

Turkey, Venezuela, Yemen, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Guatemala, Iceland, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua.

*Paragraph 2 was rejected by 11 votes to 6, with 30 abstentions.*

170. The PRESIDENT put paragraph 3 to the vote.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Czechoslovakia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

*Against:* Denmark, Greece, India, Liberia, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia.

*Abstaining:* Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Guatemala, Iceland, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Cuba.

*Paragraph 3 was rejected by 12 votes to 7, with 28 abstentions.*

171. At the request of the representative of Denmark, the PRESIDENT read out the parts of the draft resolution which had been adopted and put them to the vote as a whole.

*The resolution as a whole was rejected by 27 votes to 5, with 12 abstentions.*

The meeting rose at 2.40 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

*Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Tuesday, 29 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*President:* General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war, and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace: report of the First Committee (A/1150)**

1. Mr. DE DIEGO (Panama), Rapporteur of the First Committee, presented the report of that Committee and the accompanying draft resolution (A/1150).

2. Without going into a detailed description of the discussions in the Committee,<sup>1</sup> the Rapporteur wished to point out that the general consensus of opinion during the debate had been an overwhelming concern for peace and tranquillity. Furthermore, the prevailing perturbation caused by the contemporary world situation had been very evident; all representatives had shown an earnest desire to find some formula to allay that anxiety.

3. Mr. de Diego had thought it his duty to inform the Assembly of the views expressed in the First Committee and of the very strong desire voiced by the representatives that the spectre of war should be exorcised and that every effort should be made to bring about the dawning of better times throughout the world.

4. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) presented the draft resolution (A/1149) of the USSR delegation. That draft was the logical consequence and development of the proposals for the strengthening of peace which that delegation had repeatedly submitted to the United Nations. It reflected the principles underlying the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, namely, ceaseless struggle for peace, security and friendship among nations.

5. As far back as 1925 Mr. Stalin, the great leader of the Soviet people, had said that the

idea of peace was the very basis of his country's foreign policy; that the task the USSR had set itself was to fight for peace, to fight against new wars and to denounce all the fomenters of a new war, who concealed their activities beneath the cloak of pacifism. It mattered little whether the mask they used was the League of Nations or Locarno; the USSR could be neither hoodwinked nor cowed.

6. The USSR still followed the same policy that its leader had thus defined.

7. For the fourth time in the four years since the United Nations had come into existence, the delegation of the Soviet Union was submitting proposals for the strengthening of peace on behalf of its Government. In 1946, it had proposed a general reduction in armaments and the prohibition of the production and utilization of atomic energy for military purposes. Those proposals had served as a basis for the epoch-making resolution 41 (I) adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1946. In 1947, the Soviet Union had proposed the condemnation of war-mongering in any form. After a lengthy discussion, the General Assembly had unanimously adopted its resolution 110 (II), of 3 November 1947, the text of which was patterned on the USSR proposals. In 1948, the Soviet Union had proposed the reduction by one-third of the armaments of the five permanent members of the Security Council and, once more, the prohibition of atomic weapons. That proposal had met with fierce resistance and had been rejected.<sup>2</sup> The majority of the General Assembly, however, had not been able merely to shelve the USSR proposal; to cover their refusal to adopt that draft they had been forced to adopt the colourless and useless provisions contained in resolution 192 (III) of 19 November 1948.

8. There was no need to stress the importance of all those proposals which had been supported

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, First Committee*, 325th to 337th meetings inclusive.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I*, 163rd plenary meeting.

by the Soviet delegations and the delegations of the people's democracies.

9. The draft resolution submitted to the current session of the General Assembly by the Soviet Union, asking for the condemnation of preparations for a new war and the conclusion of a five-Power pact to strengthen peace, was the logical development of the proposals made by the USSR in previous years. In submitting that draft to the Assembly, the Government of the USSR was conscious of its high responsibility, which it shared with the other permanent members of the Security Council and with the United Nations as a whole, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

10. Despite General Assembly resolution 110 (II) denouncing war-mongering in any form, war-mongering continued unabated. Preparations for a new war were being carried on not only by means of propaganda but also by an armaments race, by large budgetary appropriations for military purposes, by the creation of numerous strategic bases and by the organization of blocs pursuing aggressive aims. That showed that certain Member States did not comply with the General Assembly's resolutions, in particular the United States and United Kingdom Governments, which were preparing a new war against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies.

11. The world was witnessing a lamentable repetition of the history of the League of Nations, which had proved incapable of restraining war-mongers and had fallen under the control of a group of States which had used it to cloak their reactionary and aggressive aims and, in some cases, even as an instrument to serve those aims. Those States had been led by the United Kingdom and France, with the support of the United States. The failure of the League of Nations should have shown the peoples of the world what an international organization responsible for world peace and security should really be.

12. The United Nations had been in existence for four years and during that time it had become apparent that the tragic lessons taught by the League of Nations had been unheeded. By its systematic violations of the Charter and the policy it followed within the United Nations, over which it held sway, the Anglo-American bloc was weakening the authority of the Organization and reducing its role in international affairs almost to naught. Such had been the result, for example, of the blatant violations of the Charter committed by the nations which had entered into treaties of aggression and had established military blocs, such as the North Atlantic Treaty and the Brussels Treaty, and had organized the Marshall Plan.

13. Those measures had created a real danger that the United Nations might become a branch office of the State Department of the United States, a branch office which would faithfully execute the orders of the head office; for the majority in the United Nations, under the direction of the United States and United Kingdom delegations, were pursuing a policy which had no relation whatsoever to the aims and principles of the Organization.

14. A rather curious division of labour had apparently been arranged: the North Atlantic Treaty Powers were engaged in the preparation

of another war, while the United Nations, by means of its Anglo-American majority, was concealing that sinister design behind bogus declarations of peace.

15. In the Committees and in the General Assembly, the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc were unleashing floods of eloquence about peace and the peoples' welfare. Outside the United Nations, however, in the General Staffs and the Foreign Offices, in the North Atlantic bloc, the Brussels group and elsewhere, they were preparing a new war, they were forging the chains which were to bind the peace-loving peoples whom they intended to condemn to suffering and poverty.

16. The pacific proposals of the Soviet Union were aimed at unmasking that monstrous conspiracy of the reactionary forces against the peace and welfare of millions of human beings. Their aim was to grasp the felon wrist of the war-mongers who were preparing to bring catastrophe on the whole world.

17. The USSR draft resolution was simple and clear. It proposed that the preparations for war which were going forward in a number of countries, more particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom, should be condemned. In proof that such preparations for war were really taking place, the Soviet Union had on more than one occasion presented to the First Committee facts which no one had been able to refute in the smallest particular.

18. The USSR believed that the employment of atomic weapons and other means of mass extermination was contrary to the conscience and the honour of nations and was incompatible with membership in the United Nations. It believed that it was unthinkable that there should be further delay in adopting practical measures for the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international supervision to ensure observance of that prohibition. The majority in the First Committee had rejected that proposal. It was regrettable, to say the least, that that majority should entertain such a paltry view of national honour and conscience, of what was or was not compatible with the principles and dignity of the United Nations. The League of Nations itself had never gone so far as to admit its true position so cynically.

19. Finally, the USSR recommended to the General Assembly that it should express the wish that the five permanent members of the Security Council, on whose shoulders rested the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, should unite their efforts to prevent the danger of a new war and should conclude among themselves a pact for the strengthening of peace. That proposal had also been rejected, although no argument of any weight had been advanced against it.

20. In general, only one objection had been raised against the three USSR proposals: it had been said that they were nothing but propaganda.

21. So it was propaganda to condemn preparations for war; it was propaganda to ask that the use of the atomic bomb should be prohibited; it was propaganda to recommend the conclusion of a pact to strengthen peace. That only showed that the enemies of the Soviet Union were prepared

to seize any excuse in order to reject proposals which did not suit them.

22. It was to be noted, as he had already pointed out, that throughout the discussion not a single fact had been adduced in support of the objections raised against the proposals of the Soviet Union. Thus the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom had confined themselves to general statements without refuting any of the numerous facts which the delegations of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR, and of Poland and Czechoslovakia had adduced to demonstrate that preparations for war were really being made, not only in the United States and the United Kingdom, but also in a number of other States, and particularly in the territories of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

23. The existence of those preparations for war was confirmed not only by Press reports but by the statements of persons as eminent as Mr. Johnson, United States Secretary of Defense, General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Field Marshal Montgomery, and General Spaatz. It was also confirmed by concrete measures which it was impossible to conceal from public opinion. That was why no one had ventured to contradict the assertions of the Soviet Union. Mr. McNeil, the representative of the United Kingdom, had merely asked, with more or less well simulated surprise, whether the USSR delegation really believed that a war of aggression was being prepared. As for facts, Mr. McNeil had not produced any. He had simply repeated once again, and very timidly at that, that the United Kingdom was reducing its armed forces, though he had added immediately that, for reasons beyond his Government's control, his country's military budget was higher than its rulers would like it to be.

24. At the same time, Mr. McNeil had had the modesty not to breathe a word of the fact that the United States had transformed the United Kingdom into a military and air base. Neither had he said anything of the plans which could no longer be concealed for the utilization of those bases for an attack against the USSR and the people's democracies.

25. Mr. McNeil could scarcely allege that none of the some 500 bases with which the United States had encircled the world were situated on British territory. It was a fact that 90 American B-29 Flying Fortresses were based on the British Isles, where they formed several groups of the strategic bombing force. Neither Mr. McNeil nor his Government could deny the report in *The New York Times* that British soldiers had expressed their dissatisfaction at the fact that their Government had consented to receive on its territory 70 B-29's as assistance received by the United Kingdom from the United States under the Marshall Plan and as a party to the North Atlantic Treaty. No one had ever explained to the General Assembly what were the duties of that bombing force, nor had anyone, with that honesty of which British diplomats were so fond of speaking, explained against what countries those bases were being constructed and those air squadrons prepared. The United Kingdom Government and its representatives in the United Nations had not said a word about all that.

26. Furthermore, there was the case of Greece, and that of Cyprus, which had been transformed into an Anglo-American strategic base for aggression against the USSR. It was not purely fortuitous that the Anglo-American Press had stated that Cyprus had been transformed into a bridgehead against Soviet expansion.

27. In the First Committee, Mr. McNeil had stated that the United Kingdom must have strong bridgeheads which would enable it, in the event of war, to defend its very long lines of external communication. Mr. Vyshinsky took the liberty of asking Mr. McNeil of what war he was speaking; he would like to know against what country that was to be and when it would take place.

28. Mr. McNeil had, moreover, stated that the United Kingdom had withdrawn its troops from its bases in other countries. He had merely passed over in silence the fact that the United Kingdom bases had been handed over to the United States and that the United States was organizing bases on British territory. It was indeed a fact that the United States had received from the United Kingdom air bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Ascension, Trinity and the Bahamas and that it had constructed 18 new bases in Canada. Mr. McNeil had perhaps forgotten that there was a military and air base under British administration at Mellaha, in North Africa.

29. In view of those facts, Mr. McNeil's assertions could deceive no one.

30. The representative of the United States had adopted the same tactics; he had simply ignored the assertions that his country was playing the chief role in preparing for a new war. He had not taken up the remarks, quoted during the debates, of General Bradley, Mr. Johnson, General Vandenberg and others who had openly revealed their plans of aggression against the USSR. He had tried to distract attention by speaking of the aims of the North Atlantic Treaty. He had, moreover, declared that the policy of the United States was directed towards co-operation with all States with a view to the organization of a system of collective security.

31. The North Atlantic Treaty gave the lie to those words. Mr. Austin and his friends persisted in alleging that the Treaty was defensive and not aggressive. Mr. Vyshinsky wished to ask Mr. Austin and the representatives of those countries which were parties to the North Atlantic Treaty against whom that Treaty was to defend its signatories. He wished to ask why they had tried to bring into that alliance Iran and Turkey, which had common frontiers with the Soviet Union and were by no means countries of the North Atlantic, and why Iran needed military assistance, as the Shah had stated when, according to the *New York Herald Tribune* of 18 November, he had said that his country would ask the United States for increased supplies of armaments. All those facts were linked with the conference of United States diplomats to the Near Eastern countries, which was meeting at Istanbul and busying itself with the dissemination of provocative rumours. For example, it had been stated that Iran must be fortified so that it might be in a position to help prevent a Soviet *Blitzkrieg* through the oil-rich territory of Iran, and that United States assistance could prevent

Soviet aggression which would constitute a threat to the whole Near East and even to India.

32. In the First Committee, the United States delegation had launched a counter-attack and had tried to show that the Soviet Union was refusing offers of co-operation with the United States and did not want such co-operation, particularly in the case of Germany. Mr. Austin seemed to have forgotten that on 4 May 1948, in a conference with Mr. Molotov, who had then been USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, the United States Ambassador in Moscow had said that as far as the United States was concerned, he considered that the door was still open for the discussion and settlement of all questions outstanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. Everybody knew that the Government of the United States had hastened to repudiate that offer as soon as the Government of the USSR had said that it welcomed such a statement with joy and hoped that it would be possible to find means of establishing excellent relations between the two countries, in the interest not only of the peoples of both countries but of the whole world. Some days later, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Mr. Bevin, had also hastened to state that his Government had no intention of taking part in a new international conference as long as the ground was not prepared. Mr. Bevin and his assistant, Mr. McNeil, had shown in their statements in the General Assembly and elsewhere what they meant by preparing the ground for co-operation with the USSR.

33. After all that, Mr. Austin was able to say without blushing that the efforts of the United States to establish co-operation with the USSR had not produced positive results because of the opposition of the Soviet Union.

34. It was with a similar distortion of the facts that Mr. Austin had brought up the question of co-operation on the German problem in the First Committee. He had presented in a false light the circumstances in which the former United States Secretaries of State, Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Marshall, had made their proposals on the famous 25 and even 40-year guarantees against German aggression. There was good reason to ask what those guarantees had been. In the proposals of Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Marshall there had been no mention of such important questions as the denazification and democratization of Germany, the establishment of international control over the Ruhr with the participation of the USSR, or the liquidation of German trusts and cartels and the banking monopolies which controlled them and which, as everybody knew, had been the organizers of German aggression. There had been no mention of the demilitarization of Germany, the eradication of all traces of fascism and the establishment of agrarian reform. Mr. Austin had been silent on all those points.

35. Mr. Austin had also been silent on the fact that, in spite of the agreement reached in Paris in June 1949, whereby the four Powers had undertaken to continue their efforts to re-establish the economic and political unity of Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom and France had split Germany in two and set up the so-called Bonn Government, a puppet Gov-

ernment which was against the people and was, moreover, already beginning to disintegrate.

36. It was the ruling circles in the United States which prevented any possibility of international co-operation. They would use any pretext to that end, for if such co-operation were to be established, it would prevent the American monopolies from carrying out their plans for world domination and for transforming other States into United States colonies.

37. Those plans had met with an insuperable obstacle in the shape of the powerful peace movement launched by all the peoples of the world under the direction of the Soviet Union, the faithful guardian of the security of nations, the relentless foe of war, the friend and protector of peace.

38. Whenever the USSR submitted to the General Assembly proposals for the prevention of the danger of war, there was talk of Soviet propaganda and of a tactical manoeuvre to cloak the true aims of the Soviet Union, which, according to the enemies of peace, were aggressive action against other countries.

39. Any lies served the purposes of those who were thus endeavouring to slander the lofty policy of the USSR. All was grist to their mill. Thus they had even resorted to falsified quotations from the classic works of the theorists of Marxism-Leninism. They were seeking in that way to substantiate their fundamental arguments, of which there were three. The first was that the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties were organizing world revolution by means of the war which they were preparing against capitalist countries; the second was that the Soviet Union neither desired nor thought it possible to establish peaceful co-operation with capitalist countries; the third argument was that under cover of its peace proposals, the Soviet Union was concealing its true aim, which was the preparation for a new war. All those arguments were pure falsehood and slander.

40. In endeavouring to justify those assertions, the Anglo-American bloc had undertaken an impossible task. Not one of its professors, its learned counsellors, its experts in black or white magic, had been able to produce the slightest evidence in their support. It had therefore been forced to have recourse to lies, the falsification of facts and a tendentious interpretation of inaccurate quotations. At all costs, public opinion was to be hoodwinked and the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies represented as an anti-democratic and aggressive force making ready for war. By contrast, the capitalistic world was to be represented as a democratic force constrained to defend itself against communist aggression and as the only force striving for the peace and security of nations.

41. It was in pursuit of that plan that the First Committee had brought on the scene the representatives of Chile, Lebanon, New Zealand and some other States, who had thundered provocations and slanders against communism, the USSR and the people's democracies.

42. All those speakers, behind whom their real prompters—the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom—were hiding, had only one aim, namely, to create the impres-

sion that the Soviet Union, which was the land of socialism, together with the peoples' democracies, were making ready for another war and had no intention of taking part in international co-operation.

43. In the First Committee, the representative of the USSR had discussed the statements made by those speakers point by point and had shown them to be a mixture of ignorance and distortion of facts. He had clearly shown that the quotations culled by those speakers from the classic works of Marxist-Leninist theoreticians and from documents issued by the Government of the Soviet Union had been distorted and carefully whittled down, the better to serve the sinister ends they had in view.

44. There had been an attempt in the First Committee to create a false idea both of the principles and of the practice of USSR foreign policy. It had been said that that policy was completely unscrupulous and was directed towards the single goal of war, which was the key to the USSR attitude to all international questions. How baseless those charges were had already been demonstrated by the Soviet representatives and the representatives of the peoples' democracies. Nevertheless, Mr. Vyshinsky would recall briefly the nature of the Soviet Union's foreign policy, the way in which it had been established and the way in which it had been practised from the creation of the socialist State until that day.

45. The first decree passed by the USSR Government had been the decree on peace of 8 November 1917. In that historical document, the young socialist State had addressed an appeal to all States and all peoples to put an end to war and to conclude a just and democratic peace.

46. The Treaty of Versailles had served merely to increase the differences between the Allies. It had turned war into a permanent threat hanging over all the peoples of the world. At that time war had been raging in USSR territory. Hundreds of thousands of invading soldiers had been thrown into the fray and had been steeping the country in blood. Even in those circumstances, the Government had continued to struggle for peace; again and again it had appealed to the Governments of the *Entente*, offering to open negotiations for peace.

47. The Conference on the limitation of armament, held in Washington in 1921 and 1922, had been one of the most outstanding manifestations of the rivalry of two great Powers of the Pacific, the United States and Japan. Although the Conference had been convened outside the League of Nations, it had been a typical example of diplomacy and democracy as they had been understood in the League.

48. Not one of the important political questions had been solved by public debate. All the negotiations had been carried out in corridor conversations between the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan. Even the French delegation had not been admitted to those talks. The USSR Government had not participated in that Conference; it had not even been invited to take part. On 19 July 1921, it had protested against such an unfriendly attitude, which ostracized the workers' and peasants' Government. Nevertheless, in that case also the

Government of the Soviet Union had made a point of stressing that it would be prepared to welcome any measure connected with disarmament or with a decrease in military expenditure.

49. In 1922, again, a conference had been convened at Genoa, for the purpose of intimidating the Soviet Union by setting against it a united diplomatic front of its enemies. In spite of the unfavourable conditions in which it had been placed, the USSR Government had stated at that conference that, although it maintained its position of communism, its delegation realized that co-operation between the capitalist and socialist systems was essential for economic rehabilitation.

50. During that conference, the USSR delegation had submitted proposals for the general reduction of armaments and had undertaken to support any measure which might lighten the burden of militarism. That offer had been rejected.

51. In 1925, the Council of the League of Nations had resolved to set up a preparatory commission for a disarmament conference and had invited the Government of the Soviet Union to take part in that conference, although that Government had not then been a member of the League. The Soviet Union had accepted the invitation, and had stressed that it attached especial importance to any step directed towards diminishing the danger of war.

52. In the same year, the Soviet Union had signed an agreement on the principles governing the settlement of all outstanding questions between the USSR and China; under that agreement, the USSR had denounced all the treaties signed by the Czarist Government which violated the sovereignty of China; it had waived its claim to the indemnities demanded from China and had asked that the sums to be paid in respect of those indemnities should be devoted to public education in China. That was the first time that China had concluded an agreement with a great Power on the basis of complete equality and independence of the two contracting parties.

53. In 1927, the Soviet Union had taken part in the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission at Geneva and had submitted a proposal for immediate and complete disarmament. That proposal had been neither adopted nor rejected; in accordance with League of Nations practice, its consideration had been postponed for a year.

54. In 1928, the USSR Government had submitted a draft convention on immediate, complete and general disarmament to the League of Nations. That proposal had been rejected. The delegation of the Soviet Union had then submitted a new draft providing for the reduction by half of the armaments of the great Powers and by one-third or by one-quarter of the armaments of the small countries.

55. The efforts to bring about the failure of those peace proposals of the Soviet Union had at that time been directed by the French delegation, headed by Mr. Paul-Boncour, a member of the Second International. Incidentally, such membership had not been considered to be prejudicial to the representation of the interests of a State in the League of Nations. Mr. Paul-Boncour had directed his opposition to the USSR proposals with great energy. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled



that fact because the delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States were adopting a similar attitude in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

56. Mr. Paul-Boncour had done his utmost to prove that the USSR disarmament plan was not practical, that it was all too simple. He had tried to show that if there were general disarmament, the smaller countries would be at the mercy of the larger, because they would no longer be able to defend themselves. He had drawn the outrageous conclusion that disarmament would actually jeopardize the interests of the smaller nations. He had advanced an argument which still enjoyed considerable success with the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc, synthesized in the slogan "security first, disarmament later".

57. There again, no one had ventured to suggest the outright rejection of the USSR proposal. Its examination had been postponed until the following session of the Preparatory Commission.

58. All those facts showed that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union had always been directed towards the strengthening of peace and the establishment of co-operation with other countries. That policy had been expressed in a statement by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union on 10 December 1928. That statement, instructing the USSR Government to persist unceasingly in its policy of peace and disarmament while keeping a sharp watch on any attempt to violate peace and drag humanity into conflict, had become the law of the land in the USSR. It appeared in the codified law of the Soviet Union, a fact without precedent in legal history.

59. Another outstanding event of the year 1928 had been the signature of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, the aim of which had been to outlaw war. That Pact had been prepared without the participation of the USSR, for its authors' intention had been to make it an instrument of war against that country, an instrument which would make possible the encirclement and isolation of the home of socialism. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union had acceded to the Pact, taking the view that it imposed certain obligations upon all the signatories indiscriminately and enabled the USSR Government to raise the problem of disarmament once again.

60. In 1929, the Government of the Soviet Union had taken a number of steps to see that the Pact came into force before the stipulated time-limit, in particular between the USSR and Poland, and later between the USSR and Lithuania. In the same year, the Soviet Union had signed an arbitration agreement with Germany and had taken part in the sixth session of the Preparatory Commission.

61. The years 1929 to 1932 had witnessed the activity of the aggressive international forces which, by preparing for a new war against the USSR, had sought a way out of the economic crisis which had recently broken out. The idea of intervention against the Soviet Union had once again been placed on the agenda.

62. The year 1930 had witnessed the appearance of the Pan-Europe scheme, the principal aim of which had been the creation of a Euro-

pean federal union in opposition to the Soviet Union.

63. The situation in Europe fifteen years previously, with its Pan-European plan for federal union, had been similar to the contemporary situation in the capitalist part of the world, with its North Atlantic Treaty and with Mr. Churchill's European movement and the Council of Europe, organizations directed against the USSR and the people's democracies. At that time, too, there had been strenuous efforts to make the USSR responsible for the sad state of affairs in the capitalist world. There had been talk of Soviet dumping and forced labour; in fact, the situation had been almost identical with what had been witnessed at the ninth session of the Economic and Social Council and at the current session of the General Assembly. Even the Pope had taken a hand at that time and had preached a crusade against the Soviet Union.

64. Of course, the bitterest champions of anti-sovietism had been the hitlerites. Hitler, it would be remembered, had cried from the housetops that the existence of six million Communists in Germany meant that Europe was in danger of colonization, that the decisive battle against communism would be fought in Germany, that that country would deliver humanity from bolshevism and that in order to do so it should be freed from the chains riveted upon it by the Treaty of Versailles. The same sort of nonsense had been repeated at the current session of the General Assembly by certain representatives who had preached a crusade against the USSR and the people's democracies without even specifying that such a crusade was supposed to be confined to prayer.

65. Meanwhile, the USSR had been calmly pursuing its gigantic task of constructing a new socialist society and continuing to strengthen its international ties by showing itself prepared to co-operate with all countries which wished to have an understanding with it.

66. Despite anti-Soviet hysteria, the Government of the Soviet Union had proposed to the Preparatory Commission of the League of Nations, which had had before it the scheme for the establishment of a Pan-European system, a plan for the conclusion of an international agreement on economic non-aggression. That had occurred in May 1931. As was to be expected, that plan had been rejected. Nevertheless, it had once again confirmed the burning desire of the Soviet Union to co-operate with other countries.

67. In 1932, at a plenary meeting of the Disarmament Conference, the Soviet Union had again submitted its proposals calling for the outlawing of war as an instrument of national policy.

68. Mr. Stalin, the great leader of the Soviet people, speaking about the lies put out by anti-Soviet propaganda, had stated in 1930 that the policy of the USSR was a policy of peace and development of trade with all the countries. Thanks to that policy, he had added, the Soviet Union had been able to defend peace. It had not permitted its enemies to drag it into conflicts, despite provocative acts and the attacks of adventurers and war-mongers. It would continue to pursue that policy by every possible means and to the utmost of its ability.

69. Such had been the policy of the USSR Government before its entry into the League of Nations, and such it had remained after its entry. Despite the weakness of the League, and although it had not been in agreement with the general policy of the League, the Government of the Soviet Union had accepted an invitation from thirty Member States and had taken its seat in that organization. Mr. Stalin, who had inspired the USSR's peace policy, had said that the League of Nations could be of value for the unmasking of the plans of aggressors and could become an instrument of peace—a weak one, indeed, but one able to delay the outbreak of war. He had gone on to say that the Soviet Union believed that in such disturbed times even an international organization as weak as the League of Nations should not be disdained.

70. Mr. Vyshinsky reminded the Assembly that the USSR had taken an active part in the League of Nations in preparing a number of proposals for preserving the peace. It had proposed that the meaning of the term "aggressor" should be defined; and that definition, as the Assembly was aware, had become the basis of a number of international agreements.

71. Between 1936 and 1938 it had been obvious that Europe was on the brink of a new war and that Hitler was about to plan his entry into a new world conflict with the direct consent of those who had then been directing the policies of the United Kingdom and France, namely Neville Chamberlain and Mr. Daladier.

72. Nevertheless, the attitude of the Soviet Union had not changed. With its consistent policy of peace and combating all danger of war, it had strongly opposed the Munich policy of treachery, which had opened the gates of Europe to Hitler's aggression. The Soviet Union had been the only Government which had remained faithful to its international obligations towards Czechoslovakia. Before the ever-increasing menace of Hitler's aggression, the USSR had on more than one occasion offered to conclude a convention with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France designed to repulse the fascist aggression which was in course of preparation.

73. All subsequent events, in particular the position adopted by the Soviet Union during the Moscow conversations from March to May 1939, showed that the USSR's policy had continued to be a peace policy. As was well known, those conversations between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France had ended in a deadlock, despite all the efforts of the USSR. They had been sabotaged. The reason had been, as David Lloyd George had explicitly acknowledged, that Neville Chamberlain, Lord Halifax and Sir John Simon had not wanted any agreement with the USSR.

74. To understand the course of events at that period, it was essential to remember that the Poland of Colonel Beck, who had been an ally of the United Kingdom and France, had signed a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1934, and that in 1938 the United Kingdom and France had signed a declaration of non-aggression with Germany, or, rather, they had in substance signed a non-aggression pact with Ger-

many, although it had borne the name of a declaration.

75. It must not be forgotten, moreover, that trade negotiations between the USSR and Germany had begun in 1938, without positive results. In July 1939, those conversations had been renewed and had been successfully concluded on 19 August 1939 with the signature of a trade and credit convention. During the summer of 1939, Germany had offered to sign a treaty of non-aggression with the Government of the Soviet Union. By that time it had become quite obvious that neither the United Kingdom nor France had any intention of coming to any agreement with the Soviet Union and that, on the contrary, the policy of Neville Chamberlain and Mr. Daladier was to direct Hitler's aggression eastward against Poland, which had recently received so-called guarantees, and against the USSR.

76. It was in those circumstances that the USSR Government had decided to conclude a treaty of non-aggression with Germany. That had been a wise decision, for it was that which had determined the victory in the Second World War of the Soviet Union and of all the peoples devoted to liberty. The decision had been taken in the certainty that Hitler's supporters were preparing for aggression against the USSR and that it was essential to gain time in order to prepare to repulse the aggressor. Those anticipations had proved absolutely correct. It should once more be noted that in preparing its aggression against the Soviet Union, the Hitler Government had attempted to dissimulate its aggressive intentions by a shameless campaign, a veritable crusade against communism. History appeared to be repeating itself.

77. On 13 April 1941, the USSR and Japan had signed, in Moscow, a pact of neutrality and a declaration concerning respect for the territorial integrity and the frontiers of the People's Republic of Mongolia and of Manchukuo. Thus, in that area of the world also, the policy of the Soviet Union had been directed towards peace.

78. In 1949, those who opposed the peaceful proposals of the Soviet Union had again launched a campaign against those proposals; they again used the same arguments which had been theirs since before the Second World War, at the time of the signature of the four-Power pact and the Munich Agreement. The hunt was on against communism and the communists, and every person with any democratic ideas was considered a communist of advanced ideas. It was no secret that, under the screen of that crusade against communism, an effort was being made, such as had been made by Hitler's followers, to conceal the crusade against the Soviet Union and against the people's democracies. All were aware that that was the ideological preparation for a new war.

79. That, then, was the atmosphere in which the General Assembly's session had begun and in which it was finishing. It was essential that the United Nations should find sufficient strength to put an end to that situation. The forces of aggression, which were opposed to peace and to the United Nations, were continuing to mobilize. It was for those reasons that the USSR

Government had formulated its draft resolution for the condemnation of preparations for a new war and the conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace.

80. The delegation of the Soviet Union opposed the draft resolution of the First Committee, for it considered it unsatisfactory. It spoke of the conditions which were essential for peace but it did not enumerate any of those conditions. Moreover, it contained a series of provisions which were in contradiction with the General Assembly's resolutions and the terms of the Charter. It avoided the question of the reduction of armaments by their regulation, and it left aside the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons, which should have had priority. It was designed to weaken the sovereignty of States. It reiterated a series of provisions contained in the Charter, without adding anything to them; its authors were trying in that way to give a legal character to the systematic violations of the Charter on the part of the Anglo-American bloc.

81. The draft resolution submitted by the USSR delegation was quite different. It called for the condemnation of the preparations for war which found their expression in the war-mongering propaganda encouraged by a number of countries, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as in the armaments race, the adoption of huge military budgets, the establishment of military bases in foreign countries, and the organization of aggressive blocs.

82. The delegation of the Soviet Union had produced many facts which fully substantiated those statements. Those facts, which had not been denied, showed that preparations were being made for war, particularly in the United States. The current occupation of the United States soldiers and civilians who took part in the social and political life of their country was the earnest preparation of plans, in a typically American businesslike manner, for a war against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies.

83. Mr. Vyshinsky would give further facts in support of his statements. Recently, at a meeting of the Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, a speaker had said that the best weapon of democracy was air power, which would make it possible to put an enemy country out of action. The speaker had gone on to say that the aim of the navy was to blockade and starve out the enemy and that strategic bombing was the one way of dealing with the only possible enemy which possessed land forces. It was obvious that everyone had understood what country was meant. Thus there was yet another war-mongering madman in the United States. In itself that fact was of little importance. What was important was that a whole university association had listened. That seemed outrageous, but it was true.

84. Furthermore, the senior officers of the United States Navy, Army and Air Force had recently quarrelled before the whole world. Some of them had even lost their posts. The dispute had arisen over the question of the best way of destroying the greatest possible number of towns and citizens in the Soviet Union.

85. At the same time, economists were calculating the profits that war would bring to United States business circles. They stated openly that war was exactly what was needed to relieve the difficult position of the United States economy, which was being increasingly affected by the approaching crisis.

86. The journalists who set themselves up as military experts were striving to prove how right they were in their estimate of the usefulness of United States air and other bases in foreign territory, and particularly in the United Kingdom. They were forever demanding new measures which would render an attack on the USSR more effective. For example, with the imperturbability of experienced assassins, the Alsop brothers were advocating the establishment of new air bases in North Africa, the Near East and Northern India. Indeed, they stated that a strategic air force would not otherwise be able to fulfil its purpose, which was to annihilate the distant centres situated in or beyond the Urals.

87. The United States bases in foreign countries were the chief preoccupation. A short time previously, the Secretary of War had requested hundreds of millions of dollars for the maintenance of those bases throughout the world—in Newfoundland, Okinawa, Greece, Bermuda, Canada and Iceland. In that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky added that the representative of Iceland in the First Committee had denied the fact that there were any United States bases in his country. Nevertheless, the existence of those bases was confirmed by an official document from the Secretary of War to the United States Supreme Court. In January 1949, the Court had studied the question of payment for work in United States bases abroad.

88. Moreover, according to recent data, the United States had 140 air, land and sea bases in Spain alone. Since 1944, it had had at its disposal the very large airport of Barajas, near Madrid. That airport had been visited very recently by the head of the sea and air transport service, by the head of the United States Air Corps in Germany and by a special mission. Barajas alone could house all the civil and military planes of Franco, which number about 350. It was also known that forty-four ports in Spain were being modernized.

89. Other information showed that in September and October several United States warships, under the orders of the United States Naval Commander in the East Atlantic and the Mediterranean, had visited Spain. That showed that Spain had been transformed into a United States military base in preparation for its next war. The Alsop brothers would know against whom that war was to be launched.

90. It was for all those reasons that the Soviet Union asked that the world should condemn the policy of war-mongering, just as all civilized nations had long since condemned the use of poison gas and bacteriological warfare. It was for all those reasons that it asked that the United Nations should declare the use of atomic weapons and kindred means of destruction to be contrary to the honour and conscience of the nations and to the duties of Members of the Organization. It was for those reasons that it considered that no delay could be allowed in the adoption of



practical measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of supervision to ensure observance of that prohibition.

91. In the opinion of the USSR delegation, the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at the 254th meeting at the instance of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada, as also resolution 191 (III) of 4 November 1948, in no way contributed to the settlement of the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of a control.

92. The USSR delegation had given close study to the communication sent to the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission by the President of the General Assembly. It was grateful to General Rómulo for having called the attention of the General Assembly and of all Governments to the need for settling the question of atomic weapons, and thought it essential to state that it granted the need for employing all possible means of conciliation where that question was concerned, since it was of capital importance for all humanity.

93. Mr. Vyshinsky reiterated the fact that any further delay in taking really practical measures for the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of a strict international control was not to be brooked. The USSR draft resolution specifically proposed the avoidance of any further delay. It recommended that the General Assembly, as the highest international tribunal, should recommend to the Atomic Energy Commission and to other Commissions that practical measures should be worked out forthwith.

94. The USSR draft resolution recommended that the General Assembly should invite all Governments to settle their differences by peaceful means, without resort to force or to the threat of force. When voted on in the First Committee, that proposal also had been rejected by the Anglo-American majority.

95. The USSR draft resolution also proposed the signing of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace. In the First Committee—and the same thing would probably happen in the General Assembly—that proposal had been rejected because of the opposition of several delegations, as though it was not a pact for the strengthening of peace which had been proposed, but a pact for the declaration of war.

96. All the arguments against the USSR proposal had been notable for their weakness and inconsistency. Thus it had been stated that the pact would be superfluous because it was already contained in the Charter. The Charter, however, had not prevented the Governments of five Member States of the United Nations from signing the Brussels Treaty, nor had it prevented the Governments of a group of Member States from signing the North Atlantic Treaty. There was no reason, therefore, why the Charter should stand in the way of the conclusion of a pact between the five permanent members of the Security Council.

97. It had been stated that the maintenance of international peace and security concerned all the Members of the United Nations, and not the permanent members of the Security Council alone. That was correct, but all were aware of

the weight and authority of the five permanent members and of the means at their disposal for implementing or, on the contrary, not respecting the measures adopted.

98. It was clear that a pact between those five Powers would constitute a solid basis for the re-establishment of general confidence and for the maintenance of peace and security, by eliminating the threat of war, by delivering the peoples from the burden of swollen military budgets and by putting an end to the armaments race and to all the unfavourable manifestations which those factors produced in the political and economic relations between the various States.

99. No pact could of its own accord eliminate forthwith all the serious differences which existed between the various Governments. A pact could, however, contribute to the settlement of those differences, on condition, however, that its provisions were respected.

100. It was clear that all the objections raised against the draft resolution of the Soviet Union were completely inconsistent. They could come only from the enemies of peace and from the organizers of new wars. That fact, however, could not deter those who fought for peace, with the support of millions of honest and devoted men. The struggle for peace against those who were instigating a new war would continue; in that struggle, those who hated war would triumph. The movement of the peoples for peace would overthrow all obstacles and would ensure peace and security in the whole world.

101. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) said that the repeated efforts of the Soviet Union, to which Mr. Vyshinsky had referred, to capture the minds of the peoples of the world by propaganda, had reached their apogee in the debates in the First Committee. Naturally, the speeches made by the communist group and by the representatives of the free world had differed from each other just as the Soviet Union draft resolution had differed from the draft submitted jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom under the heading: "Essentials of Peace".

102. The debate and the vote in the First Committee had shown that the free world had not been able to regard the USSR draft resolution as a genuine effort to strengthen peace.

103. The draft resolution and speeches of the USSR delegation, including that just made by Mr. Vyshinsky, charged that the United States and the United Kingdom, together with certain unnamed countries, were war-mongering and fomenting a new aggressive war. They made accusations. They asked the General Assembly to make condemnations and, in the same breath, they proposed a treaty for strengthening peace. Curiously enough, that proposal was addressed to those very countries which were charged with evil designs for war.

104. After four years of non-co-operation and obstruction by the Soviet group in the United Nations, that group could hardly expect to have the support of those whom they accused. Obviously the same difficulties which had impeded progress, through lack of unanimity, would frustrate a new pact. It seemed unlikely that the rest of the world would be induced to condemn the United States and the United Kingdom and

to coerce them to sign a treaty with a country having the record of the Soviet Union.

105. That country had attempted to use its membership in the United Nations as pressure upon the other four great Powers to attain a political objective. It had failed to realize that not only the representatives gathered in the Assembly, and the Governments they represented, but the peoples of the free world themselves would perceive that the USSR intended to cite the rejection of the so-called peace pact in the United Nations as proof of its charges that the United States and the United Kingdom, and certain other unnamed countries, were fomenting an aggressive war, and that the Soviet Union and the communist States were the only ones fighting for peace. But the truth had been indelibly recorded by the vote in the First Committee of fifty-three States, the unanimous membership outside the communist group.

106. First of all, the free world had rejected the contention that an unnamed number of States and, in particular, the United Kingdom and the United States, were preparing for an aggressive war on the Soviet Union. The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union had asked against whom the North Atlantic Treaty, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act and the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro were directed and whether it was not against his country. The obvious reply was that they were directed against an aggressor; they were not directed against any nation unless that nation became an aggressor.

107. Mr. Vyshinsky had also asked why nations should be willing to sign the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty, and not the proposed five-Power pact. The answer to that question was equally simple. All the Members of the United Nations knew why the Brussels Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty had become necessary. The rest of the world had felt a lack of security, caused by the inability of the Security Council to perform its primary function. That was due, in fact, to the abuse of the principle of unanimity by the Soviet Union. Thus it had become necessary to have such organizations as those created by the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty, as well as by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, not as aggressive measures, but as defensive measures. The free world had declared its belief that such collective efforts as the North Atlantic Treaty, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act and the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro had a defensive purpose and a peaceful objective.

108. Furthermore, the record showed the conviction of the entire free world that the fears which prevailed were excited by the policies and acts of the USSR. If the Government of the Soviet Union would accept the assurance that the suspicions which darkened its approach to all the rest of the world had no foundation, a great advance would have been made towards understanding and peace.

109. The speech of the USSR representative, however, which expressed the views of all the countries in the Soviet group, rendered the prospect of acceptance of that assurance rather dubious. It was apparent from his reference to a speech before the Land Grant Colleges that what was lacking was sufficient knowledge about

the people and institutions of America. Too little knowledge was a dangerous thing in the mind of a suspicious person. Had Mr. Vyshinsky known that the Land Grant Colleges received their foundation money and were erected with the absolute obligation to maintain a course of teaching in the mechanical arts and in military science in their curriculum, he would not have described as sad and monstrous a speech which was orthodox and which fulfilled one of the necessary provisions for the maintenance of the trust that had erected those great institutions of learning. That was proof of the absolute necessity for a better understanding of other members of the family of nations. A better understanding of the great institutions in the United States would show that such speeches did not by any means signify the imminence of war, nor could they be termed war-mongering. They were commonplace, routine speeches, part of the required course in the Land-Grant Colleges of the United States, as they had been ever since the founding of the colleges in 1865.

110. Turning to the joint draft resolution proposed by the United Kingdom and by the United States and approved by the First Committee, Mr. Austin stated that it was clear from the debate on that draft and the vote of the entire representation of the free world in the United Nations that the broad perspective, the general view in the world, was one of harmony and peace. Mr. Vyshinsky had described it as a cynical position. The free world was united; it understood the risk of being divided. The draft resolution on the "Essentials of Peace" had been approved with unprecedented decisiveness and certainty. No debate which had ever taken place in the United Nations could compare in candour with that which had taken place in the First Committee on that issue. The facts had been recorded with accuracy and without unnecessary accusation or condemnation. The language and the demeanour of the representatives of the fifty-three nations had been sober and had revealed their concern. They had recognized the problem caused by a minority in the world; that minority was a separate closed community which believed that all the rest of the world was its enemy and that some of the leaders, the great nations which constantly strove to base their way of life upon the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, were seeking to lead the rest of the world into an attack upon it.

111. Statements had been made by representatives of Governments directly accountable to their own peoples. In their attitude on that, as on every other issue, each representative, speaking for his own country in the light of its own position in world affairs, had set forth an analysis of the causes of the state of the prevailing international tension. They had judged whether or not the proposals under discussion contributed towards the alleviation of that tension and towards the maintenance of peace. A striking feature of the whole proceedings had been the obvious determination of each country diligently to seek an answer to the problem of peace. The writings, speeches and statements of Marx, Lenin and Stalin, as well as those of Mr. Vyshinsky and the communist theoreticians, had been reviewed. The policies of the Soviet Union at Yalta and Potsdam, at the Paris Peace

Conference, in the Allied Control Council, in the Council of Foreign Ministers, in the Security Council, in the General Assembly and in other organs of the United Nations had been analysed. The action taken by the USSR with regard to Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Korea, China and all the Allied forces in Berlin had been recounted. Whether the considerations were primarily ideological, political or geographic, the major causes for concern had been seen to arise from the policies and actions of the Soviet Union.

112. Mr. Austin felt that the debate in the First Committee had conveyed a message to all nations, and particularly to the USSR, to the effect that all should live and let live and should replace sweeping propaganda gestures by earnest efforts to settle outstanding differences. They should recognize the common interest and negotiate in a spirit of adjustment and accommodation; they should admit the possibility of sincerity on the part of a dissenter and seek a common understanding; they should act in good faith to fulfil existing agreements, before making new promises. If all nations adopted that attitude, fear and tension would be removed and the door to peaceful progress would be opened.

113. Never before had the *Cominform* so completely isolated itself from the rest of the world. Mr. Austin was stating that fact, not with any feeling of satisfaction, but rather in the hope that recognition of the fact would persuade the Government of the Soviet Union to seek to end its self-imposed isolation.

114. A common desire for peace should unite all nations. The world was not as any one nation would like it to be; there was enough tragic evidence to show that attempts to change the world by force only made matters worse and, at that juncture, could even destroy it.

115. The lesson was clear: the nations of the world could disagree on many things, but not on the necessity of preventing differences from leading to conflict. The Charter contained the code of conduct that should enable peoples of different ways of life to live together in peace. It was the duty of the United Nations to promote mutual understanding of that code, and it was its task to find the best methods of promoting confidence and creating a spirit in which divergent views could be harmonized.

116. No magic wand could transform the world in a day. To make peace prevail in the hearts of men was a slow process. It was not a question of arousing good emotions for the moment, but of convincing minds that men must really seek to settle their controversies and disputes without the use of force, by peaceful methods that were well known and had been tried out, thus far effectively, in the United Nations.

117. The United Nations was creating new techniques and developing old ones. The current session of the General Assembly had stimulated the process of consultation. A greater appreciation of individual and national characteristics had been shown, keener regard for sensibilities, better understanding of individual and collective responsibilities, and deeper wisdom respecting the relationships between large and small nations. The fact that the USSR had agreed to continue

consultations on atomic energy and to join with the five permanent members in consultations as a preliminary to important votes in the Security Council was a hopeful and welcome sign. That had much to do with the maintenance of peace, the strength of the unity of nations and harmony. All Members of the United Nations should devote themselves sincerely to the work of progressively broadening their co-operation by extending consultations among Governments and among peoples.

118. What was demanded of the Assembly was firm adherence to the great principles of the Charter, which were developed in the First Committee's draft resolution on the essentials of peace. It must continue unflinchingly, over a long and unglamorous period, its carefully directed efforts to reconcile the violent disagreements and to make it possible for people who held opposing views with regard to economic systems to live together in peace. For peaceful coexistence to be possible it was also essential for the Government of every country to conduct all its activities with full respect for the rights of all other Governments. Surely the USSR would some day realize that its interest lay in that direction. When it did, it could readily demonstrate its sincerity by working towards and not against peaceful settlements in the troubled areas of the world.

119. The draft resolution entitled "Essentials of Peace" was a measure of the anxiety of its authors and its supporters to avail themselves of every opportunity to work in the cause of peace. Mr. Austin assumed that when the General Assembly approved the First Committee's draft resolution, that item would henceforth be recorded as "Essentials of Peace", and would not bear the opprobrious title of the USSR draft resolution, which was one of condemnation. The title of the First Committee's draft resolution was the title that should be carried into the record of the General Assembly. There should never again be an opportunity for a mere title to give the world the impression that that title had prevailed, although all the substance following the title had been defeated. Certainly it should not prevail when the title bore a condemnation of the great countries of the United Kingdom, the United States, and other unnamed countries, as war-mongers fomenting a new aggressive war. The course of action recommended in the draft resolution of the First Committee was such as every nation which assumed the obligations of the United Nations Charter should follow. It did not embrace all the principles of the Charter, but it did embody the practical steps which should be taken at the points of friction in the world if the United Nations was to be made a living instrument for maintaining peace.

120. The path of peace had been charted in San Francisco. Some of the signposts along the path had been knocked askew by the events of the previous four years. It was for the Assembly to set them straight, so that the United Nations might move forward again towards its goal.

121. The acceptance by fifty-three of fifty-nine delegations of the draft resolution on the essentials of peace gave a powerful impetus and great promise to that effort. Fifty-three nations were united, and it was to be hoped that fifty-nine nations would become united. The Assembly must summon all its patience, all its devotion to prin-

ciples and to ethics, and all its determination to search unceasingly for the solutions to common problems. The United States stretched out the hand of co-operation to those few who as yet remained aloof.

122. Mr. VAN HEUVEN GOEDHART (Netherlands) wished merely to explain why his delegation would not take part in the debate on the question before the Assembly.

123. The USSR draft resolution had been discussed in the First Committee for days on end, after which it had been defeated by an overwhelming majority. The views of the Netherlands delegation, which remained unchanged, were therefore to be found in the summary records of the First Committee.

124. Although it was the formal right of the Soviet Union to re-introduce its proposals in the

Assembly, that way of exercising its right did not in fact make sense. The only meaning of a rule of procedure entitling a delegation to re-introduce a proposal in the Assembly after it had been defeated in a Main Committee of exactly the same composition as the Assembly itself was that it should be applied in those cases where there was a reasonable chance of reversing the result of the voting in the Committee. If there were no such chance—and all were aware that there was none in the case under consideration—re-introduction served no purpose and amounted simply to a waste of time. For that reason the Netherlands delegation would not take part in the discussions, and it hoped that many other delegations would follow its example.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

*Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Tuesday, 29 November 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).*

### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war, and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace: report of the First Committee (A/1150) (continued)**

1. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) wished to face squarely the problem before the General Assembly, which was to find out how to ensure the peaceful co-existence of two systems. One of them, under the hegemony of the United States, was preparing to annihilate the other, the system of socialism and peace which, under the leadership of the USSR, comprised the peoples of the new democracy and had been joined by China.

2. But that was not the sole potential cause of conflict, as the capitalist bloc was full of internal contradictions and, by its very nature, it bred war. The current meeting of the Assembly, however, it was, if not formally, at least in practice, examining the possibility of a conflict between the socialist and the capitalist systems.

3. Capitalism and socialism existed side by side in the world, and it was the firm conviction of the people's democracies that they could so exist side by side and even co-operate as they had done during the Second World War. Mr. Wierblowski believed, therefore, that the co-existence of those two systems did not by itself lead to armed conflict.

4. That extremely important postulate had repeatedly been stated by the great leader of socialism, Generalissimo Stalin, and by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Vishinsky, and it followed from the very principles of Marxism-Leninism. The sincerity of those statements could be doubted only by those who sought bad excuses for their rash ventures.

5. A second postulate followed from the first. The people's democracies not only believed that peace and collaboration were possible; they also

held that such collaboration should assume a constructive character in the interests of all.

6. Those were not mere words. The people's democracies were giving daily proofs of their will to collaborate and were sparing no effort to convince all people of good will of the need for such collaboration.

7. The USSR draft resolution (A/1149) represented an epoch-making contribution to the mighty struggle for peace carried on in the United Nations, and it reflected the will of millions throughout the world to strive against the threat of war.

8. The arithmetical calculations of Mr. Austin, the United States representative, concerning the fifty-three States which always voted for the United States and its proposals, were not convincing, for the real majority was behind the people's democracies.

9. Those who opposed the USSR draft resolution spoke of their aversion to war, but they proposed no concrete solution to relieve the tension prevailing in the world. Nor did they propose any measures for stopping the armaments race or avoiding the horrors of war.

10. They were trying to persuade the General Assembly to vote for unfounded assertions which would solve nothing. No one could affirm that the world was at peace, for all could see the manifestations of the cold war brought about by those who were trying to hoodwink the Assembly with empty phrases.

11. When analysing the joint draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom in the First Committee,<sup>1</sup> the Polish delegation had pointed out that one of its aims was to drag the small States into the cold war at the side of the United States, and indirectly to obtain the blessing of the United Nations on the various

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, First Committee, 325th to 337th meetings inclusive.*