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Human Rights Council Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances

Communications transmitted, cases examined, observations made and other activities conducted by the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances*

122nd session (21–30 September 2020)**

I. Communications

1. Between 16 May and 30 September 2020, the Working Group transmitted 35 cases under its urgent procedure, to: Belarus (1), Cameroon (1), China (1), Egypt (8), Iran (Islamic Republic of) (2), Lao People's Democratic Republic (4), Libya (1), Pakistan (12), Qatar (1), Rwanda (1), Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) (2) and Yemen (1).
2. At the session, held from 21 to 30 September 2020, the Working Group decided to transmit 224 newly reported cases of enforced disappearance to 15 States: Afghanistan (9), Bangladesh (2), China (52), Democratic People's Republic of Korea (12), Egypt (6), India (9), Iran (Islamic Republic of) (4), Iraq (1), Lebanon (1), Pakistan (37), Russian Federation (23), Saudi Arabia (3), Serbia (1), Sri Lanka (56) and Syrian Arab Republic (8).
3. The Working Group also decided to transmit five newly reported cases of violations tantamount to enforced disappearances allegedly perpetrated by non-State actors in Libya (1) and Yemen (4).
4. The Working Group also clarified 223 cases, in: China (6), Egypt (37), Pakistan (174), Philippines (1), Russian Federation (1), Syrian Arab Republic (1), Turkey (2) and United Arab Emirates (1). A total of 206 cases were clarified on the basis of information provided by the Governments and 19 on the basis of information provided by sources.
5. Between 16 May and 30 September 2020, the Working Group transmitted 43 communications jointly with other special procedure mechanisms. The communications consisted of 14 joint urgent appeals, to: Bahrain (1), Cambodia (2), Cameroon (2), Egypt (1), Honduras (1), Iran (Islamic Republic of) (1), Kenya (1), Pakistan (1), Thailand (2), United Arab Emirates (1) and United States of America (1); and 29 joint allegation letters, to: Angola (1), Bangladesh (1), Belarus (2), Brazil (1), China (2), Colombia (1), Democratic People's Republic of Korea (1), Djibouti (1), Egypt (2), India (1), Iran (Islamic Republic of) (1), Lao People's Democratic Republic (1), Mauritania (1), Pakistan (1), Rwanda (1), Sri Lanka (1), Turkey (1), United Arab Emirates (2), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

* The annexes to the present document are reproduced as received, in the languages of submission only.

** In view of the travel restrictions imposed due to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the Working Group decided to meet remotely by videoconference, from 21 to 30 September 2020, to partially fulfil the programme of activities of its 122nd session. During these meetings, the Working Group continued to review information received on alleged cases of enforced disappearance, as well as information submitted by States and by sources of cases.



(1), United States of America (2), Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) (1), Yemen (1), Zimbabwe (1) and to an “other actor” (Keenie Meenie Services) (1).¹

6. On 18 September 2020, the Working Group issued eight key guidelines on coronavirus disease (COVID-19) and enforced disappearances, jointly with the Committee on Enforced Disappearances. The guidelines aim to assist and guide States in adhering to their international obligations relating to enforced disappearance during the COVID-19 pandemic (see annex IV).

7. During the session, the Working Group reviewed and adopted one general allegation concerning Colombia (see annex II).

8. The full list of press releases and statements issued by the Working Group during the reporting period is contained in annex V.

II. Other activities

9. During the session, the Working Group held virtual meetings with relatives of disappeared persons and with non-governmental organizations working on the issue. On 22 September 2020, it also held a virtual coordination meeting with the members of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances.

10. Also during the session, the Working Group held a virtual meeting with representatives of the Government of Japan, and informal bilateral meetings with other government representatives. In follow-up to its exchanges with representatives of the Government of Colombia during the session, the Working Group requested a visit to Colombia in 2021.

11. On 23 and 25 September 2020, as part of the events to mark 40 years since its creation, the Working Group, together with the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, convened two public webinars on the search for disappeared persons and investigation of enforced disappearances. On 24 September 2020, the Working Group also convened an online expert panel on missing persons and memory governance, together with T.M.C. Asser Instituut.

12. Between the 121st and the 122nd sessions, the Working Group continued to engage with States in the provision of assistance and technical cooperation. On 27 and 28 July 2020, the Working Group facilitated an online workshop with representatives of the Government in Turkmenistan focusing on the Working Group’s mandate, practice and methods of work.

13. The Working Group has also continued engaging with specialized search mechanisms worldwide, and welcomes the fruitful exchanges taking place between the search units of Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico and Peru.

III. Information concerning enforced or involuntary disappearances in States reviewed by the Working Group during the session

Afghanistan

Standard procedure

14. The Working Group transmitted nine cases to the Government under its standard procedure (see annex I).

¹ Such communications are made public 60 days after their transmission to the State, along with responses received from the Government, if any, and are available from <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/Tmsearch/TMDocuments>.

Application of the six-month rule

15. On 31 August 2020, the Government provided information on one outstanding case, on the basis of which the Working Group decided to apply the six-month rule to the case.

Information from the Government

16. On 31 August 2020, the Government of Afghanistan transmitted information concerning two outstanding cases, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the cases.

Angola**Joint allegation letter**

17. On 2 June 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning alleged acts of intimidation and harassment of human rights defenders working for the non-governmental organization Missão de Beneficência Agropecuária do Kubango, Inclusão, Tecnologias e Ambiente (MBAKITA).

Bahrain**Application of the six-month rule**

18. On 23 December 2019, the Government provided information on the case of Mohamed Ramadhan Issa Ali Hussein, on the basis of which the Working Group decided to apply the six-month rule to the case.

Joint urgent appeal

19. On 29 July 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning Mohamed Ramadhan Issa Ali Hassan and Hussain Ali Moosa Hassan Mohamed, two Bahraini nationals who are facing imminent execution following the confirmation on 13 July 2020 of death sentences against them by the Court of Cassation.

Bangladesh**Standard procedure**

20. The Working Group transmitted two cases to the Government under its standard procedure (see annex I).

Joint allegation letter

21. On 1 September 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning alleged threats against and acts of intimidation and legal prosecution of Asaduzzaman Noor, and the ongoing harassment of his family members in Bangladesh.

Observation

22. The Working Group notes with concern that it has been raising similar reports regarding the situation of enforced disappearance in Bangladesh for several years. It is alarmed that it continues to receive cases, many of which relate to individuals linked to opposition political parties, and by the apparent impunity for the practice in the country. It also strongly regrets the lack of engagement with the Working Group. In this regard, the Working Group notes that it has not received replies to any outstanding cases this year and that only one case has ever been clarified since the Working Group transmitted the first case to the Government in 1996. The Working Group hopes to receive information on the outstanding cases as soon as possible.

23. The Working Group reiterates its interest in undertaking a visit to Bangladesh, as expressed in several communications transmitted since 2013.

Belarus

Urgent procedure

24. Under its urgent procedure, the Working Group transmitted one case to the Government concerning Maria Kalesnikava, who was allegedly abducted on 7 September 2020 near the National Art Museum in Minsk by unidentified individuals presumably associated with the Belarusian security services.

Application of the six-month rule

25. On 5 October 2020, the Government provided information, on the basis of which the Working Group decided to apply the six-month rule to the case of Ms. Kalesnikava.

Joint allegation letters and replies

26. On 27 August 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning reports of torture and ill-treatment of detained protesters and at least seven reported cases of enforced disappearance.

27. On 31 August 2020, the Government of Belarus provided a reply to the joint allegation letter.

28. On 16 September 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning the reported enforced disappearance of Ms. Kalesnikava and what appears to be systematic targeting and persecution by security forces of the members of the opposition associated with the Coordination Council. According to the reports received, most of the members of the opposition were also subjected to enforced disappearance.

29. On 5 October 2020, the Government of Belarus provided a reply to the joint allegation letter.

Information from sources

30. Sources provided updated information on three outstanding cases, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the cases.

Observation

31. The Working Group is concerned at allegations of short-term enforced disappearances perpetrated by the Belarusian security services against peaceful protesters and opposition leaders with the intention of quashing protests, stifling dissent and sowing fear. Equally alarming are reports indicating the lack of compliance with fundamental legal safeguards, which are enshrined in national legislation and international law to prevent human rights violations. These include immediate registration, judicial oversight of the detention, notification of family members as soon as an individual is deprived of liberty, and the right to hire a defence lawyer of one's choice. In this regard, the Working Group requests the Government of Belarus to fully comply with these safeguards, conduct effective, independent and impartial investigations into serious allegations of enforced disappearance, and provide an effective remedy to the victims and their families.

32. The Working Group also remains concerned about a culture of impunity stretching back decades. It therefore recalls that the termination or suspension of a criminal investigation regarding an alleged enforced disappearance does not release the State from its obligation to search for and locate the disappeared person or his or her remains, including the identification and return of remains to the relatives, with due respect for cultural customs. In this connection, the Working Group reiterates a request to the Government of Belarus to take the necessary steps to develop and implement a time-bound strategy for the search process.

Brazil

Joint allegation letter and reply

33. On 29 June 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning public remarks made by the President and members of his Government denying the existence of a military dictatorship in Brazil between 1964 and 1985, providing a positive assessment of the events that had occurred during that period and trivializing the human rights violations that had been committed. The letter also concerned the alleged interference of the President and members of his Government in the work of existing transitional justice mechanisms.

34. On 26 August 2020, the Government transmitted a reply to the above-mentioned joint allegation letter.

Cambodia

Joint urgent appeals and replies

35. On 12 June 2020 and 15 July 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, urgent appeals concerning the alleged abduction and enforced disappearance in Cambodia of Wanchalearm Satsaksit, a national of Thailand, and the lack of progress in the investigation.

36. On 19 June 2020 and 13 August 2020, the Government of Cambodia provided replies to the urgent appeals.

Cameroon

Urgent procedure

37. Under its urgent procedure, the Working Group transmitted one case to the Government concerning Njoka Kingsley Fomomyuy, a citizen of Cameroon born on 26 March 1975, who was allegedly abducted on 15 May 2020 from his place of residence by national security agents.

Joint urgent appeals and reply

38. On 7 July 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an urgent appeal concerning the alleged enforced disappearance, torture and killing in detention of Samuel Ajiekah Abuwe, alias Samuel Wazizi, and the alleged arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance of Njoka Kingsley Fomonyuy.

39. On 14 August 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an urgent appeal concerning the alleged violations of the rights of 13 individuals belonging to the Anglophone minority in the North-West and South-West regions of Cameroon, including arbitrary detention, prolonged pretrial detention, enforced disappearance, torture and ill-treatment, as well as extrajudicial killings.

40. On 7 September 2020, the Government transmitted a reply to the joint urgent appeal sent on 7 July 2020.

China

Urgent procedure

41. Under its urgent procedure, the Working Group transmitted one case to the Government concerning Aikebaier Aisaiti, also known as Ekpar Asat, reported in May 2020 to being held in a prison in Aksu City (Akesu), Aksu Prefecture, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.

Standard procedure

42. The Working Group transmitted 52 cases to the Government under its standard procedure (see annex I).

Clarification based on information from sources

43. On the basis of the information provided by sources, the Working Group decided to clarify six cases. Reportedly, two individuals were freed from detention, three were in detention and one was released on bail.

Information from sources

44. Sources provided information on five other outstanding cases, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the cases.

Application of the six-month rule

45. On 12 June 2020, the Government provided information on 10 outstanding cases, on the basis of which the Working Group decided to apply the six-month rule to those cases. The individuals concerned are reportedly at liberty.

Information from the Government

46. On 12 June 2020, the Government of China transmitted information concerning six cases, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the cases.

Joint allegation letters and replies

47. On 2 June 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning the reported continued enforced disappearance of Gedhun Cheokyi Nyima, and the regulation of reincarnation of Tibetan living Buddhas against the religious traditions and practices of the Tibetan Buddhist minority.

48. On 13 July 2020, the Government provided a reply to the above-mentioned letter. The Working Group remains concerned that the fate and whereabouts of Gedhun Cheokyi Nyima remain unconfirmed.

49. On 13 July 2020, the Government also provided a reply to the joint allegation letter sent on 7 May 2020, which was still pending translation at the time of the session.

50. On 13 August 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning the trial and sentencing, behind closed doors, of Yu Wensheng, whose place of detention remains undisclosed.

Replies to joint urgent appeals

51. On 18 May 2020, the translation was received of two replies transmitted by the Government on 3 April 2020 regarding two joint urgent appeals sent on 9 March 2020 and 12 March 2020.

Reply to general allegation

52. On 12 June 2020, the Government replied to the general allegation transmitted after the 119th session (A/HRC/WGEID/119/1, annex I). The reply is contained in annex III to the present report.

53. With regard to the reply, the Working Group welcomes information on the safeguards in place. However, while the information provided indicates that families must be notified of the *liuzhi* measures, it does not indicate whether notification includes information on the individual's place of detention or on detainees' access to family visits or their right to legal counsel. The Working Group reiterates that accurate information on an individual's place of detention, including all transfers, must be made promptly available to his or her family members; failure to do so can constitute an enforced disappearance.

Observation

54. The Working Group received information from the Government regarding the procedures for notifying family members of detainees held in detention centres in Xinjiang. The information indicated that families are informed of the location of the centre and that individuals may return home and receive visits.

55. However, the Working Group is concerned by the patterns of cases it is receiving, particularly the number of allegations indicating that persons associated with disappeared individuals went to embassies or consulates of China in different countries and either did not receive replies, or were told to return to China to find information about their relatives. The Working Group is also extremely concerned at allegations that individuals are detained because they have relatives abroad or have travelled abroad and that individuals residing in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region are afraid to contact relatives abroad because that might lead to reprisals.

56. The Working Group underlines the fact that the families of forcibly disappeared persons are also victims of the crime and that the anguish and sorrow of the family may constitute a violation of the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The right to truth is an absolute right which cannot be restricted and there is an absolute obligation to take all the necessary steps to find the person (A/HRC/16/48). The Working Group also underlines the fact that families should be protected from ill-treatment or intimidation (Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, art. 13). This applies irrespective of whether the family member in question is residing in the same country as the disappeared individual or abroad.

57. The Working Group further underlines the fact that the right to a prompt and effective judicial remedy as a means of determining the whereabouts or state of health of persons deprived of their liberty and/or of identifying the authority ordering or carrying out the deprivation of liberty is required to prevent enforced disappearances. States must ensure that any person having knowledge or a legitimate interest who alleges that a person has been subjected to enforced disappearance has the right to complain to a competent and independent State authority and to have that complaint promptly, thoroughly and impartially investigated by that authority. These rights are also applicable to family members of forcibly disappeared individuals who reside abroad and, in this regard, consulates and embassies should provide assistance to such family members.

58. The Working Group hopes that the Government will soon reply positively to its country visit request, transmitted on 19 February 2013, and the subsequent reminders it has sent.

Colombia

Joint allegation letter

59. On 25 September 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning the undermining and questioning of the mechanisms of the Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition, and of criticism of and attacks on the reputation of the members of those institutions

General allegation

60. The Working Group received information from credible sources alleging difficulties encountered in Colombia in implementing the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. The general allegation, contained in annex II, focuses on the right to truth and justice for victims of enforced disappearance in relation to the dredging works in the San Antonio estuary, which could reduce the possibility of identifying the human remains of missing persons whose bodies were disposed of in that area.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Standard procedure

61. The Working Group transmitted 12 cases to the Government under its standard procedure (see annex I).

Information from sources

62. Sources provided updated information on one outstanding case, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the case.

Joint allegation letter

63. On 23 June 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning the reported enforced disappearance of civilians and prisoners of war from the Republic of Korea following the outbreak of the Korean war on 25 June 1950, and concerning individuals who were abducted following the war, including nationals of the Republic of Korea, of Japan and of other States.

64. On 30 June 2020, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea provided a reply to the joint allegation letter.

Observation

65. The Working Group again reiterates its serious concern regarding the lack of cooperation from the Government, including the identical replies it continues to receive in relation to transmitted cases. The Working Group emphasizes the importance of carrying out investigations, including searches, in order to clarify the fate or whereabouts of disappeared persons, and to provide precise information to the Working Group on the efforts undertaken and the results of the investigations.

Djibouti

Joint allegation letter and reply

66. On 27 July 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning the reported incommunicado detention, torture and ill-treatment of Mohammed Abdullah Saleh al-Asad in the United Republic of Tanzania, then in Djibouti, in Afghanistan and in Yemen, within the framework of the extraordinary rendition programme conducted by the United States of America. The letter also concerned Zahra Ahmed Mohamed, his wife, who allegedly suffered the psychological consequences of not having any information about her husband's fate or whereabouts.

67. On 24 September 2020, the Government of Djibouti provided a reply to the joint allegation letter.

Egypt

Urgent procedure

68. Under its urgent procedure, the Working Group transmitted eight cases to the Government concerning:

(a) Ahmed Abdelsattar Mohamed Amasha Shawky, a citizen of Egypt born on 3 June 1962, allegedly arrested by police officers on 17 June 2020 at his home and taken to an unknown location. A first urgent action concerning Ahmed Abdelsattar Mohamed Amasha Shawky was transmitted and clarified by the Working Group in 2017;

(b) Ibrahim Ahmad, a citizen of Egypt born on 5 February 1984, allegedly last seen in June 2020 at the National Security Branch in Al Abbasiya, Cairo Governorate;

(c) Osama Saad Mohamed Emara, a citizen of Egypt born on 7 August 1989, allegedly arrested on 29 July 2020 with his father and brother at their family home by national security agents and police officers;

(d) Ahmed Saad Mohamed Emara, a citizen of Egypt born on 8 December 1993, allegedly arrested on 29 July 2020 with his father and brother at their family home by national security agents and police officers;

(e) Saad Mohamed Mohamed Emara, a citizen of Egypt born on 29 December 1951, allegedly arrested on 29 July 2020 with his two sons at their family home by national security agents and police officers;

(f) Ahmed Mohamed Ahmed El-Sayed Ahmed Ayoub, a citizen of Egypt born on 4 February 1994, allegedly abducted on 6 July 2020 from his home by members of the State security forces wearing civilian clothing;

(g) Hasan Gouda, a citizen of Egypt born on 12 April 1995, allegedly last heard of on 16 April 2020 while detained at Bandar Aswan police station;

(h) Sara Fathi Ibrahim Ahmad, a citizen of Egypt born on 8 December 1989, allegedly abducted from her home on 15 April 2020 by national security agents in Cairo.

Standard procedure

69. The Working Group transmitted six cases to the Government under its standard procedure (see annex I).

Clarification based on information from sources

70. On the basis of the information provided by sources, the Working Group decided to clarify nine cases concerning Abdulrahman Ali Mahmoud Ali Fatih al-bab, Hasan Mahmoud Ragab al-Kabbani, Ahmed Mosbah Abu Sati Tantawy, Naji Mohammad Naji Mohammad Salim, Hadi Refaat Abdulwahed Mostafa, Ashraf Zahran, Mohamed Ahmed Hassan Ahmed and Mohamaden Gouda, who are all in detention, and Abdulrahman Mohamed Yasin Ali, who was released from detention.

Application of the six-month rule

71. On 3 September 2020, the Government provided information, on the basis of which the Working Group decided to apply the six-month rule to the case of Sara Fathi Ibrahim Ahmed, who has been released from detention on bail.

Information from sources

72. Sources provided information on three outstanding cases, but the information was considered to be insufficient to clarify the cases. On the basis of new information received from one source, the Working Group decided to suspend the six-month rule it had applied at the 121st session to a case concerning an Egyptian minor.

Clarification

73. On the basis of information previously provided by the Government, the Working Group decided to clarify 28 cases. In 21 of those cases, the following individuals were reportedly in detention: Abdelrahman Mohamed, Omar Khaled Taha Ahmed, Mohamed Gamal Ahmed Abdulmaguid Ali, Islam Raafat Abdel Mohsen Mohane, Abdurrahman Karim Fattouh Hamed, Mosaab Kamal Tawfik Mosaab Kamal Tawfik, Jamal Abdelwahab Awad Allam, Ahmed Adel Abdo El Zraa, Moatasem Ballah Adel Abdo El Zraa, Abdel Rahman Saad Saad Eid Noser, Mohamed Ezzeddin Youssef Malek, Islam Ali Abd El-aal Mohammed, Mohamed Abdel Malek Hussein Abdel Malek, Alaa El Sayed Ali Ibrahim, Hesham Abdelmaksoud Ahmed Ghobashi, Shrief El-Sayed El-Mohamady El-Sayed, Mohamed Ali Hassan Seoudy, Mohamed Magdi Mohamed Hussien, Magdi Mohamed Mohamed Abdeldayem, Ahmed Adel Sultan Abd al-Halim and Mustafa Hussein Mohamed Omar. In seven of the cases, the following individuals have reportedly been released: Mohamed Ahmed Abdelhamid Antar, El Sayed Qasem Saleh Ali El Gezawy, Eslam Atya Ali Atya

Sarhan, Ahmed Kamal Ragab Soliman Frag, Salah Hussin Mohamed Ali Ghoneim, Moaaz Ahmed Mohamed El Farmawy and Mohamed El-Sherif.

Joint urgent appeal and reply

74. On 19 August 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an urgent appeal concerning Mohammad Awsam Abdulaziz Ali Rashed, a student at the Faculty of Engineering, Mechatronics Department, and his father, Awsam Abdulaziz Ali Rashed, both allegedly held incommunicado at the Burj Al Arab Prison following convictions by military and criminal courts, respectively, without due process. As at 1 March 2020, their fate remained unknown.

75. On 9 September 2020, the Government transmitted a reply to the above-mentioned joint urgent appeal.

Joint allegation letter

76. On 2 June 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning the arrest and ongoing pretrial detention of prominent labour rights activists and trade union leaders, including Haytham Mohamadein, Hassan Barbary, Alla Essam and Khalil Rizk.

77. On 29 July 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning the reported continued detention in Egyptian prisons of human rights defenders and other individuals who, since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, have had their communication with the outside world heavily restricted, their pretrial detention renewed in absentia and are at grave risk of contracting the virus.

Observation

78. The Working Group has continued to receive reports of arrests carried out by police officers and national security agents without the presentation of arrest warrants, and of persistent obstacles to lodging complaints with competent authorities concerning enforced disappearances.

79. The Working Group regrets that it had to reopen the case of Ahmed Shawky Abdelsattar Mohamed Amasha on 23 June 2020. The new allegations of enforced disappearance follow a first instance of reported enforced disappearance initially transmitted and clarified in 2017. The Working Group finds these reports all the more regrettable given that the case of Ahmed Shawky Abdelsattar Mohamed Amasha was included in the 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020 reports of the Secretary-General on cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights. The Working Group notes with concern the reports of enforced disappearance of the journalist Osama Saad Mohamed Emara and two members of his family including his father, Saad Mohamed Mohamed Emara and his brother, Ahmed Saad Mohamed Emara. The Working Group notes that it continues to receive reports of disappearances that are perpetrated during the process of release, as was reported to be the case for Hasan Gouda. The Working Group recalls that persons deprived of their liberty should be released in a manner permitting reliable verification that they have actually been released, and in conditions in which their physical integrity and ability to fully exercise their rights are assured. In this regard, the Working Group requested information regarding measures taken by the Government of Egypt to implement the provisions of article 11 of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.

80. The Working Group suspended the six-month rule previously implemented for the case of a minor and is extremely concerned at the allegations that the child might have died as a result of torture while in detention.

El Salvador

Information from the Government

81. On 21 August 2019, the Government of El Salvador transmitted information concerning four cases, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the cases.

Honduras

Joint urgent appeal

82. On 25 September 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an urgent appeal concerning the violent death and disappearance of several human rights defenders in Honduras, as well as threats and harassment against them, in what appears to be a situation of high risk for human rights defenders.

India

Standard procedure

83. The Working Group transmitted nine cases to the Government under its standard procedure (see annex I).

Joint allegation letter

84. On 1 July 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning the reported sudden closure of the Jammu and Kashmir State Human Rights Commission in October 2019, which has left the people of the region with limited legal recourse to seek justice for potential human rights violations.

Observation

85. The Working Group is concerned that it continues to receive cases relating to enforced disappearances that allegedly occurred in Jammu and Kashmir, including cases from the 1990s and 2000s. It notes that in many instances, despite the legal recourse that was undertaken and the decades that have elapsed since the disappearances, there has been little progress on establishing the fate and whereabouts of the individuals.

86. The Working Group wishes to reiterate that States should take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent and terminate acts of enforced disappearance, that no circumstances whatsoever may be invoked to justify enforced disappearances, that investigations into all cases should be conducted for as long as the fate of the victims of enforced disappearances remain unclarified and that acts constituting enforced disappearance should be considered a continuing offence as long as the perpetrators continue to conceal the fate and whereabouts of persons who have disappeared and these facts remain unclarified (Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, arts. 3, 7, 13 and 17).

87. The Working Group deeply regrets that it has not received any replies from the Government concerning any of the cases for several years and hopes to receive information soon. The Working Group also hopes that the Government will soon reply positively to the country visit request, transmitted on 16 August 2010, and the subsequent reminders it has sent.

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Urgent procedure

88. Under its urgent procedure, the Working Group transmitted two cases to the Government concerning:

(a) Manuchehr Bakhtiari, who was reported on 20 July 2020 to have been abducted from Kish Island Airport on 13 July 2020 by individuals from the Ministry of Intelligence;

(b) Hedayat Abdollahpour, who was reported on 16 June 2020 to have been transferred from death row in the central prison in Urumieh, in West Azerbaijan Province, to an unknown location.

Standard procedure

89. The Working Group transmitted four cases to the Government under its standard procedure (see annex I).

Application of the six-month rule

90. On 7 and 27 August 2020, the Government provided information on two outstanding cases, on the basis of which the Working Group decided to apply the six-month rule to those cases.

Information from the Government

91. On 11 August 2020, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran transmitted information concerning one case, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the case.

Joint allegation letter

92. On 3 September 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning reports of the continued refusal to disclose the circumstances of the deaths and the whereabouts of the remains of thousands of political dissidents who were forcibly disappeared and then allegedly extrajudicially executed between July and early September 1988, and the authorities' refusal to provide the families with accurate and complete death certificates.

Joint urgent appeal and reply

93. On 17 June 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an urgent appeal concerning the alleged enforced disappearance and reported secret execution of Hedayat Abdollahpour, a member of the Kurdish minority.

94. On 12 August 2020, the Government transmitted a reply to the above-mentioned joint communication. In its reply, the Government contests the allegations made by the special procedure mechanisms and provides its own account of the events, indicating that Mr. Abdollahpour has been executed.

Observation

95. With regard to the above allegations, the Working Group recalls article 10 of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, which establishes that any person deprived of liberty shall be held in an officially recognized place of detention and, in conformity with national law, be brought before a judicial authority promptly after detention. Article 10 (2) requires States to promptly make available accurate information on the detention of such persons and their place or places of detention, including transfers, unless a wish to the contrary has been manifested by the persons concerned. In addition, article 10 (3) requires States to maintain an official up-to-date register of all persons deprived of their liberty in every place of detention.

96. With regard to the information received concerning the ongoing concealment of burial sites of those forcibly disappeared and then allegedly executed, the Working Group recalls that an enforced disappearance continues until the fate and whereabouts of the individual concerned are established, irrespective of the time passed, and that the family members have a right to truth which means the right to know about the progress and results of an investigation, the fate or the whereabouts of the disappeared persons, and the circumstances of the disappearances, and the identity of the perpetrator(s) (A/HRC/16/48). The refusal to

hand over the body of an executed individual for burial amounts to inhuman treatment of the family concerned (see A/67/279, para. 52, and CCPR/C/106/D/2120/2011). As the Working Group emphasized in its general comment on the right to the truth in relation to enforced disappearance, the family of a deceased individual has the right to have the remains of their loved one returned to them, and to dispose of the remains according to their own tradition, religion or culture (A/HRC/16/48, sect. II (G), para. 6).

Iraq

Standard procedure

97. The Working Group transmitted one case to the Government under its standard procedure, concerning Abdel-Wahhab Allawi Aboud Latif Al Najdi, a citizen of Iraq born on 17 August 1978, last heard of on 6 June 2007 while he was on a bus between Fallujah and Baghdad. The Mahdi Army is believed to be responsible for his disappearance.

Kenya

Joint urgent appeal

98. On 20 May 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning the threats made against the female human rights defender, Ruth Mumbi, who is at risk of enforced disappearance for defending the right to housing of evicted individuals.

Lao People's Democratic Republic

Urgent procedure

99. Under its urgent procedure, the Working Group transmitted four cases to the Government concerning Vacher Her, Zoua Her, Kia Vang and a child, all allegedly disappeared after passing the Paksan checkpoint.

Information from the Government

100. On 21 August 2020, the Government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic transmitted information concerning two cases, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the cases.

Joint allegation letter

101. On 31 August 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning the reportedly alarming situation of the Hmong indigenous community located in the Phou Bia region (referred to as the ChaoFa Hmong), including indiscriminate attacks against the community, enforced disappearances, denial of access to food, safe drinking water and health care.

Lebanon

Standard procedure

102. The Working Group transmitted one case to the Government under its standard procedure concerning Khaled Alwies, a citizen of the Syrian Arab Republic holding refugee status in Lebanon, who was allegedly arrested on 22 November 2012 while he was at the residency renewal branch of the General Directorate of General Security in Beirut.

Libya

Urgent procedure

103. Under its urgent procedure, the Working Group transmitted one case to the Government concerning Usama Edawi A. Aburas, a national of Libya who was the acting head of the National Anti-Corruption Commission in Libya, and was allegedly abducted at around noon on 15 June 2020 by a group of armed men belonging to the Special Deterrence Force, which is allegedly affiliated with the Ministry of the Interior.

Standard procedure

104. The Working Group announced that, from September 2019, it would start documenting violations tantamount to enforced disappearances perpetrated by non-State actors (A/HRC/42/40, para. 94). Accordingly, during the session, the Working Group considered one case tantamount to an enforced disappearance, allegedly perpetrated in the part of the territory of Libya that is controlled by the Libyan National Army.² The Working Group transmitted the case to the Government of Libya and the Libyan National Army under its standard procedure. The case concerns Omar Al Mukhtar Ahmed Al Daguel, a Libyan citizen who was allegedly last seen in December 2020 at Al Kouifya prison in Benghazi, which is under the authority of the Libyan National Army.

Application of the six-month rule

105. On 22 January 2020, the Government provided information, on the basis of which the Working Group decided to apply the six-month rule to six cases, concerning: Ayman Salim Muhammad Dababash, Abdelatif Al Raqoubi Salem Muhammad, Salem Saeed Salem Awad Jadran al-Mughrabi, Ali al-Dabea Saleh al-Talhi, Almanafi Ahmed Abdessalam Hassane and Majdi Faraj Hamad Salah Al Hawat. All six men were said to have been released from detention.

Information from the Government

106. On 22 January 2020, the Government of Libya transmitted information concerning eight outstanding cases, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the cases.

Maldives

Information from the Government

107. On 11 June 2020, the Government of Maldives transmitted information concerning one case, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the case.

Observation

108. The Working Group welcomes the information that the parliament of Maldives has approved ratification of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and hopes that the ratification process can be completed promptly.

Mauritania

Joint allegation letter

109. On 11 June 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning the absence of effective remedies for the victims of human rights violations linked to the period known as the *passif humanitaire*, and concerning the bill on transitional justice that has been brought before Parliament.

² The Working Group stresses that the cases addressed to the Libyan National Army do not in any way imply the expression of any opinion concerning the legal status of any territory, city or area, or of its authorities.

Mexico

Information from sources

110. Sources provided information on four outstanding cases, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the cases.

Morocco

Reply to general allegation

111. On 17 June 2020, the Government of Morocco provided a response to the general allegation transmitted by the Working Group on 17 April 2020 (A/HRC/WGEID/120/1, para. 99 and annex I). In its reply, the Government of Morocco notes that the general allegation deliberately ignores the merits of the Moroccan transitional justice process. It recalls the progress that has been made throughout that process with regard to the right to truth, memory, compensation and guarantees of non-repetition. The full text of the response is contained in annex III to the present report.

Nepal

Reply to joint allegation letter

112. On 15 June 2020, the Government transmitted a reply to the joint allegation letter sent on 16 March 2020 concerning the reported lack of effective consultation with victims concerning the amendment of the Act on the Commission on Investigation of Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconciliation 2071 (2014).

Pakistan

Urgent procedure

113. Under its urgent procedure, the Working Group transmitted 12 cases to the Government concerning:

- (a) Zubair Ahmed, a national of Pakistan, allegedly abducted from Soro Mand military camp by the Frontier Corps on 15 May 2020;
- (b) Sana Ullah Baloch, a national of Pakistan, allegedly abducted while on his way home to Muhalla Thana Road, Kharan, Balochistan, by security officers dressed in plain clothes, on 11 May 2020;
- (c) Muhammad Azum, a national of Pakistan, allegedly arrested in Zabad village in the Gresha area of Nal, Khuzdar, Balochistan, by the Pakistani army during a raid on his home on 13 June 2020;
- (d) A minor, allegedly abducted from his residence in Nazrabad, Balochistan, by military and security forces on 1 May 2020;
- (e) Muzawar Khan, a national of Pakistan, allegedly arrested in Miami Kabul Khel, Shewah, North Waziristan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, by military secret service agents on 10 May 2020;
- (f) Aurang Zaib, a national of Pakistan, allegedly abducted from house No. 5342, sector 15/16, 14 Gulshan Mazdoor Hub River Road, Baldia town, Karachi, by armed men in plain clothes, at around 8 p.m. on 2 June 2020;
- (g) Mina Jan, a national of Pakistan, allegedly abducted from his home town in Tank district adjacent to the South Waziristan Federally Administered Tribal Area, by Pakistani police officers of the Counter-Terrorism Department and agents of the Pakistani military secret service on 5 August 2020;

(h) Ghullam Mahdi Chandio, alias Ghullam Mahdi, a national of Pakistan, allegedly arrested during a raid on his residence at flat No. 407 Iqra Complex, Gulistan-e-Johar, Karachi, by armed personnel, including police and rangers in plain clothes, on 7 July 2020;

(i) Mahfooz Ismail Notkani, a national of Pakistan, allegedly arrested in his residence at Notkani Muhalla, ward No. 04, near the boys' higher secondary school in Shaheed Fazil Rahoo (Golarchi) in the district of Badin, by armed uniformed State agents, including police officers, and individuals in plain clothes at around 3.10 a.m. on 24 June 2020;

(j) Shafqat Hussain Malik, a national of Pakistan, allegedly arrested in his residence at house No. B-2 Civil Hospital Colony Ghotki, Sindh, by armed and masked Pakistan Rangers Sindh personnel in military uniform along with two persons in plain clothes, at around 12.45 a.m. on 22 June 2020;

(k) Waqar Manzoor, a national of Pakistan, allegedly abducted in front of his residence in Tazi Abad, Pedrak, Turbat in Kech Makran, by unidentified persons believed to be State agents, at around 8.45 p.m. on 20 June 2020;

(l) Ejaz Khan, a national of Pakistan, allegedly abducted from Madrassa Darul Huda, Capital territory of Islamabad, by agents of the Pakistani military secret service on 22 August 2020.

Standard procedure

114. The Working Group transmitted 37 cases to the Government under its standard procedure (see annex I).

Application of the six-month rule

115. On 31 August 2020, the Government provided information on 77 outstanding cases, on the basis of which the Working Group decided to apply the six-month rule to those cases.

Information from the Government

116. On 31 August 2020, the Government of Pakistan transmitted information concerning 29 cases, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the cases.

Clarification

117. On the basis of information previously provided by the Government, the Working Group decided to clarify 174 cases, which had been placed under the six-month rule at its 120th session (A/HRC/WGEID/120/1, para. 108), concerning: Shahab Ikram, Shahab Ikram, Allah Ditto, Zakir Bangulzai, Mir Sohrab Khan Marri, Sharif Ahmad Baloch, Bukhsh Muhammad, Murtaza Chandio, Zubirahmed Baloch, Hameed Baloch, Karim Uddin Syed, Muhammad Rehan Muhammad Haroon, Tanveer Ahmed Zameer Ahmed, Syed Aashiq Elahi, Muhammad Rehan Akram, Faisal Khurshid, Mansoor Muhammad, Mirza Zeeshan Baig, Muhammad Ali Muhammad Yousuf, Muhammad Ghayas Ahmed Muhammad Muhammad Shabir Ahmed, Muhammad Shafiq Muhammad Rafiq, Naveed Ahmed Syed, Syed Akhtar Hussain Ather Hussain, Aamir Ali Ashiq Ali, Muhammad Kashif Muhammad Yousuf, Farhan Farooq Muhammad Farooq, Muhammad Shakeel Fateh Muhammad Khan, Ali Mehmood, Syed Farhan Hashmi Syed Maqbool Ahmed, Syed Saleem Ali Syed Faraz Ali, Ali Lodhi Nasarullah, Shah Nawaz Gayasuddin, Zafar Ali Khan Zahid Ali Khan, Faisal Nadeem Jameel Ahmed, Waseem Qamar Ali, Zeeshan Zaki, Muhammad Imran Muhammad Yameen, Nasir Shah Ali, Muhammad Aamir Saeed, Waseem Ahmed Abdul Ghani, Muhammad Sohail, Riyaz Ahmed, Raheel Abdul, Muhammad Siddiq, Shabbir Ali Abid Ali, Rizwan Akram Niazi, Shahnawaz Muhammad Iftikhar, Muhammad Iftikhar Muhammad Wali, Haider Ali Khursheed Haider, Faheem Andah Rajput, Muhammad Ejaz, Zeeshan Saleem Durrani, Farhan Mitha Umer Deen, Abdul Sattar Khan Sher Afghan, Zahid Ali Khan Nasir Ali Shah, Ali Syed Murad Ali Syed Muhammad, Barkat Ali Rehmatuddah, Rayaz Ahmed Mushtaq Ahmed, Muhammad Yaseen Muhammad Yameen, Shakeel Ahmed Ghaffar, Imran Khan, Aziz Ali Ali, Hammad Sharif, Jan Muhammad, Jahanzib Jahanzib, Hafiz Mohammad Tabish Qazi Mohammad Safdar, Abdul Hameed Muhammad Aslam, Aziz

Uddin Assif Aziz, Waheed Ullah Ubaid Ullah Habib, Qureshi Niaz Hussain Mohammad Imram, Naveed Anwar Siddique Khursheed Anwar Siddique, Khushi Muhammad Salahuddin, Iqbal Ali Liaquat Ali, Safeer Rehman Shafique Rehman, Muhammad Majid Khan Junaid Muhammad Mufeez Khan, Muhammad Nizam Abdul Jalil, Syed Rehan Uddin Misbah Uddin, Raheel Mansoori Abdul Sattar, Muhammad Nazar Mukarram Abdul Razzaq, Muhammad Tariq Siddiqui Masood Ilahi Siddiqui, Majid Ali Khan Kakir Ali Khan, Muhammad Irfan Khan Muhammad Abrar Khan, Sharif Ikramuddin, Usama Junaid, Jawad Ali, Bahadur Sher Syed, Fazal Raheem, Luqman, Sagheer Ahmad Shah, Muhammad Amir Baloch, Hafiz Hassan Akbar Hafiz Hassan Akbar, Hasnain Afzal Raza Hasnain Afzal Raza, Saleem Shazad Mehboob Elahi, Mohammad Ashraf Noor Mohammad, Nafees Ahmed Siddiqui Zaheer Ahmed Siddiqui, Kashif Kashif, Khamadan Khan, Hafiz Basheer Ahmad, Huzaifa, Molana Shalim, Adeem Sartaj, Naeem Muhammad, Akhtar Naveed, Abid Hussain, Kashif Khan, Zabit Khan, Mohammed Azeem, Muhammad Farooq Muhammad Ashraf, Syed Shiraz Ali Syed Zahid Ali Hashmi, Gul Mohammad, Ghulum Raza Raza Jarwar, Ijaz Ullah, Alamgir Qambrani, Muhammad Farhan Muhammad Hassan, Abdul Aziz Ansari Abdul Sattar Ansari, Muneer Ali Khan, Amir Panhar Masroor Ahmed, Farman Ali Mst Fehmida Khanam, Inam Ullah Abassi, Abdullah Shah, Munir Ahmed Haqani, Muhammad Islam, Riaz Ul Iqbal, Imran Mumtaz, Ahmed Khan, Muhammad Yousaf, Muhammad Yasir, Mehran, Khalil Ahmad Baloch, Mehboob, Tehseen Askari, Nasir Aziz, Umer Yaar, Abdul Rasheed, Shehzad Qayyum, Hidayatullah Lohar, Gul Wahab, Muhammad Farooq, Shoukat Khan, Muhammad Ismail, Ali Muhammad, Zia-ur-Mustafa Channa, Syed Ameer Faisal, Mudasir Hassan, Fareed Ghulam, Syed Sheeraz Haider Ali Sheeraz, Abdul Rehman, Shakoor Abdul, Tahir Mehmood, Molana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, Mihadullah, Hussain Ahmed, Saleem Shah, Azhar Haroon, Muhammad Sher Ali Khan, Shakirullah, Muhammad Siddique, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Bakht Sher, Rasool Nawaz, Sabir Khan, Sumiullah, Khan Laali, Rasheed Iqbal, Fahad Mehmood, Israr Ahmad, Sohail Ahmad Khan, Asad Abbas, Safdar Muavia, Zakirullah, Ajab Khan, Imtiaz, Ali Murad Rind Baloch and Muhammad Aqib Shahid. In 89 of these cases, the individuals concerned were reportedly found to be at liberty; in the other 85 cases, the individuals concerned were reportedly in detention.

Joint urgent appeal

118. On 11 June 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an urgent appeal concerning the continued disappearance of and risk of torture and ill-treatment faced by the human rights defender Idris Khattak.

Joint allegation letter

119. On 31 August 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning the continued incommunicado detention and risk of torture and ill-treatment faced by Mr. Khattak.

Paraguay

Reply to joint allegation letter

120. On 14 August 2020, the Government transmitted a reply to the joint allegation letter sent on 7 August 2019. The letter provided details of the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Paraguay of 22 May 2019 bringing to a close the criminal proceedings against the defendants Camilo Almada Morel and Eusebio Torres Romero for crimes relating to arbitrary detention, arbitrary execution and torture committed between April 1976 and May 1979 and providing for their release, allegedly leading to impunity for crimes against humanity.

Philippines

Clarification based on information from sources

121. On the basis of the information provided by sources, the Working Group decided to clarify one case. The individual is reportedly deceased.

Information from sources

122. Sources provided information on three other outstanding cases, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the cases.

Information from the Government

123. The Working Group finished processing the information provided by the Government of the Philippines on 11 September 2019. The remaining information concerning 17 cases was considered insufficient to clarify those cases.

Observation

124. The Working Group hopes that the Government will soon reply positively to the country visit request, transmitted on 3 April 2008, and the subsequent reminders it has sent.

Qatar**Urgent procedure**

125. Under its urgent procedure, the Working Group transmitted one case to the Government, concerning Abdul Razzak Ahmad Erzaik, a citizen of the Syrian Arab Republic born on 4 May 1985, allegedly abducted on 27 May 2020 near his home in Doha by the State security services.

Russian Federation**Standard procedure**

126. The Working Group transmitted 23 cases to the Government under its standard procedure (see annex I).

Information from sources

127. Sources provided updated information on 15 outstanding cases, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the cases.

Information from the Government

128. On 22 July 2020, the Government transmitted information concerning 10 cases, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the cases.

Clarification

129. On the basis of information previously provided by the Government, the Working Group decided to clarify one case, concerning Alvi Lechievich Khaiderkhanov, who is reportedly in detention.

Observation

130. Concerning the outstanding cases from the North Caucasus, the Working Group reminds the Government of the Russian Federation of its humanitarian obligation to search for and locate disappeared persons or their remains, including the identification and return of remains to the relatives, with due respect for cultural customs. In this regard, the authorities of the Russian Federation should take the necessary steps to develop and implement a time-bound strategy for the search process.

131. With reference to the outstanding cases of the disappearances of Sakhalin Koreans, the Working Group urges the local and federal authorities of the Russian Federation to locate interment sites in Sakhalin, identify the human remains of these individuals, and return them to their relatives in the Republic of Korea.

132. In this connection, the Working Group considers that the right to truth is both a collective and an individual right. Each victim has the right to know the truth about violations that affected him or her, but the truth also has to be told at the level of society as a vital safeguard against the recurrence of violations. It is therefore essential that archives, including military archives, be opened and made fully accessible to the public, including to relatives of the disappeared.

133. The Working Group hopes that the Government will soon reply positively to its country visit request, transmitted on 2 November 2006, and the subsequent reminders it has sent.

Rwanda

Urgent procedure

134. Under its urgent procedure, the Working Group transmitted one case to the Government concerning Venant Abayisenga, a citizen of Rwanda who was allegedly abducted on 6 May 2020 at around 4 p.m. near his place of residence.

Joint allegation letter

135. On 30 September 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, an allegation letter concerning Paul Rusesabagina, who has reportedly been forcibly transferred from Dubai to Kigali, under uncertain circumstances, and is currently detained in Rwanda, facing terrorism-related charges.

Saudi Arabia

Standard procedure

136. The Working Group transmitted three cases to the Government under its standard procedure (see annex I).

Serbia

Standard procedure

137. The Working Group transmitted one case to the Government under its standard procedure concerning Šimun Marojević, who was allegedly abducted and executed on 20 June 1992 during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina by an armed militia affiliated with the security and intelligence services of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The whereabouts of his remains are reportedly unknown.

138. In accordance with its methods of work, the Working Group transmitted copies of the case to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Government of Croatia.

Sri Lanka

Standard procedure

139. The Working Group transmitted 56 cases to the Government under its standard procedure (see annex I).

Information from the Government

140. On 20 July 2020, the Government of Sri Lanka transmitted information concerning 32 cases, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the cases.

Joint allegation letter

141. On 4 June 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning the alleged role of Keenie Meenie Services and nationals of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland employed and/or contracted by the company in violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law that were allegedly committed during the armed conflict in Sri Lanka between 1984 and 1988, and the related lack of accountability and remedies for victims.

Syrian Arab Republic**Standard procedure**

142. The Working Group transmitted eight cases to the Government under its standard procedure (see annex I).

Clarification based on information from sources

143. On the basis of information previously provided by the sources, the Working Group decided to clarify one case, concerning Hadi Al Zuhuri, who was reportedly released from prison.

Observation

144. The Working Group continues to receive alarming reports concerning intimidation of and reprisals against relatives of the disappeared because of their legitimate inquiries about the fate and the whereabouts of their disappeared family members. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic must ensure that all persons involved in the investigation into cases of enforced disappearance, including complainants, their relatives, lawyers and witnesses, are protected against ill-treatment, intimidation and reprisals, as stipulated in article 13 of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. In this regard, the Working Group requests the Government to take the necessary measures to protect relatives of the disappeared from targeted reprisals and to uphold their basic rights to truth, justice, reparation and memory.

145. The Working Group reiterates its request to the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic to immediately stop and prevent enforced disappearances; search for and locate the victims; conduct transparent, independent and effective investigations into these abuses, with particular emphasis on the reported deaths in custody; hold the perpetrators accountable; and provide redress to the families of the disappeared.

Thailand**Joint urgent appeals and reply**

146. On 12 June 2020 and 15 July 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, urgent appeals concerning the alleged abduction and enforced disappearance in Cambodia of a national of Thailand, Wanchalearm Satsaksit, and the lack of progress in the investigation.

147. On 11 August 2020, the Government of Thailand provided a reply to the urgent appeals.

Turkey**Information from the Government**

148. On 20 July 2020, the Government of Turkey transmitted information concerning seven cases, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the cases.

Clarification

149. On the basis of information previously provided by the Government, the Working Group decided to clarify two cases, concerning Turgut Capan, who is reportedly in detention, and Birlik Abdalbaki, who is reportedly dead.

Joint allegation letter

150. On 10 July 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter regarding the arrest of a human rights defender and his potential extradition to the Islamic Republic of Iran, where he may be at risk of being subjected to enforced disappearance.

Observations

151. The Working Group calls on the Government of Turkey to promptly address the recommendations made following the Working Group's visit to Turkey, the implementation of which was assessed in its recent follow-up report (A/HRC/45/13/Add.4). In accordance with its humanitarian obligations, Turkey should establish a dedicated and independent search mechanism in close coordination with relatives of the disappeared. During this process, the Working Group has recommended that the authorities consider independent initiatives led by civil society, such as studies mapping burial sites across Turkey.

152. The Working Group reiterates that the termination or suspension of a criminal investigation regarding an alleged act of enforced disappearance does not release the Government of Turkey from its obligation to search for, locate and identify disappeared persons or their remains, including their return to the relatives, with due respect for cultural customs.

153. The Working Group remains committed to providing technical assistance to the Government in meeting its human rights and humanitarian obligations within the framework of eradicating enforced disappearances and protecting the rights to truth, justice, memory and reparation.

Ukraine

Information from the Government

154. On 20 July 2020, the Government of Ukraine transmitted information concerning five cases, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the cases.

Application of the six-month rule

155. On 22 September 2020, the Government provided information on four outstanding cases, on the basis of which the Working Group decided to apply the six-month rule to those cases.

Information from a non-State actor

156. On 13 July 2020, representatives of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic provided information on four outstanding cases, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the cases.³

³ The cases were transmitted following the announcement of the Working Group, in September 2019, that it would start documenting violations tantamount to enforced disappearances perpetrated by non-State actors (A/HRC/42/40, para. 94).

United Arab Emirates

Clarification based on information from sources

157. On the basis of the information provided by sources, the Working Group decided to clarify the case of Sheikha Latifa Mohammed Al Maktoum, who is reportedly being held in incommunicado detention at her family home in Dubai.

Discontinuation

158. The Working Group decided, exceptionally and in accordance with the provisions in paragraph 28 of its methods of work, to discontinue its consideration of two outstanding cases concerning Eliana Massiel Domingues Cid and one child. The cases may, however, be reopened at any time.

Joint urgent appeal

159. On 15 July 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an urgent appeal concerning 20 former detainees at Guantanamo Bay, who were resettled in the United Arab Emirates between November 2015 and January 2017 and were held in detention, without trial or charge.

Joint allegation letters

160. On 14 July 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning a national of Yemen living in Saudi Arabia, who was arrested at a checkpoint in Yemen, detained in unofficial detention facilities and allegedly tortured and intimidated by forces of Yemen and their allies.

161. On 30 September 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning Paul Rusesabagina, who has reportedly been forcibly transferred from Dubai to Kigali under uncertain circumstances and is currently detained in Rwanda, facing terrorism-related charges.

Observation

162. The Working Group is deeply concerned about the reports it received of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance in clandestine detention centres located in Yemen and run by the authorities of the United Arab Emirates. In the context of the armed conflict and humanitarian crisis in Yemen, which have been ongoing since 2015, individuals have reportedly been detained arbitrarily, not informed of the reasons for their arrest, denied access to lawyers or a judge and held incommunicado for prolonged or indefinite periods of time, amounting to enforced disappearances. These human rights violations have allegedly been carried out under the pretext of counter-terrorism operations by officials of the United Arab Emirates and of Yemen, operating in cooperation.

163. In this regard, the Working Group recalls the provisions of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, establishing that each State shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent and terminate acts of enforced disappearance in any territory under its jurisdiction (art. 3); the obligation to criminalize enforced disappearance (art. 4); that no circumstances, including no threat or state of war, may be invoked to justify enforced disappearances (art. 7); that any person deprived of liberty shall be held in an officially recognized place of detention and, in conformity with national law, be brought before a judicial authority promptly after detention (art. 10); the right to complain to a competent and independent State authority and to have that complaint promptly, thoroughly and impartially investigated by that authority (art. 13); and the prohibition on granting amnesties or similar measures that might have the effect of exempting individuals who have committed or participated in the commission of enforced disappearances from any criminal proceedings or sanction (art. 18).

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Joint allegation letter and reply

164. On 4 June 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning the role of Keenie Meenie Services and nationals of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland employed and/or contracted by the company in violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law that were allegedly committed during the armed conflict in Sri Lanka between 1984 and 1988, and the related lack of accountability and remedies for victims.

165. On 2 August 2020, the Government provided a reply to the joint allegation letter.

United States of America

Joint urgent appeal

166. On 15 July 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an urgent appeal concerning 20 former detainees at Guantanamo Bay, who were resettled in the United Arab Emirates between November 2015 and January 2017 and were held in detention, without trial or charge.

Joint allegation letters

167. On 14 July 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning a national of Yemen living in Saudi Arabia, who was arrested at a checkpoint in Yemen, subjected to enforced disappearance while in detention from 19 May to 25 June 2018 in unofficial detention facilities, and allegedly tortured and intimidated by the forces of Yemen and the United Arab Emirates. It is alleged that intelligence agents of the United States participated in the extraterritorial interrogation.

168. On 27 July 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning the reported incommunicado detention, torture and ill-treatment of Mohammed Abdullah Saleh al-Asad in the United Republic of Tanzania, then in Djibouti, in Afghanistan and in Yemen, within the framework of the extraordinary rendition programme conducted by the United States of America. The letter also concerned Zahra Ahmed Mohamed, his wife, who allegedly suffered the psychological consequences of not having any information about her husband's fate or whereabouts.

Viet Nam

Reply to joint allegation letter

169. On 26 May 2020, the Government transmitted a reply to the joint allegation letter sent on 31 March 2020, concerning the alleged arbitrary arrest and potential enforced disappearance of Truong Thi Ha while crossing the border into Viet Nam, in what appears to be an act of reprisal for her human rights advocacy.

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

Urgent procedure

170. Under its urgent procedure, the Working Group transmitted two cases to the Government concerning:

(a) Leonardo David Chirinos Parra, reportedly disappeared on 21 April 2020 in the city of Maracaibo, Zulia State, after agents of the Directorate General of Military Counter-intelligence assigned to the headquarters in Boleíta took him into custody;

(b) José Antonio Zamora Uriana, reportedly abducted at the Mariscal Juan Crisóstomo Falcón Naval Base in the city of Punto Fijo, Falcón State, on 7 May 2020.

Information from the source

171. Sources provided information on one outstanding case, but the information was considered insufficient to clarify the case.

Joint allegation letter

172. On 14 September 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning the disappearance of at least 73 migrants, including potential victims of trafficking, who were heading from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the island of Curaçao and to Trinidad and Tobago in three different boats between April and July 2019.

Yemen**Urgent procedure**

173. Under its urgent procedure, the Working Group transmitted one case to the Government concerning Redwan Al Hashidi, who was allegedly arrested on 8 July 2020 by the Yemeni security services at Say'un Hadramawt Airport following an alleged deportation from Egypt.

174. In accordance with its methods of work, the Working Group transmitted a copy of the case to the Government of Egypt.

Standard procedure

175. The Working Group announced that, from September 2019, it would start documenting violations tantamount to enforced disappearances perpetrated by non-State actors (A/HRC/42/40, para. 94). Accordingly, during the session it considered four cases tantamount to enforced disappearances, allegedly perpetrated in territory controlled by the de facto authorities in Sana'a.⁴ Under its standard procedure, the Working Group transmitted to the de facto authorities in Sana'a the cases concerning:

(a) Abkr Barakhli, allegedly abducted on 16 March 2016 in Hudaydah by an armed group allegedly affiliated with the de facto authorities in Sana'a;

(b) Ghazali Mahdabi, allegedly abducted on 15 October 2015 on the street in Hudaydah by an armed group allegedly affiliated with the de facto authorities in Sana'a;

(c) Tariq Khalaf, allegedly abducted on 18 March 2016 from his home in Al-Qamaria by an armed group affiliated with the de facto authorities in Sana'a;

(d) Omar al-Shareef, allegedly abducted on 2 January 2016 from his home located in Ahmed Sagheer village by an armed group affiliated with the de facto authorities in Sana'a.

Joint allegation letter

176. On 14 July 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning a national of Yemen living in Saudi Arabia, who was arrested at a checkpoint in Yemen and detained from 19 May to 25 June 2018 in unofficial detention facilities, where he was allegedly tortured by forces of Yemen and their allies.

⁴ The Working Group stresses that the cases addressed to the de facto authorities in Sana'a do not in any way imply the expression of any opinion concerning the legal status of any territory, city or area, or of its authorities.

Zimbabwe

Joint allegation letter and reply

177. On 2 June 2020, the Working Group transmitted, jointly with other special procedure mechanisms, an allegation letter concerning the arbitrary arrest, disappearance, torture and ill-treatment of Joannah Mamombe, Cecelia Chimbiri and Netsai Marowa, members of the MDC Alliance Youth Assembly, between 13 and 15 May 2020.

178. On 16 June 2020, the Government transmitted a reply to the joint allegation letter.

Annex I

Standard procedure cases

Afghanistan

1. The Working Group transmitted 9 cases to the Government, concerning:
 - (a) Ezzatullah, allegedly arrested in November 2017 by police officers from his residence in Kandahar city;
 - (b) Aminullah Rafiqi allegedly arrested on 16 March 2019 from his residence in Kandahar city, by members of the special unit of the National Directorate of Security (NDS03);
 - (c) Shafiullah allegedly abducted on 24 October 2016 from his shop in Kandahar city by two armed men believed to be plainclothes police officers;
 - (d) Sayed Mohamad, allegedly arrested on 26 September 2016 from his residence in Kandahar city by police officers;
 - (e) Ahmad Khan, allegedly arrested on 4 September 2017 from his shop in Kandahar city by armed men believed to be members of a police special unit;
 - (f) Sayed Ibrahim Hashimi allegedly disappeared on 12 June 2016 from Rig detention facility in Dan District, Kandahar;
 - (g) Gulalai, allegedly arrested on 8 December 2015 from his shop in Kandahar, by the police;
 - (h) Fazel Rahman, allegedly arrested on 28 June 2015 from his shop in Kandahar City by police officers;
 - (i) Mohibullah, allegedly arrested on 15 March 2014 from his shop in Kandahar city by police officers.

Bangladesh

2. The Working Group transmitted 2 cases to the Government, concerning:
 - (a) Ansar Ali Ali, allegedly abducted on 18 April 2012, from Dhaka by armed men believed to be state agents;
 - (b) Saidur Rahman Kazi, allegedly arrested from Jessore Municipality Park on 5 April 2017 by police officers.

China

3. The Working Group transmitted 52 cases to the Government, concerning:
 - (a) Tajiguli Wufuer, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
 - (b) Reyihanguli Reman, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
 - (c) Mieradili Abulaiti allegedly arrested in August 2017, from Kashgar city, Xinjiang, by Chinese police officers wearing uniforms;
 - (d) Tueroxun Suliye disappeared in 201. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;

- (e) Lhadar, allegedly arrested on 8 October 2019 in his village in Nagchu (Naqu) County, Nagchu Prefecture by local police;
- (f) Norsang allegedly arrested at the end of September in 2019 in Nagchu (Naqu) County, Nagchu Prefecture by local police;
- (g) Imamu Tuoheti allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (h) Nur Maimaiti Imamu allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (i) Nur Amina Imamu, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (j) Rukeya Imamu, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (k) Saidula Tuoheti, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (l) Reziwanguli Maimaiti, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (m) Haisiteli Ahong, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (n) Yidiresi Ahon, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (o) Denaguli Ahong, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (p) Kasimujiang Ahong, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (q) Yiheya Bawudung, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (r) Zuorigul Bwaudung, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (s) Ayixiamuguli Bwaudung, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (t) Wufuerjiang Bawudung, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (u) Omarjiang Abudurexiti, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (v) Naijibula Abulaiti, allegedly disappeared on 20 February 2018 after being summoned to a police station in Kashgar;
- (w) Maimaitiming Reman, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (x) Abuduwaili Reman, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (y) Alimujiang Mamutijiang, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (z) Ayinuer Mamutijiang, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (aa) Areziguli Reman, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (bb) Maihemutijiang Kunahung, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;

- (cc) Guoyaguli Reman, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (dd) Nurmaimaiti Aizizi, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (ee) Rusitaimujiang Aizizi, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (ff) Wusimanjiang Maimaiti, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (gg) Buheliqiemu Maimaiti, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (hh) Aihemaitijiang Kunahung, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (ii) Aini Maimaiti, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (jj) Reyihanguli Abudurexiti, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (kk) Busala Maimaittuersun, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (ll) Abudourezake Maimaittuersun, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (mm) Maimaitiming Maimaittuersun, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (nn) Haisiteli Abudurexiti, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (oo) Alimu Hashani, allegedly was arrested in August 2018 in Beijing by the police;
- (pp) Mamat Abdullah arrested on 29 April 2017 from Urumqi City, Xinjiang, by Security Administration Police;
- (qq) Nuerbiya Mamutijiang, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (rr) Kunahung Maimaiti, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (ss) Hushtar Eysa, allegedly disappeared in 2017. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (tt) Yalkun Isa, allegedly disappeared in 2017;
- (uu) Ailijiang Mamuti, allegedly arrested in May 2017;
- (vv) Ametjan Abdurashid, allegedly last seen in late 2016 at Kashgar City People's Court;
- (ww) Abdukahar Ebeydulla, allegedly detained in 2016 by the Police;
- (xx) Yakefu Niyazi, allegedly arrested in June 2017 in arrested in Xinhe (Toqsu) Country, Akesu (Aqsu) Prefecture, Xinjiang;
- (yy) Hairiguli Niyazi, arrested in August 2017 in Urumqi;
- (zz) Yusufu Niyazi, seen in August 2016 in detention in Tumshuq, Xinjiang.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

4. The Working Group transmitted 12 cases to the Government, concerning:

- (a) Ki-Yeong Jang, allegedly abducted on 11 December 1969 after Korean Air Lines flight YS-11 was hijacked by an agent associated with the security services of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
- (b) Gyeong-Suk Jeong, allegedly abducted on 11 December 1969 after Korean Air Lines flight YS-11 was hijacked by an agent associated with the security services of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
- (c) Hyuk-geun Kwon, allegedly abducted on 11 December 1969 after Korean Air Lines flight YS-11 was hijacked by an agent associated with the security services of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
- (d) Jong-soon Kim, allegedly abducted on 11 December 1969 after Korean Air Lines flight YS-11 was hijacked by an agent associated with the security services of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
- (e) Ki-Ha Lee, allegedly abducted on 8 August 1975 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea forces while on board a fishing boat;
- (f) Ki-sik Min, allegedly abducted on 8 August 1975 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea forces while on board a fishing boat;
- (g) Kyung-soo Kim, allegedly abducted on 20 November 1965 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea authorities when arriving by accident to Chanjon Port;
- (h) Sang-won Lee, allegedly abducted on 29 May 1968 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea forces while on board a fishing boat;
- (i) Soon-chul Ko, allegedly abducted on 7 November 1968 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea forces while on board a fishing boat;
- (j) Sung-ryong Lee, allegedly abducted on 15 February 1974 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea forces while on board a fishing boat;
- (k) Yi-deuk Kim, allegedly abducted on 30 October 1968 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea forces while on board a fishing boat;
- (l) Young-chun Hwang, allegedly abducted on 25 December 1971 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea forces while on board a fishing boat.

Egypt

5. The Working Group transmitted 6 cases to the Government, concerning:

- (a) Mr. Mohamed Salah Ahmed Mohamed Bayoumi, an Egyptian citizen born on 1 July 1987, allegedly abducted on 3 January 2020 in front of his home by security forces in plainclothes and uniforms;
- (b) Mahmoud Ali, an Egyptian citizen born on 12 October 1998, allegedly arrested on 22 March 2020 from his home located in El-Iraqy village, Abo-Hammad centre, Sharqia governorate, Egypt by Police officers in uniform and National Security agents in civilian clothes;
- (c) Mr. Mohamed Hadeya, an Egyptian teacher born on 13 July 1988, allegedly arrested on 22 December 2019 at his home located in Cairo Governorate by masked State Security agents;
- (d) Assem Ahmed Abdul Hameed Amin, a 25 years old Egyptian citizen, allegedly arrested on 5 March 2018 from Al-Sarraj Mall by security forces both in uniform and plainclothes;
- (e) Yousif Mohamed Mahmoud Amin, an Egyptian citizen born on 15 June 1998, allegedly arrested on 3 November 2019 from his home in Cairo by police forces in uniforms and plainclothes;

(f) Darwish Abd El-Hafiz, an Egyptian citizen born on 3 February 1988, allegedly arrested on 27 October 2018 in front of his home, in 6th of October City, by National Security Agents.

India

6. The Working Group transmitted 9 cases to the Government, concerning:

(a) Abdul Khaliq Mir, allegedly last seen on 16 October 2000 in Yatipora Headquarters of the army;

(b) Ghulam Mohammad Thachoo, allegedly last seen on 24 November 2005 in Mahu camp, Mirpur, Jammu and Kashmir;

(c) Ghulam Nabi Butt, allegedly disappeared on 20 August 2002 while on his way to Khadi, Adpinchla, Banihal. It is believed that the Army was responsible for his disappearance;

(d) Irshad Amin Khan, allegedly disappeared on 17 December 2004 after going to the Army headquarters in Srinagar;

(e) Jalaluddin Hajam, allegedly disappeared on 15 August 2000 near Naidiki village. It is believed the Army was responsible for his disappearance;

(f) Mehraj-ud Din, allegedly abducted on 20 August 1999 from Baramulla District by members of the Indian army;

(g) Mohammad Akbar Rather, allegedly abducted on 28 November 1996 from his residence in Baramulla District by members of the Indian army;

(h) Mohammad Sharief Wani, allegedly abducted in 2000 by the personnel of 12 Rashtriya Rifles;

(i) Nazir Ahmad Gojjar, allegedly abducted near his residence in Bandipora District, on 26 January 1992 by the Dogra Regiment of the Army.

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

7. The Working Group transmitted 4 cases to the Government, concerning:

(a) Mansouri Abdollah, allegedly arrested in Nezam Abad Street in Tehran in June-July 1981 by state security forces, imprisoned since then, and last seen on 16 October 2000 in Yatipora Headquarters of the army;

(b) Nafiseh Rouhani, allegedly arrested at Falake Khomeini (aka Khomeini Square) in Mashhad on 18 August 1988 by agents of Iranian Security services;

(c) Ahmad Behtash, allegedly arrested at the home of a person associated with him in Dowlat Avenue in Tehran on the evening of 23 or 26 July 1986 by agents of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) dressed in uniform;

(d) Abbas-Ali Monshi Roudsari, allegedly arrested in his home on 31 July 1986 by security forces from the Revolutionary Committees or the Ministry of Intelligence.

Pakistan

8. The Working Group transmitted 37 cases to the Government, concerning:

(a) Noor Dad Nil, allegedly abducted on 29 November 2019 in Ormara, district Gwadar, Balochistan by Pakistani Navy while returning home;

(b) Usman Usman, allegedly abducted on 16 August 2012 from the Inayat Kalay Bazar (Market) in Tehsil Khar by the Pakistani Army and military secret service;

(c) Muhammad Maqsood Kiyani Nill, allegedly abducted on 22 September 2017 in Doli Tehsil Bagh by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) while returning home from Muzaffarabad;

(d) Umar Safdar Nill, allegedly abducted on 28 January 2016 by three men of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who broke into his house at 5:30 p.m.;

(e) Muhammad Waseem, allegedly abducted in his temporal residence at Street no 11, Golra Railway station, Islamabad, on 10 March 2018 by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

(f) Ansar Ahmad Khan Nill, allegedly abducted at 6:00 a.m. on 20 June 2014 from his residence at PO Malot, Chanut, Bagh District, Dhirkot, Azad Kashmir, by seven members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

(g) Nazir ul Islam Khan Nill, allegedly abducted in April 2011 by fifteen members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) while traveling from Rawalpindi to Gujarat in Punjab;

(h) Ibrahim Shah Syed, allegedly abducted on 16 April 2015 at lunchtime by Pakistani Police. It is believed that Mr. Ibrahim Shah Syed is detained in an internment centre run by the Pakistani Army;

(i) Insaf Ali Dayo, allegedly abducted on 29 May 2019 at 11 a.m. from his tailoring shop at Maghani Shopping Centre, Larkana, District Larkana, Sindh by police team from Police Station Rehmatpur, along with agents from the intelligence agency dressed in uniforms and in plainclothes in white Vigo vehicle and reportedly taken to Rahmarpur Police Station;

(j) Mohammad Hassaan, allegedly abducted on 14 February 2020 at Qili Qambarani, Qambarani Road Quetta, Balochistan, by agents of the Inter-Service Intelligence ISI when buying household items;

(k) Salman Ali Saleem, allegedly abducted in the early morning of 7 May 2019 during a raid by agents of the Frontier Constabulary (FC) while offloading diesel from his car in Bolo town of Mand, Balochistan;

(l) Zakir Balochzahi, an Iranian national, allegedly abducted in October 2019 in Panjgur, district Panjgur, Balochistan, by agents of the Inter Service Intelligence ISI and reportedly taken into custody by intelligence officials from Chetkan town in Panjgur;

(m) Irfan Khan, allegedly arrested on 15 July 2017 at a checkpoint between Dera Ismail Khan District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Punjab Province by agents of the police and secret services dressed in plainclothes and taken to an unknown location;

(n) Ali Bakhtiyar, allegedly abducted on 13 February 2015 near Peer Umar Jan area of Panjgoor, Balochistan, by personnel of Frontier Corps (FC) and secret agencies of Pakistan;

(o) Zia Ul Islam, allegedly arrested on 6 March 2015 in Islamabad by personnel of the Pakistani Secret Services dressed in plainclothes and driven to an unknown location;

(p) Sheraz Khan allegedly abducted on 17 December 2018 in Khyber Agency, Peshawar, by agents of Pakistani Security agencies and military personnel;

(q) A minor, allegedly arrested on 14 April 2013 at the Student Welfare Hostel Danish Abad, Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, by agents of the Pakistani Military Service and reportedly driven to Sadda District Kurram Prison. It is believed that he is being held in an internment centre at Lakki Marwat district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa run by Pakistan Army since 16 March 2019;

(r) Hassan Ali, allegedly abducted on 28 January 2010 from his residence at Mohala Kowz Plow Postoffice Zirakhaila Chungi Swat by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

(s) Mohabat Shah, allegedly abducted on 2 February 2014 from Korangi Industrial Area Bilal Kaloni Karachi by two members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in plainclothes with Ranger vehicles while returning to his carriage;

(t) Arbistan, allegedly abducted on 2 October 2014 from Ashraf Road Balahasar Hashat Naghri Peshawar by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after exiting the mosque following the conclusion of Fajr prayers;

(u) Sarzameen Khan, allegedly abducted on 4 October 2014 from Ishrangri Pull Peshawar by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) while working at Ashangari Bridge;

(v) Rehman Ullah, allegedly arrested on 25 April 2017 in his residence at Alingar, Tehsil Lakray, District Mohammed Agency by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

(w) Muhammad Shahbaz, allegedly abducted on 19 December 2014 from his residence near Fire Brigade Line No. 2 Mohala Sunare Town Faisalabad by 15 members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in black uniforms;

(x) Muhammad Imran Khan, allegedly abducted on 7 October 2016 near his residence at PO Abbaspur, Polas, Tehsil Abbaspur, District Poonch Azad, Kashmir, by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

(y) Ali Khan, allegedly abducted on 5 September 2011 around 6:00 a.m. from room No. 6, 2nd floor of Amir Plaza, Dalazak road, Peshawar, by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

(z) Baloch Khan, allegedly arrested on 17 January 2019 around 5:00 a.m. in the house of a person associated with him in Balochabad Mand, District Kech, Balochistan, by Frontier Corps while he was sleeping when the house was raided by Pakistani military;

(aa) Nill Muslim, allegedly abducted on 4 May 2013 from a hospital in Turbat city, Kech, Balochistan, Pakistan by Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence;

(bb) Hizbullah Nill, allegedly abducted on 14 February 2020 while walking along the main road in Qili Qambarni, Qambarani Road Quetta, Balochistan, along with a person associated with him by Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence in two vehicles while they were buying groceries;

(cc) Jahanzaib Nill, allegedly abducted on 3 May 2016 from his residence in Qili Qambarani, Qambarani Road Quetta, Balochistan by agents of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence accompanied by Frontier Corps;

(dd) Fazil Rehman, allegedly abducted on 20 May 2010 from his residence at Alankinar, Shinwari Bahadur Kaly Tehsil Apar Mohmand District Mohmand Agency by two members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

(ee) Talha Talha, allegedly arrested in 2014 in Peshawar City, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, by agents of the secret service dressed in plainclothes and taken away in a car to an unknown destination;

(ff) Imran Satti, allegedly abducted on 28 August 2016 at 6:30 a.m. from Sanch Dak Khana Khas, Tehsil Muree, District Rawalpindi by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

(gg) Sadam Khan, allegedly abducted on 24 February 2017 at 06:30 p.m. from his residence at Dilazakh Road, Fatuabul Rahima, Peshawar by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

(hh) Arshad Ahmad, allegedly abducted on 21 May 2014 from Hanna Vally, near staff college, Quetta, Balochistan, by agents of the Pakistani military secret service;

(ii) Abdul Qadir, allegedly abducted on 5 May 2014 in front of Saleem Hotel at Kuchlagh Bazaar, Balochistan, by masked individuals suspected to belong to the Pakistani military intelligence;

(jj) Insaaf Ali Dabo, allegedly abducted on 28 May 2017 from Mulghai Centre, Nazar Muhalla Main Road, Centennial Hall, Larkana by three police officers in uniform and three individuals in plainclothes in a white Vigo car with a blue siren;

(kk) Hafiz Hassaan Akbar, allegedly abducted on 19 October 2015 from Faizan Plaza, Committee Chowk, Marri Road, Rawalpindi, by agents of the Counter-Terrorism Department connected with the Pakistani military secret service.

Russian Federation

9. The Working Group transmitted 23 cases to the Government, concerning:

(a) Yong-In Woo, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(b) I-Geun Kim, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(c) Yun-Gap Si, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(d) Ok-Dong Park, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(e) Young-Sul Park, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(f) Byeong-Seon Kim, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(g) Seong-Hak Park, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(h) Man-Dong Kim, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(i) Gui-Yong Yoo, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(j) Seong-I Baek, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(k) Seok-Nam Yoon, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

- (l) Gyu-Bong Kim, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;
- (m) Sang-Mun Choi, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;
- (n) Ok-Seong Bae, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;
- (o) Yun-Ok Do, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;
- (p) Sergei Remenyuk, allegedly abducted on 15 June 2016 by armed groups associated with the self-proclaimed 'Donetsk people's republic' in the area of Mnogopolye, Donetsk. It is reported that he was transferred to the city of Rostov in the territory of the Russian Federation shortly after the abduction¹;
- (q) Adam Medov, allegedly arrested on 15 June 2004 by a group of armed men associated with the Federal Security Service in Karabulak;
- (r) Sayd-Salekh Ibragimov, allegedly arrested on 20 October 2009 by special agents of the Ministry of the Interior during a raid on his house in Goyty village;
- (s) Khizir Tepsurkayev, allegedly arrested on 27 August 2001 by a group of Russian servicemen from military unit no. 6779 that was participating in a special operation in Urus-Martan;
- (t) Aindi Dzhabayev, allegedly arrested on 8 September 2002 by armed military officers in a raid on his home in Urus Martan;
- (u) Dzhamaalayl Yanayev, allegedly arrested on 28 December 2004 at Beslan Airport by two armed men wearing camouflage uniforms allegedly affiliated with the Regional Department for Combating Organized Crime;
- (v) Adam Didayev, allegedly arrested on 6 December 2001 by approximately 20 armed masked men in camouflage uniforms in a raid on his house in Gekhi;
- (w) Moul Usumov, allegedly arrested on 30 June 2001 by around 20 armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms with dogs during a raid on his house in Kurchaloy.

Saudi Arabia

10. The Working Group transmitted three cases to the Government, concerning:

- (a) Mohammad Ali Saghir Manea, a Yemeni citizen, allegedly abducted from the streets of Jizan in Saudi Arabia on 21 December 2015 by the military police;
- (b) Suleiman Ali Hussein Salim Suleiman, a Yemeni citizen, allegedly abducted from the streets of Jizan in Saudi Arabia on 21 December 2015 by the military police;
- (c) Mohd Monzer Al Imam, a Syrian citizen, allegedly arrested between his place of residence and his workplace at Hashem contracting & trading in 3225 Turki Ibn Abdullah Al Saud, Sulaimaniyah, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 14 August 2018 by Homeland Security agents.

¹ In accordance with its methods of work, the Working Group transmitted a copy of the case to the Government of Ukraine and the self-proclaimed 'Donetsk people's republic' as a non-State actor. The Working Group stresses that the case addressed to the self-proclaimed 'Donetsk people's republic' does not in any way imply the expression of any opinion concerning the legal status of any territory, city or area, or of its authorities.

Sri Lanka

11. The Working Group transmitted 56 cases to the Government, concerning:

- (a) Puniyamoorthi Palanimuthu, allegedly abducted on 5 September 1990 from Vantharamoolai Eastern University Refugee Camp, Batticaloe, Eastern Province, Sri Lanka, by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (b) Vincent Mersiyaas, allegedly disappeared on 26 November 2006 near Vavuniya Town and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (c) Vikneshvaran Suntharam, allegedly abducted on 25 December 2007 from his residence in Batticaloe District by individuals believed to be members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (d) Yogendran Siluvaimuthu, allegedly disappeared on 17 May 2009 after being brought from Mullaithevu to the Omanthai Camp by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (e) Umunithambi Chinathambi, allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (f) Valipillai Chinathambi, allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (g) Thilaiyamma Ilaiyathambi, allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (h) Vijayakumar Kanahaiya, allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (i) Rameshkaran Kanapathipillai, allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (j) Sureshkaran Kanapathipillai allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (k) Thanapalan Kanapathipillai allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (l) Thangamma Kandhapan allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (m) Savundaram Kirubaratnam allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (n) Seenithambi Kumarvelu, allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (o) Suthaharan Rathnaiya allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (p) Kanapathipillai Thambipillai allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (q) Supulaxmi Thangavel, allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (r) Shanthimathi Vadivel, allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (s) Karunairasa Seyanthan, allegedly last seen on the Vadduvakal Bridge, Vadduvakal, Mullaitivu District, Northern Province being taken away by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (t) Navaratnam Navendran, allegedly last seen on 10 March 2009 in Matthalan, Mullivaikyal, Mullaitivu District, Northern Province, Sri Lanka and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;

- (u) Sritharan Pararasasingham, allegedly last seen on 13 April 2009 in Pokkunai, Matthalan Mullivaikal in the Mullaitivu District and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (v) Nitharjini Rasamohan allegedly seen in April 2009 in Mullivaikal, in the Mullaitivu District and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (w) Rasendram Gajendran allegedly disappeared on 10 May 2009 in Mullivaikal, Mullaitivu District, Northern Province and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (x) Prasath Upulkumara Thupahi, allegedly abducted on 4 September 1989 from river in Rathgama, Poogoda, Olunagoda, Rathgama, Galle, Southern Province, by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (y) Muthaiah Muthukumar allegedly last seen on 5 September 1990 being taken away from Vantharamoolai Eastern University Refugee Camp, Batticaloe, Eastern Province, by the Army;
- (z) Vikneshwaran Nahaiya allegedly last seen on 5 September 1990 being taken away from Vantharamoolai Eastern University Refugee Camp, Batticaloe, Eastern Province, by the Army;
- (aa) Gunarathinam Nawaratnam allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (bb) Mohansundari Paramakutty allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (cc) Vinothini Perinbam allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (dd) Ponammah Periyathambi allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (ee) Dathees Mahendran allegedly disappeared 13 March 2009 in the village of Vellamullivaikal, Mullaitivu District, Northern Province and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (ff) Chandrakumar Dharmarasi allegedly disappeared on 28 August 1993 from Vantharamoolai, Batticaloe, Eastern Province and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (gg) Balasubramainiyam Naheshwaran allegedly disappeared on 20 May 1996 from Chenkaladi, Batticaloe district, Eastern Province and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (hh) Prakalathan Srikaneshamoorthi, allegedly disappeared on 10 June 1993 in Batticaloe, Eastern Province, and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (ii) Sivanlavan Seevarathinam allegedly disappeared on 6 October 2009 in Batticaloe District, Eastern Province, and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (jj) Sooriyakumar Dharmarasi allegedly disappeared on 6 March 2001 and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (kk) Nirosan Joseph, allegedly abducted on 18 January 2009 from Velam Mullivaikal, Mullaitivu district, by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (ll) Thiyananth Yogendran allegedly abducted on 21 March 2009, in Pudukudirippu, in the Mullaitivu District and Northern Province by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (mm) Joyal Sivachandru allegedly abducted on 21 April 2009, in the Mullaitivu District, Northern Province of Sri Lanka by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (nn) Sivaranjan Sinnarasa allegedly abducted in August 2008, when leaving his residence in Paranthan, Killinochi District, Northern Province, by the Sri Lankan Army;

(oo) Shantha Saundra Hennadige allegedly abducted on 15 November 1989 from Kotagoda, Hungandeniya, Mathara District, Southern Province, Sri Lanka, by the Sri Lankan Army;

(pp) Thivanesan Santhirakumar allegedly abducted on 14 October 2008 from his residence in Kovil Puliyankulam, Velankulam, Vanuniya, Northern Province, by the Sri Lankan Army;

(qq) Priyantha Vijesinghe Ranepura Hevage allegedly abducted on 15 March 1989 from Weliketiya, Mathara District, Southern Province, Sri Lanka by the Sri Lankan Army;

(rr) Nagaratnam Subatheepan allegedly last seen on 1 March 2009 and is believed to have later been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;

(ss) Upali Lawransuhewage allegedly abducted on 30 November 1989 from Madamwella, Dewinuwara, Mathara District, Southern Province, Sri Lanka, by the Sri Lankan Army;

(tt) Anton Kovinthisamy allegedly abducted on 6 October 2008 in Vavuniya, between Poovarasankulam and Thalikulam, Northern Province, Sri Lanka by the Sri Lankan Army;

(uu) Parameswaran Kirushnan allegedly last seen in 2009 in Iranaipalai, Puthukudiuppu (Mullaithivu District) and believed to have later been abducted by the Army;

(vv) Piratheepan Kanagaratnam allegedly disappeared on 23 February 2009 from Pokkunai, Mullaithivu District and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;

(ww) Kajatheepan Kanagaratnam allegedly disappeared on 1 March 2009 from Matthalan, Mullaithivu District and is believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;

(xx) Jeevananthini Kanakarathnam allegedly abducted on 12 May 2009, from Mullivaikkal, Mullaithivu District, Northern Province by the Sri Lankan Army;

(yy) Arutsan Muthulingam allegedly disappeared on 24 February 2009 from Ambalavan, Pokkanai, Mullaithivu District, Northern Province and is believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;

(zz) Jeyamani Thushyanthan allegedly last seen in Mullikulam Mannar District, Northern Province and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;

(aaa) Jeyamani Sasiharan, allegedly last seen on 10 April 2009 and believed to have later been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;

(bbb) Chandrasena Charlis Silva allegedly abducted on 2 November 1990 near the Beruwla Buddhist Centre, Kalutara District, Western Province, Sri Lanka by unidentified individuals believed to be members of the Army;

(ccc) Navaraththinam Aarumugam, allegedly abducted on 24 June 2009 from Manatchchenai, Poththuvil, Ampara district, Eastern Province, Sri Lanka by unidentified individuals believed to be linked to the government;

(ddd) Manogaran Aarumugam, allegedly abducted on 24 June 2009 from Manatchchenai, Poththuvil, Ampara district, Eastern Province, Sri Lanka by unidentified individuals believed to be linked to the government.

Syrian Arab Republic

12. The Working Group transmitted 8 cases to the Government, concerning:

(a) Abdulhamid Alsaloum, allegedly arrested on 27 October 2012 by Air Force Security agents in a raid on his home;

(b) Aiman Alnemr, allegedly arrested on 29 August 2014 when he turned himself in at the Political Security branch in Hama town;

- (c) Hussein Alnemr, allegedly arrested on 21 February 2014 by the Syrian security forces in a raid on his home;
- (d) Ahmad Dahhan, allegedly arrested on 7 March 2012 by agents affiliated with the Palestine Branch in al Salehiya area of Damascus;
- (e) Wardan Alnemr, allegedly arrested on 1 May 2013 by three agents of the Military Security Branch in a raid on Al-Dahra neighborhood;
- (f) Moussa Al Allawi, allegedly arrested on 12 July 2012 by Military Police units in Qaboun;
- (g) Imad Al Ammar, allegedly abducted on 11 March 2012 by agents of the Syrian Military Intelligence Services following a raid on his village;
- (h) Alaa Al Ammar, allegedly abducted on 27 November 2012 by the Syrian Military Intelligence at a checkpoint near the train station of Mheen town.

Annex II

[Spanish only]

General allegations

Colombia

1. El Grupo de Trabajo recibió información de fuentes fidedignas sobre obstáculos encontrados en la aplicación de la Declaración sobre la Protección de Todas las Personas contra las Desapariciones Forzadas en Colombia. La presente alegación general se enfoca en el riesgo que el inicio de obras de dragado del estero de San Antonio puede generar en las posibilidades de hallar a personas desaparecidas, cuyos cuerpos habrían sido dispuestos en esa zona.
2. De acuerdo a la información recibida, las obras se enmarcan en un proyecto suscrito entre el Distrito de Buenaventura y el Instituto Nacional de Vías –INVIAS–, y consisten en ampliar la profundidad en el estero para que la zona de marea baja sea navegable para los barcos de cabotaje. Aunque la obra mejora las condiciones de movilidad para las comunidades, de acuerdo a la alegación también puede ocasionar daño en los lugares de disposición de los cuerpos que fueron arrojados u ocultos en la zona del estero, en lugares conocidos por la comunidad como acuafosas y, en consecuencia, destruir los cuerpos allí ocultos.
3. Según información suministrada por las fuentes, desde el año 2000 se ha documentado la práctica de ocultamiento en las acuafosas de los cuerpos de personas desaparecidas forzosamente por acción de organizaciones armadas ilegales. Es así que se advierte que habría indicios fuertes para afirmar que en el Estero de San Antonio yacen cuerpos de personas desaparecidas a las que sus familias están buscando.
4. De acuerdo a la información recibida, es conocida la existencia de lugares de disposición de cuerpos en el estero San Antonio y, debido a sus dimensiones de recorrido es una zona compleja y extensa para la búsqueda de personas dadas por desaparecidas. La zona, de seis kilómetros, va desde el barrio Muro Yusti, Puente Nayero, la Playita, Alfonso López, Alberto Lleras Camargo, Palo seco, Cocal, Kennedy, San Luis, San Francisco, Juan XXIII, Pampa linda, Olímpico, el Cristal, Colón hasta Antonio Nariño.
5. Según las fuentes, en caso de adelantarse las operaciones del proyecto sin realizar previamente la búsqueda de los cuerpos arrojados al estero, se teme la inminente pérdida de los cuerpos y la evidencia, con lo cual se destruye cualquier posibilidad de hallazgo y cese de la incertidumbre. Las operaciones de dragado, se sostiene, ocasionan por sí mismas un deterioro en los cuerpos que puede conducir a la pérdida de estructuras óseas que contienen material genético que permitiría su identificación así como otras evidencias del hecho que pueda encontrarse en el lugar.
6. De acuerdo a la información recibida por el Grupo de Trabajo, las condiciones del suelo y el clima del estero San Antonio, al igual que los fenómenos ocasionados por los flujos de las mareas podría haber hecho que las evidencias se hayan perdido o deteriorado, así que cualquier acción externa, como la del dragado, sería perjudicial para obtener respuesta y garantizar los derechos a la verdad, la justicia, la reparación y la no repetición para los familiares de los desaparecidos.
7. Las fuentes sostienen que no se han llevado adelante evaluaciones del riesgo que genera el dragado en las búsquedas ni se han adoptado medidas urgentes para mitigarlo y, de esta manera, proteger los derechos de las personas desaparecidas y sus familias. Asimismo reclaman el establecimiento de un plan de acción que garantice el derecho de los familiares de los desaparecidos a la búsqueda de sus seres queridos en el estero de San Antonio.

Annex III

[French and English only]

Replies to general allegations

China

1. On 12 June 2020, the Government replied to the general allegation transmitted after the 119th session (A/HRC/WGEID/119/1, annex I).

Legislation and practice regarding the *liuzhi* (supervision) system

Legislation regarding the *liuzhi* supervision system

2. First, there are conditions for the use of *liuzhi* supervision. According to article 22 of the Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China, the conditions specify that if a person under investigation is suspected of corruption, bribery, dereliction of duty, malfeasance in office, or any other serious duty-related violation or crime, and a supervision body has obtained some facts and evidence on the violation or crime but needs to conduct further investigation of important issues, the person may be detained at a specific place in any of the following circumstances: 1. if the case in question is particularly important or complex; 2. if there is a risk of flight or suicide; 3. if there is a risk of collusion of suspects' confessions or of falsifications, cover-ups or destruction of evidence; or 4. if there is the possibility of other acts that may obstruct the investigation. In addition, the supervision body may apply *liuzhi* supervision in accordance with the above provisions in the case of persons suspected of crimes involving bribery or actions taken in collusion in the performance of work duties.

3. Secondly, there is the examination and approval procedure, and also the department responsible for the *liuzhi* supervision measure. Under the first paragraph of article 43 of the Supervision Law, when supervision bodies adopt measures of *liuzhi* supervision, the measures must be the subject of joint consideration and a decision taken collectively by the body's directors. *Liuzhi* supervision measures adopted by supervision bodies below the level of multiple-district cities must be reported for approval to the supervision body at the next higher level. The provincial supervision body reports the measures for the record to the National Supervisory Commission.

4. Thirdly, there are procedural requirements for taking *liuzhi* supervision measures. Article 41 of the Supervision Law specifies that investigators who take such investigative measures must, in accordance with the regulations, produce certificates adopted by at least two persons, issued in writing and sealed and signed by the relevant persons.

5. Fourthly, there is a legal obligation of notification. Article 44 (1) of the Supervision Law stipulates that the employers and family members of persons under investigation for whom *liuzhi* supervision measures have been adopted must be notified within 24 hours, unless there is the possibility of the destruction or falsification of evidence, witness tampering, collusion of suspects' confessions or other circumstances involving obstruction of the investigation. Once circumstances of obstruction of an investigation no longer exist, the person's employer and family must be notified immediately.

6. Fifth, there is a limit on the length of *liuzhi* supervision. Article 43 (2) of the Supervision Law specifies that the period of *liuzhi* supervision must not exceed three months. In exceptional circumstances, it may be extended once, and the extension must not exceed three months. If the measure is taken by a supervision body below the provincial level, then the extension must be reported for approval to the next higher level. If a supervision body finds that a supervision measure has been taken improperly, it must promptly rescind it.

7. Sixth, there are the guarantees of the rights of persons placed under *liuzhi* supervision. Articles 40, 41 and 44 of the Supervision Law stipulate that the supervision body must

provide guarantees for the diet, rest and safety of persons placed under *liuzhi* supervision and provide them with medical services. When they are interrogated, interrogation must take place at reasonable time and for a reasonable duration and the record of the interrogation must be read and signed by the person who is interrogated. It is strictly prohibited to use threats, lures, cheating or other illegal means to collect evidence or to insult, beat, scold or abuse persons under investigation or others involved in a case, or to use corporal punishment, or hidden forms of corporal punishment, against them. Investigators, when questioning, searching, sealing or impounding evidence and otherwise conducting important work to collect evidence, must make audio and video recordings of the entire process and keep them for reference. These provisions all help to protect the legal rights of persons subjected to *liuzhi* supervision.

8. Seventh, in the event of illegal *liuzhi* supervision, there are ways to remedy the situation and establish responsibilities. Articles 60, 65 and 67 of the Supervision Law establish that if the legal period of *liuzhi* supervision is exceeded and the supervision body and its staff members fail to remove the *liuzhi* supervision measure, the persons under investigation and their close relatives have the right to appeal to the supervision body or even to apply for review by a supervision body at a higher level, and if the supervision body and its staff members take *liuzhi* supervision measures in violation of the regulations, the leaders who bear responsibility and the staff members who are directly responsible must be dealt with according to the law. At the same time, if the supervision body, its staff and the staff members directly responsible, in the course of their duties, violate the rights and interests of citizens, legal entities or other organizations or cause damages, the latter are entitled to compensation from the State, in accordance with the law.

9. Eighth, there is an organic connection between the supervision system and the criminal procedure system. Article 170 of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China makes provision for a conversion between *liuzhi* supervision measures and criminal coercive measures. For cases that have been transferred for prosecution by a supervision body when *liuzhi* supervision measures have already been taken, the people's procuratorate must first detain the criminal suspect, at which time the *liuzhi* supervision measures are automatically lifted. The people's procuratorate then must make a decision within 10 days whether to proceed with the person's arrest, place the person on bail or assign the person to residential surveillance. Article 44 (3) of the Supervision Law establishes that the period under *liuzhi* supervision is to be deducted from the sentence. Once persons subjected to *liuzhi* supervision are transferred as suspects to a judicial body, if they are sentenced, in accordance with the law, to public surveillance, criminal detention or fixed-term imprisonment, one day of supervision is considered equivalent to two days of public surveillance, or to one day of criminal detention or fixed-term imprisonment.

10. After the adoption of the Supervision Law, the National Supervisory Commission issued a series of regulations to strengthen the supervision and administration of the use of *liuzhi* supervision.

The *liuzhi* supervision system in practice

11. Since the reform of the national supervision system, the supervision bodies at all levels have made use, in accordance with the law, of *liuzhi* supervision measures, with strict compliance with the Supervision Law and the relevant supporting regulations. First, they have fully understood the conditions for the implementation of such measures and have strictly abided by the legal limits on the length of *liuzhi* supervision. Secondly, they have acted strictly in accordance with the examination and approval mandates in implementing, extending and ending supervision measures and they have reported such measures to the higher authorities for the purposes of approval or record-keeping, and they have rigorously carried out the approval and filing procedures when required. Third, they have strictly implemented the relevant procedures, for example informing persons subjected to the *liuzhi* supervision measures of their rights and obligations, keeping their employers and family members informed and issuing the relevant legal documents, in accordance with the law, to protect their right to be informed. Fourth, in implementing the *liuzhi* supervision measures, they have guaranteed the legal rights of the persons subjected to supervision, with the relevant departments within the supervision bodies monitoring the entire process. Fifth, the

interrogation of persons subjected to *liuzhi* supervision measures has taken place with strict application of the relevant rules, with video and audio recordings of the entire interrogation process.

12. Zhejiang Province, as a pilot area for the reform of the national supervision system, attaches great importance to adopting, in accordance with the law and legal standards, various investigation measures, including *liuzhi* supervision. The Zhejiang Province Supervisory Commission drew up and adopted the Rules for the Operation of Supervision in Zhejiang Province (for trial implementation), the Code of Conduct for the Staff of Discipline Inspection and Supervision Bodies in Zhejiang Province and the Operational Guidelines for Supervision Measures in Zhejiang Province (for trial implementation), providing guidance for the supervision bodies in the whole province to adopt investigation measures, in accordance with the law, including *liuzhi* supervision measures. In practice, the supervision bodies of the entire province strictly follow the relevant provisions of the *liuzhi* supervision measures in this system and explore the possibility of establishing a supervision mechanism in which the supervision bodies issue decisions on *liuzhi* supervision stays while the public security bodies are responsible for management and security, thus ensuring that they have clearly defined responsibilities and the departments responsible for case supervision and management oversee the whole supervision process. At the same time, a special department has been set up to receive complaints and accusations of excessive periods of *liuzhi* supervision or infringement of the legal rights of persons subjected to supervision, so as to fully protect their legal rights.

13. During the pilot period, from January 2017 to the end of March 2018, the supervision bodies of the whole province took *liuzhi* supervision measures for 343 persons under investigation, with an average length of stay of 44.67 days, the longest being 181 days and the shortest being 2 days. The length of the measures did not exceed the statutory time limit of 6 months, and in all cases the families of the persons subjected to the *liuzhi* supervision were informed. There was no ill-treatment of the persons in question.

14. The reform of the national supervision system in China has undergone a sound pilot phase and has been the subject of a rigorous legislative process. Supervision bodies at all levels, in strict accordance with the Supervision Law and the mandate given by the legislature, have overseen all public officials exercising public power, have investigated violations and crimes in the performance of their duties and have carried out work to build up good governance and to combat corruption, with good results. *Liuzhi* supervised stays are one of the statutory supervision measures provided by the Supervision Law and do not constitute secret detention. Their applicable conditions, examination and approval procedures, time limits and the protection of the rights of the persons subjected to such supervision are all openly and clearly stipulated by law.

Morocco

15. On 17 June 2020, The Government of Morocco provided the following response to the general allegation transmitted by the Working Group on 17 April 2020 (A/HRC/WGEID/120/1, annex I).

Observations concernant l'allégation générale du Groupe de travail sur les disparitions forcées ou involontaires

16. Faisant suite à la Note verbale du 17 avril 2020 du Groupe de travail sur les disparitions forcées ou involontaires (GTDFI) concernant une allégation générale relative aux disparitions forcées ou involontaires au Maroc, les autorités marocaines font part de leurs observations à cet égard et demandent leur publication en intégralité dans le rapport de la 122ème session du Groupe (du 21 au 30 septembre 2020) et qu'il y soit fait référence dans le prochain rapport annuel du Groupe de travail qui sera présenté au Conseil des droits de l'homme lors de sa 45ème session.

17. Les autorités marocaines rappellent préalablement qu'elles ont toujours veillé à entretenir un cadre d'interaction positive et constructive avec le Groupe de travail depuis de très nombreuses années, ce qui lui a d'ailleurs permis de suivre de près tous les développements liés au traitement du dossier des violations graves du passé au Maroc. Les autorités marocaines se félicitaient que la démarche du Groupe de travail s'inscrivait initialement dans une démarche d'accompagnement des autorités dans leurs efforts dans le cadre du processus de justice transitionnelle engagé courageusement et avec clairvoyance au Maroc et porté au plus haut niveau de l'Etat.

18. Durant plusieurs années, les autorités ont eu la certitude que le Groupe de travail mesurait l'ampleur de ce processus et se réjouissait du cadre d'interaction basé sur la bonne foi et une véritable volonté de compréhension des spécificités de l'expérience marocaine comme l'ont démontré différentes rencontres entre le Groupe de travail et des délégations officielles de haut niveau. Dans ce contexte, les autorités avaient invité le Groupe de travail à effectuer une visite au Royaume en 2009 et pour rappel, elles avaient accueilli favorablement ses recommandations formulées à l'issue de cette visite considérant que ces recommandations soutenaient le travail des autorités et des autres parties prenantes. Une interaction qui s'est poursuivie dans le cadre du rapport de suivi de la visite en 2013.

19. Dans cet esprit de coopération, des délégations officielles de haut-niveau ont rencontré le Groupe en marge des 114^{ème}, 115^{ème}, 116^{ème} et 119^{ème} sessions. L'engagement stratégique et irréversible du Royaume en matière de droits de l'homme a été réitéré à chaque fois.

20. Des discussions franches et constructives se sont également tenues en marge de ces rencontres qui ont porté sur les cas toujours en instance devant le Groupe. A ce propos, les autorités marocaines rappellent qu'aucune expérience dans le monde ne s'est révélée parfaite au regard des grands principes sous-jacents à la justice transitionnelle et que les différentes expériences connues à travers le monde, ont toutes fait face à des difficultés objectives et ne dépendant pas de la volonté de l'Etat.

21. Dans ce contexte, les autorités marocaines s'interrogent sur le bienfondé de cette allégation générale. En effet, l'allégation générale fait délibérément abstraction des mérites du processus de justice transitionnelle marocain. Celle-ci contredit l'appréciation du Groupe de travail lui-même auparavant qui avait, à maintes reprises, expressément salué l'expérience marocaine et considéré qu'elle « devait servir de modèle à d'autres Etats ... » (Para 87 du Rapport de Mission du GTDFI au Maroc en 2009). L'expérience marocaine de justice transitionnelle avait également été appréciée par plusieurs autres mécanismes onusiens ou experts internationaux reconnus dans le monde entier sur les questions de justice transitionnelle.

22. En outre, au niveau national, il convient de souligner que le processus a été accueilli favorablement par l'ensemble des parties prenantes. En effet, l'une des spécificités réside dans le consensus social et politique national qui a pris forme entre les différentes parties prenantes, y compris et surtout les organisations non gouvernementales, les organisations syndicales, les partis politiques de tous bords qui a permis de garantir la réussite du processus initié dans un contexte d'ouverture politique et de transition démocratique.

23. Aussi, il convient également de souligner que l'ensemble du processus a été porté par des représentants des victimes et des défenseurs des droits de l'homme, lesquels étaient parties prenantes à part entière au processus et n'ont jamais cessé d'être impliqués directement. La plupart des membres de l'Instance Equité et Réconciliation (IER) étaient d'anciennes victimes des violations graves des droits de l'homme. Ce processus appuyé par Sa Majesté le Roi et l'ensemble des forces sociales et politiques, a été conçu et mené de manière souveraine, volontaire et indépendante.

24. Il convient de relever que l'expérience marocaine s'est inspirée d'autres expériences établissant des Commissions de vérité constituées sur les principes et standards internationaux en matière de justice transitionnelle, sachant que l'expérience marocaine a intégré des dimensions inédites. L'expérience marocaine en matière de justice transitionnelle, est la première dans son genre dans la région. C'est aussi la première à être menée à la faveur d'une transition pacifique.

Le droit à la vérité dans le processus de justice transitionnelle

25. De par sa nature, ses missions et ses attributions, l'IER relève incontestablement des commissions communément appelées commissions de vérité et créées dans un contexte de justice transitionnelle. Elle a été mandatée pour élucider les cas de violations graves des droits de l'homme commises au Maroc durant la période allant de 1956 à 1999.

26. Aussi, les autorités marocaines par les présentes observations rejettent catégoriquement toute tentative visant à discréditer son processus de justice transitionnelle ou visant à dénaturer les faits, les acquis et les résultats tangibles obtenus dans le cadre de la recherche de la Vérité et dans le cadre de la réparation et des compensations.

27. En particulier, les autorités marocaines déplorent le fait que le Groupe de travail relaie dans ses termes la revendication de la source à créer un « mécanisme national chargé du parachèvement de la vérité ». Les autorités expriment leur étonnement au regard du fait que le Groupe de travail ait cru devoir préciser que ces « revendications sont appuyées par (ses) recommandations » alors que ni son rapport de mission de 2009, ni dans son rapport de suivi de 2013 relatif à l'évaluation de la mise en oeuvre de ses recommandations ne font mention à cette revendication.

28. Aussi, au-delà de cette appréciation générale, les allégations rapportées dans l'allégation générale adressée aux autorités sont contestables à différents égards. L'Allégation générale nie la réussite de l'expérience marocaine de justice transitionnelle et a fortiori l'ère nouvelle qu'elle a générée et les implications concrètes en matière de protection des droits de l'homme qu'elle a suscitées, notamment au regard des différents processus de réformes législatives et institutionnelles du début des années deux mille, puis dans le cadre de la Constitution du 1er juillet 2011.

29. L'IER a disposé de 23 mois pour examiner une période de 43 ans s'étalant du début de l'indépendance jusqu'à la création de la Commission Indépendante d'Arbitrage. Son mandat a couvert l'ensemble des violations graves, massives et/ou systématiques des droits humains : les disparitions forcées, la détention arbitraire, l'atteinte au droit à la vie, la torture, l'exil forcé, et l'usage disproportionné et excessif de la force publique lors de mouvements sociaux de protestation.

30. Parmi les particularités de l'expérience marocaine, l'Instance elle-même a élaboré ses statuts, approuvés par Dahir du 10 avril 2004, qui ont précisé et détaillé les missions dont elle est investie, les violations objet de son mandat et les modalités d'organisation de son travail. Elle a eu également le pouvoir d'accorder directement des réparations aux victimes et leurs ayants droit.

31. L'approche genre a été retenue par l'IER comme une option méthodologique transversale à tous ses domaines d'intervention. Cela a impliqué l'examen minutieux des violations subies par les femmes dans leur spécificité, des préjudices qui en ont découlé, de leur expérience particulière et de leur rôle dans la lutte contre les violations. Il s'agissait en outre de qualifier ces violations, de déterminer leurs séquelles et des mesures susceptibles de garantir la non-répétition.

32. Dans ce cadre, le Maroc a oeuvré pour la reconnaissance des violations graves et systématique du passé, l'élucidation du sort des victimes, la réparation des préjudices subis, puis la réhabilitation médicale et psychologique, la réinsertion sociale tout en prenant de véritables mesures de protection et de non-répétition.

33. Les autorités marocaines tiennent par ailleurs à rappeler que le dispositif institutionnel de justice transitionnelle mis en place a été conçu comme un mécanisme extrajudiciaire pour déterminer la responsabilité de l'État et de ses organes, et non les responsabilités individuelles, et ce, dans une logique de consolidation des réformes et de réconciliation.

34. Ce processus n'a pour autant nullement exclu le droit des victimes, de leurs familles ou ayants de leur droit de recourir à la justice. Il convient de relever d'ailleurs qu'il n'a pas été question d'adopter des lois d'amnistie de nature à favoriser l'impunité des agents publics impliqués à cette époque, ni chercher à instituer de prescription des violations.

35. Le choix d'écarter les responsabilités individuelles s'est basé non pas sur une volonté de soustraire les responsables des violations à leur responsabilité pénale, mais s'est basé sur

une approche réaliste découlant d'ailleurs d'une approche comparée avec d'autres expériences de justice transitionnelle dans le monde qui ont montré leur limites sur ce sujet notamment au regard des preuves (soit de l'absence de preuve ou leur destruction).

36. L'établissement de la vérité est l'une des attributions essentielles de l'IER qui en constitue à la fois la base et l'objectif. Le droit à la vérité a en effet structuré le processus intégral de l'IER et du Comité de suivi, constituant une des dimensions ajoutées à la Commission Indépendante d'Arbitrage.

37. L'IER s'est employée à fournir les informations sur les causes des événements qui ont conduit aux violations graves de droits de l'homme, les raisons, les circonstances et les conditions de ces violations, les responsabilités de l'Etat et de ses organes et, en cas de décès ou de disparition forcées, le sort des victimes. Aussi bien dans ses dimensions individuelles que collectives, le droit à la vérité n'a fait l'objet d'aucune restriction dans le travail de l'IER ni celui du Comité de suivi (installé par le CNDH pour suivre la mise en oeuvre des recommandations de l'IER).

38. L'IER a tout mis en oeuvre pour garantir pleinement et effectivement le droit à la vérité, à la fois dans sa dimension individuelle et collective. En révélant le sort des victimes de la disparition forcée et en identifiant les raisons des violations graves des droits de l'homme. L'IER s'était appliquée à mettre en oeuvre le droit à la vérité.

39. Les autorités marocaines soulignent également que le droit à la vérité dans le processus marocain de justice transitionnelle s'est notamment distingué par :

- l'indépendance totale des deux Instances mises en place dans ce cadre ;
- le fait que l'établissement des faits par ces mécanismes s'est basé sur la collecte des preuves provenant de différentes sources : les témoignages des victimes, les informations des ONG, les auditions et les informations émanant des autorités publiques, les visites effectuées dans les lieux de détention secrets, l'exhumation de restes humains, des analyses médico-légales ;
- la combinaison d'audition à huis clos et auditions publiques des victimes et des familles ;
- Le fait que le partage de ces données avec les familles et les ayants droit et la diffusion de l'ensemble de ces données a été largement permis en posant ainsi les bases pour la préservation de la mémoire et de la réhabilitation ;
- La place et le rôle des victimes elles-mêmes et/ou des familles dans les différentes étapes du processus de justice transitionnelle.

40. L'IER a rassemblé plus de 20000 témoignages personnels de victimes et de leurs familles. Ces témoignages constituent des archives précieuses et des ressources inestimables pour l'établissement de la vérité et la préservation de la mémoire.

41. L'IER a organisé un nombre important de conférences, de séminaires et d'auditions sur une multitude de questions essentielles pour comprendre le contexte des violations des droits de l'Homme au Maroc. Elle a tenu des audiences publiques afin de donner aux victimes une tribune pour partager leurs récits.

42. Concernant spécifiquement la disparition forcée, à l'issue du processus d'investigation conduit par l'IER, 742 cas ont été élucidés et clarifiés, à travers tous les moyens disponibles et reconnus, notamment les études contextuelles, les témoignages, les enquêtes et investigations, les registres institutionnels, les archives privées et publiques, les auditions et les analyses médico-légales. Ce nombre de cas dépasse largement les listes établies par les ONG et d'autres acteurs concernés.

43. Dans ce contexte les exhumations et les analyses médico-légales ont été réalisées dans le respect des garanties juridiques et judiciaires. Les jugements déclaratifs de décès ont été rendus par les tribunaux.

44. L'ensemble de ces données a été rendu public dans le cadre de la publication du rapport final de l'IER.

45. Le Comité de suivi, avec les mêmes moyens de procédure que l'IER, continue sa mission de parachèvement de la vérité concernant le sort des cas de disparition forcée restant non élucidés. Des éléments supplémentaires relatifs à l'ensemble des travaux du Comité de suivi, feront l'objet de communications ultérieures par le Conseil national des droits de l'homme.

Réparation des dommages individuels et collectifs

46. Dans le cadre de son mandat, l'IER a ouvert des dossiers individuels qui ont tous été instruits. Les cas relevant de la compétence matérielle et temporelle de l'Instance ont fait l'objet de décisions arbitrales d'indemnisation et de recommandations relatives à d'autres modalités de réparation, à savoir la réhabilitation médicale et psychologique, la réinsertion sociale et le règlement de la situation administrative et financière des victimes.

47. Aussi, dans le cadre de l'indemnisation financière, l'IER a établi des critères et des unités de compte, sur la base du type de violation subie, du principe d'égalité et de solidarité entre les victimes ayant souffert des mêmes violations, et de l'approche genre.

48. En ce qui concerne la réparation individuelle, le nombre total de victimes des violations graves des droits de l'Homme et des ayants droit, bénéficiaires de l'indemnisation financière, depuis la création de l'Instance d'arbitrage indépendante (IAI) en 1999 et de l'Instance Équité et Réconciliation (IER), s'élève à ce jour à 27763 personnes, ayant bénéficié d'un montant de 1.929.778.728,80 de dirhams (soit 196.877.000 USD).

49. De plus, l'IER a recommandé que les victimes et les ayants droit bénéficient d'un système de couverture médicale. Le nombre global de cartes remis aux bénéficiaires, est de l'ordre de 8744 victimes et ayants droit.

50. Concernant la réinsertion sociale, l'IER a recommandé la réinsertion sociale pour certaines victimes et ayants droit ayant été incarcérés pendant de longues durées, et pour les enfants qui ont perdu leurs parents alors qu'ils étaient mineurs. A ce titre 1475 victimes et ayants droit ont bénéficié de la réinsertion sociale selon des différentes formes telles que l'intégration à la fonction publique, logement sociale, appui financier pour activité économique.

51. Concernant la régularisation de la situation administrative et financière, l'IER avait également recommandé la régularisation de la situation administrative et financière de certaines victimes licenciées de la fonction publique, en raison de leurs engagements politiques ou syndicaux. La situation administrative et financière de 393 victimes, a été réglée par les administrations concernées.

52. La réparation communautaire s'est basée sur l'approche droits humains et participative en consolidant l'implication effective des concernés et à tous les niveaux sur le genre en garantissant les intérêts des femmes et des groupes vulnérables, et le volet culturel en prenant en considération les spécificités culturelles régionales. Les projets de réparation communautaire ont été mise en oeuvre dans les régions où existaient des centres de détention irréguliers, ou ayant connu des événements sociaux suivis d'une marginalisation socio-économique. Le budget alloué aux programmes mis en place s'élève à ce jour à 159.799.892.00 DHS (soit 1.630.290.000 USD). Ces données ont été rendues publiques.

53. Le programme de réparation individuelle a été exécuté. Quant au programme de réparation communautaire, il est à ce jour très largement mis en oeuvre. Le Groupe de travail avait lui-même reconnu l'approche novatrice de l'IER en ce qui concerne la réparation communautaire dans son rapport de mission de 2009.

54. 39. Le Comité de suivi continue d'entretenir des relations étroites avec les victimes, les ayants droits pour les actions d'appui aussi bien à titre personnel que dans le cadre d'appui en raison de santé.

Mémoire, Histoire et Archives

55. La préservation de la mémoire, et son corollaire de garantie de non répétition, figurent clairement dans le mandat de l'IER. En effet, le Dahir établissant le mandat stipule que l'IER doit « recommander des mesures destinées à préserver la mémoire et garantir la non répétition

des violations, remédier aux effets des violations et restaurer la confiance dans la primauté de la loi, et le respect des droits de l'homme » (article 9.6).

56. Tous les documents de référence encadrant le travail de l'IER (Recommandation du CCDH de 2003, Discours Royal d'installation, statuts publiés par Dahir) lui ont assigné, entre autres missions, celle de préserver la mémoire, cette préservation étant considérée comme une des composantes de la réparation mais aussi comme une des garanties de prévention de la répétition.

57. Au-delà du devoir de mémoire, l'IER a également contribué de manière importante à l'écriture de l'histoire du temps présent du Maroc, tout en s'interdisant de produire un récit unilatéral ni livrer une lecture définitive de l'histoire du Maroc récent.

58. L'IER a émis des recommandations portant sur la mémoire et l'histoire. Elle a notamment préconisé l'adoption d'une loi moderne sur les archives et la création d'un institut de recherches sur l'histoire du Maroc.

59. En partenariat avec des organismes publics et la société civile, le Comité de suivi (CNDH) poursuit le processus de préservation de la mémoire à travers la rénovation, la réhabilitation de certains anciens lieux de détention (notamment sous forme de musées), l'aménagement des cimetières à travers l'établissement de stèles commémoratives.

60. Dans le cadre de la préservation des archives, ont été remis à l'Institution nationale « Archives du Maroc » les archives de l'IER et de l'Instance Indépendante d'Arbitrage, comme il a été apporté l'appui nécessaire à cette même Institution notamment en vue de la promotion de l'archivage public relatif aux violations des droits de l'homme dans le passé.

61. Par ailleurs, toujours dans le contexte de la préservation de la mémoire, il y a lieu de souligner que 33 ouvrages relatifs aux dites violations du passé ont été publiés autour de différents thèmes, et de même ont été produits plusieurs films sur l'histoire contemporaine du Maroc. De surcroît, le CNDH a créé en son sein une unité chargée des études et recherches sur le thème « Histoire et Mémoire » au Maroc.

Réformes et garanties de non répétition

62. L'IER prévoyait dans son statut de proposer des recommandations en matière de réformes et de garanties de non répétition des violations graves des droits de l'homme. A ce titre dans son rapport final, elle a formulé des recommandations pertinentes au regard de la réforme de la Constitution, du renforcement du cadre juridique et institutionnel, de la ratification des principaux instruments internationaux pertinents, de la situation des personnes vulnérables tel que les femmes et les personnes privées de liberté, de l'incrimination des violations graves des droits de l'homme, de la gouvernance sécuritaire, de la planification stratégique en matière des droits de l'homme...

63. Ces recommandations ont eu un impact positif sur la réforme constitutionnelle en 2011 à travers la constitutionnalisation même de celles-ci. La Constitution a retenu toutes les recommandations pertinentes de l'IER à travers la primauté des Conventions internationales en matière des droits de l'homme sur le droit interne et l'harmonisation des dispositions pertinentes de la législation nationale, la criminalisation des violations graves des droits de l'homme, la consécration des droits et libertés fondamentales, la séparation des pouvoirs, le renforcement des garanties du procès équitable et la constitutionnalisation des Institutions nationales des droits de l'homme (INDH).

64. Ces recommandations ont eu par ailleurs, un impact positif sur les réformes juridiques et institutionnelles et notamment :

- La réforme de la justice ;
- Le renforcement de l'indépendance et du rôle des INDH ;
- L'intégration de la dimension droits de l'homme dans les politiques publiques ;
- L'élaboration du Plan d'Action National en matière de Démocratie et des droits de l'homme ;

- L'élaboration de la Plateforme citoyenne de la Promotion de la Culture des droits de l'homme.

65. Les autorités marocaines réitérent leur ferme engagement dans leur interaction positive et constructive avec l'ensemble des mécanismes onusiens des droits de l'homme, et leur action continue en faveur de la protection et la promotion des droits de l'homme au niveau national et international.

Annex IV

Key guidelines on coronavirus disease (COVID-19) and enforced disappearances

1. The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and the Committee on Enforced Disappearances recall that enforced disappearance is prohibited in all circumstances, and call on member States to continue, during the COVID-19 pandemic, to respect their international obligations.
2. In the context of COVID-19, it is of concern that related measures have reduced the capacity of all actors to take the necessary action to search for disappeared persons and to investigate their alleged enforced disappearance. The measures adopted to fight against the pandemic such as confinement, or the redeployment of security forces to control their implementation, obviously affect the capacity for action and reaction by the relatives of disappeared persons and the organizations that accompany them, but also of the State authorities in charge of search and investigation. In that context, it is of utmost importance that all actors involved follow best practices in relation to the search for disappeared person and the investigation of enforced disappearances.
3. The current circumstances are particularly concerning in relation to recent disappearances in which the immediate intervention of State authorities is required to search for the disappeared person. These circumstances also amount to an additional factor of victimization for the relatives of persons who have been disappeared for years, as authorities de facto suspend all measures to search for them and investigate their disappearance. Particular attention is also necessary to ensure that COVID-19 does not become an excuse for committing enforced disappearances.
4. The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and the Committee on Enforced Disappearances wish to call the attention of States to eight key guidelines to be taken into account by States in the COVID-19 context.

Guideline 1.

Enforced disappearances remain strictly prohibited in all circumstances

5. Enforced disappearances are continuing to occur and there is an additional risk of States using the pandemic and associated states of emergency as cover for enforced disappearances.
6. The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance ([the Convention](#), article 1) and the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance ([the Declaration](#), articles 2 and 7) are clear to the effect that enforced disappearance is strictly prohibited in all circumstances. States thus should not practise, permit or tolerate enforced disappearances at any time, including during the pandemic.

Guideline 2.

Search and investigation into enforced disappearances cannot be discontinued and must be carried out without delay

7. The COVID-19 context poses additional challenges to the abilities of State authorities to take action immediately and to visit relevant sites. In particular specific health protection measures need to be taken for State agents as well as for victims and civil society

organizations who should be able to take part to the search and investigation.¹ However, the COVID-19 context cannot justify the authorities' failure to take immediate action to search for disappeared persons: every day that passes puts the victim at further risk of mistreatment and death.

8. In compliance with articles 12 and 24 of the Convention and article 13 of the Declaration, the search for disappeared persons and the investigation of cases of enforced disappearances are continuing obligations that cannot be suspended, even in the context of the pandemic. In all activities developed, States are urged to follow the [Guiding principles for the search for disappeared persons](#) produced by the Committee.

9. As soon as the competent authorities become aware, through any means, or have any indications that a person has been subjected to enforced disappearance, they should begin the search immediately and promptly, even when no formal complaint or request has been made (article 9(1) of the Declaration, article 12(1) and 2 of the Convention).² Whenever necessary, adapted health precautions must be taken for all actors involved to enable them to carry out all required search and investigation activities, such as visits to the relevant sites (article 9(2) of the Declaration, art. 12(3)b of the Convention).³

10. Throughout the process of search and investigation, channels to report cases and to follow-up on any developments should remain accessible to relatives and the organizations supporting them. They should be kept periodically informed of the activities being undertaken in their respective cases.

Guideline 3.

Information on individuals deprived of their liberty including those subjected to compulsory quarantine should be provided to their families and monitoring should continue

11. The COVID-19 pandemic has created new contexts where enforced disappearances may occur. This includes during compulsory quarantine in places of deprivation of liberty such as quarantine centres or medical facilities where individuals may, intentionally or unintentionally, be deprived of contact with their relatives.

12. At the same time, the suspension of visits to regular places of detention has, in some cases, led to a complete absence of contact between detainees and the outside world. This is conducive to incommunicado detention and may lead to enforced disappearances.

13. Procedural guarantees contained in articles 12, 17 to 21 of the Convention and 9 to 13 of the Declaration apply at all times and to all places in which persons are deprived of their liberty, including compulsory quarantine centres. Whatever the circumstances, all individuals deprived of their liberty must be held only in officially recognized and supervised places of deprivation of liberty, and any form of secret detention must be excluded. State should also proactively ensure that the authorities in charge of the search for the disappeared person have access to all places of detention. States must also take all necessary measures to ensure that persons deprived of liberty are able to communicate with their relatives, counsel or any other person of their choice, and with consular authorities,⁴ including when visits have to be limited.

14. Releases from places of deprivation of liberty should be done in a manner permitting verification of the release and States should take necessary measures to assure the physical

¹ Committee on Enforced Disappearances, Guiding principles for the search for disappeared persons (CED/C/7), "Principle 14. The search should be carried out safely".

² CED, Concluding observations on Colombia, CED/C/COL/CO/1 (2016), paras. 20 (a) and 26 (a); Iraq, CED/C/IRQ/CO/1 (2015), para. 20; Mexico CED/C/MEX/CO/1Vi (2015), paras. 28 (a) and 41 (a); Bolivia CED/C/BOL/CO/1 (2019), para. 21.

³ CED, Guiding Principles for the Search for Disappeared Persons, CED/C/7, Principle 6: "The Search should begin without Delay", and Principle 10: "The Search should be organized efficiently", paras. 2 and 3.

⁴ CED, Concluding observations on Colombia CED/C/COL/CO/1 (2016), paras. 29–31, Iraq CED/C/IRQ/CO/1 (2015), paras. 28–29; Tunisia CED/C/TUN/CO/1 (2016), para.30.

integrity and ability of individuals to exercise fully their rights at the time of release. Monitoring of places of detention, which is an important tool to prevent enforced disappearances, should also continue with health precautions taken as appropriate.

Guideline 4.

Bodies of the deceased should be dealt with in a manner permitting identification by relatives and remains should be treated in line with their tradition, religion and culture

15. In some contexts, the treatment of the bodies of individuals deceased through COVID-19 has led to a risk of disappearances. This includes the lack of proper registration of remains, and the loss of bodies before relatives can identify them. In countries where enforced disappearances are prevalent, specific situations have been brought to the attention of the Committee and Working Group demonstrating a risk that such practices are being used to conceal cases.

16. States have the obligation to ensure that the recovery, identification, reporting and return of the remains of deceased persons to their families is carried out in a scientifically rigorous, dignified and respectful manner, in conformity with the highest standards (articles 15, 17(3) and 24(3) of the Convention, article 19 of the Declaration).⁵ Dead bodies must be consistently registered and stored in a way permitting identification and the performance of autopsies. The relatives of persons who have died as a result of COVID-19 or other causes, must systematically be given the opportunity to identify the remains, and all remains must be dealt with in line with their tradition, religion or culture, despite the various challenges that may be raised by the COVID-19 context (such as, for example, the lack of access to bodies for health reasons; the lack of capacity of the competent authorities to reply to requests for the return of remains; the unavailability of forensic experts as a consequence of the COVID-19 confinement measures, etc.).

Guideline 5.

Access to information should be assured

17. For many victims of enforced disappearances, access to information on the progress of the search or investigation is only possible through physical visits to the premises of the competent authorities. Such visits may be significantly limited in the current circumstances. Even when contact is possible through other means such as telephone or the internet, victims have indicated that, in many instances, no replies are being received.

18. Any person with a legitimate interest should have access to the information related to an individual's deprivation of liberty (articles 18 and 19 of the Convention and 10 of the Declaration).⁶ Where access to that information is denied, any persons with a legitimate interest, is entitled to take proceedings before a court as a means of obtaining without delay this information. This right may not be suspended or restricted in any circumstances (article 20(2) of the Convention).⁷ The COVID-19 context should not extend the delays in terms of access to such remedies, which remain particularly urgent in cases of unlawful detention and disappearance.

⁵ WGEID, General Comment on the Right to the truth, A/HRC/16/48, para. 6, CED, Follow up to Concluding observations on Mexico, CED/C/MEX/CO/1/Add.1 (2019), para.21; Concluding Observations on Ecuador CED/C/ECU/CO/1 (2017), para. 10 (b).

⁶ CED, Concluding observations on Iraq CED/C/IRQ/CO/1 (2015), para. 29; Mexico CED/C/MEX/CO/1 (2015), para. 35; Honduras, CED/C/HND/CO/1 (2018), para. 33; Slovakia CED/C/SVK/CO/1 (2019), paras. 16–17.

⁷ CED, Concluding observations on Iraq (2015), CED/C/IRQ/CO/1 para. 30; Burkina Faso CED/C/BFA/CO/1 (2016), para. 32; Japan CED/C/JPN/CO/1 (2018), para. 34; Slovakia CED/C/SVK/CO/1 (2019), para. 21.

Guideline 6.**Relatives of disappeared persons, their representatives and surviving victims of enforced disappearances should be supported and empowered, and protected from harassment or reprisals**

19. The relatives of forcibly disappeared persons, their representatives, and surviving victims of enforced disappearances may be in an additionally precarious position during this period of crisis. Enforced disappearances always put relatives in very challenging position. Their victimization becomes even greater when the head of household is disappeared. As the family structure is disrupted, spouses and children are affected economically, socially and psychologically and have specific needs. Taking into account that men are usually the main target of enforced disappearances, the Committee and the Working Group underline the particular gravity of the situation for women in that context.⁸ The COVID-19 pandemic has often led to additional difficulties for victims to find interlocutors and support for their needs.

20. In some contexts, relatives, human rights defenders and organizations working on disappearances have also continued to face harassment and intimidation.

21. States must take appropriate steps to support disappeared persons and their relatives in fields such as social welfare, financial matters, family law and property rights (article 24(6) of the Convention), even more so in the context of the economic crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. In this connection, the specific position of relatives and victims of enforced disappearance should be considered in any programmes to mitigate the impact of the pandemic. This is in addition to States obligations to ensure the right of victims to obtain reparation and prompt, fair and adequate compensation (article 24(4) of the Convention and article 19 of the Declaration).

22. States must also ensure that all those involved in the search and investigation of enforced disappearances are protected from reprisals, and that all acts of intimidation or reprisals are investigated and punished without delay (articles 12 and 24(7) of the Convention and 13 of the Declaration).

Guideline 7.**Enforced disappearance of migrants should be prevented and terminated**

23. COVID-19 has created additional risks for migrants. Those who may have decided to migrate due to a risk of enforced disappearance, face the closure of borders and the suspension of asylum procedures. Migrants also continue to risk enforced disappearance during their journey or upon arrival in their country of destination and forced returns have continued despite the pandemic, in violation of the principle of non-refoulement.

24. States remain strictly prohibited from expelling, returning or extraditing a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance (article 16 of the Convention and article 8 of the Declaration). The search and investigation into disappearances of migrants should continue without delay, with appropriate health precautions taken as required. Where migrants are deprived of their liberty, they should be registered and be able to communicate with their relatives, lawyers or representatives as well as be informed about their right to communicate with the consular authorities of their country of origin. States are urged to implement the recommendations contained in the Working Group's report on [enforced disappearances in the context of migration](#). States should also continue to cooperate with each other to assist victims of enforced disappearance to search for, locate and release disappeared persons, and to return remains in case of death (article 15 of the Convention and article 2 of the Declaration).

⁸ WGEID, General comment on women affected by enforced disappearances, A/HRC/WGEID/98/2, para. 12.

Guideline 8.**Enforced disappearance of women and of children born in detention should be prevented and terminated**

25. In the context of the pandemic, women are at a heightened risk of suffering gender-based violence, as well as being subjected to enforced disappearance, especially when deprived of their liberty for health reasons. The enforced disappearance of women is a form of gender-based violence when women are specifically targeted because of their sex or gender.⁹ In certain countries, women from minority groups and women affected by poverty and social inequalities are particularly exposed to enforced disappearances.¹⁰ These pre-existing vulnerabilities may be exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 also heightens the risk that children born to mothers who are deprived of liberty will not be registered or recognised by the law and may be subjected to appropriation.

26. No gender-based violence, including as related to cases of enforced disappearance, can be justified. States should ensure that the pandemic does not result in a limitation to the measures taken to prevent such violations. In this context, strict compliance with international standards in relation to detained women is essential to the prevention of enforced disappearances. Holding women in detention in unofficial or secret places of detention is strictly prohibited in all circumstances.¹¹

27. States that have not already done so should establish specific protection measures for pregnant women who are detained.¹² In particular, the birth of their children should be immediately registered, guaranteeing their true identity, and information should be provided to the relatives or other persons with a legitimate interest.¹³

⁹ Ibid, para. 4.

¹⁰ Ibid para. 7.

¹¹ Ibid, paras. 3, 20.

¹² Ibid. paras. 9 and 10, WGEID, General comment on children and enforced disappearances, A/HRC/WGEID/98/1, para. 15.

¹³ Ibid.

Annex V

Press releases and statements

1. On 10 June 2020, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release calling on Zimbabwe to end a reported pattern of disappearances and torture aimed at suppressing protests and dissent.¹
2. On 25 June 2020, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release lamenting the decision by the United States Government to target and sanction individual staff of the International Criminal Court (ICC).²
3. On 25 June 2020, on the 70th anniversary of the Korean War, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release urging the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to repatriate hundreds of people abducted during and after the Korean War, and end decades of anguish for the families of those taken.³
4. On 26 June 2020, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release expressing alarm at the repression of fundamental freedoms in China.⁴
5. On 29 June 2020, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release welcoming the disclosure by the Pakistani Government of the whereabouts of Idris Khattak, a leading human rights defender, yet strongly condemning his enforced disappearance.⁵
6. On 3 July 2020, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release expressing outrage at reports of the secret execution by the Islamic Republic of Iran of Hedayat Abdollahpour, a member of the Kurdish minority in the country.⁶
7. On 9 July 2020, ahead of the 25th Anniversary of the Srebrenica Memorial Day on 11 July, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a statement urging governments to honour victims of the 1995 Srebrenica genocide by building peaceful, inclusive and just societies to prevent a repetition of such an atrocity.⁷
8. On 16 July 2020, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release strongly condemning the decision in the Islamic Republic of Iran to uphold death sentences against three men for participating in protests in November 2019.⁸
9. On 4 August 2020, a year after India revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release calling for urgent action to remedy "alarming" human rights situation.⁹
10. On 29 August 2020, ahead of the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances on 30 August, the Working Group, together with the Committee on Enforced Disappearances issued a statement calling on States to continue the search for people who have been forcibly disappeared, despite the COVID-19 pandemic.¹⁰

¹ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25944&LangID=E.

² See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25997&LangID=E.

³ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26248&LangID=E.

⁴ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26006&LangID=E.

⁵ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26010&LangID=E.

⁶ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26036&LangID=E.

⁷ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26060&LangID=E.

⁸ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26106&LangID=E.

⁹ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26148&LangID=E.

¹⁰ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26189&LangID=E.

11. On 1 September 2020, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release calling on Belarus to stop torturing detainees and bring to justice police officers humiliating and beating protesters in their custody with impunity.¹¹

12. On 4 September 2020, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release calling on the Pakistani authorities to end the secret detention of human rights defender Idris Khattak.¹²

13. On 21 September, on the occasion of the Working Group's annual reporting to the Human Rights Council, the Working Group issued a press release calling on the international community to strengthen cooperation to enable timely and effective investigations and prosecutions of enforced disappearances.¹³

14. On 25 September 2020, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release calling on Belarus to release prominent opposition leader Maria Kalesnikava, and to bring to justice those responsible for her enforced disappearance.¹⁴

¹¹ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26199&LangID=E.

¹² See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26207&LangID=E.

¹³ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26268&LangID=E.

¹⁴ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26296&LangID=E.