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CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda item 25: Restoration of the lawful rights of the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia in the United Nations (concluded)	1175

**President: Mr. Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA
(Algeria).**

AGENDA ITEM 25

**Restoration of the lawful rights of the Royal Government
of National Union of Cambodia in the United
Nations (concluded)**

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like first of all to apologize to members of the Assembly for the delay in starting this morning's meeting. That delay was due essentially to the necessary consultations I had to have with a certain number of delegations, precisely in connexion with agenda item 25, which we shall continue to consider this morning.

2. Members will recall that the General Assembly at its 2301st plenary meeting, on 27 November 1974, adopted the text now re-issued under the symbol A/L.737/Rev.2, with the exception of the fifth preambular paragraph. A separate vote on the fifth preambular paragraph had resulted in a tied vote, which meant, under rule 95 of the rules of procedure, that a second vote had to be taken on that paragraph. Rule 95 explicitly states that:

"If a vote is equally divided on matters other than elections, a second vote shall be taken at a subsequent meeting which shall be held within forty-eight hours of the first vote, and it shall be expressly mentioned in the agenda that a second vote will be taken on the matter in question. If this vote also results in equality, the proposal shall be regarded as rejected."

3. The paragraph in question reads as follows:

"Considering that the lawful rights of the two Governments are only valid if it is determined that these rights emanate from the sovereign people of Cambodia as a whole."

4. The General Assembly also has before it, of course, draft resolution A/L.733 and Add.1-3 and the amendments thereto contained in document A/L.744. For the moment we have to decide essentially on the paragraph I have just read out. Is there any objection to this method of procedure?

5. I call on the representative of Thailand on a point of order.

6. Mr. PANYARACHUN (Thailand): A few minutes ago, Sir, you recalled that the General Assembly had adopted the amended draft resolution in the early morning of Thursday, 28 November, with the exception of the fifth preambular paragraph. As you may recall, during the proceedings on the night of Wednesday, 27 November, my delegation, on behalf of the sponsors, offered to withdraw what was then paragraph 4 of the amendments in document A/L.745 [2301st meeting, para. 468] but, in accordance with the rules of procedure, the paragraph had to be voted upon and the result of the vote was a tie.

7. The General Assembly will recall also that on Wednesday night and early Thursday morning we sat here continuously for nine or ten hours and were completely exhausted, and yet we refused to adjourn and went on to make a decision on a very important and substantive matter.

8. I come to the rostrum merely to say that I do not think the General Assembly would be very keen to have another lengthy and prolonged debate; so, in order to facilitate the task of the Assembly and to assist in the smooth functioning of the proceedings of the Assembly this morning, I should just like to say that the delegation of Thailand and the other sponsors would like to facilitate the work of the Assembly and intend to vote against the fifth preambular paragraph. We shall reject this proposal, because we feel it is immaterial to the substance of the matter, and I should like to urge all representatives, in the hope that this will be a short meeting and that the proceedings will run smoothly, to reject that paragraph entirely.

9. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call upon the representative of Senegal on a point of order.

10. Mr. FALL (Senegal) (*interpretation from French*): I should like briefly to inform the Assembly that the sponsors of draft resolution A/L.733 and Add.1-3 will remain faithful to their views. They are not in the habit of going back on their views and they will not do so today. They will vote against the amendment which has been submitted, and that amendment will most certainly be rejected.

11. After the vote, we shall explain why we have adopted that position. We could have taken up an attitude contrary to the one just proposed by the representative of Thailand, which would have added to the confusion, but we shall remain faithful to ourselves and, as I have said, after that we shall give the explanation of our position.

12. Nevertheless, I should like to call to the Assembly's attention the fact that the representative of Thailand did not withdraw that part of the amend-

ment submitted by Mr. Baroody until after the vote which resulted in a tie, and not before as he has just said.

13. That is the clarification I wished to make to the Assembly. If he had known that a tied vote was going to be the outcome of the vote, he would certainly have withdrawn it prior to the vote, but he did so only after the vote had resulted in a tie. That is the clarification I wanted to make at this stage of our deliberations. After the vote it is my intention to explain to the Assembly the reasons why we have adhered to our position.

14. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The decisions we are about to take are decisions of exceptional seriousness. I would appeal to the Assembly to rise to the level of the gravity of the situation and to demonstrate the serenity required in a decision that directly affects the issue of war and peace.

15. I now call on the representative of Cuba on a point of order.

16. Mr. ALARCÓN (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): We would fully join you in your appeal, Mr. President. We certainly believe that this Assembly is considering a question of the highest importance and that in doing so it should fulfil certain conditions designed to maintain the prestige and the high level that our deliberations should have. It was indeed in that spirit that I asked to speak on a point of order when I heard the statement of the representative of Thailand, which appeared to us very surprising from one standpoint although it was to be expected from another.

17. I shall not speak at length, since I am able to subscribe fully to what was stated by the representative of Senegal, namely, that the sponsors of draft resolution A/L.733 and Add.1-3, who have not come to this hall to engage in manoeuvres, who have not come to this hall in order to distort or twist the democratic decision of the members of the Assembly, will today vote as they voted yesterday, remaining faithful to certain principles.

18. However, I did want to point out, speaking on a point of order, that if there is a real desire to facilitate the work of this Assembly it is, to say the least, surprising that the representative of Thailand, together with all the sponsors of draft resolution A/L.737/Rev.2, should have started by violating our rules of procedure; for the essence of what he said consisted in explaining to us how he and all the sponsors of the above-mentioned document are going to vote on that document, something which is clearly not permissible to the sponsors of a draft resolution.

19. The document we now have before us clearly indicates that the paragraph on which we are now going to vote is sponsored by the delegation of Thailand and a group of countries that put forward the text of document A/L.737/Rev.2. To what is unusual—although not so unusual—namely, that they should vote against their own text, can be added what is doubly unusual, that they have taken the liberty of explaining their vote against their own document and contrary to the rules of the General Assembly.

20. In accordance with your appeal, Mr. President, I should like to ask that at this meeting, since we are

now coming to the end of the consideration of this item, we at least show some respect, however little, for and abide to a certain extent by the rules of procedure, which could not be clearer, as, for example, the one which forbids the sponsors of a draft resolution from explaining their vote on it, even if it is against their own text.

21. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): All the members of the General Assembly are familiar with the contents of rule 88 of the rules of procedure, but I thought that, in view of the gravity of the situation, each delegation ought to be able to express its point of view here in the most democratic fashion possible. I think that since the beginning of this debate I have attempted to be tolerant in my dealings with all delegations, so that the General Assembly might take its decisions in all sovereignty and as objectively and correctly as possible.

22. We shall now proceed to the vote on the paragraph in question, the fifth preambular paragraph of document A/L.737/Rev.2, which reads as follows:

“Considering that the lawful rights of the two Governments are only valid if it is determined that these rights emanate from the sovereign people of Cambodia as a whole.”

A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll call.

Brazil, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: None.

Against: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia.

Abstaining: Burma, Cyprus, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Iran, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Botswana.

*The paragraph was rejected by 102 votes to none, with 32 abstentions.**

23. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I now give the floor to those representatives wishing to make statements in explanation of vote.

24. Mr. FALL (Senegal) (*interpretation from French*): Our Assembly has just witnessed a masquerade, a farce that is unworthy of our Organization. We have seen the sponsors of a draft resolution, including the main sponsor, decide to vote against the proposal that they themselves made two days ago in the Assembly.

25. For those who have not the rules of procedure before them, I would point out that this farce is not without an ulterior motive. Rule 90 of the rules of procedure states quite clearly:

“... If one or more amendments are adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted upon.”

26. It was in order to avoid our Assembly having to take a second decision on this draft resolution in document A/L.737/Rev.2 that the sponsors of the draft resolution decided, in the teeth of common sense, to vote against their own proposal. I wish due note to be taken of this manoeuvre.

27. On the afternoon of 27 November we had a long meeting [2301st meeting]. We understood and appreciated the impatience of certain delegations, which were most anxious for our debates to be hastily concluded; but I think our Assembly was wise to ignore those suggestions, and I might also say that our Assembly did not waste its time by attempting to discuss this important problem in all its details. We believe that the stakes were worth the effort. We adopted a draft resolution. In spite of the temptation, I shall refrain from saying what I think of the manoeuvres and manipulations attendant on the vote on that draft resolution. However, before this debate comes to a close, I should like to put on record certain considerations.

28. First of all, the vote taken at the 2301st meeting concerned a so-called draft resolution in document A/L.737/Rev.2, which we received this morning. That draft resolution is dated 27 November 1974, and yet when we were called upon to vote at the 2301st meeting upon the priority to be given to the draft resolutions submitted to us, we voted on a draft resolution in document A/L.737/Rev.1, which was dated 13 November 1974. So these are indeed two different draft resolutions. The vote on priority that we took at the 2301st meeting did not apply to the draft resolution in document A/L.737/Rev.2. I would therefore ask that due note be taken of that fact.

29. Also, draft resolution A/L.737/Rev.2 is not a revised draft resolution. In fact, it is the draft resolution in document A/L.745, submitted by Mr. Baroody, and improperly entitled “amendments”. It is that draft resolution that was put to a vote, with the amendments submitted by the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/L.737/Rev.1. I would ask that due note be taken of that fact also.

30. The Assembly must also take note of the fact that in draft resolution A/L.737/Rev.2, which has now been adopted, no reference whatsoever is made in any part of that draft resolution, which has now become a resolution of the Assembly, to the right of the Lon Nol Government to represent the Cambodian people as a whole.

31. This draft resolution also:

“Calls upon all the Powers which have been influencing the two parties to the conflict to use their good offices for conciliation between these two parties with a view to restoring peace in Cambodia.”

32. I believe that in order to try to re-establish peace in Cambodia the first operation to be carried out is the withdrawal of all the American forces from Cambodia, asking that super-Power to refrain from any acts that might be likely to make any contribution whatsoever to either of the parties.

33. This warning is addressed to the United States; it is also addressed to the countries that offer their territories as bases for the bombers that sow death and terror in Cambodia.

34. Still in the same draft resolution, the General Assembly:

“Requests the Secretary-General, after due consultation, to lend appropriate assistance to the two contending parties claiming lawful rights in Cambodia and to report on the results to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.”

35. The vote in the General Assembly makes it clear that these two parties “claim” lawful right to represent Cambodia. Accordingly, neither of these two parties has the right to represent, in our Assembly, the people of Cambodia.

36. I think that the Secretary-General, to whom is entrusted the execution of this resolution, will take note of its provisions and will draw the necessary consequences from them. I think that the Secretary-General, whom we have the good fortune to have with us today, will carefully examine this resolution—which is not the one we should have wished to see but whose philosophy consists in placing the two parties claiming to represent Cambodia on the same footing of equality—and draw the consequences therefrom, because it is not just that in the present circumstances, after the vote on this draft resolution, one of the parties should remain here to represent Cambodia while the other is absent from our deliberations.

37. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Saudi Arabia.

38. Mr. FALL (Senegal) (*interpretation from French*): Point of order.

39. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Senegal on a point of order.

40. Mr. FALL (Senegal) (*interpretation from French*): We have just had a vote. Those who wish to speak now have but one recourse, and that is to explain their vote, and I feel it is time for us to apply our rules of procedure. We have played around enough since Wednesday; let us get back to serious matters and apply the rules or procedure which we have in sov-

* The text adopted at the 2301st plenary meeting of the General Assembly [see paras. 457 and 508 of the record of that meeting] accordingly becomes resolution 3238 (XXIX).

ereignty assigned to ourselves. Article 88 of these rules of procedure states:

“... The President shall not permit”—
you do not have the right, Mr. President—

“the proposer of a proposal or of an amendment to explain his vote on his own proposal or amendment.”

I oppose the right to speak on this vote being given to the representative of Saudi Arabia.

41. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I took the precaution just now, of saying that each one of us has carefully read and assimilated rule 88 of the rules of procedure. No delegation has the right to prejudge what any other delegation should say; and as far as I am concerned, I cannot be a prophet and predict what is going to be said by the Saudi Arabian representative, who, more than anyone else, is totally familiar with the rules of procedure and rule 88.

42. I therefore call on him.

43. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): “If you live long enough, you will see a lot”, and I have seen a lot. After the statement of my good friend, brother and neighbour, the representative of Senegal, I do not think he read my mind correctly as to what I had to say. I use the past imperfect: not “I have to say” but “I had to say”.

44. I am not being irregular, as the representative of Senegal mentioned. The voting is finished. We took a vote, and it is my right to explain the new stand I took on that paragraph and no one can rob me of that right—neither the President, nor any Member, nor the Secretary-General. Only God, who can send a thunderbolt on my head, and then I will stop; and I am serious. I know the rules. I was not infringing by manoeuvres anyone’s rights. My whole intention was to bring peace—not necessarily in Cambodia because that is a big-Power play—but to bring peace to this Assembly, and the record states that. I do not want to see this Assembly divided against itself because a house divided against itself cannot stand.

45. May I explain why I voted against a text that originated with me. I submitted those amendments and applied them to both draft resolutions. You may recall that at the 2301st meeting [*see paras. 342-345*], I asked why the sponsors of the two draft resolutions did not approach me or why they did not address themselves to my amendments. Either they were adamant or negligent or perhaps were treating them with contempt. It is their privilege even to treat them with contempt.

46. After I said that, the sponsors of draft resolution A/L.737/Rev.1 approached me through my good neighbour, the representative of Thailand. He said—and God is my witness—“Do you insist on that paragraph?”—the paragraph that was the bone of contention. He said that he and some of the other sponsors had some doubts about it. I said, “Please, do not tinker with my amendments. I want them to be voted on, if possible, as a whole”. He then consulted with the other sponsors. You may recall that he said—and he did not tell me this in advance—that in principle the sponsors thought they might accept the amendments. They then decided to incorporate my amendments because they thought, as I did, that perhaps it would

be a compromise. I repeat that I was informed through the representative of Thailand that they were unhappy with my amendment to the preamble that read:

“*Considering* that the lawful rights of the two Governments are only valid if it is determined that these rights emanate from the sovereign people of Cambodia as a whole.”

Later I replied that since it was a preambular paragraph it was tied in some way to the operative paragraphs. I said, “If you want my amendments, then in order to avoid a protracted debate you must take them or leave them”. That was not an ultimatum. In my opinion, that was a procedure for conducting business in an orderly way; otherwise, every amendment would have had to be discussed separately and we would still be meeting on this question and would perhaps need another 10 meetings to examine each amendment and to see whether it fits into the policy of certain Powers and whether others had reservations about it. They accepted the amendments.

47. Then when the representative of Mexico asked for a separate vote, I went to him and said, “For heaven’s sake, in order to facilitate our work please do not insist on a separate vote”. But in his wisdom—he may have had instructions, that is up to him to explain—he insisted on a separate vote.

48. When I thought that a separate vote might create difficulties, in the light of what I had said, namely, that I wanted to see all my amendments taken *in toto* so as not to create further protracted debate, I stated from this rostrum—and this will appear in the verbatim record—that I did not insist. However, it was put to the vote and there was a tied vote.

49. Some of my friends who were opposed not only to my amendments but also to draft resolution A/L.737/Rev.1 told me frankly that they were not going to keep quiet but that today they were going to open the door. I said: “For heaven’s sake, I witnessed the League of Nations and I saw what happened there. I was an *ex officio* observer. It foundered on less dissent and on less turmoil. Do you want to destroy this Assembly, the United Nations?” But you know how high emotions run, sometimes including my own. We are all human beings with emotions.

50. I was told—I am not going to use any names lest we have a right of reply, but I am looking at the section where that representative is sitting in order that he may know—“We have to fight because you use manoeuvres”. I asked, “Do I use manoeuvres?” He said, “No, others use manoeuvres”. I accepted his saying that others used manoeuvres. But there are no manoeuvres except those within the rules of procedure.

51. Why did I vote “No” today and not abstain? I could easily have abstained. I would have been a hypocrite to have abstained. I voted “no” in order to facilitate the work of the Assembly on a text which I said we could do without. That is in keeping with what I said, that we could do without it if its elimination was essential for expediting our work.

52. Do you know now why I voted “No”, my good friend and brother and neighbour from Senegal and others who looked and snickered when they saw the red button light up next to the name of Saudi Arabia? I thought that my good Chinese and Russian friends

would be happy to see me flash the colour red, which is the symbol of the Socialist revolution.

53. That is the reason why I voted against a text that was originally mine and with which the sponsors of draft resolution A/L.737/Rev.1 were unhappy. And if they voted "No"—they consulted with me—I said it was in order for two reasons: first, because they were unhappy about that amendment and secondly, because we could cut short a protracted debate that would surely have ensued. Somebody would say, "Let us now consider voting on the draft resolution as a whole", and there would be a debate on whether it should have a two-thirds majority. We would be in trouble and I would enter the *mêlée*, and I did not wish to enter the *mêlée*. So I said, "Leave it at that". That is the truth and God is my witness.

54. Baroodi never lies, not even in politics. I was never a politician. When someone called me a liar, he had to apologize here from this rostrum. My integrity derives from the region from which I come. There are three things one cannot do in my region: curse his parents, curse the religion, and call someone else a liar. People can be killed for such insults. Respect for parents, respect for religion—not just one's own, but that of other people also—and a sense of honour. We have our liars, but one does not tell them in public that they are liars.

55. The Holy Koran says that God is merciful and compassionate and He forgives our human sins. But there is one thing that He does not forgive, that is *nafaak*—hypocrisy. Hypocrisy is not lying, but creating trouble between two parties—whether they be individuals or nations—by means of lies. That is what *nafaak* is. And the Holy Koran says that the place for those people is, not hell, but the lowest stratum of hell, as a warning to people that they should not engage in *nafaak*—at least in Islam. I think those are good exhortations.

56. I hope that there will be no more incidents like this and that we can proceed with our work in peace.

57. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): One does not argue about taste and colours, and it was merely that there was the possibility of a shade of contradiction with rule 88 of the rules of procedure, although everything else was perfectly acceptable.

58. Mr. ALARCÓN (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): We are now nearing the conclusion of the debate on agenda item 25, and my delegation would like to explain its position with regard to what is known as draft resolution A/L.737/Rev.2, which was amended yesterday and again this morning.

59. We believe, first of all, the purpose of this document, submitted as if it were a draft resolution, was to prevent the Assembly from taking a decision on the only draft resolution on this item, which basically was submitted at the twenty-eighth session, for the Assembly's consideration, when manœuvres started in an attempt to protect, at all costs, the Lon Nol régime's usurpation of Cambodia's place in this Organization.

60. In the course of the past few hours, the Assembly has witnessed all kinds of manœuvres, pressures and devices calculated to achieve the same goal: to prevent us from taking a decision about Cambodia's represen-

tation in this Organization. A start was made by establishing an arbitrary order of priority for a document that was never put to a vote; immediately thereafter the Assembly had to maintain that priority for the document that finally—after amputations, corrections, revisions and more amputations—was adopted, and this document that was never accorded priority by the General Assembly.

61. We should like, as was done by the representative of Senegal, to place on record that several hours ago, at our last meeting, the Assembly voted—as was stated on more than one occasion by the President—on the request in document A/9875 concerning priority; and that that document, which was drafted and signed by the representative of Thailand, could not be more categorical and exclusive. It requested priority for draft resolution A/L.737/Rev.1 "before any other draft resolution under the above item or any other substantive or procedural matter relating to the item".

62. None the less, those same delegations which called for this categorical and exclusive priority abandoned it a few minutes later when they came to an agreement with the author of the so-called amendments and agreed to change the original text. We saw that later when there was a tied vote on a paragraph which had been represented by both the original author of the amendment and the sponsors of draft resolution A/L.737/Rev.1 as an important and useful paragraph, which would improve the original text that had been submitted for consideration. When the tie occurred, we heard those same defenders of that paragraph request that it be quietly forgotten—just like any other paragraph that might give rise to difficulties with regard to the attainment of the objective they were after.

63. Today, finally, we are able to see, with the greatest clarity, how, if need be, they were capable of voting against their own document in order to attain their objective. Their objective has always been to prevent the Assembly from voting on draft resolution A/L.733 and Add.1-3, the only one related to the item under consideration and the only one which could have enabled us to resolve the question of Cambodia's representation in a legitimate and proper way.

64. The delegations that have made so many efforts to preserve for a while longer Lon Nol's representation in this Organization should, however, not feel too satisfied. That is proved by the fact that today they all voted against one part of their own draft resolution—obviously because they did not dare to attempt a second vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

65. Despite all the resources of North American imperialism, tremendous efforts had to be made to gather the feeble majority of two votes, and they could not afford to jeopardize all that 24 hours later. It should be noted, also, that one of the two votes that made possible the adoption of this document was the vote of the Lon Nol representative, a vote that is absolutely invalid in our eyes.

66. Immediately after the end of our last meeting, all the information media in the United States took on the task of announcing to the world that the debate on Cambodia had been concluded; apparently they too were concerned about the possibility of a second vote today. For example, according to today's edi-

tion of *The New York Times*, all day yesterday officials of the Cambodian Government—the reference, of course, is to the Lon Nol régime—were telephoning the United States Embassy in Phnom Penh asking for information about what had happened here. It is interesting to note, from this article by *The New York Times* correspondent in Phnom Penh, that officials of the Lon Nol régime, which claims here that it is a sovereign State, had to depend on the United States Embassy to find out what had happened in the United Nations on a question affecting their survival. I imagine that the United States Embassy in Phnom Penh is very busy trying to inform that régime of what has taken place in this hall recently.

67. I think we should place on record what the same correspondent of *The New York Times* in Phnom Penh says about the opinion that Western diplomats, including those from the United States, have formed of the consequences of what took place here yesterday evening. For instance, he says:

“Almost all foreign diplomats here—including the Americans, whose aid is the only prop the Lon Nol Government has—agree that the vote solved nothing.”*

68. Further on in the article, the correspondent quotes a Western diplomat as having said this:

“We called it a victory when we held them off in the United Nations last year. But here we are a year later and we’ve done it again and nothing has improved on the ground here. Things are worse than ever.”*

69. To achieve that meagre majority of one vote, to keep the Lon Nol régime in our Organization for a further period of time, the United States and those that have joined it in this adventure even had to agree that the draft resolution originally sponsored by them be so amputated and changed as to contain the elements referred to today by the representative of Senegal.

70. In that respect, it should be pointed out that the sponsors of the document were obliged to acknowledge the existence of the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia, headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and to vote for the cessation of foreign interference in Cambodia, but nowhere in the draft resolution did they take the trouble to confirm the legitimacy of the Lon Nol régime nor of its presence in the United Nations; indeed they requested the Secretary-General “to lend appropriate assistance to the two contending parties claiming lawful rights in Cambodia”—as operative paragraph 2 specifically provides.

71. In my delegation’s view, this resolution is not appropriate and it does not satisfy us, but we do wish to point out that by its very text it explicitly questions the legitimacy of the Lon Nol representation and leaves open the matter of who should lawfully represent Cambodia in the United Nations.

72. Furthermore, as we read in the United States press itself, the situation on the spot, in Cambodia, is worse than ever for them. Representatives here should be aware that, even with documents like these, whose adoption has been so difficult and complicated, even with the murky and stubborn manoeuvres carried

out here and in many capitals recently, even with the biased propaganda that has been used to distort the true feeling of the majority of this Assembly, even with all the trickery and all the might concealed behind it, they will not be able to prevent the situation on the spot from getting worse and worse for imperialism and the aggressors; nor will they be able to prevent the Cambodian people from taking, one day—and sooner rather than later—the categorical and final decision that this Assembly, because of the use of underhanded means, has not been allowed to take.

73. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): Simple things are explained and expressed in simple terms. The most acrobatic language, the most skilful dialectics, the most sophisticated rhetoric cannot transform the farce which we have witnessed today into the act of heroism that some would like to call what has just happened in this Assembly.

74. This tragi-comedy does not mean that the Assembly has maintained its unity. Still less does it mean that it has maintained its dignity. I am not happy about having to say that, but I think it must be said and must be placed on record, because, for some time now, some here have been doing everything possible to discredit this Assembly and the majority of which it is composed. Some often go so far as to describe our attitude as illogical, and they are the very persons who try to act here as the defenders of law and of the rules of procedure.

75. I wish to see it recorded today in the archives of this Organization that those who have until now wanted to act as our teachers and lecture to us must appear, rather, in the history of the Organization as being the first not only to hold this Assembly in contempt, even to flout its principles and rules, but also the first to cover themselves with scorn. It was never part of the intentions of our group to attempt to paralyse the work of this Assembly. We tried to defend ourselves against the procedural manoeuvring that was going on here and that was not always particularly inspired. We could have made use, had we so desired, of the facilities offered to us by the rules of procedure; we could have gone on fighting and seeking to impose our views in one way or another. But for us, that was not the problem. The problem that we took the initiative of raising before this Assembly is for us a highly important one.

76. The draft resolution that we have just adopted garnered for itself a majority of two votes. We regret that the Assembly did not pronounce itself by a greater majority, one which might at least have been interpreted as the clearly expressed will of the Organization.

77. What conclusion can we draw from the vote that has just resulted in the adoption of what was draft resolution A/L.737/Rev.2? Has the Assembly genuinely taken a decision? Has it in fact answered the question that was addressed to it? Has it, by the position it has adopted, made things easier? We say no.

78. The problem we introduced at the twenty-eighth session, the discussion of which we have continued this year, still stands, and in the same terms. But, despite the very clear-cut division that has emerged in this Assembly, I believe that certain positive factors can nevertheless be singled out and emphasized. And it may perhaps be relevant for me to stress that, for

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

once, there was unanimity in this Assembly, and that that unanimity centred around recognition of the legitimacy of the Royal Government of National Union. I say "unanimity" because, besides the group that opposed draft resolution A/L.737/Rev.2 and defended that legitimacy, the sponsors of draft resolution A/L.737/Rev.2 and those who voted in its favour also share that view. Suffice it to read the text of the draft resolution that has just been adopted in order to become convinced of this.

79. I should like to state at once that we take note of this fact and, if need be, we shall recall it to both the sponsors of draft resolution A/L.737/Rev.2 and the members of the Assembly who have voted in favour of it. We shall do so because we believe that this debate has not yet ended, and that in spite of the fact that our draft resolution, A/L.733 and Add.1-3, will not be put to the vote, our debate will be resumed at the thirtieth session, on the agenda of which the item entitled "Restoration of the lawful rights of the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia in the United Nations" still stands. And in the course of that debate, we hope that the Assembly, without losing the dignity we wish to see it always preserve, will succeed in ridding itself of these procedural pitfalls that have been so well exemplified in the debate just concluded.

80. Mr. JAIPAL (India): The fifth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution could have been formulated differently, so as to clarify more precisely the important principle embodied in it. Even so, it is sad and significant that not a single vote was cast in favour of that paragraph.

81. With the utmost gravity and dignity and with scrupulous adherence to our rules or procedure, the General Assembly has taken what is in fact an absurd decision: the General Assembly has rejected the dem-

ocratic principle that the lawful rights of a government emanate from its people.

82. In this unreal situation, the only proper thing for us to do was to abstain from voting.

83. Mr. EKUA MIKO (Equatorial Guinea) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I wish to say that my delegation voted not only against the fifth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/L.737/Rev.2, but also against the whole of that text, because we feel that it is a paper inked over with words chosen at random. We have taken this position for the following reasons.

84. First, the General Assembly gave priority in the vote to draft resolution A/L.737/Rev.1 and then proceeded to vote on draft resolution A/L.737/Rev.2. This fact has been recorded in a document that already forms part of the archives of the Organization, which constitute the history of the United Nations.

85. Secondly, as stated by the representative of Thailand, the sponsors of a draft resolution have just voted against one of its paragraphs. This has indicated to my delegation that if the same opportunity had been given as regards the other paragraphs, the result would have been similar; the delegations that sponsored the draft resolution just adopted by the General Assembly have made it clear that they are no more than the keys of a computer manipulated by the imperialists.

86. The decision just taken by the General Assembly can only prolong the bloodshed which began four years ago in Cambodia. The General Assembly has adopted the so-called draft resolution A/L.737/Rev.2 without taking the past into account, and those who forget the past are condemned to repeat the same mistakes.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.