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President: Mr. Nasrollah ENTEZAM (Iran).

Duties of States in the event of the outbreak of hostilities: report of the First Committee (A/1500)

[Agenda item 72]

Mr. THORS (Iceland), Rapporteur, presented the report of the First Committee and the accompanying draft resolutions (A/1500).

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I wish to remind the Assembly that under rule 67 of the rules of procedure, the First Committee's report is not to be discussed in plenary meeting of the General Assembly unless at least one-third of the members present and voting consider such a discussion to be necessary.

2. I put this question to the vote.

It was decided, by 39 votes to 3, not to open a debate.

3. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I must draw the attention of the Assembly to the fact that the First Committee has submitted two draft resolutions, A and B, in its report. The Soviet Union has submitted an amendment [A/1512]. I shall put that amendment to the vote first.

4. I call upon the representative of the Soviet Union on a point of order.

5. Mr. ZARUBIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I should like briefly to explain the USSR delegation's vote on draft resolution A submitted by the First Committee on the duties

of States in the event of the outbreak of hostilities; if the President has no objection, I should then like to refer briefly to the Soviet Union amendment to draft resolution B.

6. The First Committee approved a draft resolution relating to the duties of States in the event of the outbreak of hostilities. The USSR delegation considers that the practical measures to end hostilities which States engaged in armed conflict would be expected to take under this resolution would fail to bring about a speedy end to that conflict; on the contrary, they would make it possible for the aggressor to continue military operations and would place the invaded State at an obvious disadvantage.

7. These conclusions are borne out by the recommendations contained in the draft resolution. Paragraph 1 (a) of the draft resolution recommends that if a State becomes engaged in armed conflict, it should take all steps to bring the armed conflict to an end at the earliest possible moment, if those steps are "practicable in the circumstances and compatible with the right of self-defence".

8. It is not at all clear to which State this statement is intended to refer, the aggressor State or the State which has been attacked, and it is only in sub-paragraph (b) that it becomes clear that the recommendation contained in sub-paragraph (a) refers to the attacking State, that is to say, the aggressor.

9. There can be little doubt that the attacking State will always be able to find excuses to justify its failure

to take steps to bring the conflict to an end. The aggressor will certainly be able to allege all kinds of circumstances to explain why he was unable to take steps to end the conflict. The recommendation contained in sub-paragraph (a) of the draft resolution therefore gives the aggressor every opportunity not to end the armed conflict but rather to intensify and continue hostilities against the State which he has attacked.

10. It is clear from the recommendation in sub-paragraph (b) that the attacking State is being given every opportunity to continue hostilities against its victim for twenty-four hours, after which it can proclaim its readiness to discontinue all military operations and withdraw those of its forces which have invaded the territory of the other State. This proclamation can only be made, however, if the other State involved in the dispute is ready to do likewise.

11. The Soviet Union delegation considers that the establishment of a time limit during which the aggressor can continue military operations with impunity in the territory of the State which has been attacked cannot contribute to bringing about a cessation of hostilities; on the contrary, it can only make it easier for the aggressor to realize his aggressive designs. It should be clear that the establishment of any time limit within which the aggressor can do what he likes with his victim is incompatible with the adoption of the speedy and effective measures which the Security Council is called upon to take against any aggressor.

12. It should also be noted that sub-paragraph (b) entirely fails to state that both parties will cease military operations even when they have proclaimed their readiness to do so. Consequently, even if the aggressor has proclaimed his readiness to end the conflict, he is not prohibited from continuing military operations against the State which he has attacked.

13. The delegation of the USSR considers that the duties of States in the event of the outbreak of hostilities set out in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of the draft resolution will operate entirely in favour of the attacking State rather than of the State which has been attacked; in practice, they will not prove to be a means of ending aggression but will be a weapon in the hands of the aggressor.

14. For these reasons, the delegation of the Soviet Union will vote against draft resolution A.

15. The USSR delegation wishes now to make a statement on draft resolution B.

16. When the First Committee discussed the draft resolution on the duties of States in the event of the outbreak of hostilities,¹ the Soviet Union delegation introduced a draft resolution on the definition of aggression [A/C.1/1608]. It introduced that proposal because it believed that, under Chapter VII of the Charter, immediately upon any threat of aggression—and, *a fortiori*, in the event of actual aggression—speedy and effective measures against that aggression should be taken which would place the victims under the collective protection of all peace-loving States and confront the aggressor with the concerted action of the Member States of the United Nations.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, First Committee*, 384th to 390th meetings inclusive.

17. The USSR delegation feels that one of the most important steps in combating aggression is to define the attacking State, that is to say, to define aggression. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union delegation introduced its proposal on the definition of aggression as far back as the second session of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments in 1933.² The basic principles of that proposal were adopted by the Committee on Security Questions;³ that USSR proposal on the definition of aggression was also applied in practice. In July 1933, a number of international conventions for the definition of aggression were concluded in London, all based on the proposals which the Soviet Union had introduced in the General Commission. In accordance with this definition of aggression, the USSR Government has concluded conventions on the definition of aggression with eleven States.

18. In view of the tasks confronting the United Nations and in the interests of general security, the Soviet Union delegation submitted a proposal to the First Committee to the effect that aggression should be defined as accurately as possible so as to forestall any pretext which might be used to justify it. During the discussion of this proposal in the First Committee, a number of representatives expressed the hope that the General Assembly would consider the definition of aggression. At the same time, they pointed out that the Soviet Union proposal failed to refer to indirect aggression; in particular, they drew attention to the fact that it contained no provision concerning armed bands and corresponding to article II, paragraph 5, of the Convention for the Definition of Aggression signed in London on 4 July 1933⁴ by five States.

19. As we all know, that article states that the aggressor shall be considered to be that State which is the first to commit any of a number of actions enumerated in the convention. Among the clauses in that article is paragraph 5, which reads as follows:

"Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection."

20. Since this definition of indirect aggression is a component part of the conventions for the definition of aggression signed in London in July 1933, the USSR delegation is, of course, prepared to add a paragraph on armed bands to its draft resolution on the definition of aggression; such a paragraph would correspond to article II, paragraph 5 of the Convention for the Definition of Aggression signed on 4 July 1933 by five States.

21. Moreover, in view of the urgency and importance of defining aggression, the Soviet Union delegation proposes that draft resolution B should be completed by

² See *League of Nations, Records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments*, Series B, Minutes of the General Commission, Vol. II, page 237 (Series L.O.N., IX, Disarmament, 1933.IX.10).

³ *Ibid.*, *Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments*, Report of the Committee on Security Questions, document Conf. D./C. G.108, published in *Conference Documents* Vol. II, page 679 (Series L.O.N., IX, Disarmament, 1935.IX.4).

⁴ See *ibid.*, *Treaty Series*, Vol. 148, page 213.

specifying the time by which the International Law Commission is to present its conclusions to the General Assembly.

22. That amendment [A/1512] calls for the addition, at the end of draft resolution B, of the words: "and present its report not later than the next regular session of the General Assembly". The USSR delegation urges the General Assembly to accept the addition which it has proposed.

23. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I did not interrupt the representative of the Soviet Union because in any event he is permitted to explain his vote, either before or after the vote. But he did not speak on a point of order according to rule 88 of the rules of procedure, for according to that rule, the point of order should relate to "the actual conduct of the voting". The speaker could, for example, have requested a vote in parts or a roll-call vote. I repeat, however, that I did not interrupt him, because he could have asked for the floor in order to explain his vote.

24. I shall put to the vote the amendment of the USSR [A/1512] to draft resolution B submitted by the First Committee and then the two draft resolutions A and B [A/1500].

The amendment was rejected by 22 votes to 12, with 13 abstentions.

Draft resolutions A and B were adopted by 49 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

25. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call upon the representative of the Union of South Africa, who wishes to explain his vote. Speeches in explanation of votes are limited to seven minutes.

26. Mr. JARVIE (Union of South Africa): I intend to confine myself to a very brief statement on the manner in which the South African delegation voted on resolution A.

27. In the view of my delegation, the proposals contained in that resolution, the original draft of which was introduced by the Yugoslav delegation, constitute a valuable contribution to the measures and procedures which we are evolving to deal with aggression and international armed conflict. This view, which governed our vote, is based on the fact that the provisions which refer to armed conflict between States seek to outlaw the use of arms except in the common interest and to suggest procedures for the earliest possible cessation of hostilities. By doing this, the resolution is aimed at the settlement of international conflicts by peaceful means:

28. Paragraph 1 (d) of the operative part requires the immediate dispatch of the Peace Observation Commission to the area of hostilities unless, of course, the armed attack in question is an isolated incident and is immediately and satisfactorily halted. The purpose of the visit would be to enable the Commission to determine, in a specific area, the military facts of the situation.

29. What is particularly important, however, is the provision contained in paragraph 2 of the operative part, in which it is stated clearly and in the most precise terms that the provisions of the resolution will in no way impair the rights and obligations of States under

the Charter. As I have stated, this provision is of particular importance, for it is essential that the system of collective security which we are gradually building up should in no circumstances become a threat to Member States in so far as that system may afford opportunities for intervention in their internal affairs.

30. I repeat that my delegation regards the present resolution, interpreted in the light of the few remarks I have made, as a valuable contribution to the system of collective security, and we therefore voted in favour of it.

31. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): I wish to explain the vote of the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR on the item called "Duties of States in the event of the outbreak of hostilities". In the First Committee the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR voted against draft resolution A, and it took the same position in the voting in the Assembly.

32. In the first place, this resolution speaks only of a State which becomes engaged in armed conflict with another State or States, without making any distinction between the aggressor and the victim. This formula is based on a concept which is mistaken, vicious and dangerous as far as the victim of aggression is concerned; according to that concept, the two parties to a conflict are treated in the same way, in other words, the aggressor who has prepared for war and the victim who resists aggression are placed on the same footing. It is easy to see that such an attitude towards the two parties to the conflict would give the aggressor an advantage over the victim and would encourage him to further conquest.

33. In the second place, this resolution calls on a State which has become engaged in armed conflict with another State or States to proclaim within twenty-four hours its readiness to discontinue military operations and to withdraw its forces from foreign territory. One glance at this provision will show how unrealistic it is.

34. To whom can such a recommendation apply? Indubitably, to the aggressor alone, whose troops are on foreign territory. Obviously an aggressor, who has long and carefully prepared for an attack on his victim and has now carried it out, cannot and will not proclaim that he will discontinue military operations, since the purpose of his long preparation was certainly not to state, at the very outset of the attack, that he was ready to discontinue military operations, and since he certainly did not attack and occupy the territory of another State in order to proclaim on the very first day of the unleashing of hostilities that he would withdraw his forces from the territory he had illegally seized.

35. Everyone knows that real aggressors do not behave in that way. On the contrary, it may rather be assumed that the aggressor will make full use of his advantage under this resolution and will try to finish off the country he has attacked as swiftly and completely as he can, seize as much of its territory as possible, disrupt its internal organization and force it to capitulate as soon as possible. Naïve as it is to expect an aggressor to proclaim that he will discontinue military operations and withdraw his troops from foreign territory, it is harmful and dangerous to make such a demand of a victim of aggression, since to ask a country

which is resisting aggression to suspend military operations would be tantamount to ordering it to capitulate. It would be an ultimatum whose rejection by the victim might mean that the victim would be considered an aggressor.

36. Thirdly, this resolution is directed against the Security Council, the United Nations organ which bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. Its pernicious provisions doom the Security Council to inaction at the outbreak of aggression and, moreover, replace the methods of opposing aggression laid down in the Charter by vague recommendations which are dangerous to the cause of peace and represent a retrogression from the London conventions for the definition of aggression.

37. Thus it is perfectly clear that this resolution is harmful, that it gives the aggressor an advantage over his victim and consequently furthers the spread of aggression. In addition, as we have already noted, it violates the Charter and is directed against the Security Council.

38. In this connexion the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR wishes to state that it fully supports the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union in the First Committee on the definition of aggression [A/C.1/608]. We feel that in the present state of international tension it is particularly important to have a definition of aggression which is precise, indisputable and recognized by the United Nations. Such a definition will be a powerful tool with which the Security Council will be able swiftly and unerringly to determine the party guilty of aggression, that is, the aggressor; this in turn will enable it to take rapid and decisive action to halt aggression.

39. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR thinks it was wrong to refer the USSR draft resolution to the International Law Commission. That is a matter which might well have been settled by the First Committee and the General Assembly themselves.

40. For the above reasons, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR voted against the resolution recommended by the First Committee.

41. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland): The Polish delegation wishes to take advantage of this opportunity to make clear its position with regard to the resolutions which have just been adopted by the General Assembly.

42. With regard to resolution A, which was originally sponsored by Yugoslavia in the First Committee, we had some important reservations to make in view of its inconsistency with the clear provisions of the Charter and, in particular, with those in Chapters VI and VII. Furthermore, the resolution completely confuses the victim with the aggressor and thus serves the ends of the aggressor but does not help international peace, so that it becomes a harmful document. It cannot be denied that such a confused resolution serves only those who favour flexible notions as to who, in given circumstances, should be characterized as the aggressor. In the First Committee the original Yugoslav draft was trimmed and pruned a great deal, but in spite of all the changes it could not stand up to a thorough legal and logical examination and we had to vote against it.

43. Resolution B transmits to the International Law Commission a document of great historical importance,

namely, the draft resolution providing for a clear definition of aggression which the Soviet Union submitted in the First Committee [A/C.1/608]. The Polish delegation would have preferred that this paramount problem had been dealt with favourably at the present session. Since that view was not accepted, it voted in favour of the USSR amendment [A/1512] providing that the Commission's findings should be reported to the next session of the General Assembly. The amendment was rejected, however, and it is our opinion that the very important historical document of the Soviet Union may now be lost in the huge mass of papers already accumulated on the desks of the International Law Commission.

44. Those are the reasons why the Polish delegation had to vote against the draft resolution.

45. Mr. HAJDU (Czechoslovakia): The Czechoslovak delegation regrets that a proposal as important as that submitted to the First Committee by the Soviet Union delegation and clearly defining aggression and an aggressor was not adopted but transmitted to the International Law Commission. This was done despite the fact that everyone who spoke in the First Committee, with the exception of the representative of the United States, stressed the usefulness and even the necessity of having such a definition of an aggressor. Not one of the representatives in the First Committee who voted for the transmission of the proposal to the International Law Commission touched upon the substance of the matter. Not one said that he disliked this or that clause, that certain clauses should be amended or that new clauses should be added defining the aggressor more precisely.

46. In spite of this, the majority in the Committee decided to transmit the draft resolution to the International Law Commission, and the question is, "Why?". Apparently they did not desire that an aggressor should be so defined as to make an act of aggression more plain and, for that reason, more difficult.

47. Instead, the General Assembly has just adopted a resolution, proposed originally by the Yugoslav delegation, which not only is not clear but which confuses the issue and obscures the existing concept of aggression as recognized by international law. It is a proposal which even facilitates the act of aggression by giving the aggressor and the victim of aggression the same legal standing, thus placing the victim in a position where he would be deprived of all opportunity of defending himself even in the area of aggression.

48. The Czechoslovak delegation, therefore, voted against resolution A and, for the reasons explained here, in favour of the Soviet Union amendment. It also voted in favour of resolution B.

Establishment of a permanent commission of good offices: report of the First Committee (A/1501)

[Agenda item 73]

49. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The report of the First Committee on the establishment of a permanent commission of good offices seems to me to be extremely simple and, unless the Rapporteur wishes to make some explanatory remarks, I shall not ask him to present it to the General Assembly. The

report concludes with a draft resolution which provides that this question should be referred for study to the Interim Committee.

50. If no one wishes to open a debate on this question, I shall put to the vote the draft resolution of the First Committee [A/1501].

The draft resolution was adopted by 45 votes to 5, with 3 abstentions.

Declaration on the removal of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace and security among nations: report of the First Committee (A/1490)

[Agenda item 69]

Mr. Thors (Iceland), Rapporteur, presented the report of the First Committee and the accompanying draft resolutions (document A/1490).

51. Mr. THORS (Iceland), Rapporteur of the First Committee: People all over the world will appreciate that this session of the General Assembly has given the all-important question of peace a most thorough and exhaustive consideration. When all these resolutions for peace are adopted, the road to peace may seem clearly marked. Let us hope that this proves to be the case.

52. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I shall now ask the Assembly to vote on whether it desires to have a discussion on this item.

It was decided, by 27 votes to 7, with 17 abstentions, not to open a debate.

53. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I wish to draw your attention to the various documents before us.

54. First of all, we have draft resolutions A and B submitted by the First Committee [A/1490]. A whole series of amendments to draft resolution A has been submitted jointly by the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union [A/1505]. We have also a separate draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union [A/1491].

55. I intend to put the amendments to the vote first, then the draft resolutions submitted by the Committee, and thereafter the USSR draft resolution.

The first amendment (A/1505, paragraph 1) was rejected by 29 votes to 5, with 15 abstentions.

The second amendment (A/1505, paragraph 2) was rejected by 28 votes to 8, with 13 abstentions.

The third amendment (A/1505, paragraph 3) was rejected by 35 votes to 5, with 10 abstentions.

56. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Only fifty delegations have voted. A number of delegations in this hall therefore do not wish to express their views, but the result is the same in the end, for non-participation in a vote is counted as an abstention. We shall continue with the voting.

The fourth amendment (A/1505, paragraph 4) was rejected by 37 votes to 5, with 11 abstentions.

The fifth amendment (A/1505, paragraph 5) was rejected by 36 votes to 5, with 13 abstentions.

The sixth amendment (A/1505, paragraph 6) was rejected by 35 votes to 5, with 15 abstentions.

57. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I shall now put to the vote, in succession, draft resolutions A and B of the First Committee [A/1490].

Draft resolution A was adopted by 50 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

Draft resolution B was adopted by 49 votes to none, with 7 abstentions.

58. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call upon the representative of the Soviet Union, who wishes to explain his vote.

59. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The Soviet Union delegation considers that the text submitted by the First Committee⁵ and now adopted by the General Assembly is unsatisfactory. Despite its grandiloquent title of "Peace through Deeds", no deeds in favour of peace are even hinted at in this resolution. We pointed this out in the First Committee and suggested the necessary amendments to the draft resolution. We also submitted those amendments to the General Assembly, but the General Assembly has rejected them. I should like to explain why, in the circumstances, the USSR delegation did not consider it possible to support the text submitted by the First Committee.

60. My first point concerns the problem of the prohibition of the atomic weapon. Sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 of the resolution which has just been adopted are wholly unsatisfactory, since they ignore the most important and fundamental question—the prohibition of the atomic weapon—and do no more than recommend the establishment of international control. We have insisted and we continue to insist on the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and other weapons of mass destruction, and on the establishment of strict international control. It is our belief, however, that it is not enough merely to refer to such international control while ignoring the question of the prohibition of the atomic weapon. After all, it is impossible to control what does not yet exist. It is impossible to see to it that the prohibition of the atomic weapon is put into effect if that prohibition itself does not exist. Our amendments, therefore, were designed to remedy these deficiencies which render this part of the resolution completely useless.

61. The second question is closely connected with the first: it concerns the reduction by the five great Powers of their armaments and armed forces by one-third during the years 1950 and 1951. Because of the way it deals with this question, the resolution will do nothing whatsoever to promote a reduction in armaments. On the contrary, it marks a retrogression from the decision taken on this question in resolution 41 (I) adopted by the General Assembly in 1946. That resolution recommended that the Security Council should give prompt consideration to formulating the practical measures which were essential to provide for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, to expedite the consideration of the appropriate conventions and to take other practical steps along those lines. The resolution which has just been adopted contains no provisions of that kind.

⁵ For the discussion on this subject in the First Committee, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, First Committee, 372nd to 383rd meetings inclusive.*

62. In order to justify this negative attitude to our proposal for a one-third reduction by the five great Powers of their armaments and armed forces during 1950 and 1951, references have been made to the weakness of the military potential of all other countries as compared with that of the Soviet Union. But what weakness of military potential can be invoked if the military potential of the United States alone, according to authoritative military experts, is at the present time the highest in the whole history of the United States? This was confirmed by President Truman who, in submitting his government's budgetary estimates for 1950, stated that "the military forces recommended in this budget are the most powerful this nation has ever maintained in peace-time".⁶ The forces in question are the armed forces of the United States.

63. It is clear, therefore, that references to the weakness or inadequacy of the war potential of certain other States, such as the United States, are merely pretexts advanced in order to refuse even the slightest reduction of armaments and armed forces, a measure which would have a tremendous moral and political effect, since it would undoubtedly ensure the strengthening of mutual confidence and the removal of the distrust which is hampering the cause of peace.

64. That is why the resolution proposed by the First Committee could not satisfy us on this point either, and why we voted against it. We introduced amendments to it in an endeavour to find a compromise, so that an agreed decision might be taken on this most important question. Unfortunately, however, our amendments were rejected, and small wonder, since the real aim of the foreign policy of the United States—which calls the tune on this question—is not to reduce armaments or to ease the burden of taxation resulting from military expenditure, a burden which weighs so grievously upon the tax-payers, but to speed up the armaments race, to build up stock-piles of atomic bombs, to arm the country as strongly as possible and to prepare all kinds of armaments. All this, of course, is in flagrant contradiction with that policy of peace about which there is so much talk but no action whatsoever.

65. The third question, and an extremely important one, is that of propaganda in favour of a new war. In this regard also the resolution is wholly unsatisfactory. It was said that there was no need to adopt any new resolutions on this question, inasmuch as the General Assembly had already adopted appropriate decisions. We know, however, that, although such decisions have been adopted, in point of fact, ever since 1947—that is to say, during the last three years—this criminal propaganda in favour of a new war and hatred of mankind has not only not diminished but, on the contrary, has been developing and growing ever more intense, thus rendering the resolution adopted three years ago by the General Assembly [*resolution 110 (II)*] completely nugatory.

66. To illustrate how far matters have gone in that direction, it is enough to refer to facts such as, for example, the publication in Washington of a magazine called *Junior Review* for school children of 10 to 14 years of age, each issue of which is taken as a subject of study at special lessons. One issue of this publication

sang the praises of the armada of bombers which can travel 5,000 miles to bomb enemy objectives. The article states that from Alaska these planes could attack the whole of Russia, except for the southern parts of the country.

67. This criminal gibberish is being fed to ten-year-old children by American teachers, whose directors in Washington differ in no respect from inveterate war-mongers. Urgent measures must be taken to put an end to this criminal war propaganda, this preparation for war and hatred of mankind which are thwarting all efforts to establish friendly relations among nations, and are nullifying all measures, even those merely in an embryonic stage, designed to strengthen international peace and security.

68. The Soviet Union Government deems it its duty to continue the struggle against propaganda in favour of a new war, and to carry on the campaign for universal peace which it has staunchly and consistently conducted since the very foundation of the Soviet Socialist State. The head of the Government of the USSR, Joseph Stalin, said in 1925: "The policy of our Government—its foreign policy—is based on the idea of peace. Its aim is to struggle for peace and against further wars, and to expose all measures taken with a view to preparing for another war, all measures which, under the catchword of pacifism, are in fact designed to precipitate another war. That is our aim." He also said: "We do not want to be a hammer for weak nations or an anvil for the strong. We want to be neither the one nor the other. We are for peace."

69. That is why the Soviet Union delegation submitted a number of amendments designed to put an end to the armaments race, to dissipate the war psychosis, to prohibit war propaganda, and to enable the General Assembly to declare firmly and resolutely that the atomic weapon and all other weapons of mass destruction must be unconditionally prohibited, and that a really strict and effective international supervision of the observance of that prohibition must be instituted. Although the text submitted to the First Committee was altogether unsatisfactory, the USSR delegation submitted amendments in the hope that the General Assembly's decision would correspond to the pressing demands of millions upon millions of people who are appealing to us to exert every effort to avert the threat of a new war, to strengthen peace and ensure international security.

70. The First Committee was unwilling to listen to our advice. On the contrary, the First Committee, or at least a number of delegations in that Committee, found it possible to slander and defame the Stockholm Appeal which has been signed by 500 million peace-loving persons, including eminent statesmen, outstanding representatives of the worlds of science, art and literature, as well as by workers and peasants. All those people are calling upon the General Assembly with a single voice to take steps to put an end to the criminal armaments race and to war propaganda, as well as to the manufacture and stock-piling of atomic bombs, to outlaw the atomic bomb, to ensure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes, and to declare that the government which first uses atomic bombs and unleashes a new war is declared a war-criminal.

⁶ Message to the United States Congress, 10 January 1949.

71. That is our position. It was in the light of that position that we considered the text submitted by the First Committee. We opposed a large number of provisions which did not offer a single practical solution and served merely to camouflage the aggressive plans on which the foreign policy of a number of nations, including first and foremost the United States, is now based. That was why we submitted a number of proposals which would have made good the deficiencies in the text put forward by the First Committee. As those proposals were rejected, we voted against that text as being wholly unsatisfactory. We declare that the Soviet Union will continue to struggle for peace, and to expose war-mongers and the aggressive plans of those who do not wish to heed the voices of millions upon millions of persons who thirst for peace and detest war.

72. Mr. JARVIE (Union of South Africa): I shall confine my explanation to my delegation's vote on resolution A, entitled "Peace through Deeds".

73. When this resolution was considered in the First Committee, the South African delegation indicated that it would need to reserve the position of its government regarding paragraph 2 (a) of the operative part of the resolution, and to abstain in the vote on that paragraph.

74. We explained that South Africa found itself in a particular and peculiar difficulty with regard to the methods and machinery of atomic energy control, and that my country's position and interest were different in this respect from those of other countries concerned. We also explained that in South Africa uranium was found as a component of the gold-bearing conglomerates of the Witwatersrand gold mine, and that the production of gold was South Africa's most important and valuable primary industry. We further intimated that the South African Government, while giving its wholehearted support to the principle of atomic energy control, was forced by the considerations I have mentioned to give the matter further close consideration and examination in order that the economic implications involved for South Africa might be clearly determined.

75. Consequently, in voting today for the resolution as a whole, we did so with the reservation I have referred to in mind.

76. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel): I wish to give a short explanation of Israel's vote. My delegation voted in favour of the second amendment proposed by the USSR to resolution A, noting that the addition of the one small word "as" materially changed the whole amendment as it was drafted previously.⁷ Whereas the amendment submitted to the First Committee read: "*Recognizing* that the use of the atomic weapon, a weapon of aggression and mass destruction, is contrary to conscience and incompatible with membership of the United Nations", the final version read: "*Recognizing* that the use of the atomic weapon as a weapon of aggression . . . is . . . incompatible with membership of the United Nations".

77. My delegation has repeatedly declared that it regards any armed aggression with whatever weapons

used as—here I wish to use the language of the resolution we have just adopted—"the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world". That is why my delegation cannot agree to the use of the atomic weapon as a weapon of aggression.

78. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland). (*translated from Russian*): By the decision of the majority, the Polish delegation was prevented from stating its position during the discussion. With the President's permission, I should like to explain the Polish delegation's vote.

79. We consider that the United Nations must seek the appropriate means of settling controversial problems, wherever they may arise. All obstacles to international co-operation must be eliminated. The United Nations must find constructive solutions to questions which the nations of the world bring before it.

80. It is clear that neither of the resolutions just adopted provides such a solution. These resolutions can in no way help to relieve international tension, or to maintain and strengthen peace and international security. On the contrary, the wording of these documents is vague and ambiguous, and their provisions create an atmosphere favouring the sinister machinations of the groups which are interested in bringing about a new war.

81. That is why the Polish delegation did not support these resolutions. It voted in favour of the USSR declaration [A/1491] for a number of reasons.

82. We believe that the peoples of the world are in a state of deep anxiety: the atomic bomb, the propaganda in favour of another war, the armaments race, all of which are championed by the representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty countries, are so many causes of fear of the future and concern for the fate of mankind. The Partisans of Peace movement has been organized to fight against the threat of war. It includes in its ranks all those who desire progress and prosperity throughout the world. It embraces all those who have a realistic approach and who believe in the obvious truth that the two systems—the socialist and the capitalist—can co-exist, co-operate and engage in peaceful competition, provided those who are at the head of the most powerful of the capitalist States—the United States—and their followers in other countries, will renounce their plans for world domination.

83. We are completely at one with the millions who want peace, and that is why we voted for the declaration proposed by the USSR delegation. We want to take steps, through the United Nations, which is dedicated to the cause of peace, to prevent the conflicts which the war-mongers are provoking in the Pacific and the Atlantic, in Europe and in other parts of the world. Our aim is peace. That is the aim of the USSR declaration which we discussed in the Committee. That is also the aim pursued by the movement of the Partisans of Peace. That is why the Polish delegation voted for the Soviet Union draft declaration.

84. That declaration calls for disarmament, and, as a first step in that direction, provides that the great Powers shall reduce their armed forces by one-third during 1950-1951, and that the question of a further reduction of armed forces shall be brought up for

⁷ The word "as" was inadvertently omitted from the English version of the amendment (A/C.1/607) submitted to the First Committee. The correct English translation appeared in document A/1505. The original Russian text remained the same in both cases.

consideration at one of the forthcoming sessions of the General Assembly. This is the first step towards the reduction of armaments proposed by the camp of peace; it is a concrete proposal which establishes the time within which such disarmament must take place and the extent of the disarmament. It is a realistic proposal whose adoption would considerably diminish international tension.

85. The other measures proposed, which do not provide concrete conditions and time limits for disarmament, will remain mere phrases; they are designed to delude the peoples of the world who consider that real disarmament is an essential prerequisite for the prevention of war.

86. There can be no effective disarmament without the prohibition of the atomic weapon. That is why one of the basic provisions in the USSR declaration is the unconditional prohibition of the use of the atomic weapon as a weapon of aggression and of mass destruction. Together with unconditional prohibition, the USSR has also proposed a strict system of international control to ensure the scrupulous observance of this prohibition. The Soviet Union, which has already repeatedly made concrete proposals on the question of control, has given further proof of its will for peace and of its desire to save humanity from the disaster which is bound to follow the use of atomic energy for military purposes.

87. It is quite clear that those who do not intend to use the atomic weapon and who have no criminal designs voted in favour of such prohibition. That is why the Polish delegation supported the USSR draft resolution. It supported that text precisely because it unconditionally prohibited the use of the atomic weapon and declared that the first government to use it should be regarded as a criminal.

88. This proposal that the first government to use the atomic weapon should be declared a war-criminal was the logical consequence of our preceding proposal for the prohibition of the atomic weapon. This proposal was made at the same time in the Stockholm Appeal. The hundreds of millions of people who have signed this peace appeal consider it a guarantee that the greatest crime which can be committed against humanity will not go unpunished, and see in it a means of making governments think twice before taking a decision which might have such fatal consequences for the future of mankind.

89. The USSR draft declaration puts the question clearly and unambiguously. The way to guarantee effective prohibition of war propaganda is, of course, to provide a punishment for the war-mongers. We are in favour of prohibiting war propaganda. We are in favour of forbidding war-mongers to carry on their provocative activities with impunity. Those who are in favour of allowing a criminal to go unpunished are in favour of the crime and share the responsibility for it. That is why the Polish delegation voted for the declaration proposed by the Soviet Union.

90. We are realists. We realize that the best plan for the maintenance and strengthening of peace will be ineffective so long as international relations are dominated by antagonism among the great Powers, so long as efforts are made to keep one of those Powers at

arm's length and to substitute for the representatives of another a group of politicians who are abject failures and have been expelled by their own people.

91. The USSR delegation has raised the question of achieving permanent co-operation and concerted action among the great Powers by proposing the conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace. In the declaration submitted for our consideration, the Soviet Union and the entire camp of peace once again give expression to their desire for co-operation for the good of all mankind. We want the conflicting interests to be settled by means of agreements, sound compromises and mutual concessions, and not by a policy of pressure, by bombs and mass destruction.

92. Our contribution to the cause of peace will be the adoption of measures to dispel the spectre of war. A serious step in that direction would be the adoption of the USSR draft resolution containing all the basic provisions required to remedy the international situation and to enable the Organization to function normally.

93. The Polish delegation calls upon all the members of the Assembly to take into account, in their future work, the seriousness of the situation, and not to vote mechanically, as they have just done at this meeting, against draft resolutions and declarations which are supported by hundreds of millions of people.

94. If the United Nations intends to fulfil the task assigned to it, if it intends to satisfy humanity's craving for peace, it must choose the path indicated by the USSR delegation—the path of agreement and international co-operation.

95. For all the aforesaid reasons the Polish delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union.

96. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR considers it necessary to explain its vote on resolution A, which was sponsored in the First Committee by the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Bolivia, India, Lebanon, Mexico and the Netherlands and submitted by that Committee to the General Assembly. In the First Committee we were forced to vote against the eight-Power draft resolution since the amendments proposed by the delegations of the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union had been rejected by the majority of the Committee. Unfortunately those amendments [A/1505] have also been rejected by the General Assembly.

97. Those amendments were intended to facilitate the adoption of a resolution which would help to remove the threat of a new war, to reduce the heavy burden of military budgets and to establish mutual trust among States. They expressed the ardent desires, expectations and hopes of all peace-loving peoples who detest and despise war and passionately yearn for peace.

98. The five delegations proposed that a new paragraph should be inserted after paragraph 1 of resolution A, beginning with the words "Solemnly reaffirms", to read as follows: "Recognizing that the use of the atomic weapon as a weapon of aggression and mass destruction is contrary to international conscience and

honour and incompatible with membership of the United Nations”.

99. We Soviets continue to insist on the prohibition of the atomic weapon as a barbarous weapon of aggression, the use of which is incompatible with membership of the United Nations and contrary to the conscience and honour of peoples. This demand was voiced throughout the world and found an answering echo in the hearts of many millions of people. No blackmail, no threats to use a “superatomic bomb”, no scares deliberately engineered by the war-mongers, no hysteria about the atomic bomb will frighten us or force us to abandon our just and consistent policy of seeking to ensure that the use of the atomic weapon as a weapon of aggression is prohibited. As early as 14 December 1946, the General Assembly expressed itself [*resolution 41 (I)*] in favour of the elimination of the atomic weapon from national armaments. Consequently there is not and never has been any reason why we should delay the adoption of this proposal.

100. Further, paragraph 2 (a) of resolution A should have been reworded in the following manner as proposed in the amendment submitted by the five delegations: “On the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control, under United Nations supervision, over the scrupulous and unconditional implementation of this ban, in order to make effective the prohibition of atomic weapons”.

101. The Soviet Union has always insisted that the use of the atomic bomb should be outlawed and that the great discovery of our age, atomic energy, should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Only by adopting such a decision could we establish conditions favourable to the free and serious consideration of the question of establishing control of atomic energy.

102. The voice of the peoples who have signed the Stockholm Appeal grows louder and echoes in every corner of the globe, although there are still those who do not wish to hear or heed it. Hundreds of millions of human beings insistently demand the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the organization of effective international control of atomic energy to ensure its use for peaceful purposes. But many delegations here do not want that.

103. We proposed, moreover, that paragraph 2 (c) of resolution A should be reworded as follows: “To regulate all armaments and armed forces in such a way as to proceed, beginning in the year 1950-51, to the reduction of armaments and armed forces”. This is a specific and clear proposal. It is obvious to everyone that the problem is ripe for a decision and that the time has now come to take definite decisions so that these tasks may be carried out. That is what the peoples of the world are demanding. By adopting such a decision we should strengthen international faith in the belief that the United Nations was really imbued with the desire for lasting peace. That would be in conformity with the interests of all peoples, since it would reduce the heavy burden of taxation imposed on them by exaggerated expenditures on armaments which are not in keeping with post-war peace-time conditions. The reduction of armaments and armed forces would bring about the end of the armaments race which has

already begun and which is now continuing with intensity.

104. At this fifth session, the General Assembly should recommend that the Security Council should draw up the necessary and practical directions for the reduction by one-third of the armies maintained by the five great Powers in time of peace. Naval and air forces should also be reduced by one-third, as they are now out of all proportion to peace-time needs. That would be a first step towards carrying out a further and still greater reduction in armaments and armed forces. Let us take this first step.

105. After paragraph 2 (d) of resolution A, it is essential to add the following:

“Condemns any form of propaganda for a new war;

“Notes that the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the condemnation of propaganda for a new war are of great importance for the strengthening of peace and security among the nations.”

106. Approximately three years ago, at the second session of the General Assembly, a similar decision [*resolution 110 (II)*] was adopted. That decision was wholeheartedly supported by all the peoples of the world and stirred the camp of the war-mongers to the pitch of fury. Since then they have not abated their efforts and, despite the decision adopted by the United Nations, they have continued their propaganda for another war. The ruling circles in the United States and the United Kingdom, who have taken no steps to oppose it, are primarily answerable to the General Assembly for such propaganda.

107. In a recent broadcast from London, that arrant war-monger, Winston Churchill, demanded the organization of a “European front” and advocated the kindling of the fires of another war in Europe. Churchill is well known to the peoples of the world as an inveterate believer in imperialism and colonialism and as the most virulent enemy of international peace and security. Similar propaganda for another war is being conducted by the war-mongers in the United States—Johnson, Eisenhower, Bradley, Matthews, MacArthur and others. General Bradley, for example, openly called for the use of the atomic bomb against peaceful populations. Such statements by the war-mongers arouse the righteous indignation of all peace-loving peoples, who demand the cessation of such misanthropic propaganda.

108. As early as 1946, Generalissimo Stalin in a reply to the President of the United Press wrote that if the peoples of the world were to be spared another war, “the instigators of a new war must be exposed and muzzled”. It is the duty of the representatives at this session of the General Assembly to expose the war-mongers and to take measures to strengthen international peace. The propaganda put out by the instigators of war should be counteracted by a wide propaganda for peace and friendship among peoples and States. Only thus can we fulfil our duty and justify the faith of the peoples who have sent us here to represent them. Such action is essential for the promotion of international co-operation and the strengthening of peace.

109. That is why the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR supported and voted in favour of the amendments to resolution A proposed by five delegations. That is why

we could not associate ourselves with that resolution and voted against it.

110. Mr. SIROKY (Czechoslovakia) (*translated from Russian*): I should like to explain the Czechoslovak delegation's vote. Resolution A, which was sponsored in the First Committee by eight States belonging to the Anglo-American bloc has superseded the Soviet Union proposal for the removal of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace and security among the nations, a proposal of the utmost importance.

111. The USSR proposal, based on the urgent need to strengthen and develop friendly co-operation among nations with a view to settling international problems, called on the General Assembly, at its fifth session, to take practical measures for the preservation of peace. In particular, it called for a ban on war propaganda, the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and a reduction of armaments and armed forces of all kinds by one-third during the year 1950-51.

112. As for the resolution adopted by the Anglo-American majority bloc, it does not provide peace-loving humanity with the instrument it needs to enable the peoples of the world to advance along the noble road which leads to the strengthening of peace and security among nations, or to oblige the Member States of the United Nations to fulfil their obligations in the spirit of the Charter. That resolution deliberately refrains from providing for any practical measures, in particular, the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the reduction of armaments and armed forces of all kinds by one-third during the year 1950-51; it is merely the last link in the chain of documents which are intended to legalize armed intervention in the domestic affairs of States, an intervention directed against the freedom and independence of peoples.

113. The representatives of the Anglo-American bloc, with their usual majority, have rejected not only the Soviet Union proposals, but also the amendments submitted by the USSR and four other States, including Czechoslovakia, despite the fact that the sole purpose of those amendments was to make the resolution an effective instrument for the pursuit of a policy of peace and for democratic co-operation among nations.

114. The declaration proposed by the Soviet Union included effective measures against ideological, political, strategic and material preparations for another world war. It proved unacceptable to those delegations whose countries have formed themselves into aggressive blocs under the leadership of the most rapacious imperialism of our times. Naturally the lucid words of the USSR delegation are not to the liking of these delegations, since the essence of the policies of their governments is not peace and co-operation among the nations, but war, oppression and the exploitation of other peoples.

115. The sponsors of the resolution speak of "effective control" of the atomic weapon. But what control can there be if the manufacture of the atomic bomb is not prohibited? Those very governments whose representatives on the First Committee talked about "effective control", hold forth in their practical political activities about "the use of the atomic bomb for the sake of peace", and "the use of the atomic bomb for purposes of defence", in other words, about legalizing the use of the atomic bomb.

116. The same applies to the question of disarmament. The USSR draft resolution called for the reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the great Powers by one-third no later than in 1950-51, which would constitute a starting point for further disarmament. The Anglo-American bloc rejected this proposal, which the whole world considered just.

117. Resolution A advocates disarmament in general and abstract terms; or, rather, it refers to "gradual" disarmament, although it is not stated when or where it is to begin, to what it must apply and how it is to be put into effect. Whenever the question is posed in concrete terms, the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc take a negative attitude, since any concrete and definite formulation would be binding. And while speaking of gradual disarmament, their countries feverishly continue to arm themselves and to arm the North Atlantic Treaty countries and western Germany.

118. Such are the reasons why the Czechoslovak delegation voted against the resolution.

119. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I am going to put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union delegation [A/1491].

120. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The USSR delegation proposes that the vote on its draft, entitled "Declaration on the removal of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace and security among the nations" should be taken as follows: a separate vote on the preamble to the declaration, and then separate and successive votes on each of the three paragraphs of the operative part.

The preamble of the USSR draft resolution was rejected by 31 votes to 5, with 15 abstentions.

Paragraph 1 of the operative part of the draft resolution was rejected by 34 votes to 5, with 11 abstentions.

Paragraph 2 of the operative part of the draft resolution was rejected by 35 votes to 5, with 11 abstentions.

Paragraph 3 of the operative part of the draft resolution was rejected by 35 votes to 5, with 11 abstentions.

121. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call upon the representative of the Ukrainian SSR, who wishes to explain his vote.

122. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR strove stubbornly and persistently in the First Committee to secure the adoption of the declaration proposed by the Soviet Union on the removal of the threat to peace, as it considered that measures to strengthen peace and security, based on a policy directed towards the peaceful and friendly settlement of international disagreements, would certainly constitute a serious obstacle to the spread of war propaganda and to the aggressive actions of the imperialists. The United States and several other influential countries, however, were unwilling to follow that course. On the contrary, the delegations of those countries did everything they could to prevent the United Nations from adopting the USSR proposals.

123. In order to counteract the declaration submitted by the USSR and to prevent the First Committee from considering it, several other draft resolutions were submitted, the basic provisions of which differed considerably from those of the Soviet Union. Those draft

resolutions did not contain such important provisions as the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and other means of mass destruction and the reduction of the present armed forces of the five great Powers by one-third during 1950-51.

124. In contrast to the clear and precise provisions of the USSR declaration, the other draft resolution had deliberately vague and indefinite recommendations which diverted the Committee from its appointed task and contained no practical obligations to remove the threat of a new war.

125. In the vote in the First Committee, the declaration proposed by the Soviet Union failed to receive the necessary majority and was therefore not adopted. It is noteworthy that the declaration was attacked primarily by the delegations of the countries which have ratified the North Atlantic Treaty. Their attitude towards the USSR proposals for peace once again laid bare the real nature and true purposes of this aggressive alliance which the United States and its adherents pretend is a defensive one.

126. In spite of the incompleteness and obvious inadequacy of the draft resolutions before the Committee, the Soviet delegations attempted to improve them and to find formulae which would be generally acceptable and make it possible to arrive at an agreed decision on so important a question as the defence of peace. But the Anglo-American bloc cynically rejected all our amendments in the Committee. As a result, the Committee approved a worthless, emasculated United States draft resolution containing no measures to remove the threat of war and imposing no obligations in that respect.

127. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR, deeply convinced that the declaration on the removal of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace and security among the nations is an essential and completely effective means to remove the threat of a new war, fully supported all the provisions of this declaration, one of the most important of which was the conclusion of a peace pact among the five great Powers.

128. The United States says a great deal in its propaganda about its alleged efforts for peace and its so-called defensive measures. The United States representatives in the First Committee also spoke on that subject. If the United States truly wants peace and if the leaders of its present government sincerely want agreed collective action in defence of peace, why should not the United States Government, together with the other great Powers, conclude a pact for the strengthening of peace, as proposed in the USSR declaration?

129. Such a pact would certainly help to unify the great Powers' efforts for peace and would therefore constitute an obstacle to military preparations and preparations for another war; but neither the United States nor the other Powers which were invited to conclude such a pact were willing to assume any obligations which would hamper them in carrying out their true intentions, which are far removed from the defence of peace. The United States delegation and its myrmidons preferred not to assume restrictive obligations which might interfere with their aggressive plans and therefore rejected the peace pact proposed by the Soviet Union.

130. The USSR draft declaration also proposed that the use of the atomic weapon as a means for the mass destruction of peaceful populations should be prohibited. It is common knowledge that this provision is fully supported by the hundreds of millions of people all over the world who have signed the Stockholm Appeal, realizing clearly that they face extermination in the devastation of an atomic war.

131. There is no need to cite the numerous statements by the leaders of the present Government of the United States and of the various civilian and military officials who extol the atomic weapon as a guarantee of peace. Such cynical statements in praise of the atomic bomb were also to be heard in the First Committee.

132. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR will of course always combat such dangerous views. The declaration proposed by the Soviet Union recognized that the use of the atomic weapon was contrary to international conscience and honour and incompatible with membership of the United Nations and provided that the atomic weapon should be unconditionally banned and that a strict system of international control should be instituted to ensure the absolute and unconditional observance of the prohibition. This proposal was based on a decision adopted by the supreme legislative body of the Soviet Union—the Supreme Council of the USSR—on 19 June of this year, in connexion with the report of the delegation of the Permanent Committee of the World Congress of the Partisans of Peace. By that decision the Supreme Council associated itself with the committee's proposal concerning the prohibition of the atomic weapon and declared its readiness to co-operate with the legislatures of other States in elaborating and carrying out measures to implement such proposals.

133. The discussion on this question in the First Committee and here, in the General Assembly, has shown that the ruling circles of the United States, which are engaged in a feverish armaments race and are spending fabulous sums for the execution of their plans for aggression, are unwilling to accept the proposal for the prohibition of the atomic weapon because the United States has no intention of discontinuing the production of atomic bombs and of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Nor has it any intention of instituting effective international control of atomic energy, notwithstanding the demagogic statements to that effect of United States representatives to the United Nations. It is perfectly obvious that the United States is continuing to increase its already tremendous war potential in order to pursue a feverish armaments race for purposes of aggression and not of defence.

134. Hence the reason which the United States delegation gave in the First Committee for its government's refusal to agree to the proposal for the reduction of the armed forces of the five great Powers by one-third during 1950-51, namely, the alleged military weakness of the United States, was false and mendacious.

135. Thus the rejection of the declaration proposed by the USSR, as well as of the amendments proposed by the Soviet delegations and the delegations of the peoples' democracies to resolution A, is clear proof of the fact that the United States and its adherents have no desire to make it difficult for themselves to carry

out their propaganda in favour of war and their policy of incitement to war hysteria as means for preparing another war.

136. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR supported the declaration proposed by the Soviet Union and voted in favour of all its provisions both in the First Committee and in the General Assembly. It also made every effort to render resolution A acceptable and defended the amendments it had submitted jointly with four other delegations. Neither the declaration, however, nor a single one of the amendments was adopted by the majority of the General Assembly, obedient to the dictates of the United States. That is why the Government of the Ukrainian SSR will continue with still greater zeal its fight in the camp of the partisans of peace. . .

137. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): This is not an explanation of a vote.

138. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): I am about to finish, Mr. President. The Government of the Ukrainian SSR will continue to fight in the camp of the partisans of peace, with the Soviet Union at its head, to avert the threat of a new war, and to strengthen friendship and co-operation among nations and international peace and security.

139. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I am going to make an explanation myself, not with regard to a vote but to throw light on my future decisions.

140. I have tried to be reasonable; where questions as important as those we are discussing now are concerned, it is essential that delegations should be given an opportunity of explaining their attitude, even if the Assembly has decided not to open a discussion. But an explanation of a vote must be that and nothing more; representatives must confine themselves to explaining the reasons for their votes. They cannot start explaining the reasons for other delegations' votes. Moreover, no representative is entitled to attack and accuse other delegations of being in the pay of certain countries or of acting under pressure. I beg all of you in future to confine yourselves as far as possible to a genuine explanation of your votes; in that case I shall certainly allow you to explain your views. I hope that you will understand my position and that from now on you will co-operate with me.

Technical assistance for Libya after achievement of independence: report of the Second Committee (A/1513)

[Agenda item 65]

141. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The Assembly has before it a report from the Second Committee on technical assistance for Libya after achievement of independence [A/1513], containing a draft resolution approved unanimously by the Committee after discussion. I hope the General Assembly will give the draft resolution the same reception.

The draft resolution submitted by the Second Committee was adopted unanimously.

Development of a twenty-year programme for achieving peace through the United Nations: memorandum of the Secretary-General (A/1304)

[Agenda item 60]

142. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The next item on the agenda was proposed by the Secretary-General; the General Assembly decided not to refer it to a Committee but to discuss it in plenary meeting.

143. I call upon the Secretary-General to make a statement on the question he wishes to submit to the Assembly.

144. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: It may be useful at the beginning of the general debate on this item to recall the circumstances in which my "Memorandum of points for consideration in the development of a twenty-year programme for achieving peace through the United Nations" [A/1304] originated.

145. Early last spring it seemed to me—as I am sure it did to most of you—that the United Nations was in grave danger. The deadlock over the representation of China came at the end of a chain of events that had progressively weakened faith throughout the world over a period of three years in the United Nations' approach to the problems of war and peace.

146. There had been a steadily growing tendency to relegate the United Nations to a secondary position in international affairs and to give first priority instead to the old, familiar expedients of arms and alliances.

147. I believed that this fatal tendency towards loss of faith in the United Nations as the principal means of preventing war must be, and could be, arrested.

148. I never had any doubt that the peoples of the world would continue to support the United Nations with all their hearts, if given a chance to demonstrate their loyalty to its humane and universal aims. I also believed that the Member States—all of them—wanted the United Nations to succeed. But the many and dangerous conflicts of interest and ideology were making all of us the prisoners of a vicious circle of charge and counter-charge, of force and counter-force, in which distrust and hatreds mounted month by month.

149. Somehow a way had to be found by the Member States to break out of this vicious circle. I felt it was clearly my duty as Secretary-General to do what I could to help. It was with these considerations in mind that I prepared my memorandum on the development of a twenty-year United Nations peace programme.

150. In this memorandum I declared my belief that the atmosphere of deepening international mistrust could be dissipated and that the threat of the universal disaster of another war could be averted by a new and great effort to employ to the full the resources for conciliation and constructive peace-building present in the United Nations Charter.

151. I personally handed the memorandum to the President of the United States, Mr. Truman, on 20 April 1950, in Washington; to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Attlee, on 28 April, in London; to the Prime Minister of France, Mr. Bidault, on 3 May, in Paris; and to the Prime Minister of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Generalissimo Stalin, on 15 May, in Moscow.

152. I discussed the memorandum, and my reasons for preparing it, with them and with other leaders of their governments, including the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Acheson; the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. Bevin; the Foreign Minister of France, Mr. Schuman; and the Vice-Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Molotov, and the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Vyshinsky.

153. My talks with these statesmen during my visits to the capitals of the four great Powers were entirely preliminary and exploratory. All the talks—without exception—were most friendly and cordial. I neither asked for, nor received commitments on specific points in the memorandum.

154. While it was indicated to me that each of the four governments might have reservations or amendments concerning some of the points of view expressed, it became equally clear that the approach I was making could provide an acceptable initial basis for discussion to all four governments.

155. As a next step, therefore, I communicated my memorandum formally, on 6 June, to all the Members of the United Nations, together with a covering letter in which I amplified my memorandum on points concerning atomic energy, trade restrictions and discriminations, and the desirability of universality of membership and support for the specialized agencies as well as for the United Nations itself.

156. Less than three weeks later came the attack from North Korea upon the Republic of Korea. I do not need today to recall here the momentous events in the life of the United Nations that have occurred since then.

157. The United Nations action in Korea and the further steps towards the creation of collective security that have been taken at this session of the General Assembly are, however, not in conflict with, nor do they diminish in the slightest degree the importance of the many other approaches to peace prescribed by the Charter and suggested in the memorandum. It is just as important now as it ever was that the United Nations should serve as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations towards achieving the purposes of the Charter—perhaps even more so.

158. The United Nations works best when negotiation, mediation and conciliation succeed in preventing breaches of the peace such as the one that occurred in Korea.

159. Once a breach of the peace has occurred, the United Nations can succeed on three conditions: first, that the breach of the peace is suppressed by effective collective action; secondly, that full collective assistance is given to rehabilitate and reconstruct the country that is the victim of aggression; thirdly, that steps towards genuine and lasting reconciliation are undertaken as rapidly as possible after peace has been restored in that area.

160. With these considerations in mind, I went ahead with my plan to place my memorandum on the agenda

of this session of the General Assembly, and I so informed the Member States in my annual report.⁸

161. I am glad that the General Assembly decided to consider my suggestions in plenary meeting. My memorandum, of course, is not in itself a programme. It is, rather, a working paper that suggests an approach to what I hope may develop in time into a twenty-year United Nations peace programme. It is a reaffirmation of the United Nations approach and an appeal to the Member States to renew their efforts to make the United Nations work as the only tolerable and civilized alternative to that barbarous thesis of despair—the thesis of irreconcilable conflict.

162. I believe that the detailed consideration of the points in my memorandum can most fruitfully be undertaken by those organs of the United Nations particularly concerned under the Charter. This consideration—by the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council and by appropriate United Nations commissions—will lead, I hope, during the coming year, to specific action by these organs in their respective fields of responsibility and to the formulation of definite and concrete proposals.

163. Already, this session of the General Assembly has made several historic decisions that reflect the will to employ to the full the resources for peace and for political, economic and social progress available under the United Nations Charter, which I had in mind in suggesting the development of a twenty-year United Nations peace programme.

164. Let me now proceed to discuss briefly each of the ten points in my memorandum.

165. The first point is: "Inauguration of periodic meetings of the Security Council, attended by Foreign Ministers, or heads or other members of governments, as provided by the United Nations Charter [*Article 28, paragraph 2*] and the rules of procedure [*rule 4*]; together with further development and use of other United Nations machinery for negotiation, mediation and conciliation of international disputes."

166. There have been no periodic meetings of the Security Council so far, either because, until 1948, the Council of Foreign Ministers met regularly, or because, until this year, there have been two General Assembly sessions each year, or for other reasons. The Charter says there "shall be" such periodic meetings, separate and distinct from the regular continuous session. The Charter also says [*Article 28, paragraph 3*] that the Security Council may hold meetings "at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work".

167. Such periodic meetings, in my opinion, should be inaugurated and used for a general semi-annual review at a high level of outstanding issues, particularly those that divide the great Powers. These meetings should not be expected to bring great decisions every time. They should not be held primarily for public debate. They should be used mainly for consultation—much of it informal—for efforts to gain ground towards agreement on questions at issue, to clear up misunderstandings, to prepare for new initiatives that may improve the chances for definitive agreement at later meetings.

⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 1*.

168. In this connexion, I hope that the Security Council and the General Assembly will be able to settle the question of the representation of China in the near future.

169. We need more direct and regular contact between the men who are responsible for policy-making. Periodic meetings of the Security Council will enable the Foreign Ministers of the five great Powers to talk among themselves and to have the benefit of the views of the Foreign Ministers of the six non-permanent members, who represent the interests of all the smaller Member States of the United Nations in the Security Council. They have often demonstrated their effectiveness in conciliating and moderating great Power disputes.

170. I suggest that the special periodic meetings should normally be held away from the Permanent Headquarters in New York, where the Security Council meets in regular session. The periodic meetings might appropriately be held in rotation in the countries of the other four permanent members of the Security Council, as well as in the countries of other Member States. Among other advantages, this practice would bring the United Nations into closer physical contact with all the peoples of the world.

171. I believe that the inauguration of a series of periodic meetings of the Security Council may not only revive negotiation on great Power policies and differences, but could also bring about the progressive development over the next few years of other United Nations resources for the prevention, as well as the mediation and conciliation, of disputes of all kinds between Member States.

172. The Security Council has well established its role as a place where international controversies can be publicly debated. It has, however, only made a beginning at using its meetings for negotiation as effectively as for debate.

173. I hope that the practice of using Presidents of the Council as rapporteurs for purposes of mediation and conciliation will be encouraged, together with regularly established and functioning machinery for private consultations of the representatives of the five great Powers among themselves as well as with the representatives of other Members—as this session of the General Assembly has unanimously recommended [302nd meeting].

174. At San Francisco the representatives of the five great Powers met every day. That was one of the means through which unanimous agreement was ultimately secured on the United Nations Charter.

175. The General Assembly has demonstrated its unique role as the main instrument through which world public opinion on international issues can be determined and given effective political expression. The General Assembly has surpassed in this respect the expectations of the founders at San Francisco. Likewise it has proved to be an ideal forum in which the statesmen of the smaller countries can exert upon conflicts of power an important and even decisive mediating and moderating influence.

176. We must build on this experience. The principle of equal rights of States, large and small, is fundamental in the United Nations approach to peace. The

smaller States not only have the right to be consulted on all matters in which their interests are involved, but they can often contribute substantially to results that will strengthen the United Nations influence for peace.

177. The second point in a United Nations twenty-year peace programme is: "A new attempt to make progress towards establishing an international control system for atomic energy that will be effective in preventing its use for war and promoting its use for peaceful purposes."

178. There is no prospect of any quick or easy solution of this most difficult problem—a problem that goes to the very heart of the greatest conflict of power and ideology in the world at the present time. I do believe in the possibility of a definitive solution, but I believe that such a solution probably will be found only at the end—rather than at the beginning—of a long series of difficult negotiations for the settlement of wider issues.

179. In the meantime, I hope that negotiation on the problem of atomic energy itself can be resumed, in line with the directive given by the General Assembly last year [*resolution 299 (IV)*], namely, "to explore all possible avenues and examine all concrete suggestions with a view to determining whether they might lead to an agreement".

180. It may be that satisfactory interim or step-by-step agreements on atomic energy control could be worked out that would at least be an improvement on the present state of affairs, when we have an unlimited atomic arms race, even though they did not afford full security. Even such initial steps could be of great importance.

181. Perhaps the General Assembly and the Security Council, in periodic meeting or otherwise should re-examine the decisions to establish two separate Commissions—the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission on Conventional Armaments—or at least consider the advisability of linking their work more closely together.

182. I recall the statement made by President Truman in this hall on United Nations Day [295th meeting], when he said in this connexion:

"One possibility to be considered is whether their work might be revitalized if carried forward in the future through a new and consolidated disarmament commission."

183. This brings me to the third point in the memorandum: "A new approach to the problem of bringing the armaments race under control, not only in the field of atomic weapons, but in other weapons of mass destruction and in conventional armaments."

184. We should not forget that a single raid in the Second World War, carried out with so-called conventional blockbuster and incendiary bombs, killed more people than the atomic bomb. The destructive power of existing lethal chemical and bacteriological weapons has not been tested, but such weapons may well be even more deadly than any atomic bombs so far made.

185. It is understandable and in conformity with their responsibilities to their own peoples that Member States, when faced with the failure to make peace and the consequent delay in establishing a United Nations collective security system, should look to their own defences.

186. In an atmosphere such as exists today strong national defences are a necessary evil. Disarmament can come only as part of a collective security system and in an atmosphere of mutual confidence such as prevailed among the Allies during the war.

187. But it is also true that any progress at all towards agreements on the regulation of armaments of any kind would help to reduce tensions and would thus assist in the adjustment of political issues.

188. We do not need to delay, and should not delay, work on the vast amount of study, discussion and planning that is required to complete preparation of an effective system of international control for all armaments.

189. Neither efforts at political settlement nor efforts at regulation of armaments will wait upon the other. Both must go hand in hand.

190. The fourth point in my memorandum is: "A renewal of serious efforts to reach agreement on the armed forces to be made available under the Charter to the Security Council for the enforcement of its decisions".

191. Negotiations on this issue have been stalemated for almost three years in the Military Staff Committee. The problem is clearly one of a political nature. This is an issue that needs new consideration by the Security Council, first of all, probably, at one of the proposed periodic meetings.

192. The important action taken by the General Assembly at this session in recommending [A/1481] to Member States that they should have forces available for United Nations service on the recommendation of either the Security Council or the General Assembly, does not in any way diminish the need for and desirability of new efforts to establish the United Nations forces that, under Article 43 of the Charter, should be made available to the Security Council. The Assembly has itself explicitly recognized this.

193. The fifth point is: "Acceptance and application of the principle that it is wise and right to proceed as rapidly as possible towards universality of membership".

194. Fourteen nations are still awaiting admission to the United Nations. Some of them have been waiting for three years. Some have been kept out by one negative vote, some by abstentions by the majority in the Security Council.

195. Arguments have been advanced against the conduct or nature of each of these governments by one side or the other. But it seems to me that the tests provided by the Charter for membership should be applied with wisdom and with generosity, bearing in mind first of all the interests of the peoples concerned, rather than the nature of their governments.

196. I believe it is better for every nation to be inside the United Nations than outside it. I believe it is better both for the United Nations and for the people of the country seeking admission. I do not think it is wise to discourage the intercourse and co-operation with the rest of the world that United Nations membership helps to promote. Membership entails the sharing of responsibility for upholding the obligations of the Charter that rests upon each Member.

197. The United Nations is made weaker, not stronger, when countries of Asia that have newly won their independence are kept outside and when Europe also is grossly under-represented because of the continued absence of nine European countries that have long ago applied for membership.

198. I look forward to the day when all the peoples of the world will be represented in the United Nations. I include not only those countries awaiting admission now, and others which may apply, but also Germany and Japan as soon as the peace treaties have been completed.

199. The sixth point is: "A sound and active programme of technical assistance for economic development and encouragement of large-scale capital investment, using all appropriate private, governmental and inter-governmental resources".

200. The fundamental purpose of such a United Nations programme is to help the people of every country to raise their standard of living by peaceful means. A good start has been made during the present year with the inauguration of the \$20 million United Nations expanded programme of technical assistance for economic development and social welfare.

201. A United Nations programme of technical assistance that will produce a basis for sound economic development and social progress must be practical and realistic; it must aim at encouraging self-help. If carefully planned and sensibly administered it will help greatly towards the type of economic development which will increase production, increase purchasing power, and expand the markets of all producers of industrial and agricultural products. The mutual interests of well-developed and under-developed nations in such a programme are apparent to everyone.

202. But such a programme is only a beginning.

203. In addition to technical assistance, the under-developed countries require financial assistance. The Second Committee has recently given unanimous approval to a draft resolution [A/1524] declaring that the volume of private capital now flowing into under-developed countries cannot meet their needs for economic development. In this same draft resolution the Economic and Social Council is asked to consider practical methods for achieving the expansion and steadier flow of foreign capital, both private and public. I hope that the steps taken by the General Assembly at this session will lead next year to real progress in solving the problems of financing economic development on an adequate scale.

204. It may be that what is needed is a strengthening of the resources of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other international organizations operating in this field. On the other hand, it is probable that additional methods of financing certain types of capital expenditures in under-developed countries will be needed. I confidently look forward to the establishment of what has been called during this Assembly a "United Nations recovery force", through which all the nations will join in a mutually beneficial effort to raise the unspeakably low living standards of more than half the human race.

205. In this connexion, I warmly welcome the initiative of the Second Committee in calling for an examination of those features of agrarian life, such as outmoded systems of land tenure, which are an obstacle to economic development. The campaign to raise the standard of living of the under-developed countries must be fought on many fronts. Next to the preservation of peace, it is the greatest undertaking to which we have put our hands. It must succeed.

206. The seventh point of the peace programme is: "More vigorous use by all Member States of the specialized agencies of the United Nations to promote, in the words of the Charter [*Article 55, subparagraph a*], higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress".

207. The United Nations' family of specialized agencies is by far the most effective machinery that the world has ever had for organized international action to eliminate human misery through persistent, day-to-day, practical programmes. The specialized agencies have quietly gone ahead in the past four years, right in the middle of the grave world crisis and with very limited resources, with the development and implementation of hundreds of such programmes. It is not too much to say that almost everybody in the world has been helped by one or more of the programmes undertaken by these agencies. They have become vitally necessary tools in a long-range programme aimed at eliminating the economic and social causes of war.

208. The specialized agencies, however, like the rest of the United Nations peace system, are not self-operating. They need wider and more constructive support from all Member States of the United Nations. It is very much to be regretted that they have not had this support in all cases in the past. I hope that all the Member States will be prepared, as time goes on, to participate fully in the work of the specialized agencies and to increase their resources.

209. Much has already been done to achieve better co-ordination so as to prevent overlapping and thus effect economies and improve programming. A more important place for the specialized agencies in the policies of governments would produce better leadership in achieving these objectives, while at the same time putting to greater use some of the best tools the world has yet devised for reducing the causes of war.

210. I wish once again to call the attention of representatives to the statement to which the Directors-General of the specialized agencies and I subscribed in Paris last May, reaffirming the principle of universality and urging that "the greatest efforts should . . . be directed towards achieving in fact true universality in the membership and programmes of the United Nations and of those of the specialized agencies which are founded on that principle".

211. The eighth point is: "Vigorous and continued development of the work of the United Nations for wider observance and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world".

212. The attention of the world has been so concentrated during the past four years upon contests of political interest and ideological dogmas that the significance of the growing demand throughout the world for better

observance of human rights has not been fully understood.

213. Evidence is already accumulating that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is destined to rank in history with such great documents as Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence of the United States and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. It goes beyond these declarations in two important respects. First, it is international—the first world-wide declaration of human rights in history. Secondly, it proclaims economic and social rights along with the traditional political and religious liberties—such rights as the right to work, the right to a decent standard of living and the right to social security, in conformity with what should now be the universal standard. Most of the peoples of the world do not yet enjoy most of these rights.

214. The United Nations has the resources to achieve a peaceful revolution during the next twenty years by securing much wider observance of these rights in all parts of the world. This effort may take many forms: international covenants on individual rights or groups of rights designed to mobilize the power of national and international law behind the observance of such rights; development of other methods to promote implementation of these rights; assistance to governments to help them create conditions in which economic, social and cultural rights particularly can be enjoyed by greater numbers of people; separate action towards such ends as promoting freedom of information, promoting the rights of women, fighting discrimination against minorities, fighting slavery and the use of forced labour.

215. These and many other programmes of action through the United Nations and the specialized agencies deserve the fullest possible support from all the Member States and peoples of the United Nations.

216. The ninth point is: "Use of the United Nations to promote, by peaceful means instead of by force, the advancement of dependent, colonial or semi-colonial peoples towards a position of equality in the world".

217. I firmly believe that such great changes as have been taking place since the end of the war—fundamental changes in the relationships of whole peoples and even continents—can be prevented from tearing the world apart only if the universal framework of the United Nations is used to contain them within peaceful bounds.

218. Since the United Nations was founded, nine countries of Asia with a population of 600 million people have gained their independence.

219. In Africa, the United Nations is assisting the former Italian colonies of Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland to achieve independent status.

220. The United Nations, through its Trusteeship System and the provisions of the Charter relating to other Non-Self-Governing Territories, offers the administering Powers and the peoples under their jurisdiction the best opportunity to move forward by peaceful means towards an era of co-operation for their mutual welfare.

221. This opportunity needs to be more fully used and I am glad to note the progress that is being made in this direction.

222. The tenth and last point in the memorandum is: "Active and systematic use of all the powers of the Charter and all the machinery of the United Nations to speed up the development of international law towards an eventual enforceable world law for a universal world society".

223. This work is in progress. It needs more vigorous support from the Member States and from the peoples. The General Assembly adopted unanimously in Paris, in 1948 [*resolution 260 A (III)*], the convention outlawing genocide—the crime of destroying a national, ethnical, religious or racial group of human beings as Hitler tried to destroy the Jews. This convention has only just now secured the number of ratifications required to bring it into force.

224. The codification and embodiment in similar conventions of the laws of the Nürnberg Tribunal under which the Nazi war criminals were punished should also be pressed forward by the Member States.

225. Other conventions widening the scope of world law—like the protocol extending the control of narcotic drugs to the new synthetic drugs and the proposed conventions on human rights—should be pressed. The constitutional scope and authority of the United Nations system will be enhanced by each such convention or treaty as it comes into force as law.

226. If, during the next twenty years, the General Assembly, the International Court of Justice, the International Law Commission and other appropriate organs of the United Nations can proceed systematically in the development of international law, by the end of that time we may have at least the essential beginnings of a system of enforceable world law directly applicable to individuals as well as governments on all matters essential to the peace and security of mankind.

227. In the meantime I hope that the Member States will continue the trend of the past year towards greater

use of the International Court of Justice both for the juridical settlement of disputes and for the handing down of advisory opinions and interpretations of the United Nations Charter.

228. I have placed my memorandum before you as a preliminary working paper. The suggestions it contains are, of course, not in any way final or complete. I am grateful for the many expressions of sympathy, interest and support that I have received from the Foreign Ministers and representatives of Member States since the circulation of my memorandum last June.

229. I welcome the draft resolution [*A/1514*] by the sponsoring Powers to refer the memorandum for further study and action to the appropriate organs. I hope that other constructive ideas and suggestions will be brought forward during this debate and will be given full and equal consideration.

230. The suggestions I have made carry with them an appeal to the Member States to make the United Nations the primary instrument of their foreign policies in all ways—in the creation of collective security against armed aggression, in the prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes, in all international efforts towards disarmament, expanding world trade, raising living standards, promoting human rights for individuals and equal rights for peoples.

231. One of the things the world needs more than anything else today is a continuing re-affirmation by the Member States that the United Nations is the right road to peace, and the only road now open to mankind.

232. We cannot foresee today what the next twelve months will bring. But of one thing I am certain—it is still possible for the Member States to win peace, and to win it for a long time to come if they will follow that road.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.