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Chairman: Mr. Djatal ABDUH (Iran).

AGENDA ITEM 58

**The Cyprus question (A/3616 and Add.1,
 A/C.1/803, A/C.1/L.197) (continued)**

1. Mr. LOIZIDES (Greece), continuing his statement begun at the preceding meeting, reviewed the history of relations between the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. The Turks had always been a small minority in Cyprus, and neither they nor the Turkish Government had ever expressed objections to the cession of the island to the United Kingdom or to the confirmation of the transfer of sovereignty by the Treaty of Lausanne.^{1/} The Turks in Cyprus had at all times lived on terms of close, friendly and co-operative relations with the Greek majority. Turks and Greeks had worked together peaceably in professional and social organizations and in local authorities. Not until the Greek Cypriots had launched their campaign for the application of the principle of self-determination to the island had attempts been made to incite the Turkish minority to hostility towards the Greek community. Nevertheless, in general, the relations between the two communities had remained friendly.

2. The Greek Cypriots were determined to live in harmony with the Turks in Cyprus. The application of the principle of self-determination would benefit the Turkish minority: in a free Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots would enjoy political and social rights on terms of equality with the Greek Cypriots and their special rights in matters of religion, education, family and property laws would be guaranteed.

3. At the 929th meeting the United Kingdom delegation had said that the reports concerning the maltreatment of Greek Cypriots by the police and the British Army in Cyprus were propaganda. Unfortunately, the reports were only too true, and their truth was proved by documentary material, by accounts printed in a London newspaper and by the proceedings of the Committee of the Council of Europe which was specifically concerned with Human rights. In his opinion the best way of removing all doubt would be to appoint a committee to investigate the complaints of brutalities committed by the United Kingdom authorities.

4. The right of peoples to self-determination was recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. It had been reaffirmed in General Assembly resolutions 545 (VI) and 637 (VII), with specific reference to Non-Self-

^{1/} Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XXVIII, 1924, p. 11.

Governing Territories, and most recently in the draft resolution on self-determination recommended by the Third Committee (A/3775) for adoption by the General Assembly. Surely, Cyprus as a Non-Self-Governing Territory qualified for treatment no less favourable than that extended to the former Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration. He appealed to all Members of the United Nations, and to the United Kingdom in particular, to respect the principles enshrined in the Charter and to allow the people of Cyprus to exercise the right of self-determination.

5. Recalling his past efforts to persuade the Turkish Government that the Greek Cypriots desired nothing more than to live in friendship with the Turkish minority in Cyprus, he again appealed to the Turkish representative to approach the problem in a democratic manner. The Greek majority in Cyprus was determined to respect the wishes of the Turkish minority.

6. Mr. SARPER (Turkey), intervening to raise a point of order, asked whether Mr. Loizides was speaking as a representative of the Greek Cypriots or as a representative of Greece.

7. Mr. LOIZIDES (Greece) replied that the two capacities were indivisible. He was speaking as a Cypriot, but he was living in Greece and was a Greek subject, and he was present in the Committee as a member of the Greek delegation.

8. Mr. SARPER (Turkey) pointed out that Mr. Loizides could not speak on behalf of the people of a Non-Self-Governing Territory without first obtaining the Committee's permission. He therefore requested the Chairman either to obtain the Committee's consent or to rule the speaker out of order.

9. The CHAIRMAN recalled that he had previously pointed out that Mr. Loizides could speak only as the representative of Greece; he requested him to observe that injunction.

10. Mr. LOIZIDES (Greece), resuming, said that reference had been made to the question of the security of the Eastern Mediterranean region, and in particular of the Turkish minority in Cyprus. But security had ceased, in his opinion, to be a regional concern; it had become a world-wide concern.

11. The United Nations, by asserting that the people of Cyprus should be given an opportunity to decide their own future, would be providing important moral support to the Cypriot cause and would be helping the United Kingdom to accelerate a process which it knew to be inevitable. The question of the application of self-determination, in its true meaning, to Cyprus was a test case for the United Nations. Whatever the outcome of the debate, the Greek Cypriots had decided to be free and to live in harmony with the Turks.

12. Mr. LARKIN (New Zealand) said that his Govern-

ment was concerned in the Cyprus question because of its ties with the three countries directly involved—the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. It regretted the decisive effects of a contest between those countries, which were now linked in a partnership on which, to a large extent, international peace and security depended. His delegation had always doubted the wisdom of debating the question in the United Nations. Specifically, it had hoped that the Assembly would avoid so immoderate an action as the endorsement of what was, despite the Greek Government's affirmations to the contrary, a demand that the United Kingdom cede a part of its territory. The Greek Government now disavowed any such demand and asked the Assembly to consider the issue purely and simply as a colonial question. But such an approach ignored certain hard facts and gave the question a dangerously deceptive aspect.

13. The Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.197) disregarded a consideration which the Greek Government had itself acknowledged, namely that United Kingdom sovereignty in Cyprus had been an accomplished fact since 1914; there was no reason to believe that the United Kingdom would not exercise sovereignty in Cyprus in the enlightened manner which had characterized its policies in other dependent territories. The solemn declaration by which the United Kingdom had affirmed that it would apply the principle of self-determination in Cyprus in conditions which would enable all of the population freely to express their views made sound political sense. The best way in which Greece could have advanced the cause of self-determination for the Cypriots would have been to support the development of institutions of self-government: lawlessness and terrorism could not produce a climate propitious to such a development. The very positive efforts made by the United Kingdom towards a settlement deserved something more than a summary rejection by the Greek Government.

14. The Cyprus question could not be solved by forcing the United Kingdom to yield to pressure for the premature exercise of self-determination by the Cypriots. A solution involved the reconciliation of the interests of the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of the island, who were to make the final choice, and of the interests of the Greek, Turkish and United Kingdom Governments. The General Assembly should help to create a favourable atmosphere for such a reconciliation and New Zealand would support any proposal to that end.

15. Mr. MOD (Hungary) said that the United Kingdom was persisting in its intransigent colonialist position with respect to Cyprus, which conflicted with the provisions of the Charter. Though professing to be willing to apply the principle of self-determination to Cyprus, the United Kingdom Government was in effect still treating the island as a strategic base in which the application of that principle was not practicable for the time being. It had stated that, in any case, defence, foreign affairs and the maintenance of law and order in Cyprus would continue to be reserved matters.

16. Moreover, notwithstanding General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI), the most brutal methods of colonial oppression were still being employed in Cyprus. The atrocities committed in Cyprus had been condemned in the world Press and had aroused special indignation in the United Kingdom itself.

17. The delegation of Hungary considered that the Cyprus question should be settled in the spirit of the

Charter and consequently in conformity with the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination. The General Assembly should, by adopting the Greek draft resolution, further the aspirations of the Cypriot people and so help to end the bloodshed. That would be a realistic step, for it would constitute recognition of a process which could not be arrested. He added that it was admitted by the majority of Governments that the realization of the right of self-determination could not be subordinated to military or other considerations; nor could the exercise of the right be qualified by stipulations contained in treaties, for according to Article 103 of the Charter the obligations under the Charter prevailed over those created by other international agreements.

18. In deciding what course to adopt, the Committee should bear in mind two overriding considerations. First, the future of Cyprus could not be decided by anybody other than the people of Cyprus; any solution to which the people did not consent would be unacceptable. Secondly, the settlement that materialized had to be a peaceful one. Accordingly, a prerequisite of any solution was the end of the colonial régime, emergency regulations and military measures. Hungary would support any effort which took those considerations into account.

19. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that Australia had had particularly close relations with all three of the countries most directly involved in the question of Cyprus: the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. It was, of course, also concerned over the problems of the people of Cyprus themselves.

20. The fact that, on the whole, the current debate had been more restrained and conciliatory indicated that the past nine months had certainly seen no deterioration of the situation but, on the contrary, the beginnings of improvement. There was evidence of a fundamental spirit of amity and constructive co-operation in the policy of the United Kingdom towards Cyprus: Archbishop Makarios had been released, safe conduct out of Cyprus had been offered to all terrorists and the relaxation of emergency regulations had begun. Most recently, the United Kingdom had attempted to arrange private discussions among the United Kingdom, Greek and Turkish Governments. Though the attempt had not yet succeeded—through no fault of the United Kingdom—it offered what was perhaps the best prospect of a solution.

21. He doubted whether at the current session the General Assembly could advance the matter any further. And because he considered that restraint was indicated, he regarded the rather more far-reaching draft resolution (A/C.1/L.197) submitted by Greece as unacceptable.

22. Commenting on some of its provisions, he said that the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft resolution tended to imply, that the Assembly had weighed events since the eleventh session and had reached the conclusion that no progress had been made. Actually, although the Committee had heard statements by representatives, it had not undertaken an investigation. His general impression was that there had been some progress towards solution, though not as much as might be desired. Patience was required; the efforts of the United Kingdom were in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI).

23. The third paragraph of the preamble was rather alarmist in tone, suggesting the possibility of more violence and intimating that there was no time for the careful development of solutions taking account both of conditions in Cyprus and of the need for good relations among the United Kingdom and Greece and Turkey. A precipitate attempt to solve so complex and delicate a situation would, he feared, not preserve peace and stability in the area. A solution in conformity with the principles of the Charter and likely to preserve peace and stability had to be worked out with deliberation and patience.

24. Referring to the operative paragraph, he said that the General Assembly should exercise great care before adopting decisions on self-determination. The first reference to self-determination in the Charter occurred in Article 1, paragraph 2, which clearly meant that respect for the principle of self-determination was one of the foundations of friendly relations among nations. It was the development of friendly relations which was the purpose of the United Nations, respect for the principle in question being one of the ways of strengthening such relations and international peace.

25. The other very important reference to self-determination occurred in Article 55. Again, the emphasis was on peaceful and friendly relations: respect for the principle of self-determination was one of the bases for such relations. The draft resolution, however, referred to a "right to self-determination". Moreover, the words "by the application of their right to self-determination" suggested something rather mechanical; the terms used were vaguely reminiscent of the Charter, but were not the actual language of the Charter.

26. The provisions in fact applicable to the domestic problem of the system of government in Cyprus were contained in Chapter XI of the Charter. The most relevant provision was Article 73 b, and what it said was a fair description of the avowed policy of the United Kingdom in Cyprus. But that provision could not be considered in isolation. The provision immediately following, Article 73 c, spoke of furthering international peace and security. In fact, the whole of Chapter XI was part and parcel of the system of international peace and security established by the Charter. That was one of the reasons why he was unable to accept the Greek argument that the United Kingdom was wrong in wishing to discuss the question with both Greece and Turkey. So far as the Charter was concerned, it was the responsibility of the United Kingdom to develop self-government in Cyprus; and in that connexion the United Kingdom was, in accordance with the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7, not subject to the intervention of the United Nations. Under the Charter, Greece had no rights with regard to Cyprus. But if the United Kingdom considered it desirable to have tripartite negotiations in the interests of the people of Cyprus, and with a view to promoting peaceful and friendly relations with Greece and Turkey, it seemed to his delegation that the United Kingdom was well within its rights under the Charter. Indeed it was to be commended, rather than criticized, for approaching the matter in that way.

27. He said that the terms of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter should restrain the General Assembly from dealing with the question of Cyprus if the only

matters involved were the political situation inside Cyprus and any difficulties between the Government and the people. The position of the Australian Government on Article 2, paragraph 7, was well known and, in participating in the discussion of the question of Cyprus, it in no way retracted the opposition it had always expressed to any attempt to have the Assembly intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.

28. For the reasons he had stated, his delegation considered the Greek draft resolution inappropriate as a practical method of advancing the solution of the complex problem of Cyprus and would vote against the draft as it stood.

Mr. de Barros (Brazil) Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

29. Mr. Yacoub OSMAN (Sudan) said that the desire of the Cypriots for self-determination and possible union with Greece was understandable, since four-fifths of the inhabitants of the island were of Greek culture. They had, in any case, made their wishes abundantly clear by the struggle they were waging against heavy odds.

30. It was only comparatively recently that the Cypriots had used other than peaceful means to achieve their aims. They had been led to believe, even before the First World War, that the day of freedom and union with Greece was approaching. The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies had acknowledged in 1907 that it was natural for the people of Cyprus, who were of Greek descent, to regard incorporation with their mother country as a cherished ideal; and in 1919 the Prime Minister of Great Britain had said that the wishes of the inhabitants of Cyprus for union with Greece would be taken into most careful and sympathetic consideration by the Government. Yet in the space of fifty years there had been no progress towards that ideal.

31. In October 1955 Archbishop Makarios had put forward as an indispensable basis for the solution of the Cyprus question the recognition by the United Kingdom Government of the right of the Cypriot people to self-determination, but even so moderate a demand had been rejected by the Government on the grounds that the strategic position of Cyprus made it impracticable. It was also true that the United Kingdom Government had offered a wide measure of self-government under a liberal constitution, but the people of the island nevertheless insisted on self-determination.

32. He appealed to the United Kingdom Government to find a solution acceptable to all parties and particularly to the people of Cyprus. He appreciated the real and legitimate concern of the people and Government of Turkey for the future of the Turkish minority, especially if self-determination led to union with Greece; safeguards for minorities would have to form part of any future constitution. It was clear that partition of the island was not practicable, and his delegation believed that an essential first step to peaceful coexistence of the majority with the minority groups was a solemn pledge by all parties concerned to work for sincere concord and understanding and to safeguard the interests of all.

33. His delegation firmly supported the right of the Cypriot people to self-determination, already accepted

by the United Kingdom Government. The effective exercise of the right would ease world tension and create an atmosphere conducive to friendly relations among the parties directly concerned.

34. Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands) said that, in the opinion of his delegation, the task of the United Kingdom Government in Cyprus was no longer so much to make right prevail over wrong as to reconcile certain opposing aspirations, each of which could merit recognition. First, the treaty rights invoked by Turkey could certainly not be ignored. Secondly, the important principle of self-determination, on which Greece and the Greek Cypriots relied, was one that commanded great respect. Thirdly, the rights and wishes of the Turkish Cypriots had to be taken into account. Lastly, the United Kingdom itself had obligations and responsibilities in the island under the terms of the United Nations Charter.

35. If the United Kingdom Government had chosen to take what might have been the easiest course, it could have imposed a one-sided settlement. The Government, however, had shown a deep sense of responsibility and had expressed willingness to continue consultations with all the parties to the dispute—the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots, Greece and Turkey—and to consider any solution acceptable to them all. It seemed to his delegation that a fairer proposal could not possibly be made, that it deserved the whole-hearted co-operation of all parties concerned and that it provided the best possible basis for a fair and lasting solution.

36. It could certainly not be the task of the General Assembly to express preference for one kind of solution or another; its wisest course was to take great care not to harm, restrict or prejudice the chances for an ultimate meeting of the minds of all those whose rights and aspirations had to be considered. If the Assembly remained true to that aim and avoided expressing, or even hinting at, a judgement concerning the superior validity of any of the competing claims, it would leave full scope to the United Kingdom to devise a solution for so delicate a political question and would thereby serve the best interests of all the parties.

37. Ato Yawand-Wossen MANGASHA (Ethiopia) said that the position of his delegation on the Cyprus question had been made clear at earlier sessions of the General Assembly. The question was identified with the principle of self-determination of peoples, which his Government was committed to support in all cases in which that principle could appropriately be applied.

38. His delegation's position was based on a number of considerations. First, the people of Cyprus, in their desire to be masters of their own land and to emancipate themselves from the status of colonialism had sought for a long time to achieve self-government by democratic and constitutional means. Failing to achieve that purpose by peaceful means, they had resorted to political agitation and even to the use of force to compel the United Kingdom Government to accede to their request. Secondly, the Greek Government, being directly concerned with the people of Cyprus by reason of geographical, cultural and racial affinities, had espoused the cause of the people of Cyprus. Thirdly, in its sincere desire to settle the question as peacefully as possible, the United King-

dom Government had conceded that the people of Cyprus were entitled to determine the status of their land by the application of the principle of self-determination, subject to certain qualifications concerning security and defence. Fourthly, apart from differences regarding the powers of security and the veto powers of the governor in legislation, there was a good measure of agreement on other matters with respect to self-government in the island.

39. In the circumstances, and having regard to the United Kingdom Government's acceptance of the view that the people of Cyprus were entitled to determine the status of their land by the application of the principle of self-determination, the delegation of Ethiopia felt that the issues separating the parties concerned were narrowed down to considerations of devising appropriate machinery for the application of the principle.

40. In his delegation's view, the situation had not changed materially since the eleventh session. It was true that the negotiations attempted since then had not succeeded, but there was ample evidence that the parties directly concerned had recognized the international importance of the question and wished to settle it as amicably as possible. There was also the very hopeful sign of the acceptance of the principle of self-determination as applicable to the island.

41. He added that his delegation would support the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.197).

42. Mr. O'BRIEN (Ireland) said that since the eleventh session of the General Assembly some progress had been made towards achieving the atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression referred to in resolution 1013 (XI), concerning the Cyprus question. Unhappily, however, no such progress had been made towards the peaceful, democratic and just solution for which the Assembly had also called, although there were some signs that such a solution might be sought more earnestly in the future. Not all signs were hopeful, however, for certain statements made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Turkey suggested that, instead of a democratic and just solution what was being prepared was the partition of the island.

43. Although all Members of the United Nations accepted the principle of the self-determination of peoples, it had become clear that they did not all interpret it in the same sense, and that some Members even interpreted it in different ways at different times. For example, according to its representative, the United Kingdom had always supported the principle of self-determination; that statement could only be considered true if the term was taken to mean the self-determination of the people of the United Kingdom as a whole. But it was hard to see how the position of Northern Ireland could be reconciled with the true interpretation of the principle of self-determination.

44. The question what was meant by "self-determination" was crucial to the problem of the future of Cyprus. In giving its full support to the Greek draft resolution, which called for self-determination for the people of Cyprus, his delegation did not understand that term to mean that because there were different ethnic groups in Cyprus the island should be divided between them. It meant, first, that the integrity of

Cyprus as a geographical and historical unit should be preserved, and secondly, that the future of that unit should be decided democratically, by the majority vote of the inhabitants. If the Government of the United Kingdom were to accept and proclaim those principles, the foundations of an enduring and peaceful settlement in Cyprus would be laid.

45. In the case of Cyprus, the application of the principle of self-determination was not difficult. No more clear-cut claim for the application of the principle had ever been brought before the United Nations. His delegation could not regard the existence of a Turkish minority in Cyprus, or the proximity of Cyprus to Turkey, or the fact that Turkey had once ruled Cyprus, as giving Turkey any right whatever to have a say in whether, how, or in what form Cyprus should be allowed to exercise self-determination. If self-determination was to be achieved for Cyprus, the parties to that achievement could only be the people of the island itself and the United Kingdom.

46. Turkey had, of course, the right to inquire what guarantees the majority of the island's population was prepared to give to the minority in respect of religious, educational and other human rights, and could also call on the General Assembly for a reinforcement of those guarantees or for practical measures to ensure their enforcement. The Assembly could and would meet such an appeal with effective action. But Turkey certainly had no claim to exercise a veto on the right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination, and the United Kingdom, if it should concede such a right of veto to Turkey, would be wrecking all hope of the peaceful and just solution for which the Assembly had called.

47. His delegation earnestly hoped that the policies applied in Cyprus in the past would be revised radically and that the principle of self-determination would be carried into effect, not in any sophisticated manner but with that respect for natural and historical reality which marked any enduring political settlement.

48. Mr. ARENALES CATALAN (Guatemala) said that the statement of its position on the Cyprus question which his delegation had made in the Committee at the eleventh session (855th meeting) was still wholly applicable, since no progress had been made since then towards a solution of the problem. His delegation continued to maintain the validity of the principle of self-determination in the case of Cyprus. The Guatemalan delegation had accepted the compromise resolution ultimately adopted by the General Assembly at the eleventh session (resolution 1013 (XI)), but it felt now that the time had come for the United Nations to give unambiguous expression to its views regarding the right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination.

49. On affirmation of the applicability of the principle of self-determination to Cyprus could not be objected to on the ground that the proposals contained in the Radcliffe report^{2/} already granted that right, for a government in which the governor would have the right of veto as well as the right to decide, without appeal, which matters fell within his competence was hardly consistent with the principle of self-determination. Nor could it be objected to on the ground that the

application of the principle would involve the revision of treaties, for the people of Cyprus had not entered into any treaties. Nor did arguments regarding the strategic interest of certain States in Cyprus impress his delegation.

50. With regard to the Turkish minority in Cyprus he said that a minority could not be allowed to obstruct the wish of the majority for self-determination. His delegation sympathized with the Turkish representative's concern for the protection of the Turkish minority in Cyprus; however, that was a matter connected not with self-determination but with the mode of the exercise of self-determination. When once the United Nations had unequivocally recognized the applicability of the principle of self-determination to Cyprus, it would be easier for the parties concerned to devise machinery for carrying the principle into effect.

51. For the reasons he had given, his delegation would vote in favour of the Greek draft resolution.

Mr. Abdoh (Iran) resumed the Chair.

52. Mr. AHMED (Pakistan) said that his country, while not having a direct interest in the Cyprus question, was nevertheless concerned at the continuation of a dispute which was impairing good relations between countries with which it was directly or indirectly linked. The problem of Cyprus was not a simple colonial problem, for if it were, the United Kingdom, which had liquidated its colonial rule over the peoples of a large part of Asia and Africa, would hardly deny to a European population the satisfaction of its legitimate aspirations. The difficulties of the problem were real and complex. Happily, the legitimate strategic interest of the United Kingdom in the future of the island was not irreconcilable with the political aspirations of the Cypriots, and in that connexion his delegation welcomed the readiness of the United Kingdom to discuss with Greece and Turkey any solution acceptable to both Greece and Turkey. But the real difficulty of the problem lay in the fact that Greece and Turkey disagreed on the question of the future of Cyprus. In his delegation's view, it was not the principle of self-determination itself, or the United Kingdom's obligation to promote self-government, which presented a problem, but rather the ways and means by which the principle was to be applied and the obligation discharged in the particular circumstances. There was no common Cypriot nation or Cypriot nationalism, so that in the case of Cyprus the problem was one of applying the principle of self-determination to two separate national groups. The use of the terms "majority" and "minority" was therefore misleading. Because of the presence of ethnic Turks and Greeks in Cyprus, the Turkish and Greek Governments were naturally and legitimately concerned with the future of the island. His delegation therefore considered that not only the United Kingdom and the Cypriots but Greece and Turkey, too, must play their rightful part in any discussions bearing on the future of Cyprus, for there could be no lasting settlement of the question without the assent of all the parties vitally concerned.

53. In his delegation's view, the considerations put forward by the Turkish representative to justify his country's interest in the future political status of Cyprus were very relevant; in particular, the impor-

^{2/} Lord Radcliffe, *Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), Cmd. 42.

tance of Cyprus to the security of Turkey and to its communications with the outside world could not be ignored.

54. The factors he had mentioned presented genuine impediments to any attempt on the part of the United Nations itself to lay down the basis of a solution to the problem. His delegation believed the General Assembly should not try to do more than suggest an approach, and the correct approach, in his delegation's view, was that recommended in resolution 1013 (XI). His delegation welcomed the reaffirmation by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Turkey of their acceptance of that resolution, and hoped that it would be possible for Greece to exercise moderation and patience in the interests of the free world and of its friendship with the United Kingdom. Finally, it would appeal to all the parties concerned, and especially to the Greek Cypriots, to create the necessary climate for the success of any negotiations which might be undertaken, and to bring to those negotiations a spirit of compromise and a consciousness of their common stake in the solution of the Cyprus problem.

55. Mr. RODRIGUEZ FABREGAT (Uruguay) expressed his delegation's hope that a renewed effort would be made to solve the problem of Cyprus in accordance with the United Nations Charter. The United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, the three countries directly concerned, had all made great contributions to human progress. But there was a fourth party, the people of Cyprus, and only they had the right to determine their own future.

56. His delegation has always supported the principle of the self-determination of peoples and the implementation of that principle by democratic processes. It could hardly be said that the people of Cyprus were not qualified to decide their own political future, and therefore the right of self-determination should not be withheld from them. His delegation hoped the Committee would adopt a draft resolution which contained a clear and categorical affirmation of that right, while avoiding any note of rancour, and an appeal for understanding between the parties, to be achieved through negotiation. It was in that spirit that his delegation would cast its vote.

57. Mr. GARIN (Portugal) regretted the divergence of views between three countries with which Portugal had such strong ties of friendship. In his delegation's view, the Cyprus question could not be settled satisfactorily except by direct negotiations among the three Governments on the lines advocated so often by the United Kingdom. All three parties wished to arrive at a solution which would be in the interests of the people of Cyprus but opinion was sharply divided on the type of negotiations to be undertaken.

58. When it had adopted resolution 1013 (XI), the General Assembly had been convinced that the cessation of terrorism was a prerequisite of any useful negotiations. The release of Archbishop Makarios, the offer of safe conduct to persons under sentence, and the truce proclaimed and temporarily observed by the leading terrorist organization on the island, had apparently led to some improvement in the local situation. The recent recrudescence of violence, coincidental with the discussion in the United Nations, was, he thought, a further argument against United Nations intervention.

59. Resolution 1013 (XI) referred also to freedom of expression, for it had been thought that without that freedom the representatives of the different communities in Cyprus would be unable to participate properly in the framing of their constitutional machinery. It was obvious that freedom of expression for a minority, or the moderate elements within a minority, could not be achieved if terrorism by extremist elements prevailed.

60. His delegation was confident that if all parties co-operated, the measures taken by the United Kingdom Government with a view to the progressive relaxation of the emergency measures would soon create the conditions of freedom of expression required under the resolution.

61. The Turkish Government had declared its willingness to consider suggestions for a satisfactory solution. It was to be hoped that the Greek Government would not press for a restricted type of negotiation which might cause the interests of other parties to be disregarded.

62. In his delegation's view, the Cyprus question was a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a Member State and therefore unsuitable for discussion in the United Nations; besides, he doubted the wisdom of discussing in the Committee a question so obviously meant to form the subject of negotiations among the three parties concerned. The Committee would agree, he hoped, that the resolution adopted at the eleventh session still offered the best prospect for the resumption of such negotiations, and that progress towards the creation of a more favourable atmosphere in the island had already been achieved. He therefore hoped that the Committee would facilitate progress by adopting a text on the lines of resolution 1013 (XI), possibly coupled with an appeal to the population of Cyprus to use calm and restraint.

63. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) drew a parallel between the case of Cyprus and that of Palestine; in both, he said, a majority and minority were so divided by nature and in their aspirations that it was difficult to find a solution satisfactory to both. In many other respects, of course, the two cases differed. The United Kingdom had had a League of Nations mandate over Palestine, whereas its relations with Cyprus were those between a metropolitan country and a colony. In the Palestine affair the United Kingdom had applied to the United Nations for guidance, whereas in the case of Cyprus not only was the United Kingdom not prepared to waive its rights but two other Member States also claimed the right to speak on behalf of the Cypriot people.

64. The United Nations should respect above all else the right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination; the question was how to ensure the exercise of that right in a way which would forestall attempts by one part of the population to victimize the other.

65. Two courses were open to the Committee. It could adopt a resolution similar to that adopted at the eleventh session, calling on all parties to resume the interrupted negotiations with a view to a peaceful, democratic, and just resolution. Alternatively, it could adopt a text under which the United Nations would take direct action. In that event, the General Assembly would have to appoint a commission to conduct a local inquiry,

consult with the people and present a plan. It would be generally agreed, he thought, that the second course was not practicable; in effect, only the first course was feasible.

66. The draft resolution submitted by Greece (A/C.1/

L.197) seemed to be too little if the United Nations was to solve the problem by itself, and too much if United Nations action was to be confined to recommending the resumption of negotiations.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.