

TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Monday, 5 December 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Prohibition of the atomic weapon and reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council: report of the Security Council

REPORT OF THE *Ad Hoc* POLITICAL COMMITTEE (A/1151)

1. The PRESIDENT, in the absence of the Rapporteur of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, drew the Assembly's attention to the report of that Committee and the accompanying draft resolution (A/1151)¹.

2. Mr. HOFFMEISTER (Czechoslovakia) pointed out that the title of item 24 of the agenda had been changed by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee by the usual majority, which was always willing to vote for anything proposed by one of the military allies of the United States. The vote of 36 to 5, with 3 abstentions, whereby it had been decided that the draft resolution should be entitled "Regulation and Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Armed Forces", showed that in fact the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had not fulfilled the task with which it had been entrusted, or at least that it had dealt with that task only so far as the second part of item 24 was concerned. That had not been an omission. The draft resolution submitted to the Committee by the Soviet Union, short as it had been, had corresponded to the task entrusted to the Committee. That draft resolution had been rejected. Perhaps it had been too logical for the inevitable anti-Soviet majority. Nevertheless, the majority had been weakened by 14 abstentions. Those 14 abstentions were very significant because they seemed to indicate that something had been forgotten in the draft resolution submitted by France and Norway. That something was nothing less than the atomic bomb.

3. People everywhere, working in the factories and in the fields, trusted the United Nations to deliver them from the fear of war. The atomic bomb had become the symbol of the threat of war which had brought fear upon the whole world. The responsibility lay with the United States, which had not only manufactured the atomic bomb but had made of it the symbol of the threat of war, thus fostering the hopes of the warmongers.

4. The people in the countries of the known majority often believed what they were told by their papers, radio commentators, senators and even by their representatives in the General Assembly of the United Nations. But still deeper in their hearts rested the conviction that war was a crime and a scourge. That was their conviction even about the war which was being prepared by the United States and its military allies against

the Soviet Union. The working masses in Western Europe did not want to fight for United States world rule; they would never fight against the USSR. And it was well known that the nucleus of the western European armies, which the United States generals were ready to throw into the American war, was recruited from the working class.

5. Trustworthy sources reported that United States and United Kingdom military experts doubted the reliability of the armies of their western European allies, for the reasons Mr. Hoffmeister had already mentioned. The United States would have to look for better gun fodder, and it was said that Field-Marshal Montgomery had already found what he needed in his new Hessians.

6. It was well known that the western Powers, in all their three sectors of the western zone of Germany, but especially in the United States sector, had ideologically armed the former nazis, and had fostered the illusion of an early return to Czechoslovakia of those Germans who had been transferred from Czechoslovakia to Germany, all of whom had been passionate supporters of their *Fuehrer*. The seed of doubt about the unchangeability of the eastern frontiers had already been planted in their minds. The idea of German revisionism was being nurtured in German minds not yet cured of the lust for world conquest. Western Germans, with help from the West, were preparing themselves for a new German mission. What that mission was to be could be learned from several sources which forecast the coming rearmament of Germany, not only with revisionist illusions, but with tanks and guns.

7. There had been too many denials that the western Powers wished to rearm Germany for these denials to be accepted at their face value. They were stressed so much only in order to quiet the qualms and uneasiness of Germany's western neighbours, but it was known that the rearmament of Germany had been taken into account and was still being taken into account, and that it had merely been postponed for the time being.

8. The representative of the United States might choose whether to state that the American Press was misinforming its public, or whether to admit that Czechoslovakia—a close neighbour of Germany that had been attacked many times—was justified in expressing concern about the persistent news that Germany would be armed. In that connexion, Mr. Hoffmeister quoted certain passages from an article in the *New York Herald Tribune* of 23 November entitled "Use of Germans in West Europe Army Forecast".

9. It was not only Czechoslovakia that was concerned by the veiled and unconfirmed rumours to which he had referred. Thus Mr. P. H. Teitgen, spokesman for the French Cabinet and Minister of Information, had stated that France could not remain in a security system that entailed the rearmament of Germany. He had made

¹ For the discussion on this subject in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, see *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 38th to 43rd meetings inclusive.*

that statement when it had already been officially declared that the Ministers for Foreign Affairs had not discussed the question of arming Germany, and it had been published simultaneously with the statement of General Omar Bradley to the effect that the rearmament of Germany depended upon the North Atlantic community and the Western Union. He had added that once that issue had been decided upon and Germany had been economically restored, the Germans' military position would be considered.

10. Mr. Hoffmeister wondered whether France had the right of veto in the North Atlantic Council, a veto which it opposed so vehemently in the United Nations, or if French interests could be overruled by a simple United States majority.

11. United States Senators were less cautious. Senator Elmer Thomas, Democratic Senator from Oklahoma, had said that he considered Germany necessary to the defence of western Europe. He had therefore concluded that several divisions of German troops should be armed by the United States without Germany itself being permitted to manufacture arms.

12. Democratic representative Joseph Pfeifer of New York had told reporters that Germany should by all means be included in the Western Union. He had said he also favoured eventual rearmament "within the framework of the United States of Europe".

13. The *New York Herald Tribune* had published an editorial entitled "Johnson and the Germans" which stated, *inter alia*, that both French chiefs of staff commanding ground forces, General Georges Revers and General de Lattre de Tassigny, who bitterly disagreed on everything else, agreed on purely military grounds that there must be some degree of German rearmament. The article further stated that all western military chiefs were convinced that the defence of western Europe was likely to prove enormously difficult in case of war without German ground troops, and that they were wholly convinced that the defence of Germany itself was totally impossible without German troops.

14. The Defence Committee formed under the North Atlantic Treaty had unanimously agreed on an armament production programme. The *New York Times*, in its issue of 1 December, had published a report from Paris stating that French officials had expressed disappointment that the organization under the North Atlantic Treaty had brought far less reassurance to the continent than had been hoped. The report had stated the reasons for that, one of which being fear lest United States aid might not prove quickly decisive. Another reason given was the apprehension that the lack of western European man-power might lead the United States sooner or later to seek enlistment of German man-power, which the French recognized as logical from the military point of view.

15. It was futile to waste the time of Members of the United Nations in discussing a plan for the reduction of armaments and armed forces when at the same time representatives of certain States were discussing among themselves the full rearmament of the North Atlantic group and the creation of new armed forces with the use of former *Hitlerjugend*.

16. A special wire from London to *The New York Times* had announced that if the meeting of the North Atlantic Council were successful, the whole military aid appropriation of 1,400 million dollars would become available for the strengthening of the West's defences.

17. That, however, was not all that the United States spent on armaments. According to the *New York Herald Tribune*, Senator Edwin C. Johnson, while pleading with a television audience for more secrecy in American atomic development, had disclosed that the United States Atomic Energy Commission was working hard to devise an atomic weapon one thousand times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

18. An official United States spokesman had thus announced what the world could expect. Yet many members of the General Assembly seemed to think that the question of atomic armaments was not worth including in the questionnaire to the great Powers. It was inconceivable that they should maintain the pretence of a sincere wish to disarm.

19. Nevertheless, the picture of the armaments discussion in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had clearly shown a certain uneasiness on the part of the participants. In the light of subsequent events, it was easy to understand why some members had participated with so much reluctance in the discussion on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction by one-third of armaments and armed forces. They had known that at the same time that they were discussing the reduction of armaments, their respective Parliaments were voting for increased military budgets.

20. For instance, the largest item in France's new budget was for military expenditure. The working people in their homes, in the factories and in the fields, were left, and would be left, to wait for a decision which eased the burden put upon them by the armaments race. Because they were simple and logical people, they expected that the plan for a reduction in armaments would also include reduction in and prohibition of atomic weapons.

21. The common man was told that the atomic bomb was a weapon, and it was very difficult for anyone to deny that. But the members of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had decided, by a vote of 42 to 5, with 5 abstentions, in favour of the draft resolution of France and Norway, that they did not care whether or not they disappointed the common man's expectations.

22. The representative of the people's democracy of Czechoslovakia knew very well that they belonged to the camp of nations which would never attack anybody. No one need fear the nations of the people's democracies, which were preoccupied with the reconstruction of their devastated lands, and whose peoples were exerting admirable efforts to transform their countries into homes of happy men, into socialist States. They were nurturing no plans for world hegemony, neither industrially, nor commercially, nor militarily, nor financially, nor atomically. They wanted freedom from fear of war, and they therefore wanted the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces, believing that that would be the first step towards world peace and a better understanding among nations.

23. The Czechoslovak delegation could not vote for the draft resolution of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, because it saw therein nothing but the culmination of efforts to kill the idea of disarmament, mutilated already in previous years and by earlier resolutions, by ever more vague and weaker implementation of the original intentions put before the General Assembly in times when everyone had still fully felt what war was, and what it could be in the future. Czechoslovakia was neither ready nor able to forget the recent war.

24. The Czechoslovak delegation would vote for the draft resolution of the Soviet Union (A/1169) and expressed the hope that the wisdom of the people would prevail over the interests of the war industrialists and the war-mongers.

25. Mr. WOLD (Norway) wished to make a few brief comments on behalf of his delegation, as it had been one of the authors of the draft resolution adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

26. From the very outset, the General Assembly had taken the strongest and most serious interest in the question of the regulation of armaments, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 11 and 26 of the Charter.

27. During its first session, the Assembly had adopted two important and fundamental resolutions, namely, resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946, dealing with the problems raised by atomic energy, and resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946 on the principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments. Mr. Wold thought there was general agreement that those resolutions were among the most important that the General Assembly had ever adopted. They had been inspired by the serious and sincere concern of all Member States and they had been adopted unanimously.

28. In the light of those circumstances, and in view of the clear responsibilities imposed on Member States in the relevant Articles of the Charter, it was unfortunate that after nearly four years so little progress had been made towards the solution of the problem. That scant progress was not only very disappointing, but it also constituted a danger which threatened the whole future of the United Nations. Moreover, it seemed to be almost impossible for either the Atomic Energy Commission or the Commission for Conventional Armaments to make any further progress in its work. Everyone realized how serious the consequences would be if international co-operation in that field could not be continued.

29. In its resolution 41 (I), the General Assembly had recognized the necessity of an early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. That necessity was still just as urgent, if not more so. The debate in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had shown general agreement on that point. There also seemed to be agreement regarding the important general principles which should apply both to disarmament and to the regulation of armaments. It was agreed that full information and effective international

control were necessary. If, therefore, the Member States really meant what their representatives said, there was a very definite basis for agreement on that vital issue.

30. The General Assembly should therefore request that the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments should continue so that every effort could be made to reach a solution. If no solution were reached, it would then be perfectly clear what had formed the final obstacle to such a solution, despite the existing agreement in principle. It would also be clear which Member States bore the moral responsibility for preventing the achievement of agreement on such a fundamental issue.

31. During the discussions, the USSR delegation had argued that information on conventional armaments could not be given unless information on atomic weapons was given simultaneously, and had introduced a draft resolution to that effect. That draft did not, however, reflect the real situation, for all delegations agreed, and had stated repeatedly, that it was essential that full information should be given both on conventional armaments and on atomic weapons.

32. It was quite clear that the question of disarmament and regulation of armaments included the question of conventional armaments, armed forces and atomic weapons. It should be the aim of the United Nations to reach agreement on the prohibition of atomic weapons and on the regulation of conventional armaments and armed forces under a system of effective international control.

33. At the same time it was clear that different means would have to be used in order to achieve that aim. For technical and scientific reasons, the two questions were dealt with by two different Commissions, which was in full conformity with the two basic resolutions adopted at the first session. That was nothing more than a practical way of approaching the work. It did not mean, and it had never been intended to mean, that the two questions were not interrelated or that they could be solved independently. They were both basic issues which would have to be solved if peace were to be secured.

34. Some representatives had maintained in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee that the aim of the draft resolution submitted by France and Norway was to delude members into believing that information on atomic weapons was not necessary for the solution of the question of the reduction of armaments. That was obviously untrue, since the draft resolution was based on the opposite concept. The question of disarmament and the regulation of armaments could not be solved unless the atomic question were solved; full information on both conventional armaments and atomic weapons was necessary. No plan dealing with armaments and armed forces could be put into operation unless there was also a plan relating to atomic weapons.

35. In the view of the Norwegian delegation, the working paper on the receipt, checking and publication of full information with regard to effectives and conventional armaments, drafted by the French delegation¹ and adopted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments,² was good and reasonable. It was based on full reciprocity,

¹ See document S/C.3/40. This document was later presented to the Security Council under the symbol S/1372 and appears in the *Official Records of the Security Council*, Fourth Year, Supplement for September 1949.

² See document S/C.3/SR.19.

and did not require any Member States to give information which other Member States would not have to give at the same time. It was true that information regarding atomic weapons had become at least as important as, if not more important than, information on conventional armaments and armed forces. On that ground, the delegation of the Soviet Union had maintained that it did not wish to give information on any part of its country's armaments and weapons, if such information was not given by all Member States at the same time.

36. That attitude was to be expected in view of the prevailing mistrust among the great Powers; that fact must be faced. The early submission of full information on conventional armaments and armed forces would certainly have constituted an essential step towards a substantial reduction of armaments. Since, however, agreement on that point could not, for the time being, be reached, the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had stated in its draft resolution that that impasse must not be allowed to stop the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The main intention of that draft resolution was that the Commission for Conventional Armaments should continue its work, keeping in mind not only resolution 192 (III) of 19 November 1948, but also the basic resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946.

37. The time for the submission of information would have to be decided upon later, when the difficult work on the plan for the regulation and reduction of armaments reached a more developed stage. At the same time, however, the plan of work laid down by the General Assembly itself and by the Security Council must be retained. The question of atomic weapons was dealt with by the Atomic Energy Commission, and information on those weapons should be submitted only in accordance with the plan on atomic energy which it was the task of the Atomic Energy Commission to work out.

38. The question of disarmament and the regulation of armaments was a difficult and complex one. Experience had confirmed that fact. It would not be practical—or even possible—for one organ to attempt to solve all the aspects of the question. That did not, however, in any way imply that Member States in one Commission had, or should have, any opportunity to gain an advantage at the expense of other Member States during the work of the other Commissions. When all those Commissions had worked out acceptable plans in their respective fields, those plans would have to be co-ordinated in a general system of collective security. Only as part of such a system would any of those plans be put into operation.

39. The main and basic difficulty was the lack of confidence between the Powers. In existing circumstances, therefore, there might not be much prospect of progress in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, but every effort should be made. Military burdens weighed heavily upon the Members of the United Nations, and there was little hope of any reduction of those burdens if the armaments question were not solved and if agreement were not reached on a general system of collective security. It was deplorable, especially for the war-devastated countries of Europe, that at a time when every effort and every resource should be used to rehabilitate and to rebuild after

the war, a large proportion of the national income was being used for armaments and military expenditures. Thus it was necessary, both for international peace and for the sound social and economic development of Member States, that the United Nations should be able as soon as possible to solve the problem of disarmament and the regulation of armaments.

40. The debate in Committee had seemed, in spite of everything, to give some hope that a solution might eventually be achieved. Even if the current session of the General Assembly had not become, as the President had hoped at the beginning of its work that it would become, an Assembly of peace, it had, on that and other important issues, served to make it clear to all that, regardless of deep and fundamental differences, international life would be impossible without collaboration in the United Nations on the basis of the Charter.

41. In conclusion, Mr. Wold wished once more to stress that if results were to be achieved, it was essential that States should display more confidence in one another as Members of the United Nations. There could be small hope of disarmament when Members accused each other of preparing a new war. If it were true that no Member State wished for a new war—and he was convinced that it was true—then there was no foundation for accusations of that kind. All the work in the Organization had only one objective—peace. Members must believe that all other Members of the United Nations really wanted and were striving for peace and security, as they were pledged to do by the Charter. It was in that spirit that the Commission for Conventional Armaments should go to work.

42. Mr. MONTEL (France) thought that the regulation and reduction of national armaments would not be an easy task even if the same spirit of international co-operation and good will prevailed among all Members of the United Nations. That task in any conceivable circumstances required that all States should apply the same standards in estimating the demands of their internal and external security, that a system of collective security such as that envisaged by Article 43 of the Charter should be put into effect, so that the size of the forces necessary for national security might be reduced and, finally, that the control system—which would be effective only if it were complete—should extend its technical investigation to every corner of the globe.

43. The regulation and reduction of national armaments, however, became far more difficult when the spirit of co-operation was replaced by suspicion on the part of States as to each other's intentions, when certain of them obstructed the application of the provisions of the Charter concerning collective security and when the same States, instead of laying down the arms which they had had at the end of hostilities, devoted and still continued to devote a considerable proportion of their economic resources to the production of more and better armaments, and persisted in entrusting their destinies to their military might alone.

44. At the current stage of discussion of the problems of disarmament in the United Nations, France was anxious that the situation should be

clear in the minds of all. It had suffered too greatly from the wars which had ravaged its territory, it had too much to fear from a fresh conflict, it had placed too great hopes in international organization to make it possible for anyone to doubt its good faith, its impartiality and its ardent desire for peace. During the debate on the USSR draft resolution or a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (257th to 261st meetings), the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Vyshinsky, once again assuming the role of public prosecutor, had gone so far as to accuse the United Kingdom and France of having been the instigators of the Second World War. It was of course easy to understand his desire to justify the German-Soviet pact and to contradict the records, which had become historical documents. France, however, had the right—and intended to exercise that right without passion but with great firmness—to recall that it had gone to the defence of Poland, which had been attacked in succession by two aggressors well known to everyone and had been partitioned in pursuance of secret agreements, which proved premeditation beyond the shadow of a doubt. Such were the historical facts; and the fanciful version of the foreign policy of the USSR could not alter them, nor could propaganda pamphlets and still less certain protestations of gratitude, the echoes of which would vibrate painfully in the hearts of loyal Poles.

45. Mr. Montel wished to depict to the General Assembly the situation of the world in relation to the forces whose explosion was to be feared and which it was the task of the Assembly to contain, measure, regulate and reduce. Once the problem was stated in clear terms, the means to deal with it would be easier to find.

46. On the one hand, when hostilities had terminated, and when the United Nations had been set up and the Charter had been about to come into force, a general and spontaneous disarmament by the western Allies had been virtually accomplished. The powerful forces which had contributed to the defeat of Hitler's Germany and its allies had been reduced almost to zero. The United States, the United Kingdom and France, like their western Allies, had laid down their arms so fast and had done so with so little desire to resume them, that many of those armaments had not even been put in condition for further use and had been dispersed, sold or destroyed. Within a few months, the great war armies had been reduced, by mass demobilization, to the few units necessary for internal security and the occupation of ex-enemy countries. The industries which had constituted the war potential, and in particular the American industries which had supplied arms to all the Allied Powers, including the USSR, had been rapidly converted and had returned to peacetime production. The controls and directing machinery which had organized that vast potential had been quickly abandoned, dispersed and abolished. It was worth noting that that had been done at the behest of those very countries which were being accused of imperialism.

47. It might be asked whether that imperialism, supposing that it existed, had since then reconstituted the military power necessary for the designs attributed to it. It might be asked whether the controls and directing machinery had been re-

established and whether the industries had been reconverted to war purposes. It might be asked whether the vast armies requisite for aggression had been reconstituted.

48. It was common knowledge that such was not the case and that there was no sign in the western countries of any preparations for aggression. Their sole military activity had been confined, and that only recently and precisely because they had disarmed, to preparations for possible defence. They had done their duty and no one could blame them for it.

49. It was claimed that the United States had established the supremacy of its power by means of the atomic weapon and a strategic air force. In reply to that it could be said that the United States did in truth enjoy exclusive possession of a possible instrument of war. That country relied on that exclusive possession to guarantee its security and that of all the western countries. The attitude of the USSR obliged free peoples to congratulate themselves on that fact. It could also be said it was not the fault of the western Powers that international control and regulation of atomic energy had not been established more than two years earlier. The world knew whence endless obstacles had come, what methods of camouflage had been employed and what means of propaganda had been used.

50. There were two ways in which a nation could busy itself with the state of its armaments. The first was to place itself in a position to defend itself from danger and to reply to aggression when aggression seemed possible. That was the attitude of the western countries. The other was to accumulate all the economic and military resources necessary for aggression, to shroud those resources in jealous secrecy, to reject any effective and adequate control which would be the best proof of a spirit of mutual international understanding and then, supported by that formidable apparatus of power in the midst of an almost unarmed world or a world which it was desired to keep unarmed, to accuse others of harbouring the designs which one had every appearance of harbouring oneself and, with supreme hypocrisy, to proclaim oneself the champion of peace. That was the attitude of the Soviet Union.

51. After the war, the USSR, far from disarming, had maintained and improved its military equipment. In that connexion Mr. Montel recalled that the cost of armaments to the American or French taxpayer had been expounded upon at length; he would like it to be shown in what circumstances it was possible for a Soviet soldier to be maintained at no cost to Soviet workers and peasants. The USSR maintained such huge armies that it was no exaggeration to estimate their peacetime strength at several million men, forming an impressive number of divisions, a large proportion of which were armoured and airborne; all those forces were organized in battle formation, each with a strategic objective and a planned line of march. An those forces merely constituted the active nucleus of a war-time army comprising a much larger number of divisions which, with a powerful modern air force and navy, represented a gigantic army unprecedented in history. There were also large forces assembled and trained in a variety of para-military formations which were outside all possible control. Nor

was it rash to add the armed forces of certain countries, some of which at least were already officially commanded by Soviet generals.

52. The industrial production feeding that military machine was expanding constantly, and no distinction was made between civil and military objectives in a régime where the State made its decisions arbitrarily.

53. The Soviet Union had been able to add the atomic weapon to its powerful apparatus of force. That fact explained clearly enough why the USSR so vigorously opposed any effective control of atomic energy and, in particular, why during the current year it was rejecting the quota system which it had formerly accepted for the control of nuclear energy.

54. What would the USSR have the world believe was the purpose of its enormous military power which had thus been built up during the years in which the United Nations had been attempting to construct a system of collective security and to inaugurate general disarmament?

55. It could hardly be for self-defence, for if it were, the disproportion between the military machine of a country which had to restore its devastated areas and provide for the needs of its population, and the reasonable military forces maintained by other States was enormous.

56. That indeed had given the free peoples yet another cause for alarm. The USSR had made its power felt in its relations with the nations under its influence. How was it possible not to fear that it might wish to add more and more to the territorial expansion already accomplished?

57. That apprehension was confirmed by the activities of that astonishing machine called the *Cominform* which, with an organization like that of a clandestine international Government, with its offices and its armed police, was responsible for controlling the States of the so-called people's democracies and preparing for similar control in the States which were still free.

58. The representative of the Ukrainian SSR had attempted to prove that the *Cominform* was a product of spontaneous generation, a historical movement, and that, in any case, it was not a tool of the USSR. He had omitted to explain by what inverted logic it could be argued that the *Cominform* worker fighting against the established order in a so-called bourgeois country was a hero and a saint, whereas the man fighting for freedom in a State governed by a proletarian dictatorship was a traitor to be executed without the benefit of trial. Surely every democratic State and Government was entitled and in duty bound to defend itself against that new weapon of destruction from within. If the *Cominform* were not in reality controlled by Moscow, it would have refrained from taking any action against communist States such as Yugoslavia, whose crime had been to defend its national independence while remaining firmly communist.

59. It was against that background of world insecurity that the Assembly was called upon to deal with the problem of the regulation and reduction of armaments.

60. The Soviet Union had constantly obstructed the sincere efforts towards disarmament undertaken in the last few years by France together with many other countries. Only once had it abandoned that negative attitude, and then only to raise the bidding. It had proposed the reduction by one third of the armed forces of the great Powers.¹ Who could fail to see the ineffectiveness of a method of disarmament which would leave the USSR in a position to keep the same relative power and to continue its methods of violence? That USSR proposal at last had the merit of making still clearer the need for control and for genuine disarmament which would place the military power of every country without exception at a reasonable level fixed by common agreement.

61. The delegations of France and Norway had had that very object in mind in submitting the draft resolution which had been approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and was now before the Assembly. That draft resolution did not commit the Assembly to purely procedural and negative solutions; nor did it have the effect of creating an illusory and dangerous situation. It merely asked the Assembly to declare that the United Nations intended to continue its efforts to implement the resolutions already approved by a large majority.

62. The strength of the United Nations lay in world public opinion. It would not be laying itself open to reproach if, in that problem of disarmament, it honestly pursued its task in the hope that concern for world public opinion would guide the opposing parties back into the ways of wisdom and loyal co-operation.

63. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that the draft resolution submitted to the Assembly by the USSR delegation, which was identical with the draft submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and rejected by that Committee, raised an important question of principle in a simple, clear and direct form.

64. Ever since the General Assembly, by its resolution 41(I) of 14 December 1946, had recommended that the Security Council should formulate the measures which were essential for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, the majority had undermined every one of the USSR proposals for the reduction and regulation of armaments.

65. At the third session, every possible argument, pretext or stratagem had been brought into play in order to conceal from world public opinion the Anglo-American bloc's fundamental opposition to the reduction by one-third of the armaments of the great Powers, as proposed by the Soviet Union.²

66. Mr. Wierblowski would not go into the details of that fallacious line of argument. At the third session, the United Kingdom representative had argued against the proposal of the Soviet Union, alleging that it was unlikely to convince the peoples of the world that that Power was in good faith and had nothing to conceal; that argument had certainly not convinced the peoples of

¹ See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, Plenary Meetings, Annexes, document A/723.*

² For the discussion on this subject during the third session, see *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, 161st to 163rd plenary meetings, and First Committee, 153rd to 160th, 194th, and 196th to 199th meetings.*

the world that the Anglo-American bloc wanted disarmament.

67. As had been emphasized before, the USSR, following its traditional peace-loving policy, had submitted to every session of the General Assembly proposals for the establishment of a lasting peace and, more specifically, for disarmament. The reply of the Anglo-American bloc had always been the same: it had armed. Furthermore, it had done so quite openly, even going so far as to boast of it, and uttering threats to the USSR, which had constantly warned it of the dangers of such a policy.

68. At that very meeting, the French representative had repeated, yet again, the old story of the aid given Poland by France in 1939. That question had been discussed several times during the current session of the General Assembly, and Mr. Wierblowski did not think it necessary to refute once more that fictitious tale, which distorted the facts and served above all to slander the USSR and to injure the unshakable friendship uniting Poland and that Power.

69. The most unlikely arguments had been advanced to secure rejection of the USSR proposals which had been so warmly welcomed by enlightened public opinion in all parts of the world.

70. The representative of Belgium, for example, at the third session of the General Assembly, had fallaciously concluded that, since the Italian fascists had used poison gas against Ethiopia, it was futile to prohibit the use of the atomic bomb unless control of the manufacture and possession of that weapon was first established.

71. To prevent the execution of resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946, the Commission for Conventional Armaments had claimed that the question of atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction did not fall within its competence.

72. There again a fallacious argument had been used, for if, under the general heading of reduction of armaments and armed forces, the question of weapons of mass destruction must be dealt with separately from that of conventional armaments, it might just as well be claimed that conventional armaments themselves should be further sub-divided and that, for example, separate considerations should be given to weapons for individual destruction, weapons for the destruction of groups, weapons for the destruction of large groups, and so on.

73. The absurdity of such reasoning on the part of the Powers wishing to evade the requirement of supplying information on atomic weapons became still more apparent if it were realized that in such circumstances it would be logical to establish a commission for revolvers, for example, a commission for machine-guns, and so on.

74. At the third session, when the delegations forming the minority had referred to the existence of a convention for the outright prohibition of the use of poison gases, the Anglo-American bloc had put forward the specious argument that such a convention had been possible because all States, or almost all, were in possession of poison gases or could obtain them, and that the fear of reprisals and nothing else made prohibition effective. That argument had been used when the Soviet Union had proposed the simultaneous im-

plementation of prohibition and control of atomic weapons. Obviously—and that still held true—the Anglo-American bloc, sure of superiority, had wished merely to have its hands free.

75. But the situation had changed since then. The illusion so long cherished by the Anglo-American bloc, the illusion on which it had built up its entire foreign policy and the Baruch plan, the illusion that it held a monopoly, had been shattered on the day when the President of the United States had announced that the USSR had the secret of the atomic bomb.

76. The Anglo-American bloc had not been prepared for that news. Finding itself suddenly deprived of its supposed monopoly, it had frantically accelerated the armaments race, deluding itself with the hope that it could attain numerical superiority. There was little need to stress the dangers of such a policy and to point out how far it diverged from the principles on which true peace was based.

77. The draft resolution of the Soviet Union had been submitted after the official statement that that country was in possession of the atomic bomb had been made both in Moscow and in Washington. Surely there was no more striking proof of the good faith of the USSR which, as in the past, continued to press for the prohibition of atomic weapons. There could not be the slightest shadow of a doubt as to the sincerity of that great Power since, although it possessed the atomic weapon, it proposed that it should be deemed essential that the States should submit both information on armed forces and conventional armaments and information on atomic weapons. Never had a more direct issue been put to the Assembly.

78. From the words of the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc it might be thought that they agreed to the prohibition of the atomic weapon provided that international control over the manufacture and possession of that weapon was first established. It might be thought that they agreed to the reduction and regulation of conventional armaments and armed forces, provided that such reduction and regulation did not cover atomic weapons. But surely, before anything was controlled, it was necessary to know what was to be controlled. Furthermore, it was quite obvious that there could be no disarmament if conventional armaments were reduced without the reduction and regulation of the atomic weapon.

79. Accordingly, the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc did not agree to reduce and regulate armaments and armed forces, since they claimed that conventional armaments had to be differentiated from atomic weapons. Of course there was a difference; there was a qualitative difference between those two types of weapons, comparable to the difference between, for instance, the bayonet and the tank. From that point of view the difference was obviously essential. But the attitude of the various States towards the submission of information on atomic weapons was the touchstone of their sincerity in the matter of a solution of the problem. There could be no talk of disarmament if the most terrible, the most destructive and the most inhuman of all weapons were excluded and if a frenzied race to produce armaments of mass destruction continued to be possible.

80. If disarmament, with all its implications, were desired, then no distinction could be drawn, with regard to the information to be supplied, between conventional armaments and atomic weapons; for armaments could hardly be regulated and reduced unless the States submitted information concerning armaments of all kinds. If such information were not submitted, then there would be nothing to control. It was clearly impossible to reduce a quantity of unknown magnitude.

81. All those questions were so simple and clear that it was difficult to understand how they could be met with an answer such as that which the Anglo-American bloc was giving, namely, that those who were asking them were acting in bad faith.

82. It was common knowledge that the United States was increasing its armed forces and its military expenditures. As reported in the *U. S. News and World Report* of 26 August 1949, it had prepared a detailed plan for the invasion of Europe providing for the use of the atomic bomb, a series of bases in various countries and an increase of from seven to forty divisions in the French land forces to fight for the United States.

83. The United States Government had concluded the North Atlantic Treaty and was working out in detail the military obligations of all the signatories. The Defence Committee, consisting of the Defence Ministers of the twelve signatories, which had recently met in Paris under the presidency of Mr. Johnson, had not only adopted a vast strategic plan, but it had also accepted the United States proposals for the immediate rearmament of the countries of western Europe.

84. The explosion of the new atomic "super-bomb" at Eniwetok would be another step in the policy of rearmament. Determined to arm, the United States was blocking any plan for genuine disarmament. One of the proofs of that was what was happening in western Germany, where a puppet Government had been set up which was nothing but a mouthpiece of the United States State Department and was full of former nazis. After having kept silent for a long time, the American Press itself was admitting as much. There was open talk, official and unofficial, of the rearmament of western Germany and the establishment of a German army. Field-Marshal Montgomery had recently stated, in the course of a secret conference with representatives of Wall Street held in New York, that the rearmament of western Germany was essential and that public opinion in the United States must be prepared for it.

85. That was not all. The rearmament policy of the United States had created an atmosphere such that the head of the German puppet Government, Mr. Adenauer, had had the audacity to say in an interview reported in the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* of 4 December that it was not only just but necessary for the United States to grant military aid to western Germany because, if a choice must be made between the danger represented by the Soviet Union and the danger of German reconstruction, the Soviet danger was the more serious.

86. Those were the words of the head of a puppet Government set up on a territory which, according to the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements, was to have been placed under the control of the

four Powers concerned, one of which was to be the Soviet Union. Thus, a puppet, which said only what the United States State Department told it to say, was inciting to war.

87. Poland, a neighbour of Germany and the first victim of hitlerite aggression, had the right to put that issue clearly.

88. That striking example of the war policy of the Anglo-American bloc, that example of its policy of encouraging German revisionist tendencies, of rearming western Germany and encouraging the re-emergence of hitlerite elements in positions of authority, proved how justified were the accusations of the minority.

89. That was why the world must be warned, particularly those countries which had not passed through the sorrowful experiences of the war. That was why Poland felt bound to voice its fears. It realized where such a policy might lead.

90. The contrast with the peaceful policy ceaselessly pursued by the USSR and the people's democracies was very forcible. Having emerged from the war weakened and ruined, those countries had concentrated all their efforts on domestic policy, on the reconstruction and development of their national economies and, in foreign affairs, on a lasting peace.

91. From the very rostrum of the General Assembly, slanders of all kinds had been hurled upon those countries; yet in spite of everything, nobody had dared to assert that those countries were, like the United States, engaged in an armaments race. The people's democracies and the USSR, as shown by the draft resolution submitted by the latter, desired only peace, had nothing to hide, and were ready to accept any genuine system of international control.

92. But insincerity and fallacious reasoning marked all the professions of the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc regarding international control. They criticized the Soviet Union for wanting to place the system of control within the framework of the Security Council and thus subject it to the rule of unanimity.

93. In reply to a specific question from the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Vyshinsky had stated categorically at the third session that the unanimity rule would in no case apply to decisions of the control agency. Two years earlier, Mr. Molotov had given the same assurances.

94. As Mr. Wierblowski had recalled in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, the Polish delegation had deemed it fitting to repeat, when submitting a draft resolution to the General Assembly at its third session,¹ that the international control agency, established within the framework of the Security Council, would be responsible for supervising and controlling the application of measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces, on the understanding that the affirmative vote of all the representatives of the States which were permanent members of the Security Council would not be required for the adoption of such decisions of the international control agency as affected measures of verification and inspection by that body.

¹ See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, plenary meetings, Annexes, document A/732*.

95. That draft resolution which the minority had felt was likely to allay all the fears of the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc had been rejected in the Committee. Yet it was the USSR which was being accused of bad faith.

96. It was wearying to listen to a repetition of the same absurd charges, and to ask questions which were never answered. Thus the United States representative had been asked what steps his Government had taken to reduce its military expenditure; whether or not it was true that it interfered in the internal affairs of other countries; what it had done, under the provisions of resolution 110 (II) of 3 November 1947, to combat the dangerous activities of war-mongers in the United States. But if the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc thought that they were deceiving world public opinion by voting against the USSR draft resolution, they certainly overestimated the power of their propaganda. They should not forget that, as Lincoln had said, all the people could not be fooled all the time.

97. Mr. CISNEROS (Peru) wished to indicate briefly the reasons why his delegation would vote in the Assembly as it had voted in Committee.

98. At the moment, there was no way of convincing the USSR and the delegations which supported it that the task of preventing war could be initiated by means of a uniform one-third reduction in the conventional armaments and in all the armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council. Those delegations had stated that they desired such a reduction, provided that at the same time the manufacture and use of atomic weapons were prohibited.

99. Nevertheless, when it was attempted to ensure such prohibition in the only effective form, namely, by means of permanent international control commencing with the raw materials and ending with the factories, those delegations became indignant and affirmed that such control would constitute an infringement of national sovereignty, that their Governments were the real lovers of peace and that the United States, the United Kingdom and the other Governments which followed their lead were the ones which were preparing for war.

100. The USSR and its supporters desired the reduction of armaments, but did not wish to reveal their own. They did not consent to control of atomic energy except as far as other countries were concerned. Other countries were to be wide open to the vigilance of public opinion, both national and foreign, but the Soviet Union and its supporters did not want control to be established so easily over their own closed territories. Even if they accepted such control, they proposed to establish strict supervision of the measures whereby it could be made effective. They wanted the prohibition of the use of the atomic weapon, but only for others; they would not agree to consider a reduction of conventional armaments until after the atomic weapon was banned.

101. As early as the San Francisco Conference, when peace had not yet been established, the prospects for the future had begun to appear ominous, for the USSR had given the first indications of its disruptive tendencies, which had necessitated the adoption of unfortunate compromises. Because of the growing insecurity created by the

Soviet threat, the American countries had joined in signing the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, thereby confirming once and for all their united purpose to defend the American continent.

102. Mr. Cisneros pointed out that that Treaty was simply a solemn endorsement of a pledge. It was not directed against any country and had no other purpose than to defend America against any potential aggressor, including the Soviet Union should that country attack an American nation. To say that that Treaty was an instrument of war was to misinterpret it and to slander the whole American continent, for those who were raising the spectre of war were not the nations of the West.

103. At the 258th meeting, the representative of the Ukrainian SSR had said that a third world war would result in the triumph of communism throughout the world, just as the first had brought it to power and the second had led to its consolidation. He could not have realized the implications of his words, for if the communists felt or knew that a third war would mean victory for them, surely none but they would seek to provoke it. But Mr. Cisneros believed that such a statement was simply one more blast in the bombardment of words and gestures which had produced so much smoke from the rostrum. He hoped that the communists would finally be forced to the conclusion that war would be a catastrophe for the whole world, including themselves. That was why those who persisted in pleading the cause of common sense, of law, justice and love for one's fellow man, were following the right course.

104. In conclusion, the Peruvian representative once more urged the great Powers to agree to disarmament and to co-operate in finding a solution to that vital problem.

105. Mr. HICKERSON (United States of America) said that the question before the General Assembly was whether the Commission for Conventional Armaments had made a proper and acceptable response to the request contained in General Assembly resolution 192 (III) of 19 November 1948.

106. That resolution had called, first, for a census of conventional armaments and armed forces and, secondly, for a system of inspection and checking to ensure the accuracy of that census. That seemed a modest request, particularly when contrasted with the sweeping proposal introduced at the third session by the Soviet Union.

107. By summarily rejecting the USSR draft resolution and adopting in its stead the provisions of resolution 192 (III)¹ the General Assembly had demonstrated a wisdom learned from the vain attempts at disarmament made between the first and second world wars, when many countries, including the United States, had not yet learned that successful disarmament could be achieved only in an atmosphere of international security and confidence, and under a system of international control which constituted an effective guarantee of the continuing good faith of all participating nations. A few States—including, somewhat significantly, France and Norway, the co-sponsors of the draft resolution adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and submitted to the

¹ See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I*, 163rd plenary meeting.

Assembly—had recognized even then those facts of international life. Most countries, however, had had to learn them through the bitter experience of a second world war, made possible by the clandestine preparations of nazi Germany.

108. Those lessons had been fresh and vivid in the minds of those primarily responsible for drafting the Charter at San Francisco. It was thus no accident that throughout the provisions of the Charter bearing on disarmament there was a recognition of the necessity for establishing an atmosphere of international confidence and security before attempting concrete action in the way of disarmament.

109. It was in the light of that principle that the General Assembly at its third session had discarded so quickly and decisively the Soviet Union's specious proposal for the reduction of armaments by one-third. And it was in accordance with the same principle, in an effort to obtain some slight improvement in conditions of world confidence and security, that the General Assembly had adopted its resolution 192 (III), requesting the census of conventional armaments and armed forces.

110. Speaking in support of that resolution at the third session, the representative of the United States had said that the arms census for which it provided would represent work which was perhaps unspectacular, but it would be honest work and would provide a solid foundation upon which the Assembly, at its following session, could proceed to develop further the essential bases of peace.

111. A year later, not only had no solid foundation been laid, but not even an excavation had been dug. There could be no doubt who was responsible for that record of negation and frustration.

112. The Commission for Conventional Armaments had responded to the request contained in resolution 192 (III) by developing a set of proposals calling for a count of the conventional armaments and armed forces of Member States, and providing for a system of adequate verification of the count. Those proposals had been adopted by a substantial majority of the Commission over the opposition of the Soviet Union. The proposals had then been introduced in the Security Council,¹ where they had received the approval of nine of the Council's eleven members, but had been vetoed by the Soviet Union.² After full consideration, the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, by a vote of 42 to 5 with 5 abstentions, had adopted the draft resolution of France and Norway which endorsed those proposals.

113. That record spoke for itself. The only question which it left unanswered was why the Soviet Union had blocked the proposals by the exercise of its veto. Nowhere in all the discussions which had taken place in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, in the Security Council, or in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, had any challenge or criticism been made of the proposals on the ground that they were inadequate or ineffective. On the contrary, those speaking in support

of the proposals had emphasized and re-emphasized their basic honesty evidenced in the guarantees which they afforded for the accuracy and validity of the information submitted. Similarly, those who had spoken in opposition to the proposals had complained vigorously of their tightness and completeness. Thus, for example, the representative of the Ukrainian SSR had criticized the proposals because they would call for information concerning reserve forces as well as regular components. The USSR representative had also condemned them because they would require disclosure of the administrative organization of armed forces, information which he had characterized as being an essential top secret. Those criticisms were significant because they disclosed the true basis of the Soviet Union's opposition to the Commission's proposals.

114. The United Kingdom representative, speaking in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on 16 November 1949, had accurately described the Soviet Union's position when he had said that that State was unwilling to let the rest of the world know the actual state of its armaments and armed forces, and that it was unwilling even to let the rest of the world know what, in the ordinary democracies which it was so ready to describe as reactionary, was submitted in Parliament, published in the daily papers and broadcast on the radio.

115. In its customary fashion, the USSR delegation had sought to conceal its true intentions and to create confusion by making wild charges of espionage and by introducing a specious counter-proposal calling merely for the submission of information concerning conventional armaments and armed forces, with no provision for verification. To add to the confusion, it had combined its proposal for information on conventional armaments and armed forces with a proposal for information on atomic weapons, disregarding the fundamental differences between the two fields which made it impossible to deal with them under one and the same plan.

116. The USSR proposal had already been decisively defeated both in the Security Council³ and in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. No one should be deceived as to why it had nevertheless been introduced for a third time, in document A/1169. It was merely another attempt to generate a smokescreen of confusion to obscure the refusal of the Soviet Union to participate in the United Nations plan for the control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons. The USSR refused to agree to a census of armaments and armed forces on the ground that the census failed to include a count of atomic weapons. In almost the same breath, its spokesmen refused to join in a co-operative venture under the United Nations plan which would render any count of atomic weapons academic, because it would render the weapons themselves completely non-existent.

117. Everyone agreed that the field of atomic weapons and the field of conventional armaments and armed forces were two segments of the same general area. Everyone agreed that the one field could not be dealt with effectively while the other was ignored. And all reasonable thinking people recognized that there were fundamental differ-

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Fourth Year, No. 46.

² *Ibid.*, No. 48.

³ *Ibid.*

ences between the two fields which required that they should continue to be dealt with separately and in different ways. Ultimately, of course, when the details had been sufficiently developed in each field, they would have to be co-ordinated and integrated within an over-all plan or system of collective security. But it must be borne in mind that the count of conventional armaments concerned weapons which were to be regulated and, it was earnestly hoped, reduced. It must also be understood that the United Nations plan for control and prohibition of atomic weapons was designed to secure the complete abolition of atomic weapons and their elimination from national armaments. The United States wanted to abolish them in accordance with that plan, not to count them. The Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union alone, had blocked the signing of a convention or conventions carrying out the United Nations plan for the control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

118. That had been clearly understood by the great majority of the Member States ever since the first session of the General Assembly. The USSR had striven persistently to becloud that clear understanding by advancing one proposal after another for merging the two problems into a welter of confusion from which no useful solution could possibly emerge. That same persistence of purpose underlay the draft resolution which it had submitted to the Assembly. It should meet with the same summary rejection as the earlier proposals.

119. It should be rejected also for its failure to provide for any inspection or other means of verifying the information submitted. That omission had characterized the other superficial proposals which had been introduced by the Soviet Union on the same question.

120. In effect, the draft resolution submitted by the USSR meant that that Power would submit information and that the world would have to take the accuracy of that information on trust. The USSR would not tolerate any verification.

121. During the discussion on atomic energy in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, Mr. Vyshinsky had repeatedly asserted that the Soviet Union was willing to open wide its doors for periodic inspection of atomic facilities. Periodic inspection of atomic facilities was wholly inadequate to cope with the problem of effective control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons. But since the USSR representative had indicated willingness to allow periodic inspections, Mr. Hickerson had inquired in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee whether that willingness extended to the field of conventional armaments and armed forces, a field where periodic inspection would be suitable. There had been no response to his inquiry.

122. The United States Government would not expect other nations simply to take whatever data it might submit, without question. Similarly, it did not feel that other nations should be asked by the Soviet Union simply to take whatever data and information it might care to submit.

123. If the United States was willing to lay open its records and facilities in order that the information it submitted might be properly checked and

verified, Mr. Hickerson failed to see why the USSR should be unwilling to do likewise.

124. The processes of a true democracy, where the people insisted on being kept fully informed of whatever action was being taken by the heads of their Government, provided a reasonably accurate test of the validity and correctness of any information submitted by such a Government. No equivalent guarantees could be derived from the governing processes employed in the Soviet Union.

125. It was strange that the very nations which had been attacked so vehemently as war-mongering and aggressor nations were, without exception, willing to accept the proposals of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, with all that they entailed in the way of inspection and checking, whereas the only nations which had persistently refused to accept them were the accusing nations which professed none but the most peaceful intentions.

126. Yet the proposals provided for complete reciprocity. They demanded no more information from one nation than they required of another. They exposed no nation to any more inspection and checking than any other nation. It was therefore a manifest absurdity for the representatives of the Soviet Union to vilify those proposals as a dastardly scheme of espionage against the armed strength of their Government. With such an attitude of secretiveness, they should not be surprised if their intentions were suspect. That was the core of the whole problem.

127. Mr. Hickerson recalled his statement in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee to the effect that the nations of western Europe were not rearming because they were opposed to disarmament, and the United States was not helping them to rearm because the United States was opposed to disarmament. They were rearming, and the United States was helping them to do so, because they feared the intentions of the Soviet Union.

128. He had further stated that the USSR had it within its power to make possible a real lasting improvement in the atmosphere of international relations, without which there could be little hope of any real progress towards the goal of world peace. That, after all, had been the real purpose of General Assembly resolution 192 (III). Its basic purpose was not the mere collection of information, since any information resulting from the implementation of proposals such as those of the Commission for Conventional Armaments would be but a means to an end. The essential objective sought was the engendering of world confidence, which it had been thought would result from an exchange of verified information. It had been hoped that that would encourage and stimulate the taking of further steps towards the goal of world peace.

129. If the Soviet Union were willing to join in accepting those proposals for a census and verification, the really significant result would not be the information eventually resulting therefrom. Rather, it would lie in the fact that for the very first time, in matters affecting the peace and security of the world, the USSR had been willing to join the family of nations in a truly co-operative enterprise.

130. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union had not as yet been willing to join the comity of nations as a fully participating member. Nevertheless, the invitation was a standing one, and it was hoped that some day soon it would see fit to accept it.

131. To that end, the draft resolution of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee recommended that the Security Council should continue its study of the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces through the agency of the Commission for Conventional Armaments and in accordance with the Commission's established plan of work.

132. Mr. Hickerson wished to point out, in that connexion, that despite the fact that the veto of the Soviet Union made it impossible to put into effect the proposals which the draft resolution called upon the General Assembly to approve, the work and effort which had gone into the development of the proposals need not be wasted. Viewed

from the perspective of future planning, rather than immediate implementation, they fitted readily into the Commission's plan of work under section III of the working paper, which dealt with safeguards for a plan of disarmament. The work thus initiated might go forward in the hope that a feasible plan of disarmament might be evolved. By that time the world situation might happily have changed for the better, so that at least a beginning could be made in putting such a plan into effect.

133. For those reasons, the United States delegation would vote for the draft resolution approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and would vote against the draft resolution of the Soviet Union.

134. The PRESIDENT stated that the list of speakers was closed.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Monday, 5 December 1949, at 2.45 p.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Prohibition of the atomic weapon and reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council: report of the Security Council (concluded)

REPORT OF THE *Ad Hoc* POLITICAL COMMITTEE
(A/1151) (concluded)

1. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that exactly three years earlier, in December 1946, the General Assembly had unanimously adopted its resolution 41 (I) on the regulation and reduction of armaments. That resolution, which also concerned the prohibition of atomic weapons, was of historic importance. Yet the United States representative had not as much as referred to it in his statement at the 267th meeting. The United States had forgotten that resolution and was doing everything in its power to make the whole world forget it. But the peoples of the world remembered that historic decision of the United Nations and knew that the United States and the group of States drawn into its aggressive network were responsible for the fact that it had not yet been implemented.

2. It should be recalled that that resolution had been adopted by the United Nations at the initiative of the Soviet Union, despite the active opposition of the aggressive elements of the Anglo-American bloc. That fact alone was sufficient to demonstrate the futility of the slanderous charges to the effect that the USSR had made no contribution to the cause of disarmament and was opposed to it. It was enough to recall that during the preceding three years, the representatives of the Soviet Union in the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments had submitted nearly thirty draft resolutions, proposals and amendments intended to speed meas-

ures for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

3. A few days after the General Assembly's adoption of its historic resolution 41 (I), two diametrically opposed tendencies had become apparent in connexion with the question of the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

4. The Soviet Union and a number of peace-loving States had urged that that resolution should be implemented so as to strengthen international peace and security, to free humanity from the threat of an atomic war and to reduce the burden of military expenditure which weighed heavily upon all the peoples of the world. The United States and its followers, on the other hand, had done everything in their power to obstruct the implementation of the General Assembly's resolution. That was why all attempts to speed measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons had met with constant opposition on the part of the countries of the Anglo-American camp, and above all on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom.

5. The first blow to the cause of reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons had been dealt by the United States and the United Kingdom at the beginning of 1947. At that time, those countries had forced upon the Security Council and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, which they themselves had created, a resolution providing that the question of the reduction of armaments should be dissociated from that of the prohibition of atomic weapons.¹ They had tried to make two different questions of those problems which, in fact, were intimately linked together, as was shown by the fact that General Assembly resolution 41 (I) had drawn no dis-

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Second Year, Supplement No. 5, Annex 13.