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President: Mr. Nasrollah ENTEZAM (Iran).

Order of business

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): As a result of conversations which I held this morning with a large number of delegations, I have come to the conclusion that the General Assembly wishes to suspend the debate on the question of the control of atomic energy and now resume the discussion of the question of South West Africa.

Question of South West Africa. Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice: reports of the Fourth Committee (A/1643) and the Fifth Committee (A/1662) (*concluded*)

[Agenda item 35]

2. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): If there is no objection, I shall put to the vote the draft resolutions before us on the question of South West Africa.

3. The report of the Fourth Committee [A/1643] contains two draft resolutions, numbered I and II respectively. We also have before us a new draft resolution submitted by the delegations of Brazil, Denmark, Peru, Syria, Thailand and the United States [A/1681]. As I explained yesterday [321st meeting], that text is intended to replace draft resolution I if that draft is not adopted. The USSR delegation has submitted an amendment [A/1661] to draft resolution II.

4. I first put to the vote draft resolution I submitted by the Fourth Committee.

5. Mr. SOLDATOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I request a vote paragraph by paragraph.

6. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): We shall therefore vote on draft resolution I paragraph by paragraph.

The first recital was adopted by 15 votes to 5, with 15 abstentions.

7. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call upon the representative of the United States on a point of order.

8. Mr. COOPER (United States of America): I rise on a point of order or perhaps a point of inquiry. Before the General Assembly is draft resolution I, which was approved in the Fourth Committee. It was the understanding of several delegations that the draft resolution which was the result of negotiations carried on yesterday was offered as a substitute for draft resolution I. It will also be remembered that several amendments were offered to the substitute upon which agreement was reached.

9. I make the inquiry as to whether or not it would be proper first to vote upon the amendments to the substitute draft resolution and then to vote upon the substitute draft resolution as amended.

10. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The Fourth Committee has submitted two draft resolutions to the General Assembly. It is true that in the meantime some delegations have endeavoured to reach a compromise and have submitted a new draft resolution; but I must point out that that draft has not come to us from the Fourth Committee. I am obliged to put to the vote first the draft resolution submitted by the Committee. Delegations which wish the General Assembly to adopt the compromise draft resolution might perhaps—I do not wish to influence them in any way—vote against the draft resolution submitted by the Fourth Committee; I think that is the best thing they can do.

11. In brief, I must first put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by the Fourth Committee; then, before putting to the vote the compromise draft resolu-

tion, I shall ask the Assembly to vote on the amendments to that draft. That will make our work easier.

The second recital was rejected by 15 votes to 13, with 21 abstentions.

The third recital was rejected by 20 votes to 14, with 13 abstentions.

The fourth and fifth recitals were rejected by 18 votes to 12, with 18 abstentions.

The sixth recital was rejected by 20 votes to 14, with 14 abstentions.

The seventh recital was rejected by 18 votes to 15, with 12 abstentions.

Paragraph 1 of the operative part was rejected by 22 votes to 18, with 9 abstentions.

Paragraph 2 of the operative part was rejected by 22 votes to 18, with 8 abstentions.

Paragraph 3 of the operative part was rejected by 23 votes to 19, with 5 abstentions.

12. Mr. SOLDATOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): I request a separate vote on sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 4.

Sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 4 of the operative part were rejected by 25 votes to 19, with 5 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 4 of the operative part was rejected by 24 votes to 15, with 9 abstentions.

Paragraph 5 of the operative part was rejected by 23 votes to 20, with 5 abstentions.

Paragraph 6 of the operative part was rejected by 22 votes to 19, with 5 abstentions.

13. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I do not intend to put draft resolution I to the vote as a whole, because only one of its paragraphs has been adopted, and that paragraph is not in the operative part.

14. Prince Wan WAITHAYAKON (Thailand): On behalf of the co-sponsors of the joint draft resolution [A/1681], I wish to announce that the amendments submitted by Cuba [A/1688] are accepted.

15. I should also like to propose a slight change of wording in paragraph 4 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution. No change of substance is involved, but only a change in style. The beginning of that paragraph should be reworded as follows: "Authorizes the Committee, as an interim measure, pending the completion of its task referred to in paragraph 3, and as far as possible in accordance with the procedure of the former Mandates System, to examine the report on the administration of the Territory of South West Africa . . ."¹

16. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): After that explanation, you will all have understood that the sponsors of the joint draft resolution accept the amendments submitted by the delegation of Cuba; we can also consider that they accept the slight drafting change suggested by the representative of Thailand. But before putting to the vote the draft resolution thus amended, I shall call upon the representative of the Union of South Africa on a point of order.

¹ This amendment is complementary to the amendment submitted by the representative of Thailand at the 321st meeting.

17. Mr. JOOSTE (Union of South Africa): I should like to clarify the position of the delegation of the Union of South Africa in regard to the draft resolution which apparently is now up for consideration. The President ruled [321st meeting] that we might explain our votes only after voting on this draft resolution, and my delegation naturally bowed to his ruling, however much it might have regretted it.

18. There has been some talk of this being a compromise draft resolution, and I wish to say that that term may be susceptible of some misunderstanding. I rise merely to make it perfectly clear that the South African delegation is not a party to any compromise in respect of this matter. The parties to the discussion leading up to the new draft resolution were, as far as we are aware, some of the Member States which sponsored draft resolution I, as approved by the Fourth Committee, and some of the sponsors of the draft resolution submitted by the United States and seven other nations. We did not take part in those discussions, and in fact only learned of the terms of the new draft now before the General Assembly a short while before it was officially circulated. It is a compromise, therefore, between a more extreme and a less extreme draft resolution, and a compromise to which we are in no sense a party. I propose to give the reasons why my delegation will vote against this new draft resolution after the voting is concluded, in accordance with the President's ruling.

19. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I shall put to the vote the joint draft resolution [A/1681], together with the amendments submitted by the Cuban delegation [A/1688].

20. I must remind you that following a discussion which took place yesterday [321st meeting] on paragraph 3 of the operative part of this draft resolution—a paragraph which deals with the setting up of a committee of five—Denmark will replace the United Kingdom.

21. Mr. JOOSTE (Union of South Africa): The delegation of the Union of South Africa requests that the operative part should be put to the vote paragraph by paragraph, and by show of hands, and that the draft resolution as a whole should be put to the vote by roll-call.

22. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): We shall therefore proceed in the manner suggested by the delegation of the Union of South Africa.

23. First I shall put the preamble to the draft resolution to the vote. I shall then put the individual paragraphs of the operative part to the vote.

The preamble was adopted by 43 votes to 6, with 5 abstentions.

Paragraph 1 of the operative part was adopted by 43 votes to 6, with 7 abstentions.

Paragraph 2 of the operative part was adopted by 38 votes to 6, with 8 abstentions.

Paragraph 3 of the operative part was adopted by 43 votes to 6, with 6 abstentions.

Paragraph 4 of the operative part was adopted by 39 votes to 6, with 7 abstentions.

24. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I now put the joint draft resolution to the vote as a whole. A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The Union of South Africa, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey.

Against: Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Colombia, New Zealand.

The draft resolution was adopted by 45 votes to 6, with 5 abstentions.

25. Mr. JOOSTE (Union of South Africa): At the outset of the debate,² the leader of the South African delegation expressed the hope that in this matter an attempt would be made by the Organization to find points of agreement instead of points of difference, to unite and not to divide, in the face of the grave crisis at the moment facing the world.

26. Progressively, we must confess, our hopes have deteriorated and our expectations have all but been shattered. It seems as if there were a spirit prevalent among certain Member States, which unfortunately they have succeeded in indoctrinating in others, to eschew the way of consultation and agreement in order to reach an amicable solution, and to prefer to ride roughshod over the fundamentals of international co-operation and the sensibilities of a fellow Member.

27. Instead of creating the machinery to ensure the calm and objective consideration of the problem of the international position of South West Africa in the light of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and other relevant factors, this compromise resolution practically closes the door to this method of approach. Instead of keeping the door invitingly open, it is only slightly ajar at the moment, and the opening has narrowed as the debate has progressed. The present compromise resolution is a further illustration of this.

28. It is significant that there was no attempt to introduce a compromise text until it was clear, from the voting in the Fourth Committee, that draft resolution I, which was based on texts submitted by the delegations of India and others, would not command a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. Then, and only then, the attempt to combine draft resolution I as approved by the Committee with a joint draft resolution submitted to the Committee by the United States and seven other nations [A/C.4/L.124/Rev.1 and Corr.1]

was initiated. The result was the draft resolution which has now been adopted by the General Assembly.

29. How was this compromise effected? It was effected, in the first place, by substituting the substance of the preamble of draft resolution I for that of the joint draft resolution submitted by the United States and seven other Powers. The preamble of the latter draft was a full, objective and complete statement of all the questions put to the International Court of Justice, together with the replies of the Court. In its place there is now a preamble which is a one-sided, partial and incomplete recapitulation of the Court's advisory opinion.

30. In the second place, an additional paragraph [A/1681, paragraph 4] was added to the operative part of the eight-Power draft, providing for the establishment unilaterally of machinery for the examination of reports and petitions before the next session of the General Assembly, by a body established for a different purpose and entrusted with this extraneous task without consultation with the Union of South Africa. This provision can surely not be reconciled with the recognition, in the immediately preceding paragraph [A/1681, paragraph 3] of the principle of conferring with the Union of South Africa concerning measures necessary to implement the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.

31. In the third place, the principle that the members of the special committee should serve in an individual capacity was discarded in favour of the principle that they should serve as representatives of States.

32. I need not discuss here the legal implications and defects of this new resolution. This, we say, is an illustration of how the development has been progressively in the direction of closing the door to a friendly solution, based on the full and free discussion of the problem in all its aspects.

33. The South African delegation still stands by what was said by our leader in his opening intervention, namely, that the South African Government would give the most careful consideration to any resolution which might emanate from the General Assembly. But he also drew attention to the natural corollary to that statement, namely, that my government's decision would be largely influenced by the nature of that resolution.

34. I have no desire to anticipate that decision, but had I been permitted to declare our vote before the vote was taken, I should have entreated the General Assembly in all seriousness and sincerity to ponder carefully the draft resolution placed before it, with particular reference to, first, the new facts discovered since the delivery of the advisory opinion on 11 July 1950,³ facts of which the International Court of Justice had no knowledge at the time; secondly, the admitted danger to South Africa, which is administering South West Africa as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa, of having its own internal policies criticized under the cloak of criticism of the administration of South West Africa, and thus in violation of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, and, thirdly, the genuine desire of South Africa to have this long outstanding matter settled and to achieve this by way of unfettered consultation in a spirit of realism.

² For the discussion on this subject in the Fourth Committee, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Fourth Committee*, 190th to 199th meetings inclusive.

³ See *International status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1950*, page 128.

35. As the resolution which has just been adopted failed to take any of these facts into consideration, my delegation was obliged to vote against it.

36. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I would remind you that speaking time is limited to seven minutes, although speakers are not required to speak for seven minutes.

37. Mr. RYCKMANS (Belgium) (*translated from French*): Belgium hopes and trusts that South West Africa will continue to be administered in the spirit of the Mandate. It hopes and trusts that the Union of South Africa will negotiate with the United Nations so that the population may continue to enjoy protection similar to that accorded to it under the previous system, by the Permanent Mandates Commission.

38. The Belgian delegation abstained from voting because, in the first place, the preamble to the resolution does not mention the chief question which was put to the International Court of Justice, namely, whether the Union of South Africa is or is not bound to place South West Africa under trusteeship. The General Assembly accepts the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. I take it, therefore, that all those who voted in favour of the resolution have accepted the decision—the opinion of that Court in that respect also.

39. The other reason why the Belgian delegation abstained from voting was that under this resolution the General Assembly decides unilaterally, and prior to the opening of the negotiations provided for in the same text, that a committee which it has established without consulting the Union of South Africa should examine the reports and petitions that may be submitted.

40. Mr. RAO (India): In view of the several alterations made in the draft of the first resolution which has just been adopted by the General Assembly, my delegation considers it necessary to make a brief statement in explanation of India's vote.

41. The original draft resolution, as the text emerged from the Fourth Committee, was in the view of my delegation a reasonable, modest and wisely conceived proposal. Unfortunately it did not receive a measure of support sufficient to ensure its adoption by the General Assembly. My delegation therefore supported the draft resolution in its revised form, although it would have preferred the text as it stood in the report of the Fourth Committee. My delegation accepted the amendments now incorporated in the resolution, in a spirit of compromise, and it did so, in the main, for two reasons.

42. In the first place, there is no real difference of opinion in the United Nations on the desirability of accepting the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, nor is there any difference of opinion on the desirability of the Government of the Union of South Africa implementing that opinion without delay.

43. Secondly, my delegation has in mind, notwithstanding the statement just made by the representative of the Union of South Africa, the assurance which the representative of that government gave to the Fourth Committee that his government would give the most careful consideration to any resolutions that might be adopted by the General Assembly.

44. My delegation therefore expresses the hope that the widely held view of the Fourth Committee in favour of the implementation of the opinion of the International Court of Justice should not be obscured by any differences over the most practical methods of implementing that opinion.

45. There have been several concessions in the amendments now incorporated in the resolution which we have just adopted. The authors of the alternative draft resolution [A/1657] which was withdrawn yesterday in favour of the amended revised draft, were keen on the appointment of a negotiating committee. Many of us in the Fourth Committee were apprehensive that a negotiating committee would mean an interval of another year, during which the inhabitants of South West Africa would continue to be denied the benefits of an arrangement whereby administration reports and petitions were examined by the United Nations, or some organ created by it.

46. The compromise now accepted meets our objection half way. The negotiating committee will, as an interim measure, perform these functions in addition to conducting negotiations with the Union of South Africa on the procedural measures necessary for implementing the opinion of the International Court of Justice.

47. My delegation was impressed by the point of view of the representative of the United Kingdom, who said in the Fourth Committee, that it was envisaged that there should be negotiations with the Union Government, not on the substance of the Court's opinion but on the procedure for implementing it, not on whether reports or petitions should be submitted but on how they should be handled by the United Nations.

48. That is what the General Assembly expects the negotiating committee to do through the adoption of this resolution. The next session of the General Assembly will, we hope, have the report of the negotiating committee before it on three main topics: on the administration reports of the Government of the Union of South Africa for the years 1947 to 1950; secondly, petitions from the territory of South West Africa, and, thirdly, the procedure to be followed in the future.

49. So far as the future is concerned, let me say a word. The second draft resolution, which is yet to be adopted, reiterates previous resolutions inviting the Government of the Union of South Africa to place South West Africa under the International Trusteeship System. It also stresses what has been pointed out by the International Court of Justice, namely, that the normal way of modifying the international status of South West Africa would be to place it under the Trusteeship System. My delegation is confident the General Assembly will adopt the second draft resolution as it has done the first, without any real opposition or dissent.

50. The problem of South West Africa has been before us ever since the United Nations came into existence, and for four years the General Assembly has sought a solution. Today we have the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, endorsing practically everything contained in the various resolutions of the General Assembly on the subject.

51. Finally, let me say a word about the observations made by the representative of the Union of South Africa. The debates this year have been admittedly free from

expressions of indignation and bitterness. Nevertheless, we have our grave misgivings, especially those of us who come from Asia, in regard to the problem and the consequences of this problem continuing to engage the attention of the United Nations in the manner in which it has done for the last four years. Those misgivings, let me say very briefly, have not diminished as a result of the statement made a few minutes ago by the representative of the Government of the Union of South Africa. If the door is being banged, it is not by the General Assembly, and the overwhelming vote which the members have just recorded in favour of the draft resolution is proof of my assertion.

52. Lord OGMORE (United Kingdom): I desire to make a short statement in explanation of my vote. The position of the United Kingdom Government was expressed on a number of occasions in the Fourth Committee. It was briefly this.

53. In our view, the resolution to be adopted on the question of South West Africa should be one which clearly set out the opinion of the International Court of Justice, accepted it in its entirety so far as the United Nations was concerned, and recommended to the Union of South Africa that it should follow suit. In addition, we considered that there should be a positive step towards the implementation of the Court's opinion, and for this purpose were anxious that a negotiating committee should be set up to work out, in consultation with the Government of the Union of South Africa, the establishment of a system of supervision which would be as close as possible to that obtaining under the old Mandate.

54. We supported a draft resolution introduced in the Fourth Committee by Denmark and seven other States, which in our opinion provided the best method of carrying out the Court's view. Unfortunately, we did not have an opportunity to vote on that draft resolution. We voted against the other draft resolutions which were proposed because we felt that they did not in fact implement the Court's decision as we should have desired.

55. We have had before us today another draft resolution, in the nature of a compromise between the framers of the various draft resolutions in the Fourth Committee, which has met with general agreement and which, although we are not in entire agreement with it, does, in our view, provide the best available basis for the implementation of the Court's opinion. In these circumstances we voted for the draft resolution as a whole.

56. I wish to place on record, however, that the United Kingdom Government considers the original draft resolution introduced in the Committee by Denmark and the seven co-sponsors as preferable to the resolution on which we have just voted because the provisions contained in paragraphs 2 and 4 of the latter text may be held to prejudice to some extent the procedure for the submission of reports and petitions. I do not say that it will so prejudice the procedure, but it may do so. We hope it will not. The original draft resolution also set out the full opinion of the Court objectively, whereas this resolution which we have adopted selects a part of the opinion and does not record the whole opinion. We should therefore have preferred, for the reasons I have given, to see the original draft resolution introduced, and it is for this reason, and this reason alone, that the United Kingdom delegation abstained from

voting on paragraphs 2 and 4 of the resolution which has just been adopted.

57. In conclusion, may I say that my government most sincerely hopes that the negotiating committee will be able to work out a solution of this vexed and difficult problem, acceptable to both the General Assembly and to the Government of the Union of South Africa.

58. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): We come now to draft resolution II. The Soviet Union has submitted an amendment [A/1661] to that draft, providing for the addition of the following paragraph after paragraph 1 of the operative part:

"2. Notes that the action of the Union of South Africa in adopting a law on the incorporation of South West Africa in the Union of South Africa constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations."

The present paragraph 2 would thus become paragraph 3.

59. I put that amendment to the vote. A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Uruguay, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Against: Venezuela, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, France, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Uruguay, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria.

The amendment was rejected by 24 votes to 8, with 22 abstentions.

60. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I shall now put draft resolution II to the vote as a whole. A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The Union of South Africa, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Against: Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, Greece, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden.

Abstaining: Yemen, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Iceland, Iran,

Israel, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Thailand, Turkey.

The draft resolution was adopted by 30 votes to 10, with 16 abstentions.

61. Mr. JOOSTE (Union of South Africa): The South African delegation voted against the text of the resolution which has just been adopted, both in the Fourth Committee and here in the General Assembly. We have already given our reasons for voting against it in the Committee, and I wish to repeat them here.

62. The effect of the resolution is to invite South Africa to submit a trusteeship agreement in regard to South West Africa. That invitation has been extended to us on different occasions in the past and we have always categorically declined it. Nothing has happened in the meantime to cause South Africa to reconsider its attitude; on the contrary, much has happened to consolidate and strengthen it. In any case, we accept previous resolutions on this matter as a standing invitation until they are withdrawn, open for acceptance at any time should we be so inclined. There thus seems to be no justification for any repetition, particularly when it is borne in mind that, apart from any invitation, the way is always open to the Union of South Africa to enter into such an agreement if it so desires.

63. South Africa has consistently maintained that it is under no obligation, legal or moral, to enter into such an agreement. I need say nothing with respect to the legal objection, but with regard to any alleged moral objection, I may merely recall that from the very beginning, and on every possible occasion, we have specifically reserved our position in regard to South West Africa with the express object of avoiding even the semblance of a moral obligation. In those circumstances, it seemed to my delegation that no good purpose could be served by a resolution of this nature and we therefore voted against it.

International control of atomic energy (continued)

[Agenda item 26]

64. Mr. LACOSTE (France) (*translated from French*): France has jointed with Australia, Canada, Ecuador, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States in submitting to the Assembly the new draft resolution on the international control of atomic energy [A/1668 and Corr.1] which was distributed to the Assembly yesterday.

65. The French Government thought it advisable to suggest to the General Assembly, in concert with the Powers to which I have just referred, a new method of approaching the problem because it felt, like the other governments which have sponsored this draft resolution, that where a topic of such capital importance was concerned, no possibility must be neglected, no effort spared, no chance scorned of reaching a solution which would be acceptable to all—or even of making a slight step forward, however small, towards an agreement among the principal States concerned.

66. To tell the truth, strong faith and persevering courage are needed to pursue such an effort, when for four years all attempts have failed, one after the other, because they have been met by obstinacy, by negation,

by a refusal to co-operate even in studying the problem, by an attitude, in short, against which no argument, no attempt at persuasion, no demonstration of the most sincere desire to arrive at a solution has been able to prevail.

67. However, since the Commission on Conventional Armaments and the Atomic Energy Commission have both been reproached for failing to show a true understanding of the special subjects with which they are concerned because they have not dealt with them as a whole, with the result that their outlook has been distorted, and because that division of labour has hindered the accomplishment of their task instead of facilitating it, we shall make yet another concession to our critics. We shall do so because we do not want it to be said that the failure of the efforts of the United Nations to settle a question which, from the point of view of the immediate as well as of the more distant future, is certainly the most serious question now facing the international community, was caused by the refusal of the majority of the Members to listen to the objections of some among them concerning a matter of procedure.

68. However, it is quite obvious that we cannot expect that this mere alteration in our procedure will bring about the success which has escaped us for so long. In fact, we believe that if our efforts had been met by a goodwill equal to our own, the manner of dealing with the problem—whether we had taken it as a whole or piecemeal—would have been of small importance. We know only too well that we can expect nothing from any change in the organization of our work if there is not a change of another kind, a change of principle, a radical change of attitude on the part of certain of our colleagues with regard to this formidable undertaking which now concerns their fate as well as ours, the destiny of this generation and of succeeding ones.

69. We are prepared to meet our critics' objections and to give them this further proof of our devotion to the cause of peace—a peace delivered from the most terrible of threats. And we appeal to them, too, to demonstrate their sincerity by returning to the bodies engaged in the study of these problems. They left those bodies, deliberately, a year ago, without any reason that could be considered valid, given the tremendous issues involved, and they have been awaited there ever since. If the Assembly accepts the suggestion of the sponsors of the present draft, the two commissions will shortly be combined; that should satisfy the wishes of our indefatigable opponents, who will find their long vacated places waiting for them. Once more, we appeal to them to join us in a resolute stand to overcome what is certainly the greatest of all the difficulties which face us; we appeal to them to show that their determination to succeed is equal to our own.

70. Mr. HOFFMEISTER (Czechoslovakia): The menace of war is inseparably related to the menace of the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb hangs above the heads of the peoples of the world, suspended, unfortunately, only by the thin thread of the political incompetence of those who would use it irresponsibly, and first, in a fit of madness caused by their overwhelming desire for conquest.

71. One of the prerequisites for peace among the peoples of the world is the knowledge that this menace has been eliminated, that there is no such bomb any more.

The prohibition and destruction of the atomic bomb, therefore, would be one of the first steps of mankind towards peace. He who really desires peace must demand the prohibition and destruction of atomic bombs.

72. The United States, which is attempting to avert an economic crisis and the consequent downfall of the powerful monopolist system through feverish rearmament, already knows today that it cannot break the liberation movement of the peoples and that it cannot bring progress and development to a stop and conquer the world for itself without a war. What other purposes are the weapons of aggression which it is producing to serve? And what will happen once the United States is armed or even "super-armed" to the teeth? It will be difficult to call it off for another time.

73. There is still time today to change this programme and to prepare for peace instead of war. But the first condition is to give up investments amounting to many billions and to destroy the atomic bomb. This is a Faust-like problem.

74. At a Press conference on 30 November 1950, President Truman said, according to a United Press report from Washington, that the United States had had under consideration the use of the atomic bomb against the Chinese communists in connexion with the war in Korea. And going from bad to worse, he stated, during the same Press conference, that he would send a request to the Congress for enormous new appropriations and for the expansion of the nation's atomic bomb production, and for large-scale expansion of the armed forces.

75. The following day, in the morning issue of *The New York Times* of 1 December, we could read this: "His words in a news conference rang with challenge to communist China and Russia."

76. I shall now quote one passage from this conference for the verbatim record because of the historical importance of this testimony:

Question: "Mr. President, I wonder if we could retrace that reference to the atomic bomb? Did we understand you clearly that the use of the atomic bomb is under active consideration?"

Answer: "It always had been, it was one of our weapons".

This reported fact thus forms the most serious working paper for our discussions.

77. May I now be allowed to bring in some additional quotations as relevantly as I can. Miss Anne O'Hare McCormick wrote in the *New York Times* of 2 December 1950, under the headline "Detonations of a word out of season", as follows:

"If the atomic bomb had been dropped, it could hardly have produced a greater sensation than the President's reference to it in his Press conference . . .

"The world-wide repercussions following the mention of this ultimate weapon proves not only how horrifying it is but how unwilling the war-sick nations of the West are to face the dreadful implications . . ."

78. Mr. Howard K. Smith, in a cable of 4 December from London, published in *The Nation* of 9 December, described the dramatic scene in the British House of

Commons, the epicentre of the discontent growing in all parts of Europe. I shall read it:

"The House happened to be in the middle of a foreign affairs debate when Truman made his statement on the atomic bomb. A Labour member of Parliament rose in the midst of the debate to read it out. Members flooded into the corridors and held hurried conferences. A Labourite drafted a letter to Attlee demanding that British troops be withdrawn from Korea if the bomb were used, and within two hours it was signed by 150 Labour members of Parliament. Anthony Eden is said to have offered his moral support to the rebels. Inside the House, R. A. Butler called to the government benches: 'The voice of Britain must be heard with greater authority . . . This country must exert its influence to avoid war with China.' And he repeated the proposal, made by many others in the debate, that Attlee himself should go to see Truman. With his own party in revolt and the opposition onslaught gathering momentum, Attlee hastened from the chamber, called an emergency Cabinet meeting, and made his decision to go."

79. Miss Freda Kirchwey wrote in *The Nation* of 9 December 1950:

"If Mr. Truman's casual brandishing of the atomic bomb was intended to reassure the faint of heart, its effect must have astonished him. Horror overtook anxiety and helped crystallize opinion. Government leaders in western Europe conferred, cabinets met . . . and Mr. Attlee came to Washington to tell the President that Europe opposed war with China . . .

"The unhappy assignment of Britain's Prime Minister was to talk plainly about such ticklish matters as General MacArthur's leadership, Mr. Truman's assertion that he alone can order the use of the atomic bomb, American intervention in Formosa, the powers assumed by Syngman Rhee, the effect of refusing Peking a seat in the United Nations. Europe's feeling about these policies is as strong today as the contrary emotions in Washington."

80. Mr. Truman's statement — this was the British Peace Committee's reaction — moved the whole British people to anger; the committee emphasized the urgency of the need for the British people to insist that the United Kingdom Government should break from its subservience to United States policy.

81. *The Times* of London wrote that the question asked of the President and his reply touched upon the most sensitive fears and doubts of this age.

82. The assembly may remember the day of the President's announcement and its impression on the minds of the representatives in the lounge of Lake Success. Most of the representatives were saying, to put it mildly, that it would be politically disastrous.

83. At last, the *communiqué* of the talks between President Truman and Mr. Attlee came. It dealt with the atomic menace at the very end, in a very short paragraph:

"The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb."

Still the impression in this Assembly remained that this was a rather poor retreat and this phrase could be added

to the list of considerable disagreements upon specific courses of action.

84. The McMahon Act provides that the atomic bomb may not be used by the military forces of the United States unless the President so decides and instructs the Atomic Energy Commission to release this weapon, of which it is given sole custody. Thus the fate of war and peace, as demonstrated by recent events, rests in the hands of those who decide on the foreign policy and the domestic policy of the United States, policies which are interdependent. May I remind the Assembly of a dispatch published in *The Times* of London, which reads as follows:

"There has been a tendency for Washington to make pronouncements without consultation, leaving its allies with little alternative but to agree . . . The Administration has taken decisions based less on rightness of policy than to keep Republicans in a co-operative mood . . ."

85. We have known for a long time that the United States subjects its rather emotional foreign policy to the requirements of its internal policy. This in its turn leads finally to regrettable regimentation of this Assembly to make it comply with the internal policy of the United States. That the policy of the United States is neither wise nor far-seeing has been confirmed by recent events.

86. The Washington columnist, Bruce Catton, wrote as long ago as November 1949 that the United States now represented terror—the force which would burn all cities and destroy civilians by the scores of thousands. The bomb, he wrote, was the keystone of the security arch of the United States, whose foreign policy rested on it.

87. There was a phrase in *The New York Times* editorial of 2 December 1950 which struck me as a rather outspoken admission. It was: "Moreover, it is within our power—alone among all the democratic countries—to precipitate or to accept a world war."

88. It is clear that it is the United States which is the main obstacle to the realization of the overwhelming desire of the peoples of the world to see the atomic weapon prohibited and the United States stockpiles destroyed.

89. The United States, with the bomb of atomic aggression hidden up its sleeve, has hypnotized the majority with the might of dollars into accepting and adopting the resolution on united action for peace [302nd meeting]. How many hypocrisies are hidden in that resolution? Where does it speak of the prohibition of the atomic bomb? Why, even this great Assembly did not prohibit the use of the atomic bomb under the flag of the United Nations!

90. The United States has convinced us that it does not desire peace. It is probably true that it does not want a war right now, this very day. But the moment will come when impatience will overcome premeditated action. Meanwhile the Americanized allies have had opportunities to convince themselves of the fact that the great aid and assistance which was promised is not only not in the least altruistic, and that it is not even so great or so powerful as the United States wanted them to believe.

91. The USSR, on the other hand, has convinced us that it does want peace. It has proved this through its concrete and constructive proposals that in no way infringe on the sovereignty either of the great or of the small. The Soviet Union realistically and logically considered the question of peace from its very basis. It demanded and continues to demand with great consistency the prohibition of atomic weapons.

92. In its draft declaration on the removal of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace and security among nations [279th meeting], the USSR, referring to the Stockholm Appeal and regarding the use of atomic weapons and other means of mass destruction of human beings as the most heinous international crime against humanity, and basing that attitude on the unanimously adopted General Assembly resolutions 1 (I) and 41 (I) of 1946 on the need for prohibiting the use of atomic energy for military purposes, proposed that the General Assembly, recognizing that the use of the atomic weapons as a weapon of mass destruction of human beings is contradictory to international conscience and honour and incompatible with membership of the United Nations, should declare that the use of atomic weapons should be unconditionally prohibited and that a strict system of international control should be instituted to ensure the exact and unconditional observance of that prohibition. It further proposed that the General Assembly should declare that the first government to use the atomic weapon, or any other means for the mass destruction of human beings, against any country, would thereby commit a crime against humanity and should be regarded as a war criminal.

93. That proposal was truly worthy of the greatest Power in the world, but it was not accepted.

94. The Soviet Union made use of every opportunity to put that basic demand for the maintenance of peace before the United Nations. It did so again [309th meeting] during the discussion on the twenty-year programme for achieving peace through the United Nations proposed by the Secretary-General. The Soviet Union, in paragraph 2 (c) of its draft resolution [A/1525 and Corr.1] stressed the fact that in its view it was essential that in further developing that programme, provision should be made therein for the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and other weapons for the mass extermination of people and the institution of control to ensure the observance of that prohibition. That proposal was also rejected.

95. How did the American majority react to all these proposals? The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Vishinsky, expressed this clearly in his speech on 2 November 1950 in the General Assembly [301st meeting] when he said:

"We must now have been seeking for some five years to ensure that a decision to outlaw the atomic bomb—the use of the atomic bomb—is taken simultaneously with a decision to organize international control which will ensure that this decision is carried out, but no one agrees with us. They say 'no', and invent all kinds of pettifogging formulæ in order to by-pass this straightforward proposal that the atomic weapon should be unconditionally prohibited and that strict and effective international control over the execution of that prohibition should be instituted

simultaneously. We submitted amendments in the First Committee. We said: 'You say this and this in your draft resolution. We agree with this, we are prepared to support it, but we demand that the atomic weapon should be prohibited also.' But you do not want this. That is the basis of the dispute between us."

96. Instead of adopting a decision on which the world could build up hopes of peace, the General Assembly adopted [308th meeting] an amorphous resolution entitled "Peace through deeds" which, as Mr. Siroky, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia and head of the Czechoslovak delegation said on 20 November [312th meeting], "virtually buries the question of disarmament and the reduction of armed forces, as well as the question of the prohibition of the atomic weapon, and at the same time establishes a further legal basis for armed intervention in the domestic affairs of States".

97. This summer, when I was visiting the peace meetings in the villages in the Czechoslovak mountains, or in the countryside close to Prague, I heard a simple citizen, not a communist, not a writer, nor a politician, just a man from the village, say something that, at that time, seemed over-simplified to me. He said: "The United States is opposed to the prohibition of the atomic bomb because it wants to use this weapon".

98. After President Truman's statement, after the continual and consistent refusal of the United States to agree to the prohibition of the atomic bomb and atomic weapons, and after witnessing all the evasive tactics of the representative of the United States, I understand that every thinking person can describe the policy of the American ruling circles only in this way, in those words.

99. Yes, the new conquerors, who today are proud of the hecatombs of the peaceful towns and villages, of the peaceful population of Korea, of the ruins left behind by the American airmen, no longer confine themselves to threats, but are willing to use the atomic bomb at a given moment in order to speed up the attainment of their objectives.

100. Today we no longer hear merely the empty words of bloodthirsty senators; at a time when policy-making is passing into the hands of generals, the world must realize that the United States has entrusted the waging of an aggressive war in the Pacific to the same man who has once before made use of the atomic bomb in that very way.

101. One of the characteristics of United States policy is a self-satisfied overestimation of the United States, and a no less self-satisfied underestimation of the Soviet Union. In internal policy, the industrial and financial circles consider the notorious American slogan "bigger and better" so effective and so essential that even those who determine the United States foreign policy have succumbed to this propaganda. And we do not even mention certain military leaders who have succumbed to the mania for ever bigger glory.

102. After the cold shower which this self-satisfied general attitude underwent when, on 23 September 1949, President Truman announced that the United States had lost its monopoly of the atomic bomb, the United States was left with only one consolation—that

it was in advance of the USSR as far as atomic bombs were concerned. That an occasional shower is quite healthy for the imperialists has become apparent from recent events this year. But we do not intend to overestimate those events, nor do we underestimate them. We do not underestimate the fact that the United States still holds that kinetic danger to world peace, to human work and happiness.

103. The United States is counting on the fact that at the beginning of any eventual conflict it would have a greater stockpile of atomic weapons than the Soviet Union and would therefore be superior in this respect. We know that the USSR does not seek to have such a monstrous superiority, nor to have greater stocks of atomic weapons, for the Soviet Union continually proposes that all stocks should be destroyed immediately and that the production of atomic weapons should be prohibited everywhere. By these measures it desires to save the world from an eventual crisis of irresponsibility during which, in a fit of overconfidence, the American owner of this stockpile might use it to start a holocaust.

104. This question of superiority in the event of a qualitative change from the cold war into a hot one is certainly also one of the characteristics of the American habit of overestimation. It is also characteristic of the overestimation of the value of the atomic bomb in general, for we know today that the atomic bomb is not going to decide the result of a war.

105. The old trick of the promoters of the slogan "control first, prohibition later" is in contradiction with the common understanding of logic. We have first to prohibit the weapon, and then, or simultaneously, to have control so that the prohibition is carried out. The immoral inverse conception cannot hide any other intention than to postpone the prohibition to a date when the mass production and the stockpile of bombs would reach a point when an atomic war could be started without taking into account any opposition to the use of the atomic bomb. We have to act now, because the day may come when arms accumulated in the arsenals will start to shoot and explode by themselves. The arms, as other goods, are destined for consumption. The businesslike American approach towards production is in natural contradiction with the manufacturing of bombs with the intention not to drop them.

106. The United States still counts on atomic energy primarily as on a weapon only. Its attitude towards a peaceful development of atomic energy is negative, even though the United States Commission on Atomic Energy declared on 23 November 1950 that it would at last publish the secrets of production of atomic energy so far as low power and nuclear reactors were concerned.

107. This stubborn demand for the control of atomic energy by a commission dominated by the United States is, in our eyes, a necessary condition for the maintenance of the monopoly of American industry. This further was a circumstance which put the control of atomic energy into the hands of American trusts. Today this fact can in no way help development, but on the contrary can only hinder development and effect a dispensary-like distribution of an energy which, if it were fully utilized, would represent a direct threat to such sources of power of the American ruling circles as coal and petrol. The Americans do not want and will not permit the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

108. Senator Connally, speaking at a hearing on the atomic energy bill, held in a committee charged with the supervision of United States policy on atomic energy, referred to the possible use of atomic energy for constructive purposes in the following terms: "Certainly power is secondary or 'thirdary' or 'fourthary' to me. I don't think the power is of any great consequence at the moment . . .".⁴ Senator Millikin left us in no doubt that the civilian utilization of atomic energy was to be sacrificed in the interest of atomic weapons. He said: "We need not push forward in those fields. I suggest, as long as the imperative overriding consideration has to do with the energy as a military weapon, for medicine is covered in a more adequate fashion by existing remedies. The same use that has been suggested in the way of power is covered at the present time by, let us say, a less efficient method. Could we not lock the whole thing up, if security required it, for a year or two years, without damaging our peace-time life in any material respect?"⁵

109. It is clear that Blackett's warning voice was not listened to. The United States is not interested in the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, but exclusively for purposes of war.

110. Today, it is the monopolies that have been charged with the utilization of atomic energy for war purposes. Billions of dollars are flowing into the pockets of those who are producing destruction. The Congress of the United States will certainly, in this case, adopt with a bi-partisan majority the policy of raising the production of atomic bombs and of greatly extending their stocks.

111. This attitude is so clear that considerations about the control of atomic energy voiced by the United Nations are becoming entirely untimely and inappropriate in American ruling circles.

112. The *New York Herald Tribune* magazine, *This Week*, of 13 November 1949, describing the human qualities of one of the top five atomic commissioners, Professor Henry de Wolf Smyth, author of the well known *Smyth Report*, wrote: "The information he gave . . . made people everywhere realize that atomic energy has the power to change the world." We agree that this is true. Atomic energy may change a booming capital into a heap of bricks—or a dry sandy desert into a fertile farmland. It depends on who uses it and for what purpose it is used.

113. In its issue of 21 November 1949, Mr. Henry Luce's *Life* magazine quoted the speech of the Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Georgi M. Malenkov, delivered last year at the October Revolution celebration in the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow. Mr. Malenkov had said that "in the hands of the Soviet people", atomic energy "can be and must be a mighty instrument of technical progress on a scale never witnessed before, an instrument for the further rapid development of the productive forces of our country".

114. On 6 November 1950, on the eve of the thirty-third anniversary of the great October Revolution, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the

USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Bulganin, spoke as follows on the question of atomic energy: "Important new steps have been taken to accomplish the task set Soviet scientists by Comrade Stalin—the task not only of overtaking but surpassing in the very near future the achievements of science abroad. Our scientists have followed up the discovery of the secret of atomic energy with many other important works and discoveries contributing to technical progress and the fulfilment and over-fulfilment of our national economic plans."

115. Perhaps one day the self-satisfied supermen who believe in the self-sufficiency of the American civilization will learn to understand that the Soviet Union is working with atomic energy and considers it as a moving force of planned industrial production and as a fuel, as was stated here last year and again yesterday by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Vyshinsky.

116. But in the Soviet Union the free development of atomic energy is not hindered by the obstructions and plots of monopoly capital and imperialism. Monopoly capital naturally tries to prevent the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, for this would threaten the petrol, coal, oil, railroad, airline and shipping monopolies. Imperialism is obstructing the peaceful utilization of atomic energy because it itself uses up this energy for the production of aggressive weapons. In order that monopoly capital should not suffer any losses in this, the imperialist managers have entrusted the tasks of war production to the monopoly trusts.

117. But peace is not in the hands of a few individuals who decide on the use of the atomic bomb. Nor is the atomic threat so terrible that it could frighten the great masses of the peoples who desire peace, or to paralyse by fear the will of the peoples for peace.

118. The United States policy makes another fateful mistake. The United States has underestimated and still underestimates the strength of the Soviet Union and of the People's Republic of China, and in the same way it underestimates the strength and determination of the peoples of the world.

119. How embarrassing did it seem when the representative of Sweden rejected [309th meeting] the honour conferred upon the capital of his country through the designation of the peace appeal as the Stockholm Appeal! Marshal Bulganin, in his November speech, said the following about this force of peace which is many times stronger than any atomic bomb:

"The Soviet people stand for peace and resolutely uphold the cause of peace. Reflecting the will of the people, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in June of this year, supported the Stockholm Appeal of the permanent committee of the World Congress of the Partisans of Peace. This appeal has been signed by 115 million Soviet citizens—the entire adult population of our country. In this way the Soviet people clearly show that they desire peace and that they will fight for a lasting peace. Millions of peoples of other countries have taken up the fight for peace. The Stockholm Appeal has obtained the support and signatures of over 204 million people in China. In Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Albania, over 50 million people have signed it. In

⁴ Quoted from the records of the hearings before the Special Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Senate, 79th Congress, 1st session, hearing of 14 December 1945.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 2nd session, hearing of 14 February 1946.

Japan and in Korea, in Britain and in Argentina and in other countries, about 50 million have done so. In Italy 16 million and in the United States two and one-half million people have signed the appeal. To date about 500 million persons have signed the Stockholm Appeal. They represent a tremendous force and a warning to the instigators of a new war. The peoples fighting for peace are sure of the victory of their just cause. They will not allow the plans of the warmongers to succeed."

120. On the one hand we see the atomic warmongers and on the other the unity of millions. We have been witnesses of the fact that the States whose representatives in the Third Committee wished to make us believe that they were the defenders of freedom of speech and of assembly, because they were afraid of the strength and the significance of the peace movement, made impossible the holding of the Peace Congress in Sheffield.

121. The United Kingdom refused visas to persons known as international authorities in arts and science such as Pietro Nenni, Kuo Mo-sho, Pierre Cot, Pablo Neruda, Dmitri Shostakovich, the Metropolitan Nikolai, Anna Seghers, Arnold Zweig, Yves Farge, General Jara, A. Fadeyev, Ilya Ehrenburg, d'Astier de la Vigerie, Father Plojahr, Tita Ruffo and Einaudi. But the defenders of the atomic horror are even afraid of the simple people. Veronica Duskevichova, a peasant woman from eastern Slovakia, seems to represent a danger for the United Kingdom because she wants peace. When she was told that she had been refused a visa she said: "Why are they afraid of me, who am just a simple woman, not a member of any party—of me, a mother of two children who wants peace for them?"

122. In vain are the atomic conquerors trying to fight against the ever-growing peace movement. The mobilization of the peoples for peace greatly surpasses the imagination of the would-be world dominators who, in their slave-drivers' arrogance, have become used to underestimating the working people.

123. The Second World Congress of the Partisans of Peace, concluded in Warsaw on November 22nd, issued a manifesto to the world where we read with emotion and respect the words:

"On behalf of 500 million responsible people who signed the Stockholm Appeal, we call for the prohibition of atomic weapons and for the general reduction of arms. The strict control of a general disarmament and the destruction of atomic weapons is technically possible. All that is needed is a firm will."

124. The peoples will enforce their will so that the atomic menace will be torn from the hands of those who are the greatest enemies of the people.

125. The question of who is holding the atomic bomb becomes ever more serious as United States policy deteriorates and slips along the shaky surface of an economy that has been and is going through many crises on the road of fascism. Let us hide the painful fact that America, which once was Jefferson's and Lincoln's America, is today changing internally and using its influence for a general fascisation of the western world. But even in Latin America, United States policy stands like a bad Parca at the cradle of every reactionary coup.

126. United States aid to Spain and money given to Franco's Falange are the saddest proofs of the impotence of American democracy. In Germany, United States commissioners support right-wing elements and the most reactionary politicians. Together with the Germans, they have played the farce of denazification and are now liberating the assassins of American and Allied soldiers, and permitting the reorganization of former SS-men into various clubs and anti-Semitic associations. It is natural that they need puppets for such fascist adventures. They have not drawn the line at using such undignified and grim figures as Chiang Kai-shek, Bao Dai or Syngman Rhee. It is only natural that they are even willing to pay Tito for his services. And the God-fearing majority of the American people watch passively while their government, the government of an erstwhile free-thinking America, is reaching agreements with the Vatican, with the blessing of the great Protestant John Foster Dulles.

127. Since the death of President Roosevelt, we see that anti-communist hysteria has become a matter of loyalty. Congress, seeing that the working class, with the weapon of strikes in its hands and with fearless fighters for human rights among its ranks, is becoming the main bastion of resistance to fascism, votes the Taft-Hartley law. By organizing trials entirely in contradiction to the principles of the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights and the United States Constitution, Congress is liquidating freedom of conviction and violating the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Increasingly anti-progressive legislation is being introduced, the acme of which is that shameful expression of nazism, the law sponsored by McCarran, Wood, Munro, Ferguson, Nixon and Kilgore. It took two years before these pearls of pro-fascist paragraphs were strung onto the rope with which the American Statue of Liberty was strangled. American democrats quake in terror at the idea that their names, their very movements, every letter, every tapped telephone call, and visits of personal friends are entered into Mr. Edgar Hoover's huge card file.

128. It has not been and it is not our intention to interfere in the internal affairs of any country. But if we are to assess the world situation rightly at a time so full of tension, at a time when fascism is advancing and its methods reviving, if we are to measure the danger caused by the fact that the atomic weapon lies in the hands of those who are losing the feeling for responsibility, then we must first and foremost take note of the internal conditions paving the way to the fascisation of the United States and through it of the western world. For it is clear that the United States, seized by megalomania, is rapidly moving toward fascism and that it is carrying its subservient allies with it into this ravine of disruption—of civil war, terrorism and reaction.

129. Such an aggressive and ruthless weapon as the atomic bomb in the hands of a blinded group of self-satisfied military or financial adventurers increases the danger for the world. People all over the world realize that a criminal or a fascist who first drops an atomic bomb anywhere in the world at the command of a higher criminal or fascist general will be the one to bear the responsibility for the destruction and ruin of the towns of even his own country. This is a terrible responsibility, and the world realizes once again that fascisation leads countries to irresponsibility. The United States has

effectively taken over an important part of the sad heritage of nazi Germany and fascist Italy. That is the sad fact. But it is a fact and the world realizes that it has reasons to fear it.

130. There is still time but not too much of it. The United Nations is not as yet a branch office of the State Department or the Pentagon. The United Nations General Assembly has to decide today where to go from here. It might be a historical decision.

131. One draft resolution invites us to embark on long delaying tactics, giving sufficient time to the atomic factories to pile up the stock of bombs. We are invited to decide to establish a committee to consider a report to the next session and so on. I think that this is going a little bit too far. The sponsors of this draft resolution should not overestimate the weariness and patience of this Assembly and should not underestimate the intelligence of its members.

132. The other draft resolution before this Assembly is the proposal made by the Soviet Union [A/1676] requesting the Assembly to instruct the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to resume its work immediately—I stress the word “immediately”—and this stands in obvious contrast to the draft resolution introduced by the United States and its associates.

133. We want peace immediately, do we not? The responsibility rests upon us today. The Czechoslovak delegation has already chosen its way, the way of the immediate safeguarding of peace. The Czechoslovak delegation will vote for the USSR draft resolution, and it invites all the delegations to vote with it for the peace and happiness of the peoples of the world.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m