

# GENERAL ASSEMBLY

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**Chairman:** Mr. Djalal ABDOH (Iran).

## AGENDA ITEM 58

## The Cyprus question (A/3616 and Add.1, A/C.1/803, A/C.1/L.197) (*continued*)

1. Mr. ULLRICH (Czechoslovakia) believed that an immediate settlement of the Cyprus question was essential, both in the interests of the people of Cyprus, who were fighting for their independence, and to ensure the continuance of peace and stability in the Near and Middle East.

2. In adopting resolution 1013 (XI), the General Assembly had had three main considerations in mind. It believed, first, that the solution of the problem required an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression; secondly, that a peaceful, democratic and just solution had to be found in accordance with the purposes and principles enunciated in the Charter of the United Nations, and thirdly, that negotiations had to be resumed and continued to that end.

3. Nine months had passed since the adoption of the resolution and during that period only the people of Cyprus had striven continuously to carry out the recommendations of the General Assembly. The Government of the United Kingdom had not made any attempt to do so; above all, it had not tried to create an atmosphere favourable to the resumption with the Cypriot people of the negotiations which had broken down. The British colonial authorities in Cyprus were maintaining the policy that had caused justifiable indignation among the entire population of Cyprus, stirred up armed strife in the island and resulted in heavy loss of life among the British as well as the Cypriots. The inhabitants of Cyprus were still subjected to the curfew; there was a ban on all political and public organizations, and Cypriot patriots continued to be persecuted.

4. The people of Cyprus and their organizations had tried without avail to resume negotiations with the competent British authorities. After his release, Archbishop Makarios, in a letter addressed to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, had made known his willingness to participate, on behalf of the Cypriot people, in bilateral negotiations to settle the question of Cyprus in accordance with the principle of self-determination laid down in the Charter. The United Kingdom Government had not accepted his offer, claiming that other problems of greater scope had to be discussed simultaneously. That attitude caused con-

cern regarding the future of the island, whose people were determined to carry their struggle for recognition of their right to self-determination to a successful conclusion. The freedom movement of the Cypriot people was a national movement, and one with which all peace-loving people everywhere were in sympathy; that was particularly true of the people of Czechoslovakia.

5. The plans put forward by the Government of the United Kingdom were not acceptable; in particular, it was anxious to settle the question of Cyprus by the introduction of the draft constitution proposed by Lord Radcliffe in December 1956,<sup>1/</sup> a constitution which the Cypriots were not prepared to accept because it failed to grant them the right to self-determination and prolonged the colonial status of Cyprus indefinitely.

6. The other plan put forward by the Government of the United Kingdom involved the partition of Cyprus, and that the Cypriots could not accept, as it would almost certainly cause difficulties. It would have unfortunate consequences for the political and economic future of the island, and there would always be a danger of disturbances and strife.

7. The statement made at the 927th meeting by the representative of the United Kingdom made it clear that it was primarily owing to military and strategic considerations that the Cypriot people were being denied the right to self-determination. The island of Cyprus, as the representative of the United Kingdom had observed, was of vital importance to British interests in the Near East. Its importance had been clearly demonstrated in 1956 when the United Kingdom, France and Israel had attacked Egypt.

8. The conversion of Cyprus into a military base was also in the interests of the United States, particularly in view of the notorious Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine for the Near East. That was why the United States viewed favourably the creation of an independent Cyprus, whose sovereignty would be guaranteed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The purpose of the plan was readily apparent: it was to subordinate Cyprus to the interests of the aggressive North Atlantic bloc and to use the territory as a military base against the socialist countries and the Arab countries of the Near East. The people of Cyprus were firmly rejecting proposals of that type, because they did not wish to be associated with the aggressive plans of the Western Powers.

9. The Cypriot people called for the application of General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI) and the immediate resumption with its representatives of negotiations which would have as their starting-point the recognition of the principle of self-determination.

<sup>1/</sup> Lord Radcliffe, *Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), Cmd. 42.

10. His delegation supported their request and felt the United Nations could play an important part by recommending negotiations to bring about a peaceful, democratic and just settlement of that urgent question.

11. Mr. QUIROGA GALDO (Bolivia) said that his delegation's attitude had been made quite clear over the four years in which the General Assembly had been seized with the question of Cyprus. Bolivia felt a sincere friendship for the United Kingdom and was trying to consolidate the economic ties which had marked Anglo-Bolivian relations since the attainment of independence by Bolivia. On the other hand, Bolivia admired Greece, not only on account of its glorious past, but also for its undying attachment to the cause of liberty, of which it had given so many proofs. With regard to Turkey, the young people of Bolivia, who had struggled to attain the nation's economic independence, had often been inspired by the immortal example of Kemal Atatürk. His delegation would therefore consider the question with complete impartiality and in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

12. The question of Cyprus, in fact, raised four separate problems.

13. With regard to the United Kingdom, the problem was colonial. That country's rights over the island were based on a treaty concluded between the conquerors and the conquered in an international war. According to the principles and standards of public international law in force before the establishment of the United Nations, the legal claims of the United Kingdom were apparently indisputable. The United Kingdom exercised sovereignty over the island under the Treaty of Lausanne,<sup>2/</sup> which transferred to it a part of the territory formerly belonging to the Ottoman Empire. There had accordingly been a transfer of sovereignty in good and due form in respect of the island of Cyprus, already administered by Great Britain under the convention of 1878 between Great Britain and Turkey.<sup>3/</sup> But it should be pointed out that under the Treaty of Lausanne, only Turkey had recognized the sovereignty of Great Britain over Cyprus. The other signatory States had confined themselves to taking note of that bilateral agreement. Moreover, the Cypriot people had not been consulted in 1923 or in 1878 when they had been given a new master.

14. While it recognized the sacred nature of contracts which had not been imposed by force and did not perpetuate unjust situations, his delegation was aware that, generally speaking, treaties, like human beings, grew old and died. Treaties could not last eternally, particularly when they were the result of a war. Peoples could not be indefinitely confined in the straitjackets of agreements imposed by conquerors. At a given moment, treaties should be revised or replaced by others in keeping with the new situation created by the evolution of the international community. The existing international status of Cyprus in relation to the United Nations was proof of that. The fact that the United Kingdom transmitted to the United Nations information on that territory clearly showed that the legal ties binding the metropolitan country to the colony

had been changed or weakened, just as if the Treaty of Lausanne had lapsed and a return had been made to the convention of 1878, under which the United Kingdom was merely the administrator of the island. He wanted to make it clear that he was not disputing the right of the United Kingdom to possession of Cyprus; he wished simply to demonstrate that the problem raised was essentially of colonial origin.

15. With regard to the political aspect of the question, it should be pointed out that since the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, the British Empire had become an association of sovereign and independent States. Similar developments were taking place in other parts of the world. That meant that the age of colonialism was past and that the current moment marked the apogee of nationalism. He asked what the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne were worth in face of the events which were reshaping human civilization. The course of history could not be arrested by agreements of that sort. The only multilateral treaty wholly valid at the current time was the United Nations Charter. The colonial question raised by the United Kingdom in connexion with Cyprus could therefore be settled only by applying the principles of the Charter, and that of self-determination in particular.

16. The second problem concerned the part played by the Greek Government and people. Rightly or wrongly, Greece had been accused of actively intervening in the Cypriot rebellion. Greece was reviving old claims over certain territories cut off from the mother country by force of circumstances. It was obvious that when it had acquired its independence in 1832, Greece had gradually outlined its geographical and political frontiers by the unification of territories inhabited by Greek-speaking inhabitants. The noble tongue of Homer, with the accretions of foreign words acquired in the course of centuries, was the intangible receptacle of the nation's soul. It was accordingly not surprising that the Greek State, which had asserted its character once more in its heroic resistance to Nazi and Fascist invaders, had sought, at a time when the political map of the world was being redrawn, to bring back into the national territory the Greek-speaking community which constituted the majority of the Cypriot population.

17. Greek statesmen, in particular the Minister of Foreign Affairs who was currently taking part in the debates in the First Committee, had stated explicitly that their country was not trying to annex Cyprus. But, owing to certain events which had occurred in the island during the past seven years, the participation of Greece in the debate as the natural spokesman for the Cypriots raised implicitly, if not explicitly, a question of unification.

18. There was no forgetting the fact that in 1950 the plebiscite organized by the Archbishop of Cyprus, in which 215,000 persons had voted, had shown a 95 per cent majority in favour of union with Greece. Despite the allegations of the colonial authorities, that plebiscite had certainly not been accompanied by any fraud; that was proved by the fact that the United Kingdom had refused since then to allow any consultation of the same type under United Nations auspices.

19. The repeated statements of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece doubtless accurately expressed his Government's firm intention to abjure a

<sup>2/</sup> Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XXVIII, 1924, p. 11.

<sup>3/</sup> Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey, signed at Constantinople on 4 June 1878. See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 69 (1877-1878), p. 744.

policy of unification, but on the other hand there could be no doubt that the Greek nation still hoped for achievement of the ideals of the movement which advocated enosis (union with Greece).

20. The third problem arose from the interest which Turkey was beginning to show in the future of the 100,000 Cypriots of Turkish extraction. His delegation fully understood the concern of the Ankara Government, but it did not think that any proposal to partition the island could be acceptable. The fact that Cyprus was inhabited by 400,000 Greeks and 100,000 Turks was no ground for a kind of judgement of Solomon, which would deprive the island of the centuries-old advantages which it had drawn from its political and geographical unity. Recent history had demonstrated that such partition did not produce good results. Experience had shown that the only way to settle the question raised by the existence of a Turkish minority was to grant that minority some status which would guarantee its free development, with respect for its national characteristics, its language and its religion.

21. The fourth problem was that of the Cypriot people itself. When a people took up arms against foreign oppression, the purpose of the rebellion was always to achieve liberty and political independence. The outbreak of guerilla warfare was the surest sign that the period of submission had come to an end. Nothing could oppose that movement: neither regular armies, nor military leaders from the best army schools. In the case under consideration, the passion and courage of the insurgents had merely been stimulated by the internment and exile of the leader who, spiritually speaking, was the foremost guerilla fighter in the Cypriot rebellion, Archbishop Makarios. The remarkable fact that Archbishop Makarios had been able to persuade the rebels to observe the truce for an indefinite period proved that he was an acceptable party to participate in the negotiations which, taking into account the economic and strategic interests of the United Kingdom in Cyprus, would enable the Cypriot people freely to decide their own political destiny.

22. At the eleventh session of the General Assembly, his delegation had stated its approval of the terms of resolution 1013 (XI). But it had pointed out that it was simply a matter of a respite granted by the United Nations to parties which, after repeated declarations of their readiness to negotiate, had not given further effect to their offer.

23. The General Assembly now found itself in the same position as in February 1957. It was true that the release of Archbishop Makarios, the relaxation of tension in the island and the replacement of the military governor by a liberal administrator were circumstances which augured well; but the will to impose rather than negotiate settlement seemed to persist.

24. His delegation accordingly thought that the time had come for the United Nations to express strongly the general wish to see the parties to the dispute resume negotiations, in order to enable the people of Cyprus to express its sovereign will freely.

25. Such negotiations should provide for a plebiscite organized under the auspices of the United Nations. By that means the inhabitants of Cyprus, whatever their origin, would be able to announce their decision on the principal aspects of the four problems raised simul-

taneously by the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the Cypriot people themselves.

26. Mr. NAJIB-ULLAH (Afghanistan) said that the disagreement between three countries with which Afghanistan maintained friendly relations was a matter of concern to his delegation, which had been constant in its desire that the question of Cyprus should be settled in accordance with the principles of justice and fairness and the purposes and principles enunciated in the Charter.

27. In his delegation's opinion, the most important part of the question was the fact that the people of Cyprus wished to attain their freedom by exercising their right of self-determination. That factor outweighed all other considerations since it involved the very foundation of the principles of equality of nations, freedom and democracy. Nevertheless, despite the genuineness of the Cypriots' desire for independence, it should be borne in mind that the people of Cyprus did not form a homogeneous entity, but was composed of a large majority of Greeks and a well-defined Turkish minority. Recent events had brought that fact out in clear relief. His delegation did not consider that co-operation between the two communities was impossible, but was convinced that a satisfactory solution could not be reached unless that difference was taken into consideration. Therefore, while recognizing the right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination, his delegation believed that the minority, as well as the majority, should be given the opportunity to exercise that right.

28. Afghanistan fully appreciated the feelings of the Greek nation towards the Greek Cypriots, but also sympathized with the feelings which the Turks had expressed towards the Turkish community on the island. In seeking a solution to the question, historical, cultural and geographic considerations had to be taken into account together with other factors.

29. The Afghan delegation had heard with satisfaction the United Kingdom representative's statement (727th meeting) that his Government would be ready to consider various possible solutions on the basis of the right of self-determination, through unconditional negotiations conducted in a spirit of broadmindedness. The Afghan delegation therefore hoped that in future the issue would be dealt with in accordance with the principles of the Charter. Moreover, it appeared from the statements of the Greek and Turkish representatives that their Governments were acting in a spirit of conciliation and hoped to settle the question in accordance with the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination. It might therefore be hoped that, despite existing differences, the parties concerned would be able to reach a just and friendly settlement.

30. Lastly, his delegation welcomed the interest which the United Nations had shown in the question and shared its concern as well, but did not believe that a solution could be reached by discussions alone; the parties concerned should initiate negotiations in a spirit of good will and objectivity and should, during the negotiations, take into consideration the legitimate aspirations of the people of Cyprus and their right of self-determination.

31. Mr. NISOT (Belgium) said that United Kingdom sovereignty over Cyprus was proved by conclusive texts and was unimpeachable. It was the exercise of

that sovereignty which had been called into question. The questions raised in the Committee fell within the framework of constitutional organization, in other words, a realm essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter explicitly forbade any interference in such matters. United Nations intervention could not be justified, moreover, on the alleged grounds that the question had international implications. Since the provisions of the Charter concerned relations among States, they were all international in character. Nevertheless, Article 2, paragraph 7, provided that none of those provisions authorized intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a State.

32. His delegation considered that the principle *pacta sunt servanda*, which the Colombian representative had invoked at the preceding meeting, imposed respect for the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. His delegation would therefore continue to refrain from taking part in the discussion of a question in which the intervention of the United Nations was prohibited by the Charter.

33. Mr. GEORGES-PICOT (France) noted with satisfaction the moderate tone of the statements of the representatives of the parties chiefly concerned. His delegation regretted, however, that the dispute among three nations with which France maintained excellent relations, and which were colleagues of France in several regional organizations, had once more been raised in the General Assembly. It considered that there were more suitable procedures for the peaceful settlement of the question and that, apart from any legal consideration, United Nations intervention would not necessarily further the evolution desired. It was in the light of those considerations that his delegation would take a stand regarding any draft resolutions that might be submitted.

34. The question of Cyprus, like most of the questions submitted to the United Nations, could be examined from two points of view: that of the law and that of fact.

35. From the legal point of view, there was no question that the island of Cyprus was administered by the United Kingdom in full sovereignty. That was a situation in law which was recognized by the Greek Government itself. The question therefore involved an internal matter which fell within the domestic jurisdiction of the United Kingdom and which, consequently, was not within the competence of the United Nations.

36. That point having been established, his delegation would, since the United Kingdom Government had not opposed a discussion of the question in the General Assembly, proceed to an examination of the facts, without, however, abandoning the fundamental position dictated by the Charter. In his delegation's opinion, the situation had developed favourably since the adoption of resolution 1013 (XI). The liberation of Archbishop Makarios, the attenuation of the emergency measures which the situation had rendered necessary, the considerable decrease in the number of armed encounters on the island, the appointment of a civilian governor-general, and more particularly, the continuation of talks between the Governments concerned, were especially encouraging signs.

37. Moreover, his delegation had noted with satisfaction the statements of the representatives of the

three Powers chiefly concerned. The United Kingdom had reaffirmed its intention to establish an autonomous government in Cyprus; Greece had stated that it had no territorial claims on Cyprus; and Turkey was not considering an extreme formula which would call for the partitioning of the island. All those facts formed an excellent foundation for a compromise solution. His delegation considered, however, that confidence must be placed in the United Kingdom Government, which had furnished sufficient evidence of what the representative of India had called "its political wisdom" for the United Nations to refrain from complicating its task.

38. With regard to the draft resolution submitted by Greece (A/C.1/L.197), the operative part of which took cognizance of the right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination, he said that at the eleventh session his delegation had explained at length what attitude should be taken towards the proclamation, on the part of the General Assembly, of a right to which magical powers appeared to be attributed. Moreover, at the eleventh session, the United Kingdom representative had stated (847th meeting) that the question of the circumstances in which the right of peoples to self-determination should be applied in any of the territories of a Member State was clearly an internal matter to be decided by that State itself. That argument was unanswerable. In the French delegation's opinion, therefore, the draft resolution submitted by Greece was useless and perhaps even dangerous, at least in its existing form. The United Kingdom was, in fact, sole judge of the conditions under which the people of Cyprus could attain self-determination. Moreover, the draft resolution was dangerous since it could encourage further incidents, which might ultimately work against those directly responsible and run counter to the goal that was being sought.

39. Since his delegation wished to leave all avenues open to the United Kingdom Government to seek means towards a peaceful, democratic and just solution, in agreement with the parties concerned, it would be unable to vote for the draft resolution.

40. Mr. SARDER (Turkey), replying to the Greek representative's observations (929th meeting) on his statement of 9 December 1957 (928th meeting), explained that he had been forced very reluctantly to mention certain facts as it was necessary to make the situation quite clear. He recalled that in the first part of his statement he had stressed the necessity of reducing the Cyprus question to its basic elements, discussing it in calm and serenity, and discerning the real issues involved in order to create an atmosphere more favourable to the exploration of existing possibilities of progress towards a solution satisfactory to all concerned.

41. His delegation had never maintained, as the Greek representative had affirmed, that the Turkish community in Cyprus should decide the fate of the Greek-speaking population. That allegation had nothing to do with the Turkish point of view. It was the Greek delegation which had insisted that the Greek community should decide the future of the Turkish Cypriots by incorporating more than 100,000 Turks against their will under Greek rule. The Turkish delegation had merely observed that if the principle of self-determination of peoples were applied to Cyprus, in view of the special circumstances of that territory, that right should be applied equally to the Turkish and Greek-



speaking Cypriots so that each of those peoples could decide their own fate. It was the Greek delegation that took an intransigent attitude, which, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, was unrealistic and against all rules of equity and justice.

42. The similarities which the representative of Greece had sought to establish between other situations and that in Cyprus were completely irrelevant. The Turkish delegation, like the Greek delegation, knew quite well that it would be a calamity to attribute the right of secession to minorities living in independent and sovereign States. Far from advocating the application of such a principle to independent countries or national entities in Non-Self-Governing Territories, the representative of Turkey had upheld the completely contrary view in his first statement (928th meeting). Cyprus was not an independent State, however, nor was there any distinct Cypriot nation. Furthermore, it was not Turkey but the Greek Government which had asked for a change of sovereignty in Cyprus.

43. The Greek representative had also said that if the Turkish Cypriots refused to be incorporated with Greece, it would be a calamity to Non-Self-Governing Territories, as it would create a precedent which would hinder the prospects of independence for many lands. But that was a fallacious argument. The Cyprus question was not a question which arose from the prospects of independence or of national entity. Cyprus was an island on which there were two distinct communities. If the question of a change of sovereignty were ever to be considered, in the form of the annexation of the island by Turkey or Greece—if such an eventuality were to be considered—it would then be a question of retracing the frontiers between those two countries. According to the Greek view, such a possibility should exist.

44. From the point of view of international law, the question of Cyprus had nothing to do with the question of the independence of Non-Self-Governing Territories and therefore could never create a precedent. Questions relating to accession to existing States were in a class by themselves and could not be settled without taking into account a great number of circumstances. In any case, if the disposal of territories having a mixed Turkish and Greek population were to create a precedent then it must be acknowledged that it was Greece which had created the worst possible precedent by annexing the Turkish province of Western Thrace, in which the Turks were an overwhelming majority. That annexation had been made through the refusal of the right of self-determination. The annexation of territories belonging to already existing States and the disposal of Non-Self-Governing Territories which were seeking to acquire their independence were two completely different questions.

45. With regard to relations between the Turkish and Greek communities, the Turkish representative wished to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that the regrettable tension between those two communities, the reason for which he had given during previous debates, had been heightened, among other factors, by the Press campaign in Greece against the Turks in general and the Cypriot Turks in particular. Furthermore, the acts of terrorism, of which the innocent Cypriot Turks were victims, had made the situation more dangerous. The propaganda and agitation for enosis had placed the Turkish Cypriots in a position of

self-defence. They felt that they must do all in their power so as to prevent themselves from coming under the domination of a Government which had taken a position against them. Those were the real causes of the tension, which responsible statesmen in all the three countries concerned should try to eliminate. In that connexion, he noted that in the leaflets distributed by the Greek terrorist organization, the Turks of Cyprus were threatened with a dire future. During the rioting which the Greek terrorists had organized to impress the General Assembly, the Turkish Cypriots had received grave warnings. According to information received by the Turkish delegation on 8 December 1957, the Turks in the village of Mitsada had been warned by loudspeaker to leave their homeland immediately. They had had to ask the Governor for protection. In such circumstances, it could not be expected that the Turkish Cypriots would place themselves under the custody of the Greek community. They had not forgotten the example of the fate of the Turkish community on the island of Crete where, at the end of the last century, after the appointment of a Greek High Commissioner to the then Turkish island, the Moslem population of the island had decreased, within two years, by 40,000. There were other examples to which Turkish Cypriots pointed as causes of their anxiety about their own future if they were placed under Greek rule.

46. If there were more Turkish Cypriots than Greek in the auxiliary police force, it was only because the Greek terrorists had murdered or intimidated the Greek policemen. The terrorists aimed at imposing their own law. As the Turkish people of Cyprus were the first target of such disorders, he asked how they could be blamed for co-operating with the forces of law and order. The Greek representative had also insinuated that the Turkish policemen were responsible for cruelties; those allegations were completely unfounded. Such unjustified accusations would only strengthen the determination of the Turkish Cypriots not to yield to those who were guilty of such a denial of justice towards them.

47. He was surprised that the representative of Greece had seen fit to recall that, during the explanation of votes at the eleventh session (856th meeting), six members of the First Committee had agreed with his interpretation; he forgot that nine other delegations had taken an explicitly different point of view and that seven others had expressed themselves implicitly along the same line. The text of resolution 1013 (XI) and the conditions under which the interested parties had accepted it required no explanation.

48. In conclusion, the Turkish representative said that General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI) included all the elements for a peaceful, democratic and just solution. If, however, one of the parties assumed an intransigent attitude in the hope of imposing its view upon the others, the conciliatory efforts of the General Assembly would be wasted, no matter what the wording of a resolution might be.

49. He reserved the right to speak again to state the views of his delegation on the draft resolution submitted by Greece (A/C.1/L.197).

50. Mr. ISMAIL (Federation of Malaya) pointed out that in its march towards independence, his country had resolved problems similar to those currently met with in Cyprus: that of the relationship between a

colony and a colonial power, that of a racial minority, and that of interests which might be altered by a change in the status of the country. The United Kingdom was offering to Cyprus the same conditions for independence as it had offered to Malaya, and experience showed that its intentions were sincere and that differences of views could be resolved to the satisfaction of all parties concerned.

51. The question of racial minorities should not intervene, for what counted were majority opinions. The Greek Cypriots should try by peaceful means to obtain a majority opinion among the Turkish minority in favour of independence, for intimidation and terrorism would not serve their interests. Furthermore, to harp on the point that the Turkish Cypriots should abide by the decision of the Greek majority under the pretext that it represented the view of 82 per cent of the population would only frighten the Turkish element, which otherwise would be ready to support the cause of independence.

52. He would like to advise those parties whose interests might be altered by a change in the status of the country to help the Cypriot people to achieve independence, for the example of Malaya showed that their positions would remain secure. The same advice could have been given to those of Malayan, Chinese, Indian and Ceylonese origin in Malaya: they should not look towards Indonesia, China, India or Ceylon, for that would only complicate the issue.

53. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) saw the Cyprus question as a matter of the liberation of a country from colonial rule. It was the task of the people of Cyprus to settle that issue in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly the principle of self-determination, and the Cypriot people were entitled to decide their fate through a plebiscite under United Nations supervision or by any other means. The United Kingdom must fulfil the obligations it had contracted by signing the Charter, and the United Nations should use all its influence to see that the Member States concerned applied the Charter in their dealings with Cyprus.

54. The United Kingdom could not invoke domestic jurisdiction in the matter, for it was a question of a dispute between the United Kingdom Government and the people of Cyprus. Neither Greece, nor Turkey, nor Syria was a party to that dispute.

55. The negotiations proposed by the General Assembly at its eleventh session had not taken place, and the discussions previously undertaken between the United Kingdom and the Cypriots had not been based on the principle of the equality of the parties concerned. When it had become apparent that they had not led to any results, the United Kingdom had concluded them by sending the spokesman for the other side, Archbishop Makarios, into exile. Even after the adoption of resolution 1013 (XI), the attitude of the United Kingdom Government had remained unchanged, while the people of Cyprus had responded to the call of the United Nations and had declared themselves willing to negotiate.

56. The United Kingdom did not intend to negotiate as long as "terrorism" prevailed on the island; there really was no terrorism, but a national revolt for liberation. However the case might be, the activity of the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA)

had ceased in March 1957. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom had not resumed negotiations, and it did not consider the principle of self-determination applicable to the Cypriots. The United Nations should therefore exert all its influence to prevail upon it to abide by the provisions of the Charter and the recommendations of the General Assembly, and to negotiate with the people of Cyprus.

57. The existence of a truly Cypriot Turkish minority—for there were no recent settlers involved—posed special problems, and that minority was entitled to safeguards. That, however, was not a reason for depriving the vast majority of Cypriots of their rights, for it was quite understood that those responsible for the future of Cyprus were prepared to provide legitimate safeguards of a constitutional and international nature which should make the minority legitimately contented.

58. The future of the island naturally concerned its neighbours; yet no matter how important it might be for the neighbours, the people of Cyprus alone had the right to decide in favour of enosis or any other solution. Among the measures to be taken to reassure neighbouring States would perhaps be the neutralization or demilitarization of the island. Syria, which was the country nearest to Cyprus, was happy to know that Greece, like Turkey a member of NATO—which moreover was already obsolescent in many respects—was favourable to that idea.

59. The liberation of Cyprus would set Syria at ease, would allay tensions between Turkey and Greece and would end the use of the island by the United Kingdom as a military base from which colonial influences could be exerted all over the Middle East. It would also end tensions between the United Kingdom and the people of Cyprus.

60. Cyprus and Syria had been one country even before the birth of Athens, and Cyprus had been united to Syria until 1878, though Turkey and the Ottoman Empire should not be confused. Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon all had an equal right to speak about ties with Cyprus, and Turkey had no more right than Syria in that respect.

61. The lucid, sincere and objective statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece had convinced him, and it was not possible to contest the facts he had presented, even less to question the legitimacy of the Greek position.

62. In the past, Cyprus had so often been used as a base for attacks against Syria that the Syrian Government could not fail to be concerned about the military operations that might be planned there. In those circumstances, Syria was entitled to participate actively and fully in international negotiations on the future of Cyprus.

63. In short, only negotiations between the people of Cyprus and the United Kingdom Government could bring about a solution based on the principle of self-determination which would provide the Turkish minority with the necessary safeguards.

64. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal) said that his delegation understood the Greek Government's interest in the struggle of the Cypriots of Greek origin, although their methods might not be approved by all. The United Kingdom had already conceded in principle the right of self-deter-

mination to the people of Cyprus; it was merely a question of how and when that right was to be implemented. The rights of the Turkish minority, though legitimate, should not be allowed to block the progress of the Cypriot people towards self-government. The right of self-determination in the case of the Cypriots should be exercised in accordance with democratic procedure.

65. The partition of the island would not provide any solution. A national minority in the ratio of one to eight could scarcely benefit from a partition of the country when that minority population was interspersed with the majority population and scattered all over the territory. Though the interest of the Greek and Turkish Governments in Cyprus was understandable, it could not be regarded as the overriding factor. It was for the United Kingdom and the people of Cyprus to solve the problem without any pressure from outside.

66. In view of the efforts made by the Government of the United Kingdom after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI), his delegation felt that the question of Cyprus could be solved through quiet diplomacy and negotiations, rather than through resolutions and public debates in the United Nations. Charges and counter-charges of terrorism might only poison the atmosphere. The fact that the Foreign Minister of Greece had welcomed Mr. Noble's reference (927th meeting) to progress towards self-government and to the principle of self-determination was encouraging and seemed to show that negotiations might lead to a solution of the problem which would be satisfactory to all. The Government of Nepal was confident that the United Kingdom would act in the spirit of fairness and understanding which had been its tradition in handling colonial questions.

67. Mr. NOVITSKY (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) considered that the question of Cyprus had created a situation that was dangerous to world peace. Everyone had seen how the island had been used as a base for the Anglo-French attack on Egypt. Press reports indicated that Cyprus was being transformed into an atomic base for NATO. In that connexion he quoted from an article that had appeared in the Daily Telegraph and Morning Post, stating, among other things, that guided missiles with a range of 1,500 miles based on Cyprus could cover the whole region of the Baghdad Pact, with the exception of Pakistan. The British White Paper published in April 1957<sup>4/</sup> had stated that British armed forces based on Cyprus would include bomber squadrons capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

68. None of those facts had been denied by Mr. Noble. On the contrary, he had admitted that the "strategic responsibilities" of the United Kingdom determined its policy in that area. Such considerations took priority over the interests of the population of Cyprus; hence the efforts of the United Kingdom to preserve and strengthen the colonial régime in Cyprus. The assertions of the United Kingdom and Turkish representatives to the effect that the Cyprus question was not a colonial question were refuted by the facts: the régime in Cyprus was typically colonial.

69. During the past few months the British colonial authorities had taken some steps to give the general

public the impression that they wished to lessen the prevailing tension and to recognize the rights of the Cypriots; in practice, however, there had been no change. Arrests without trial continued; more than 900 people were detained in concentration camps; house-searches were frequent; the prisoners were subjected to torture; trade-union leaders were being persecuted. Small wonder, in those circumstances, that the population of Cyprus had intensified its struggle against the colonizers. As always when a people tried to throw off the colonial yoke, its opponents spoke of "terrorism" and represented the struggle as one waged by a small group of outlaws.

70. Mr. Noble had declared that the struggle of the people of Cyprus was subsiding. Only recently, however, The New York Times had reported serious clashes between Cypriots and British troops. The struggle of the colonial peoples for freedom was growing more intense and nothing could stop it. Theirs was a just cause, which had the sympathy of all peace-loving people.

71. The United Nations should do all in its power to enable the colonial peoples to exercise their right of self-determination and to achieve independence. Resolution 1013 (XI) had had no result, for the United Kingdom Government had not changed its attitude. The problem of Cyprus could not be settled in that way. The General Assembly should take every step to ensure that the people of Cyprus could exercise self-determination. That would be an important contribution to the maintenance of peace and the elimination of tension in that part of the world.

72. Mr. LOIZIDES (Greece) said that, as both a Cypriot and a member of the Greek delegation, he was able to give some first-hand information on the problem.

73. The Cyprus question primarily concerned the Cypriots themselves. The Cypriots, on their own initiative, had knocked at the door of the United Nations long before the Greek Government had decided to support their cause. That had been in 1950, at the fifth session of the General Assembly. At that time he had been a member of the Cypriot mission which Mr. Entezam, the President of the General Assembly, had received and listened to with the greatest courtesy.

74. The following year, in Paris, a Cypriot delegation had reminded the United Nations of the existence of the problem. At the seventh session, in 1952, Archbishop Makarios had come to the United Nations Headquarters in person and had got into touch with many delegations. Greece had still not sponsored the demands of the Cypriot people; it had still hoped that it would be possible to find a solution outside the United Nations.

75. At its seventh session, however, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 637 (VII) recommending that the Administering Powers should promote the realization of the right of self-determination of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories. As Cyprus was a Non-Self-Governing Territory, the Cypriots had naturally requested the Administering Power to respect that resolution; but in vain.

76. On 12 August 1953, therefore, Archbishop Makarios, on behalf of the Greek Cypriots, who constituted 81 per cent of the whole population of the island, had

<sup>4/</sup> Defence: Outline of Future Policy (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), Cmd. 124.

submitted a petition to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, asking for the application to the Cypriot people of the right of self-determination. In order to be included in the agenda the petition had needed the sponsorship of a Member State. Once again Greece had preferred to continue its efforts to find a solution outside the United Nations. He himself had therefore been deputed by the Cypriots to come to the eighth session of the General Assembly in order to find a delegation which would sponsor their petition. Prince Wan Waithayakon of Thailand, who at that time had been chairman of the Asian-African group and President of the General Assembly, had agreed to place the request before the group for consideration.

77. The Cyprus demand had finally been brought before the General Assembly at the ninth session, in 1954. The item had been included in the agenda but the General Assembly had decided not to adopt a resolution on it. That hesitation on the part of the United Nations to assist a people demanding respect for the principles and purposes enunciated in the United Nations Charter was responsible for the developments which had followed in the island.

78. The resistance of the Cypriots had ceased when, in its resolution 1013 (XI), the General Assembly had expressed the desire that a peaceful, democratic and just solution would be found in accord with the Purposes

and Principles of the Charter. Unfortunately, the desired result had not been achieved.

79. Consequently, the General Assembly was once again faced with the Cyprus question. At the preceding meeting the representative of the United States had advocated patience and the solution of the question through quiet diplomacy. He had heard about quiet diplomacy ever since he was a child; the Cypriots had waited and waited, but patience had its limits. The Cypriot people, having met with no response either from the United Kingdom or in the United Nations, had been driven to what was called violence. They did not like violence but they had been driven to it after so many years of waiting in vain for a peaceful solution.

80. He suggested that, as it was growing late, it might perhaps be better for him to continue his statement at the following meeting.

81. The CHAIRMAN agreed that it would be better to adjourn and to hear the rest of the statement at the afternoon meeting.

82. He felt he should point out that speakers in the debate officially represented the delegations of which they were members and could participate in the debate only on behalf of those delegations.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.