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President: Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

AGENDA ITEM 102

Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries (*continued*)* .

1. Mr. HOVEYDA (Iran): My delegation views with much interest, and hails the motivation and intent of, the Soviet proposal to cut arms expenditures while assisting the development efforts of under-privileged nations.
2. Disarmament and development can justly be described as the two most cherished of all hopes this Organization has ever espoused and sought to realize. Their link has long been recognized and reflected upon. Concrete measures to release resources hitherto used in the arms race for development purposes were proposed as far back as 1958 and rehashed in a variety of forms since then.
3. We all adhere to this commonly held view that the most pressing task facing the future is to bridge the gap between the poor and the most advanced nations. This requires the transfer of immense resources to developing countries, and as was said by Mrs. Myrdal:
“ . . . from where could we better remove those resources than from the competition to produce ever more destructive tools of war?”¹
This remark is particularly pertinent coming from an eminent activist in the arms control field who only two years ago chaired the Group of Experts who produced the widely acclaimed report entitled “Disarmament and Development”.²
4. In its arms control dimension the Soviet initiative deserves credit, particularly since it does not, perhaps, raise

technical issues of verification as complex as some agreements on specific weapon systems. Problems of a somewhat different nature may nevertheless arise. There is no common understanding what a military budget consists of. Such problems, however, seem more manageable than the intractable discords over the verification of particular weapon systems. In spite of such positive attributes, it would be unrealistic to assume that the Soviet initiative is self-implementing.

5. In the past 20 years, various States at different times have proposed cutting military budgets. Yet the military expenditures of the great Powers have maintained their upward spiral; there has been no let-up in what was once described aptly as the “mad momentum of the arms race”. It requires no particular perceptiveness to determine the root-cause of the malady: security and trust have always been at the heart of relations among States; their absence creates a vacuum within which no true measures of disarmament can flourish. This frame of analysis applies to the Soviet draft resolution [A/L.701] as well as to other important measures in the field generally known as disarmament.

6. My country's interest in the Soviet proposal and our assessment of its prospects are connected with a unique experience few other countries share.

7. In 1965, Iran unilaterally undertook to donate the equivalent of one day of its military expenditure to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] as a contribution to the international illiteracy campaign. Addressing a Conference of Ministers of Education of some 60 countries gathered in Teheran in 1965 to chart an international campaign against illiteracy, my Sovereign said that it was perhaps not too fanciful to ask the Governments of the world to devote a negligible proportion of their military budgets to that great task.

8. In granting \$700,000 to UNESCO to fight illiteracy, my Government sought to take a pioneering step in diverting military resources to peaceful pursuits. Unhappily, only four other countries followed suit; Ecuador, Mali, Morocco and Tunisia were in fact the only countries that accepted the call to donate sums deducted from their defence budgets to the international literacy campaign.

9. In citing this experience, I do not wish to advocate inaction. Neither do I wish, in a dispirited mood, to express doubt over the prospects of the Soviet initiative, which is cast entirely in a different mould, and presented under different circumstances.

10. The failure of the international community to respond to what we thought was not a very “fanciful” measure of cuts in defence expenditure is nevertheless a telling experi-

* Resumed from the 2175th meeting.

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, First Committee, 1950th meeting, para. 58.*

² *Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.IX.1).

ment that tends to confirm our earlier contentions that disarmament efforts can prosper only where a congenial environment exists.

11. It is worthy of particular note that the reference to the concept of military détente in the Soviet draft more or less conveys the same thought. The third preambular paragraph of the Soviet draft pointedly suggests that "political détente should be supplemented by military détente". Trust and security as embodiments of the concept of détente do, in fact, provide the underpinning for the realization of military détente. But this condition is realized when détente has grown to the state of maturity and has assumed a global character. The absence of this condition explains the doubts voiced or implied on the part of some other nuclear Powers to the Soviet proposal as contained in the Soviet draft resolution.

12. In our view, the value of this draft, so ably introduced by Ambassador Malik on 15 October [2154th meeting], is in its concreteness and its aim. We are somewhat uncertain, however, about the utility and effectiveness of convening a special committee to distribute the funds released as a result of a 10 per cent reduction before there is any ground to assume that such funds would indeed be forthcoming. We are nevertheless prepared to consider this draft in a positive spirit, and in this we are encouraged to learn that ideas designed to dispel such doubts are being developed and might be presented.

13. Détente, though not global and though not discernible in every aspect of international life, is nevertheless a growing reality. One may thus hope that the present political situation will prove to be more receptive to such initiatives. No doubt one of the ways to buttress and strengthen détente is through the adoption of measures that are designed to increase trust between States. Where formal agreements are not possible, self-restraint is an important ingredient of arms control. And it is on that note that I end my remarks.

14. Mr. UPADHYAY (Nepal): The most conspicuous development in the international field over the past two years has been the growth of détente among the major Powers. Appropriately enough, world "détente" had become the most frequently used single word in the statements made in the United Nations in recent years. The underlying mood of détente has been reflected in the many moves that the major Powers have been making during the past couple of years.

15. The détente I have been mentioning is a political détente. But what about military détente? It seems strange and sometimes even suspicious to note that political détente has not resulted in any progress towards military détente. The arms build-up all over the world has been going on at full speed; in spite of the various agreements and treaties, more and more sophisticated weapons are being produced and stockpiled. Thousands of millions of dollars are being spent in the development of weapons of mass destruction, and this planet of ours is becoming a more unsafe place in which to live with the passage of each day.

16. What meaning does détente have if it does not lead to peace? But how can lasting peace be achieved when a feeling

of fear and suspicion continues to pervade the minds of everyone because of the continuous arms build-up?

17. This is one side of the story. The other side is all too well known. Every year \$200,000 million are spent in the development and production of armaments while a great majority of the people of the world go hungry. Six countries alone account for nearly 70 per cent of the total world expenditure on armaments. The developed countries spend 25 times as much on military budgets than what they spend on development aid to developing countries.

18. This is where the link between disarmament and development becomes clear and vivid. In a report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures it is observed that:

"... a halt in the arms race and a significant reduction in military expenditures would help the social and economic development of all countries and would increase the possibilities of providing additional aid to developing countries."³

It goes without saying that if savings on military expenditure are diverted for civilian purposes like food, shelter and clothing, this will go a long way to alleviate the hunger, disease and poverty that are so rampant all over the world.

19. It is on the basis of these observations that my delegation welcomes the move of the Soviet Union in placing before this session of the General Assembly a draft resolution which aims at a 10 per cent reduction of the military budgets of the States permanent members of the Security Council and the release of a part of such savings as assistance for the economic development of the developing countries.

20. The draft resolution also expresses the desirability of other States, particularly those with military and economic potential, to reduce their military budgets and to release the funds thus saved for economic assistance to developing countries. This is in keeping with the laudable principles of disarmament and development which the draft resolution seeks to promote. It is a matter of common knowledge that apart from the permanent members of the Security Council there are quite a few other countries which spend enormous sums on their military budgets and at least one country has a military budget that is higher than that of some of the permanent members of the Security Council.

21. My delegation tends to believe that, in submitting this draft resolution, the sponsor has been motivated by a genuine desire, on the one hand, to reduce military expenditure as a further step towards disarmament and, on the other, to help the developing countries of the world. Such a motive, if it really exists, has obviously a double merit and therefore deserves wide support.

22. The draft resolution seeks to reduce the military budget of the five permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent based on the level of 1973. It calls for

³ *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.72.IX.16), para. 120, subpara. 3.

the reduction of the military budget by that percentage for the succeeding year. Why just for the following year? My delegation is inclined to go even further and to suggest that there should be a freeze on the level of spending for military purposes at the 1973 level. The goal of disarmament will remain as remote as ever if a reduction of the military budget for a particular year by 10 per cent is followed by an increase of 20 per cent in the subsequent year. A freeze on the level of military spending will mean that there will be a limit beyond which expenses cannot go up and that, even if reductions are not made in terms of figures, reductions will ensue because of the decline of the purchasing power of the money due to the inevitable tendency of inflation. It is not the intention of my delegation to suggest that a freeze on the level of military spending would be an adequate step. What I wanted to suggest is that the first step should be a freeze and then attempts should be made subsequently to make further reductions from that level.

23. Some doubts were expressed by certain delegations about the difficulty in assessing the military expenditure of certain countries and so it was branded as a mere propaganda move. We do not overlook the question altogether and believe that there would be innumerable difficulties in the way of working out the practical aspect of the question. However, we cannot ignore such an important issue, merely as a propaganda venture. We have to uphold the basic merits of the draft resolution and only then can we find what are the impediments to practical implementation of such principles. Besides these, we have a few more observations to make.

24. First, the funds which become available as a result of the savings made on military expenditures should be given as additional aid to the developing countries. Otherwise this will not result in any greater benefit to the developing countries but will merely amount to, as some delegations observed earlier, a change in the label of the development aid.

25. Secondly, all such assistance should be treated separately from the normal aid and the target of 1 per cent of gross national product should be pursued independently without considering this aid.

26. Thirdly, my delegation feels that there is a greater need of expertise to determine the actual savings that will be available as a result of the reduction of military expenses than for the purposes of distributing such savings. There are numerous possibilities for ensuring a just and equitable distribution of the development aid and should, therefore, constitute no insurmountable problem if only the concerned countries muster up enough political will to make the actual reductions possible.

27. Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translation from Russian*): Pursuing its consistent policy of strengthening international security and disarmament, the Soviet Union has come forward with a new and important initiative in proposing for consideration by the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session the item entitled "Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries". The unanimous decision of

the General Assembly to include this item in its agenda and to discuss it at plenary meetings shows that the Soviet proposal is viewed by the States Members of the United Nations as an important political question which is of great significance for the cause of strengthening international peace and security and reflects the interests of all countries and peoples.

28. The general debate in the plenary meetings and the discussion of disarmament questions in the First Committee have already shown that the Soviet initiative has won support among States and that many delegations are interested in seeing it implemented in practice. It should be particularly stressed that in the course of these debates—that is, even prior to the official discussion of the USSR proposal—it was supported in the statements of delegations from more than 30 countries.

29. The Soviet initiative flows directly from the détente and the improvement of the international situation which have recently been taking place in the world. The dangerous rapids of the cold war are being successfully negotiated, even though there still exist forces which are attempting to impede this process. The situation is improving in various parts of the world. Europe is moving ever more confidently towards the creation and consolidation on that continent of a system of genuine security and comprehensive co-operation among States. The peoples of Indo-China have for the first time in many years been given the opportunity to settle their internal problems without foreign aggression. On the Asian continent, the idea of creating collective security in Asia with the participation of all the States of the region is becoming ever more popular. The desire of States in other parts of the world to create the bases for the strengthening of regional security and the development of close and mutually beneficial co-operation is spreading.

30. In spite of the recent aggravation of the situation in the Middle East, caused by the extremist policy of Israel and its continuing occupation of Arab lands, real opportunities have emerged for establishing a lasting and just peace in that area on the basis of the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts.

31. The threat of direct confrontation between the two world social systems is receding. There is normalization and development of relations among States with different social systems on the basis of ever greater recognition and confirmation of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

32. The Soviet Union and the United States have concluded at Washington in June 1973 an important agreement on the prevention of the threat of nuclear war and have reached an agreement in June 1973 at Washington on the basic principles of negotiations on the further limitation of strategic offensive arms.

33. Thus, there has been a substantial change for the better in the world climate. Now our task is to secure this positive progress and to make it irreversible. It is also important that the progress achieved in terms of political détente should be complemented by steps towards military détente.

34. As we know, in recent years an ever larger number of States has indicated that, although a certain amount of encouraging progress has been made towards curbing and limiting the arms race, it none the less continues because of the actions of the Western Powers, total military expenditure is constantly growing and the astronomical sum of \$200,000 million per year has already been exceeded. As indicated in the report of the Group of Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament, entitled "Disarmament and Development":

"If military expenditures continue to grow during the 1970s, at the same average annual rate as in the 1960s (3 per cent a year) they will reach \$280 billion (at 1970 prices) in 1980. If their share in the GNP were to remain the same as in 1970, the figure would reach \$360 billion."⁴

35. Of course, this inevitably gives rise to concern among the peoples of the world. If this dangerous trend is not halted, the development and production of armaments will continue and military expenditures will creep ever upwards; in the final analysis, this may have irremediable consequences.

36. One of the important measures which could promote the switch to cessation and reduction of the armaments burden would be a reduction of the military budgets of States. The Soviet Union is proposing that this be done primarily by those States which possess the greatest military potential and incur the greatest military expenditures. Since, under the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council, and consequently its five permanent members, bear the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, since these five Powers possess nuclear weapons and have the highest military expenditures, it is quite natural to ask that all these same permanent members of the Council jointly lead the way in reducing military budgets and set an example for other countries. It is also desirable that other States with major military and economic potential be included in this process of reducing military expenditures and that the circle of countries reducing military spending be widened. This could only benefit the cause of international détente and of the strengthening of international peace and security.

37. The proposal for the reduction of military budgets was put forward earlier by the Soviet Union both inside the United Nations and outside the framework of this Organization. Unfortunately, no decision was taken on this question, owing to those whose stand was one of militarism and aggression. However, we do not consider that this should stop us. Times have changed. Furthermore, the experience of the disarmament talks shows that real progress in this regard is entirely possible, if there is political will and willingness on the part of States and if conditions are created in which the opponents of disarmament are compelled to yield. Many of the disarmament agreements concluded and now in force, which were adopted on the initiative of the Soviet Union, are the result of lengthy and laborious efforts on the part of many of the world's States over a number of years.

38. The Soviet proposal provides for the reduction during the next financial year of the military budgets of all States permanent members of the United Nations Security Council without exception by 10 per cent compared with the 1973 levels. It also proposes that 10 per cent of the funds released as a result of the reduction in military budgets be allotted for the provision of assistance to developing countries so as to permit the execution of urgent economic and social projects. The Soviet proposal originates from the need to ensure that the widest possible circle of States, including the developing countries, benefits from the results of the improvement in the international situation. It takes full account of the fact that in recent years the question of a reduction of military budgets and of an increase in the amounts of aid to the developing countries has been raised with increasing insistence in the United Nations, in the Disarmament Committee, and in other international forums.

39. Thus, for example, in the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, unanimously adopted at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, it is pointed out that:

"... there is a close connexion between the strengthening of international security, disarmament and the economic development of countries, so that any progress made towards any of these objectives will constitute progress towards all of them" [*resolution 2734 (XXV), para. 19*].

40. The report of the Secretary-General entitled "Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures" states that:

"A halt in the arms race and a significant reduction in military expenditures would help the social and economic development of all countries and would increase the possibilities of providing additional aid to developing countries."⁵

41. In the Committee on Disarmament during this year's session, practically all the participants, including States which are permanent members of the Security Council, pointed to the continuing growth of military expenditures, and in one degree or another all spoke about the need to release funds for more productive purposes. For example, at the opening of the Committee's session, the representative of the United States listed among the questions which should be considered: "How can we maintain political and military stability at lower levels of expenditure?"⁶

42. The representative of the United Kingdom, speaking in the Committee on Disarmament, stated:

"Our task is to negotiate further measures to increase security, to increase confidence, and to release scarce resources for more productive ends than the maintenance of great defensive structures against each other."⁷

We are also very familiar with what has been said on disarmament matters by the delegation of France at various

⁵ See *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.72.IX.16), para. 120, subpara. 3.

⁶ See document CCD/PV.585.

⁷ See document CCD/PV.587.

⁴ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.72.IX.1, para. 7.

sessions of the General Assembly, including expressions of support for the cessation and the reversal of the arms race and of military expenditures.

43. Prior to the beginning of the 1960s, the Soviet proposals on disarmament questions—and this includes the proposal to reduce military expenditures—were actively supported by the People's Republic of China.

44. In its final act, the International Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations held at Geneva in September 1972 declared its support for the implementation, as a first step towards universal disarmament, of a 10 to 15 per cent reduction of States' military budgets.

45. In the first over-all review and appraisal of the progress in the implementation of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade submitted by the working group, it was pointed out in particular that international peace and security and the extension of détente to all regions of the world "would enable all countries, irrespective of their social and economic system or level of development, to benefit from this process and utilize it for the realization of the goals and objectives for economic and social progress of the Second Development Decade".

46. At this twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, in a resolution unanimously adopted by the First Committee on 15 November 1973 [1960th meeting], we find an appeal to all States:

"... to make renewed efforts aimed at adopting effective measures for the cessation of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, including the reduction of military budgets, particularly of the strongly armed countries, with a view to achieving progress towards general disarmament."⁸

47. At the present time, the movement for the reduction of military spending is making itself felt on an international scale at all levels—both that of Governments and that of the public. Various international governmental and non-governmental organizations are taking part in it. The World Federation of Trade Unions held in Bulgaria and the World Congress of Peace Forces held at Moscow have also come out in favour of a reduction in military spending.

48. Thus, the new atmosphere in the world and also the growing understanding among peoples and States of the need to take measures in this field are creating a good basis for a new approach to the problem of disarmament and for starting the reduction of the military budgets of States.

49. The Soviet proposal gives no one-sided advantages or benefits to individual States to the detriment of others. It does not violate the principle of the equal security of States, because if all the five permanent members of the Security Council made a proportionately equal reduction of their military budgets this would not lead to a change in the existing balance.

50. An analysis of data published on the military expenditures of the permanent members of the Security Council over several years demonstrates that the military expenditures of the Soviet Union over the last four years have remained unchanged, while the military expenditures of the other States permanent members of the Security Council during the same period of time have increased. For example, from 1970 to 1973, the military expenditures of the United States increased from \$77,800 million to \$83,400 million; those of the United Kingdom from £2,400 million to £3,400 million; and those of France from 22,500 million francs to 28,100 million francs—the data for France relate to 1972. The military expenditures of the People's Republic of China have also increased; according to assessments made in the Western press, they amounted to \$16,000 million in 1973. It would appear that those countries should find it much easier to respond positively to the proposal of the Soviet Union, which for the period from 1970 to 1973 allocated for defence needs the unchanged amount of 17,900 million roubles a year.

51. The reduction of the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council would yield benefits both to the countries which made such a reduction and to the developing countries. It would be in the interests of all States and peoples.

52. Indeed, the countries that carried out a reduction of their military budgets would be able, as a result, significantly to reduce the burden of military spending and to use the funds thus released for solving economic problems. A reduction of military budgets would undoubtedly have the effect of lowering the level of military production, which would help greatly to attenuate the energy crisis in the countries which are experiencing it, without detriment to the needs of the workers. In the case of the developing countries, implementation of the Soviet proposal would make it possible for them, in conditions of international détente and strengthened international security, to intensify and increase their efforts to accelerate economic and social progress through the use of all possible internal resources and the increased amounts of additional international assistance. Implementation of the Soviet proposal would be of advantage to all States and peoples and, in the final analysis, would serve the cause of peace and of the consolidation of international security and progress.

53. Adoption of the draft resolution proposed by the Soviet Union would be an important and concrete disarmament measure and would undeniably step up the search for constructive decisions on the other proposals under consideration with regard to limitation of the arms race and disarmament.

54. A good deal has been said about the significance of the Soviet initiative for the developing countries. Therefore, we would only stress once again that the fulfilment of the plans and schemes which the developing countries envisage for the development of their national economies for the 1970s would be considerably facilitated as a result of the adoption and implementation of the Soviet proposal. It would create opportunities for dealing successfully with the proposals to reduce the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries, and would not only permit the convening of a World Food Conference under the auspices of

⁸ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, First Committee, Annexes, agenda items 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38, document A/9359.

the United Nations but would also release funds for solving the problem of hunger in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. After all, it is perfectly clear that no recommendations of the World Food Conference, even though they might be very good and scientifically well-founded, could be put into effect if there were no funds, if the Moloch of the arms race continued to devour vast resources.

55. In the general stream of statements in support of the Soviet proposal, we also hear the voices of individual representatives either speaking directly in opposition to it and appealing for an increase in the military budgets of States or entering various reservations, the purpose of which is to cast doubt on the value and significance of the Soviet proposal and to avoid its adoption.

56. In connexion with the statement of the representative of China, the burden of which was vicious anti-Sovietism and total disregard of the interests and requirements of the developing countries, we should simply like to stress, in addition to what has already been said in similar circumstances in both the plenary and the First Committee, that China's position is not in keeping with the duty of the United Nations to strengthen peace and international security, but is a routine attempt, which is doomed to failure, to poison the international atmosphere and to increase international tension. It is typical of this type of statement by the representative of China that no place was found in it for the previously obligatory assertion that China is an advocate of disarmament. Similarly, the Chinese representative fully confirmed, by his own statement, that the present leadership of China is taking a stand of blocking all realistic measures to limit and reduce the arms race, is disregarding the desire of the peoples for peace, and is damaging the interests of the developing countries.

57. As for those who are sowing doubt or who are boasting about their assistance to developing countries during the arms race, they are proposing not a reduction of military budgets and the apportionment of additional funds for purposes of development and of assistance to developing countries, but merely the consideration and study of various points connected with the possibility of implementing the Soviet proposal. We should like to take this opportunity to warn the members of the General Assembly of the danger of replacing the substantive solution of questions by endless studies of the possibilities of implementation. The history of the United Nations contains many examples of cases where a good initiative has been drowned in discussions, studies and reports on various of its aspects. It is only the reluctance of individual States, which take no account of the view of the majority, to undertake decisive measures for disarmament that can explain their attempts to divert the discussion from the adoption of the clear-cut and timely proposal of the USSR. Those delegations which oppose the adoption and implementation of the USSR draft resolution assume the entire responsibility for such actions before their own peoples and before the peoples of the developing States.

58. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR calls upon all other delegations to support actively the draft resolution proposed by the Soviet Union, as this is necessary in the interests of peace, disarmament and development.

59. Mr. MESTIRI (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): It was with pleasure that the Tunisian delegation received and examined the Soviet proposal that was added as a supplementary item to the agenda of this session.

60. In the course of the general debate, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Tunisian Republic welcomed the initiative of the Soviet Union to reduce by 10 per cent the military budgets of the States permanent members of the Security Council. At that time, however, he explained that that offer would be extremely limited were it to be surrounded by the *sine qua non* condition that it could only go through if it was applied by all five countries concerned, since from the outset we knew that that unanimity was not going to be achieved. However, we shall go back to that aspect, which is not the only one that raises doubts.

61. A number of representatives here have referred to the technical difficulties that arise from, for example, the definition of a military budget. But it should be possible to solve this difficulty to within a few hundred thousand dollars. It is true that only an international organ can set up valid comparisons between the military budgets of different States.

62. A more important criticism, however, has been levelled at draft resolution A/L.701, and that is the one that refers to the very modest amount that has been mentioned for development assistance. But even considering that these are resources additional to those already covered by the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade [*resolution 2626 (XXV)*], they still would not be sufficient to rise to the level of the hopes placed on détente and the impact which détente supposedly will have on the solution to the problems that confront our world and that we term: development, environment, natural disasters and so on. When we think of the number and the scope of the problems raised, the proportionate amount, one hundredth, seems extremely small, not to say diminutive. We could hardly offer a figure, but the 5 per cent cited by the representative of Brazil in his brilliant statement at the opening of the debate seems far more realistic. At any rate, we should try to come as close as possible to that figure.

63. We believe that the draft resolution should not mention the exact proportion, but that it should be left to the special committee envisaged in paragraph 4 to set the amount of the reduction that is to be allocated for assistance to developing countries.

64. We believe that that special committee, rather than dealing with the distribution of the funds released—something that can be done by the United Nations Development Programme [*UNDP*], for example—should have as its mandate: first, to deal with the question of the definition of military budgets and secondly, to determine the percentage to be reserved for development assistance, it being understood that that percentage would vary from 1 to 5 per cent of the military budgets under consideration. Obviously, account would be taken also of the suggestion made by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union of a certain priority to be given the developing countries which have suffered from natural catastrophes, such as the recent drought in Africa. The special committee, there again, could decide upon a specific percentage that would be allocated to such coun-

tries. Thirdly—and this is most important—the special committee would follow the progressive evolution of the implementation of the draft resolution.

65. Thus the mandate of the Committee would be to explore all the ways that would lead to the concrete, practical and realistic implementation of the resolution. We referred to the progressive evolution of implementation because it is obvious that we can only progress by stages: partial measures to be added to other partial measures. This has always been the way in which the United Nations has acted, both in the field of disarmament and in that of assistance to development. Be that as it may, we cannot seriously hope that the five Powers primarily concerned will all give a favourable response immediately to the recommendation of the General Assembly. In the light of reality, we can have no illusions; and the reality is that the five permanent members of the Security Council cannot be placed on an entirely equal footing when it is a question of disarmament or détente. Furthermore, there is an open contradiction between the attitude of speaking of a general détente when there is an agreement between only the two super-Powers and the attitude of speaking of equal responsibilities on the part of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

66. A détente in fact exists only between two of the permanent members of the Security Council, the two members—and this is no coincidence—which have the largest military budgets.

67. Let us, therefore, begin at the beginning, that is by an immediate reduction of the military budgets of the countries in this détente. That would be on the general lines of the logic of the preamble of draft resolution A/L.701, which contains a paragraph which says: "Believing that political détente in the world should be supplemented by military détente".

68. We wish to be clearly understood: we are not penalizing those countries which have contributed most to the disappearance of the cold war and to the re-establishment of trust in their mutual relations. Rather, we are taking note of the fact that the two countries concerned are so far ahead of all the others in modern armaments that a 10 per cent reduction of their military budgets would certainly not place them in a position of inferiority or even of equality.

69. As far as the other three permanent members of the Security Council are concerned, each of them is a specific case. Of the three, the United Kingdom is the only one that has signed the treaties on disarmament and participates in the Vienna Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces, Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe. Let us hope that it, too, will be able to proceed in the immediate future to the reduction requested in the draft resolution.

70. France, whose representative has clearly made known the position of his country here, is a different case again. That is a country that devotes a considerable amount to armaments, but that also devotes almost 20 per cent of its military budget to development assistance.

71. Finally, China is again a completely separate case because it is a country that is at the same time a nuclear

Power, a permanent member of the Security Council and a member of the third world.

72. We do not say that these countries must be exempted from making substantial contributions from their military budgets, but a study by the special committee could make recommendations regarding the target dates and the amounts of such contributions.

73. We believe that the mandate of the special committee should be such that it would be able to clarify the many aspects of the very complex questions raised by this draft resolution.

74. We believe, furthermore, that it is possible to take into account several of the suggestions made here by a number of delegations of the third world. We are not yet being called upon to decide who is to pay how much, since the draft resolution before us only speaks of recommendations and hopes. Further, this is what spells the flexibility of the draft resolution and is, in fact, one of its great advantages, although there are others.

75. Another advantage is that this proposal has been made by the Soviet Union, one of the countries most directly concerned, and thus bespeaks goodwill and a spirit of co-operation in a field where the great Powers have been hardly very generous to date. Another positive aspect of the draft resolution is that it clearly corroborates the organic link established between disarmament and development. The importance of this fact has been sufficiently underlined by many speakers who have preceded me and it is not necessary, therefore, for me to return to it.

76. The last, and certainly not the least, of the advantages is that this link is established concretely by a precise proposal. This has allowed us to enter the debate easily on two essential aspects of United Nations activities whose solution constitutes a fundamental condition for the maintenance of true peace and stable international security, namely, disarmament and development.

77. If we add some of the practical suggestions made by my delegation and others to the specific nature of the draft resolution, we would vote in favour of it with great enthusiasm. Our enthusiasm will be somewhat lessened if the draft resolution stands as it is, although we shall vote in favour of it because we support the principle and want action to be initiated.

78. Mr. ENE (Romania) (*interpretation from French*): The Romanian delegation would like to make some comments on the item on the agenda of the General Assembly, inscribed on the initiative of the Soviet Union, on the basis of its position of principle on problems of disarmament and development.

79. Both at Geneva, in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and in the discussions which have taken place every year during sessions of the General Assembly, Romania has come out resolutely in favour of the implementation of authentic measures to call a halt to the armaments race and to bring about real disarmament, in the interests of peace and security of all countries, great or small, nuclear or non-nuclear, developed or developing.

80. The freeing of mankind from the burden of weapons and the spectre of war constitutes a problem of the greatest significance for the future of mankind and civilization.

81. The debates that have taken place in the course of the present session have clearly stressed the dangers to international peace and security, as well as to the economic and social development of all nations, represented in the constant upswing of the armaments race and particularly in the massive accumulation of stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

82. The Romanian delegation particularly shares the concern expressed from this rostrum of the United Nations by a number of delegations regarding the lack of progress in the negotiations on disarmament and the alarming increase in nuclear danger, a situation that threatens the security of all nations and encourages implicitly the constant increase in the burden of armaments and the growth of military expenditures in all countries.

83. In the course of the debates in the First Committee, my delegation dwelt at length on the conclusions and recommendations contained in the latest reports on these matters, submitted by the Secretary-General, namely, the report entitled "Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures" and the report entitled "Disarmament and Development".

84. In the first of these reports it is stated:

"The discussions and negotiations which have been pursued in the United Nations and elsewhere in order to achieve the basic goal of the maintenance of peace and the elimination of war . . . have not succeeded in halting, let alone reversing, an arms race which has grown ever more perilous over the years, and ever more wasteful of human and other resources".

The report goes on to say that "the cost of the arms race is enormous, and because of it, resources have been denied almost every other field of social activity".⁹

85. Together with many other States, we believe that in this process the main priority should be given to nuclear disarmament through the negotiation of a programme to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, to put a stop to their production and improvement, to reduce and ultimately to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as any other means of mass destruction.

86. The report of the Secretary-General entitled "Disarmament and Development" provides:

"One measure which might help the transition from partial measures to general and complete disarmament will be an agreement to limit and reduce military budgets. . . . Because of that, the question of budgetary limitations of military expenditures deserves serious further study."¹⁰

87. The squandering of immense human and material resources for military purposes appears even more unrea-

sonable when we refer to the picture of the economic and social situation in the world, dominated at the moment by the dramatic widening of gaps between countries and the continuation of underdevelopment in vast regions of the world, a situation which makes international security even more fragile.

88. The economic and social progress of all nations is indivisible and constitutes one of the most vital requirements for a true détente and understanding among States.

89. It is in this spirit that Romania has constantly spoken out in favour of effective support for developing countries, with a view to accelerating their economic and social progress, consolidating their economic independence and closing the gaps that exist in the world.

90. The United Nations must act with determination in order to attain the targets for the Second Development Decade, as well as the measures that have been dictated for development. Thus, the resources placed at the disposal of the Organization, particularly by the most developed and industrialized States, must be increased substantially and must be geared towards the realization of complex projects to promote directly the economic growth and social progress of the developing countries.

91. It has been stated here that it would be sufficient merely to set aside 5 per cent of the amount at present spent on armaments, to achieve the figures set for international assistance by the International Development Strategy. Disarmament could contribute to economic and social development by encouraging peace and international détente, but it can also do so through the resources freed for peaceful purposes.

92. I wish to state, however, that, though they are interdependent, since the enormous resources squandered in the arms race could be used to facilitate development and progress, it is obvious that disarmament and development can and must also be encouraged independently. It is for that reason that we entirely share the view expressed from this rostrum by the representative of Algeria, Mr. Rahal, who stated:

"... the slow rate of progress which unfortunately we have witnessed in the past towards disarmament should in no case have repercussions on development, the pursuit of which should continue separately, utilizing all available means". [2171st meeting, para. 100.]

93. I have stressed these problems in order to prove that, as far as my country is concerned, the concern over stemming the arms race, reducing military budgets and utilizing the resources thus freed in order to uphold the efforts of the developing countries are all matters of principle that we have constantly stressed and supported over the years. This attitude stems from the position of Romania on questions of disarmament and first and foremost of nuclear disarmament, on the causes of the acceleration of the arms race and increasing military expenditures and on the fundamental requirement of supporting, by all means at our disposal, the efforts made by the developing countries themselves to ensure their economic and social progress.

⁹ United Nations publication (Sales No. E.72.IX.16), paras. 1 and 114.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* (Sales No. E.72.IX.1), para. 10.

94. It is in this spirit that Romania has constantly spoken out in favour of the preparation, in the context of measures of disarmament, and in the first place, nuclear disarmament, of a concrete programme for freezing and gradually reducing military budgets, beginning with the budgets of the large powerfully armed nations. It is in this light that we consider the proposal made by the Soviet Union, now before us, as well as other similar proposals to reduce military budgets which have been presented over the years at the United Nations and elsewhere and which might be a first step in a systematic process of disarmament and reduction of military budgets.

95. Such measures would liberate significant resources that could then be devoted to the peaceful building of nations, raising of the standard of living, fighting against economic under-development and the solving of other problems on which the progress of mankind depends if it is to achieve true civilization.

96. The United Nations should, we believe, tackle with more determination the problems of disarmament that face it. It should strengthen its capacity to act in that field as well as in the field of development.

97. Romania is firmly convinced that, as long as the arms race continues, and as long as there continue to be large military arsenals and enormous stockpiles of nuclear weapons, our fundamental target must be to guide our efforts towards general disarmament, beginning with nuclear disarmament. Action to that end can be facilitated by the adoption of measures to slow down and stop the arms race and avert nuclear danger. That process can begin with a concrete proposal for the reduction of military budgets.

98. At the same time, we believe that any action to reduce military expenditures and to achieve general disarmament can be useful and positive so long as it is based on the true interests of States and takes into account their equal right to peace, security and development. Any step in that direction will receive the active support and full co-operation of my delegation in accordance with the mandate given it by the Romanian Government.

99. Mr. GROZEV (Bulgaria) (*translation from Russian*): The General Assembly has, at this session, once again underscored the need to encourage the efforts so far made and to take new steps to settle all problems, regional and global, in order to strengthen the trend towards the normalization of international relations and to intensify the process of détente and universal co-operation among States. The whole series of questions connected with disarmament has once again become the object of great attention and considerable discussion at this session. The prevailing opinion is that we must not only continue but also redouble our efforts to ease military tension and to halt the arms race. In that context, the role and responsibility of the United Nations and, more specifically, of the General Assembly are on the increase. The General Assembly must give a new boost and encouragement to disarmament efforts.

100. It is true that the problems of disarmament are complex and difficult. However, experience shows that in this field too, substantial results can be achieved if there is sincere and serious intent to overcome those difficulties and

if declarations of good will are accompanied by political will and concrete action.

101. The proposal submitted to the General Assembly at this session by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Comrade Andrei Gromyko, for the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries is inspired by precisely that kind of political will and concrete approach to disarmament. An important element in the new Soviet initiative is also the appeal to other countries with a major economic and military potential to reduce their military budgets and to allocate part of the funds thus released for the provision of assistance to the developing countries.

102. We should like to repeat that what we are talking about is the reduction of the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council and, possibly, of other States with a major economic and military potential, but not of the budgets of the developing countries, as some people are asserting in an attempt to mislead the General Assembly at this session.

103. The proposal to reduce military budgets by a specific percentage has a number of advantages. It is comparatively easy to put into effect and could open up broad prospects for the future.

104. Reduction of the military budgets of the five permanent members of the Security Council and also of other States would be a significant and very substantial step towards the cessation of the arms race. It would undoubtedly be the most striking proof and manifestation of the political will and determination of States to proceed towards effective disarmament.

105. The reduction of military budgets is indissolubly linked with development and with increased assistance to the developing countries. That point has been convincingly and eloquently made here by the representatives of Algeria, Mauritius, Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic, Kuwait, Colombia and Finland, and, today, by the representatives of Iran, Nepal and others.

106. I shall confine myself merely to recalling the concluding words of the statement by the representative of Algeria, Mr. Rahal, concerning the Soviet idea:

“We therefore will give this proposal our full support, as we would also give our full support to any suggestion that would respond to our two-fold concern of reducing military expenditures and increasing resources devoted to development.”¹¹ [2171st meeting, para. 108.]

107. Implementation of the Soviet Government's proposal would have an immediate and direct effect: substantial funds would be released which could be devoted to providing assistance to the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. This would assist in overcoming as rapidly as possible the economic backwardness of those countries, resulting from centuries of exploitation of their

¹¹ Quoted in French by the speaker.

natural and human resources by the imperialist colonialists and neo-colonialists. The surest way of achieving a considerable increase in the amount of funds available for the provision of assistance to needy countries is to release part of the colossal sums spent on armaments. Clear confirmation of this is to be found in the Political Declaration adopted at the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Algiers in September 1973, which emphasizes:

“... the enormous benefits to the well-being of all peoples and to the social and economic development of developing countries which could ensue from the ... releasing of resources resulting from disarmament.” [See *A/9330 and Corr.1, para. 76.*]

Thus, the proposal which we are now discussing has won support among a wide range of States, particularly developing countries.

108. The representative of Kuwait, Mr. Bishara, stated a few days ago from this rostrum:

“My delegation is grateful to the delegation of the USSR for taking the initiative in including this important item in the agenda. The inclusion of the question of the reduction of military budgets as an item in the agenda is by itself a commendable step. It becomes more so when that reduction is channelled to assist the developing countries in their economic development.”¹² [2173rd meeting, para. 32.]

109. The Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, Mr. Kelani, stressing his favourable attitude towards the Soviet proposal, stated:

“Regardless of the angle from which we view it, we see in the idea of the practical implementation of this proposal nothing but positive results both for the strengthening of international peace and security and for the acceleration of efforts for economic development undertaken, still with considerable hesitation, by the members of the international community. The greatest merit of the Soviet proposal lies, it is true, in the fact that it establishes what henceforward we would wish to call the link between general disarmament and international peace and security, on the one hand, and between disarmament and economic development on the other.”¹³ [*Ibid.*, para. 27.]

110. In the light of those and many other favourable comments, the objections to the reduction of military budgets from those who ascribe to themselves the role of champions of the small and medium-sized States sound strange, to put it mildly. These are precisely the countries that could use the funds released as a result of the reduction of the military budgets of the large States. Or perhaps certain delegations oppose the idea precisely because their States are also large, and also permanent members of the Security Council, and would have to reduce their military budgets and provide part of the funds thus saved to the needy countries. The negative attitude of China to the new Soviet proposal is nothing new. It is just one more link in the

chain of negativism towards and rejection of any Soviet initiative designed to reduce armaments or ease international tension.

111. The proposal to convene the World Disarmament Conference in essence brought a “no” from the Chinese delegation; the decision to establish the *Ad Hoc* Committee on that Conference also received a “no”; the proposal for the non-use of force in international relations and for the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons got another “no”, and so on, and so on. To all of these we now see added yet another “no”, another rejection, another instance of opposition to a new Soviet initiative.

112. In the view of the Chinese representative, the new Soviet proposal is, it would seem, nothing but a shoddy deception, a smoke-screen, a propaganda stunt, which, as they see it, the Soviet Union would like to use to cover up its own continuing armament, and so on, and so on.

113. The most fitting answer to this slander was given by the distinguished representative of Colombia, Mr. Caicedo, who, in his statement on the Soviet proposal, said:

“I sincerely believe that a great Power does not reach this level of public commitment for reasons of mere propaganda and cheap gestures. Nor does it come forward to this level either out of mere generosity but, rather, out of an over-all and very enlightened sense of the evolution of the world and its own risks and limitations.” [2175th meeting, para. 26.]

114. And what prevents us from determining whether or not the proposed measure is a deception and whether or not it represents a sincere desire to reduce armaments and to contribute to development? For the developing countries to receive in the course of a single year more than \$1,000 million in additional assistance is no deception or smoke-screen; it is a real and tangible contribution.

115. Once again, I wish to associate myself with the words of the Syrian representative, Mr. Kelani, when he said:

“It is not wishes or generalizations that are expressed, but rather effective measures capable of being applied.

“Let us therefore concentrate on the positive aspects of this proposal and let us avail ourselves of this opportunity to make further strides in the field of disarmament, since this is a tangible effort to increase capital devoted to development, which has been so meagre up to the present.”¹⁴ [2173rd meeting, paras. 29-30.]

116. In their desire to undermine the new Soviet initiative, the representatives of China have attempted to use as an argument the fact that a similar initiative was put forward in the past but was rejected.

117. Yes. That is true, but the blame for this lies least with the sponsor of the proposals. Everyone knows that the Western countries were then pursuing a policy of proceeding from a position of strength, since in those days they could count on a subservient majority in the United Nations and it was easy for them to reject such a proposal.

¹² Quoted in English by the speaker.

¹³ Quoted in French by the speaker.

¹⁴ Quoted in French by the speaker.

118. However, since that time the international situation and the membership and the situation in our Organization have changed decisively.

119. The peoples in the West, and throughout the world, have categorically refused to accept that a lasting peace can be built on the basis of the arms race. There has been a rejection, as being a threat to peace and unsound from the viewpoint of the peoples' interests, of the policy of "permanent confrontation", which was at the root of frenzied rearmament and which gave rise to the numerous military-political pacts such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the South-East Asia Treaty Organization, the Central Treaty Organization, and others of the same kind. The policy of cold war and atomic blackmail has failed. The ratio between the forces of peace and the forces of aggression has changed in favour of the former. In spite of all this, the opponents of disarmament are now asserting that the proposed measure—the reduction of military budgets—is impracticable. In their view, refusal to undertake such a reduction of military expenditures should be welcomed as being praiseworthy, but willingness to make such a reduction is to be censured as reprehensible. What surprising and improbable logic!

120. Moreover, they display particular irritation at the fact that, as they say, at each session of the General Assembly the Soviet Union has submitted not less than one proposal concerning disarmament. This cannot, of course, be denied. However, neither can we deny that numerous agreements designed to curb the arms race are a reality primarily as the result of the persistence and the consistent efforts and proposals of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union and its representatives in our Organization are justifiably proud of their concrete initiatives and actions in favour of peace and international security. Can those who oppose the Soviet ideas and proposals with such hostility boast of similar initiatives on their own part?

121. It is clear that, whether they like it or not, they are the mouthpieces, the heralds of imperialism and reaction on these matters.

122. The progress achieved hitherto in disarmament also shows that the concept of "all or nothing" in this regard is unfounded and dangerous, that it can lead only to deadlock and that, in practice, it covers up a reluctance to participate in efforts to achieve disarmament. It is clear that, by simply denying and opposing everything which leads to disarmament, to détente, and to international peace and security, one cannot get very far. Where would our Organization and the world be if all delegations had taken a similarly negative stand on other vitally important problems of mankind? What, for example, would have happened if, like the Chinese delegation, everybody in the Security Council had contented themselves with mere fiery speeches and non-participation in voting when the Council was discussing a cease-fire in a raging war, and the saving of dying people and of property?

123. Of course, it is a matter not just of the delegation itself, but primarily of the policy pursued by the Peking leadership. Obviously, in this particular case, in addition to anti-Sovietism, there is disagreement with and reluctance to

undertake disarmament in order that China may more easily realize its undeclared but easily detectable strategic designs and great-Power ambitions. As the Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, declared:

"The facts eloquently show that the Peking leaders are enthralled by hegemonistic and great-Power conceptions; that their policy is increasingly becoming identified with the policy of all the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist forces and with that of the most reactionary imperialist circles. This policy has no future. It is contradictory to the interests of the working class and of peoples. It has nothing whatsoever in common with the true interests of the Chinese people. Such a policy is doomed to total failure."

124. The distinguished representative of one of the non-aligned countries was correct when he justifiably stated a few days ago that, if all the socialist and other progressive, anti-imperialist States were united, this would constitute a tremendous force which would set the tone not only in our Organization but in international relations in general. And this is what we shall hope and believe, that sooner or later this will happen and all the socialist and anti-imperialist forces will act in unison for the benefit of our peoples and of all mankind.

125. It is well known that we have among us delegations which, without in principle rejecting the Soviet proposal for the reduction of military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council and others by 10 per cent, have attempted to show how their countries have, by other means, been contributing much more to the developing countries. From this they conclude that the proposed reduction of military budgets and the allocation of part of the funds thus saved for the provision of assistance to the developing countries do not concern them.

126. In answer to these unfounded assertions and even more unfounded conclusions, we should recall the following points. First, we are all aware how much these rich States have taken from the developing countries in the past. Accordingly, what they are now giving them is no more than a few crumbs, and is not comparable with what those States owe them. Secondly, we must stress once again that the new assistance which would be granted to the developing countries if the proposal we are now considering was adopted would be additional and exceptional assistance over and above what is being, and is to be, given as part of the Development Decade.

127. And, of course, there are those who, while they are against the Soviet proposal, do not want to admit it openly from this rostrum, but are working actively behind the scenes and are hiding behind the backs of others.

128. It may be that, from their point of view, they are right. Why should they speak themselves, when they have others to speak for them? They do better to rub rather than to burn their hands, when there are others willing to pull their chestnuts from the fire.

129. Others, while acknowledging the timeliness and usefulness of the Soviet proposal, consider that 10 per cent is

altogether too low a figure and that this percentage, and hence the sum that would be provided to the needy countries, should be increased. However, we have figures which show whether this is a little or a lot. As we know the world spends \$220,000 million annually for military purposes. Of this amount, \$130,000 million is attributable to the five permanent members of the Security Council. If we were to reduce their military budgets alone by 10 per cent, we would save \$13,000 million. And, if we were to allocate just one-tenth of that to the needy countries, they could receive \$1,300 million every year.

130. Therefore, why should we ask for more? Let us begin with what is proposed in order to proceed later to more decisive disarmament measures.

131. All peoples would stand to gain from this, including those of States whose budgets would be reduced. Everyone can imagine what tremendous sums would be released and devoted to the development of the economy, of science, education and culture, and to solving a number of social problems.

132. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria considers that the proposal of the Soviet Government is extremely clear and very concrete. We consider that we should not permit it to be burdened or clouded with artificial and unnecessary details at this stage. The history of disarmament talks shows that more than once sensible and completely feasible initiatives have been frustrated precisely on the pretext that so-called "technical" or other studies are required. Very often, insistence upon "explanation", "clarification" and so forth in fact cover up the absence of goodwill and of a genuine intent to reach agreement.

133. We are deeply convinced that, if the General Assembly adopts a decision in the spirit of the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union, the questions connected with its practical implementation can and will be resolved. We must take into account, above all, the considerable political and financial advantages. The adoption of this decision by the General Assembly would strengthen the authority of the world Organization and would demonstrate its ability to react speedily and successfully to current needs and effectively to promote the implementation of practical measures concerning disarmament and further détente in the world. It goes without saying that in order to implement this initiative we need practical and constructive co-operation from all States, and particularly from all the permanent members of the Security Council.

134. The unwavering and clear-cut position of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on disarmament matters is well known and is warmly supported by the entire Bulgarian people, which wishes to build its life and future in conditions of lasting peace and security. We therefore wholeheartedly support the new Soviet proposal for the reduction of military budgets.

135. We are convinced that with the implementation of this idea a decisive step forward will be taken towards freeing the peoples of the world from the heavy burden of armaments and towards ending the senseless wastage of vast material resources, energy, and the creative forces of

millions of people, and using them for the development and progress of all the world's peoples.

136. Mr. MOJSOV (Yugoslavia): Item 102 of the agenda deserves to be examined by the General Assembly with the greatest attention, owing to the understandable and widespread interest in questions of disarmament and development. We are not exaggerating when we say that perhaps more words have been spoken and written on these issues during the post-war period than on any other similarly acute problem of our time. The interdependence of these two problems had already been established a long time ago. The solving of the problems of disarmament raises the hope of establishing such political and material conditions as will make it possible to undertake, in all earnestness, the solution of problems of development, particularly in the developing countries. This should, on the other hand, open up prospects for durable and more humane relations in the world, founded on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

137. We are reverting once again to these problems, not only because the efforts invested in their solution have not yet produced the expected results, but because we believe that no new effort made in that direction should be considered as superfluous if it helps to bring us nearer to realization of the objectives we have set ourselves with regard to the adoption of effective disarmament measures and the promotion of the economic and social development of the developing countries.

138. The United Nations has agreed to seek vigorously a separate solution for each of these two objectives, disarmament and development—each in its own right, regardless of the pace of progress in approaching the other. Specifically, nations have agreed that national and international efforts to promote development should neither be postponed nor be allowed to lag merely because progress in disarmament is slow. In the report of the Group of Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament, it is rightly noted that:

"The problems of achieving disarmament and of making rapid progress with economic and social development, as well as the problem of generating more aid for developing countries, are essentially political. Disarmament will come only if people—political leaders, citizens and activists in political and social organizations—change the direction of the policies which have led to arms races; if they reject external policies of intervention; if they reject international competition for power and prestige expressed through military might. More aid, and other measures aimed at helping developing countries, will come only if people to a greater degree adopt and act upon internationalist values—the equality of man; the need to eliminate poverty, mass unemployment, disease, hunger and illiteracy; the desirability of bringing the benefits of science and technology to everyone."¹⁵

139. We believe that disarmament can be achieved, primarily if the factors generating the arms race are eliminated. It logically follows that disarmament depends directly

¹⁵ Disarmament and Development (United Nations publication, Sales No. E. 73.IX.1), para. 3 (d).

on the state of international relations. This interrelationship between the realization of an agreement in the field of disarmament and the development of international relations implies that the disarmament process should accompany the positive course of development of international relations and not lag behind it. It is, however, evident that that is not the case. Despite some relaxation in international tension and the expansion of the area of agreement among States, especially the leading world Powers, which undoubtedly lessen the danger of a nuclear war and create the essential assumption that more decisive steps will be taken towards disarmament, the arms race continues, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and embraces new areas. Indeed, we are witnesses to the fact that scientific and technological discoveries continue to be most often applied first to the perfection of existing (and the creation of new, more and more destructive and more and more costly) armaments. This to a great extent neutralizes the political advances attained in the international field and gives rise to an atmosphere of fear and mistrust among States.

140. The reflexes of the arms race of the leading military Powers affect each individual country and compel it, even unwillingly, to participate in that race and to suffer all its negative consequences.

141. Technological progress stimulates the qualitative aspect of the arms race in both nuclear and conventional weapons, and, instead of serving primarily economic development, especially that of the developing countries; it, in fact, increasingly directs human potential and material resources towards the need for armaments.

142. This situation has a particularly negative effect on the economies of developing countries. The fact that they are compelled to allocate considerable resources to armaments has a direct influence, slowing down the completion of, or postponing, projects that are vital to their economic and social development. Instead of an organized and systematic reduction of the gap between the developed and the developing countries, this gap is constantly widening, because of, among other things, new demands for the increased material resources continuously required by the arms race.

143. The abandonment of the arms race quantitatively, qualitatively and territorially is thus of particular importance to efforts to establish a stable peace and security for all peoples and all countries in conditions of true equality and prosperity, which is the basic aim of the United Nations. This, in our opinion, would result in the achievement, in the area of the economic and social development of the developing countries especially, of four essential goals: first, to increase significantly the resources of international economic aid to the developing countries; secondly, to help the developing countries themselves to contribute to their own more rapid development by enabling them to use the resources not allocated to armaments to finance their economic and social projects; thirdly, to make possible a more rapid and extensive transfer of modern technology to the developing countries; and, fourthly, to speed up and undertake systematically the examination of problems that increasingly threaten our environment, for whose solution, under conditions of a constant intensification of the arms race, even the most developed countries are always in a position to secure sufficient financial means.

144. The question of a reduction of military budgets has been considered in various United Nations organs many times. Many initiatives have been taken but, unfortunately, they have not produced the desired results. On the contrary, expenditure for armaments has been increasing constantly, so that it has now attained a figure of \$220,000 million annually, and, if it continues to grow at the same rate as last year, it will amount, in 1980, to \$280,000 million at 1970 prices and, if its share on the gross national product remains the same as in 1970, this expenditure will increase to \$360,000 million.

145. Several agreements on the limitation of armaments have been concluded during the last 15 years. However, they have not resulted in a reduction of military budgets, as attention was concentrated on the improvement of the quality of weapons whose price is now much higher than the prices of earlier types or generations of weapons. The reduction of military budgets would constitute, therefore, in our minds, an effective partial measure that would contribute towards restraining the arms race still further. What is more, we believe that every future agreement on disarmament should be accompanied by appropriate measures in the field of the reduction of military budgets.

146. Ever since the first initiatives for the reduction of military budgets, it has been emphasized that the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be used for promoting development, especially the development of the developing countries. This idea has been clearly set out in a number of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. Paragraph 8, chapter II of the comprehensive programme of disarmament states:

“A substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries”.¹⁶

A similar stand is also found in the preamble of the International Development Strategy. The Economic and Social Council, UNESCO and other United Nations organs have also insisted on the setting aside of a substantial portion of savings derived from disarmament for solving the burning problems of the developing countries. Such an orientation would, at the same time, contribute to the narrowing of the economic gap between the developed and the developing countries and, thereby, to the elimination of a dangerous hotbed of international crises and conflicts.

147. It is widely accepted today that the problems of disarmament, development and international security are related most closely. For this reason we believe that it would be particularly important and useful to undertake a reduction of military budgets and to use most of the savings derived in this way for the needs of development, particularly of the developing countries. This would constitute, in our view, a significant contribution to the strengthening of international security.

148. In drawing attention to the urgent problems of disarmament, the non-aligned countries have repeatedly laid

¹⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 93 and 94, document A/8191, para. 8.*

stress on the absolute need to reduce the expenditure on armaments considerably and to channel the largest possible portion of the human and the material resources released in this way towards development, especially of the developing countries. At the ministerial meeting of the non-aligned countries held last year at Georgetown, this demand was formulated in the statement of International Security and Disarmament. Paragraph 76 of the Political Declaration, adopted by the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries states:

“The Conference further emphasizes the enormous benefit to the well-being of all peoples and to the social and economic development of developing countries which could ensue from the peaceful use of nuclear technology and the releasing of resources resulting from disarmament.” [A/9330.]

149. The idea embodied in the most recent proposal of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction of military budgets are in harmony with the endeavours of non-aligned and developing countries aimed at putting a stop to the arms race, at reducing the expenditure on armaments and at utilizing most of the savings obtained in this way for extending assistance to the developing countries. Therefore, the Yugoslav delegation appraises this initiative as a significant one and considers that it could provide an incentive for finding widely acceptable long-term solutions that would constitute an inseparable part of the general efforts exerted in the fields of disarmament and development and that it would, consequently, contribute towards strengthening international security.

150. In the opinion of my delegation it is quite normal that this demand should apply, primarily, to the great Powers permanent members of the Security Council, which account for almost four-fifths of the total expenditure on armaments. We believe, however, that the General Assembly should also urge the other military significant States with a major military and economic potential, to act in the same way and thus demonstrate, in practice, their desire and readiness to contribute to the solution of the problems of disarmament, development and security. We also consider that in assisting the developing countries, the major part of savings obtained in this manner should be used as additional resources for the solution of the acute problems with which these countries and, especially, the least developed among them are faced.

151. The developing countries do not, of course, labour under the illusion that the economic and social difficulties they are encountering can be overcome in this way. However, an action like this one may make it easier to find effective solutions to these problems and may have a positive general impact on international relations. For these reasons, the Yugoslav delegation supports the initiative of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, convinced that it will be possible to evolve a common platform that will be not only in the interest of the developing countries, but also in the general interest of international peace and security.

152. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Before I adjourn the meeting, I shall call on the representative

of the Soviet Union, who wishes to make a statement regarding draft resolution A/L.701.

153. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): The Soviet delegation would like to make a special additional statement. The purpose of this brief statement is to present to the Assembly a revised draft resolution on the question of the reduction of military budgets which, when circulated, will have the symbol A/L.701/Rev.1.

154. Having listened attentively to the views of the many representatives who have spoken on this question, an absolute majority of whom expressed support for this proposal of the Soviet Union, the USSR delegation has decided to make some changes in the original text of its draft resolution for purposes of clarification. They relate to those provisions of the draft which refer to the question of the utilization of part of the funds saved as a result of the reduction of the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council for purposes of development, that is to say, for the provision of assistance to the developing countries. In their statements, a number of representatives stressed that these funds for development purposes should be provided in addition to the assistance that the developing countries are receiving at the moment. In other words, the assistance to the developing countries using the funds saved from the reduction of the military budgets of the five States should be in addition to the assistance they already receive. The Soviet delegation would like to make it absolutely clear that the funds saved as a result of the reduction of military budgets, which will be used to provide assistance to developing countries, should be and will be in addition to that assistance which the developing countries already receive through other channels.

155. With that purpose in mind, the Soviet delegation is introducing a clarification in paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, to the effect that the funds derived from the reduction of military spending for the provision of assistance to developing countries will be an addition to the assistance that is already provided to them through existing channels. This clarification is in keeping with the interests of the developing countries, corresponds to their wishes, and takes into account the views expressed in the Assembly by the delegations of those countries.

156. At the same time, the Soviet delegation would also like to clarify another point.

157. As delegations to the General Assembly already know, the Soviet Union, in putting forward its proposal supported the establishment within the United Nations system on a temporary basis of a special international committee for the distribution of the funds released by the reduction of military spending. The USSR delegation, speaking in the General Assembly on 15 October 1973, [2154th meeting] presented detailed explanations of how this organ should be composed. In the view of the Soviet delegation, this organ should be sufficiently representative, but at the same time reasonably limited in size, so as to enable it to work efficiently. On the same occasion, the Soviet delegation expressed its readiness to listen to and study the views and points put forward by other delegations

and, of course, above all, the delegations of the developing countries, with regard to the specific States that might become members of such a body.

158. Taking into account the views and points put forward by a number of delegations, the Soviet delegation considers that such a committee should automatically include among its members the States permanent members of the Security Council, that is, the countries which would have to make a reduction in their military budgets: China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States. Furthermore, the committee should include three States, to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly, from each of the three regional groups in the United Nations: Asia, Africa and Latin America, as well as two States from each of the other two regional groups, Eastern Europe and Western European and other States. Such a committee would, in our view, give broad representation to the developing countries, which would take a direct part in the determination of the amounts of the funds to be allotted to the various developing countries for assistance to them.

159. For that purpose, an appropriate amendment has been made on this point also to the same paragraph 4 of the draft resolution. Taking into account those two amendments, the new text of paragraph 4 would read as follows:

“Establishes a Special Committee to distribute the funds released as a result of the reduction of military spending, for the provision of assistance to developing countries as an addition to the assistance that is already provided to them through the existing channels, consisting of the following countries: China, France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America,

and also three countries from the regional groups of Africa, Asia and Latin America, respectively, and two countries from the regional groups of Eastern Europe and Western European and other States, respectively, which will be appointed by the President of the General Assembly after consultations with those regional groups, and instructs the Special Committee to distribute the said funds on an equitable basis, having regard to the most urgent needs and requirements of the recipient countries and without discrimination of any kind, and to determine the amount of the funds to be allotted to the various countries and the schedule for provision of the funds.”

160. Permit me to express the hope that these clarifications in the draft resolution will enable delegations better to understand and to support the text. In expressing its gratitude to those who have already stated their support for the proposal for the reduction of the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries, the USSR delegation voices the belief that those States which, at a number of sessions of the General Assembly, at the fifty-fifth session of the Economic and Social Council, at the session of the Committee on Review and Appraisal of the Second Development Decade, and at the conference of non-aligned countries, spoke and voted in favour of the principle of mutual interdependence between disarmament and development and in favour of the idea that détente should bear fruit for the developing countries too, and those who supported and support the use of funds saved by disarmament for the provision of assistance to developing countries, will support this draft resolution and vote in favour of it.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.