

each delegation had delivered speeches so full of sincerity and conviction. The Soviet Union should take to heart the example of fifty-three widely separated countries, with different political institutions, cultures and cultural modalities, yet following only the dictates of their conscience.

168. The USSR should also take into consideration the desire for peace common to all countries. When they had voted against the proposed pact, all the delegations had expressly signified their desire that negotiations should continue through the marvelous medium of inter-governmental consultation which the New World had passed on to the Old World as a token of thanks for having created it and having transmitted its civilization to it.

169. But nobody could believe himself infallible. Young countries should do no more than reiterate their hopes, their anxiety or, as Unamuno had put it, "their agony for peace".

170. Mr. GONZÁLEZ ALLENDES (Chile) moved the adjournment of the meeting.

171. The PRESIDENT announced that three representatives still wished to speak on the subject before the Assembly: the Chilean representative, the Brazilian representative, who wished to explain his vote, and the USSR representative who wished to reply to some previous remarks.

172. As several representatives interested in certain of the subsequent items on the agenda of the Assembly were desirous of leaving on Friday, 2 December, he left it to the Assembly to decide whether it would adjourn, on the proposal of the Chilean representative, or continue the discussion and proceed to the vote.

The motion for adjournment was adopted by 28 votes to 10, with 8 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Thursday, 1 December 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Condemnation of the preparations for a new war, and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace: report of the First Committee (A/1150) (concluded)

1. Mr. OSTRIA GUTIÉRREZ (Bolivia) said that before explaining his delegation's vote, he wished to correct the statement made at the 260th meeting by the representative of the Byelorussian SSR, namely, that Bolivia, under pressure from United States capitalist interests, had negotiated a loan from Dillon, Read and Co. in order to make war on Paraguay. That was quite untrue, because Bolivia had obtained that loan many years before the Chaco war and had devoted the whole of it to building railways.

2. Furthermore, the assertion that that war had been incited by United States trusts was equally false and ridiculous, because its real cause had been the territorial dispute over the Chaco, which had lasted almost a century; and Bolivia had conducted the war thanks to its own mineral resources and the heroic sacrifices of its people.

3. The conduct of the Bolivian people which had been inspired by the eternal ideal of patriotism, could not be intelligible to representatives of countries which had no will of their own and lay under the tyranny of fanatical and transient dogmas. Fortunately, distortions such as those of the representative of the Byelorussian SSR did not change historical truth and could not harm the brotherhood and friendship of Bolivia and Paraguay, which had risen above disaster at the close of the sanguinary Chaco war and which had buried the hatchet.

4. Mr. Ostria Gutiérrez reiterated the explicit statement made by the representative of Bolivia in the First Committee¹ to the effect that Bolivia

could not accept the USSR draft resolution: condemnation of the preparations for a new war, and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (A/1149). On the other hand, it reaffirmed its support of the draft resolution on the essentials of peace submitted by the United States and United Kingdom delegations and approved by the First Committee, because that draft resolution not only reasserted the principles of the Charter, but also provided a guarantee for the peace and security of the weaker countries and a pledge that their freedom and independence would be respected in the face of any act or threat likely to lead to civil strife and to the subversion of the will of their peoples.

5. The Bolivian delegation felt that the first sentence of paragraph 3 of the draft resolution of the Soviet Union expressed an idea which appeared in a clearer and more complete form in the draft resolution of the First Committee. It considered, therefore, that each draft should be voted on as a whole, and either adopted or rejected as a whole, because any one provision, taken separately, might lend itself to misinterpretation and give rise to confusion. Bolivia would support the draft resolution of the First Committee and would vote against the USSR draft resolution.

6. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) said that during the debate in the First Committee as well as in the discussion in the Assembly, the Soviet Union had suffered its greatest reverse to date in the United Nations. The unanimity of the fifty-three democratic countries had exposed the vassals of Moscow to the moral censure of a peace-loving, but vigilant, public opinion.

7. Apart from the Stalinist profession of faith made at the 258th meeting by the representative of Poland, nothing new had been revealed during the debate. On the contrary, the Soviet delegations and the delegations which supported them had once more accused the democratic countries of following the United States and the United

¹ For the discussion on this subject in the First Committee, see *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, First Committee, 325th to 337th meetings inclusive.*

Kingdom in preparing for war against the USSR. That accusation had been rejected in the First Committee by an overwhelming majority.

8. The representative of Chile asserted that those delegations had failed to answer a number of charges, which he proposed to repeat:

(i) The USSR had enlarged its territory by annexing Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, as well as parts of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, and was proposing to continue its expansion towards the west through eastern Germany and Yugoslavia;

(ii) It had forced pro-Soviet communist governments on Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Albania;

(iii) It had encouraged and financed the civil war in Greece;

(iv) It had blockaded Berlin and had established a puppet government composed of German communists, trained and tamed in Moscow;

(v) It had declared an ideological war on Yugoslavia and had mobilized its tributary States to blockade that country economically, politically and militarily;

(vi) It had violated its treaties with China and had taken possession of Mongolia, Manchuria and part of China through the Chinese Communist Party;

(vii) It had prevented the establishment of a united and independent Korea;

(viii) It was helping and financing communist movements in Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia and Malaya;

(ix) It had sabotaged European reconstruction by opposing the Marshall Plan and refusing to co-operate with other countries;

(x) It was encouraging the struggle of various communist parties against the economic development of under-industrialized countries, lest with a better standard of living in those countries Soviet propaganda in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and Asia were irrevocably doomed to failure;

(xi) It remained within the United Nations only in order to use that forum for purposes of propaganda, and refused to co-operate with the specialized agencies and to support most of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly;

(xii) It had cut itself off from the civilized world; it forbade its nationals to marry foreigners and refused to allow those who had already married foreigners to leave its territory;

(xiii) It maintained an army far in excess of normal peace-time needs.

9. The Chilean delegation had accused the USSR of endangering peace through its two-faced international policy, one of the faces being the international communist movement. The preceding day, the Press had published the decisions of the third session of the *Cominform*, which reproduced exactly the statements and insults of the Soviet delegations and which were the same as those which were being disseminated by the Soviet communist parties of the world.

10. The non-communist nations were continually under the threat of possible aggression by the USSR and were suffering within their territories from the anti-national action ordered by the

Cominform. It was part of the functions of the United Nations to ward off the communist peril.

11. It was not sufficient that the First Committee had approved a draft resolution, which would mainly also be approved by the Assembly, recalling the fundamental principles of international conduct for ensuring peace. The next step was to study ways and means of achieving peace. In order to guard against the aggressive intentions of the USSR and its imperialist tendencies, various measures had been taken, including collective security agreements, in particular the North Atlantic Treaty; but other measures were necessary, because those security agreements only related to security from external danger and did not take account of the internal communist movements at the service of the *Cominform*.

12. National unity in the democratic countries had to be safeguarded lest movements arose within their frontiers that owed loyalty to the *Cominform* and framed their policy to suit the interests of the USSR. Opposition to the parties affiliated to the *Cominform* was one of the fundamental conditions for the maintenance of peace and one of the replies to the recent provocative resolutions of the third session of the *Cominform*. When the Soviet Union had dissolved the Third International, it had given the impression that it had freed communist parties from their allegiance to Moscow. That step had really been dictated by imminent danger. But if the USSR was not prepared to treat the *Cominform* in the same way in 1949, the democracies must put an end to Soviet activities on their own territory, as had been done by Chile, which had felt the effects of communist action and had seen the danger in time. Chile, by a decision of its free Parliament and of its independent courts as well as through the executive action of its democratic Government, had denied the Soviet communist party the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, and had done the same with all anti-democratic groups and organizations. It had also denied them the right to make and disseminate anti-democratic and anti-national propaganda. That was Mr. Santa Cruz' reply to the representative of Poland, who had doubted the democratic character of the system which had been in force in Chile for a hundred and twenty years.

13. Security measures should be adopted that would help to make democracy an indisputable reality. The representative of Chile recalled the experience of the fight against nazism, when mankind had rallied to the ideal of a free life — not to the defence of the USSR system of government. The Soviet communists had made a show of respecting international democracy, dissolved the aggressive *Comintern* and left the communist parties in each country free to act in support of democracy. That had been the only way of enabling democratic and non-democratic countries to live side by side.

14. The existing situation was similar to the period just before the Second World War. It was a vital necessity for the democratic nations to strive for the ideal of a free life and to resist the expansion of Soviet Communism with a different conception of life and a different philosophy calculated to lead to economic and social progress and well-being. That involved great responsibilities and, in the first place, the obligation to co-operate and collaborate in every field,

15. A great deal had been achieved in that direction by the democratic countries. They had strengthened the action of the United Nations and the specialized agencies to that end, and had promoted undertakings such as the Marshall Plan, aid to Greece and Turkey and assistance to several under-developed areas by means of technical assistance plans and financial aid. A new awareness of international co-operation was undoubtedly abroad in the world.

16. The USSR had not co-operated in those accomplishments. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and the communist parties had not been able to weaken the United Nations or prevent the success of those activities. Soviet sabotage had not succeeded in frustrating the Marshall Plan or the first steps towards economic development and social welfare in the less favoured areas of the world. The USSR's double failure should make its Government reflect profoundly.

17. International co-operation was the only real means of achieving peace. That co-operation was as yet insufficient and must be developed to the full. The USSR was playing its expansionist cards with time on its side and there were still many grave problems unsolved. The democratic countries must win the race against time, cut down on the time-limits which had had to be applied to the vast problems, and prevent Soviet communism from creating confusion in the under-developed countries. For that purpose, international co-operation must be developed and rendered effective and timely.

18. Such co-operation was already taking place in the economic sphere in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the requirements of peace, for the benefit of the inhabitants of the areas concerned. Thus, traditional ideas and prejudices were being transformed. A country's sovereignty was not impaired by the receipt of economic aid from a more powerful country, unless that aid were granted only for the sake of obtaining political advantages or ran counter to the interests of the inhabitants of the receiving country. A country could no longer feel that its sovereignty was impaired because foreign capital was still invested within its borders on terms belonging to a former era, provided that it knew how to defend its sovereignty and provided, above all, that the country from which that capital derived respected the principles of the Charter and observed a good neighbour policy. Such was the case with Chile, to whose sovereignty the USSR representative had felt it necessary to refer (257th meeting). Such was also the case of many other countries in Latin America, which had no need of unduly solicitous protectors to defend their sovereignty.

19. Yet the process of reshaping the ideas of the democracies concerning their joint responsibility for the solution of economic and social problems in order to create conditions of peace must go still further. Any system of international co-operation for the economic development of a country would seem contradictory unless at the same time its people shared the benefits derived from their country's wealth. The idea of the association of all those countries in order to achieve a better use of their natural resources must be strengthened, while at the same time they must never

cease to think in terms of their collective responsibility.

20. The gravity of the struggle in defence of democracy and peace raised unprecedented problems and accordingly some resistance was being met to begin with. Nevertheless, those ideas would have to take shape and the economic independence of all countries, within a harmonious system of trade and exchange, must grow more rapidly, for the good of peace and democracy.

21. With the Soviet Union or without it, there would be peace as democracy became ever more democratic.

22. Mr. PEARSON (Canada) remarked that the debate on the item under consideration had ranged far and wide, over the fields of history, philosophy and politics. It had explored communist dogma. It had led the Assembly through the intricacies of the USSR interpretation of its own foreign policy. It had presented the Assembly once again with the familiar, and in his opinion unconvincing, communist critique of the social, economic and political system of the non-communist world. It had also, of course, produced the usual charges that those who did not agree with that critique were ignorant, professional slanderers, babblers and so on. The debate — both in the Assembly and in the First Committee — had also produced, among other things, a great deal of confusion. Some of it was no doubt due to deliberate efforts to confuse, but some he thought was due to the fact that the communist delegations had presented the Assembly with contradictions and inconsistencies.

23. For instance, the Assembly had heard Mr. Vyshinsky denounce as useless the Kellogg Pact, while at the same time urging in even more general and unspecific terms than those used twenty years previously the adoption of a new pact among the five great Powers. It had heard him say that Marx had prophesied that a capitalist society led inevitably to crises which in turn led inevitably to war; the correctness of those prophecies, Mr. Vyshinsky had said, could be read in history. On another occasion, however, referring to the future of the non-communist world, he had said that he was no prophet and that Marx had not been one. Mr. Vyshinsky had gone to great lengths on many occasions to deny that the communist party believed in the inevitability of force and violence to bring about the social and political changes in which it believed. On another occasion, however, he had said that both in the United Kingdom and in the United States, the prior condition for any people's revolution was the destruction of the governmental system set up in those countries before the First World War. Yet, in the face of those words and others of the same kind used by contemporary communist leaders, in the face of the violent and war-like pronouncements of the *Cominform*, especially those hurled at the Government of Yugoslavia, Mr. Vyshinsky asked the Assembly to believe in the lamb-like qualities of Soviet revolutionary communism. Naturally, the Assembly did not believe that and was not deceived by it. Nor were the peoples of the world deceived, except those whose minds and souls were drugged and deadened by propaganda from a State machine which prevented them from securing information from any other source, a machine which, when it saw fit,

could alter for home consumption even the text of speeches made in the Assembly by the Foreign Minister of the USSR.

24. The communist delegations had been accusing certain representatives — among whom Mr. Pearson himself had been specifically included — of trying to divert attention from their peaceful intentions by introducing confusing and irrelevant issues. To them, of course, any issue which was embarrassing could be irrelevant, just as any quotation which was disturbing was said to be torn out of its context. It might be asked what was relevant in Mr. Vyshinsky's opinion; what coherent pattern emerged from the hours and hours of talk which had been heard from the communist delegations in that debate; what Mr. Vyshinsky and his friends really wanted. As Mr. Pearson saw it, their desire seemed to be that the General Assembly should brand the United States and the United Kingdom as war-mongers; that those States, so branded, should be embraced by the USSR in a pact of peace; and that, touched by that fraternal embrace, they and the other democratic countries should disarm, without any adequate assurance that the most heavily armed country in the world would put into effect similar measures of disarmament or that it would co-operate in a sincere and earnest desire to close the gap that divided the world.

25. That kind of propaganda disarmament had been exposed so many times as a manoeuvre, not even useless but even dangerous to peace, that there was little to be added. It had never been exposed more effectively than in the official history of diplomacy, published in the USSR in 1945, from which Mr. Pearson proceeded to quote a passage stating that the idea of disarmament had from time immemorial been one of the most favoured forms of diplomatic dissimulation of the true motives and plans of those governments which had been seized by a sudden love of peace.

26. In an attempt to draw some permanent benefit from the long and arduous debate which had taken place, Mr. Pearson drew attention to two or three points which had emerged and seemed to point to practical measures that could be taken to help restore the confidence which was so greatly needed.

27. Opening his remarks in the First Committee, Mr. Vyshinsky had spoken of a reference Mr. Pearson had made to the growth of what the latter had termed the new imperialism in the east of Europe, and had accused Mr. Pearson of trying to confuse the issue of the debate. If, however, Mr. Vyshinsky really wished to contribute to the preservation of peace, he should try to persuade his Government to pay some attention to the fear in the world of that new imperialism and to the deep and wide-spread concern about the methods which it adopted to spread its influence, and the threats to peace which were inherent in those methods. Within the USSR sphere of influence—the new Soviet empire—had been included many peoples who had previously had their own free Governments: Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Romanians. Not all the impassioned eloquence of the representatives of the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian SSR could convince Mr. Pearson that those peoples had of their own free will, happily and confidently, entrusted their destinies and their persons to the

USSR. The fact that the Soviet Union Government found it necessary to cut off the inhabitants of its territories from all normal contacts with other countries and to distort and manipulate information about other peoples in order to create misunderstanding and fear was convincing evidence to the contrary.

28. The methods used to create and maintain the Soviet sphere of influence had converted it into one of the most unstable, restless and explosive areas of the world. That represented a grave danger to peace, the evidence of which was to be seen every day. Thousands of people from the Baltic communities had had to be expelled from their homes; a Marshal of the USSR had become the Polish Minister of Defence; the leader of the Hungarian Church had had to be imprisoned; a communist Foreign Minister of Hungary had been hanged for treason; the Government of Czechoslovakia had been catapulted into a persecution of its middle classes. The communist Governments of Romania and Bulgaria had been engulfed in internal dissension, and the people of Albania had been involved in an economic crisis which daily threatened their very existence. To complete the picture, the people of Yugoslavia had had to stake their very lives on an effort, single-handed, to free themselves from the yoke of USSR domination.

29. Such was the frightening state of affairs, and it was Mr. Pearson's sincere and earnest hope that, as a contribution to the peace of the world, the Government of the Soviet Union would abandon its aggressive intervention in the affairs of other countries. People were gaining their freedom in other parts of the world by a process of adjustment and negotiation. If the Soviet Union would relax its tight grip over the peoples on its borders so that they too could freely work out their relations with their great neighbours, the whole world would breathe more easily. The world must not be engulfed in war a third time because of trouble in the Balkans or in the borderlands of the USSR.

30. There were still other practical measures by which some of the fear of war could be removed. Mr. Pearson was not sure, however, whether Mr. Vyshinsky really believed that it was possible to organize peace, for he had said again and again that he was convinced that the rest of the world was determined to make war upon the Soviet Union. If Mr. Vyshinsky really believed that the fifty-four States which had refused in the First Committee to vote for his draft resolution were planning an attack on his country, it was doubtful whether anything those States could say or do would put his mind at rest. In spite of everything Mr. Vyshinsky had said about disarmament, he did not even appear to think that disarmament would necessarily bring much comfort. Speaking, for example, of Iceland, which he regarded as a danger to the Soviet Union even though it was totally disarmed, he had indicated that military preparations or the lack of them did not necessarily bear any relation to the evil intentions that he feared. The conclusion to be drawn was that Mr. Vyshinsky considered himself and his country to be in danger no matter what happened.

31. Fortunately, however, Mr. Vyshinsky was not always so discouraging. On other occasions he had seemed to indicate that it was possible for

the USSR position to be flexible and even conciliatory. At one point in the debate, for example, he had urged the Assembly to face all divergencies of opinion and keep striving to find the true road toward co-operation and the resolution of differences.

32. On another occasion, Mr. Kiselev, the representative of the Byelorussian SSR, had asserted that Marx and Lenin had believed in the possibility of good neighbourly or friendly relations between communist States and capitalist countries in general, and the United States and the United Kingdom in particular. Mr. Kiselev had supported his argument by quoting Generalissimo Stalin, who had said that the USSR stood for peace and for the strengthening of business and commercial relations with all countries.

33. That was the kind of proposition that the Canadian delegation understood and believed in. It was willing to negotiate with Mr. Vyshinsky and his colleagues any number of times provided they really believed that there was some possibility of a firm and honest accommodation emerging from those discussions. There could not, however, be such a settlement unless both sides were willing to adjust their positions when necessary, to write the resulting agreement in simple and precise terms, to carry out its provisions in good faith, and then to regard the matter as settled.

34. It could be assumed that Mr. Vyshinsky had really meant what he said when he had suggested that his Government was willing to go steadily and patiently to the end of the long road of negotiation by which international problems were settled. That was hopeful news, which would mean more to the world than any number of five-Power pacts, for it would enable the United Nations to set about solving the many outstanding problems which had been left over since the end of the war. The most dangerous feature in the immediate situation was that nations might be led to think that it was hopeless to try to make such an effort. History, meanwhile, was adding new complications to those problems, hardening the moulds that would have to be changed, giving permanency to situations which all regarded as temporary. Those problems were to be found at every point on the periphery of the Soviet Union sphere of influence and in all the major issues. They could not be settled without concessions on both sides. Mr. Pearson would suggest that the most useful contribution that Mr. Vyshinsky and his Government could make to the maintenance of peace would be to come forward with practical suggestions which they honestly considered might form a basis for reasonable negotiations for the settlement of any one of those outstanding problems. Even if only one of them could be settled, the tension in international relations would begin to decrease and the peaceful objectives which Mr. Vyshinsky so vociferously proclaimed would be within reach.

35. What was lacking was mutual confidence. Mr. Pearson did not suppose that confidence could be restored solely, or even mainly, by talk; it would nevertheless be useful to all to study the statements that had been made in the debate. From the study he himself had made of them so far, he was surprised to find that Mr. Vyshinsky and his colleagues seemed still to be obsessed with the old fear of encirclement and intervention. At

one point Mr. Vyshinsky had said with a great show of enthusiasm that six hundred million people in the world shared his views. Mr. Pearson assumed that he had reached the figure of six hundred million by adding together the two hundred million people of the Soviet Union and its borderlands in Europe and the four hundred million people of China whom he now claimed to be within the communist world. Time alone would show whether the Chinese were as zealous converts as Mr. Vyshinsky assumed, but at least he was entitled to take what comfort he could out of the existing circumstances. Since he reached his figure of six hundred million people in that way, it was to be concluded that he regarded the countries of the world outside that area as hostile to the Soviet Union. Mr. Pearson could, however, assure him that the people of the USSR had friends in the free world, not only communist friends, but friends of all sorts who admired their courage and resourcefulness and who sincerely desired to live at peace with them on the basis of mutual tolerance and respect. Intervention had certainly been a fact in Russian history, but it was long since dead, and there was no need for Mr. Vyshinsky to frighten the people of his own country by making that ghost walk again.

36. As for encirclement, surely the leaders of the Soviet Union, whose power was greater than ever before in Russian history, could not have any real fear of that. That might, of course, be something which Mr. Vyshinsky spoke about simply because of its effect on his own people, because of the desire of the ruling circles in the Soviet Union to hold those people together even if fears and suspicions must be manufactured for that purpose. It was an old device in history. Mr. Pearson could not believe, however, that that state of mind would necessarily persist. Much had been heard from USSR representatives about the great progress that was being made within that country. If those reports were true, it was to be hoped that Mr. Vyshinsky and his colleagues would soon feel able to give up the business of telling their people that the rest of the world was determined to destroy them and that they would one day abandon their customary practice of choosing blood-curdling stories and reports from the free western Press for speeches in the United Nations and for circulation at home in order to incite and frighten those people who had no way of checking the accuracy or the importance of such reports.

37. In conclusion, Mr. Pearson recalled that Mr. Vyshinsky had stated during the debate that he considered it was possible to find some common ground for understanding. It was that element in the many speeches of the USSR and communist delegations which gave the Assembly some ground for hope. If that was what they and their Governments really believed, there would be a ready response from the rest of the world. That belief, however, must be demonstrated in deeds and in the application of those principles to mutual problems. Canada was willing to accept that test for itself and it demanded its acceptance by others. But there was not much encouraging evidence of such acceptance in the denunciatory USSR draft resolution before the Assembly and in the violent speeches that had been made in support of it.

38. Above all, Mr. Pearson urged the Soviet Union to keep its *Cominform* from attempting to overthrow by force other people's governments and institutions, and he reminded Mr. Vyshinsky of his own statement in the debate that ideological intervention was wont to become military. That statement was very true and it embodied the greatest threat to peace. The draft resolution of the First Committee enunciated principles which, if implemented, would lessen that threat, and the Canadian delegation would therefore vote for it.

39. The PRESIDENT explained that although the list of speakers was closed, the representative of the Soviet Union had asked the Chair to accord him the right of reply. In accordance, therefore, with rule 66 of the rules of procedure, he would call upon the representative of the USSR to speak.

40. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), replying to the United Kingdom representative's assertion (259th meeting) that the Soviet Union had refused to make any attempt at co-operation with regard to the reduction of armaments and armed forces, remarked that it was to be doubted whether the work of the so-called Commission on Conventional Armaments had any real bearing on the problem of the reduction of armaments. In actual fact, that Commission dealt only with what it called the regulation of armaments. Accordingly, Mr. McNeil had distorted facts, and not for the first time. The USSR had not refused to take part in the work of the Commission; it had simply made its acceptance subject to one condition, namely, that the information to be transmitted should also cover atomic weapons. That was quite clear from the draft resolution which the delegation of the Soviet Union had submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.¹ The Commission, however, had rejected his idea, because it did not suit the United States and the United Kingdom.

41. Mr. McNeil had also asked him whether the revolution in the United Kingdom would be carried out by peaceful means or with violence, and had reproached him for his failure to reply. Mr. Vyshinsky emphasized that he had not undertaken to act as Mr. McNeil's adviser in the matter. He had not even undertaken to reply to any of the questions which Mr. McNeil might feel inclined to ask and he had never set himself up as a prophet. Mr. McNeil should reflect on that question himself and with the help of his advisers he would certainly find an answer.

42. The representative of Norway had stated (259th meeting) that the Soviet Union was completely isolated. That was a rather odd statement, coming from the Foreign Minister of a country bordering upon the USSR. Mr. Lange should have realized that his statement bore no relation to the facts. The USSR delegation had produced abundant evidence disproving such a statement, and none of that evidence had been refuted. Mr. Lange had said, with much feeling, that everybody was weary of propaganda. Mr. Vyshinsky wondered what type of propaganda Mr. Lange had had in mind, propaganda for peace or propaganda against peace. Propaganda for peace could never weary the true supporters of world peace.

By contrast, it did weary and it even caused considerable distress to war-mongers, who were driven into a state of hysteria, as had been seen during the discussions in the United Nations and particularly in the First Committee.

43. The representative of Yugoslavia had repeated (260th meeting) the slanderous allegations which he had made in his speech before the General Assembly two months earlier (228th meeting). He had said that the USSR's actions did not agree with its words: Mr. Vyshinsky could assure all delegations—including that of Yugoslavia—that such was not the case. The Yugoslav representative had claimed that his delegation's questions had gone unanswered by Mr. Vyshinsky. But the nonsense that had been heard in the First Committee could surely not be termed questions. One of the representatives appeared to have devoted his whole speech to proving that he was not a spy in the service of a foreign Power. Another had devoted himself to uttering slander against the Soviet Union—the land of socialism. The representative of Yugoslavia, or of the Yugoslav group, had even spoken disparagingly of the Soviet-Yugoslav Treaty of 5 April 1941, although that had been a noble act on the part of the USSR Government and at the time had served as a warning to the hitlerite bandits that the Soviet Union would be a stern avenger of their crimes. Yet, that representative had mounted the rostrum of the General Assembly and, masquerading as a Marxist, had poured torrents of abuse and slander on the USSR and the peoples' democracies. He had even claimed that the USSR representative owed an answer to some unspecified question. It was quite clear that he had forgotten that the delegation of the Soviet Union had said much earlier that it had no intention of entering into discussions with such persons.

44. The representatives of some States, for instance Ecuador and Lebanon, had rashly asked the USSR to change its foreign policy. But surely they did not really wish that country to change a policy which was rooted in a fervent desire for peace.

45. The representative of Ecuador (260th meeting) had chosen to describe the situation by saying that during the Second World War the USSR had been forced to co-operate with other Governments. It had in fact co-operated with them by shedding the blood of its people in the fight against the hitlerite bandits, and by shouldering the whole burden of a war unprecedented in the history of mankind. But the Ecuadorean representative had added, since the end of the war the Soviet Union had been losing that spirit of co-operation.

46. The war had ended, the enemy was crushed—owing chiefly to the efforts of the Soviet Union. Apparently, the co-operation of that Power was no longer indispensable. To justify such an attitude, however, it was necessary to accuse the Soviet Union, in the face of all the facts. Speakers would always be found to present that point of view.

47. The Ecuadorean representative was displeased that the USSR draft resolution should call a spade a spade; that draft called war-mongers and the organizers of a new war by their proper names. That, in the eyes of the Ecuadorean representative, was an insult and a challenge. But

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 40th meeting.*

there was no alternative. The generals, admirals and ministers of the United States and the United Kingdom were daily threatening to launch a new war, to annihilate the population of the cities and villages of the USSR, to destroy its factories, schools and hospitals, its economy and its culture. The USSR delegation was denouncing those barbarous plans and asking that their authors should be condemned, and that an end should be put to their activities, which were directed against peace and against the interests of all mankind. That was the attitude which displeased the representatives of Ecuador and Uruguay.

48. It had also been said that the USSR draft resolution was not appropriate, as world confidence was badly shaken. It was for that very reason that the draft resolution was particularly important. If relations between the Powers in opposing camps had not been tense, there might have been no need for such a step as the signing of a pact for the strengthening of peace. Any other reasoning was devoid of logic.

49. The Ecuadorean representative, referring to the practices of bourgeois diplomacy, had ventured to attribute similar qualities to Soviet diplomacy. That, at any rate, was how Mr. Vyshinsky had understood his intervention. The example set by the Ecuadorean representative had enticed the Canadian representative to do the same. That point deserved some discussion.

50. Mr. Vyshinsky would not take his facts from the book on the history of diplomacy which certain persons had glanced at cursorily without understanding some of the passages. They had not understood that in laying bare the methods of bourgeois diplomacy, the Soviet scholars to whom the Ecuadorean representative had referred, had denounced and advised against the use of those methods. Attempts were being made to turn those facts against the USSR itself. The only possible explanation was that those who had glanced through the book had not understood it.

51. Mr. Vyshinsky could not, in the short time at his disposal, dwell on that question at greater length. But the methods employed by bourgeois diplomacy during the Second World War constituted a monstrous example not only of the hypocrisy but of the perfidy of some great Powers. It had even been said that intervention against the Soviet Union was hardly unlawful as any war against that country, by whatever State and for whatever reasons it was waged, was perfectly legitimate.

52. Mr. Vyshinsky would recall another example of bourgeois political morality. In 1941, Colonel Moore-Brabazon, United Kingdom Minister of Aircraft Production, had stated that the happiest result of the war on the eastern front would be if the Soviet Union and Germany bled each other white, for then the United Kingdom could occupy a leading position.

53. There was a third example. The day after Germany had basely attacked the Soviet Union, a prominent person in the United States had seen fit to say that if Germany was winning, the United States would have to help the Soviet Union; if the Soviet Union was winning, Germany would have to be helped; and it would be best if they killed each other. That example was fully characteristic of the morality which the representatives of such countries as Ecuador, Urugu-

guay, Chile and Canada were advocating in the General Assembly. That morality was based on one principle only, namely, that any means was justified which injured the USSR as much as possible and brought about its ruin.

54. Presumably the representative of Ecuador had not given that matter any thought; the statement he had made in the Assembly indicated that he had not; that was the only possible explanation for the nonsense the Assembly had heard on that occasion and had heard again from the Canadian and Chilean representatives.

55. The Uruguayan representative had dwelt in particular on the question of the principles by which the USSR Government was guided (260th meeting). Following in the footsteps of certain earlier speakers, he had attempted to distort the situation and to show that, according to Marxism, no co-operation was possible between socialist and non-socialist States. He had merely repeated what the General Assembly had heard more than once in recent weeks.

56. Mr. Vyshinsky would not dwell on those distortions so often repeated in the General Assembly and the First Committee. At the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party, in 1934, the leader of the Soviet people, Mr. Stalin, had stated that only those ignorant of history could try to distort Marxism. Marxism was the scientific expression of the fundamental interests of the working class. Attempts had been made in the General Assembly to kill Marxism by claiming that it was no longer necessary. But before Marxism could be killed, the working class would have to be destroyed, obviously a hopeless undertaking. As Generalissimo Stalin had said, since Marxism had appeared on the world stage, had even hundreds, of bourgeois governments had attempted to annihilate it. In fact, however, the bourgeois governments themselves had disappeared one after another, whereas Marxism had lived in undiminished vigour. More than that, Marxism had triumphed throughout a sixth of the world, in the very country where it had been thought to have been annihilated.

57. The Soviet Union was being asked to renounce its foreign policy based on a scientific theory. Attempts were being made to convince it that it was only by renouncing Marxism that peace could be guaranteed. Those appeals were obviously purely gratuitous, for everybody knew quite well that the USSR would not renounce its foreign policy. Everybody also knew that that policy was one of peace.

58. The representative of Uruguay had objected to the well known Leninist theory that there could be no revolutionary movement without revolutionary theory. But surely the revolutionary theory was scientific. Surely the Darwinian theory of evolution had been a revolutionary theory in natural science. Surely, in the same way, Marxism constituted a revolutionary theory in world science.

59. Marxism was a scientific theory which showed not only in what direction society was moving but also in what direction it would and should move in the future. The USSR delegation had emphasized on more than one occasion that social evolution was governed by its own laws. But human society was a society of rational beings who should know the laws of social evolu-

tion. The Marxist-Leninist theory made it possible to obtain a clear conception of the laws of social evolution and to determine the future progress of society on the basis of those laws. Obviously that might displease some people, groups and classes, in particular the obsolete classes which would, of course, not step down from the stage of history without a struggle.

60. The most important proposition of scientific and revolutionary Marxism was that no social structure would perish until its productive forces had decayed. That was a factor which was not understood by those who criticized the Marxist-Leninist theory, who misinterpreted it and tried to persuade their naive followers that that great doctrine could only be an obstacle to the establishment of peaceful international relations.

61. The days of alchemy and astrology were past. The modern era was a scientific one. None could advance save those who took scientific theories as a basis.

62. Mr. Vyshinsky wished to dwell on yet another question. Certain delegations seemed to believe that they had the right to interfere brazenly in questions with which the United Nations was not concerned. What right had they to discuss the structure of the Soviet Union and to criticize the laws and provisions governing that country? That was nothing to do with the United Nations, a fact which the United States understood perfectly well, since its representative, Edward Stettinius, had stated in a report to his Government in 1945 that the United Nations should be set up in an atmosphere which would permit all countries to co-operate with the Organization by the adoption of measures designed to achieve the economic and social aims of the United Nations, in accordance with their own methods, with due regard for their economic and political peculiarities and without the least interference in their internal affairs. The United Nations was based on that principle.

63. In taking the liberty of slandering Soviet methods, certain representatives, such as the representatives of Uruguay, France, Chile and Ecuador, had forgotten the principles that should govern their behaviour. There was nothing new in the fact that they did not like the structure of the USSR, but they should know that the inhabitants of that country did not like the structure of the countries on whose behalf those representatives had spoken. Nevertheless, the delegation of the Soviet Union did not take the liberty of interfering with the life of other countries, as did the representatives of certain other States.

64. The delegation of the USSR had voted against a number of the provisions of the draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom in the First Committee and had voted against the adoption of that draft as a whole. It had abstained from voting on some of the provisions, since it considered that those passages merely repeated the provisions of the Charter, without adding anything to them. The delegation of the Soviet Union had pointed out that those passages had been incorporated in the draft in order to dissimulate other provisions and to give an appearance of legality to the systematic violations of the Charter that were being perpetrated by the Anglo-American bloc. The statements which had been made during the current

meeting of the General Assembly fully confirmed those views.

65. In that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky remarked that the representative of Chile had avoided an extremely important matter in his statement. Mr. Vyshinsky had openly stated in the First Committee that there had been certain distortions in the quotations the Chilean representative had made. He had therefore accused the Chilean representative of making use of falsehoods and that representative had not replied to his accusations. It was obviously impossible to enter into a discussion with such people.

66. The Canadian representative's statement had also confirmed the truth of Mr. Vyshinsky's assertions. Mr. Pearson had misrepresented the statement the representative of the Soviet Union had made concerning Iceland. Contrary to Mr. Pearson's allegations, Mr. Vyshinsky had stated that it was unnecessary to possess an army in order to make war, for wars were sometimes waged on territories held on leases from other Governments which were in sympathy with such wars, and were often waged with forces provided by other Governments. Mr. Pearson had not said that, for he had distorted Mr. Vyshinsky's words. Mr. Pearson had also said that the people of China, the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe which were friendly to the USSR numbered 600 million men. That was bad arithmetic. In speaking of those millions of men, Mr. Vyshinsky had had in mind the Peace Congress held in Paris, at which 561 national organizations and twelve international organizations working for peace had been represented. That Congress, which had taken place partly in Paris and partly in Prague, owing to the opposition of the French Government, had convened the representatives of 600 million men. In any case, the peoples of China, the Soviet Union and the countries which were friendly to the Soviet Union was well over a thousand million.

67. In spite of all those attempts to distort the spirit and letter of the USSR draft resolution, Mr. Vyshinsky considered that it represented the only method of ensuring world peace and security.

68. Preparations for a new war must be stopped. There must be an end to all the inadmissible measures that were systematically taken in a number of countries to prepare for a new conflict. That must be stated openly—it was a duty which representatives owed to their conscience, to all the peoples of the world and particularly to the peoples of the United States and the United Kingdom.

69. It was essential to provide for the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control to ensure observance of that prohibition. Instead of trying to preach to the delegation of the USSR, it would be preferable to lend an ear to what was happening outside the General Assembly hall. The voices of the millions must be heard, the voices of the peoples of the world, clamouring for peace.

70. Whatever might be the result of the vote that would be taken at the current meeting, the USSR delegation knew well that tens and hundreds of millions of people who thirsted for peace, who abhorred war and who rightly considered the

Soviet Union to be the standard-bearer of the world struggle for peace, would support its draft resolution outside the Assembly hall.

71. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) said that his delegation's self-respect had prevented it from replying to the charges of distortion levelled against it by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, originally in the First Committee, and again at the current meeting of the General Assembly.

72. The passage which Mr. Santa Cruz had read in the First Committee appeared in the Spanish version of page 175 of the French translation of the *Istoriia Diplomatii*. A reading of the French text itself would enable the Assembly to compare it with the records of the First Committee and judge whether he had in fact distorted its meaning. From such a reading he drew the conclusion that not a single line of the Spanish version failed to render exactly the strict meaning of the French text.

73. Mr. Vyshinsky had made particular mention of the phrase *intrigaremos a todo el mundo*, which he had quoted. That, however, was a correct translation of the French *nous intriguerons tout le monde*.

74. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he had indeed charged Mr. Santa Cruz with falsifying facts. He would stand by that accusation and was ready to produce documentary evidence. On 22 November 1949, Mr. Santa Cruz, speaking in the First Committee, had misquoted an article published by Lenin on 14 March 1922. Where Lenin had said that the USSR would kindle the interest of the whole world, the Chilean representative had quoted him as saying that the USSR would plot against the whole world—an obvious mistranslation.

75. There had been other minor distortions, but he would mention that very important one only, basing his statement on the published text of Volume III of Vladimir Potemkin's *Istoriia Diplomatii*.

76. The PRESIDENT stated that the Assembly would proceed to vote and, in accordance with the rules of procedure, would first vote on the draft resolution recommended by the First Committee, entitled "Essentials of Peace" (A/1150).

77. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) asked for a separate vote to be taken, not only on the various paragraphs but also on the titles of the draft resolutions, in order to avoid any subsequent confusion. Difficulties had sometimes arisen in the Security Council when reference had been made to resolutions which, after undergoing considerable amendment and in some cases being rejected, had retained their original titles. It was essential that the decision of the General Assembly should be perfectly clear, and for that reason he was proposing that, whatever draft resolution was taken first, there should be a vote upon its title before each separate paragraph was voted upon.

78. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) considered that a vote should first be taken on the USSR draft resolution, since it was the basic document which his delegation had submitted as early as the 226th meeting. It had also been the first to be voted on in the First Committee.

79. He asked therefore that the draft resolution submitted by the USSR delegation should be voted on first, paragraph by paragraph. The General Assembly could then vote on the draft resolution of the First Committee, and in that case also he would ask that the vote should be taken paragraph by paragraph.

80. The PRESIDENT pointed out that the established practice in the General Assembly was to vote first on the draft resolution recommended by the Committee. The Chair would follow that practice.

81. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia), speaking on a point of order, asked for a separate vote to be taken on the first sentence of paragraph 3 of the USSR draft resolution when the latter came to be voted on.

82. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the title of the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee.

The title was adopted by 51 votes to 5.

83. The PRESIDENT put paragraphs 1 to 13 to the vote successively.

Paragraph 1 was adopted by 54 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

Paragraph 2 was adopted by 53 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

Paragraph 3 was adopted by 54 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

Paragraph 4 was adopted by 54 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

Paragraph 5 was adopted by 53 votes to 5, with one abstention.

Paragraph 6 was adopted by 52 votes to 5.

Paragraph 7 was adopted by 53 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

Paragraph 8 was adopted by 53 votes to 5, with one abstention.

Paragraph 9 was adopted by 54 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

Paragraph 10 was adopted by 53 votes to 5, with one abstention.

Paragraph 11 was adopted by 51 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

Paragraph 12 was adopted by 52 votes to 5, with one abstention.

Paragraph 13 was adopted by 52 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

84. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the draft resolution as a whole.

The resolution as a whole was adopted by 53 votes to 5, with one abstention.

85. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the title of the USSR draft resolution (A/1149).

The title was rejected by 39 votes to 5, with 11 abstentions.

86. The PRESIDENT put paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft resolution to the vote successively.

Paragraph 1 was rejected by 51 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

Paragraph 2 was rejected by 39 votes to 5, with 15 abstentions.

87. The PRESIDENT put the first sentence of paragraph 3 to the vote.

The sentence was rejected by 21 votes to 13, with 23 abstentions.

88. The PRESIDENT put the remainder of paragraph 3 to the vote.

The remainder of the paragraph was rejected by 41 votes to 5, with 10 abstentions.

89. The PRESIDENT declared that since none of the paragraphs of the USSR draft resolution had been adopted, it was unnecessary to put the draft to the vote as a whole.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Thursday, 1 December 1949, at 3 p.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Application of Liechtenstein to become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice: report of the Sixth Committee (A/1054)

1. Mr. FERRER VIEYRA (Argentina), Rapporteur of the Sixth Committee, presented the report of the Sixth Committee and the accompanying draft resolution (A/1054).

2. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the resolution proposed by the Sixth Committee.

The resolution was adopted by 40 votes to 2, with 2 abstentions.

Registration and publication of treaties and international agreements: report of the Sixth Committee (A/1100) and report of the Fifth Committee (A/1108)

3. Mr. FERRER VIEYRA (Argentina), Rapporteur of the Sixth Committee, presented the report of the Sixth Committee and the accompanying draft resolutions (A/1100).

4. He drew the attention of the General Assembly to two aspects of the matter which were of particular interest. First, he referred to the progress made during the year, notably in the publication and registration of treaties and agreements.

5. In the report submitted by the Secretary-General (A/958) as well as in the supplementary working document submitted to the Sixth Committee on the state of publication up to 26 October 1949, it was shown that up to that date twenty-two volumes containing treaties registered or filed and recorded up to 24 December 1948 had been published.

6. At present there was a difference of only ten months between the registration and the publication of treaties.

7. The General Assembly knew that the principal objective of Article 102 of the Charter was to obtain publication of agreements or conventions signed by the various States; its aim was to fight the diplomatic secrecy of past years.

8. The Sixth Committee¹ had agreed that it was necessary to continue publication of the series of treaties at the same rate and had therefore included in paragraph 3 of draft resolu-

tion A, a provision requesting the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to bring about the earliest possible publication of all registered agreements and treaties.

9. He referred to Article 102 of the United Nations Charter, which stated that every treaty and international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the Charter came into force should as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it, and that no party to any such treaty or international agreement which had not been registered in that way could invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations. In other words, before any treaty or agreement, bilateral or multilateral, could be invoked before the United Nations, and that included the International Court of Justice, it had to be registered with the Secretariat.

10. When in 1946, during the second part of the first session of the General Assembly, the rules for the application of Article 102 of the Charter had been approved,² a clear distinction had been drawn between the elements which characterized two different legal procedures, namely the deposit of an agreement or international instrument of any kind, and the registration of an agreement or international instrument. The matter had been discussed at length in connexion with the publication of such documents.

11. Mr. Ferrer Vieyra considered that under Article 102 of the Charter the depositing and registration of an international instrument was a legal obligation binding upon those States which were parties to that instrument. The United Nations was only obliged to bring about the earliest possible publication of treaties and international agreements registered by Member States. Only under certain determined conditions was the Secretariat authorized, in the rules for the application of Article 102, to register treaties. Those conditions were when the United Nations was a party to a treaty, and when the United Nations, not being a party to a treaty, had been given such authority in a special clause or article.

12. In the draft resolution submitted by the Sixth Committee, it had been suggested that a paragraph should be added to article 4 of the regulations to give effect to Article 102 of the Charter, authorizing the United Nations to register multilateral treaties when it was the deposi-

¹ For the discussion on this subject in the Sixth Committee, see *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Sixth Committee*, at its 174th meeting.

² See *Official Records of the second part of the first session of the General Assembly*, 65th plenary meeting.