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Agenda item 102:

Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries (*continued*) . . . . .

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*President:* Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

AGENDA ITEM 102

**Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries (*continued*)\***

1. Mr. FRAZAO (Brazil): The General Assembly resumes today its consideration of a subject that may have important implications for our common efforts in the key areas of disarmament and development. Before going into an analysis of the issue now before the General Assembly and the evaluation both of its past history and its prospects, it is my intention to offer a few preliminary comments in the hope they will contribute to clarify certain basic misunderstandings on the present item, which in my view were already apparent at earlier stages of the current session.

2. As a first point, I would like to point out that reductions in the military spending of the big Powers can only fit within the framework of disarmament—which is to say, general and complete disarmament under effective international control—if those cuts are effectively tied to specific measures of disarmament; for instance, if they are taken in conjunction with commitments to cancel ongoing arms programmes. Properly speaking, cuts in military expenditure belong to the sphere of national budgets. By and in themselves, they are not measures of disarmament as long as we adhere to the accepted phraseology in this field; nor, for the same reasons, can they be considered to be measures of arms control. I should comment in passing that within any budget there is a grey area where military and civilian expenditure may appear under ambiguous headings.

3. If it is not squarely considered within the context of disarmament, the problem of the reduction of the military budgets of the big Powers becomes a misplaced problem, and, for that matter, a false one. Consequently, any inadequate or less than comprehensive decision by the General Assembly on this matter would amount to a final justification for, or tacit approval of, the extremely high levels of

military expenditure by those Powers. To put it very simply—and simplicity often adds to reason—if the General Assembly approves and applauds the reduction of a certain percentage of military expenditures, we would ensure that it would not be applauding and approving the bulk of the military spending by the big Powers.

4. As a second point, since we do not confuse disarmament with non-armament and arms control measures, or disarmament with so-called cuts in military spending, let us, in addition, avoid confusing peace with détente among the big Powers. Let us not for one moment forget that, despite or perhaps because of the much vaunted diplomacy of the era of détente, an international climate of confidence and security is yet to be established, that efforts towards the co-management of international life are still being made, and that the international community continues to be confronted with trends favouring intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the setting up of spheres of influence. We are definitely not living in the best of all possible worlds simply because the super-Powers now agree to consult each other on certain important matters and to strengthen their relationship, however welcome these developments may be.

5. A third point I should like to make is of a semantic nature, but has, none the less, serious political implications. It relates to the fact that in debates on disarmament, countries are usually characterized as “nuclear-weapon States” and “non-nuclear-weapon States”. This is the current phraseology and, I believe, a valid one. Although all the nuclear-weapon States also happen to be permanent members of the Security Council, this latter capacity should be invoked only within the confines of that main organ of the United Nations and always in strict accordance with the Charter. At the General Assembly all members are permanent members of the Assembly and have identical rights. No single Member of the United Nations, whether or not a permanent member of the Security Council, has, for instance, any valid title to claim preferred access to seats in the subsidiary organs of the General Assembly, which must be based solely on the principle of equitable geographic distribution. Based on these considerations, and without intending any undue criticism, I believe it would be more appropriate in the context of the present item not to speak of permanent members of the Security Council but of nuclear-weapon States.

6. The debates on this question will certainly highlight the link between the two most urgent, fateful problems facing mankind, namely, the continuing nuclear arms race, and the widening gap between developed and developing countries. These debates will thus have a bearing on the long-term economic viability of many developing countries, on aspirations for political and economic security for all mankind, and on the mere survival of man on this planet.

\* Resumed from the 2154th meeting.

7. Convinced of the primacy of these issues, Brazil, together with many other Member States, has for quite a few years waged a consistent struggle to gain international recognition for the principle that savings obtained through measures in the field of disarmament and related areas should be devoted to the promotion and acceleration of the economic development of the developing countries. As long ago as July 1970, not to go back any further in time, the Minister for External Relations of Brazil, while addressing the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, asserted that there was a need to establish a concrete correlation between savings deriving from measures of disarmament and their channelling to the promotion of the economic development of the developing countries. On that occasion, Mr. Gibson Barboza added that in an era characterized both by very large expenditures on sophisticated weapons and by a clear dearth of funds for the purpose of economic co-operation, it should be recalled that even a small fraction of the resources frozen in the thermonuclear arsenals could generate investments that were highly needed by hundreds of millions of persons in the developing countries. Indeed, several years earlier, Brazil had advanced the proposal that at least 1 per cent of funds expended on armaments and other military items in the developed world should be devoted to programmes of economic co-operation. That proposal—the allocation to productive purposes of “1 per cent of human folly”, as it was described at the time—never found much favour among the countries that would provide these funds.

8. In point of fact, all endeavours to affirm this principle and to make it operative have met with the opposition of would-be donor countries. In private or closed meetings, this opposition has been stated in clear and unambiguous terms, while in open forums such as this one, our efforts have been hampered by much foot-dragging and by the attempts to water down the principle involved. So much so, that the developing countries have yet to benefit from reductions in military expenditures or from cancellations of arms development programmes announced from time to time by one Power or another.

9. This less than encouraging circumstance has not deterred the nuclear-weapon States from putting forward proposals or initiatives. In this connexion, I may recall, for instance, that on 16 April 1953 the President of the United States, the late Dwight D. Eisenhower, stated that:

“... this Government is ready to ask its people to join with all nations in devoting a substantial percentage of the savings achieved by disarmament to a fund for world aid and reconstruction”.

10. In 1955 at the time of their Geneva meeting, the Heads of Government of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States had on their agenda a French memorandum on disarmament, containing a proposal to the effect that resources made available by reductions in military budgets should be used in whole or in part to assist under-developed countries. Similarly, the Soviet Union submitted a proposal to the thirteenth regular session of the General Assembly, recommending that the big Four of that era should reduce their military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent, and that part of the resulting savings should be allocated to a fund for assistance to under-developed

countries.<sup>1</sup> Similar proposals were reiterated regularly throughout the 1950s and the 1960s.

11. All lofty pronouncements linking savings in armaments-spending to investments in economic co-operation have so far failed to yield any practical result. Worse yet, when debates take a more concrete turn, the developing countries are generally faced with equivocation, fallacy and denial. It has been stated, for instance, that savings will be released only after the completion of the process of general and complete disarmament, or that no measure of disarmament or arms control currently under discussion is likely to produce savings that might be transferred to the developing world. For a time some sectors of opinion even argued that military expenditure was an essential tool for the stabilization and growth of advanced economies and, therefore, that if disarmament ever came to light, it would provoke a world-wide economic crisis. Those arrangements were disavowed, first, by the report of the 1962 group of experts on the economic and social consequences of disarmament,<sup>2</sup> and then, a decade later, by a report prepared by another group of experts, under the title of *Disarmament and Development*.<sup>3</sup>

12. In those reports, it has been ascertained, *inter alia*, that nuclear disarmament offers the promise of benefits for the developing countries through the release of nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes and through a sharp increase in the availability of technical and scientific expertise that could be directed, in part, towards assisting the programmes of the developing countries for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In another area, biological disarmament has already released resources that may be usefully employed in research on diseases, and chemical disarmament may yet add resources for ecologically acceptable pest control and toxicological research.

13. A more general conclusion reached in those reports has been that a halt in the arms race and a significant reduction in military expenditure would help the social and economic development of all countries and would increase the possibilities of providing additional aid to developing countries. In this connexion, it has also been ascertained that one major effect of the arms race and military expenditure has been to create difficulties for trade and other exchanges, as well as to reduce the priority given to aid by donor countries. Another important conclusion is that a shift to development assistance of only 5 per cent of current arms expenditures would make it possible to meet the official targets for aid.

14. Last week, in her valedictory statement before the First Committee, the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Alva Myrdal—to whom my delegation wishes to render once again a tribute for her untiring efforts in the field of disarmament—reminded us of the magnitude of the resources that must be transferred to the developing countries if the target of the United Nations for official development assistance is to be attained.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 64, 70 and 72, document A/3925.

<sup>2</sup> *Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 62.IX.1).

<sup>3</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.IX.1.

15. Having chaired the group of experts that produced the widely appreciated report on disarmament and development, Mrs. Myrdal is in a particularly authoritative position to comment on these matters. My delegation for one, believes that, if years ago it was advisable to propose the channelling to the developing countries of resources equivalent to 1 per cent of the military budgets of the best armed countries, today, in the light of the conclusions of the relevant reports and of the targets set in the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade [*resolution 2626 (XXV)*], one should not envisage magnitudes amounting to less than 5 per cent of those budgets.

16. At its twenty-fifth session, the General Assembly unanimously affirmed its belief that there is a close connexion between the strengthening of international security, disarmament and economic development, so that any progress towards any of these objectives will constitute progress towards all of them [*resolution 2734 (XXV), para. 19*]. This stand was taken at the initiative of Brazil and other Latin American countries. Thanks to our persistent efforts, the General Assembly unanimously established a link between the fundamental issues of disarmament and development and stressed the need for launching a self-sustaining process, which would aim at the generation of conditions of international peace and security [*ibid., para. 21*]. These provisions are a central feature of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, and provide a framework for a serious examination of the present item.

17. At that same session, the General Assembly adopted the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, a document that is a landmark in the history of international co-operation. In the Strategy for Development, it was accepted that the success of international development activities will depend, in large measure, on improvements in the general international situation and, in the first instance, on concrete progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Accordingly, the General Assembly held that progress along the route of disarmament should release substantial additional resources which could be utilized for the purpose of economic and social development, in particular, that of the developing countries. Speaking before the Second Committee in 1970, on the question of the economic and social consequences of disarmament, I had the opportunity to stress the need for a close link between the Second United Nations Development Decade and the Disarmament Decade, a link that was then established both by the International Development Strategy and by General Assembly resolution 2685 (XXV). That resolution also reiterated in unambiguous terms the principle that concerns us today.

18. These were the views upheld by the General Assembly in 1970. In that historic year, when the international community commemorated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, the concept of the channelling of savings to development purposes was precisely formulated and commanded widespread, if not unanimous, support.

19. Despite all this, and despite all the efforts made in Geneva by the group of 12 States, not a single word on that

principle was included in the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction as submitted by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the following session of the General Assembly.

20. Even more surprising and disappointing was the omission of the same principle in the original draft resolution endorsing the Convention,<sup>4</sup> a draft, I should stress, that was sponsored, in the main, by the two super-Powers and by States belonging to military pacts. This was a particularly conspicuous—and I would even say, disgraceful—omission, not only in the light of the resolutions adopted a year earlier by the General Assembly itself, but also in view of the fact that the biological weapons Convention was actually the first real measure of international disarmament since the Second World War, and that the reaffirmation of the savings principle within that specific context would entail no complex problems of implementation.

21. To remedy that unfortunate situation, the Brazilian delegation, together with 15 others, introduced an amendment<sup>5</sup> adding a new preambular paragraph to the draft resolution, affirming “the principle that a substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries”. That amendment had no other aim than to express adequately the consensus of the General Assembly on this matter.

22. It so happens that the sponsors of the draft resolution decided, however, to reject this clear-cut formulation. In the ensuing negotiations between the interested delegations, an accommodation was reached with a view to ensuring the unanimous endorsement of the draft convention by the General Assembly. The compromise formulation, it should be noted, is less satisfactory and less operative than we had a right to expect.

23. What could be only partially achieved at the level of the endorsement of the biological weapons Convention was, however, obtained in full at the very same twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, with the adoption of resolution 2880 (XXVI) on the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security. Paragraph 8 of that resolution contains *ipsis litteris* the principle on savings that Brazil and other countries had sought to affirm.

24. I hardly need to recall that, in the context of the negotiations currently under way at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament regarding the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, 10 delegations, including the Brazilian delegation, have introduced a working paper, expressing their views on important aspects of a treaty banning chemical weapons.<sup>6</sup> Among the general provisions

<sup>4</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 98, document A/8574, para. 7.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 8.

<sup>6</sup> See document CCD/400.

of that working paper the principle on savings stands out. It is our firm hope that the international community will, at long last, begin to accord recognition to that principle, at the operative level.

25. As we are painfully aware, the small steps so far taken in the long-drawn-out effort to affirm the principle on savings, although important and valuable, unfortunately do not go beyond the conceptual level. If doubts have been removed, mistakes corrected and false problems elucidated, it is no less true that, for a variety of reasons, the international community has not yet succeeded in translating conceptual gains into practical action. Notwithstanding all pertinent resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the fields of disarmament and development continue to be, for all day-to-day purposes, separated from each other by unsurmountable obstacles.

26. Yet, even a brief inventory of past initiatives and debates in both the areas of disarmament and development is enough to demonstrate how closely they are interrelated, and how much the international community stands to gain from an integrated approach to them. The aim is clear. It is incumbent upon us to make sure that those who benefit the most from the present international structures, whether political, military or economic, fully realize that they bear a responsibility for taking the initiative of finally putting into practice a principle they have already accepted in theory and are committed to uphold.

27. If we were living in an ideal world, the issues involved in the debate of this item, so timely introduced by the delegation of the Soviet Union, could be discussed on their own terms. We believe, however, that this particular question must be placed within the context of the international reality, as we perceive it, so that all its implications may be identified and all possible misunderstandings clarified.

28. At this stage, one can confidently state that, despite the still dangerous flare-ups, and, indeed, instances of open war in the Middle East and elsewhere, the post-World War era is coming to a close, and that efforts towards détente appear at last to predominate over cold-war policies. As a new international outlook emerges, the role of the United Nations must be reappraised, and its Charter reformed accordingly. Security for all must be established, and concrete progress made along the road of general and complete disarmament. Resources that had been devoted to weapons of mass destruction must now be invested in tools for mass development.

29. If, in the past, specific problems were dealt with in accordance with the iron laws of the cold war, now it is reasonable to expect that they will loosely follow the emerging principles of détente. Gains so far obtained in the political field must be translated into terms of disarmament and development so that a mutually reinforcing process may set in.

30. It would be rather naive to pretend that this has already happened. There are grounds to fear that the process of détente may be in the end reduced to the naked realities of power, to the freezing of the international *status quo*, and to the allocation of spheres of influence under the aegis of a balance of power. I wish to add, parenthetically,

that the new era of détente has already caused a proliferation of proposals and initiatives, which merely, on account of their number, are hard enough to sort out, let alone evaluate. No wonder, therefore, that it is more and more difficult to get excited about new initiatives that are almost daily put forward. Here and elsewhere, a certain restraint is called for since propaganda efforts continue to take place now as in the past.

31. As the process of the relaxation of international tension develops, certain contrasts become glaring. While, on the one hand, various agreements have been signed, and political understandings reached, especially at the level of the super-Powers, on the other hand, the nuclear arms race and the subsistence of a large segment of mankind under conditions of destitution, hunger and hopelessness are persistent, but, nonetheless, terrifying facts of life.

32. These are the grim realities of our era. International security is daily denied by the continuing nuclear rivalry, and international affluence still coexists with international poverty. No effective measure of disarmament has blunted the threat posed by nuclear weapons, which, in point of fact, represents the greatest threat ever faced by man, simply because those are the most awesome weapons ever devised and developed. Nor have efforts towards international co-operation succeeded in defusing the potentially explosive interaction between post-industrial or industrialized countries on the one hand, and industrializing or pre-industrial societies on the other, as the struggle for development goes on.

33. If any hope is to be retained, détente must set in motion a process aimed at the establishment of a more equitable international order, under conditions of political and economic security. Détente must be deepened and conditions created to impel the international community to go beyond détente itself. In the words of the Minister for External Relations of Brazil at the opening of the general debate [2124th meeting], we should agree on something more than a mere temporary harmonization of means; we should indeed define a common and global concept of the ends we seek.

34. If this grand design is to become a reality, certain fundamental steps will have to be taken in this forum and elsewhere. Within the purview of the present item, I should reaffirm that one such measure is doubtlessly the channelling of savings deriving from disarmament measures for the purpose of development.

35. To accomplish this end, a dose both of candour and of political will to enter into commitments is required. By the same token, propaganda and rhetorical appeals must be put aside. Empty words would offend our sense of value and proportion. It would be a short-sighted policy, not to say a foolish and arrogant one, to reduce the treatment of fundamental issues, such as the question that concerns us today, to the fanning of illusions among the developing, unarmed countries and to the unacceptable manipulation of man's common desire to survive the era of mutual deterrence.

36. The delegation of Brazil, for one, does not question motivations, nor do we take shelter behind old differences in order to forgo the duty of trying to solve problems at

present dogging the international community. On the contrary, we believe that assumptions must be uncovered, principles must be discussed and mechanisms already available must be used, or new ones created.

37. For our part, we have studied the proposal that the delegation of the Soviet Union saw fit to place before the General Assembly [4/9191], and we are prepared to participate in an open and frank dialogue on that proposal and on the decisions that the General Assembly should adopt under the present item.

38. The item under consideration has undeniable merits *per se* and deserves careful consideration by the General Assembly. We would therefore urge all delegations to approach it with a positive spirit. It would be most welcome, indeed, to ascertain the reactions of all groups of delegations, in particular those of developed countries, to the substance of the issues involved here.

39. If, as we should, we take the Soviet proposal at face value and react constructively to it, we must examine its main features in the light of our overriding concerns in the fields of disarmament and development. We must, in fact, make sure that any decision taken on this issue is relevant to those concerns, that it serves commonly shared ends, and that it is a practical proposition.

40. In this connexion, one particularly thorny problem regards what should and should not be considered part of a military budget and, therefore, what could and what could not be counted as a cut in military expenditure. My delegation still requires further information before it takes a final position on this specific point. Our first reaction to this up-to-now intractable problem is that, notwithstanding its complexity, it should not be beyond the political and technical ingenuity of the General Assembly, once an agreement on the substantive aspects of the question is reached. I might add that, in the opinion of my delegation, any approach that would leave it up to each nuclear-weapon State to fix unilaterally the basis for its own contribution would be less than satisfactory, and most probably unworkable. Elementary realism therefore suggests that, at an appropriate time, the General Assembly should try to work out guidelines for the solution of this aspect of the problem. Perhaps the Soviet delegation itself could spell out in detail its own ideas on this matter and put forward alternative suggestions.

41. The fate of the present item will depend not on high-sounding, although, in the end, platitudinous announcements, but on the willingness of the parties involved to accept concrete commitments and to define them in a precise manner. That is to say, absolute and relative figures must be carefully examined, and suggestions regarding appropriate mechanisms for the transfer of savings must be considered, once we have agreed on the main features of the issue before us. In turn, the General Assembly should certainly envisage ways and means to ensure: first, that contributions for development purposes will be made; secondly, that their volume will be commensurate with existing resources and to the needs to be met; and, thirdly, that they will represent a step forward in the process of international co-operation.

42. To ensure that contributions are forthcoming, one would have to foresee a scale of contributions that would vary in accordance with the economic and military standing of the prospective contributors. Larger contributions would come from those that are most developed and best armed; smaller ones would be expected from other countries.

43. I also believe that if any proposal on this matter is to be taken seriously by the developing countries, we must, in the first place, be assured that it effectively represents a forward step in the process of international co-operation. This is a central point, in our view. For this conviction to evolve, certain fundamental principles must be observed; and, I would suggest, they should be the following ones.

44. First, funds to be made available will have to be additional to resources for development currently existent; otherwise, the proposal might boil down to a mere shift in the labels of funds already available instead of promoting an increase in the flow of resources to the developing countries. This is the principle of additionality.

45. Secondly, funds will have to be provided without any strings attached. That is to say, no political, military or economic conditions may be placed on their availability or disbursement. This is the principle of unconditionality.

46. Thirdly, contributors will undertake a firm commitment to provide specified minimum amounts over a number of years. These are the principles of predictability and of contractual obligation.

47. Fourthly, funds will be provided in an equitable manner and without any discrimination, taking into account the needs of developing countries, in particular the least developed among them, and their capacity to absorb those resources. This is the equity principle.

48. Fifthly, funds must be disbursed and controlled through multilateral channels, with full participation of both donor and recipient countries. This is the principle of the multilateralization of the assistance.

49. As a first step and without prejudice to the principle of additionality, the total magnitude of all contributions should be in the vicinity of the sums that would make it possible to approach the International Development Strategy target for the transfer of public funds to the developing countries.

50. In due time, the General Assembly should be prepared to adopt guide-lines for the utilization of the resources made available through these contributions. To my delegation, it is quite clear that many possibilities are open. International co-operation for development purposes can take various formats.

51. In this connexion, one of the most promising fields for the application of these funds would be that of the transfer of science and technology to developing countries, and, in particular, that of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As recognized in the 1968 Declaration of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, an increase in the possibilities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy is of particular impor-



tance for the economic development of the non-nuclear-weapon countries and for the acceleration of the development of the developing countries.<sup>7</sup>

52. In that important Declaration, which was subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly [*resolution 2456 (XXIII)*], it was noted that it is imperative to ensure conditions that would promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including the potential use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes within appropriate and effective international safeguards; encourage international co-operation in this field; ensure the unhampered flow of nuclear materials under appropriate and effective international safeguards, as well as that of information, scientific knowledge and advanced nuclear technology, exclusively for peaceful purposes, on a non-discriminatory basis.

53. At the very core of the decisions adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States is its resolution J,<sup>8</sup> which calls for international co-operation programmes in the fields of nuclear technology research and development, and of the use of nuclear energy in economic development projects, and outlines the need for a fund of special fissionable materials for the benefit of non-nuclear-weapon States, and, in particular, of developing countries. That resolution, besides inviting the nuclear-weapon States to assume the main responsibility for the financing of these programmes and to commit themselves to supply the fund in kind, also specifically recommends that the nuclear-weapon States channel into the proposed programmes and fund a substantial share of such financial resources and special fissionable materials as may be released as a result of the adoption of disarmament measures.

54. Let me add that we would not insist that all nuclear-weapon States should proceed simultaneously with synchronized cuts by the identical percentage in their military budgets, as seems to be the idea behind the original proposal. We tend to believe that, to a certain extent, the security interests of the nuclear-weapon States which would take the lead in the reductions of military spending would not be substantially affected if other nuclear Powers did not find them possible or did not really wish to commit themselves concurrently. On the contrary, it occurs to us that the proposed measure could be taken on a staggered basis, that is to say, countries could adhere to it at different stages. It could also have its scope progressively broadened so as to encompass other industrialized States which are not nuclear-weapon States but which form part of military pacts, responsible for more than 80 per cent of military expenditures, and which, given their high level of development, would certainly not wish to be deprived of the opportunity to contribute.

55. The acceptance of such a basic understanding would be encouraging and would certainly serve to demonstrate good faith and political will on the part of those who bear a special responsibility for the arms race. It would further convince us that the General Assembly is dealing here with a practical proposition and not with loose pledges carrying pre-conditions almost impossible to be fulfilled—pledges,

therefore, doomed never to be honoured and never to become operative realities.

56. Even if for various reasons the route I have outlined appears blocked at the present stage; even if no nuclear Power is currently in a position to commit itself to take true disarmament measures; and even if reductions of budget, whether or not coupled with specific disarmament measures, are out of the question, it would still be possible to seek alternate routes and to envisage the establishment of a mechanism for development assistance based on contributions to be made by the nuclear-weapon States in the much more likely event that their military budgets continue to grow. One could certainly devise a mechanism whereby a part of this growth could be earmarked for development assistance.

57. These are the main concerns guiding the Brazilian delegation in the current debate. When the General Assembly comes to the stage of taking a decision on this item, my delegation will be prepared to contribute to the search for any solution responding to the ideas I have put forward.

58. Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius): In the course of the general debate my delegation declared support for the consideration of the item now before the Assembly [*2146th meeting*]. We did so for two reasons, which we clearly stated in our policy statement. We expressed our concern for the steadily rising costs of the arms race, which as we know consumes over \$200,000 million annually. On the other hand, we stressed the importance which we attach to the economic and social progress of the developing countries, mindful of the fact that conditions of stability and well-being are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations. The questions of disarmament and economic and social progress are obviously interrelated. In the report on the *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* submitted in 1971 by a group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General it was noted that:

“A halt in the arms race and a significant reduction in military expenditures would help the social and economic development of all countries and would increase the possibilities of providing additional aid to developing countries”.<sup>9</sup>

One of the recommendations of the experts was that there should be: “A substantial reduction in the military expenditures of all countries, particularly of those whose military expenditures are highest. . .”.<sup>10</sup>

59. It is bearing this in mind that we support the reduction of the military budgets by 10 per cent and the allocation of the funds that would be saved to the provision of assistance to the developing countries. At this moment, when the latter are in dire need of financial support of their economic and social development, any measure that this Assembly could take to make available to them a portion of these huge sums of money spent on armaments would be welcome. Considering that the military expenditures of the great Powers account for a sizable amount of the \$200,000 million that

<sup>7</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session*, document A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2, p. 19.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>9</sup> See United Nations publication, Sales No. E.72.IX.16, para. 120 (3).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 110 (1).

are spent annually on armaments, it is obvious that the reduction by 10 per cent of their military budgets would release a large amount of money, which, if fairly allocated, would greatly assist the developing countries. In spite of the International Development Strategy, the gap between the more advanced countries and the developing countries is widening. It should be recalled that the goals of the Strategy included a more equal distribution of income and wealth and annual financial resource transfers from the richer countries to the poorer. The shortcomings of the Strategy make it imperative to assist the developing countries in many other ways that were not defined in the Strategy. We believe that the reduction by 10 per cent of military budgets is an acceptable way in so far as it would result in transfers of funds from the countries concerned to the developing countries. The Strategy declares that the average annual rate of growth in the gross product of the developing countries during the Decade should be at least 6 per cent while we note that these countries have grown at an annual rate of less than 4 per cent. We believe that the reduction of military budgets and the utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to the developing countries would greatly contribute to accelerating their growth. Of course there are many other ways to which we would resort to remedy the shortcomings of the Strategy. Some of them have been very ably presented to the Assembly by the Foreign Minister of Sierra Leone when he requested the inclusion in the agenda of this session of the item entitled "Reduction of the increasing gap between the developed countries and the developing countries" [A/9197].

60. While awaiting the report of the Second Committee on the proposals of Sierra Leone, it is appropriate that the Assembly should take up the concrete proposal submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. We realize, of course, that our consideration of this proposal will entail the difficult task of defining the size of the military budgets which we are supposed to reduce, but we trust that the countries concerned will reach an agreement without too much controversy, assuming that the information presently available to us is not sufficient. Generally speaking, we hope that the discussion of the item will not give rise to differences among the great Powers, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council. We urge that the paramount consideration to be kept in mind in tackling this item should be the benefits which the developing countries expect to derive from a positive and fruitful discussion.

61. In our policy statement we stress the importance of general and complete disarmament. That is why, in concluding, we should like to state that we welcome the reduction of military budgets by 10 per cent in so far as it also constitutes a genuine partial disarmament.

62. Mr. HOLLAI (Hungary): The Hungarian delegation whole-heartedly supports the proposal of the Soviet Union entitled "Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries", contained in document A/9191. We attach paramount importance to this Soviet initiative because:

"... if carried out correctly and with good will, it may give rise to favourable new occurrences in the fields of

disarmament, economic development and international political co-operation" [2144th meeting, para. 43]

as was pointed out by the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the general debate. We regard this proposal as a logical and important step in the efforts made by the Soviet Union to reduce international tensions and strengthen international peace and security by curbing the arms race.

63. The importance and timeliness of the Soviet proposal have been vindicated by the reception it has had so far. In the general debate on disarmament items, many delegations both in the General Assembly and in the First Committee have welcomed the Soviet initiative by expressing their interest in the reduction of military budgets and the conversion of savings thus made to development purposes. To mention only some of them, I wish to refer to the statements by the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Kuwait, Uganda and Yugoslavia in the First Committee and the further statement by the delegation of Brazil at this afternoon's meeting.

64. Efforts aimed at converting part of the military expenditures to peaceful uses to promote the economic growth and social progress of developing countries are not new in the United Nations. They have a long but, unfortunately, unsuccessful history.

65. Many relevant studies and resolutions have been drafted and adopted in and outside the United Nations. I should like to underline in this connexion the 1962 report of the Secretary-General entitled *Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament* and his 1971 report on the *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures*. Both reports have made an excellent contribution to a better understanding of the problems involved and the possibilities offered by the peaceful uses of the resources released by disarmament or by the reduction of military expenditures.

66. The Hungarian delegation fully agrees with the unanimous conclusion of the latter report stating:

"A substantial reduction in the military expenditures of all countries, particularly of those whose military expenditures are highest, should be brought about as soon as possible. The sooner concrete measures of disarmament, particularly of nuclear disarmament, are achieved, and the arms race is thereby halted and reversed, the faster will be the progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament."<sup>11</sup>

67. When discussing the initiative of the Soviet Union, I find it necessary to recall that the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution as far back as the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, recommending that the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and the United States reduce their military budgets by 10-15 per cent and that part of the savings be allocated to a fund for assistance to developing countries. Unfortunately, the draft did not receive the attention and support it deserved.

68. The Soviet Union has now taken the initiative again, but in a different international situation, one which is char-

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 120 (1).

acterized by détente. Many speakers before me have dealt with the causes, factors, results and limits of the present détente; so I do not think it necessary to refer to them now. What I should like to stress in this connexion is that the Soviet Union and the other States of the socialist community do their best to couple the political détente with a military one—which is the primary objective of the current negotiations in Vienna—in order to make the political détente more solid and durable. The Soviet proposal serves this lofty purpose.

69. I do not want to deal with all aspects of the proposal of the Soviet Union which was presented so eloquently by Ambassador Malik on 15 October [2154th meeting]. I should like to mention only some questions of paramount importance.

70. First of all, the Hungarian delegation would like to express its deep satisfaction that the proposal envisages a joint action of the five permanent members of the Security Council. In our opinion, this approach is logical and deserves the utmost attention in many respects. In this connexion I should like to point out only two basic facts: first, these five great Powers, the permanent members of the Security Council, bear primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and at the same time they are best suited for the purpose; secondly, as is well known, these Powers spend the most in the world on armament.

71. In order to strengthen the present and future role of the United Nations, we have to seek and find ways and means to promote co-operation among the members of the Security Council bearing primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as to help solve the problems of the developing countries. The correct implementation of this proposal could promote both purposes, which are of paramount importance for the favourable development of the international situation.

72. Past and recent experience has amply demonstrated the vital importance and necessity of joint action by the permanent members of the Security Council. The Hungarian delegation considers that the draft resolution submitted in document A/9191 paves the way for the amelioration of co-operation among these Powers in the field of disarmament by curbing the arms race. This purpose of the draft certainly calls for unlimited and unreserved support on the part of the General Assembly.

73. The realization of a collective reduction of the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council could lead to other positive changes in the international situation. Better understanding, lessening of tensions, amelioration of international relations and new steps in the field of disarmament could be the propitious consequences of this collective action. The co-operation of the five great Powers in this field could facilitate the preparation and the convening of the world disarmament conference which has the support of the overwhelming majority of Member States.

74. Another very important characteristic of the Soviet initiative is that it clearly reflects the close connexion between the strengthening of international security, disarm-

ament and the economic development of countries. This interrelationship already has been accentuated in the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security adopted during the twenty-fifth anniversary session of the General Assembly. Part of the resources saved by the 10 per cent reduction of the military budgets of the five permanent members of the Security Council could substantially increase international assistance in the development of the developing countries. The Soviet proposal pays special attention to those developing countries which suffered natural disasters. It says:

“The funds set aside for economic assistance to developing countries should be provided, in the first instance, to those Asian, African and Latin American countries which, because of major natural disasters that have occurred this year, particularly drought, have encountered serious difficulties in carrying out the most urgent economic and social projects.” [A/9191.]

It is to be hoped that the example of the five permanent members of the Security Council will be followed by other militarily important countries. Reduction of their military expenditures would create better conditions on a broader basis for the enlargement of international assistance aimed at facilitating the economic and social development of the developing countries.

75. In conclusion, I should like to reiterate the full support of the Hungarian delegation for the draft resolution contained in document A/L.701, and I urge the General Assembly to give its unreserved endorsement to it.

*Mr. Martínez Ordoñez (Honduras), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

76. Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (*translation from Russian*): As a result of the positive changes now occurring in international life, conditions are becoming favourable for the strengthening of the process of détente. Such a turn away from the “cold war” to peace and international co-operation fosters the strengthening in international relations of the principles of the peaceful coexistence of States with differing social systems and the solution of the acute problems of our time in the interests of all the world’s peoples. Thus life itself reveals the need to make the process of détente irreversible.

77. It is our view that, in the light of this, every constructive effort directed towards the limitation and halting of the arms race and towards the adoption of partial disarmament measures is of extreme importance to the cause of peace and international security.

78. It seems clear to us that it is precisely for the purpose of taking specific action in this field that the Soviet proposal concerning a reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the United Nations Security Council by 10 per cent and the utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to the developing countries has been placed before the twenty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

79. As is well known, the new Soviet initiative received wide support in the statements by many delegations as early as during the general political debate in the General Assem-



bly. The Soviet Union, a peace-loving socialist Power, made this timely proposal as an important and urgent matter, an act in which it was guided by a sincere desire to consolidate the positive trends in international life and to give the peoples of a wide range of States, including those of the developing countries, the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of the relaxation of international tension.

80. From this high rostrum, the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic would like once again to express its full support for the Soviet proposal. As the head of the Mongolian delegation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic, Mr. Rinchin, said on 26 September in the general debate at this session of the General Assembly:

"Our delegation considers this to be a most timely and constructive proposal. The translation of this new and important initiative into reality would be a practical step towards solving the problem of disarmament; it would enable additional resources to be allocated for constructive purposes; and it would permit the acceleration of economic progress in the developing countries." [2129th meeting, para. 45.]

81. The Mongolian delegation, together with the representatives of the other socialist States, has in the past in the United Nations repeatedly advocated the reduction of military budgets, the halting of the arms race, and the implementation of partial disarmament measures with a view to ultimately achieving general and complete disarmament.

82. In current conditions the question of disarmament is undoubtedly the most complex of all the problems of international relations. However, history demonstrates that, through the persistent and consistent efforts of States and on the basis of a sober and objective approach, tangible results can be achieved in this field, particularly with regard to the elaboration of partial measures, the practical implementation of which would further the cause of disarmament.

83. Thanks to the constructive and purposeful actions of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, and as a result of the active efforts of all peace-loving peoples and of the realistic approach of other States to the solution of urgent problems, major progress has been made towards curbing the arms race. Thus, for example, such international agreements as the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water<sup>12</sup> and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII)] have been concluded and have entered into force. International instruments are now in force which prohibit the emplacement of nuclear weapons in outer space and on the sea-bed and ocean floor. There is a convention which bans the production and use of biological weapons and calls for the destruction of stockpiles.<sup>13</sup> An important contribution towards saving mankind from thermonuclear disaster has been made by the Soviet-United States Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War.<sup>14</sup> This step will, in our view,

undoubtedly assist in achieving an understanding on further measures to curb the arms race. In addition, the talks being held between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on the limitation of strategic arms, together with the Vienna meetings and talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe, will also be of great significance in consolidating the positive changes in international life.

84. All this demonstrates that, given goodwill and joint efforts, it is possible to make real progress in the field of disarmament. Thus, for example, two great Powers—the USSR and the United States of America—have reached agreement on the basis of the principle of mutual security and will limit armaments. So why cannot the five permanent members of the Security Council reach a common opinion and take a similar step in this question? If a unanimous decision is taken in this matter, other States will undoubtedly have to follow suit.

85. In our opinion, conditions are now ripe for an appropriate decision by the General Assembly with regard to the Soviet proposal regarding agenda item 102 and for the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as States with a major economic and military potential, to proceed on the basis of that decision to take practical measures in this area.

86. The facts confirm that, against the background of the general improvement in the international climate, the outlines are clearly emerging of favourable opportunities which can be used to supplement the relaxation of tension in political relations by détente in military matters, leading to practical steps in terms of disarmament. And it is from this very standpoint that the Soviet proposal deserves special attention.

87. In welcoming the willingness of the Soviet Union to reduce its own military expenditure, the Mongolian delegation has emphasized that we are justified in expecting similar measures from the other permanent members of the Security Council; this is a prerequisite if the proposal is to be implemented. Our delegation has also emphasized that reduction of their military expenditure by the nuclear Powers would set a convincing example for other countries which have considerable economic and military potential, and would promote the further strengthening of trust and co-operation among States to the benefit of peace and the progress of peoples.

88. Our delegation attaches exceptional importance to the limitation and halting of the arms race and considers that only concrete measures in this area can serve as a real proof of the interrelationship between the process of disarmament and the process of development. And this view is reflected in a document issued by the General Assembly itself. I am referring here to the report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures which was prepared with the help of a group of experts appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General.<sup>15</sup> This document notes with complete justification the fact that the cessation of the arms race and a significant reduction of military expenditure would promote the social and eco-

<sup>12</sup> Signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963.

<sup>13</sup> Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex).

<sup>14</sup> Signed at Washington on 22 June 1973.

<sup>15</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No. E.72.IX.16.

economic development of all countries and would increase the opportunities for assistance to all the developing countries.

89. Naturally, the reduction of military expenditure will result in vast material benefits to all the States and peoples who bear the heavy burden of the arms race. The developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which have recently been confronted with great economic problems as a result of natural disasters, will receive as additional aid funds for the restoration and development of their economies. So far as the members of the Security Council and the other States which make such a reduction are concerned, they will have the opportunity to devote considerable resources to the goals of economic, scientific and technical, and cultural development.

90. But the point of the matter lies not only in material benefits. Implementation of the Soviet proposal would be of great benefit to the strengthening of the cause of peace and universal security, to the strengthening of trust and mutual understanding among peoples, and to the development of friendly co-operation among States.

91. We think that the objectives of the consistent implementation of the noble ideas in the Soviet proposal, which are in full accord with the lasting interests of the peoples of all countries and with their sincere desire to guarantee universal peace and social progress, would be served by the further expansion of the process of limiting and halting the arms race so that the process would involve an ever wider circle of States and new parts and regions of the globe.

92. At the same time, I am bound to mention that there is apparent in the Assembly a sceptical and, what is more, a negative attitude towards the question of limiting the arms race.

93. Those who speak out here against the limitation of the arms race, against disarmament, reflect the interests of the militarist circles which, in a criminal alliance with the military-industrial complex that is deriving fabulous profits from the manufacture of weapons of destruction, are fighting for an unbridled arms race, because they consider it a "fatal inevitability". They are speaking in the name of those who pay lip service to peace and disarmament while they in fact whip up military hysteria, calling upon the people to be ready for "famine and war".

94. Such an irresponsible approach to the crucial problem of our day justly deserves the condemnation of all peace-loving peoples, who have welcomed with relief and hope the major changes which have become apparent in the international arena.

95. The Mongolian People's Republic, as a peace-loving socialist State in Asia, has consistently favoured and continues to favour the practical implementation of specific measures aimed at strengthening the process of détente and at extending this phenomenon to the Asian continent in the interests of furthering the cause of peace and international security. Our Government firmly supports this line in its foreign policy, believing as it does that the breeding ground of military confrontation has not yet been eliminated from the Asian continent. In Asia, the peace-loving States, the forces of peace and progress continue to encounter the

aggressive actions of imperialism and of the forces associated with it.

96. In conclusion, the Mongolian delegation would like to emphasize that the Soviet proposal being discussed in the General Assembly represents a realistic programme of action aimed at the curbing of the arms race which swallows up vast human and material resources.

97. The delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic, in supporting the new Soviet initiative, associates itself with those delegations which have appealed to the General Assembly to take an appropriate decision on the matter in the interests of peace and the progress of peoples.

98. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): Since its creation, the United Nations has included in its agenda two problems—disarmament and development—and these are problems which the international community considers to be of the utmost significance for the future of mankind. Although major efforts are made to find a solution to these problems, and while year after year lengthy debates are devoted to these problems both in the General Assembly and in the specialized agencies which are entrusted with these matters, we must nevertheless recognize that the progress made in respect of each of these problems continues unfortunately to be minimal, without for that matter weakening the will of the United Nations and its Members to pursue their efforts in search of a successful outcome.

99. This is a reflection of the degree to which we are all aware of the vital need, in the interest of our peoples and of peace in the world, to succeed in achieving the aims that we have set for ourselves and which we restate at every session, both in the field of disarmament and in that of development.

100. In speaking both of disarmament and of development, I am certainly not in any way being original, because a link had been established long since between these two phenomena. It is not that they are indissolubly linked the one with the other, because we can equally well study each of these phenomena separately, and the pursuit of our studies on each of these problems should not be hampered by the inherent nature of the difficulties facing the other problem. But it is evident from the first glance that any progress achieved towards disarmament will release resources that could be used to promote development. What is more, disarmament and development are indivisible for the establishment of a lasting peace, in the sense that they help to counter the threats which are engendered either by the growth and perfecting of the means of military destruction or by the increasing gap between the levels and standards of living of peoples. Disarmament fosters détente in international relations and, in turn, détente creates a more propitious climate for the settlement of the problems of development. We should also emphasize that although disarmament was not conceived to support, at least partially, the efforts towards development, it would result in a worsening of the imbalance in the standards of living in the developed countries and the underdeveloped countries, and thus would not fully achieve the effect that one might expect in the introduction of a situation of détente in the world. It is obvious that the slow rate of progress which unfortunately we have witnessed in the past towards disarmament should in no case have repercussions on development, the pursuit of

which should continue separately, utilizing all available means. On the contrary, a disarmament that was not brought about in favour of development would lose at least part of its significance as an element contributing to international peace and security.

101. But we must recognize that these considerations, which everyone concedes are valid and which have been the subject of serious and technical studies, are not being reflected in practice. In the developed countries, military expenditures represent more than 30 times the amount of resources devoted to aid for development. The few measures aimed at partial disarmament which have been adopted do not seem to have had any impact on the volume of aid for development. This is an observation that we make without bitterness but that might serve to explain the scepticism into which we sometimes fall when people speak about the wisdom of the largest Powers and about the sincerity of their intentions.

102. The dangers that current stockpiles of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons represent are felt by all peoples, whether they be powerful or weak, because they are all equally exposed to these dangers. Therefore, it is not surprising that they should all be in favour of disarmament and that they should all be attentive to the progress made on the path towards disarmament. For the great Powers, the arms race mobilizes vast amounts of energy and incalculable resources that weigh heavily on their budgets. The military expenditures that they are compelled to bear result from the relations of force which exist between them and from their wish, which is completely understandable, to preserve their standing and to discourage any attempt at domination by any other Power. It is only through the establishment of a climate of confidence in their mutual relations that they will be able to consider the progressive reduction of their military expenditures. That is what is beginning to happen between the United States and the Soviet Union, which are negotiating simultaneous partial disarmament, but that will none the less preserve their situation of military superiority over other Powers. If this trend towards peaceful coexistence were to be strengthened, as we hope it will be, it may not be amiss to think that other disarmament measures involving the other great Powers could also be put into effect in order to fit these measures into the perspective of general and complete disarmament, which remains the ultimate objective.

103. But the conflicts that break out in the regions of the third world compel the under-developed countries, in their turn, to devote part of their resources to military expenditures. The burden which these military expenditures represent for them is even more intolerable, for they obviously are vitally in need of devoting all of their wealth to fighting against under-development. There is no doubt whatsoever that that would be the case if the disputes in which they find themselves involved, and which are often imposed on them by an international order which lies beyond their control, could be settled in a satisfactory and lasting manner. For the countries of the third world, the problem of disarmament is therefore linked to the problem of the recognition of their rights, their freedom and their sovereignty, and it is clear that the realization of this goal is a function of the capacity of the international community to do justice to these peo-

ples and to impose an order founded on right and not on might.

104. Thus, disarmament is a concern to all peoples who see in disarmament the guarantee of true détente and the restoration of the primacy of right over might. The same cannot be said of development, which is primarily the concern of the countries of the third world. It is they who suffer directly from under-development and who are fighting desperately to improve the economic and social conditions of their peoples. The prosperity enjoyed by the richest countries may perhaps not allow them to form a precise judgement of the distress in which the peoples who represent the largest portion of humanity live. They are probably aware of their suffering and the injustice of their situation. They are desirous of expressing praiseworthy humanitarian feelings to them and of coming to their aid in an upsurge of solidarity which does them honour. But in the situation of these peoples, they do not discern any immediate threat to their security and that perhaps explains the relatively less interest that they devote to the problem of development. They are probably wrong in so doing, first of all because most of them bear a considerable share of the responsibility for the current state of under-development of the countries of the third world which, when placed under their domination, sometimes for centuries, were deliberately kept in a state of backwardness which encouraged their exploitation. What is more, it is the resources of these countries of the third world which, subjugated to colonial exploitation, have made possible the enrichment and development of many countries which today are highly industrialized. Lastly, it is obvious that the maintenance of such a vast gap between the standards of living of the rich peoples and the poor peoples, the persistence of inequality in the distribution of wealth and the perpetuation of an economic order characterized by injustice which tends to accentuate the gap, are just so many threats against international balance and against world peace.

105. Therefore, we can never over-emphasize the fact that if it is necessary to work towards the realization of disarmament, it is even more important, and perhaps even more urgent, to foster development by fighting, first of all, against under-development. That is why we take a favourable view of the proposal presented by the Soviet Union, recommending a reduction of 10 per cent in the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council and the utilization of the resources thus released to provide aid to the developing countries.

106. We are not blind to the short-comings of this proposal, and some of the criticisms made of the text are undoubtedly well founded. The first weakness in the text is that it requires the agreement of all the permanent members of the Security Council, which will certainly be difficult to attain. The technical difficulties which will be encountered in putting it into effective application represent another type of difficulty. Finally, the share that it allocates to the developing countries from the total of resources released is excessively modest.

107. But this proposal represents a concrete attempt to act in favour of both disarmament and development. In any event, it goes along the lines of one of the recommendations of the group of experts which was asked to study the eco-

conomic and social consequences of disarmament, which states the following in its report of 1972:

“ . . . that a 20 per cent general reduction in military expenditures, for example, would contribute not only to the satisfaction of urgent economic needs of both developed and developing countries, but also to the reduction of the economic gap between the two groups if such developmental assistance were raised globally in the same proportion or slightly more.”<sup>16</sup>

108. The step proposed by the Soviet Union should make it possible to come closer to this objective, if it were applied with the sincere desire of reaching a further stage towards more general disarmament and of providing larger resources for the struggle against underdevelopment.

<sup>16</sup> See United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.IX.1, para. 34.

We therefore will give this proposal our full support, as we would also give our full support to any suggestion that would respond to our two-fold concern of reducing military expenditures and increasing resources devoted to development.

109. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Before adjourning this meeting, I should like to remind representatives that, as announced earlier, the list of speakers on agenda item 102 will be closed tomorrow at 6 p.m. As I hear no objection, I take it that the General Assembly agrees.

*It was so decided.*

*The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.*