

of any particular capitalist State, but of capitalism itself.

123. Those whom the gods had not made mad should draw the obvious conclusions from history. Despite all the threats made by the United States

and the United Kingdom, the Soviet peoples would continue to defend the cause of peace, as they had always done, in the assurance that it would eventually triumph.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-NINTH PLenary MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Wednesday, 30 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Condemnation of the preparations for a new war, and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace: report of the First Committee (A/1150) (continued)

1. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) recalled that the representative of the Soviet Union, in his speech at the 257th meeting, had asked why Iran had tried to obtain arms from the United States. The reply was very simple; it needed such arms to ensure that order and security prevailed in its territory.

2. The Iranian army had been disorganized because Iran had put all its arms and all its communications and transport facilities at the disposal of its allies during the war. Mr. Entezam wished to recall, in passing, that the only arsenal in Iran had been employed, during the war, in the manufacture of automatic rifles for the USSR army.

3. Hundreds of thousands of tons of munitions and arms sent to the Soviet Union by the United States had crossed Iran via the Trans-Iranian railroad. The people of Iran had therefore been in danger of famine. They had no regrets, however, because they were convinced that, in a common struggle, all allies, great or small, must contribute to the joint effort.

4. During the war, the whole world had recognized the services rendered by Iran to the allied cause. Therefore, in the declaration which they had signed at the end of the Teheran Conference, Mr. Churchill, President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Stalin had thanked Iran and had promised to assist it after the victory. It was surely not surprising that one of the Allies should try to keep the promises it had thus made.

5. Iran requested arms only to ensure that order and security prevailed within its borders. No representative in the Assembly would question the peaceful intentions of the Government of Iran. No one could think for a moment that Iran was trying to arm itself in order to endanger the existence of its neighbours. Only a few days before (250th meeting), the Shah of Iran had come to the General Assembly to plead the cause of peace. Iran had only one desire; it wished to live in peace with all its neighbours, provided they respected the rights of Iran as Iran respected theirs.

6. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) recalled that Mr. Vyshinsky had accused him of offering no facts, whereas Mr. Vyshinsky had claimed that he himself and the delegations supporting him had offered many facts. The definition of fact was, of course, a curious business in which Mr. Vyshinsky was doubtless very skilled. Mr. McNeil

had certainly not attempted to lay before the First Committee, during the discussion of the question,¹ a whole range of Press cuttings and to maintain that they were fact, nor had he offered sweeping assertions such as Mr. Vyshinsky's reference to 140 bases in one country, while giving the name of only one such base. Mr. McNeil had, however, attempted to deal with some quite simple factual matters.

7. For instance, Mr. McNeil had offered figures relating to the budget proportions of the United Kingdom. Yet at the 258th meeting, the representative of the Ukrainian SSR, Mr. Manuilsky, without any reference to that examination, had blandly and emphatically referred once more to those budgets. It was a slogan, and although a slogan might in some situations be an admirable instrument, it was not a substitute for argument and certainly no substitute for fact.

8. Mr. McNeil had tried to draw the attention of the USSR delegation and the First Committee to another single group of figures; he had said that by the best calculations available to him, the Soviet Union had at least four million people mobilized, whereas the United Kingdom had reduced its mobilized forces from around 5 million at the end of the war to a figure of 720 thousand. As he had pointed out before and would point out again, that figure was verifiable, whereas, as far as the General Assembly was concerned, no figure given by the USSR was verifiable. It was noteworthy that Mr. Vyshinsky had not addressed himself to that point, but had urged upon the Assembly other considerations such as the Soviet Union proposals relating to atomic energy. The Assembly might well ask itself why, if the USSR delegation was unwilling to co-operate and to pledge itself to such a relatively simple matter as an international instrument for the verification of figures which were of such great concern to the whole Assembly, Mr. Vyshinsky had urged upon the Assembly the much greater instrument relating to atomic energy.

9. Mr. McNeil would not for a second suggest that Mr. Vyshinsky's proposals with regard to atomic energy were adequate or workable, or would produce satisfaction in the minds of the world, but since Mr. Vyshinsky obviously believed that they were so, it would be natural to assume that, if he was prepared to go so much farther on that subject, he should be prepared to go at least a little way towards the verification of effectives.

¹ For the discussion on this subject in the First Committee, see *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, First Committee, 325th to 337th meetings inclusive.*

10. All were agreed that the current debate was highly useful. While the USSR delegation and its supporters had repeated, both in the First Committee and in the Assembly, the same monotonous propaganda, other delegations had spoken in the Committee and in the Assembly, each approaching the problem in its own way, each seeking to explain the difficulties as it experienced them, each attempting to persuade the Soviet Union that it must take some part in the creation of international confidence, and each explaining its fear that the Soviet Union was destroying such remnants of international confidence as still existed.

11. The General Assembly and the world outside would decide which of those two groups of accredited representatives was the more concerned to demonstrate the truth and to arrive at valid conclusions. The determination of credibility and sincerity was a matter upon which all had acquired some facility in international conferences. If such a distinguished legal representative as the leader of the Soviet Union delegation were to see two, three, four or five witnesses testify in regard to some complicated happening in pedantically identical language, he would not, Mr. McNeil was sure, be convinced of their credibility, for each man saw a happening with slightly different colouring and slightly different timing, in relation to a slightly different context and background. Mr. Vyshinsky would undoubtedly conclude that identity of language suggested neither honesty nor unusual powers of analysis or observation, but rather a rehearsal. Yet that was the effect that Mr. Vyshinsky and his supporters had conveyed to the Committee and would doubtless convey to the General Assembly.

12. On the other side, there had been a great range of approach. There had been the philosophical analysis of the leader of the Lebanese delegation, which some of his opponents had dubbed worthless although all his opponents had found it necessary to devote a great deal of time to an examination of it; there had been the careful humility of the Danish delegation, the almost personal, unvarnished and unostentatious approach of the delegation of Iceland, the precision of the Belgian delegation, the great effort to be impartial which the Indian delegation had disclosed, to name but a few at hazard. All those differing approaches had indeed built up an impression of credibility and earnestness. It was therefore no accident that in the Committee and, Mr. McNeil anticipated, in the Assembly, there had been such an astonishing approach to unanimity upon the subject. There was no automatic majority at the disposal of either the United States or the United Kingdom. Everyone was aware that in other Committees meeting at that very moment, the United States and the United Kingdom sometimes showed differing views, and that the United Kingdom delegation and at times the United States delegation had sustained substantial defeats.

13. Upon the subject under consideration, however, there had been a unanimity never before demonstrated, to which the USSR delegation, most properly but by its own methods, had again and again directed the attention of the Assembly. The solid vote which had taken place in the First Committee, that identity of conclusion, signified

that the propaganda attempts of the delegation of the Soviet Union to mislead and confuse world opinion had been a failure. Mr. McNeil hoped the USSR delegation would, however reluctantly, come to that conclusion, so that the future proceedings of the Assembly might become more useful.

14. Anxious and sincere delegations, perhaps even timid delegations, had in the past two, three or four years been most reluctant not to give the delegation of the Soviet Union the benefit of the doubt, wherever it was possible to do that. That situation had passed, however, and no further doubt existed. However reluctantly, those delegations had come to the conclusion that the USSR was making no contributions to the conditions necessary for world peace by such draft resolutions, such proposals and such manoeuvres as the Assembly had been examining. Such proposals did not touch upon the reality of the problems before the United Nations. They were in conflict with the actions, if not with the intentions, of the Soviet Union. Having arrived at those quite definite conclusions, several Governments of the democratic countries had had to agree upon limited defence measures—but only defence measures—and had set about designing and implementing as a result of that conclusion.

15. No delegation other than the USSR delegation and those which supported it could fail to see the conflict between the apparent intentions of that delegation, as reflected in its draft resolution (A/1149), and the activities of the Soviet Union outside the Assembly.

16. Representatives had listened with great attention to the very short and direct speech of the Iranian representative. Mr. McNeil had been shocked when, at the 157th meeting, Mr. Vyshinsky had apparently decided that it was again necessary to attack the Shah of Iran in his speech. There had been a steady flow of accusations and attacks by USSR propaganda against its neighbour, Iran. There had been denials and there had doubtless been diplomatic conversations. Yet, despite that background, Mr. Vyshinsky, pleading for the acceptance of his draft resolution providing for a peace pact, had given the Assembly that demonstration of good neighbourly feelings toward His Imperial Majesty, the Shah of Iran.

17. Turning to another neighbour of the Soviet Union, Turkey, Mr. McNeil stated that no country had displayed greater stability and more calmness of mind in the face of violent propaganda attacks than had Turkey. A stable and a freely elected Government in Turkey was obviously an essential for the creation of conditions of peace in that part of the world, and it could therefore be reasonably concluded that the Soviet Union, in conformity with its expressed intentions during the debates, would be interested in seeing that the sober, constitutional processes of Turkey were allowed to take place unhindered. That was not the case, however. Only the previous day Mr. McNeil had had occasion to read translations of some of the current Soviet propaganda directed against Turkey, and he had no doubt that at that very moment USSR loudspeakers were blaring out attacks against their near and peaceful neighbour, designed to set the Turkish soldier against the Turkish civilian, to set Arab against Turk, to widen to a maximum any gap that existed be-

tween employer and employee, to impede the normal democratic, constitutional processes of that country and to create instead a chaotic and turbulent situation. He wondered how that could be explained in the light of the professions to which the Assembly had so often listened and of the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union.

18. If further dramatic evidence of the conflict between the professed intentions of the USSR and the reality of its action was wanted, there could scarcely be a more arresting and alarming piece of evidence than the publication that very morning of the *Cominform* resolution.

19. The *Cominform*, which claimed and sought to represent peoples in widely separated regions and to direct advice to its followers in all parts of the world, had just told them bluntly and without qualification that, for reasons no doubt attractive to the communist régimes and to the communist elements throughout the world, they should among other things assert themselves to displace Marshal Tito and those who supported him in the Government of their own country. Moreover, it did so in the most remarkable language, remarkable for a peace resolution, for a peace campaign. According to the report in the *New York Herald Tribune*, the Yugoslav Communist Party had been described as being in the hands of murderers and spies, and the language of the resolution spoke of "spies and assassins" and alleged that the Tito régime had converted Belgrade into an American centre of espionage and anti-communist propaganda.

20. As the representative of France had said at the 258th meeting, there must always be a relationship between intention and the language used. There must surely be some relationship between such deliberate and calculated violence of language and the frame of mind in which it was used. It looked much more like a war manifesto than a peace manifesto.

21. Mr. Vyshinsky and Mr. Manuisky had reminded the Assembly of the millions of people in the world who were hungry and thirsty for peace and the conditions of peace. Those people would always be so, except at those rare times when things so sacred to them were threatened that they deserted their normal ways of peace. It would remain true that the primary desire was for peace; but it was not a desire for Soviet peace, it was certainly not a desire for the type of peace to which the *Cominform* directive had turned its attention that morning. The peace the world desired was a peace chosen by the will of the people, as envisaged in the Charter under which the Assembly worked.

22. Despite all the vigour, the ingenuity and the eloquence of Mr. Vyshinsky and Mr. Manuisky, there was no doubt that those ordinary people of the world had contrasted and studied the difference between Mr. Vyshinsky as he appeared in the Assembly and Mr. Vyshinsky's deputy as he had apparently appeared in Bucharest to direct the proceedings of that recent meeting of the *Cominform*. Those ordinary people would have decided that the Soviet Union had placed part of its power and had committed itself partly in that sense to the *Cominform*, and that it apparently committed itself to the United Nations by words and proposals alone.

23. Mr. McNeil believed that the USSR wanted peace, but it was peace at its own price and under the conditions designed by it. At the same time as it enunciated a desire for peace, it sought and hoped to extend its influence by creating in the capitals of the world Governments and régimes completely acceptable to its purposes because they were completely docile to its directives. Concluding that those two objectives might well prove to be in conflict with each other at different times and places, he had asked Mr. Vyshinsky, in the final stage of the debate in the First Committee, whether he gave priority to the creation of the conditions of world peace or to the sustaining, directing and helping on of the processes of world revolution. Mr. Vyshinsky apparently took the view that that revolution could not take place in the United Kingdom or the United States except by violence, but Mr. Vyshinsky had returned no answer to Mr. McNeil's simple question, either when making his final speech in the debate in Committee or when he had spoken in the Assembly.

24. To persuade the Assembly that his intentions and the intentions of his Government matched the draft resolution of the Soviet Union, Mr. Vyshinsky should reconvene the *Cominform* and send out its apostles to tell its people in whatever country they were to be found that they must desist immediately from creating chaos, from slandering and libelling Governments and governmental representatives violently and with scarcely a reservation, and that they must concentrate instead on creating the conditions of stable and progressive government.

25. It was because that contrast was so obvious, so discernible in almost all parts of the world, that the representatives in the First Committee had rejected the USSR draft resolution by a vote of unprecedented magnitude and had endorsed, by a similar vote, the draft resolution submitted jointly by the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom.

26. Mr. McNeil found little satisfaction in that situation or in that vote. The only possible satisfaction would be if the delegation of the Soviet Union were to conclude that the campaign it had led—in Mr. McNeil's opinion a campaign to sabotage peace, and certainly a campaign aimed at establishing only the kind of peace the Soviet Union wanted—had been completely unsuccessful and was not likely to have any subsequent success. If that conclusion emerged, the Assembly would consider the subject again at its following session with a much greater hope of making some progress towards the objective to which all paid homage, but it would not be possible to make any progress unless there was acceptance of that conclusion and a changed attitude.

27. With all humility, Mr. McNeil would say to the USSR delegation, to Mr. Manuisky and to the people who had framed the *communiqué* from the *Cominform*, that their eyes were shut and that they were out of touch with the ordinary people of the world if they believed that those people were any longer deceived by their manoeuvre to confuse and mislead the world. For four years those people had been anxious to believe—as all had been anxious to believe—that the delegation of the Soviet Union was speaking the simple and unqualified truth. They had been forced to the conclusion that there was no identity

between the actions and operations of the USSR and a draft resolution such as that which it had submitted to the Assembly. That conclusion was being reached by the people in increasing numbers, by the people with whom all representatives took persistent, continuous and reasonable care to remain in contact and whose opinion they sought to understand—the people whom, however unfittingly, the General Assembly represented as best it could.

28. Mr. LANGE (Norway) said that the problem before the Assembly was a grave one—perhaps the most important that could be discussed by an international assembly. Haunted as they were by the fear of war and by general insecurity, the peoples represented would undoubtedly welcome a debate in the General Assembly on the true basic essentials of peace. They would welcome such a debate if it were conducted in a conciliatory manner with open minds and a sincere will to understand each other's point of view. Even if differences should still prove to be great, a discussion carried on in such a spirit might help to make the atmosphere in the world somewhat less charged and to make the work of the United Nations easier.

29. He believed, however, that, after following the proceedings in the First Committee, many representatives wondered whether the discussion had served any good purpose at all. Some delegations had even questioned whether it had been intended to serve any but propaganda purposes.

30. He was most sceptical of a policy of trying to solve basic problems by means of general declarations. The serious tension in the world under which all suffered and which all wanted to help relieve had many and complicated causes. The lack of solemn declarations on the part of Governments and statesmen, however, was not one of them. As had been pointed out by the representative of Sweden in the First Committee, such declarations were frequently not trusted when made in an atmosphere poisoned by propaganda.

31. The fundamental problem of war and peace was not an abstract question to be tackled in an abstract and general manner. It resolved itself into a number of concrete practical issues ranging from the control of atomic energy and disarmament on the one hand, to quite minor problems on the other, on which the parties could not agree simply for reasons of prestige and general distrust.

32. Some of those questions—and Mr. Lange feared that the question of atomic energy was one of them—were simply insoluble as long as there was not more mutual confidence among the Members of the United Nations. If it was desired to create such confidence and to make a real contribution to peace, there was no escape from the hard way of solving the existing problems one by one in a spirit of give and take. The best written declaration of good-will was no substitute for the display of genuine good-will in the solution of grave issues upon which the Members of the United Nations found themselves in something approaching a deadlock.

33. Despite its scepticism, however, the Norwegian delegation would have been glad, under certain conditions, to support a draft resolution along the lines suggested in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the USSR draft resolution. It would have done

so although it was perfectly aware that a call for the prohibition of atomic weapons subject to appropriate strict international control might be said to be an empty gesture as long as all knew that the real difficulty lay in the fact that there was no agreement with regard to what constituted appropriate strict international control. It might also be said that a pact for strengthening peace among the five great Powers might tend to obscure the fact that peace was the concern of all nations, large and small, members and non-members of the Security Council.

34. Nevertheless, an appeal unanimously agreed upon for the prohibition of atomic weapons and a pact among the great Powers for the strengthening of peace might have a beneficial effect under certain conditions, namely, if it were presented and adopted in a spirit of conciliation, or, even better, if it were accompanied by, or presented simultaneously with, suggestions for the solution upon a new basis of some of the problems with which the United Nations had been struggling for a long time. Unfortunately, such was not the case.

35. Members would recall the speech made at the 226th meeting by the Foreign Minister of the USSR, which had concluded with a call for a pact among the great Powers. Practically every word in that speech had run counter to the conclusion at which he had surprisingly arrived. Moreover, the very text of the USSR draft resolution made it unsuitable as an instrument for peace, and unacceptable either in part or as a whole.

36. As had been most correctly noted by the representative of India in the First Committee, paragraphs 2 and 3 took their colour from paragraph 1. The context in which the two paragraphs that the Norwegian delegation might have considered supporting was presented was one of accusation, not of conciliation.

37. Mr. Lange regretted that that should be so. No Member of the United Nations was in a better position than the Soviet Union to dispel many of the world's fears and anxieties; no Member was in a better position to prove that they were unfounded. The actions and policies of that country were perhaps not always interpreted correctly. Certainly it would be the gravest of mistakes not to give the most serious consideration to any measure for the strengthening of peace proposed by the USSR Government.

38. A constant difficulty, however, arose from the fact that the people of the Soviet Union were extremely isolated from the outside world. If there could be free exchange of information and ideas between that people and the rest of the world, Mr. Lange was convinced that Members of the United Nations would find it much easier than they did to come to terms on a basis of mutual understanding and friendship with the USSR Government. He wished to add that his own Government had always had, and still had, friendly relations with the Government of the Soviet Union, just as their two peoples had for centuries lived as friendly neighbours in the North.

39. The draft resolution submitted in the First Committee by the United States and the United Kingdom, and adopted by that Committee, stressed, in his opinion, some of the fundamental

conditions for an enduring peace. If Member States followed the precepts set forth in that draft by refraining from the use of force or from threatening other countries in any manner, by respecting international agreements, by respecting the dignity of the human person, by promoting political and religious freedom, by improving standards of living, by removing barriers to the free exchange of information and ideas, by fully participating in United Nations activities, by exercising restraint in the use of the veto, by regulating conventional armaments and by exercising national sovereignty jointly to the extent necessary to achieve effective international control of atomic energy, the world would be on the way to a stable and lasting peace. If all the Members of the United Nations would at all times scrupulously adhere to the letter and the spirit of the Charter, and in accordance with its Articles fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them, there would be no need for any special declarations. On the other hand, without the faithful observance of all the provisions of the Charter—which Member States had solemnly undertaken to observe—there would seem to be no use in entering into new undertakings.

40. Mr. Lange could not but regret that the draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom, expressing as it did what should be universally acceptable principles, had not received the support of all the members of the First Committee. From the very outset the presentation of that item of the agenda had been too involved in the pattern of propaganda of which the General Assembly had long been weary. He wondered whether such frequent accusations, couched in terms which only a generation before would have been a *casus belli* if used by responsible statesmen in reference to another nation, were not a factor tending to worsen the international situation. Once in a while it might, of course, be a good thing that States which had conflicting interests and were suspicious of each other's motives should tell each other what they thought in plain words, understandable to everyone; but that practice was altogether too frequent in the United Nations, and it tended to create an atmosphere in which it became difficult to arrive at solutions even on questions upon which there was a large measure of agreement.

41. As the representative of India had so appropriately said in the First Committee, the business of the United Nations was to resolve conflicts, not to create new ones or to aggravate existing ones. Whatever measures nations might find it necessary to take in other spheres of their international activity, the United Nations should serve the purposes of conciliation.

42. In important instances, the United Nations had already proved that it was an institution well suited to solve complicated international problems. It was, however, an instrument which might be used or not used. By its very constitution, its use was entirely dependent upon the will of Member States.

43. In conclusion, Mr. Lange emphasized that perhaps the most important essential for peace was readiness on the part of all Member States to use the United Nations not for extraneous purposes, but for the purposes for which it had been created.

44. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) admitted that the pact proposed by the Soviet Union would indeed be an excellent thing if the basic atmosphere of confidence were present. In his opinion, however, it was putting the cart before the horse to suppose that such a pact would itself contribute to the creation of that necessary atmosphere. Only a fundamental change in communist doctrine, whereby the rest of the world would no longer be absolutely damned in principle, could bring about the type of confidence which would give substance and meaning to such pacts. As long as it was an inalienable part of communist doctrine—the fact could be amply demonstrated—that any dealings with the non-communist countries were in the nature of tactical manoeuvres justified only as temporary expedients to further the total communist grand design, special pacts lost their meaning. The conclusion of such pacts could mean either that the non-communist countries were so decadent that they did not perceive the trap into which they were being led, or that they were so cunning that they made the communist countries believe they did not perceive the trap, while in fact they were preparing a trap of their own. Mr. Malik did not believe the first assumption was valid; as for the second, it was manifestly unworthy of the United Nations. In any case, both assumptions unmistakably signified that the necessary confidence was lacking, and pacts were therefore unavailing.

45. On the other hand, the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee did at least possess the virtue of reaffirming faith in the United Nations and underlining those fundamental concrete modes of international co-operation whose cumulative effect would be to help to create the necessary atmosphere of confidence. Since the United Nations was unthinkable without the active participation of the Soviet Union, it was a good thing that the draft resolution stated, in effect, that the United Nations solemnly believed in and sought the co-operation of that Power, and that it sincerely believed in constant meetings with that Power in a spirit of candour and frankness, in the hope that the Soviet Union might one day be induced to believe that the rest of the world was not as damnable, even from its own point of view, as it had thought it to be.

46. Communism was an offshoot of western European culture. Without the intellectual apparatus of German idealism and the social and economic phenomena of English industrialism, communism would have been impossible. From the infinitely rich existence of the West, however, it had singled out only the material economic aspect, setting it up as the source of all values and concentrating on the modes of production and exchange, even to the extent of deifying them. Communism was manifestly a rebellion against the Western authentic order of values. It was, in effect, an inversion of that order.

47. It followed that the authentic West could understand communism, could appreciate its positive values and pass objective judgments on its shortcomings. Communism, on the other hand, could neither understand nor appreciate nor authoritatively judge the West. If it could, it would have modified its position and peace would have become possible, for communism was hopelessly imprisoned within the walls of its own relativism and materialism. It interpreted everything in terms of the premises and the categories

of the Marxist philosophy. When it encountered a thing, it did not see the proper nature of that thing in itself; it at once dissolved it in the pre-suppositions and outlook of Marxism. It could not allow things to speak to it innocently by themselves. It explained every view in terms of its social and economic origin and function, and assessed every value by the measure of its service-ability to a class or to the cause of the classless society.

48. The West, thanks to its belief in the objectivity of truth and values, or at least to the presence in it of free and vigorous institutions which embodied that belief, was capable of understanding the premises and the views of communism in themselves, of appreciating positive communist achievements in their own society, of judging those positive achievements as also the privations and rejections of communism from the standpoint of its affirmative belief in the objective and the absolute.

49. The interesting paradox of the confrontation of communism and the non-communist world, a glimpse of which had been revealed in the debate in the First Committee, was that it was precisely the ideology of materialistic relativism which had absolutized itself into an exclusive dogmatism intolerant of any other view, disdainful of any other value, suspicious of any other motive, dismissing the rest of the world as unworthy of anything save bitter hatred or, at least, cynical sarcasm. Symptomatic of that apparently constitutional incapacity of communism to understand the West in terms of the West's own nature, in terms, indeed, of the West's better self, was the thoroughly Marxist identification of the West as such with capitalism, or reduction of the West in the glorious plenitude of its values and the diversity of its traditions to the sheer image of the economic structure which communism more or less equivocally and misleadingly termed capitalism. If it was to understand its own historic position in its true light, communism must thoroughly understand the fact that it was standing face to face with and rebelling against the West, the Greek, Roman, Hebrew, Christian, humane traditions of the West, and not only the unhappy West of secularism, liberalism, capitalism and imperialism. Communism must initially admit the possibility of genuine encounter and diversity, of mutual understanding despite disagreement, of communion in spite of otherness, of love in spite of radical differences. Otherwise there would be no prospect of genuine confrontation, understanding, confidence and peace.

50. Mr. Malik submitted that it was communism itself which was the obstacle to understanding, confidence and peace. Dogmatically entrenched in its own relativistic and materialistic pre-suppositions, it rejected the very notion of objective truth and thus precluded the very possibility of a genuine confrontation, of communication, of agreement. If there was no objective truth, a truth about communism and the West, a truth independent of and transcendent to communism and the West, a truth which judged of what Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin believed as well as of what Plato, Aquinas and Kant had believed, then there was no room for agreement but merely for condemnation, no room for a United Nations but merely for a group of representatives who assem-

bled for the specific purpose of denouncing one another while their Governments speeded up their armaments programmes in preparation for the next war.

51. Without wishing to return to the debate in the First Committee, Mr. Malik would like to point out one very revealing fact about that debate. Two spokesmen of the communist States had reacted in a very significant way to two different portions of his statement in the First Committee. One representative had said, in a happy moment of self-revelation, that he was surprised at the section of the statement concerned with the critique of the West. He had even said that he had not been able to believe his own eyes when he had read it. Another representative had intimated that he could not believe that Mr. Malik was honest in his appreciation of the positive achievements of the Soviet Union. That was very interesting, for it demonstrated that communism could not conceive of any nation honestly criticizing itself or honestly appreciating the positive worth of its opponents.

52. Those were corollaries of the rejection of objective truth. If each were to reject a truth which was above himself, his cause and his position, above his interest, above mere nationality and class and tradition, as well as above the opponent's cause and positions and interests and traditions, there could be no possibility of one man convincing another, of nations coming to terms with one another or facing and meeting one another. Surely the mere fact that different nations held different views need not make them eternally incapable of meeting one another except externally and superficially in mutual condemnation, distrust and hostility.

53. If communism would but admit the possibility of truth in the non-communist world, grant the possibility of error in its own teachings, recognize that truth really existed independently of communism and non-communism and was to be sought and found by communists and non-communists and discussed between communists and non-communists, the absurdity of discussion and the impossibility of agreement between communists and non-communists would at once vanish. Then, but only then, would peace be possible. Otherwise, the only peace that remained for the world was unauthentic and insecure peace, a peace which was virtually a state of potential warfare.

54. Mr. CLEMENTIS (Czechoslovakia) would not even attempt to refute the remarks of the representative of Lebanon, because the latter had entirely failed to grasp the full implications of the very serious matter under discussion.

55. Turning to the USSR draft resolution, he said that its acceptance or rejection would be a test of the General Assembly's ability to deal with vital contemporary problems. That draft resolution had not only been rejected by the First Committee, but had been replaced by a joint United States and United Kingdom draft resolution which, under the cloak of general considerations, merely repeated the provocative attacks against the USSR and its allies which had become familiar in previous sessions of the General Assembly. All the other draft resolutions adopted by the usual majority in the First Committee and

the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee have the same stamp of the power policy of the United States which, counting mainly upon its economic and financial superiority, demanded that the States bound to it should support both within and outside the United Nations such ideas as fitted its current strategies. The aim of those strategies was quite simply what President Truman, in his message to Congress on 6 January 1947, had called the world leadership of the United States.

56. United States military circles spoke of such leadership in less guarded terms. General Omar Bradley, for example, addressing the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on 29 July 1949, had spoken of the need for such courage in the United States rise to leadership as would give it first rank in the history of great actions. The Czechoslovak delegation would like to know to what kind of great action General Bradley had been referring.

57. Such statements had a direct bearing upon paragraph 1 of the USSR draft resolution in connexion with the request that the General Assembly should condemn the preparations for a new war currently being conducted, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom.

58. Not a single opponent of the USSR draft resolution or supporter of the joint draft resolution in the First Committee had been able, in the course of a very extensive discussion, to advance any convincing refutation of the documented facts concerning the ideological and material preparations for a new war submitted by the supporters of the USSR draft resolution. The representative of the United Kingdom had failed to do so at the current meeting of the Assembly. The documents and factual statements cited in support of the USSR draft resolution had been passed over in silence or had been answered with mere generalizations.

59. The supporters of the USSR draft resolution had stated that the United States was aiming at world domination. The cloak of philanthropical verbiage about securing world peace with which it shrouded its ambitions was threadbare; Hitler had acted in precisely the same way.

60. That contention was borne out by an article entitled "War is Peace" in the *Wall Street Journal* of 27 July 1949, in which it was noted that President Truman's message of that period to Congress had been tantamount to an affirmation that peaceful measures could not preserve peace and that warlike measures must therefore be used, which would mean the end of the United Nations.

61. No delegation in the course of the debate in the First Committee had been able to refute the facts which had been presented to show that the achievement of world rule by the United States had become a doctrine formulated, propagated and put into political practice by all the leading official authorities of that country. The Czechoslovak delegation had explained in detail how that ideological preparation was reflected in material preparation through measures such as those listed in paragraph 1 of the USSR draft resolution. Such preparation had culminated in the organization of States under the control of the United States through the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty.

62. A somewhat different aspect of the United States plan directly concerned the United Nations. The natural consequence of the doctrine of the predominance of the United States was that the United Nations would be deprived of all significance save in so far as it served the aims of the United States. The truth of that was demonstrated not only by the experience of many delegations within the United Nations itself, but also by the fact that both the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty had been established outside the framework of the United Nations, that meetings of the military agencies connected with the North Atlantic Treaty had taken place immediately before the opening of the General Assembly and were taking place even during its session and that, during the same period, there had been an almost ostentatious meeting of the Foreign Ministers of three Powers which were permanent members of the Security Council. Furthermore, in dealing with the questions concerning international peace still before the General Assembly, the United States delegation was willing to co-operate and to accept the decisions of the Assembly only if such decisions coincided with its own needs and aspirations, or in other words, if they contributed to the achievement of world domination by the United States.

63. It was instructive, in that connexion, to recall that Mr. Johnson, the United States Secretary of Defense, had told the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on 29 July 1949 that even if the United States point of view with regard to armaments were accepted by the United Nations, that would have no influence upon the continuing rearmament of that country. He had said that he was suspicious of all talk of disarmament and that the sole hope for American peace, which meant world peace, lay in the strength of the arms and economy of the United States.

64. That was the theory of *pax americana*, and it was not the first time in history that one Power had wished to impose its own type of peace upon the world. Such attempts had always resulted in war and had always ended in the defeat of the Power which had made them.

65. Since no delegation in the First Committee had been able to deny the existence of the United States doctrine that it must rule the world, it would be equally impossible to deny the disastrous consequences to which that policy would lead, not only in world politics in general, but particularly in the United Nations. There was no need to stress the significant role of the atom bomb in that connexion.

66. The United States was taking great pains to emphasize that its doctrine of world domination was sufficiently supported by its material, economic and military power through the stockpiling of strategic materials, rearmament and the construction of military, naval and air bases.

67. Admitting in the First Committee that the United Kingdom had a small number of military bases scattered throughout the world, Mr. McNeil had said that was essential because the dependent territories of the United Kingdom were themselves scattered throughout the world. It was common knowledge that the United States had an incomparably larger number of military, naval and air bases encircling the entire globe. From

Mr. McNeil's explanation it followed that the territories lying within the circle of the United States bases were also dependent territories of the United States. There was much evidence to show that that was the case.

68. Mr. McNeil had also said that while his country had withdrawn its troops from many territories after the war, Soviet units had never left what he had described as subjugated areas. Among the territories which rightfully constituted an inseparable part of the Soviet Union, Mr. McNeil had mentioned Ruthenia.

69. That was a good illustration of the basis for all the insinuations about USSR expansion and imperialism. Ruthenia—or, more correctly, the Trans-Carpathian Ukraine—had been attached to Czechoslovakia after the First World War as a so-called autonomous region. Even at that time the Czechoslovak Government had made it clear that it did not consider that territory as a permanent part of Czechoslovakia but as a kind of trust territory which would some day be adopted by what had then been called the new Russia. When the Ukrainians from Galicia had united with their fatherland after the Second World War, and the Ukrainian SSR had become an immediate neighbour of the Trans-Carpathian Ukraine, the Czechoslovak Government had on its own initiative informed the Government of the USSR that it recognized as fully legitimate the desire of the Ukrainian population in that area to unite in one State with the rest of the Ukraine. The same applied to the other so-called subjugated areas mentioned by Mr. McNeil.

70. That absurd accusation would be ludicrous were it not an integral part of a deliberate campaign designed to represent the Soviet Union as a *de facto* aggressor against which war would in fact be a defensive war. Hence the need for some kind of proof of the alleged popular dissatisfaction with the régime of the people's democracies. That was the aim of the BBC and the Voice of America. Furthermore, the enemies and traitors of those countries received special intelligence training and were then smuggled back with money, secret transmitters and weapons. Their terroristic attacks were bound to fail, but that was of small importance to the instigators who remained safe either outside the country or under the protection of diplomatic immunity. On the contrary, the elimination of any terrorist or espionage organization in the people's democracies provided a pretext for Press campaigns designed to create the impression that the régimes in those countries were unstable and that they would eventually be liquidated. That was one of the admitted aims of the cold war.

71. Turning to paragraph 3 of the USSR draft resolution, Mr. Clementis said that lasting peace could be based only on the unanimity of the great Powers. Neither the Soviet Union nor the Chinese People's Republic would agree to a *pax americana*. In the First Committee, fourteen States had voted in favour of paragraph 3 of the USSR draft resolution in order to show their desire for the co-operation of all the five great Powers; twenty-six States had had the courage to keep silent and only nineteen had declared that they wanted peace without the Soviet Union. Accusations should not be levelled against the Soviet Union for launching peace offensives but

rather against those who made those offensives necessary by their activities. The rejection of the USSR draft resolution would only strengthen that country in its determination to preserve peace.

72. The USSR draft resolution contained concrete proposals to meet the existing situation. The draft resolution of the First Committee, although veiled by a smoke-screen of the principles of the Charter, was nothing but a mixture of all the things against which Czechoslovakia had been fighting in the United Nations and would continue to fight. The Czechoslovak delegation in the First Committee had voted against that draft resolution as a whole, although abstaining on the paragraphs which set forth the principles of the Charter. Indeed, Czechoslovakia had given sufficient proof of its determination to apply those principles in practice.

73. Behind that smoke-screen, the substance of the First Committee's draft resolution could be divided into two parts: paragraphs 5, 12 and 13 demanded the recognition of certain principles which had already been applied by the usual majority over the protests of the minority, in connexion with some of the questions brought before the Assembly at its previous and current sessions; the primary aims of paragraphs 6, 8 and 10 were to give support to the systematic campaign waged against the Soviet Union and its allies.

74. Paragraph 5 called upon all nations, whether Members or not of the United Nations "to afford all United Nations bodies full co-operation and free access in the performance of the tasks assigned to them under the Charter". When submitting the joint draft resolution in the First Committee, Mr. Austin had enumerated all the specialized agencies and had denounced the USSR for not participating in them. Czechoslovakia, which was a member of all those specialized agencies except one, could state that the majority of them were far behind their tasks, while the activities of some were such that Czechoslovakia was forced to reconsider the advisability and even the possibility of further participation in them.

75. What was even more significant about paragraph 5 was that it implicitly provided for co-operation with organs such as the Interim Committee. What indeed could be the tasks assigned under the Charter to that illegal body, which had been set up and prolonged in violation of the Charter itself? What could be the tasks under the Charter of the United Nations Commission on Korea, which had been established in violation of an existing international agreement? Clearly, such bodies could serve only selfish interests and were thus contrary to the principles of the Charter. There could be no doubt, for instance, that the Commission on Korea served the strategic and economic needs of the United States, which regarded South Korea as an important base in the building of its world empire. Last, but not least, what could the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans do to implement the principles of the Charter or contribute towards world peace in general? That Committee had been created in order to consolidate the results of Anglo-American armed intervention in the internal affairs of Greece and its task for the future was to further the unwarranted campaign which was being conducted against Albania and Bulgaria. In

the circumstances, it was hardly realistic to ask all Member States to co-operate with the Special Committee, and to expect Albania and Bulgaria to afford it free access to their territory.

76. It was permissible to ask what had actually been the purpose of the United Kingdom and the United States in inserting that paragraph in the draft resolution they had submitted to the First Committee. Perhaps they had been assailed by certain doubts about their actions and wished once more to share their responsibility with the automatic majority in the General Assembly. Mr. Clementis did not think that was really the case and, in his opinion, the only explanation of the paragraph lay in the basic purpose of the draft resolution as a whole, which was to distract attention from the concrete and constructive USSR proposals and to concentrate it again on a campaign against the Soviet Union and its Allies.

77. The same could be said of paragraphs 12 and 13 of the draft resolution. Instead of providing for the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons—weapons of an insidious aggressor to be used for the commission of genocide—the draft resolution simply offered a few phrases about the acceptance of an unacceptable plan of control, whereby all the means of producing atomic energy would be dominated by a super-trust under the direction of the United States.

78. The problem was one of great magnitude, since atomic energy had unlimited possibilities and could be used for destructive or creative purposes. Mr. Clementis would not repeat what had already been said about that burning problem on other occasions, but he would simply stress one particular aspect. For some time the belief that the United States had a monopoly of atomic weapons had fostered the idea of the inevitability of a third world war and had rendered such an idea acceptable to public opinion, particularly in the United States, by spreading the illusion that the country which held the monopoly of the atom bomb could speedily wipe out its enemies without much loss of life among its own citizens. The news that that monopoly had come to an end had therefore been a tremendous boon to mankind.

79. Czechoslovakia was very grateful to the scientists and leaders of the Soviet Union who had worked unflinchingly for the unconditional prohibition of the use of atomic weapons and had striven towards the goal of providing atomic energy for beneficial purposes. Their aim had been to turn that terrible weapon of destruction into a great instrument of technical progress which would help to raise the standards of living of the peoples throughout the world. Czechoslovakia was proud to have been able to contribute towards that great work and to have provided uranium ore once more for the service of all humanity.

80. The news of the atomic explosion in the USSR had not yet been reflected in the Assembly's discussions, but that was only because the leading circles in the United States were finding it difficult to give up an illusion which had formed the basis of their plans for many years. The whole aggressive structure of the United States armed forces had been built up on the basis of a two-fold illusion: the illusion that the atom bomb would be the decisive weapon in the future war

and the illusion that the United States held the monopoly of the weapon. Eventually, however, facts would prevail over illusions. In the meantime, the usual majority in the United Nations, though perhaps with a feeling of uneasiness, would be forced to vote as they had done in the First Committee in favour of a draft resolution which was still based on the old illusion.

81. The debates in the First Committee had shown that the usual majority had chosen the method of leading the discussions as far as possible away from the actual substance of the problem. Thus representatives had been forced to listen to pseudo-philosophical meditations and to embarrassingly primitive comments on Marxism-Leninism. That method had apparently been used in order to distract the attention of the representatives from the actual text of the joint draft resolution which, even in the eyes of its supporters, was obviously a poor substitute for the USSR draft.

82. Paragraph 6 of the draft resolution adopted by the First Committee had obviously been inserted for the express purpose of justifying the position of the majority with regard to the so-called violations of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. Mr. Clementis could, of course, repeat the vast quantity of evidence which had already been given about discrimination and violations of the most elementary human rights in the very countries which had sponsored the draft resolution, but he would refrain from doing so.

83. Turning to paragraph 8, he noted that the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom had both expressed their indignation at the fact that the Soviet Union and the people's democracies refused to acknowledge the merits of the Voice of America and the BBC as disseminators of information and ideas essential to international understanding and peace. If those representatives had really been familiar with the daily broadcasts of the Voice of America and the BBC to the USSR and the people's democracies they would hardly have spoken in that manner. The sole aim of those broadcasts was to instigate a handful of desperadoes to commit crimes against the people's democratic régimes and to overthrow the Governments concerned. The methods used were inventions, lies, half truths, personal insults and the worst possible kind of abuse. After February 1948, those two broadcasting organizations had let loose a campaign against Czechoslovakia equal in violence to that launched by Goebbels before the Munich crisis. Yet the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom had been indignant that Czechoslovakia had failed to be grateful for the campaigns launched against it by the Voice of America and the BBC.

84. If the United States representative really tried to eliminate the obstacles which prevented the people of his country from finding out the truth about the people's democracies, he would doubtless be summoned before the Committee on Un-American Activities.

85. Paragraph 10 of the draft resolution called for the limitation of the use of the veto in the Security Council. All Mr. Clementis had to say on that point was that those who made the appeal belonged to the very countries which systemati-

cally created situations in the Security Council whereby the USSR representative was compelled to use the veto in the interests of a correct solution of the problems at stake as well as in the interests of the United Nations itself.

86. The representative of Czechoslovakia wished to state in conclusion that he had shown quite clearly that the draft resolution of the First Committee did not serve the purpose of peace but that its adoption would simply prolong the cold war. Unfortunately, the same could be said of other resolutions adopted by the usual majority in the General Assembly. Those who really wanted peace would be warned by the negative results of the Assembly's discussions to increase their vigilance and their efforts towards co-operation among peace-loving nations which did not want peace bearing the trade mark "made in and for America", but which simply wanted peace.

87. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) recalled that the draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly by the First Committee had been supported by fifty-three delegations in the Committee. He appealed earnestly to those who took a different view of that very grave matter, the gravest matter with which the United Nations and individual Members could ever be concerned, to ponder the significance of that vote.

88. All nations desired peace, not only because peace was in itself a desirable state of affairs and should be highly valued among civilized nations, but also all had recently passed through experiences which had brought home to each individual the horrors, misery and devastation that war brought in its wake and left behind as a legacy.

89. Austria had been the first victim of the Second World War; Czechoslovakia had come next; Poland had brought about the crisis which could not be evaded; Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France had followed; and then had come the turn of the USSR itself. On the other side of the world, China had already become a victim much earlier; then Indo-China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya and Burma had all been overrun and devastated. The sub-continent of India, comprising India and Pakistan, had been gravely threatened by that devastation. All nations had felt, directly or indirectly, the impact of war. Modern war was not the same thing as war even half a century before.

90. The fact that fifty-three States so situated had voted in one way on the draft resolution signified, in the first place, that they were satisfied that the condemnation contained in paragraph 1 of the Soviet Union draft resolution was a slander. It was a fact that, until conditions of peace were secured and peace became assured, States must take appropriate measures for defence. It was idle to pretend that because a nation took due measures for its defence and security it was preparing for aggressive war. As matters stood, neglect of due precautions would be criminal and

a breach of the trust that each Government owed to its people and to coming generations. That did not mean that nations so placed desired war and were preparing for aggression.

91. The vote also signified that of the two draft resolutions before the Assembly, the draft sponsored jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom and adopted by the First Committee represented a better approach towards the maintenance and preservation of peace than the draft sponsored by the USSR. It by no means followed that the adoption of one would guarantee peace any more than the adoption of the other, but the former pointed to a better way of securing peace.

92. On the other hand, it had been urged that the only thing that would secure peace would be a five-Power pact. It was true—at least for any reasonably foreseeable period—that if the five Powers indicated in the USSR draft resolution did not enter into armed conflict with each other, peace could and would be preserved. In that sense, perhaps, a five-Power pact to preserve the peace might be some indication that those Powers intended to preserve the peace. There was no need, however, to limit it to the five Powers. All Powers, great and small, should reaffirm their determination to carry into effect to the uttermost their obligations under the Charter.

93. It would be well for the Assembly to recall that the United Nations had been set up because the peoples of the United Nations were determined "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" — the very object that those two draft resolutions had in view. The solemn declaration in the preamble of the Charter constituted a pact into which all Members had already entered. Let all reaffirm that that was their pact. Pacts, after all, served only to remind the signatories of their duty. They were only a means, not an end in themselves. History was full of instances of pacts—non-aggressive pacts, peace pacts—having served only as cloaks for aggression.

94. The truth in that respect was pithily expressed in a Punjabi proverb, which ran: "It is not the pilgrimage to Mecca that purifies the heart; it is the purity of the heart that makes the pilgrimage to Mecca worth while".

95. It was for all Member States, then, to supply what was lacking, namely, purity and sincerity of motives and intentions. If all were determined to carry out to the uttermost the obligations of the pact into which they had already entered, no more pacts, no more resolutions would be needed. If they were not prepared to do that, then any number of pacts and resolutions would not suffice. It was no use for each Member to determine that every other Member should carry out its obligations; each nation must determine that it would carry out its own obligations to the full.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.