it were held elsewhere in Europe. These estimates were based on the assumption that the host government would provide the greater part of the conference facilities.

126. Thus we should be faced with this position. We have already this year had to increase our budget by \$1,500,000. If we go to Europe, we are going to add at least \$1,750,000 to that. Can we seriously contemplate doing that in the present situation? Can we take upon ourselves the additional burden of a sum not less than \$1,750,000, which might easily, as the representative of Pakistan explained, go up to \$2,500,000 or more?

127. Let us think of the other responsibilities we have and which, it has been explained, there has been some difficulty in meeting, such as the need to provide for rehabilitation in Korea, the need to provide for the welfare of children, the need to assist the Palestine refugees and our expanding advisory social services.

128. For that reason my delegation will vote against the joint draft resolution.

129. Mr. DEVINAT (France) (*translated from French*): The delegations of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru have taken the initiative of presenting a joint draft resolution proposing that the sixth session of the General Assembly should be held in Europe. The French delegation cannot do otherwise than give its unqualified support to that proposal, the wisdom of which, is borne out by important considerations of principle to which considerations of political expediency lend added weight at the present time.

130. Generally speaking, my delegation has always supported the principle that the main organs of the United Nations should meet away from Headquarters, at more or less frequent intervals. It is not that we attach too little importance to considerations of economy, which favour the holding of most meetings at Headquarters, but that we think that such considerations should not be permitted to obscure the political or moral advantages which, we feel, are involved in a reasonable decentralization of the activities of the United Nations organs.

131. Direct contacts between the various principal organs of the United Nations and areas of the world distant from New York cannot but help the United Nations to get a quicker and better grasp of the many local problems. Such contacts also enable the United Nations to view the world problems before it in a new light. And let us not forget that local public opinion, which so often is poorly or inadequately informed, finds in those contacts and in the presence of our organs an opportunity better to understand our aims and ideals and to acquaint itself with the machinery which serves those aims and ideals.

132. Those reasons have already led the French delegation to vote on several occasions in favour of the holding of sessions of the Economic and Social Council in Geneva and, only a few days ago, in favour of the

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Fifth Committee, 278th and 279th meetings.*

holding of the twelfth session of that Council in Santiago, Chile. Those reasons are even more weighty in the case of a session of the General Assembly, the supreme organ of the Organization.

133. May I add that a decision of the General Assembly to hold its sixth session in Europe would, in present circumstances, have a great political and psychological importance. It would testify to our faith in the Organization and to our confidence that mankind will survive the crisis through which it is passing. Europeans would see in it a message of confidence and a proof of solidarity.

134. This psychological aspect of the proposal submitted to us should be emphasized. It largely overrides the material or financial difficulties which might be involved in leaving the New York Headquarters for the 1951 session.

135. My delegation will therefore be especially happy to vote in favour of the joint draft resolution.

136. Mr. AMMOUN (Lebanon) (*translated from French*): My delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution presented by the delegations of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. It has two reasons for so doing.

137. The first is, naturally, the reason which led the sponsors of the proposal to submit it. They have stressed the technical difficulties which might impair the normal functioning and the facilities for discussion of the General Assembly at its next session. We should, in this connexion, bear in mind the difficulties with which we are faced now despite the zeal of the Secretariat and the praiseworthy efforts which it has made and which we should recognize. I do not wish to speak of the inconvenience suffered by delegations which are compelled each day to make a double journey, the pleasures of which wear rather thin with time. What we are concerned with is the considerable loss of time, which affects our work. At least two hours each day are wasted and that represents about one-third of our time. It has been said that the third session, in Paris, was longer than the present session. I doubt whether such a criterion can be applied. What in my opinion should be considered is the importance of the discussions rather than the number of subjects discussed. In the circumstances, I am afraid that the difficulties affecting our work might become even more serious next year with the dispersal of services and meetings between Manhattan and Flushing Meadow.

138. The second reason, political expediency, has just been referred to by the representative of France. The

United Nations has decided to establish its Headquarters in New York. Nevertheless, when an opportunity arises to hold a session of the General Assembly or one of its subsidiary organs, such as the Economic and Social Council or the Trusteeship Council, in some other country, I feel that such an opportunity should not be lost. Devotion to the work of our Organization cannot but be strengthened if the United Nations establishes the strongest possible contacts with the peoples that are its Members.

139. I am certainly not suggesting that the General Assembly should become an itinerant body. But periodic visits to various countries would help the peoples to understand its work, just as they would help the United Nations to understand the peoples and to know their needs. One of those needs stands out particularly: the need for peace and security. The presence of the United Nations General Assembly on a continent where peace of mind is more disturbed than anywhere else could not fail to have some effect. The Assembly should meet in Europe next year. It can serve the cause of peace there too and, moreover, it can work even more effectively for international understanding.

140. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I shall put the draft resolution [A/1593] to the vote. A roll-call has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Saudi Arabia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Bolivia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Poland.

Against: Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yemen, Australia, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Israel, Liberia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan.

Abstaining: United States of America, Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Denmark, Iceland, Iraq, Mexico, Philippines.

The draft resolution was adopted by 31 votes to 16, with 11 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.