

130. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union had not as yet been willing to join the comity of nations as a fully participating member. Nevertheless, the invitation was a standing one, and it was hoped that some day soon it would see fit to accept it.

131. To that end, the draft resolution of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee recommended that the Security Council should continue its study of the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces through the agency of the Commission for Conventional Armaments and in accordance with the Commission's established plan of work.

132. Mr. Hickerson wished to point out, in that connexion, that despite the fact that the veto of the Soviet Union made it impossible to put into effect the proposals which the draft resolution called upon the General Assembly to approve, the work and effort which had gone into the development of the proposals need not be wasted. Viewed

from the perspective of future planning, rather than immediate implementation, they fitted readily into the Commission's plan of work under section III of the working paper, which dealt with safeguards for a plan of disarmament. The work thus initiated might go forward in the hope that a feasible plan of disarmament might be evolved. By that time the world situation might happily have changed for the better, so that at least a beginning could be made in putting such a plan into effect.

133. For those reasons, the United States delegation would vote for the draft resolution approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and would vote against the draft resolution of the Soviet Union.

134. The PRESIDENT stated that the list of speakers was closed.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

*Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Monday, 5 December 1949, at 2.45 p.m.*

*President:* General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

### **Prohibition of the atomic weapon and reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council: report of the Security Council (concluded)**

REPORT OF THE *Ad Hoc* POLITICAL COMMITTEE  
(A/1151) (concluded)

1. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that exactly three years earlier, in December 1946, the General Assembly had unanimously adopted its resolution 41 (I) on the regulation and reduction of armaments. That resolution, which also concerned the prohibition of atomic weapons, was of historic importance. Yet the United States representative had not as much as referred to it in his statement at the 267th meeting. The United States had forgotten that resolution and was doing everything in its power to make the whole world forget it. But the peoples of the world remembered that historic decision of the United Nations and knew that the United States and the group of States drawn into its aggressive network were responsible for the fact that it had not yet been implemented.

2. It should be recalled that that resolution had been adopted by the United Nations at the initiative of the Soviet Union, despite the active opposition of the aggressive elements of the Anglo-American bloc. That fact alone was sufficient to demonstrate the futility of the slanderous charges to the effect that the USSR had made no contribution to the cause of disarmament and was opposed to it. It was enough to recall that during the preceding three years, the representatives of the Soviet Union in the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments had submitted nearly thirty draft resolutions, proposals and amendments intended to speed meas-

ures for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

3. A few days after the General Assembly's adoption of its historic resolution 41 (I), two diametrically opposed tendencies had become apparent in connexion with the question of the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

4. The Soviet Union and a number of peace-loving States had urged that that resolution should be implemented so as to strengthen international peace and security, to free humanity from the threat of an atomic war and to reduce the burden of military expenditure which weighed heavily upon all the peoples of the world. The United States and its followers, on the other hand, had done everything in their power to obstruct the implementation of the General Assembly's resolution. That was why all attempts to speed measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons had met with constant opposition on the part of the countries of the Anglo-American camp, and above all on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom.

5. The first blow to the cause of reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons had been dealt by the United States and the United Kingdom at the beginning of 1947. At that time, those countries had forced upon the Security Council and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, which they themselves had created, a resolution providing that the question of the reduction of armaments should be dissociated from that of the prohibition of atomic weapons.<sup>1</sup> They had tried to make two different questions of those problems which, in fact, were intimately linked together, as was shown by the fact that General Assembly resolution 41 (I) had drawn no dis-

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Second Year, Supplement No. 5, Annex 13.

inction between atomic weapons and conventional armaments. The United States and the United Kingdom had therefore openly violated a decision of the General Assembly.

6. There could be no doubt that the reduction of armaments could not be effective unless it was accompanied by the prohibition of atomic weapons; the destructive power of any type of conventional armaments could not be compared to that of atomic weapons. The explosive power of the atomic bomb dropped on the Japanese town of Hiroshima had been estimated by the American Press as representing the equivalent of 2,700 tons of ordinary bombs. Quite recently, the same Press had published a report to the effect that a new atomic bomb had been produced with an explosive power several times greater than that of the bomb used at Hiroshima.

7. According to the American Press, United States General Spaatz had recently stated that in view of the offensive power of atomic weapons, the ninety American super-fortresses equipped with such weapons which were stationed in Europe could be considered as the equivalent of 19,800 super fortresses or 79,200 flying fortresses equipped with the usual armaments.

8. Thus to exclude prohibition of atomic weapons from the measures intended for the reduction of armaments was merely to delude the peoples of the world.

9. That was a situation which the Peruvian representative had not appeared to understand when he had attempted, at the 267th meeting, to justify the stand taken by his country's military ally, the United States. Yet there could be no possible doubt that all those who tried to separate the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons from the question of the reduction of armaments were condemning the Assembly to failure in its endeavours to solve both those problems.

10. The Anglo-American bloc had dealt a second blow to the cause of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons in August 1948, when it had imposed its views on the Commission for Conventional Armaments.<sup>1</sup> Masking their intentions with references to the need for creating an atmosphere of international security and confidence, the United States and the United Kingdom had declared that any reduction in armaments was impossible before effect was given to Article 43 of the Charter, control of atomic energy established and peace treaties signed with Germany and Japan. By such action, they had once more violated resolution 41 (I) which, as was common knowledge, had not laid down any prior conditions. In any case, by so acting, the Anglo-American bloc had put the cart before the horse, for in point of fact, an international agreement would have been the best way to bring about international confidence.

11. Mr. Hickerson, the United States representative, had referred at the 267th meeting to the historical lessons which were to be drawn from the debates which had taken place in the League of Nations on the problems of disarmament and reduction in armaments. He had claimed that the

United States had borne that experience in mind and that it had been at the basis of the stand it had taken.

12. Such assertions had no foundation in fact. The experience of the League of Nations did in fact show that it had been the United Kingdom and France, with the tacit acquiescence of the United States, who had been responsible for the failure of all attempts to reduce armaments and all efforts for disarmament and which had, in that very way, made it possible for the Hitlerite aggressors to arm. It was with that same end in view that the United States was at the moment opposing every practical step in that field and was trying to impose measures which would enable the new aggressors, once more claiming world supremacy, to arm, to continue the armaments race, to practise a policy of aggression and to unleash another war.

13. The peace-loving nations had drawn another lesson from the experience of the League of Nations. They considered that only the adoption of practical measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces, together with the prohibition of atomic weapons, could serve the cause of international peace and security.

14. At the third session of the General Assembly, the United States and the United Kingdom had made every effort to secure the rejection of the USSR draft resolution for the reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the five great Powers.<sup>2</sup> For that purpose they had hastened to advance a new argument: no reduction of armaments or armed forces, they had said, was possible before the States Members of the United Nations had supplied information on their own armaments and armed forces. That was the point of view which had inspired resolution 192 (III) adopted by the General Assembly on 19 November 1948 on the insistence of the Anglo-American bloc. The representative of the United States had recently spoken in praise of that decision, and it was natural that he should do so, for it was acceptable only to those who did not wish to reduce armaments and did not wish to see atomic weapons prohibited.

15. Attention had been entirely concentrated on information about the size of the armed forces and armaments of the States Members of the United Nations. At the same time, and quite inadmissibly, there was absolutely no mention of information on atomic weapons which, as everybody knew, were not defensive weapons, but instruments of aggression and mass extermination.

16. Thus the United States and the United Kingdom had quite openly attempted to avoid the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces. Instead, they had tried to divert discussion to the collection of information, such information, moreover, to bear solely on the conventional armaments of the various States. That attitude had been adopted at a time when the aggressive alliance of Brussels had been nearing completion and the North Atlantic aggressive alliance had been under preparation.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 2, pages 71 to 73 inclusive.*

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, plenary meetings, Annexes, document A/723.*

17. Before that, the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro had set the final seal on the inter-American military alliance which had been formed under the pretext of protecting the American continent, although it was common knowledge that neither the continent as a whole nor the individual countries thereof were threatened by any aggression. As a result of all those manoeuvres, thirty-two of the fifty-nine Member States had found themselves drawn into a system of military alliances created and directed by the United States and the United Kingdom.

18. The way in which the international situation had developed during the previous three years showed conclusively that the whole of that new system of post-war alliances had been created by the United States and the United Kingdom solely in order to further their aggressive plans for world domination, to transform the other countries into colonies of the United States and to deprive States of their sovereignty and make them the slaves of American monopoly capital.

19. As was well known, it was stated openly in the Press of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, as well as by numerous statesmen, that the North Atlantic Treaty and the Western Union had both been established in opposition to the USSR and the people's democracies, despite the fact that the policy of those countries was very obviously peaceful.

20. The purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty had been clearly revealed in the statement published by the USSR Foreign Ministry on 29 January 1949. That statement showed that the leading circles in the United States and the United Kingdom had tried to gain control over as many States as possible, had deprived those States of any independence in their internal and foreign policy and had turned them into useful instruments for the achievement of their own aggressive plans.

21. In harmony with the true wishes of their peoples, who desired international friendship and co-operation, the Soviet Union and the people's democracies were opposed to those plans. That was the chief explanation of the hostile and aggressive attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom towards those countries and that was why they were arming and inciting the countries of western Europe against the USSR and its friends.

22. The facts showed how false it was to state that the North Atlantic Treaty was simply a defensive alliance. They also showed that those who had organized the Treaty were preparing for a new war. They had already prepared a strategic plan of aggression and had turned to study the practical execution of that plan. It was in that connexion that Field-Marshal Montgomery had recently visited the United States.

23. The representative of France, speaking at the 267th meeting, had not succeeded in persuading the General Assembly that western Europe was not preparing for aggression. Anyone who could not see and hear what was going on in that part of the world must either be an aggressor himself or else blind and deaf. France was becoming a parade ground for the new claimants to world hegemony. France was no longer in control

of its own affairs, and foreign generals and field marshals were on its territory preparing plans of aggression and setting up headquarters in order to put those plans into action. That fact alone showed how little the speech made by the French representative corresponded to reality.

24. All those facts proved clearly that the ruling circles of the United States and the United Kingdom had needed new systems of military alliance in order to pursue their policy of aggression. It was not surprising, therefore, that in that atmosphere the discussions in the United Nations on the question of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons had been unsuccessful.

25. At the same time, the Anglo-American warmongers were carrying on unrestrained propaganda for a new conflict. In that international situation, only the death-merchants, the armaments and atom kings of the United States, were in their element.

26. Since 1946, when the General Assembly had adopted its resolution in regard to the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armed forces, the profits of United States monopolies had increased fabulously. According to the report for the first half of 1949 submitted by the President of the United States to Congress, the profits of American limited liability companies had amounted to 38.6 milliard dollars in 1946, to 47.9 milliard dollars in 1947 and to 52.9 milliard dollars in 1948. After taxes had been paid, the net profit of those companies had amounted to 12.8 milliard dollars in 1946, 18.1 milliard dollars in 1947 and 20.1 milliard dollars in 1948.

27. Thus the armaments kings were growing rich thanks to the frantic armaments race which was taking place in the United States and in the countries of western Europe. At the same time, the masses of the people in every country, dragged into military alliances by the United States, and in the first place the American people themselves, were becoming increasingly poorer.

28. It was known who it was that derived profit from the armaments race; the cold war and the preparations for a new war. The purposes of the agents of Wall Street and the City in spreading senseless rumours that the peoples of western Europe feared the intentions of the Soviet Union was also well known.

29. It was also noteworthy that the activities of the representatives of the United States to the United Nations to sabotage measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons and for the reduction of armaments had increased in recent years, in direct proportion to the profits of American monopolies.

30. In its preparations for a new war, the United States was drawing within its orbit not only the States upon which it had already been able to impose obligations under military agreements, but also the States bound to it by agreements providing for the establishment of United States military bases in their territories.

31. According to the American Press, the number of United States bases in foreign territory amounted to several hundred. A statement made in January 1949 by Mr. Royall, United States

Secretary of the Army, indicated that United States bases existed in the Philippines, Newfoundland, Okinawa, Iceland, Greece, Canada, Bermuda and many other countries. In the same statement, Mr. Royall had admitted that the United States was constructing many secret bases in foreign territory.

32. Having taken the path of aggression and of preparations for a new war, the United States and the United Kingdom had considered it essential to bury once and for all the idea of the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons. They and their military satellites had drawn up plans for receiving information on armaments from all States. That step was explained by the fact that the leaders of the aggressive alliances wished to obtain information of that kind especially from the States against which their bellicose policy was directed. Nevertheless, the United States and the United Kingdom were well aware that few States would consent to provide information on their armaments while the United States continued to maintain silence on its atomic weapons. In those circumstances, the Anglo-American bloc would be obliged to try, as Mr. Hickerson had already tried, to accuse others of having caused the failure of the plans that they had prepared themselves.

33. The attitude of the United States in refusing to give information on its atomic weapons together with information on its other armaments was in conformity with the policy which that country had adopted as soon as the problem of atomic energy had been raised, the purpose of which was to enable it to continue the production of atomic weapons.

34. The head of the USSR delegation, Mr. Vyshinsky, had already drawn the attention of the General Assembly to the fact that the United States plan for the control of atomic energy did not provide for putting an end to the production of atomic weapons in the United States. That fact had been mentioned officially in a letter of 17 March 1946 from a commission presided over by Mr. Dean Acheson and addressed to Mr. Byrnes, the then Secretary of State. That document had not yet been refuted in any way.

35. From the rostrum of the General Assembly, the representative of France had tried to distort the facts in order to prove that the Soviet Union was opposed to the establishment of control over atomic energy. Everyone knew that that allegation was absolutely false. The USSR had always asked, and continued to ask, that atomic weapons should be prohibited immediately and unconditionally and that strict international control should be established in order to make that prohibition effective. The peoples of the whole world knew that, whatever the representative of France might say, the Soviet Union was not opposed to the establishment of control over atomic energy; on the other hand, it did object to the "Marshallization" of free and sovereign peoples under the pretext of such control.

36. Mr. Malik wished to draw attention to other facts which also explained the position taken by the United States with regard to the question of

the reduction of armaments and armed forces. Everyone knew that the ruling circles of the United States and the United Kingdom were endeavouring to include western Germany and Japan in their plans of aggression. United States senators were already counting the divisions of German mercenaries that the United States could set up in order to provide cannon fodder in the next war for the establishment of Anglo-American hegemony throughout the world. Mr. Johnson, United States Secretary of Defense, was trying to conceal that fact by vague general allegations that the United States did not intend to arm western Germany; nevertheless, General Bradley, who had accompanied him in his journeys in Europe and had collaborated with him in drawing up plans for aggression, had clarified Mr. Johnson's statements. He had said that the United States did not intend for the time being to arm western Germany.

37. The words "for the time being" seemed to have been introduced because of the opposition of a country for which the rearmament of Germany boded no good. The Anglo-American inciters to war pretended to take France's opinion into consideration, but they were secretly preparing to rearm western Germany and to train an army of mercenaries, consisting of fascists who had survived the defeat.

38. General MacArthur was doing the same in Japan. Thus the Anglo-American militarists were preparing plans to involve Germany and Japan in the struggle against the Soviet Union and to use the territory of those countries as a spearhead for aggression against that Power. That explained why the United States and the United Kingdom refused to conclude treaties of peace with Germany and Japan and why they maintained occupation régimes in those countries. At the same time, with absolute hypocrisy, they asserted that no reduction in armaments was possible until treaties of peace had been concluded with those countries. The aggressive circles of the United States and the United Kingdom were thus creating a vicious circle.

39. To cloak its preparations for war and to increase its armed forces still further, the United States was making use of Article 43 of the Charter, which provided that international armed forces would be created and made available to the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. During the discussions in the Military Staff Committee on the number and composition of the forces to be made available to the Security Council by its five permanent members, the United States had insisted on the creation of forces and armaments which far exceeded the requirements.

40. It might be recalled that four of the delegations in the Military Staff Committee, namely, the USSR, the United Kingdom, France and China, had long since agreed on the number of fighter aircraft which should be made available to the Security Council. The delegation of the United States, however, had not agreed with the other delegations and had pressed for the adoption of a number two and half times higher. An

almost similar situation prevailed where other armaments were concerned.

41. Thanks to such tactics, the United States was preventing any agreement in the Military Staff Committee and by so doing was thwarting any reduction of armaments. At the same time, it asserted that no reduction of armaments was possible until the provisions of Article 43 had been implemented.

42. In its efforts to develop an aggressive system of alliances, the United States was forcing a number of Member States to militarize their economies still further, to increase their armed forces and to inflate their military budgets, which were a heavy burden on the masses of the people. The lot of those masses grew steadily worse every day. Blinded by their dream of world hegemony, the leading circles of the United States cared nothing for the interests of their own people or the people of any other country which had become economically, politically and militarily dependent on the United States.

43. To mask the aggressive tendencies of its foreign policy, the United States, supported by the United Kingdom and France, was carrying on endless conversations in the United Nations on the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

44. The United States was seeking any kind of pretext to delay and impede effective measures in those fields. That was the aim of the draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom submitted to the General Assembly by the majority of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

45. Mr. Malik called that draft the draft of the United States and of the United Kingdom although it had been submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee by the delegations of France and Norway. The latter were the military allies of the former, so that those four countries were certainly settling military questions by joint agreement, as between good allies.

46. The delegation of the Soviet Union was opposed to that draft, for it contributed nothing to the solution of the problem before the General Assembly.

47. Paragraph 2 of the draft resolution asserted that the submission of information on armaments and armed forces would constitute an essential step towards a substantial reduction of armaments and armed forces. The authors of the draft fully realized that such an assertion was unfounded and that it could only mislead the General Assembly and world public opinion. They knew very well that to obtain information only on conventional armaments—atomic weapons being excluded—would contribute nothing to the solution of the problem. Those were but empty phrases to veil the refusal to reduce armaments. In any case, the United States and the United Kingdom had already declared that no reduction of armaments was possible until the conclusion of peace treaties with Japan and Germany, the adoption of the Anglo-American plan on the control of atomic energy and the implementation of the provisions of Article 43 of the Charter.

48. After proposing the collection of information on armaments and armed forces, excluding atomic weapons, the United States and the United

Kingdom had gone a step further and were proposing the establishment of a very strict supervision of the information supplied by Governments. They were proposing that what might be called supervisors of the international control agency should be sent into all countries, and obviously into the USSR and the people's democracies in the first instance.

49. The real purpose of such a system of collection and supervision of information had obviously nothing whatever to do with the reduction of armaments and armed forces. Its purpose was simply to ensure that information should be made available to the general staffs of the States which had united in aggressive alliances aimed, as their organizers themselves had admitted, against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies.

50. To accept the draft resolution of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee in such circumstances would be a sign of unpardonable gullibility. The arguments of the United States representative in the Committee and in the General Assembly had rung false when he had asserted that the collection of information on armaments and armed forces, excluding atomic weapons, would be honest and would contribute to the furtherance of international confidence. In actual fact, there was not a grain of honesty either in that draft or in the work involved. What was certain was that to supply information on armaments, and to keep from the United Nations all information about atomic weapons, could only augment mutual suspicion among governments and could only worsen international relations.

51. Nevertheless, the United States and its military satellites persisted in slandering the USSR by asserting that the latter was opposed to the establishment of an international control system in the field of armaments and armed forces. Mr. Hickerson had repeated that allegation at the 267th meeting. The position which the Soviet Union had consistently taken and the proposals which it had submitted on a number of occasions fully disposed of those arguments. Mr. Hickerson and his colleagues in the United States delegation had heard the representatives of the USSR express their country's views in the Security Council, in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and in the Assembly.

52. Mr. Malik would make yet another direct offer to the United States delegation. The USSR delegation had submitted a draft resolution (A/1169) which read as follows:

*"The General Assembly*

*"Deems it essential that the States should submit both information on armed forces and conventional armaments and information on atomic weapons."*

If the United States delegation were willing to accept that draft resolution, it would certainly be possible to reach subsequent agreement on the question of the control system.

53. The USSR had always demanded, and was continuing to demand, that an international control agency should be set up within the framework of the Security Council, and that steps should be taken to prohibit atomic weapons and to reduce armaments and armed forces. It must be repeated



that the Soviet Union was asking that official and full data on armed forces and armaments of all kinds, including atomic weapons, should be submitted to the international control agency. That had been included already in the draft resolution which the USSR delegation had submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on 17 November. It was surely obvious that it was only the weakness of their position and the lack of valid arguments that made the representatives of the United States distort facts.

54. By submitting the draft resolution of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee to the General Assembly, the Anglo-American bloc in the United Nations was attempting to draw the Assembly into a flagrant violation of the Charter. The Charter clearly defined the relations between the principal organs of the United Nations and, in particular, between the General Assembly and the Security Council. Under the Charter and in established practice, the General Assembly was not competent to ratify proposals prepared or adopted by subsidiary organs of the Security Council, unless the latter had adopted them. The Security Council itself could not examine and ratify proposals from subsidiary organs of the General Assembly unless the General Assembly requested it to do so.

55. Nevertheless, the United States and its military satellites were seeking to compel the Assembly to ratify the proposals of the Commission for Conventional Armaments on the provision of information on armaments, excluding atomic weapons.

56. Desirous of implementing the resolutions of the General Assembly on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments as rapidly as possible, the delegation of the Soviet Union had submitted at the current session the draft resolution, quoted above. It was its belief that the strengthening of peace and international security and co-operation in the achievement of the aims and principles of the United Nations required the implementation as rapidly as possible of the historic resolution 41 (I) which the General Assembly had adopted on 14 December 1946. It was important for that purpose that the Assembly should possess exhaustive data on armed forces and armaments of all kinds, including atomic weapons.

57. All those who had the interests of peace and international security at heart were in duty bound to support the draft resolution of the Soviet Union.

58. Mr. LEQUERICA VÉLEZ (Colombia) wished to define his delegation's approach to the problem of the reduction of conventional armaments and the adoption of a universal system of control of atomic weapons.

59. The arguments which he would briefly outline were the same as those which his delegation had been offering in the Assembly for two years and which it had repeated in the Security Council and the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

60. As the United States representative had said, each nation must make up its mind to be quite

frank and open towards the other members of the family of nations; there must be a real will fearlessly to conduct a comprehensive investigation in every country to ascertain the state of its arms preparations and its future plans for armaments.

61. The Colombian representative recalled that when the Security Council had decided in 1947 that the Commission for Conventional Armaments should deal with non-atomic armaments, while the question of atomic weapons was to be reserved for the Atomic Energy Commission, that decision had been guided by the desire to divide the work in order to avoid jurisdictional conflicts between the two organs. But there could clearly be no hope for the success of the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments if the Atomic Energy Commission failed in its task.

62. The situation had greatly deteriorated since 1947, when the Colombian delegation had believed that the two Commissions would reach agreement; it had deteriorated to such an extent that it was obvious in 1949 that the Atomic Energy Commission had failed.

63. It would be idle to discuss the limitation of conventional armaments in the abstract. Naval or air forces could not be limited unless atomic weapons were first limited or general control of nuclear energy were first instituted. Recent discussions had shown that air and naval forces were regarded as complementary to the atomic weapon; thus new types of aircraft were being designed for the transport of atomic bombs or the interception of planes carrying atomic bombs. It was illogical to call for the reduction of the aero-naval forces of a given country without first restricting atomic weapons. Moreover, nations could not be expected to consent to submit information regarding their air forces when those forces might be required to wage a future atomic war.

64. Nor should it be forgotten that all the disarmament efforts undertaken since the First World War had failed. The Washington Conference on the limitation of armaments, which had dealt with the reduction of naval forces, had not prescribed what types of ships were prohibited; it had been concerned with total tonnage only.

65. Experience showed that no war had ever been won with the weapons existing at the outbreak of hostilities. In time of peace, armaments became obsolete in two or three years and there would therefore be no advantage for countries to receive concrete information on the arms of their neighbours at any given stage in peace-time. Significant information was likely to be confined to five or six essential weapons; thus it was pointless to continue to discuss methods of submitting data on conventional armaments since they became outdated so rapidly.

66. A primary prerequisite for the reduction of armaments was the establishment of complete collective security. Countries would not give up the right to take security measures unless they had adequate guarantees. The great Powers had the

largest quantities of and the greatest means of producing armaments, while the small countries were always the victims of wars. However, the time had come for the small nations to speak out clearly and reject the idea that information could be useful even if it bore on the most recent weapons. The only useful information would be data relating to appropriations for defence and to scientific methods of further nuclear research.

67. The problem of war or peace was in the hands of the permanent members of the Security Council. Until those Powers reached agreement, particularly with regard to atomic energy, any discussion of conventional armaments was pointless.

68. If the representative of Colombia believed that the reduction of armaments and international security depended on the submission of information, he would support the USSR draft resolution calling for full information. But the Colombian delegation would not support that draft because it felt that disarmament depended not on the submission of information, but rather on the establishment of collective security.

69. The Colombian delegation would abstain from voting on the draft resolution of the Soviet Union as well as on the draft submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee because it considered that it would be the greatest possible mistake to deceive world public opinion by giving the impression that the United Nations was solving the problem.

70. It was preferable to admit frankly that the efforts of the United Nations had not succeeded fully, that the world was in serious danger and that it should not place its hopes for a solution of the question in the United Nations, even though the Organization had tried hard. An appeal might be made to world public opinion to exert such strong pressure on the great Powers that they would be forced to find a solution to the problem.

71. In conclusion, the representative of Colombia wished to state that while in the long run the proposals made by the representatives of Egypt and Venezuela in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee might lead to agreement, in the prevailing circumstances their adoption would be inadvisable. The only effective and expeditious procedure would be for all the small nations and all those countries whose industrial development was as yet insufficient to abstain *en bloc* from voting on both draft resolutions submitted to the Assembly, thus demonstrating their disagreement with the systems which had hitherto been established. The debate could then be reopened at the following session of the General Assembly and more effective proposals might be presented in a more favourable atmosphere.

72. Mr. GALAGAN (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), before turning to the substance of the discussion, wished to comment on the remarks made by the representative of France, who had asked why, in the eyes of the Soviet delegations, those who opposed the system of exploitation were heroes whereas those who opposed the equitable social structure established by the workers were considered criminals. The reply was very simple. One group was defending the mass of the people against a small number of exploiters and deserved the respect of all honest

men. The other was defending a small number of exploiters against the mass of the people and deserved nothing but general contempt.

73. Turning to the problem before the Assembly, Mr. Galagan recalled that a short time before, the Assembly had studied the draft resolution of the Soviet Union calling for the condemnation of the preparations for a new war, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of control of atomic energy, and the conclusion, by the five great Powers, of a pact for the strengthening of peace (257th to 261st meetings). The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, in pursuance of their aggressive aims, had secured the rejection of that draft resolution. In acting thus, the leading circles of the United States and the United Kingdom had shown that they were hostile to peace and had indicated once again that they refused to co-operate with the USSR in carrying out effective measures for the maintenance of international peace and security.

74. That cynical attitude on the part of the leading circles of the United States and the United Kingdom towards the draft resolution of the Soviet Union threw an even clearer light on their tactics of sabotage in regard to the question of the reduction of the conventional armaments and armed forces of the five permanent members of the Security Council. An excellent example of the methods employed by the United States, the United Kingdom and their supporters was afforded by the so-called working paper on the future work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments<sup>1</sup> which the members of the Anglo-American bloc were seeking to induce the Assembly to adopt. That working paper had been prepared by France and adopted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments; its sole purpose was to substitute for the question of the reduction of armaments and armed forces the question of the collection of military information for the use of the general staffs of the United States and its allies.

75. The Soviet delegations had never denied that for the purpose of reducing armaments, the States consenting to that step had to furnish exact, authentic and complete information on the state of their armaments and the strength of their armed forces. At the same time, however, they had demanded that the information thus furnished should be utilized for the banning of atomic weapons as well as for the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and that, in addition, that information should cover all types of armaments, including atomic weapons. They had always believed that the ban on atomic weapons could not be something apart from a ban on armaments generally.

76. By contrast, the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc, while pressing for the supply of information on conventional armaments and armed forces, did not wish to take steps towards the prohibition of atomic weapons. At the same time they were continuing their armaments race. Thus it became quite evident that they were attempting to obtain military information from other Governments, not for the

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Fourth Year, Supplement for September 1949, document S/1372.

purpose of the reduction of armaments but for the benefit of their own military intelligence.

77. In distorting the facts, the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc were attempting to make the world believe that the USSR refused to supply information on its armaments and forces and was thus delaying the solution to the problem. That was not true. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR could prove that by referring merely to two documents, namely, the draft resolutions submitted to the Security Council by the USSR delegation on 8 February 1949<sup>1</sup> and 25 February 1949.<sup>2</sup> If those two drafts had been adopted, the Security Council would have been in possession, as early as 31 March 1949, of exact information on the armaments and the strength of the armed forces of its five permanent members.

78. Even while attempting to secure from other States exact data on their conventional armaments, as well as on the strength and disposition of their military forces, the United States was obstinately refusing to supply information on its own atomic weapons. To justify its stand, it claimed that the supplying of information on atomic weapons was properly part of the plan for the control and prohibition of atomic weapons adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 191 (III) of 4 November 1948.

79. It was unnecessary to dwell on that plan, for at the 226th meeting of the General Assembly, the delegation of the Soviet Union had shown how unacceptable it was. As a matter of fact that plan, whose true author was not the United Nations but the famous Mr. Baruch, had been imposed on the Assembly at a time when the majority of the Members of the United Nations, deliberately deceived by assertions to the fact that the United States had a monopoly of atomic weapons, had not been in possession of information concerning the true state of atomic energy development in the various countries. In those circumstances, the General Assembly had not been able to adopt the proper approach to the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of controls designed to ensure that atomic energy was used for peaceful purposes only.

80. In order to justify its refusal to furnish information on its country's atomic weapons, the United States delegation claimed that competence in that matter lay with the Atomic Energy Commission and that therefore information on atomic weapons should not be included in the information on the state of armaments and armed forces in the various countries. Yet the discussion which had recently taken place in the General Assembly on the question of the international control of atomic energy (253rd to 256th meetings) had shown that it was the same United States delegation which had prevented the Atomic Energy Commission from accomplishing its task and which had led it to a hopeless impasse.

81. The prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of controls of atomic energy could not be separated from the general problem of the

reduction of armaments and armed forces. The draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union to the Security Council on 8 February 1949 rightly emphasized that fact. The reason why two bodies had been established in pursuance of resolutions 1 (I) and 41 (I) of the General Assembly, namely, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, had been simply that such an arrangement was convenient from a technical point of view. There had been no idea that the failure of the one would be exploited to sabotage the work of the other, as the representatives of the United States and of their allies of the North Atlantic Treaty were doing.

82. Those facts showed that those who were seeking to induce the General Assembly to adopt the working paper concerning the future work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, wished to secure information on the armaments of other States for their military intelligence services, and at the same time to conceal from the United Nations all information on that instrument of mass destruction, the atomic weapon.

83. In their attempts to deceive public opinion, the United States and the United Kingdom were adducing an absurd argument in favour of the working paper; they were saying that a system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces could be established only in an atmosphere of international confidence and security. That was hardly a valid argument when the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic aggressive bloc were doing their best to poison the international atmosphere. Mr. Galagan took the view that the persistent refusal of the United States to submit information on atomic weapons, while at the same time insisting that other States should supply data on conventional armaments and the strength of their armed forces, must necessarily arouse justifiable suspicion as to its true intentions on the part of those other Governments. Such suspicion was particularly justifiable in view of the fact that the United States was not only strengthening its own armaments, but was arming other countries and inciting them to adopt a policy of aggression.

84. It was difficult to speak of strengthening international confidence and improving international relations when the United States military expenditure for 1949-1950 amounted to 14,300 million dollars, or 34 per cent of the United States budget. That sum did not of course include the 3,500 million dollars appropriated for the development of atomic energy and for other national defence purposes, in other words, for preparations for another war. If the expenditures involved in arming the States signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty were included, as well as those involved in arming certain other countries such as Greece and Turkey, the total military expenditure of the United States for 1949-1950 would amount to approximately 70 per cent of the national budget.

85. At the same time, the United States was forcing the countries parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to pursue the same policy, to militarize their industries and to increase their armed forces, although there was nothing to justify such steps.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Fourth Year, No. 10.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission*, Fourth Year, No. 2.



86. In its issue of 5 August 1949, the *U.S. News and World Report* had stated frankly that the Truman plan for the arming of other countries would turn the United States into an arsenal of the anti-Soviet world. It had said that under that plan, tanks, guns, planes and warships were to be sent abroad, and that particular emphasis would be laid on heavy equipment for armoured divisions.

87. More than 1,000 million dollars had already been set aside for carrying out the plan, and far-reaching measures were in progress for its execution. The United States was in the process of transforming the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty into military bases for the attack it was contemplating against the Soviet Union.

88. When the *U. S. News and World Report* had asked the United States Department of Aviation whether the United States air force had bases outside American territory, the Department had replied officially that it had. There were bases for B-29s in the United Kingdom, western Germany, Saudi Arabia, near Tripoli and on Okinawa. The range of attack from those bases, the Department had said, extended to cities in the USSR. In the case of war, it had added, other bases could be established, under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, in such countries as Italy, France, Portugal, Iceland and Norway.

89. Both in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and in the Assembly, Mr. Hickerson, the representative of the United States, had tried to show that the United States was arming itself and the countries of western Europe solely because it was afraid of the intentions of the Soviet Union. A high degree of political cynicism was needed to uphold such arguments.

90. The real reasons why the United States was arming itself and other countries emerged from the statements of far more important persons than Mr. Hickerson. The statement made to Congress by the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Johnson, on the question of military assistance to the countries of western Europe showed without any possible doubt that the United States was not even thinking of reducing armaments or prohibiting atomic weapons. In fact, when one of the members of the House of Representatives had asked him to confirm that military assistance to other countries did not mean that the United States was abandoning its efforts in the United Nations on behalf of disarmament, Mr. Johnson had said that he regarded all such negotiations on disarmament with suspicion. In his opinion, he had added, peace could exist only if the United States was strong. Mr. Johnson had made a similar statement on 5 October 1949 at the first meeting of the Defence Committee of the North Atlantic Council.

91. In those circumstances, there were grounds for wondering who was speaking the truth, Mr. Johnson, United States Secretary of Defense, or Mr. Hickerson, that country's representative to the United Nations. Judging by the United States Government's activities during the previous few years, Mr. Galagan was inclined to believe Mr. Johnson. It was because of that attitude that the leading circles of the United States, the United Kingdom and France feared all the proposals made by the Soviet Union for the purpose of

ensuring international peace and security, because those proposals were obstacles to their aggressive intentions.

92. The peaceful policy of the USSR had always been supported by the great masses of the people, who knew that it was that country which, in 1922, 1927, 1937 and after the Second World War, had initiated proposals for disarmament, and that it had proposed the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction and regulation of armaments and armed forces.

93. If the United States, and the countries which had become associated with it in pacts of aggression, really wished to strengthen international confidence, it must first of all renounce its own aggressive policy which it was imposing upon other countries. It must agree to the immediate prohibition of atomic weapons and to the establishment of an effective control which would make it possible to assure the world that atomic energy would be used for peaceful purposes only. It must cease all preparations for a new war and all propaganda to that end. It must abolish the military, land, air and naval bases which it had established throughout the world and recall the troops and military missions which were being maintained in the territories of other Members of the United Nations. It must cease interfering in the domestic affairs of those countries. It must accept the proposal of the Soviet Union for the conclusion of a pact for strengthening peace among the five great Powers.

94. The Soviet delegations were being accused of presenting the question of the reduction of armaments in an illogical order, of beginning work at the top of the structure without having first laid the foundations. Arguments of that kind were not new. They had been raised against the USSR delegation in the League of Nations in 1927, and at the Disarmament Conference in 1932. History, however, had shown that the USSR had been right.

95. Those who were asking the General Assembly to adopt the draft resolution of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, which endorsed the proposals submitted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments concerning the information to be supplied by Member States and concerning the verification of such information, maintained that those proposals were preferable to the USSR draft resolution. They said that those proposals provided that the organ of control would check the information submitted by States Members of the United Nations concerning their armed forces and armaments. That that argument was worthless was amply demonstrated by the fact that atomic weapons would not be subjected to control. Moreover, the working paper adopted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments provided that the information would not bear on installations for research, experiments and testing of materials. By using that loophole, some countries would be able to refuse to furnish information on certain armed forces as long as those forces had only such weapons as were still at an experimental stage. Thus the working paper allowed those countries which did not desire disarmament not only not to furnish information on atomic weapons, but also to refrain from furnishing complete data on their

conventional armaments and the strength of their armed forces. Consequently that paper could not serve as a basis for the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments and could not be approved by the Assembly.

96. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would therefore vote against the draft resolution of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee which called for approval, by the Assembly, of the provisions of the working paper adopted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments. It would cast its vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the USSR delegation.

97. Mr. ASTAPENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) had recalled that at the third session of the General Assembly, the USSR had submitted concrete proposals for the prohibition of atomic weapons and for the reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council. Those proposals had also provided for the establishment, within the framework of the Security Council, of an international control organ.

98. That noble step had met with the approval of the peoples of the whole world, who had been impressed by the practical character of the plan. The adoption of the proposals would have made it possible to reduce military budgets, to allocate large sums of money for reconstruction, to raise the living standard of workers and to improve international relations.

99. The United States and the United Kingdom, however, in pursuance of their policy of sabotaging disarmament, had made every effort to prevent the adoption by the General Assembly of those proposals, which had been designed to strengthen peace and to remove the threat of a new world war. Thus the Anglo-American bloc had secured the adoption of resolution 192 (III), which had no meaning and which, except in its title, borrowed from the USSR proposals, made no mention either of the prohibition of atomic weapons or of the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

100. None of the problems concerning armaments and armed forces which had been placed before the General Assembly as early as 1946 had yet been solved. The representatives of the United States and their followers maintained that the establishment of international confidence was a prerequisite for the reduction of armaments. But it was obvious that the best way of establishing that confidence was to reduce armaments and unconditionally to prohibit atomic weapons.

101. It was interesting to note that neither the United States nor the United Kingdom had ever submitted concrete proposals for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments. In the Atomic Energy Commission, the United States had submitted only the so-called Baruch plan,<sup>1</sup> under which all the means of production of atomic energy, all the sources of raw materials and all the plants for transforming those materials were to be placed in the hands of a super-trust under the control of United States monopolies and superior to States, Governments and the United Nations. It had been clear

that a plan of that type did not aim at the prohibition of atomic weapons.

102. Since the Anglo-American bloc refused to prohibit atomic weapons and to reduce armaments and armed forces, it was endeavouring to substitute for the essential problem another problem, namely, that of information to be furnished concerning the strength of armed forces and the conventional armaments of States Members of the United Nations. That was the purpose of the notorious French working paper which had been adopted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments and which was endorsed in the draft resolution adopted by the Anglo-American majority in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

103. It was quite clear that in the circumstances, information thus obtained would serve, not for the reduction of armaments, but for the documentation of the Anglo-American military information services.

104. All those facts showed, moreover, that by sabotaging the USSR proposals, the Anglo-American bloc was endeavouring to divert the United Nations from implementing its resolution 41 (I) and to create a situation in which the United States and the United Kingdom could continue their mad armaments race.

105. It was not difficult to prove that that race was proceeding full pace in all the countries of the Anglo-American bloc, and more particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom. Thus, at the moment, in peace-time, direct military appropriations in the United States for the fiscal year 1949-1950 were twelve times greater than the military expenditure in the years immediately preceding the Second World War. In the United Kingdom, military expenditure was eight times greater than before the recent war. As the message of the President of the United States to Congress on 25 July 1949 indicated, the five countries which had signed the Brussels Treaty, as well as Norway, Denmark and Italy, spent annually, for military purposes, nearly 50,000 million dollars.

106. The armaments race had been transformed into a gigantic business venture which enabled United States monopolies to enrich themselves at the expense of the peoples. That legalized theft at the expense of the masses was continuously increasing; thus—the figures had already been cited, but it might be useful to repeat them once more—the profits of the big United States monopolies had amounted to 7,000 million dollars in 1939, 18,000 million in 1947 and 20,100 million in 1948.

107. By refusing to agree to the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armed forces, the Anglo-American bloc, headed by the United States, was organizing a plot against the peace and security of peoples. It was in order to start aggression, in order to unleash a new world war, in order to realize their mad dream of world domination that the United States had imposed on the countries of Western Europe the notorious Marshall Plan. It was for the same reasons that the United States had brought into being the aggressive North Atlantic Treaty.

108. The parties to the North Atlantic Treaty no longer even sought to deny that the North Atlantic Treaty was directed against the Soviet

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission*, No. 1.

Union and the people's democracies. The United States was constantly striving to consolidate existing military blocs or to establish new ones. It was continually establishing new military land, air and sea bases, both on the territory of States Members of the United Nations, such as the Philippines, Turkey, Denmark, Greece, Iceland and the United Kingdom, and on the territory of non-member States such as Spain, Portugal and Japan. Those bases were situated thousands of kilometres from the United States itself, but in immediate proximity to the frontiers of the USSR and the people's democracies.

109. In Washington, London, Paris and Fontainebleau, plans were being prepared for a new war in which, as had been shown by the scandal which had recently occurred in leading circles of the armed forces of the United States, the place of honour would be reserved to the atomic bomb. Aggressive circles in the United States were proceeding to rearm the countries of western Europe, and the United States Congress had already voted 1,314 million dollars for that purpose.

110. The Conference of Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France and the United States, which had taken place some weeks previously in Paris, had also served the aggressive purposes of the Anglo-American inciters to a new world war. As the Press had indicated, that Conference had decided to include in the concert of western nations the puppet State of western Germany, which was thus given the opportunity of entering the North Atlantic Treaty by a side door.

111. The reason for bringing western Germany into what was called the concert of Europe, was to utilize that country directly for the preparation of a new war. It was not by chance that the industrial and military potential of western Germany was being hastily re-established. It was not by chance that a member of the House of Representatives of the United States had proposed that an army of mercenaries should be formed with Germans from western Germany. It was worth pointing out, in that connexion, that that Congressman had been enraged at the mere idea that Americans might doubt that Germans wished to shed their blood in a struggle against the Soviet Union to defend the interests of United States monopolies.

112. But those who were worried were right, for history showed them the sad fate of the Hessian troops sent by the British crown against the Americans who, under the leadership of Washington, had been fighting for their freedom and independence. That was a lesson of the distant past. Other more recent lessons showed that certain people, in their efforts to transform their mercenaries into armies of the Kuomintang, had spent 6,000 million dollars and had met with a complete and shameful defeat; the most serious defeat in the history of the United States.

113. The insensate plans of aggressive Anglo-American circles, their desire to establish their domination over the whole world, to create an Anglo-American empire of Anglo-Saxon race, were the real reasons which had prevented agreement on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments.

114. Those who were preparing for a new world war attempted to frighten simple people and to

deceive the public by spreading fantastic tales about a so-called threat from the East. Their efforts were doomed to failure. All the peoples of the world knew very well who was leading the armaments race, who refused to condemn the preparations for a new war, who refused to conclude a pact for the strengthening of peace, who was preventing the signature of an agreement for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments. The movement for peace was continuously developing throughout the whole world. The aggressive plans of the Anglo-American warmongers must be foiled.

115. The General Assembly had before it two draft resolutions. The first, which had been presented by the delegations of France and Norway to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, had been adopted by that Committee on the proposal of the Anglo-American bloc. Neither its title nor its content was commensurate with the problem before the General Assembly. It proposed the collection of information on conventional armaments and armed forces of States Members of the United Nations. That question had nothing to do with the real problem before the General Assembly; namely, prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR would vote against that draft resolution, as it had already done in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

116. The other draft resolution had been presented by the USSR. It laid down the need for all States Members of the United Nations to furnish information on their armed forces and armaments including atomic weapons. It was the only draft which might lead to the adoption of the necessary practical measures. For that reason the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR had supported the draft resolution in Committee and would continue to support it in the Assembly.

117. Mr. MONTEL (France) said that before the Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and on the USSR draft resolution, he wished to draw attention to the need for giving the former draft a suitable title.

118. Certain delegations had asserted, during the discussion, that it was incorrect to speak of the delegations of France and Norway as the authors of the draft resolution submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and adopted by that Committee; they had claimed that those two delegations had simply lent their names to the draft. It had also been said that the French and Norwegian delegations had deliberately confused matters by omitting the question of disarmament in respect of atomic weapons.

119. Those assertions presented an excellent opportunity for dispelling any such misunderstanding. It should be recalled that it had been on the basis of a draft resolution submitted originally by France and Canada that the Assembly had adopted its resolution 299 (IV) on the regulation and control of atomic energy, whereas the draft resolution under discussion applied solely to conventional armaments.

120. Mr. Montel asked therefore that before voting on the substance of the draft resolution of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, the Assembly should take a decision regarding its title, namely,

"Regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces". Thus the subject matter of the draft would be perfectly clear and unambiguous.

121. Mr. Montel's request was intended only to clarify the discussion by showing that the reason why the delegations of France and Norway had not mentioned the question of atomic energy in the draft resolution which they had submitted in Committee was that they had not wished to confuse two questions which were of course connected and which must be settled in a plan for collective security, but which were being studied by two separate Commissions.

122. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) wished to say a few words with reference to the French representative's statement.

123. It was not the first time that objections had been raised to the title of the item before the General Assembly. A similar attack had been made by the Anglo-American bloc in the Security Council during the consideration of General Assembly resolution 192 (III) of 19 November 1948. The title was "Prohibition of the atomic weapon and reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council." Having rejected the USSR proposals for the preparation of practical measures for reducing armaments and prohibiting atomic weapons, the Anglo-American bloc wished even to eliminate the title embodying the lofty and generous concept of those proposals.

124. It was perfectly obvious that the meaningless resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its third session, as well as the draft resolution which was before the Assembly at the current session, did not correspond to that title. The Anglo-American bloc wished to omit from the resolution which the Assembly was to adopt at its current session any reference to the prohibition of atomic weapons and to concrete measures for the reduction of armaments. Moreover, none of the speakers of the Anglo-American bloc—neither the representative of the United States nor the representative of France, nor any other representative—had mentioned resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946. They had forgotten it and wanted to make others forget it, but they would not succeed.

125. The title which the Anglo-American bloc had imposed upon the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and which it was trying to impose upon the General Assembly, did not correspond to the substance of the draft resolution either, for the draft did not deal with reduction of armaments, but

with information on conventional armaments and armed forces. To be honest, the draft resolution should be called "information to be supplied on armaments and armed forces".

126. The PRESIDENT asked the Assembly to vote on whether the words "Regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces" were to be retained as the title of the draft resolution of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

*The title was adopted by 40 votes to 5, with 8 abstentions.*

127. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the draft resolution of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (A/1151).

*The resolution was adopted by 44 votes to 5, with 5 abstentions.*

128. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the USSR draft resolution (A/1169).

*The draft resolution was rejected by 39 votes to 6, with 9 abstentions.*

### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece (concluded)**

129. The PRESIDENT announced that the delegation of the Soviet Union had withdrawn its draft resolution (A/1080) concerning the suspension and repeal of death sentences pronounced in Greece, and that the delegation of the United Kingdom had withdrawn its draft resolution (A/1116) concerning the competence of the General Assembly to adopt the USSR draft.

130. The delegation of Ecuador had submitted to the Assembly a draft resolution (A/1207), the substance of which had already been approved by the First Committee.<sup>1</sup> The text of the draft read as follows:

*"The General Assembly*

*"Requests the President of the General Assembly to ascertain the views of the Government of Greece concerning the suspension of death sentences passed by military courts for political reasons, as long as the Conciliation Committee is in existence."*

131. The PRESIDENT put the draft resolution of Ecuador to the vote.

*The resolution was adopted.*

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, First Committee, 298th meeting.*