

United Nations  
**GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY**

TWENTY-SIXTH SESSION

Official Records



**1996th  
PLENARY MEETING**

Friday, 26 November 1971,  
at 3 p.m.

NEW YORK

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**President: Mr. Adam MALIK (Indonesia).**

AGENDA ITEM 24

**Celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations: report of the Committee for the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations**

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the Rapporteur of the Committee for the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations, Mr. Migliuolo, of Italy, to introduce the report of the Committee [A/8425].

2. Mr. MIGLIUOLO (Italy), Rapporteur of the Committee for the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations: The report of the Committee for the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations that I have the honour to present today to the General Assembly has been the object of close scrutiny in the course of a number of meetings of that Committee. The report is composed of a summary of the activities of the Committee during this past year as well as a detailed and accurate description of the various initiatives implemented, either within the United Nations or outside its framework, for the commemoration of the silver jubilee of the world Organization. Being factual in its essence and the result of lengthy consideration by the Committee, the document hardly needs any introduction or explanation. However, I feel it my duty to stress that, behind the concise, bureaucratic and therefore somewhat arid language of the report, lies the constructive work and the persistent and earnest efforts of members of the Committee, who have tried to implement fully the mandate entrusted to them in the light of:

“...the generally shared feeling in the Preparatory Committee that the anniversary should be an occasion to strengthen the Organization and make it more effective by reaffirming the faith of Governments and peoples in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and renewing their endeavours ‘to maintain international peace and security . . . to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . . and to achieve international co-operation in solving inter-

national problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’.”<sup>1</sup>

3. In that spirit, many Governments made suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations. They did so either in reply to the note of the Secretary-General of 14 February 1969 asking for their suggestions on ways of commemorating the anniversary or in statements made by their most authoritative spokesmen during the commemorative session and at the twenty-fifth session as a whole. The general membership will note from the concluding paragraph of the report that, while the Committee took cognizance of those suggestions in accordance with its mandate under paragraph 5 (c) of resolution 2499 (XXIV), time did not permit detailed consideration of all of them.

4. The PRESIDENT: The Chairman of the Committee for the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations, Mr. Akwei of Ghana, wishes to make a brief statement.

5. Mr. AKWEI (Ghana): As Chairman of the Committee for the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations whose report is now under consideration, I should like to take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to the Rapporteur, Mr. Migliuolo of the Italian delegation, for his accurate, succinct and lucid introduction of the Committee's report contained in document A/8425. Mr. Migliuolo's high sense of duty, his unfailing loyalty and his ready co-operation were of invaluable assistance to me. I should like also to pay a special tribute to the officers of the Committee with whom I was privileged to work so closely: Mr. Tarabanov and Mrs. Gavrilova of the Bulgarian delegation, Mr. Thompson and Miss Jardim of the Guyana delegation and Mr. Sen of India. These distinguished colleagues brought to their work a richness of experience, a spirit of conciliation and constructive counsel which greatly facilitated and enhanced the work of the Committee. Lastly, permit me to thank all the members of the Committee who co-operated so strenuously and so patiently in discharging the functions entrusted to us by the General Assembly. For me it was a most rewarding and satisfying experience, despite the difficult and controversial nature of some of the subjects that the Committee had to grapple with. Through co-operation, restraint and a spirit of accommodation we were able as a Committee to reach agreements on the basis of consensus.

6. I am sure it has not escaped the attention of delegations that the report under consideration is one of the shortest

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 25, document A/7690, para. 28.

ever to come before the General Assembly. Yet this will not conceal from those who know the difficulties that faced the Committee and the positive nature of the results of its work. The Committee was set up at the twenty-fourth session in connexion with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations. It had three specific tasks: to draw up and co-ordinate plans for the anniversary; to organize suitable activities for the anniversary by the United Nations; and to consider proposals and suggestions, in relation to the anniversary, for increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations.

7. The general spirit of the time, which was reflected in much of the Committee's work, was to make of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations an occasion not merely for ceremony, rejoicing and celebration—legitimate as these were—but, more important, for taking stock of the general situation of the Organization, rededicating ourselves to its ideals and considering how best to strengthen it and make it more effective in facing up to the tasks of the future. It was that mood which found eloquent expression in the theme adopted for the anniversary: "Peace, justice and progress".

8. To that end the commemorative session was organized, with the co-operation of the anniversary Committee, from 14 to 24 October 1970 to bring together in solemn assembly as many of the world's leaders as possible and to adopt important documents to guide the future work of the Organization in its major fields.

9. It was, therefore, a matter of satisfaction to know that as many as 44 Heads of State and Government were able to attend this solemn commemorative session, as well as two Vice-Presidents, four Deputy Prime Ministers, 92 Foreign Ministers and a number of special envoys representing their Heads of State and Government. The solemnity of the occasion was matched by the importance of the documents adopted then by the General Assembly, namely, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [*resolution 2625 (XXV)*], the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade [*resolution 2626 (XXV)*] and the Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations [*resolution 2627 (XXV)*]. Of equal importance were the programme of action for the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [*resolution 2621 (XXV)*] and the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [*resolution 2734 (XXV)*] adopted during the twenty-fifth session. By these blueprints, important milestones were marked out to guide the international community in giving effect to the basic purposes of the United Nations in the fields of international peace and security, inter-State relations, world economic and social development, decolonization and racial harmony. It is now for States to reflect these guidelines in their day-to-day policies and actions.

10. In this respect, the organizing of the World Youth Assembly can be regarded as one of the important achievements of the anniversary Committee. For the first time, the youth of the world—the whole world—who form

more than half of the world's population, were invited to indicate the lines on which they would wish to co-operate with the United Nations and help it solve the many problems confronting it. That was the most significant feature of the anniversary, for the message and reports resulting from this Assembly on the questions of world peace, development, education and environment are an important contribution to the work of the Organization. As the Secretary-General, U Thant, said, the United Nations will never be the same again after the World Youth Assembly.

11. Mention should also be made of the important ceremonial meeting held on 26 June 1970 in San Francisco and organized by that City. That as well as other events organized through the kindness of the city authorities were an inspiring reminder to us all of the historic origins of the world Organization and of the message of hope which went out in 1945 with the signing of the Charter of the United Nations. The report also describes the many important activities taken by the Organization and its specialized agencies on the recommendation of the anniversary Committee—activities such as the issue of commemorative stamps and medals, the organization of public celebrations, exhibitions, symposia and colloquia and the publication of booklets and distribution of films and television programmes by the Office of Public Information, which were all designed to intensify public knowledge of and interest in the United Nations.

12. Equally important in the report is the chapter on the commemoration of the anniversary at the national level. Details may be found in the archives of the Secretariat, and it should be a matter of satisfaction that so many Member States were able to organize appropriate national activities such as special parliamentary sessions, radio, television and press programmes, seminars, studies, publications, lectures, symposia and debates, as well as sports competitions for the purpose of deepening popular involvement and interest in the work of the United Nations.

13. Highly commendable also is the positive result of the appeal launched by the General Assembly for increased ratification and accession of various international instruments which have been adopted, endorsed or supported by the United Nations [*see resolution 2499 A (XXIV)*]. Let us hope that more States will respond to this appeal in order to widen the basis of a truly international legal order.

14. There was, however, one aspect of the work of the Committee which was not completed to the satisfaction of some. As stated in chapter XII of the report, the Committee was not able to give detailed consideration to all the many useful suggestions and proposals which were made during the twenty-fifth session and to the anniversary Committee on how best to strengthen the United Nations and make it more effective. A considerable number of these proposals, ranging over many fields of the whole United Nations system, were indeed very interesting and far-reaching and could well benefit the future work of the Organization. It is regrettable, therefore, that their detailed consideration was not possible because of lack of time. It would be for the Assembly to decide how best to deal with this matter, if it should wish to do so. It is worthy of note, however, that some of these suggestions are being con-

sidered currently by existing organs or Committees of the United Nations. The report of the Special Committee on the Rationalization of the Procedures and Organization of the General Assembly [A/8426] is one such result.

15. Let me say in conclusion how very much all the members of the anniversary Committee appreciated the continued interest, assistance and inspiration received from the Secretary-General, U Thant, in the course of the Committee's work. Without his support and the assistance of his officers in the Secretariat, our work would not have been as successful as we hope it was. I should like also to pay a special tribute here to the Secretaries of the Committee, especially Mr. Akashi, who served the Committee with such constancy and devotion.

16. The twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations was observed, indeed, as a historic and solemn occasion and as the harbinger of a new era. Significant decisions were taken which could now form the basis of a renewed dedication to advance the ideals of peace, justice and progress. It is now for Member States to strive to give effect to these decisions, if hope and confidence in the Organization for the next decade are to be sustained.

17. The PRESIDENT: I wish to express the appreciation of the General Assembly and the personal thanks of the President to the Chairman and members of the Committee for the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations for the successful organization of the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

18. If no one wishes to speak, I shall take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to take note of the report contained in document A/8425.

*It was so decided.*

19. The PRESIDENT: We have thus concluded our consideration of agenda item 24.

## AGENDA ITEM 97

### World Disarmament Conference (*continued*)

20. Mr. PEREZ DE CUELLAR (Peru) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Peruvian delegation considers the study at the present session of the question of convening a world disarmament conference extremely interesting. The important initiative taken by the Soviet Union has gained even further importance with the effective presence of China in the Organization, since now the five Powers with the greatest war potential in the world and that possess nuclear weapons are all Members of the United Nations. As permanent members of the Security Council, those Powers do have an outstanding role to play in the maintenance of international peace and security. Since the time of the explosion of the first atomic bomb better conditions have never existed than those which at present prevail, for a total abolition of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

21. We believe that we should not turn a sceptical eye on the possibility of a world disarmament conference merely for reasons of method. We know without doubt that the

success of such a conference must depend, in the final analysis, on the political will of a few States, and that at first sight it might appear more expedient to continue negotiations on a more restricted scale. However, as many have pointed out from this rostrum, the progress achieved by the Geneva Committee on Disarmament since its creation has been meagre; it has limited itself to collateral aspects which cannot, even by the utmost stretch of the imagination, be considered as disarmament measures.

22. In point of fact, the partial test-ban Treaty, known as the Moscow Treaty,<sup>2</sup> is severely limited, since two of the nuclear Powers have failed to subscribe to it. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] suffers from the same limitation and seems more oriented to a freezing of the nuclear *status quo* than to non-proliferation, since it does not offer simultaneous safeguards to the non-nuclear-weapon States. With regard to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof [*resolution 2660 (XXV), annex*], it applies only beyond the 12-mile coastal limit; and apart from not being a disarmament measure—since we have been told that when the Treaty was opened for signature there were no such weapons in that area—it is also not a measure to limit or control armaments. Furthermore, it is a dangerous measure, for it tacitly permits the establishment of devices where, supposedly, they had not existed earlier—that is to say, between the coastline and the 12-mile limit. Then, too, the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [*A/8457, annex A*], submitted for consideration at the present session of the General Assembly by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, has been achieved thanks only to prior unilateral decisions adopted by the Powers that do possess such weapons.

23. Outside Geneva, the Soviet Union and the United States are holding their Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—known as SALT—yet these deal only with the limitation of strategic weapons—that is to say, with doing away with the “over-overkill”; and nothing has been said regarding the possible destruction of stockpiles and the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

24. In the light of these results, which represent the experience of the last 25 years, the concept that negotiations for effective disarmament could prosper within a more restricted atmosphere falls by the wayside.

25. My delegation in no way wishes to under-estimate the work of the Geneva Committee; *faute de mieux*, our position on some of the instruments set up there has been one of open support. But the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament does not seem to have the right structure to allow a mediating and effective role to be played by those of its members which are not nuclear-weapon States or military allies of the super-Powers—and we cannot forget the problems raised by France's non-participation.

<sup>2</sup> Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

26. That is why it is necessary for us, through a body that has the moral and political authority of universality, to breathe new life into the timid negotiations that are taking place at present and that have only just approached what is conceptually considered disarmament. We believe that a world disarmament conference that brought together all countries affected by the arms race, particularly the nuclear ones, and not only those Powers interested in preserving a balance of terror, would give new impetus to this primary task of our Organization. What we are asking for is that a chance be given to countries capable of contributing, perhaps fundamentally, to do so on an equal footing with those that are at present members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

27. Moreover, we should bear very much in mind the tremendous obstacle to development constituted by the immense squandering of resources on weapons—particularly nuclear weapons—that was brought out in the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade [*resolution 2626 (XXV)*], a document that was approved by the Assembly last year and reiterated at the second ministerial meeting of the "Group of 77",<sup>3</sup> where the developing countries, which are the ones most directly affected by the spiral of expenditures on that type of armament, stressed the matter.

28. My delegation therefore feels that we have to create an atmosphere of credibility and confidence through effective proof of a will to disarm, particularly on the part of the nuclear Powers. And what more convincing proof than legal commitments regarding nuclear-free zones and the immediate and unconditional discontinuance of nuclear tests in all environments?

29. With a desire to encourage and not to hamper, to widen and not to restrict, Peru therefore supports the idea of holding a world disarmament conference.

30. However, it would be lamentable were we to fall into the error of 1965, when the General Assembly endorsed the initiative of the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in 1964 and approved a resolution which took up the idea of calling a disarmament conference on a world-wide level but left it to the individual initiative of States, by failing to create effective preparatory machinery. If a conference is truly desired, this time, the Assembly should itself create *ad hoc* preparatory machinery and at the same time urge the nuclear Powers, through individual or collective measures, to encourage and ensure success for the conference.

31. Since we venture to hope that there will be a true will for disarmament and a determination on the part of the great Powers to create an atmosphere conducive to it, and since at the same time we believe that this General Assembly may decide to call such a world conference, under the auspices of the United Nations and as universal as possible, let us endeavour to adopt the concrete measures that will make it a living body, and let us not limit ourselves to expressing just one more pious hope and formulating another vague and vain promise.

32. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): A world disarmament conference at the present juncture in United Nations history seems to my delegation eminently appropriate and necessary. We are thus thankful to the delegation of the Soviet Union for its initiative in including this item in the agenda [*A/8491*]. The United Nations has embarked on the Disarmament Decade, which in itself calls for a new and more effective move towards achieving the main objectives of disarmament. And there is also at the present moment a significant development towards universality for the United Nations: the presence in our midst of the People's Republic of China. We express the hope that a spirit of positivism, understanding and co-operation may eventually emerge in our deliberations.

33. The essential meaning and purport of a world disarmament conference would be to bring a new approach to the problem of disarmament and its close interconnexion with other problems and a new impetus to the whole effort. The conference should take a sober look at the road travelled so far in the disarmament effort and at the procedures adopted with a view to making the effort more meaningfully effective.

34. When our basic disarmament resolution was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly twelve years ago [*resolution 1378 (XIV)*] and was coupled with the agreement between the nuclear Powers on the principles of disarmament,<sup>4</sup> the hopes and expectations of an anxious humanity were not unnaturally aroused. Regrettably, however, in the ensuing negotiations not only has practically nothing been achieved towards eliminating, reducing or limiting the production and development of nuclear weapons—which was the main objective of that resolution—but the reverse situation has prevailed. For while the disarmament talks were being unproductively conducted, at the same time—as though to counteract the disarmament effort—the arms race was continuously and uninterruptedly pursued, even at an increased tempo. A comparison of the figures on nuclear armaments between 1961 and 1971 graphically illustrates the road we have travelled and where that road leads. The land-based inter-continental ballistic missiles, which numbered only 30 in 1961, increased to 2,600 in 1971. If submarine missiles are included, the figure becomes 3,500 inter-continental ballistic missiles. The world expenditure on armaments rose from \$97,000 million in 1960 to \$204,000 million in 1970. The stockpiling of megatons rose from 6,000 in 1960 to 320,000 in 1968 and is still continuing on an upward course.

35. Now, could such an accumulation of weapons—sufficient to destroy all life on earth, according to the Secretary-General's report on the consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security [*A/8469*—be needed as a deterrent? This wasteful competition for more and more over-kill capacity seems utterly senseless from every point of view, and so is the continuous testing of new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons of global destruction.

36. We do not in the least underrate the benefit derived from the important collateral or partial measures that have

<sup>4</sup> Joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879).

<sup>3</sup> Held at Lima, Peru, from 25 October to 5 November 1971.



been achieved in the last decade with a view to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to peripheral areas or their proliferation to non-nuclear States. And we fully appreciate the dedicated efforts exerted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for their achievement. In particular, the partial test-ban Treaty has been a most significant step towards checking the grave dangers to human life from further radio-active contamination of the atmosphere. As a disarmament measure, however, this Treaty has been of little avail. By leaving the field of underground testing wide open, it has had no impact on the arms race. Indeed, by far the largest number of nuclear test explosions have taken place since the partial test-ban Treaty came into force. So long, therefore, as the arms race not only remains wholly unaffected but continually escalates, negating and destroying all efforts at disarmament, something more effective has to be done to halt it and to reverse the present ominous drifting before it is too late.

37. Besides the dangers and hazards and the economic drain involved in the arms race, such continued preparation for war is not without its psychological effects. By creating a war psychology, it brings a spirit of conflict and unrest, insecurity and uneasiness into the world that is not the best counsel for peace. In consequence, competitive arming becomes more generalized. Thus the developing countries have increased their military budgets at the expense of their economic development to such an extent that, as the representative of France, Ambassador Kosciuszko-Morizet, has very pertinently remarked, their total expenditure on armaments is now "almost double the public aid that these countries receive" [1989th meeting, para. 15].

38. The greatest wish of the world's peoples is for relief from the crushing and useless burden of armaments so that they can devote their time and energy and the world's resources to the improvement of life and to the safeguarding of what has come to be known as our plundered planet. Future generations will find it hard to comprehend why so large and irreplaceable a part of the precious resources of this earth are diverted to such totally useless and destructive ends as the armaments race without anything being done over the years to put a stop to it.

39. In thus commenting on the lack of a curb on armaments, we are by no means questioning either the effort or the integrity with which the relevant task has been invested. It seems, however, as though the nuclear Powers are locked in an irreversible process—a process of armament from which there is no escape and no way for them to extricate themselves.

40. Under the aegis of a world disarmament conference, a determined effort could be made to help the nuclear Powers to extricate themselves from this apocalyptic arms race. The arms race is a process that the nuclear Powers themselves fully condemn, while at the same time they feverishly engage in it and are incapable of interrupting it. We recognize that they have earnestly tried to interrupt it and are still trying, but it seems as though the arms race has its own self-reinforcing characteristics, its own irresistible momentum that cannot easily be overcome. Thus the machinery of spiralling armaments seems now to be edging towards the point of uncontrollability.

41. Even the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), on which mankind has pinned so many hopes, now seem almost in danger of being submerged under an avalanche of weapons, as a result of an accelerated arms race in the deployment of more anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Yet the prevention of just such further deployment was the very object of the talks. As a *New York Times* editorial of 21 November pointed out, "So far, instead of curbing the nuclear missile race, the talks seem to have stimulated it". Such unrelenting competition in nuclear armaments in preparation for a war that we all know can never be, involving as it must mutual suicide and global destruction, seems to us utterly incomprehensible.

42. We believe that the talks must be saved now. They must be extricated from the clutches of the arms race. Therefore, in all modesty and earnestness we appeal to the two super-Powers to agree, while there is still time, to a moratorium—a halt in the further testing and deployment of nuclear weapons, at least during the period in which the arms limitation negotiations are pending, so that the progress achieved may not be lost and the talks may be allowed to proceed to fruition and yield their positive and anxiously-awaited results.

43. The general benefit to the international community of such a halt in the arms race is incalculable. Its significant impact on world developments in all fields cannot be too strongly emphasized. And the present circumstances are favourable. There is a climate of *détente* and East-West rapprochement, enhanced by the German agreements and the expected European security conference, all of which militate against losing the present opportunity to reach agreement in the talks.

44. But if this vicious circle of the nuclear arms race cannot be broken from within, then perhaps the people of the world at large, who stand to become its victims, may help to break it. Their determined, dedicated and concerted will for survival, channelled and focused through a world disarmament conference, may raise the human effort to a completely new level of achievement.

45. The proposed world disarmament conference must focus its primary and main efforts on the cessation of the arms race—should it still be continued. Halting the arms race is the key to the solution of the whole disarmament problem. It is this that will release resources for development. It is this that will create a more peaceful climate in the world.

46. I agree with previous speakers that the conference must be universal. All States must be able to participate, whether they are at present members of the United Nations or not, if the disarmament effort is to have the sanction and support of the peoples of the world. Disarmament is a matter that concerns all nations and peoples without exception. All should be convened to meet the unprecedented challenge of common dangers and common needs.

47. We support the principle of equal interest in disarmament by all States, nuclear or non-nuclear, big or small; for indeed, the consequences of armament affect all of them equally. As the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador

Mojsov, pointed out in his statement, the non-aligned countries feel that "Conditions should be created for the equitable participation of all States in every phase [of the disarmament negotiations]". [1987th meeting, para. 40.]

48. It is also my delegation's conviction that the conference, and any other disarmament forum existing at present or to be created, must be organically related to the United Nations, which is ultimately charged with the responsibility for world disarmament and for the maintenance of international peace and security. Any attempt to set up the conference outside the framework of the United Nations would result in parallelism, contradiction and diffusion of efforts.

49. Various proposals have been made both this year and in past years on the nature of the conference itself. We believe that the world disarmament conference must review all aspects of the world's arms burden. The agenda for the conference must be the full range of disarmament topics and related economic issues. In this connexion we endorse the suggestion made by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal [1989th meeting] that the comprehensive programme of disarmament commended by the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session in resolution 2661 C (XXV) and brought to the attention of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, would serve admirably as the agenda and framework for the planned conference. In particular, I should like to draw attention to section IV of that programme, dealing with peace-keeping and security, which points out that "there is a close interrelationship among disarmament, international security, peaceful settlement of disputes and a climate of confidence."<sup>5</sup> In this connexion it is not premature to sound a note of caution. Disarmament cannot, of course, occur in a vacuum, not even a controlled vacuum. If disarmament is finally to take place, it must be within a context in which attention is given to the development of the peace-making capabilities of our Organization; in other words, in a context in which the institutions of a world legal order and international security as envisaged in the Charter become effective.

50. A conference of the importance and scale proposed must be carefully prepared to take adequate account of the view of all States and to establish the appropriate timing and agenda. The suggestion that the Disarmament Commission be convened and charged with the task of appointing a small but widely representative preparatory committee may have some merit. We, however, favour and endorse the suggestion of the representative of Egypt, Ambassador El-Zayyat [1985th meeting] that the Assembly approve the convening of a world disarmament conference in principle, and direct the Secretary-General to undertake consultations as regards the modalities of the conference. Prior consultations with the nuclear Powers is of utmost importance, and the participation in the conference of all nuclear Powers is, of course, indispensable.

51. In this connexion it may be pointed out that, while a conference such as the one envisaged can provide a broad context, perspective and new direction, actual negotiations, as experience has shown, are much more fruitfully con-

ducted in a smaller body, like the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The expertise and valuable procedures of that body should be conserved. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, reorganized as appropriate, should continue its effort towards bringing to completion the partial treaties, namely, through a comprehensive test ban, a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed.

52. Cyprus, in its interventions in the United Nations over the years, has expressed its profound concern about the rising tide of armaments and the escalating arms race and its dedication to the principles and purposes of the United Nations and the strengthening of the Organization as an instrument of peace and security in the world. In this sense and for reasons already stated, we look forward to the world disarmament conference. We do not propose to speculate how far it may be successful but we know it can succeed if there is faith, dedication and inspired purpose.

53. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): The position of Pakistan on the question of convening a world disarmament conference of all States has been a positive and consistent one. In 1957 the Pakistan delegation voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 1011 (XI), which invited the Disarmament Commission to consider the desirability of convening a general conference on disarmament. Again in 1965 we voted in favour of resolution 2030 (XX) in favour of a world disarmament conference to be convened not later than 1967, to which all countries would be invited.

54. There should therefore be no doubt about the position of my delegation in this regard. In principle we welcome any proposal for a conference of all countries of the world, nuclear and non-nuclear, to give a new impetus to disarmament negotiations and to the strengthening of the security of all States in the nuclear era.

55. All the delegations which have so far spoken in this debate on the Soviet proposal, including the delegation of the People's Republic of China, have expressed themselves in favour of the idea of convening a world disarmament conference of all States. But we submit that, as other delegations have also pointed out, more is required than an agreement in principle if such concrete questions as the agenda and timing of the conference are to be decided, and we consider that this should be taken into account in any proposal to convene a conference, and the two aspects—namely the decision to convene the conference and the question of the agenda and timing—should not be separated.

56. Wide-ranging and intensive consultations among all Member States have to be carried out if the necessary conditions for the success of the conference are to obtain. Any premature decision by the General Assembly is likely to lead to a repetition of our experience since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2030 (XX) six years ago. If consultations pursuant to that resolution ever did take place with a view to convening the conference not more than two years after its adoption, they only revealed disagreements so profound that the decision of the General Assembly could not be implemented. The Pakistan delegation therefore supports the view that further consultations

<sup>5</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970*, document DC/233, annex C, sect. 42.

are necessary before we can be called upon to decide on convening a world disarmament conference.

57. As I have said before, a decision in this regard cannot be divorced from, but must remain linked to, its agenda and its timing. To take a decision which in effect would do little more than repeat General Assembly resolution 2030 (XX) would hardly constitute a significant step towards its realization.

58. Proceeding from the assumption that a decision to convene a conference must take into account the present possibilities of reaching agreement on its agenda and also whether the present timing is appropriate, we note that the Soviet proposal [*A/L.631 and Add.1*] does envisage the possibility of according priority to the prohibition and elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, their production and their use. This subject by itself comprises an almost intractable complex of disarmament problems which would fully preoccupy a first world disarmament conference. We would like, therefore, to see the agenda confined to this item alone. It should not be made coextensive with the whole range of disarmament problems, including other weapons of mass destruction and the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. These other questions can form the subject matter of subsequent conferences, assuming that our experience of the first is sufficiently encouraging for repeating them.

59. The question of the prohibition and destruction of other weapons of mass destruction such as biological and chemical weapons is under consideration by the General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and should have been successfully resolved by the time a conference is convened.

60. As for the question of general and complete disarmament, we do not think it would be practicable to take it up simultaneously with the question of nuclear disarmament. A world conference, irrespective of the level at which it is held, cannot be in permanent session. Since the Soviet Union itself recognizes that, as Mr. Malik pointed out [*1978th meeting*], the whole great complex of disarmament problems would require periodic world meetings over a long period of time, no constructive purpose will be served by trying to provide at this initial stage that the question of general and complete disarmament should also be taken up at the first world conference.

61. To say this is not to ignore the thesis that measures of conventional disarmament must be drawn up and put into effect simultaneously by many States to counterbalance the disequilibrium which nuclear disarmament might involve. We are fully conscious of the joint statement of agreed principles on disarmament negotiations, within the framework of which negotiations must proceed to make general and complete disarmament a reality. But those principles were agreed upon a decade ago and since then the United States and the Soviet Union have multiplied their nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and brought about qualitative changes which have resulted in an effective duopoly which cannot be broken by the other nuclear-weapon Powers in the near future.

62. We submit that no violence could be done to the principle of equilibrium and the simultaneous implementa-

tion of nuclear and conventional disarmament measures if the United States and the Soviet Union were to begin to reduce the weapons systems that they have accumulated during the last 10 years down to the levels that obtained between them when the joint statement of principles was drawn up 10 years ago. Once the levels of 1961 or 1960 are reached, the principle of equilibrium between nuclear disarmament measures and reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments could be strictly observed. The setting of such an example by the two Powers should effectively serve to dispel the fear of monopolies and hegemonies without affecting their security—that is, the security of the Soviet Union and the United States.

63. The Pakistan delegation is, therefore, of the view that the agenda of the first world disarmament conference should be confined to the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Even if so restricted, the scope of the agenda would be so vast as to be likely to pose a most formidable challenge to the attainment of that goal. In fact, if the conference could just bring about agreement on a convention to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones, and among nuclear-weapon countries themselves, my delegation would consider that it had taken a historic step towards strengthening international security in the nuclear era.

64. So much for the agenda of the conference in question, if we are to satisfy the condition that the conference should have a clear aim.

65. In regard to the question of timing, this should obviously be determined on the basis of the existence of a predisposition on the part of the major Powers to reach agreement on an agenda. We cannot say that there is at present unanimity on the proposal put forward by the Soviet Union at past sessions of the General Assembly to conclude a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. It is our earnest hope that the favourable political developments in Europe in recent months, which have opened up the possibility of discussions on European security and mutual and balanced force reductions, as well as the outcome of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, will induce those who are still unwilling to do so to reappraise their attitude and to agree to the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. But until indications are given to us that they would be willing to reappraise their attitude, then the question of the timing of the conference becomes crucial to any decision at this session of the General Assembly. So until such time as these Powers are prepared to contemplate a change in their present attitude—which is that they are not ready to accept a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons—we think that it would be premature to contemplate deadlines for convening a conference.

66. Whatever the outcome of this debate, the Pakistan delegation, for one, considers it to have been a useful one, because for the first time the voice of the people of China, who constitute nearly a quarter of the human race, has been heard in this Assembly of nations on the question of disarmament. Our deliberations have thus acquired a new context and a new dimension. We believe that the statement of the Chairman of the delegation of the People's

Republic of China [1995th meeting] contains many positive elements that should not be ignored. They call for serious consideration. These positive elements are first, that China is in favour of convening a conference of all countries of the world to discuss disarmament. Secondly, this conference must have a clear aim—that is, to discuss the question of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Thirdly, as a first step, a solemn agreement should be reached on the non-use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones. Fourthly, China is willing to discuss the question of the level at which the conference should be held, and also whether it should be convened inside or outside the United Nations.

67. Since I have already mentioned the views of my delegation on the agenda or aim of the conference, I need comment only on the question of non-use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan welcomes the stand of the People's Republic of China that nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones. At the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States held at Geneva in 1968, there was near-unanimity on this issue. But all our efforts to formulate an undertaking which would be acceptable to the United States and the Soviet Union failed because nuclear weapons exist in the territories of some non-nuclear-weapon States. At the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States we were divided on the question whether countries so circumstanced should be given immunity against nuclear attack or not. Is it not time now that all of us renewed our efforts to find a formula which would be acceptable to the nuclear-weapon Powers concerned, and also to the non-nuclear-weapon countries?

68. Another important statement made by China in this debate was that at no time and in no circumstances would China be the first to use nuclear weapons. It is noteworthy that this undertaking has been given to the world by China without insisting on any reciprocal obligation on the part of the other nuclear-weapon Powers. China has therefore made an important contribution to the strengthening of security in Asia.

69. Turning to the other prerequisite laid down by China, namely that nuclear-weapon States should dismantle all their nuclear bases abroad and withdraw all their nuclear weapons and means of delivery from outside their own territories, it occurs to us that somewhat similar proposals have been put forward in the United Nations before. I refer to the proposals for the dismantling of foreign military bases. In themselves, therefore, such proposals do not constitute a negative element. All nations, large and small, are bedevilled by security problems of their own, and China is no exception in this regard. In view of the importance of the problem, all of us are called upon to take into account such concerns, no matter from which quarter they emanate, if our deliberations on disarmament are not to be divorced from central issues.

70. Would it be too much to express the hope that the initiatives towards normalization of relations among the major Powers would accelerate the present *détente* in Europe and lead to its extension to Asia in order that the security preoccupations of Asian countries might also be allayed?

71. In conclusion, my delegation cannot but agree that the measures of arms control that have been concluded after 25 years of negotiations, important as they are, have hardly brought us a step nearer real disarmament. The representative of France has told us [1989th meeting] that the object of the talks that have taken place and are now taking place is not to destroy existing arms; it is to maintain the balance of strength on a higher level, ensuring for those who possess nuclear weapons a monopoly not only of these weapons, but also of the political power which they bestow. It is this reality that has been brought home so forcefully to us. Who can say that we did not need to be reminded of it?

72. Mr. PHILLIPS (United States of America): I should like to set forth briefly the specific views of the United States on the important question which is before the Assembly.

73. In the comments of other delegations on this issue during the general debate, in informal talks and in recent statements we have heard a variety of ideas expressed about a world disarmament conference. There has been a broad measure of agreement among many Members on two basic points: first, on the overriding importance of serious progress in the fields of arms control and disarmament; and, second, on the need for flexibility, co-operation and mutual accommodation among all interested parties if such progress is to be made. On those two central points, I can assure representatives, the United States is in agreement with many Members. With those two points in mind I should like to offer the following observations regarding a world disarmament conference.

74. Representatives will recall that when the United States Secretary of State, Mr. William P. Rogers, addressed this Assembly on 4 October he stated:

"Frankly, we are sceptical that such a generalized approach"—the creation of a periodic world disarmament conference outside the framework of the United Nations—"would produce specific accomplishments. All post-war experience indicates that a concrete, step-by-step approach offers better prospects for success than more grandiose schemes, which tend to generate many words but few results." [1950th meeting, para. 21.]

75. The scepticism which the Secretary expressed about an overly broad, unfocused approach to the question of disarmament forums is a long-standing view of the United States and one we have frequently expressed. It is a view that is based on the following central considerations.

76. Progress in restraining armaments, progress towards halting and turning back the arms race, progress that is stable and durable, can best be achieved through the working out and the acceptance of concrete agreements among States. Such agreements are most likely to be reached through serious and careful negotiations. They are not likely to be produced through the convening of large and unwieldy conferences. The crucial issues of arms control and disarmament are inevitably and inextricably linked up with the basic national concerns of States. They involve both complex technical problems and broad political questions of great domestic and international sensitivity to Governments.



77. Serious arms control and disarmament negotiations are thus difficult and complex. Major achievements cannot be registered without careful and lengthy preparations. Negotiations can be conducted purposefully only in forums and in an atmosphere relatively free of polemics. Speeches and documents setting forth the positions of Governments must be directed towards the development of compromises and accommodation. Progress in such negotiations requires businesslike, thoughtful, quiet exchanges of views. It requires patience and persistence—and at times long and frustrating waits while Governments are formulating positions on the proposals of other participants. We would not expect that these would be characteristics of a world disarmament conference.

78. We recognize that while concrete progress can best be made through the negotiation of sound agreements, a broad and regular review of arms control issues by the international community can provide an important stimulus to arms control efforts. This, indeed, is one of the central purposes of the annual consideration of these issues by the General Assembly. It is a purpose to which a substantial portion of the statements in the general debate and of the work in the First Committee is devoted. In our view, the United Nations General Assembly provides adequate scope and satisfactory procedures. It is the best forum for this purpose. Given the central role of the General Assembly in this area we believe, as Secretary Rogers stated, that “there would seem to be no reason for establishing still more world disarmament machinery outside the United Nations framework.” [*Ibid.*, para. 22.]

79. In discussions of the question of arms control forums, many delegations here have ascribed particular importance to a point raised by a number of the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during the past two years. They have expressed the view that the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in arms control talks would be not only desirable but perhaps even prerequisite for progress on the most serious disarmament issues we face. In this regard I should like to recall the statement that Ambassador Leonard, the United States representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, made on this subject last June. He stated:

“For our part, we recognize that a stable and enduring peace must ultimately be based on broadly accepted limitations on armaments rather than on the unconstrained, competitive development of armaments. We recognize as well that an enduring structure of peace must reflect the contributions and reconcile the aspirations of all nations.”<sup>6</sup>

Ambassador Leonard went on to say:

“Accordingly we would welcome the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in arms control and disarmament efforts in a manner satisfactory to all those States and in a manner reflecting the interests and concerns as well of non-nuclear-weapon States.”<sup>7</sup>

My Government holds those same views today.

<sup>6</sup> Document CCD/PV. 517, para. 27.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 30.

80. With these thoughts in mind I should like to emphasize that the United States delegation has studied carefully the statements that have been made here on the question of a world disarmament conference. We recognize that a number of United Nations Members see merit in the idea of convening such a conference and that they would like to keep this item before the General Assembly for its further consideration. Many delegations have, however, expressed reservations about one or another aspect of the Soviet draft resolution. We believe the Assembly should approach this matter in a deliberate and cautious manner. We certainly see no reason at present to attempt to establish a specific date for such a meeting. We are, however, prepared to participate in a further exchange of views regarding the advisability of this sort of conference.

81. The United States delegation believes that it would be appropriate for any resolution on this subject that might be adopted during the present session of the General Assembly to recognize that the question of a possible world disarmament conference is a matter that deserves careful consideration and to call upon States to consult and to co-operate with each other in considering all relevant questions, including the question of what might be an appropriate time for holding such a conference. We believe such a resolution should place the question of the world disarmament conference on the provisional agenda of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, and should not attempt to prescribe when or in what circumstances a possible meeting should be held. This would enable all interested Governments to consider during the coming year the many suggestions and observations regarding this item that have been made by representatives during the current session of the General Assembly and to consult with one another about them, as well as to develop a fuller consideration of the issues involved. We believe that a resolution along those lines would take account of the variety of views which exists regarding both the desirability of a world disarmament conference and the way in which this question should be approached.

82. In that connexion my delegation would like to support a suggestion made by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Garcia Robles whose wide-ranging and careful analysis of this subject we listened to with great interest earlier this week [*1992nd meeting*]. We believe that after the general debate on the question of a world disarmament conference is concluded it would be most helpful if voting on any draft resolution regarding this item were postponed to permit further consultations among Members concerning the issues involved.

83. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): For ten days the United Nations General Assembly has been conducting a detailed discussion in its plenary meetings of the important and urgent question of the convening of a world disarmament conference, which was included in the agenda of the current session of the Assembly at the proposal of the Soviet Government.

84. The basis of our proposal is that, with the aim of intensifying efforts by all States in the struggle to slow down the arms race and achieve disarmament, the time is ripe to convene a special international conference to

consider the problem of disarmament, to be attended by all countries of the world without exception and without any discrimination. This is a new initiative which stems from the peace-loving Leninist policy of the Soviet Union and is motivated by a sincere desire to assist in strengthening international peace and security and eliminating the threat to humanity of world-wide thermonuclear catastrophe. The achievement of these aims is of vital interest to all peoples of the world. The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction that the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference has not only given rise to wide-ranging discussion and in fact occupied a central place in the work of the Assembly, but has also won the approval and support of the overwhelming majority of delegations which have taken an active part in the discussion of this very important international problem.

85. In this connexion I should like to express our deep gratitude to all those delegations which have approached the Soviet initiative with understanding and expressed their approval and support.

86. Analysing the numerous statements by representatives of various States who have taken part in the discussion, the delegation of the Soviet Union has reached the following conclusions, which directly concern the implementation of the proposal for a world disarmament conference.

87. Members of the Assembly have agreed that participation in the forthcoming conference should be open to all States of the world on a basis of equality, irrespective of whether or not they are Members of the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

88. The problem of disarmament involves everyone. When it is discussed, no discrimination should be allowed against anyone. That approach, as we have seen, has not been challenged by a single representative who has spoken on the subject. The representatives of an overwhelming majority of countries have stated that at the world forum on disarmament the whole range of disarmament problems should be considered, on the understanding that the problem of prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons should be given primary attention. Any State should and may raise at the conference any questions and make any proposals it considers the conference should discuss which relate to slowing down the arms race or achieving general and complete disarmament.

89. The idea advanced in statements by delegations of one or two countries of restricting the conference to one specific problem, thus denying other States the opportunity of making their own proposals on any other aspect of general and complete disarmament, is baseless and unlawful, because all States should participate in the conference on a basis of equality. Such an approach, as is apparent, found no support during discussion in the Assembly.

90. As regards the objectives and tasks of the conference, the Soviet delegation would like to indicate that it definitely cannot agree with the assertion of some speakers—fortunately only a few—that the Soviet proposal for convening such a conference contains an insufficiently clear formulation of its aims. In order to dissipate any doubts on this subject, the Soviet delegation would like to refer to the

letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, to Secretary-General U Thant, dated 6 September 1971, which sets forth the approach of the Soviet Union to the objectives and tasks of the disarmament conference. On this subject, the official document clearly and precisely states the following:

“... the world disarmament conference could consider the whole complex of problems relating to disarmament, with regard to both nuclear and conventional armaments. At the same time, inasmuch as the nuclear armaments race arouses the greatest anxiety among peoples, primary attention could be devoted to the questions of prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons, if the majority of the participants in the conference should so desire”. [see A/8491.]

91. That is a clear and precise definition of the principal objective and task of the conference. References in this case to vagueness could come only from someone who, under the pretext of so-called vagueness, is trying to delay and postpone the adoption of a decision to convene the conference.

92. The Soviet Union has a flexible approach to the agenda of the forthcoming conference, as it wishes to enable all States to submit proposals on general and complete disarmament which they consider are most urgent and ripe for solution.

93. The Soviet Union considers that the world conference should devote primary attention to such problems of nuclear disarmament as the cessation by all States of all nuclear weapon tests, the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and the elimination of stockpiles of such weapons, whose use could not be countenanced by the conscience of humanity.

94. The Soviet Union further suggests that it would be useful for the conference also to consider other ways of reducing and putting an end to the arms race and international tension, including the elimination of all military bases on foreign soil, the reduction of armed forces and armaments in areas where military confrontation is particularly dangerous and the reduction of military expenditure, in particular by the great Powers. In other words, it should consider in a practical and concrete manner all ways leading to general and complete disarmament and to the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. There can be no doubt that the consideration and the achievement of a positive solution of all these problems would be greeted with profound approval by all the peoples of the world.

95. Many of the representatives who have spoken have emphasized that special responsibility for the achievement of disarmament and, above all, for the solution of the problem of prohibiting and eliminating all stockpiles of nuclear weapons, lies with the States which possess such weapons.

96. The Soviet delegation fully agrees with this opinion. Quite clearly, if these Powers were to prohibit and

eliminate the nuclear weapon stockpiles in their arsenals, this would remove once and for all the danger of an outbreak of war involving thermonuclear weapons of mass destruction, which is hanging over mankind. In this matter of vital importance for all mankind, declarations and promises alone are not enough, however comprehensive their wording. We need deeds, not words. The Governments of the nuclear Powers must fully recognize the extent of the historic responsibility incumbent on them.

97. The Soviet Union believes that these Powers should do everything they can to relieve humanity of the threat of nuclear catastrophe and the danger of mass annihilation. In this connexion, none of the Powers which possess nuclear weapons should hide behind the States which do not possess such weapons.

98. As is well known, the Soviet Government this summer proposed a meeting of the five nuclear Powers in order to take a decisive step towards nuclear disarmament. The purpose of this important political initiative was to make the nuclear Powers discharge their responsibility to the peoples of the world and take specific measures towards liquidating their nuclear arsenals.

99. In the light of this important task, any attempts to allege that the Soviet Union proposal was aimed at arranging a confrontation of nuclear and non-nuclear States or consolidating the monopoly of the nuclear Powers can be seen to be groundless, far-fetched and baseless.

100. The Soviet proposal for a meeting of the five nuclear Powers tied in with the simultaneous proposal for a world disarmament conference. As we have pointed out more than once, these two Soviet proposals are not in the least contradictory; on the contrary, they complement each other and are both directed to the same end—to save humanity from the nuclear catastrophe hanging over it.

101. No one can be convinced by the rhetorical expatiation to the effect that all international agreements achieved so far aimed at limiting the nuclear arms race were concluded in spite of and to the detriment of the interests of the peoples of the world, and for the benefit of the nuclear monopoly of "one or two Powers" possessing nuclear weapons.

102. Contrary to this far-fetched and groundless point of view, the Soviet Union considers that such agreements as, for example, the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof are, although admittedly limited, nevertheless undoubtedly useful steps in the right direction, towards limiting the arms race and towards disarmament. They constitute an excellent spring-board for further progress towards the achievement of the main goal—general and complete disarmament leading to removal of the threat of a thermonuclear catastrophe for humanity.

103. It is well known that the 1963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer

Space and under Water enjoys wide international support. This agreement was the result of mass action by the peoples of all countries in favour of the cessation of nuclear explosions, which by dangerously contaminating the earth's atmosphere have already, even in peacetime, caused irreparable damage to the health and welfare of millions of people. After the Treaty was concluded, following long and complex diplomatic negotiations here in the United Nations and elsewhere, man's environment, the air he breathes and the food he eats have become much freer of harmful radio-active substances. This is reflected in precise scientific experiments and measurements which have recently been reported by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation and published for general information.

104. Unfortunately, the prohibition proclaimed by the Moscow Treaty does not cover the fourth area in which nuclear tests are being carried out, i.e. under ground.

105. Equal anxiety is also being caused by the fact that not all States which possess nuclear weapons have acceded to the Moscow Treaty. The problem of an all-embracing nuclear test ban is still on the agenda of the world community and of its main meeting-place, the United Nations; the Soviet Union considers it urgent to solve this problem.

106. As was stated at the twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, our country strongly advocates the cessation of all nuclear tests in all places and by all States. Today we are obliged to note that those who criticize and attack the Moscow Treaty on a partial nuclear test ban are themselves, under various pretexts, not ceasing nuclear tests and are not proposing any positive basis for the solution of this problem.

107. The Soviet delegation would also like to point out the great international significance of another important agreement concerning the limitation of the arms race, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

108. As early as the beginning of the 1960s, a group of non-nuclear States raised in the United Nations the question of the urgent necessity of concluding such an agreement. On the way to this agreement, which has now become a reality, it was necessary to overcome no small opposition on the part of forces which wished to retain for themselves the freedom to spread nuclear weapons, by supplying nuclear warheads to the participants in aggressive military blocs.

109. The non-proliferation Treaty constitutes an obstacle to the spreading of nuclear weapons. Limiting the number of countries which possess a nuclear arsenal will make the task of nuclear disarmament easier. It is quite clear that it would be much more difficult to reach an agreement on the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons if those weapons were the possession of dozens of States, rather than a few.

110. The danger of the outbreak of a war involving the use of thermonuclear weapons would have become much greater. And it should be clear to everyone who is capable of understanding that here in the United Nations, where the

overwhelming majority of Members are parties to international agreements on the limitation of the arms race which have already been drawn up and approved by the international community, attacks on these agreements are particularly inappropriate. It would be much more useful and constructive to hear at sessions of the General Assembly speeches in favour of further progress towards the conclusion of new disarmament agreements; this would be an even more effective brake on the arms race, including the nuclear arms race, and would finally lead to general and complete disarmament.

111. It can be stated with satisfaction that the majority of delegations at the present Assembly have spoken in favour of just such an approach to the solution of this important problem.

112. The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction that a considerable majority of States regards the convening of a world disarmament conference as a timely, useful and essential international step which should be taken without delay with the aim of slowing down the arms race and achieving concrete and effective decisions and agreements on disarmament problems.

113. In the view of the Soviet delegation, it was precisely these considerations which gave rise to the proposals from various delegations regarding the practical approaches to the convening and holding of such a conference. During consideration of the Soviet proposal, many delegations emphasized how important and necessary it was carefully to prepare for the world disarmament conference, which must be a broad international forum for the examination of all armaments problems.

114. It is impossible to disagree that its success will in large measure depend on the extent to which the preparation for the conference is thorough and well thought out.

115. For its part, the Soviet delegation is also in favour of comprehensive and thorough preparation for this conference. We feel that all States should have the opportunity to express their views—views which it is essential to take into account if the world disarmament conference is to be held on a mutually acceptable basis and its decisions are genuinely to reflect the thoughts and aspirations of the peoples of the entire world. No one, not a single sovereign State, should be arbitrarily deprived of the right and the opportunity to participate in such a world-wide forum and consider a question which is so important for all peoples of the world.

116. However, at the same time the fact cannot be ignored that certain—fortunately only a few—delegations are already making modest attempts, by arguing the necessity of careful, lengthy and comprehensive preparation for the conference, essentially to conceal their clear intention and desire to delay the proposal to convene the conference and to postpone it indefinitely—until the Greek Calends.

117. That is precisely the way in which the position and the intentions of the preceding speaker, the United States representative, and his country should be understood.

118. To work for the success of the conference is one thing. To embark on a course of postponing the conference

with the aim of wrecking it is something completely different, directly opposed to the universal opinion of an overwhelming majority of those who have spoken from this rostrum during the discussion of the problem.

119. We believe that the majority of the States which have participated in this discussion are against that course, which runs counter to the interests of peace and disarmament and, consequently, to the vitally important interests of the peoples of the world.

120. We are against negativism about the date for the convening of the conference, in whatever form that negativism may be presented to the General Assembly—in a “solo” or a “duet”.

121. The Soviet delegation has listened carefully to the views and concrete proposals put forward by many other delegations during discussion of the question of the convening of a world disarmament conference. Our attitude to a large number of those proposals has been one of understanding, and we have examined them in the most careful and constructive way.

122. The Soviet delegation adopts a considerate, attentive and suitably understanding approach towards the constructive opinions, views and proposals which have been advanced by many delegations participating in the consideration of the Soviet proposal for convening the conference.

123. We have noted that many delegations have spoken in favour of convening the world disarmament conference within the framework of the United Nations, on the understanding, of course, that invitations to participate will be addressed to all States irrespective of their membership in the United Nations or its specialized agencies.

124. Nor have we been inattentive to the reasonable, constructive views and proposals advanced in the statement by the head of the Egyptian delegation, Mr. El-Zayyat [*1985th meeting*] on the practical steps towards preparation for the convening of a world disarmament conference. As you know, they found wide support among delegations.

125. The delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is authorized to state that the Soviet Government, in its sincere desire to facilitate and hasten the convening of a world disarmament conference, has taken into account and considered these views and proposals and, for its part, is prepared to agree to the proposal that the world disarmament conference should be held within the framework of the United Nations.

126. Of course, the Soviet Union is here proceeding from an assumption which has met with wide support from many delegations during the discussion, namely that all States without exception should have the opportunity to participate on a basis of equality in the disarmament conference. This is a firm and unalterable condition; if it is met, the Soviet Union proclaims that it is ready and able to support the proposal to hold the conference within the framework of the United Nations.

127. As has already been pointed out, during discussion of the question of the convening of the conference there has



been a considerable positive response to the views and proposals put forward by the delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt regarding practical steps and concrete organizational measures to prepare for the conference. If I have correctly understood its intentions, the proposal of the Egyptian delegation is as follows: to prepare for the convening of a world disarmament conference, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should address a special request to all States—both Members and non-Members of the Organization—to make known their opinion, views and proposals on the time, location, agenda and procedural arrangements for the conference.

128. At the same time, the Egyptian delegation suggested that the Secretary-General should also conduct appropriate consultations on this matter with the permanent members of the Security Council. In this connexion, it is also intended that the Secretary-General of the United Nations should request opinions on all questions connected with the convening and holding of the conference from all States which are parties to one of the following recent international agreements limiting the arms race: the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.

129. The Soviet delegation is authorized to state in this matter that it supports those proposals and is ready to give its agreement to their inclusion in the Soviet draft resolution on the convening of the conference, reflecting the proposal of the Egyptian delegation on practical steps to prepare for the conference, which has received such wide support in the General Assembly.

130. In conclusion, I should like on behalf of my delegation to express the hope that the proposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the convening of a world disarmament conference will be approved and supported by the General Assembly. As was underlined by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in his speech [1942nd meeting], such a conference, if it were held soon and were successful, would help to revitalize negotiations on disarmament with the participation of all States of the world. It would undoubtedly be a significant landmark on the difficult and tortuous road towards general and complete disarmament, which is of such vital interest for the peoples of the entire world.

131. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of the People's Republic of China to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

132. Mr. CHIAO (China) (*translated from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation deems it necessary to make a few remarks in regard to the speech the Soviet representative, Mr. Malik, delivered at the meeting of 24 November [1995th meeting].

133. First, the Soviet representative tried hard to deny that the Soviet Union is a super-Power and that, like the United States, the Soviet Union attempts to monopolize nuclear weapons and to push its policies of nuclear

blackmail and nuclear threats against other countries. Such an attempt is utterly futile. Everyone knows that it is precisely the Soviet Union and the United States, which possess large quantities of nuclear weapons, that have up to now obstinately refused to undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and that they have continued to maintain large numbers of armed forces and military bases on foreign soil, including nuclear armed forces and nuclear bases. The partial nuclear test-ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons jointly devised by the United States and the Soviet Union are something entirely imposed on others; they are aimed at monopolizing nuclear weapons and controlling other countries. We can never agree to them. The Soviet leadership has carried out aggression, subversion, control and interference against other countries. This is clearly known to the representatives of many countries present here. China has had its own experience in this respect, and here I shall not speak at length about the relevant history. Countless facts have shown that what the Soviet leadership is practising is certainly not socialism but, as Lenin put it, socialism in words, imperialism in deeds—that is, social-imperialism.

134. Secondly, the Soviet representative denounced China's disagreement with the Soviet proposal for convening a world disarmament conference as a "Sino-American duet of negativism". Those are cheap and demagogic words not worth refuting. Who, after all, is singing a duet with United States imperialism? To the north of China, large numbers of Soviet armed forces, including rocket forces, are stationed in the People's Republic of Mongolia. To the east of China, the United States is maintaining a large number of military bases and nuclear bases in Japan proper and Okinawa. Is that not a kind of duet? And that is not true only with regard to China. In Europe, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and other parts of the world, the Soviet leadership considers the final say rests only with an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. Is that not a duet?

135. Thirdly, the speech of the Soviet representative is a splendid self-exposure. The Soviet representative is upset when others call the Soviet Union a super-Power. Yet his speech has vividly revealed the features of a super-Power which lords it over other countries and orders them about. It is entirely China's own business how the Chinese delegation should speak and act and what stand it should take here. There is no need whatsoever for the Soviet representative to lecture us. The Soviet attitude towards the Chinese delegation is exactly the same as the crude behaviour towards some Afro-Asian countries adopted by another super-Power not long ago. The Soviet representatives have probably become used to acting the patriarch within their small realm, and they consider that whatever they say others will have to obey. Otherwise they will label you anti-Soviet. Distinguished representatives of the Soviet Union, you are wrong. This is not anti-Sovietism; this is opposition to your attitude of great-Power chauvinism and your policies of social imperialism. We have long had experience with such behaviour of yours. The Chinese people do not buy such stuff of yours, and your baton no longer works. The days are gone when the super-Powers could dominate the world. An increasing number of

medium-sized and small countries of the world have more and more seen through to your true features. The sooner the Soviet delegation understands this, the better for themselves and the work of the United Nations.

136. Fourthly, in his speech the Soviet representative unwearily boasted that the Soviet Union had fought for disarmament for more than two decades, putting on the airs of a veteran peace fighter. A simple but important principle of Marxism-Leninism is that one must judge a person not merely by his words but by his deeds. Not long ago, the Soviet Union concluded with a neighbour of China a so-called Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation, which is in essence a treaty of military alliance. With the encouragement and support of this treaty, that country launched a bare-faced armed aggression against Pakistan, another neighbour of China, thus aggravating tension in Asia. This fully reveals the true features of the so-called foreign policy of peace pursued by the Soviet leadership. The Chinese Government and people have consistently maintained that disputes between countries should be resolved through consultation between the countries concerned without resorting to the use of force. The Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly support the Pakistan people in their just struggle against foreign aggression and for the defence of their national sovereignty and unity.

137. In short, on the question of aggression and anti-aggression, disarmament and arms expansion, peace and war, one must be judged by his deeds. Bragging and boasting, or putting on the airs of an "old-timer" are of no avail. If the Soviet Government truly has the desire for disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, the Soviet representative should come forward to this rostrum and solemnly declare that at no time and in no circumstances will the Soviet Union be the first to use nuclear weapons and that it will dismantle all nuclear bases and withdraw all nuclear weapons and means of delivery from abroad. Distinguished Soviet representative, do you dare to do so? If you are man enough, you will do it. But if you have a guilty conscience and an unjust cause, you will not dare to do so, because although you appear to be tough outwardly, you are in fact timid inwardly. We are certain that you will not dare to do so. Is this not true? Please reply.

138. Fifthly, in order to enable all the Member States of the United Nations to hold full consultation and discussion on such an important issue as disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, the Chinese delegation has proposed that the Soviet draft resolution for convening a world disarmament conference not be put to the vote at this session of the General Assembly. Our desire is that we should strive to enable the United Nations on the principle of reaching a consensus through consultation to make a new start on this question that is truly conducive to disarmament. We still hope that our fellow representatives will give serious consideration to our view. However, if the Soviet delegation insists on putting its draft resolution to a vote, the Chinese delegation cannot but declare with regret that China will not participate in the voting and will assume no obligation as to the result of the voting.

139. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The Soviet delegation has not

and has never had any intention of turning the high rostrum of this international organization—the United Nations—into a place for ideological arguments with schismatics. That is an altogether different matter, and other places and possibilities exist for such arguments. For that reason, I shall refer only to questions of international politics and to the question under discussion, on which the Chinese representative, as in his first statement, has made no small effort to distort and slander the sincere peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union in which we take such pride and which, in firm and unvarying adherence to the Leninist path, we have been pursuing from October 1917 until the present day and which we shall continue to pursue in the future. Here too, participating in the work of the General Assembly since its first session and in the preparation and formulation of the Charter, we have been following that Leninist road, and we are proud that our policy has won us the support and understanding of the overwhelming majority of the countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and all the continents of the world. Together with the other socialist States and other peace-loving countries here in the United Nations, we are waging a tireless battle for peace, security, disarmament and the development of co-operation between all peoples and countries who wish to co-operate with us. And no slanders, no fabrications either from this rostrum or from any other can pervert, distort or slander our peace-loving Soviet policy, which has stood the test of time over more than half a century.

140. It is obvious that the Chinese delegation has taken the offensive with its thesis about "super-Powers". That is its favourite hobby-horse. What is the basic aim of this thesis—this "theory"? To cast aspersions on the peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet Union; to set the Soviet Union off against other countries and other States, totally ignoring the fact—which is well known to the Peking leaders and their representatives in the United Nations—that the Soviet Union is the bulwark of all anti-imperialist forces; to set it up alongside the other great Power, the most powerful country in the capitalist camp.

141. To put forward the utterly untruthful thesis of "two super-Powers", purportedly opposed to all other States and to the entire world, is fundamentally—to call a spade a spade—an act of class treachery on the part of the Chinese leadership. Attempts are being made in Peking in this way to conceal the antagonism between the two world systems, socialism and capitalism; they are attempting to avoid and are in fact avoiding the real struggle against imperialism and aggression. The situation has reached the point where they are sending advice to other States and those States' monopolies on how best to unite their forces for the struggle against "one or two super-Powers". It is also impossible to ignore the fact that in its statements in the Assembly the Chinese delegation has importunately vaunted the claim that China will never be a super-Power; at the same time the Chinese leaders and their representatives in the United Nations pretentiously state that China is the best protector of all small and medium-sized countries. What is that but an attempt, under the guise of a struggle against "one or two super-Powers", to conceal and mask their own hegemony-seeking great Power aspirations to use the so-called third world for the achievement of their aims? It is no accident that in the corridors of the United Nations there is more and more obvious talk to the effect that, even

during the short period that the Chinese delegation has been here, in the United Nations, it has, using the thesis of the struggle against "one or two super-Powers", in fact been aspiring to the role of leader and ruler of the "third world". China is attempting to use this "third world" as a means to achieve its real aims, i.e. as a spring-board for immediately becoming a "super-super-Power". That is the essence of the Chinese "theory" of a struggle against "one or two super-Powers", which is false and fabricated, or rather borrowed from the arsenal of imperialist propaganda. Such phraseology and such false "theories" will not help the Chinese delegation to consolidate its position here or to establish the authority and prestige of China amongst the countries of the "third world". We are deeply convinced that the States of the "third world", those States which have entered the United Nations as a result of the historic national liberation anti-colonialist revolution from the beginning of the 1960s, or rather from the end of the 1950s—and there are many of them here—have since they arrived in the United Nations, collaborating jointly with the socialist countries in the struggle for peace, security, friendship and co-operation between all peace-loving countries, so grown up and matured that they have no use for any claims to hegemony or to leadership. They will reject anyone who claims to be their mentor, to tutor them or to assume the role of leader, "protector" and ruler.

142. The fairy-tale spread by Chinese propaganda about an alleged threat to China from the north, from the Soviet Union, has been dreamed up especially in order to confuse the Chinese people and world public opinion.

143. The Soviet Union has never threatened and will never threaten anyone.

144. Beginning in autumn 1969, and not in the Soviet Union, but in China, an extensive campaign has been waged of preparation for war in the north, against the Soviet Union. Literally the entire population of the country is being involved in this campaign, which is constantly being exacerbated by provocative warnings about an alleged threat of an attack on China from the North.

145. From this rostrum the Chinese representative drew an analogy between Soviet forces on USSR territory to the north of China and United States forces to the south of China, in Indo-China.

146. This is China as it is now. The aggression of foreign forces in Indo-China is placed on the same level as the presence of Soviet armed forces, peacefully stationed on their own territory and protecting their native frontiers because of China's active hostile propaganda in preparation for war against the Soviet Union. Here, from this rostrum, an analogy is drawn between the aggression against the peoples of Indo-China and the lawful measures taken by the Soviet Union to protect its frontiers to the north of China.

147. One need only consider that fact, that analogy, in order to understand the nature of the ideology and policies of the modern Chinese leadership.

148. It was obvious that the Chinese representative was not pleased by my phrase about an "American-Chinese duet of negativism" towards the Soviet Union proposal for the

convening of a world disarmament conference; however, that phrase is true and exact, and it strikes home. At an earlier point the Chinese representative stated, and he has repeated today, that the delegation of the People's Republic of China is opposed to adoption by the General Assembly of the Soviet proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference. The same thing was said in the general debate by Secretary of State Rogers, and today Rogers' negative statement has been repeated by the United States Ambassador, Mr. Phillips, in his speech. Those are the facts. They are irrefutable. From this rostrum the Chinese delegation opposes the adoption of the Soviet proposals and the United States representative opposes their adoption. There is a duet for you—an American-Chinese duet of negativism. You dispute that? Disprove it. I shall quote his words and yours. Both delegations oppose the convening of a disarmament conference.

149. I can understand that you are not pleased by my phrase "Chinese-American duet". But everyone present here has heard your speech and those of Mr. Phillips and Mr. Rogers; they all read documents and records of meetings. And so we have the Chinese-American or, if you prefer, American-Chinese duet. But it is a duet—that is a fact and you cannot refute it.

150. You teach us Marxism-Leninism; you say that Marxism tells us to judge by deeds, and not by words. But we judge both by deeds and by words. And your deeds and words and those of the Americans coincide. Both you and they are against adoption of the Soviet proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference, which has received the support of an overwhelming majority of the members of the Assembly. There you have Marxism in action and the Chinese interpretation of it.

151. The Soviet delegation considers it below its dignity to reply to the Chinese representative's slanderous claim that the Soviet-Indian treaty of friendship and co-operation is directed against some third country.

152. The objective of the Government of India, I am deeply convinced, and that of the Government of the Soviet Union—I say this as an official statement—is to strengthen the cause of peace in that region, not to attack anyone, and not to direct or use the treaty against anyone.

153. On that note I think I can end this short reply to the anti-Soviet speech of the Chinese representative.

154. I should like next to speak about nuclear disarmament.

155. In order to conceal the unwillingness of China to participate in the conference of the five nuclear Powers and the world disarmament conference proposed by the Soviet Union, the Chinese delegation has delivered an ultimatum that the Soviet delegation ought to state such-and-such and such-and-such from this rostrum. Let me tell the head of the Chinese delegation that this is not done in the United Nations. Spend a little time here, do some work, acquire a few bruises, and then you will act differently. Ultimatums can achieve nothing here, and there is no point in your resorting to such methods. Our suggestion is that we should meet together at a conference of the five nuclear Powers or

at a world disarmament conference and consider all the questions, all your and our proposals, all the proposals of the five nuclear Powers.

156. Why do you refuse? Only the other day the official representative of China in the Security Council, Mr. or Comrade—let us call him Comrade—Huang Hua, requested that the reply of the Chinese Government to the Soviet Government's appeal for the convening of a conference of the five nuclear Powers should be issued as a document. Unfortunately, I do not have that document to hand, but my memory tells me that it contains the refusal of China to accept the proposal on various far-fetched pretexts. Instead of accepting it and solving the problem at a conference, China refused to accept the proposal. What has that achieved? I have already said here that China's refusal has provided very good grounds for the United States and the United Kingdom also to refuse to participate in the conference on the ground that, since China has refused, the question has become an "academic" one. China has helped the United States and the United Kingdom to find a pretext also to refuse to participate in a conference of the five nuclear Powers. And now China and the United States are also jointly refusing to accept the proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference. These are also deeds and words, according to Marx, as interpreted by the head of the Chinese delegation.

157. The position is as follows: accept the proposals, either for a conference of the five nuclear Powers or for a world disarmament conference, or both, and let us examine all the questions and all the proposals; let us consult and reach agreed decisions. But do not present us here with ultimatums, which are a pointless waste of time and words.

158. On that point I think I may end my reply to the Chinese delegation.

159. The PRESIDENT: I call upon the representative of Japan in exercise of his right of reply.

160. Mr. TANAKA (Japan): The representative of the People's Republic of China said in his speech that the United States maintains nuclear bases in Japan. I should like to point out that it is a basic policy of the Japanese Government not to allow any nuclear weapons to be deployed on Japanese soil.

161. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of India in exercise of his right of reply.

162. Mr. SEN (India): Some reference has been made to the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation<sup>8</sup> and I thought it necessary, therefore, to clear up any misunderstanding that anyone might still seek to create about this Treaty.

163. The true nature of the Indo-Soviet Treaty is well known to all who care to know. It is a Treaty of friendship, and no one who has no aggressive designs against the signatories need have any fears. In so far as India is concerned we have said—and I repeat it now—that we are willing to sign similar treaties with other countries in suitable circumstances.

164. As regards aggression against Pakistan, there has been no aggression against it by any outside country. There is simply a civil revolt in that country following massive repression and atrocities and unprecedented violation of human rights. As a result, India has the intolerable burden of looking after nearly 10 million refugees and also faces many grave threats to its national security and its entire national fabric. These facts are well known and need no elaboration.

165. The PRESIDENT: I call upon the representative of Mongolia in exercise of his right of reply.

166. Mr. DUGERSUREN (Mongolian People's Republic) (*translation from Russian*): The distinguished representative of the People's Republic of China referred in his statement to the presence of Soviet troops in the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic. Those troops are there under a treaty of friendship concluded between two countries. They are helping the Mongolian people in the building of socialism and the protection of our country's freedom and independence. They are not, of course, defending us against the Soviet Union, which the representative of China tried to depict as an aggressor. In the light of half a century of co-operation with the Soviet Union, we, the representatives of the Mongolian People's Republic, consider the statement of the representative of China concerning the foreign policy of the Soviet Union to be a distortion of the truth and entirely unfounded.

167. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Pakistan in exercise of his right of reply.

168. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): The representative of India stated that the Indo-Soviet Treaty is known to all and that it is a treaty of friendship. We in Pakistan have no objection to any treaty of friendship that our neighbour signs with any country, but it is a misnomer to call this Treaty purely a treaty of friendship and co-operation. Article IX of the Treaty states that the two parties will enter into mutual consultations in the event of any threat to peace—and the Indians stop citing the article at that point. They say it is merely a treaty of consultation. But let me recall that that clause goes on to say: "... with a view to taking effective measures to remove the threat to peace". Everyone knows that this is diplomatic language for what could be stretched to become a treaty of military alliance.

169. A few weeks ago I had occasion to speak in the First Committee [*1806th meeting*] on the Indo-Soviet Treaty and to say that we in Pakistan would judge it by its results. We have noted the assurance of the Soviet Union that it is not directed against a third party, but, as I stated on that occasion, the Treaty will be judged by its results. Will it act in restraint of war, or will it precipitate the other party to the Treaty into launching war?

170. In India the interpretations of that Treaty and what it means are very different from those we have heard from the Soviet Union.

171. Only last Friday, 19 November, the President of Pakistan, on the occasion of *Eid-ul-Fitr*, publicly offered the hand of friendship to India; and on Sunday India unleashed an armed attack against Pakistan at five different

<sup>8</sup> Signed at New Delhi on 9 August 1971.



places, involving four of its divisions, with tank regiments, and even its air force.

172. We in Pakistan believe that, whatever the motivations of the Soviet Union, it has bolstered India in its designs against Pakistan.

173. The representative of India said that India had committed no aggression against Pakistan. Take any definition of aggression, take any statement of the Indian position on what constitutes aggression, and by their very words they have committed aggression against Pakistan.

174. At first the statement was made that the Indian armed forces had strict instructions not to cross the border into Pakistan; subsequently, when it became known that Indian forces—at two or three places in brigade group strength and at other places in battalion strength—had attacked Pakistan, that prisoners had been taken and weapons captured, the earlier statement was modified and it was stated on behalf of the Prime Minister of India that the Indian armed forces had been given modified orders; they could cross into Pakistan territory in self-defence.

175. What a grotesque definition of self-defence: the right to violate an international frontier. The violation extends far beyond the so-called right of hot pursuit, and it has been stated that that right was given to every member of the Indian armed forces—from the top commander right down to the private, the individual soldier—while no limit was placed on the extent to which those forces would go into East Pakistan. With the assistance of Indian armoured regiments, penetrations were effected—in some cases four, eight or ten miles deep into Pakistan territory—and then the Indian forces retreated to let the armed secessionist groups they had brought with them take control of the territory; and now they propagate throughout the world the fiction that the rebel government has a territory and a population and is exercising jurisdiction, so as to pave the way for recognition. Yet they deny that their objective is the dismemberment of Pakistan.

176. For months dissident rebel groups have been organized, trained and unleashed into Pakistan; when they were driven out they were given sanctuary in India. Foreign observers have been prevented from going to those places along the border, and the Indians say—it has been stated openly in the press—that they do not want the observers to see what they are doing. Yet the representative of India revives this question of repression.

177. If repression took place, the circumstances that were created by the armed secessionist elements, the massacres that were perpetrated, required that the Army should intervene.

178. We have said countless times that we are ready to take back all the refugees, right now, under United Nations supervision, with international assistance; yet India continues to refuse to let them go and talks of the intolerable burden on India. It is a self-imposed burden. No sane country would accept such a burden, except for some very high strategic purposes, in this case the dismemberment of Pakistan so that India can emerge as the dominant Power in the sub-continent.

179. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Anyone who had served for a quarter of a century in this Organization would, indeed, be not only sad but also deeply disturbed to witness what we have seen this evening.

180. I am speaking first as an Asian, and later I shall speak as a man of what is—I hope—one world.

181. I hail from the eastern side of the Mediterranean, or western Asia; our colleague, the representative of China, hails from the eastern part of Asia. We should be mindful also that although Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union, is in Europe, to a large extent the Soviet Union is an Asian country.

182. I am also sad at having witnessed two brothers, the representative of India and the representative of Pakistan, altercate about a tragic situation which we do not have to go into from this rostrum.

183. I felt constrained to say a few words in view of the fact that, instead of turning over a new leaf, we are reverting to the era of the cold war, which was abortive and produced nothing but hatred, rancour, accusations, recriminations and vilifications signifying nothing, since they created more troubled waters. And it was we, the small Powers, who suffered most as a result.

184. I do not like to call any Power “super-Power”; let us call them the major Powers. It seems that they have learnt nothing from history. Not “they” as a people, because among the wisest in Asia one finds the Chinese; among the wisest in the sub-continent one finds many a sage; and I do not want to beat the drum of the Middle East for having produced teachers and prophets.

185. The sad thing about the whole matter this evening is that we are opening old wounds that should have healed.

186. I have never heard anyone speak with such studied criticism as our colleague from China; he was cool and collected. And I have rarely seen our colleague from the Soviet Union speak with such high emotion. They were talking in terms of duets, whereas we in this Organization should constitute an orchestra and produce a symphony rather than a cacophony between brothers who are at odds with certain policies.

187. I for one have the right to reply, because our colleague from China referred to capitalism. I happen to be a capitalist. But I am a capitalist who has never exploited anyone. I do not own any houses which I rent to others. I do not have a factory that uses cheap labour. I do not have land which a farmer ploughs while I sell the produce at a profit. I do not have cows that are milked by peasants while I sell the milk. A capitalist is a man who saves a little money, or perhaps a little more than that: one who is thrifty. Then if he cannot work for one reason or another he employs that money so that it may generate work. Advisedly, there is what is called enlightened capitalism.

188. We should not start hurling criticisms at each other from this rostrum: “You are a capitalist”, “He is an imperialist”—these are rubrics and stereotyped phrases of which we are tired. We have listened to them since 1945.

For heaven's sake bring us something a little more creative. You cannot label this fellow a capitalist and that fellow an imperialist and the other fellow a socialist—imperialist—and I have never heard anything like that: it is a contradiction in terms.

189. I hope that in the long run Asian wisdom will prevail. Let us not borrow from our European cousins, who are only a thousand years old in civilization. Let us revert to our Asian tradition of magnanimity and chivalry. There is no lack of it throughout Asia.

190. I think I shall ask to speak any time I find that our debates are becoming abortive, because we are here, paid by our governments, to work and produce, rather than to exchange vilifications and accusations.

191. What if one does not agree that there should be a world disarmament conference? Say "I do not agree", and that is the end of it. And if you agree, you agree.

192. Now you are revealing something to us, China and the Soviet Union: you are neighbours and you are under such tension. You are neighbours. You are both communist. Good Lord, what have you left for the capitalists? You are both communists. You are entitled to be communists. We are all entitled to elaborate the ideology that suits us best.

193. What I am going to say is very sad indeed. Two or three representatives of some small Powers passed by me and said, "Good, we will benefit from the dissension between the Soviet Union and China, and one day between China, perhaps, and the United States, and another day between the United States and the Soviet Union". There you have three combinations.

194. I submit that it is we, the small countries, who will pay the price—but the peoples of the three major Powers will also pay a stiff price. After all, we are representatives, it is true, of peoples, but we are representatives of governments first and foremost here in this forum. There is no such thing as a Russian or a Chinese, or an American atmosphere; it is one atmosphere, and should there be a nuclear war, the whole atmosphere would be poisoned; and we have to live in that atmosphere. Should there be—God forbid—any conflict between the major Powers, the conflict will not be on their soil. It will most likely be on the checkerboard which contains the small Powers. And the major Powers will not be moving wooden pieces. They will be playing with the destiny of small nations.

195. It is not that they like to do so, but it is the force of circumstances. Enlightening ourselves from what has happened in history, we realize that it is usually the powerless and the small who become the victims. With the danger of nuclear warfare, their own people would also be prime victims.

196. We, the small nations, should therefore not draw any consolation from the situation that obtains: the playing of this or that duet. Let us have some orchestration, some harmony, as is prescribed in the Charter, rather than borrow antiquated phrases from past debates. To our colleagues and brothers from China I must say that we have

witnessed this style from 1947 until now, this style of accusations and vilifications. And we have got nowhere. I do not say you have no right in the matter—you are a sovereign State and who are we to tell another sovereign State, whether it be one of 800 million or one of 8 million, what it should do? But if I venture to express my views it is because I would indeed be sad to leave this United Nations worse than I found it, and I think that expresses the feelings of many elders here, like Mr. Matsch of Austria, who was also a representative at the League of Nations. I was an *ex officio* observer at the League of Nations, and to see us committing the same mistakes here is indeed tragic.

197. One last word. We Arabs speak in proverbs, perhaps because they are a dramatic means of conveying a meaning succinctly. For my Arab brothers who are here I shall first recite one in Arabic and then translate it into English: "The wind and the sea had a quarrel, but the one who paid the price was the sailor in the boat". We are all of us in the boat. The small nations are sailors in the boat. We cannot afford to see the wind and the sea engage in such a violent quarrel for, although they may hurt themselves, they will drown us with them.

198. Thank you, Sir, for being patient with me and allowing me to make this statement. I felt that I could not keep silent, because silence would be guilt in the face of a storm that may gather and sweep us all away instead of clearing the way for peace, progress and justice—the motto of the twenty-fifth anniversary of this very same Organization.

199. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Saudi Arabia. However, it might be helpful to the Assembly to know that the general debate on item 97 has been closed, and the Presidency would appreciate it if the speakers would kindly confine themselves to the present stage of the discussion.

200. I have been requested by the representative of India to allow him to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

201. Mr. Narendra SINGH (India): Ambassador Shahi has taken the opportunity once again to make certain false charges against my country. I should like here to read out the text of the statement made by my Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, in both Houses of Parliament of India the day before yesterday:

"The House is aware of the announcement made by President Yahya Khan yesterday declaring a state of emergency throughout Pakistan. This declaration is the climax of his efforts to divert the attention of the world from Bangla Desh and to put the blame on us for a situation which he himself has created. Such a declaration by a military régime, which has been waging war on the people of Bangla Desh for the last eight months and threatening us with total war for the last three to four months, has no meaning except to deceive his own people and the world at large.

"President Yahya Khan's message had created the impression that at last he was heeding the advice of a number of world leaders to abandon the military approach and seek a political solution. We hope that the

declaration of emergency is not a device to get out of the compulsion of seeking a political solution.

"Since the recession of the monsoon, the successes of the Mukti Bahini have apparently upset the plans of the military régime. The liberation forces of Bangla Desh, with the full support of their entire people, have taken a heavy toll of Pakistan's armed forces and have freed large parts of their homeland.

"At great cost to ourselves, we have been shouldering the intolerable burden of looking after nearly 10 million terror-stricken men, women and children who have fled from Pakistani oppression. The refugees want to return to their homes under credible guarantees of safety and human dignity. We are determined to ensure that they are enabled to do so as soon as possible.

"Pakistan's armed forces have been shelling our border areas, inflicting damage on life and property. Its air force has wantonly violated our air space several times . . . Spies and saboteurs have been blowing up trains and bridges. Since March, 1971, we have lodged 66 protests for border violations covering 890 incidents. For air violations we have lodged 17 protests covering 50 incidents. However, these protests have had no effect and, to cover up their incessant violations, Pakistani propaganda media have been putting out the story that we are engaged in an undeclared war and have mounted massive attacks with tanks and troops. This is wholly untrue. In fact, it was Pakistan which threatened total war and moved its entire armed strength into operational positions on our borders and launched a massive 'Hate India' campaign, with slogans like 'Crush India', 'Conquer India'. We had, therefore, to take appropriate measures and moved our forces to defensive positions in order to protect the integrity of our country and the lives and properties of our citizens. It has never been our intention to escalate the situation or to start a conflict. To this end we have instructed our troops not to cross borders except in self-defence. We cannot ignore our experience of 1947-1948, January 1965 and August-September 1965.

"On 21 November Pakistani infantry, supported by tanks and artillery, launched an offensive on the Mukti Bahini, who were holding the liberated areas around Boyra, five miles from our eastern border. Pakistani armour, under heavy artillery cover, advanced to our border, threatening our defensive positions. Their shells fell in our territory, wounding a number of our men. The local Indian military commander took appropriate action to repulse the Pakistani attack. In this action 13 Pakistani Chafee tanks were destroyed.

"On 22 November Pakistani forces called up an air strike of four Sabre jets on our positions. These were

intercepted within Indian territory by our Gnats, which destroyed three Sabre jets. Two of the Pakistani pilots who baled out were captured on our territory. We regard this as a purely local action.

"Even though Pakistan has declared an emergency, we shall refrain from taking a similar step unless further aggressive action by Pakistan compels us to do so in the interest of national security. In the meantime, the country should remain unruffled. Our brave armed forces and our people will ensure that any adventurism on the part of the military régime of Pakistan meets with adequate rebuff. The rulers of Pakistan must realize that the path of peace—of peaceful negotiation and reconciliation—is more rewarding than that of war and the suppression of liberty and democracy."

202. The PRESIDENT: I understand that the representative of Pakistan wishes to exercise the right of reply.

203. Mr. JALAL (Pakistan): The representative of India seemed to be talking of something that was not on our wavelength. We talked about the modification of what I may call battle orders. He read out to this gathering the full text of a speech which Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made in one of their two Houses of Parliament. He did not once contradict the fact that a Defence Department spokesman of the Government of India has openly admitted that the instructions that under no circumstances any Indian armed forces was to cross the border had been modified and that in fact such a modification had been put into effect and that the Indian Army had indeed crossed the Pakistan border several times. Those who are up to date with the news must have heard today that this morning the Indian spokesman in New Delhi once more admitted that these modified orders had been taken advantage of again and that the Pakistan border and Pakistan territory had been violated.

204. He was talking about the Mukti Bahini, as he calls them; we call them the militant secessionists. Well, it is difficult for us to have anything to say about them, but the whole strategy, the whole manner in which these misled people are being used to serve India's ends, is most unfortunate. From the battle plan, it seems obvious that Indian heavy artillery and tanks move into the Pakistan border and then they let the Mukti Bahini come in later on. Then these secessionists are left to battle—I concede, unfairly—with the Pakistan regular army, and the result is a complete massacre. They are promoting the massacre of our own people by our own people, however misguided they may be, and this is for us a matter of deep regret.

*The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.*