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*President:* Mr. Nasrollah ENTEZAM (Iran).

**Relations of States Members and specialized agencies with Spain: report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1473)**

[Agenda item 62]

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call upon Mr. Lopez, Rapporteur, to present the report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on relations of States Members and specialized agencies with Spain.

2. Mr. LOPEZ (Philippines), Rapporteur of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee: The resolution recommended by the Committee seeks to revoke the recommendations embodied in resolution 39 (I) of the General Assembly of 12 December 1946, asking Member States to withdraw their ambassadors and ministers from Madrid and excluding Spain from membership in the specialized agencies of the United Nations.

3. The delegations opposing this draft based their stand on the principle that, since no change had taken place in the present Government of Spain, there was no justification for altering in any manner or form the resolution of 12 December 1946.

4. I think it important to record two points which were stressed by many of the delegations that voted in favour of this draft resolution in the Committee: first, that their affirmative votes did not imply approval of the domestic policies of the present Government of Spain, but meant only that the Member States and the specialized agencies should be free to decide for themselves the extent of their relations with the Spanish Government; and, secondly, that this resolution would revoke only the recommendations contained in the 1946 resolution, leaving intact the remainder of that resolution.

5. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I shall ask the members of the General Assembly to indicate whether they think it necessary to discuss the Committee's report.

*It was decided, by 33 votes to 5, with 15 abstentions, not to discuss the report,*

6. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I shall therefore put to the vote, without discussion, the draft resolution attached to the report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee [A/1473].

7. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) (*translated from Spanish*): My delegation only wants to put it on record that it abstained from voting on whether or not there should be a debate. The delegation of El Salvador was ready and willing to take part in the debate had the Assembly decided that there should be one. I wanted to explain the position and to point out that my delegation, which is one of the sponsors of the draft resolution, simply desired to comply with the wishes of the Assembly as to whether or not there should be a debate.

8. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I still have three speakers on my list. I assume that they wish merely to explain their votes, without initiating a discussion.

9. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): Before the General Assembly proceeds to a vote on the draft resolution approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, my delegation finds it necessary, in view of the importance of the matter and of its far-reaching implications, fully to explain its position and the reasons why we cast a negative vote. We want to have these reasons on record for the consideration of any future session of the General Assembly which may deal with this problem. The decision of the Assembly that there should be no general debate on this question forces us to make this statement because we believe that before the Assembly adopts that resolution, it must be fully aware of what it is doing.

10. The reasons for the indecent and unusual haste with which the sponsors and supporters of the draft resolution before us have attempted to push it through the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and now through the General Assembly are quite clear. For it is evident that they are fully aware that its passage will come as a profound shock to all freedom-loving humanity, and they wish to bring the debate on this draft to a quick

finish, in the vain hope that world public opinion will thereby not be too greatly alerted and aroused. It is for the same reason that it has been claimed again and again that the draft resolution deals only with technical questions, does not constitute a basic revision of our original estimate of the Franco régime and does not impose any action on anyone except those who desire to take action—and hence is of no great importance.

11. But that strange attempt to minimize the importance of the draft resolution and to belittle its implications also attests to its significance and to the fact that its passage will represent a definite and disgraceful retreat of the United Nations from its first action, undertaken almost four years ago, in defence of freedom and democracy and in fulfilment of the solemn pledges given by the United Nations to the people of Spain.

12. Let me remind the Assembly in this explanation with what great acclaim resolutions 39 (I) and 114 (II), of 12 December 1946 and 17 November 1947, were received. Let me remind you that those resolutions were greeted everywhere—and not least of all by the Spanish people—as initial and vital steps towards furthering the principles of the United Nations and resolving one of the outstanding problems which we of the United Nations inherited from the Second World War and from the domination of the greater part of Europe by the fascist Axis. The memory of that warm and enthusiastic support of our action by world public opinion would in itself be sufficient to demonstrate that the problem of Franco Spain is not a minor or unimportant one to be brushed aside by specious arguments, by legalistic twists or by blocking debate. For it would not be in keeping with our obligations to the great people of Spain, and it would not be in accordance with the principles of this Organization, if we passed over this question lightly and cast our vote in favour of this draft.

13. The problem of Franco Spain is and has been a touchstone of our democratic convictions, and haste or mild words will not obscure the meaning of the draft resolution on which we are invited to vote without debate. I cannot but state that whoever submits such a draft resolution will be marked as a betrayer of democratic principles, and those who support it, either by voting in the affirmative or by using the convenient mechanism of abstention, will be qualified as the underwriters of fascism. My delegation will not be a party to such a shameful deed.

14. During its discussion of this item the Committee was faced with a sad sight indeed. A heavy cloud of depression hung over all the representatives, who sat in silence fully aware of the shameful task which the majority of the Committee had undertaken, the pressure to which they had been subjected, and the harmfulness of their action. Everyone was aware that this draft resolution which we are invited to adopt today was a shameful draft, and that it had been introduced as long ago as 18 January 1950 by the United States Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, when, in a letter to Senator Connally, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, he expressed the readiness of the United States to send an ambassador to Spain and to have Spain admitted to the specialized agencies.

15. The members of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, and we among them, were fully aware of the fact that

the United States—in the face of anti-Franco sentiment and in view of the feelings of the trade unions of every political hue and the feelings of the peoples of western Europe—was trying to hide its role in this action. The members of the Committee were also fully aware that they were betraying the faith and convictions of millions of men and women throughout the world. Yet they yielded and thought, by shortening the discussion and cutting down the length of the meeting by hasty approval, to conceal the bluntness of the action which was to be taken. They thought they could fool world opinion by technicalities, glib words and high-sounding phrases. Nevertheless, no one in this Assembly will escape having to give a clear answer to the question as to whether this Organization is to support fascism or reject it, and no one will be able to hide behind excuses and a meaningless flow of explanations.

16. It is enough to remind the General Assembly that the resolutions of 12 December 1946 and 17 November 1947 presented a confirmation by the United Nations of decisions taken at the Potsdam Conference and the San Francisco Conference—decisions which made it clear not only that Franco Spain was to be barred from the United Nations and its activities, but also that, in view of the fact that the Franco régime was the only government of a former Axis ally still in existence, concrete steps were to be taken to help the Spanish people to cast off the yoke of oppression and establish a democratic government.

17. It was in those terms and in that spirit that we in the United Nations, implementing the desires not only of the Potsdam Conference but also those expressed in the declaration made by France, the United Kingdom and the United States in March 1946,<sup>1</sup> took steps to solve the problem of Spain and to achieve what was clearly understood to be one of the basic aims of the great struggle against the fascist Axis. When, in resolution 39 (I), we specifically mentioned the specialized agencies and suggested the withdrawal of ambassadors and ministers, we laid down clearly that this was not the total sum of our action to aid the suffering people of Spain and to help them in their unceasing struggle to bring about the speedy downfall of the fascist régime. The resolution showed clearly that Members voting for it were expressing the hope that stronger and more definite measures would be taken if, after a reasonable time, the situation had not improved.

18. Today, almost three years later, we are confronted with a draft resolution which attempts to cancel the operative part of the resolutions of 1946 and 1947. But before such a draft resolution can be approved it must be demonstrated—and should have been demonstrated before any attempt of this kind was made to justify its adoption—that our initial and basic characterization of the Franco régime was incorrect, and that the basic premises which were the reasons for our action were wrong or had undergone some change.

19. The resolutions previously adopted were based on findings which showed that the Franco régime had been established with the help of the Axis Powers and that Franco had been a guilty party in the conspiracy of war against the United Nations. Those same findings con-

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, Special Supplement, revised edition, p. 76.*

firmed the fascist character of the Franco régime. Therefore, before any relations with Franco can be established in any other manner than that provided for in the resolution of 1946, it must be proved that at least one of our premises has changed—it must be proved that the Franco Government is no longer in power.

20. I cannot in this explanation take up the time of the General Assembly by quoting from lengthy documents showing the close alliance between Hitler, Mussolini and Franco. There are many documents in the possession of the Members of the Organization which show how the substantial aid which Franco gave to Hitler and Mussolini during the war was extended; the same documents will show how Franco rejoiced in every Axis victory. He expressed joy at the fall of France. He congratulated the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and on the capture of Manila.

21. Only one or two of those who spoke in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee dared to suggest that the characterization of the Franco régime did not remain true in all its details; but if that basic characterization remains true, then our original conclusion that the existence and activities of the Franco régime constitute a situation likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security also remains true, and must constitute our basic line of reference with respect to the draft resolution now before us.

22. It therefore follows that the draft resolution must be rejected. My delegation will vote most categorically against it. This draft resolution must be rejected if the General Assembly has any respect either for its own estimate of the Franco régime—an estimate which cannot be cast aside—or for the opinion of mankind and the Charter of the United Nations.

23. It is clear that the mechanical majority which approved the draft resolution in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee has attempted here to have a no less mechanical approval of it. I know that the reason which that mechanical majority gives is that the draft does not constitute anything important and represents only a minor change; I am aware of the attempt to present this draft in that way, despite the fact that such an action would be a blunt and cynical rejection of the facts on the basis of which the Potsdam and San Francisco Conferences branded the Franco régime as a fascist régime, as a régime which had been imposed by force on the Spanish people, and the continuance of which in power rendered Spain's full co-operation with the nations of the world impossible. They try to present this draft resolution in that way despite the obvious fact that it is an attempt to smuggle Franco into the United Nations through the back door, that it is a deliberate connivance with Franco to defeat the aims of the nations which joined together to defeat the Axis Powers and their ally Franco and which promised to do everything to assist the suffering people of Spain to establish a democratic régime and thus eliminate a continuing threat to peace.

24. It was evident in the Committee that in pressing for the passage of this draft resolution—a draft which is contrary to the facts and so opposed to the sentiments of the people the world over—strange and powerful considerations motivated its sponsors and supporters. I say "strange considerations" for they have nothing to

do with the cause of international peace and security. They do not aim to further the purposes for which the Charter was established. I say "powerful considerations" because the speed with which this draft resolution is being rushed through, and the contempt which is being shown for world public opinion, indicates that from the point of view of certain Powers this action is needed to further their aims, as which have nothing to do with the furthering of peace or aiding the Spanish people. The simple truth is that the attitude of certain Members towards Spain is now determined wholly by military and strategic considerations, and this is the main reason why the resolutions of 1946 and 1947 were circumvented, sabotaged, weakened and made inoperative.

25. The main responsibility for the existence of the Franco régime today and the continuation of the reign of terror against the Spanish people resides entirely with United States action taken in the political, economic and military field. With the change in its foreign policy and the increase of United States domination in Spain, the United States threw in its lot with the Franco régime. Spain began to play an important role in the strategic plans of the United States. That can be proved by the visits of the United States military and naval officers, by military alliances, by visits of warships and the establishment of a Spanish military mission in Germany. Some could ask whether this mission is helping or supervising the denazification of Germany. In the same connexion I cited in the Committee the fact that loans were being granted, war material was being delivered and military bases were being equipped and supervised. I may recall only that now, in 1950, there exist 54 airports, 37 aerodromes, 7 airplane bases and 54 ports built, reconstructed or converted under the supervision of United States officers, ready to serve the cause of war.

26. The eagerness with which Franco is preparing to turn Spain into a war base is appreciated by the United States, the spokesmen of which often call Franco their best and most reliable ally. Franco has become a part of the preparations for the so-called preventive war. Only a few months ago, in discussing "the possible course of the third world war," the American Press described Spain and Britain as expendable territory, thus placing the United Kingdom in the invidious position of sharing with Franco Spain the doubtful honour of being the main United States base in Europe.

27. I submit, and these are the reasons for our negative vote, that such economic and military considerations, however important they may be for the profits and war plans, furnish no ground for changing even one comma of our previous resolutions. I ask this General Assembly, before we take a vote, to strike, as we did, a simple balance sheet on the problem of Spain. On the one hand place these economic and strategic considerations, and on the other hand the facts of the internal situation, the increased terror and religious and political persecution, and the desperate economic plight of the Spanish people. When these considerations are weighed, which of them weigh most in determining our attitude to the draft resolution before us, a resolution which can only strengthen the fascist régime and its hold on the Spanish people? There can be only one answer, and my delegation gives it: the rejection of this draft resolution,

unless those who vote for it or even abstain from voting are determined to disregard their obligations incumbent upon them under the Charter, and to disregard the Spanish people themselves.

28. Those who submitted this draft, who voted in favour of closing the debate and who want quietly to pass over the problem, cannot be aware, as we are, that the state of civil war proclaimed in July 1936 still prevails in Spain. They know that, for ten years, 28 million Spaniards have been kept in a state of bondage by an army of occupation instructed in the art of terror by Gestapo officers still functioning under assumed names. They are aware that thousands have been tortured and hundreds are being executed. They know of the plundering of villages by the civil guards. They know of the *ley de fuga* which is being used to cover up hundreds of political murders. They are well aware of the police terror against the Protestant Church in Spain. They had an opportunity to read of the religious and political persecution of the Moslem population in Spanish Morocco. They cannot brush aside these damning facts about the Franco régime and the situation in Spain. They demonstrate that the situation in Spain which motivated our resolution remains unchanged. We cannot therefore change the position which we took on the basis of those facts.

29. Facts are facts. Neither hypocritical talk about concern for the plight of the Spanish people nor promises that ambassadors will not be dispatched and relations will not improve can hide the fact that the adoption of the draft resolution before the Assembly will be a victory for Franco and will encourage him to take further repressive measures against the Spanish people. It will be a victory which can only encourage Franco to express even more sharply his contempt for the United Nations, for this Organization which he called a "putrid corpse", and for the sponsors of the draft resolution.

30. My delegation noticed that, on the day this draft was introduced in the Committee, the entire Falangist Press started a campaign against the United Nations, stating that Spain would refuse a partial settlement in the form of admission to the specialized agencies or the returning of envoys. It lashed out at the sponsors of the draft resolution, demanding a total surrender and berating them for not proposing it. After the vote had taken place in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, Franco himself made it clear—to quote the *New York Times*' summary of his remarks—that any improvement in relations with the United States and the United Nations could not be based on a half-way meeting; he must be met on his own terms. Facts are facts.

31. The PRESIDENT: How many pages have you left, Mr. Katz-Suchy?

32. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): I shall speak for only a few minutes more. No sugar-coating can disguise the bitterness of the pill which the Spanish people are being asked to swallow by the sponsors of this draft resolution. The brave and proud Spanish people, who have in the past demonstrated that they prefer to die standing for freedom rather than to remain alive on their knees, have not ceased their struggle for freedom. If the sponsors of this draft hope that its adoption will cow the Spanish people into complete submission to

Franco and into becoming cannon fodder for the projected preventive war, they are sadly mistaken. Three years of struggles against the combined power of German, Italian and Spanish fascism and against the assistance given to that combination by the so-called non-interventionist policy of the western Powers did not succeed in breaking the spirit of democratic Spain.

33. This draft does not take account of the determination of the Spanish people to overthrow the Franco régime. Its adoption will not help the Spanish people to get Franco off their backs; it will only sharpen the spurs which he is digging into them. The adoption of this draft will not assist the attempts which are being made to ease world tension. Verbal professions of sympathy for the Spanish people and arguments which rely on legal twists, turns and technicalities will fool no one, will shield neither those who vote for nor those who abstain from voting on this draft resolution.

34. In explaining our vote, I have not lost confidence that this draft resolution can still be defeated, if the members of the General Assembly will brush aside all special considerations. They can do this despite the laughter of the United States delegation. The draft can still be defeated if members will adhere to their duty. They must realize that there can be no compromise on the draft resolution before the Assembly. It reverses our previous policy and can bring only shame and dishonour to the United Nations. My delegation will vote against it, because it considers that we must not surrender to fascism. We shall vote against it, because we consider that we must not betray the Spanish people. We shall vote against it, because we consider that we must not betray the aims pursued and the pledges given by the Allies—the United Nations—during the war. We shall reject this proposal, and we shall uphold the cause of democracy and peace and of the United Nations Charter. We shall vote against the draft resolution, because we believe that only those who vote against it have the right to hold their heads high when they leave this room.

35. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I noticed that during the speech of the representative of Poland a number of representatives looked at me as though they wished to raise a point of order. If that was their intention, they were quite right. It is hardly fair that a representative should deliver a half-hour speech on the pretext of explaining his vote. I ought to have limited the length of speeches, and I did not do so. I shall profit by this experience in the future.

36. There are several names on my list of speakers. I shall limit the length of explanations of votes to seven minutes. That is long enough for a statement.

37. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): I wish to raise a point of order.

38. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): If your point of order is not in order, I shall be obliged to stop you. Perhaps you wish to reproach me for not interrupting you during your remarks?

39. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): I wish to raise a point of order in connexion with the President's remarks. I wish to point out that each delegation has the right to determine the time which it will take to explain its vote.

40. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Please refer to the rules of procedure, Mr. Katz-Suchy. I believe I know them as well as you do. I am even entitled to refuse to allow a representative to explain his vote.

41. Rule 88 of the rules of procedure reads as follows: "The President may permit Members to explain their votes, either before or after the voting, except when the vote is taken by secret ballot. The President may limit the time to be allowed for such explanations".

42. This confers discretionary power on the President. I cannot accept your point of order, Mr. Katz-Suchy.

43. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The USSR delegation deems it necessary to give some explanation of the reasons for its vote on the draft resolution regarding the relations of States Members of the United Nations and the specialized agencies with Spain. The eight-Power draft resolution which received the support of the majority in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and which that Committee has submitted to the General Assembly for approval is unacceptable, and the delegation of the Soviet Union will vote against it for reasons which I shall proceed to give.

44. The USSR delegation will vote against the proposal for revoking the recommendation in General Assembly resolution 39 (I) of 12 December 1946 on the withdrawal of ambassadors and ministers from Madrid, as there is no justification for revoking that recommendation. The Committee's report notes that none of the delegations which spoke in the Committee in favour of revoking that recommendation asserted that the present Government in Spain had changed in the slightest degree since 1946, when the General Assembly adopted its recommendation on the withdrawal of ambassadors and ministers from Madrid. Moreover, some of the delegations which sponsored the draft resolution now before us, as well as some of the other delegations, stressed that the condemnation of the Franco régime contained in the General Assembly resolution of 1946 still remained in force.

45. Since this is the case—and there is no reason to doubt that this is in fact the case, because the Franco régime remains an anti-popular fascist régime opposed to the interests of the Spanish people—there is obviously no need for any change in the relations of the United Nations and its Members with the Franco régime. A change in our relations with the régime which now holds sway in Spain would be possible only if there were a change in the state of affairs in that country. In the present circumstances, revocation of the General Assembly resolution of 1946 can only serve to cloak support of the anti-popular Franco régime in complete and flagrant defiance of the interests of the Spanish people. In the interests of the Spanish people, the decision taken by the General Assembly in 1946 on the withdrawal from Madrid of ambassadors and ministers of the Member States of the United Nations must be upheld.

46. It is stated in the preamble of the draft resolution before us that the establishment of diplomatic relations and the exchange of ambassadors and ministers with a government does not imply any judgment upon the domestic policy of that government.

47. The General Assembly's grounds for deciding, in 1946, to recommend the withdrawal of ambassadors and ministers from Madrid, were not simply that the domestic policy of the Franco régime was objectionable; its grounds were also that the Franco Government was a fascist government, that it had been imposed on the Spanish people by force with the aid of the Axis Powers, that it had given substantial aid to those Powers during the war and that it did not represent the Spanish people. By remaining in power in Spain, Franco's fascist government makes it impossible for the Spanish people to take part in international affairs together with the peoples of the United Nations.

48. Those were the reasons for the General Assembly resolution of 1946. All admit that the Franco régime remains exactly the same as it was in 1946. There is therefore no justification whatever for changing that part of the General Assembly resolution of 1946 which defines the relations of Member States of the United Nations with the Franco régime in Spain. Consequently the General Assembly decision on the withdrawal of ambassadors and ministers from Madrid should remain in force.

49. Those are the reasons why the USSR delegation will vote against the proposal for revoking the General Assembly decision regarding the withdrawal of ambassadors and ministers from Madrid.

50. As regards the proposal for revoking the recommendation that Franco Spain should be debarred from membership in international specialized agencies, the delegation of the Soviet Union will vote against it for reasons which I shall explain.

51. The preamble of the draft resolution points out that the specialized agencies of the United Nations are technical and largely non-political in character and have been established in order to benefit the peoples of all nations, and that they should therefore be free to decide for themselves whether the participation of Franco Spain in their activities is desirable.

52. The USSR delegation considers it wrong to allege that the specialized agencies are non-political organizations and can therefore disregard in their activities the principles and tasks arising out of the political policy laid down by the United Nations. It considers it wrong to say that those agencies need not be guided by that policy or may even pursue a policy contrary to that of the United Nations. If that were not so, those organizations could not be regarded as international specialized agencies of the United Nations.

53. Here again it would be appropriate to point out that even the delegations which propose revocation of the General Assembly recommendation of 1946 emphasize the fact that the condemnation of the Franco régime contained therein remains in force.

54. How is it possible to allow the anti-popular Franco régime, which was condemned and remains condemned to this day, to be represented in the United Nations specialized agencies, which must carry on their work in their respective special fields in accordance with the general policy of the United Nations? For this reason the General Assembly decision of 1946 to debar the Franco Government from membership in international agencies must be maintained in force.

55. The USSR delegation therefore considers the proposal for revoking that General Assembly decision both wrong and incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It will accordingly vote against the proposal for revoking the recommendation that the Franco régime should be debarred from membership in the specialized agencies.

56. Those are the reasons why the delegation of the Soviet Union will vote against the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on the question of the relations of States Members and specialized agencies with Franco Spain.

57. I thank the President. I think I have exceeded the time he allowed me by only one minute.

58. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I believe Mr. Arutiunian has not even exhausted the seven minutes' limit. Besides, when I fixed the limit at seven minutes, I merely meant not more than seven minutes; no representative should feel obliged to use that entire time.

59. Mr. DEMCHENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR wishes to indicate the reasons why it will vote against the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

60. The draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly proposes the revocation of two of the most important clauses of the General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1946—the recommendation for the withdrawal of ambassadors and ministers from Madrid and the recommendation for debarring the Franco Government from membership in international agencies established by or brought into relationship with the United Nations.

61. Those clauses of the 1946 resolution are not independent; they are the direct consequence of the General Assembly's appraisal of the Franco régime in Spain, which it found to be in origin, nature, structure and general conduct a fascist régime patterned on, and established largely as a result of aid received from Hitler's nazi Germany and Mussolini's fascist Italy. On the strength of that finding, the General Assembly adopted the two above-mentioned recommendations with a view to isolating the fascist régime from Member States of the United Nations and its agencies until such time as a new and acceptable government was formed in Spain.

62. The situation in Spain bears out the fact that the régime in power in that country has not become any more democratic since the adoption of those decisions by the General Assembly. That fact is also borne out by the report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, which emphasized that no representative in that Committee claimed that the present Spanish régime had undergone any change along the lines indicated in the General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1946. If, therefore, the situation which led to the adoption of the General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1946 remains unchanged, there are no grounds for revoking it.

63. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR accordingly considers that the revision of the resolution of 12 December 1946 is illegal and contrary to the United Nations Charter; its adoption would serve to strengthen

the fascist régime and would be an act of betrayal of the Spanish people. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR will therefore vote against the draft resolution.

64. Mr. GOLDSTUCKER (Czechoslovakia): The Czechoslovak delegation will vote against the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee for reasons which I shall enumerate.

65. First, this resolution would amount to a friendly gesture on the part of the United Nations towards fascist Franco. We do not want this Organization, which was born out of the war against fascists, to betray its principles and appease the greatest fascist war criminal to have escaped so far his just punishment, thanks to his friends in the ruling circles of the United States, the Vatican, and elsewhere.

66. Secondly, this resolution would reverse the operative part of the General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1946, by which Franco's régime was branded as a fascist régime established by Hitler and Mussolini, as having entered into a conspiracy with those dictators which brought about the Second World War, and as an active participant in that war on the side of Hitler and Mussolini. We consider that resolution of 12 December 1946 to be the minimum expression, on the part of the United Nations, of the views and sentiments concerning fascist dictatorship in Spain of hundreds of millions of people everywhere. We consider those views and sentiments as a basic lesson learned by mankind at the terrible cost of lives and property lost in the Second World War, and we consider it highly immoral to act in contradiction to them.

67. Thirdly, it is the more immoral since it is evident that the Franco régime has not changed at all in its origin, nature, structure and general conduct, and the betrayal of this Organization's principles is sought purely for the benefit of the United States expansionist and aggressive policy of war preparations. The United States is building naval and air bases in Spain and it wants this Organization to make a friendly gesture towards the fascist criminal, Franco, in order to make him more amenable to accept that part which the United States wishes him to play in the framework of its aggressive North Atlantic Treaty system. We do not think the principles and prestige of this Organization should be sacrificed for such an unworthy purpose.

68. Fourthly, this proposed resolution means a betrayal of the Spanish people, who are looking to the United Nations for moral support in their effort to free themselves of the Franco dictatorship forced upon them by Hitler and Mussolini, having on its conscience the lives of almost one and a half million people and oppressing the Spanish people in a horrible manner. We do not want to be associated with such a betrayal, and we wish to assure the Spanish people of our sympathy.

69. Fifthly, we see in this draft resolution a clear indication of two very serious phenomena, namely, that the United States is today conducting a foreign policy in the framework of which Franco, the fascist war criminal, finds a ready place—facts are, on this point, more eloquent than words of denial—and that the policy of the United States and its associates is a direct continuation of the policy which is for us and for the whole world characterized by the ugly name of Munich. Then, as now, fascists were appeased, given moral

and material support, as well as assistance of a strategic character. We see the same thing happening today, whatever protests are made to the contrary.

70. We want our peoples, and other peoples, to know this and to reach their own conclusions as to the reactionary aggressive facts of such a policy. We think the United Nations should not become an instrument for the furthering of such a policy. That is why the Czechoslovak delegation will vote against this shameful draft resolution.

71. Mr. SKOROBOGATY (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR also deems it necessary to explain the reasons for its vote on the draft resolution before the General Assembly.

72. In the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee my delegation spoke and voted against the draft resolution for reasons which I shall outline.

73. The Franco régime in Spain was established by the brutal force of arms against the will and wishes of the Spanish people and with the assistance of the Axis Powers. During the Second World War, Franco abetted Hitler and Mussolini in their struggle against the Allies and helped hitlerite Germany and fascist Italy by sending them arms, food supplies and strategic raw materials and by placing air and naval bases at their disposal. Substantial armed forces from Franco Spain took a direct part in the war on the eastern front against the Soviet Union.

74. After the collapse of hitlerite Germany and fascist Italy, the Members of the United Nations pledged themselves to eradicate the remnants of fascism as the worst enemy of mankind; that is why at the first session of the General Assembly they adopted a resolution providing that the requisite measures should be taken against the Franco régime in Spain.

75. In the period which has elapsed since the first session of the General Assembly, no political changes have taken place in Spain. Spain is still ruled by the anti-popular Franco régime, a régime whose methods are imprisonment, political terror and the enslavement of the Spanish people. As in the past, hundreds of thousands of Spanish patriots are languishing in prison or wandering through foreign countries seeking for shelter. The fascist Falange is the only organization which is allowed to exist in Spain. The trade unions, schools and churches are all made to serve the fascist cause.

76. In the light of these facts, there is no justification whatsoever for revoking the recommendation in regard to the Franco régime contained in General Assembly resolution 39 (I) of 12 December 1946 or for adopting a new recommendation legalizing the anti-popular Franco régime in Spain and favouring its continued existence.

77. From the numerous facts published in the world Press, as well as from those emanating from various official sources, it is clear that it is essential to the ruling circles of certain States that the Franco régime should be rehabilitated so that Spain may be included in the aggressive North Atlantic bloc and be used more readily as a military arsenal in Europe. That is contrary to the principles underlying the United Nations struggle for

international peace and security. The revocation of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 1946 would outrage the feelings of the heroic, freedom-loving Spanish people and of all those who are honestly striving for peace, human rights and freedoms and for international friendship and co-operation; in the eyes of world public opinion it would lower the prestige of the United Nations, which came into being in the ardour of the struggle against the forces of fascism.

78. For these reasons the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR will also vote against the draft resolution before the General Assembly.

79. Mr. ANZE MATIENZO (Bolivia) (*translated from Spanish*): I shall be very brief and shall not speak for the entire seven minutes allotted to me, because I fully realize that the President, however kindly disposed he may be to me, cannot allow me to speak in explanation of my delegation's vote on the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee to the Assembly, since, as everybody knows, my delegation is one of the sponsors of that draft resolution.

80. My reason for speaking is not to explain my delegation's vote on this draft resolution. I am speaking, rather late, to explain its vote on the Assembly's decision not to discuss the item but to proceed directly to the vote on the draft resolution.

81. There would have been no need for me to justify the abstention of my delegation, because, like the delegation of El Salvador, it is one of the sponsors of the draft and was prepared to discuss it if the majority had so wished. My delegation's interpretation of rule 67 of our rules of procedure is objective, in other words, it is based on the wording of that rule. My delegation considers, therefore, that the sole purpose of that rule is to prevent further discussion on a question which has already been sufficiently studied in Committee and on which an overwhelming majority has been secured—which is precisely what has happened in the case of the draft resolution now under consideration. My delegation therefore abstained from voting because certain representatives, speaking from this rostrum, had tried to show that other representatives were seeking to impose the adoption, by shameful and underhand means, of a draft resolution which, according to them, we did not want to discuss because we were not sure of the rightness of our action. It is my duty to explain that my country cannot tolerate such statements which, directly or indirectly, are derogatory to its dignity.

82. The case is very simple and I shall confine myself to saying something which is perfectly clear: this morning's vote was the expression of circumstances against which words and phrases are of no avail. The fact is that by resolution 39 (I), adopted in 1946, Member States voluntarily limited their sovereignty in order to eliminate the remaining traces of nazism and fascism which had perished in blood in the Second World War after having plunged the world, by their arrogance, into one of the worst tragedies in history. Yet, when that resolution was adopted, nobody could have foreseen the tragic fact that those totalitarian systems were to be reproduced in other parts of the world, under different names, and that the same political phenomenon would continue to threaten our liberty and independence. That is why all the speakers who try to prove to us that the

Franco régime should still be subject to the sanctions of 1946 fail to meet with any response from world opinion, because they are trying to make us embark upon a course of action which is futile, inopportune and devoid of moral significance.

83. We, for our part, cannot continue along the same lines as in 1946, while efforts are being made to make us accept the régime of Mao Tse-tung, who is now helping to kill soldiers in Korea, when at the same time General Franco, on the other hand, is making a friendly visit to the Canary Islands. I am saying this to show the contrast between the two attitudes, and my delegation, when it sponsored this draft resolution, did so in the firm conviction that it was serving the Spanish people as a whole, and respecting all their domestic problems and also the feelings of the Spanish patriots, whatever may be the circumstances in which their feelings as citizens have placed them.

84. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) (*translated from Spanish*): I wish briefly to explain my delegation's vote, though it might appear unnecessary since El Salvador is one of the sponsors of the draft resolution. So many efforts, however, have been made to obscure the issue that it has become necessary to define the bases upon which the draft resolution rests.

85. The draft under discussion really comprises two resolutions.

86. Paragraph 1 of the operative part would have the effect of restoring to Members of the United Nations their right to decide for themselves, that is, without any outside intervention, what rank they wish to bestow on the diplomatic representatives accredited by them not only to Spain but to any other State in the world. To decide upon the rank of diplomatic representatives, to send or to withdraw diplomatic missions, is the sovereign prerogative of each State.

87. In view of the circumstances prevailing at the time, the majority of the Members of the United Nations voted in 1946 for resolution 39 (I) which restricted that right, although it is one of the sovereign rights of every State. Four years have elapsed since then. The resolution then approved has been quite ineffectual, and indeed could hardly have been otherwise. For persons not fully acquainted with such matters, the resolution appeared equivalent to the breaking off of diplomatic relations; yet that was not so. It implied simply the withdrawal of ministers and ambassadors from Madrid and their replacement by *chargés d'affaires*. That meant that diplomatic relations continued, but in a different form. Such diplomatic relations continued unchanged. A *chargé d'affaires* has the same functions as ambassador or a minister. The resolution produced no results and that is why the Members of the United Nations are reconsidering their former attitude and finding that it is absolutely unnecessary to continue to renounce their right to decide for themselves, that is, without outside intervention, what rank to bestow on their diplomatic envoys.

88. Paragraph 2 of the operative part of the draft resolution refers to the specialized agencies which are concerned with the interests of mankind. Thus the goal of the World Health Organization is to protect health throughout the world; it should be a sufficient answer to those who make such protestations of their love for

the Spanish people to point out to them that to exclude the Spanish people from the World Health Organization means withholding from them the information which could help them to combat the epidemics which might befall them.

89. As regards trade, or the Universal Postal Union, we can also see that the Spanish people—I repeat, the Spanish people—have both an interest and a need to restore their trade relations, since otherwise they must suffer hunger and distress, and that is just what some delegations are trying to force on the Spanish people, in spite of their many professions of love for and devotion to that people.

90. There is no reason at all why Spain should be excluded from the specialized agencies, for they have no political character and are designed purely to promote the general interests of humanity.

91. I shall conclude by saying that I shall not even reply to the unjust and offensive allegations of the Polish representative. The Assembly will itself give that reply. The vote to which we are about to proceed—and I ask that it should be taken by roll-call—will be the best answer to attacks of that kind, which should never be made in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

92. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Before calling on the next speaker, who wishes to explain his vote, I wish to make a statement for the record and, if the Assembly agrees, to set a precedent.

93. The representatives of Bolivia and El Salvador stated that they were the authors of this draft resolution. I do not regard them as such because the draft resolution was submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. If I had considered that they were in fact the authors of the draft resolution, I should have been obliged, under rule 88 of the rules of procedure, to refuse to allow them to explain their votes. Rule 88 lays down that the President "shall not permit the proposer of a proposal or of an amendment to explain his vote on his own proposal or amendment".

94. I considered this draft resolution to have been submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

95. I call on the representative of the Soviet Union to speak on a point of order.

96. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I have taken the liberty of speaking after hearing the President's ruling because I believe it to be of significance from the point of view of principle. Besides having a bearing on the present case, it may also set a precedent. I must state that I cannot agree at all with the President's interpretation of the last part of rule 88 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

97. The President is of the view that the author of any draft resolution submitted by a Committee for consideration by the General Assembly must be the Committee itself. If that is so, it must be asked to what proposals or amendments rule 88 refers. Does it refer only to draft resolutions submitted by minorities? Such an interpretation can certainly not be accepted. Rule 88 is not a discriminatory rule directed against the rights of minorities. Suppose a minority were unable to agree to a decision — to a draft resolution — adopted by a

Committee, and submitted its own draft resolution to be considered in the Assembly; and suppose the majority in the Assembly decided not to permit a debate or even to allow representatives of the minority to explain their votes. The result would be that the representatives of the minority would be deprived in every way of the possibility and the right to defend their position in the Assembly.

98. How can such an interpretation of rule 88 — or rather, of the last part of that rule — be admitted? I feel that the last part of the rule, where it is stated that the President "shall not permit the proposer of a proposal or of an amendment to explain his vote on his own proposal or amendment", refers to the proposers of any proposals, wherever they may have been previously considered. In the present case, the proposers are Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru and the Philippines, and no one questions the fact that they are the sponsors of the draft resolution before us.

99. The majority in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee approved this draft resolution. Should someone arrive at a christening to christen a child, it does not mean that he is the father of that child. The child's father remains the father. The author of this draft resolution is the group of eight delegations which sponsored it, and no one else. The Committee is not the proposer. As a matter of fact, it cannot even write. It may approve a draft resolution submitted by a delegation. The Committee, as such, does not submit any draft resolution for its own consideration. Every draft resolution, therefore, has its own proposer — a specific delegation. In the present case, there are eight sponsoring delegations. That, of course, is why statements made by the representatives of Bolivia and of El Salvador were not in order.

100. I can understand our President. From the very beginning, his attitude has been to refrain from interrupting speakers on such politically delicate issues as the relations of States Members and of the specialized agencies with the fascist Franco Government of Spain. I understand such an attitude. It probably accounts for the fact that the President refrained from interrupting the representatives of Bolivia and of El Salvador. I can understand such a position but I cannot understand or in any way agree with the general interpretation of the last part of rule 88, which would result in restricting the rights of minorities alone in the Assembly. I believe that such a restriction cannot be accepted and I feel that the President cannot have intended to interpret the clause in such a way as to restrict the rights of the minority. We cannot agree to such a restriction or to an interpretation which would unquestionably set a precedent unacceptable to the General Assembly.

101. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I have explained how I understand this rule, but I do not want to set a precedent. We have more important work to do than to set legal precedents. The record will show that the President stated his views and that one delegation opposed them. Let future Presidents or jurists study the legal aspects of the question if they wish to. For the time being I am not giving a ruling or setting any precedents.

102. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from French*): It is not only

one delegation which objects to the President's interpretation. There may perhaps be several others which also object to it.

103. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The President has made a statement and one delegation has opposed that statement. No delegation has supported the President's opinion. The record will show that the President explained his point of view. Other delegations have made no criticisms, perhaps out of courtesy to the Chair. The President's interpretation has been opposed by one delegation. What has happened has supported that delegation's point of view, since mine has received no support. I have not even asked for such support, since we have more important work to do.

104. The representative of France has the floor in order to explain his vote.

105. Mr. PLAISANT (France) (*translated from French*): At this time, when we are about to vote on the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on the initiative of Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru and the Philippines regarding relations of States Members and specialized agencies with Spain, the French delegation wishes to explain its position.

106. The feeling of the French Government for the Spanish people cannot be questioned. They were clearly expressed during the various debates on relations with the Spanish Government which have taken place in the General Assembly. They were reflected in the various measures taken, which were in keeping with the spirit of resolution 39 (I) of 1946 and some of which were actually taken only by France. It must be recognized, however, that results have not come up to expectations and that the situation in Spain does not appear to have changed.

107. The French delegation cannot see any valid reasons for changing its basic position. It considers, on the other hand, that the decisions proposed to the General Assembly may prove expedient even if they are not justified. My delegation observes, however, that the draft resolution does not involve the revocation of the statements made in the preamble to the resolution adopted on 12 December 1946; it takes note of that circumstance.

108. At a time when the Assembly is about to vote, it is an honour and a pleasure for the French delegation to show its sympathy for the Spanish people — a sympathy which is in keeping with our tradition and the intellectual ties which unite the two countries — by recalling the desire expressed by the United Nations in 1946 to give Spain a warm welcome when circumstances allowed it to enter the Organization.

109. It is our duty to recall the hope expressed in the resolution adopted by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe on 28 August 1950, that the Spanish people may in the near future hold elections and establish a constitutional régime whose representatives may become members of the Consultative Assembly.

110. I should also like to express the hope that Spain may be in a position, as soon as possible, to resume the splendid role conferred upon it by its history and the nobility of its thought in an international community based on equal rights and freedom.

111. Mr. MORA OTERO (Uruguay) (*translated from Spanish*): Not one sponsor in this Assembly has conceded that there is a single new circumstance in the situation which resolution 39 (I), adopted by the General Assembly in 1946, was supposed to remedy.

112. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee itself states: "Indeed, no representative claimed that the present Spanish Government had undergone any change along the lines indicated in the General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1946." The report adds: "Further, a number of the sponsoring delegations and others pointed out that the joint draft resolution, while revoking the recommendations embodied in the 1946 resolution, left intact the condemnation of the Franco régime contained in the 1946 resolution."

113. In pursuance of that very report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, the delegation of Uruguay will vote against the revocation proposed here today.

114. I should add that my delegation has also presented a proposal [A/AC.38/L.11] to the Committee on the subject of membership of the United Nations, the purpose of which is to prevent the admission to membership of any government which has been established with the help of a foreign government. My delegation wishes to remain consistent with its principles in any similar case which may arise.

115. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Before putting the draft resolution to the vote, I call upon the representative of Poland on a point of order.

116. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): When I spoke on a point of order previously, I wished to refer to certain words used by the President to which my delegation must take exception and against which we must protest. When commenting on my explanation of the vote which my delegation would cast on the draft resolution under discussion, the President stated that under the pretext of making an explanation I had made a statement. I believe that my delegation has every right, under rule 88 of the rules of procedure, to make any explanation, and that as long as neither the President nor the General Assembly itself establishes a time limit, each delegation is free to decide what shall be the length of its explanation.

117. I do not doubt that the President knows the rules of procedure better than I, and I realize that as President he should do so. Nevertheless, I wish now to protest against the use of such words and to endorse the request made yesterday [303rd meeting] by the representative of Iraq that the President should show a little more leniency to representatives, which could only facilitate smooth working.

118. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): Broadly speaking I ask only two things of delegations — that they should observe order and that they should not attack each other. I have often said and I repeat it — the President is willing to submit to all sorts of attacks against himself without ruling his attackers out of order.

119. With regard to the remarks of the representative of Poland, I am in complete agreement with him; I had not set any time limit on speeches. If I had, I should certainly have interrupted the representative of Poland. Instead, I allowed him to speak for half an hour. I have told the Assembly that it is the business of the President

to limit the time of speeches. So long as he has not done so, the representative of Poland is fully entitled to make a speech which he can, if he chooses, describe as an explanation or a vote. In the future, the President will try to be a little more indulgent. I do all I can to serve you. I am very grateful for your support. I also thank the representative of Poland for the courteous way in which he raised the matter. I hope the incident is now closed.

120. The representative of Australia has requested that the draft resolution should be voted on in parts, separate votes being taken on the preamble and on the operative part.

121. I put the preamble to the vote.

*The preamble was adopted by 38 votes to 9, with 11 abstentions.*

122. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I now put to the vote paragraph 1 of the operative part. There has been a request for a roll-call vote on this particular paragraph as well as on the draft resolution as a whole.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Indonesia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United States of America, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland.

*Against:* Israel, Mexico, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala.

*Abstaining:* Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia, Burma, Cuba, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, India.

*Paragraph 1 of the operative part was adopted by 38 votes to 10, with 12 abstentions.*

123. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I now put to the vote paragraph 2 of the operative part.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Afghanistan, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United States of America, Venezuela, Yemen.

*Against:* Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Israel, Mexico, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Yugoslavia.

*Abstaining:* Burma, Cuba, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

*Paragraph 2 of the operative part was adopted by 39 votes to 10, with 11 abstentions.*

124. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I shall now ask the Assembly to vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Saudi Arabia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United States of America, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa

Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines.

*Against:* Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Israel, Mexico, Poland.

*Abstaining:* Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia, Burma, Cuba, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway.

*The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 38 votes to 10, with 12 abstentions.*

*The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.*