



Wednesday, 27 November 1957,
 at 3 p. m.

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda item 59:	
The question of Algeria	253

Chairman: Mr. Djalâl ABDOH (Iran).

AGENDA ITEM 59

The question of Algeria (A/3617 and Add.1)

1. Mr. PINEAU (France) paid a tribute to the memory of Mr. Ali Chekkal, a member of the French delegation to the eleventh session of the General Assembly, who had been the victim of a premeditated murder because, as a French Moslem from Algeria, he had expressed his devotion to France in the United Nations.
2. The fact that the French delegation had not objected to inclusion of the question of Algeria in the agenda should not be interpreted to mean that it had altered its position and was now accepting United Nations intervention in a matter which was exclusively one of domestic jurisdiction. It had always held that the General Assembly was not competent to settle the Algerian problem, a position based on a fundamental Article of the Charter.
3. France had been in Algeria since 1830 and in 1848 with the adoption of the Constitution of the Second Republic, Algeria had become a part of France. That was long before the incorporation of such authentically French provinces as Savoy and Nice and long before many other Member States had absorbed most of the territories which now legitimately came under their sovereignty. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that France had joined the United Nations with the frontiers which had been traditionally recognized as the frontiers of France; Algeria was included and thereby protected from the intervention referred to in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. Although there might be those who regretted not having made the reservations then that they were now making, that did not entitle the Assembly to exceed its rights by waiving an obligation which all Member States had assumed and without which there could be no international life at all.
4. He recalled that 1.2 million persons of European origin had been settled in Algeria for many generations and that they represented one-eighth of the local population. Conversely, nearly 300,000 French Moslems from Algeria lived and worked in France, where they enjoyed the same rights as other citizens and had access to the highest posts in the Republic. Consequently, the problems arising in Algeria, however complex they might be, came within the framework of French sovereignty. Furthermore, there was no national uprising in Algeria directed against foreign oppression; it was a political campaign organized by a

minority schooled in the methods of terrorism and subversion. It would have failed a long time ago had it not been supported by certain countries which had provided arms, money, directives and even bases of operations. If there was any international aspect to the Algerian question, that was certainly the only one. Under the Charter, it was not France that should be accused, but those who threatened its security and sovereignty.

5. France had been reproached for not having negotiated with those fighting against it in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1012 (XI), but the only offers to negotiate made with no unacceptable preconditions had come from the French side. They had consistently been rejected. As early as 9 March 1956, Mr. Guy Mollet, then Prime Minister, had publicly appealed to the rebels for a cease-fire so that free and fair elections could be held to be followed by talks concerning the establishment of a new Algeria. That offer had been renewed since, in particular on 9 January 1957, and recently by the Prime Minister of the new French Government. For its part, France would not make the negotiations contingent on any political condition; their purpose would be the restoration of calm and security.

6. Once calm had been restored, there would be elections on the basis of a single electoral roll, enabling the populations of Algeria freely to choose their representatives. No movement supported by a minority group of the population could demand that it be recognized as the only spokesman for the whole country. With a view to ensuring the genuineness of that popular consultation the French Government was prepared to invite countries accustomed to the rules of democracy to send as many observers as might be needed to the spot.

7. Finally, as soon as the elected Algerian assemblies had been organized, discussions would take place in order to establish the permanent institutions of Algeria, which should take into account the occasionally divergent interests of the various communities and allow for the full exercise of individual rights and freedoms.

8. France was determined to pursue that policy in three stages, and the *loi-cadre* (basic law) which was now being debated in the French Parliament, was to be one of the instruments of that policy.

9. The French proposals for a cease-fire had failed because the leaders of the rebellion had put forward conditions which were unacceptable. In its desire to put an end to the conflict as quickly as possible, the French Government had gone so far as to enter into unofficial conversations with some of its enemies. But the leaders of the rebellion were utterly intransigent and refused to negotiate unless the independence of Algeria was first recognized. In order to illustrate how intransigent they were, he quoted a number of

statements made by representatives of the National Liberation Front (FLN). All those statements were rejections of the French offers to negotiate. Thus, it was the attitude of the rebels which constituted the real obstacle to negotiation. The position of the French Government was clear; first, representative government was the result of free elections and not of terrorism and, secondly, the political demands which continued to be made the preconditions for the opening of negotiations had the effect of rendering such negotiations futile. It was inadmissible for negotiations of any kind to be made contingent on the acceptance by one of the parties of all the claims put forward by another party.

10. That was one of the basic reasons why France was not in a position to act on the offers of good offices made by the King of Morocco and the President of the Republic of Tunisia. The joint communiqué published at Rabat on 21 November 1957 designated the FLN as the only spokesman for the other side. The FLN could not, any more than any other political party, claim to be the sole representative of the Algerian populations. Moreover, although the communiqué no longer made independence a precondition, it replaced it by the precondition of recognition of the sovereignty of Algeria, a less precise term perhaps, but one of absolutely identical juridical meaning. Finally, France did not see how two Governments whose freedom of action respecting the FLN was more than dubious could usefully be brought into the negotiations, for mediation presupposed the neutrality of the mediator. It did not want to run the risk of jeopardizing, perhaps finally, the chances of creating a French-North African community when the time was ripe. Moreover, in its communiqué of 23 November, the FLN had reaffirmed its intransigence by insisting that negotiations should be held on the basis of Algerian independence.

11. He wished to draw the Committee's attention to the sharp divisions between the rebel groups. Outside Algeria, there was conflict between various groups and committees jockeying for leadership. In Algeria itself, the forces of pacification were not being confronted with anything like a unified army; on the contrary, they had to deal with independent bands of varying strength, sometimes openly hostile to each other. At the present time, calm had been restored in most of the country, but there were still quarrels between rival factions, in particular, between the FLN and the Algerian National Movement (MNA). They were waging a propaganda war, and where persuasion failed, they resorted to intimidation and murder. In the interior, there were armed skirmishes between rival bands for the control of the sectors most profitable for looting and gun-running.

12. In addition to those political rivalries, there were the antagonisms created by differences of race and language. Even within the FLN, relations between Kabyles, Chaouïas and Arabs were anything but cordial. The Chaouïa rebels of the Aurès region rejected any Arab or Kabyle authority, whether under the banner of the FLN or the MNA. Those dissensions were also demonstrated in metropolitan France, where the number of attacks and assassinations had reached a magnitude unprecedented in the history of conflicts between rival bands. The FLN had undertaken to destroy the leadership of the Union syndicale des travailleurs algériens, a trade union organization affiliated with the MNA, and had had several of its leaders murdered. During the first six months of

1957, there had been about 600 Algerian Moslems killed in France and more than 2,000 wounded, all at the hands of other Algerian Moslems. In Belgium and Tunisia, accounts between rival bands had been settled in a similar manner. Everywhere, working people were the victims of methods against which they continued to protest. There was no doubt that the Algerian people had had more than enough of the tyranny to which they were being subjected by the lords of the civil war. In any event, it was futile to try to ascertain whether any given movement represented the will of the people when the matter could easily be settled through free elections. But the FLN undoubtedly had more confidence in totalitarian methods than in the public goodwill.

13. He would not depict in detail the Algerian terrorism which he had described at the previous session. The methods used by the terrorists were being actively or passively resisted by the Algerian population and alienated most of those who, because they had been either misguided or under duress, had at one time supported the rebellion. The objectives of the rebellion had been to spread terror by every possible means in order to implant the myth that it was all-powerful, to impose on the Moslem populations blind obedience to orders, and to create undying hatred between the Moslem and European communities. Between 1 November 1954 and 1 November 1957, the rebels had killed 8,429 civilians, including 310 women and 120 children. That tragic figure included 1,126 Europeans and 7,303 Moslems, of whom 222 were women and 84 children. Those figures showed that the rebellion did not enjoy the spontaneous support of either the Moslem or the European community.

14. At the present time, the gangs responsible for organizing terrorism in the cities had been successfully broken up. Similarly, the attempts ruthlessly to intimidate those who contravened rebel orders had resulted in failure. In addition to collective murders, there were individual executions intended to force acceptance through terror of the most exorbitant demands, such as the prohibition, under penalty of death, of traditional family and religious celebrations.

15. The order to boycott the schools had also been unsuccessful: there were now nearly 400,000 Moslem children attending school as against 300,000 as of October 1954, on the eve of the rebellion. At the same time, the Moslem students in France had spontaneously resumed their attendance at the universities, disregarding the unrescinded strike call.

16. That reversal of the situation could not be better illustrated than by the admissions of certain responsible leaders of the rebellion themselves. In the Constantine area, for example, a political officer signing himself "Abd El-Krim" had written in October 1957 that the people of the area no longer obeyed the orders of the leaders.

17. At Algiers itself, one of the last of the rebel chiefs, recently arrested, had written on 21 September 1957, that a strike intended to call attention to the United Nations debate on the Algerian question, however short its duration, would be doomed to failure in that city. He (Mr. Pineau) had photostats of those documents and of others to which he would refer later, which were at the disposal of members of the First Committee. He noted in passing that the rebels had not hesitated to resort to the services of paid professionals. Twenty of the chiefs of FLN terrorist-cells arrested in the last three years were old offenders.

18. One of the chief tasks of the rebels was also to prevent any co-operation between Moslem and Europeans, as well as any participation by Moslems in public life, through the elimination of all those among them, namely elected or appointed officials, who engaged in such activities. In that respect too, the rebellion had failed, despite the murders. Volunteers had immediately replaced the municipal, departmental or regional delegates who had been murdered. They included militant trade unionists appointed by their organizations, heads of municipal delegations elected by their peers, and—an important innovation—young Moslem women.

19. The religious leaders themselves had not been spared. On 22 August 1957, one of the most respected figures of Moslem Algeria, the old Sheikh Ben Tekkouk, had been murdered together with his son; two days later the FLN spokesman on Radio Tunis had hailed that feat of arms with satisfaction. However, thousands of Algerians had in spite of the FLN prohibition, attended the funeral of the Sheikh, whose prestige extended even to Libya.

20. The violence that had struck the notables had not spared the people. The rebels tried to prevent the villagers from attending the regional markets for fear that they would make contact with the administration or seek the free treatment given by the hospital services. Yet in one year the number of free medical consultations had increased from 250,000 per month to 610,000.

21. On 28 May 1957, an FLN leader in the Oran region had written to one of his lieutenants that "armed men should be sent to execute all the men and women who visited the officers of the specialized administrative sections" to give them information. Unfortunately, such assignments had often been carried out. Directives of the FLN of 17 April 1957 had contained orders to burn all the villages which had requested French protection and to kill all the men in them over the age of twenty. As a result, the villages of Aïn-Manas, Wagram, Sédoui, Bouandas, and especially Melouza had acquired a melancholy fame.

22. Those crimes against humanity had had an effect opposite to the one sought by their authors. All over Algeria, village communities had spontaneously established vigilance committees which were increasing in number and which took an active part alongside the regular forces in destroying the rebel bands. Their numbers had tripled since the beginning of 1957; on 1 November they had numbered 57,000 men. Simultaneously, the surrenders of rebel bands had become more and more numerous.

23. Attacks committed against the population of European origin were for the most part intended to provoke violent reactions which would exacerbate hatred on both sides. The instructions to avoid all excesses which the French Government had given to those vested with its authority had in general been obeyed, as the reports of several international commissions testified. The few individual errors which had been committed had been investigated and punished.

24. At present, although sporadic outbreaks of terrorism were still occurring, peace was being restored in Algeria. Public life had been resumed and—a significant detail—taxes were being collected normally.

That restoration of the situation would never have been possible if the Moslem populations as a whole had not persevered and demonstrated its attachment to France.

25. He recalled that at the eleventh session (830th meeting) he had dealt at length with the activities of the Algerian Communist Party. He would briefly sum up those activities and the way in which they had been continued since February 1957.

26. On 31 October 1954, the eve of the day on which the Algerian tragedy had begun, during a secret meeting held at Algiers, Mr. Frachon and Mr. Dufriche, speaking on behalf of the Confédération générale du travail, the central French communist trade union, and the World Federation of Trade Unions, had offered the nationalists their unconditional support in the struggle for independence. In 1954 and 1955, close contacts had been established between nationalist and Communist leaders. In January 1957, the arrest of a militant Communist had made it possible to establish that the Communist terrorist organizations of Algeria had merged with those of the FLN and had formed joint groups.

27. The participation of the Algerian Communist Party in the rebellion took two forms. First, it had specialized in the organization of urban terrorism, for which its members were technically better prepared. A major portion of the explosions of infernal machines which had caused several hundred victims in Algiers were attributable to it. It made use especially of militants of European origin who were certainly acting not in order to support the cause of Algerian nationalism, but in the hope that the triumph of the rebellion would make possible the establishment in Algeria of the system of their choice. Secondly, the Algerian Communist Party had made a successful effort to introduce its militants into the FLN bands. Many Moslem Communists trained abroad in underground centres had been assigned the specific mission of infiltrating the rebel bands. If France withdrew from Algeria, it was those Communists who would be in the best position to take power. They constituted the only really disciplined force on the rebel side.

28. He had already said that he was not claiming that the Algerian rebels obeyed Communist orders alone; he wished only to call the Committee's attention to the grave danger, for the future, inherent in Communist participation in the subversion in Algeria. The rebellion, even if it was sincerely opposed to the establishment of a Communist régime in Algeria might one day constitute, even against its will, the Trojan horse of communism in North Africa.

29. Although it was understandable that some might have an interest in maintaining insecurity in North Africa, it was less easy to understand what interest other countries had in prolonging the Algerian conflict by the moral and material support they were giving the rebellion.

30. It was from Cairo that the orders had come which had unleashed the first disorders in the Aurès region on 1 November 1954. It was in Cairo that the FLN had been formed, with the encouragement of the authorities and in large part at the orders and with the money of the Egyptian secret services. It was in Cairo also that the so-called National Committee for Algerian Resistance had held its most recent plenary meeting in August 1957. Frenzied appeals calling for "holy war",

murder and violence, as well as extravagantly false news bulletins, were beamed to Algeria every day from the official radio stations of Cairo and Damascus. Since January 1954, the League of Arab States had regularly included in its budget a "North African Fund" intended to support subversion. In certain member countries of the League, public collections to aid the rebellion were carried out periodically.

31. Much more serious still was the fact that shipments of weapons were constantly increasing. The investigation following the boarding, off the Algerian coast, in October 1956, of a ship flying no flag and carrying no papers, had made it possible to establish the grave responsibility incurred by Egypt in that respect. The ship in question, the *Athos*, which had been chartered by the Egyptian special services, was carrying about a hundred tons of arms and ammunition supplied by Egypt and intended for the bands of western Algeria. Previously, several other clandestine deliveries of arms, whose source had always been Alexandria, had taken place by sea in North Africa. France had, as was known, submitted a complaint to the Security Council on those serious violations of international obligations (S/3689). Nevertheless, Egypt had persisted in its attitude. On 13 June 1957, the Spanish authorities in Ceuta had seized in their turn, aboard the freighter *Juan Illueca*, a cargo three times larger than that of the *Athos*, which had also been loaded at Alexandria under the supervision of an Egyptian military detachment. Large shipments were made to other ports, particularly Tunisian ports, from which they were secretly forwarded to Algeria.

32. France fully realized that the situation in Algeria was of concern to Tunisia and Morocco, neighbouring States, and that those two countries wished for an end to the strife as soon as possible. Unfortunately, the assistance they afforded the rebellion in various more or less voluntary forms achieved the opposite result. The very sovereignty of those two States was being threatened by the pressure the Algerian rebels exerted on them.

33. In that connexion he referred to the activities of the FLN in the Province of Oujda (Morocco): the FLN was so firmly entrenched there that it levied its own taxes, forcibly recruited young men, and ran camps for training and regrouping. Thus for several months it had been able to carry out raids into western Algeria with relative security. Nador (East Morocco) was the site of one of the largest centres for receiving and forwarding arms sent to the rebels from abroad.

34. In Tunisia, the situation was even more serious. Assistance to the rebellion, which had been relatively discreet until the beginning of 1957, was becoming increasingly overt. A military headquarters of sorts, under the orders of Mr. Ouamrane, claimed to direct operations throughout eastern Algeria from Tunis. The said Ouamrane had at his disposal facilities which were entirely improper under international law. His equipment and men were sometimes transported in Tunisian military vehicles. Barracks of the Tunisian national guard had been placed at his disposal, for example at Tunis and Souk-el-Arba. He had set up real bases at Souk-el-Arba, Tadjerouine and Toseur, and camps at Teboursouk, Aïn-Draham, Thelepte and elsewhere. It was from those centres that commandos left to infiltrate into Algeria, where they regrouped to carry out surprise attacks. When-

ever they felt the danger was too great, they took refuge on Tunisian soil. The tension prevailing on the Algerian-Tunisian frontier and the incidents occurring there had no other cause. By no means could they be attributed to France, which could not renounce its right of self-defence.

35. Because of those facts Morocco and Tunisia did not have sufficient freedom of attitude with regard to the FLN for their good offices to be used to advantage between the FLN and France.

36. Each instance of moral and material encouragement to the Algerian rebellion, regardless of its source, constituted a violation of the most firmly established principles of the United Nations Charter, which imposed on Member States the obligation to live together in peace with one another as good neighbours. Article 2, paragraph 4, prohibited Members from threatening the territorial integrity of other States. Moreover, the "Essentials of peace" resolution (290 (IV)) which the General Assembly had adopted at its fourth session, called upon every nation to refrain from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity of any State, or at fomenting civil strife in any State.

37. Moreover, the African-Asian Conference, held at Bandung in 1955, had adopted, among others, two principles which certain Members of the Assembly invoked in other circumstances: the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations and of non-intervention and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries.

38. In view of the intransigence with which the leaders of the rebellion had consistently rejected all offers of negotiation for a cease-fire, the French had had to choose between two courses of action: either to rely exclusively on force, or, on the contrary, to undertake in all fields immediate reforms designed to ensure the resumption of conversations with the Moslem populations based on mutual trust. The French Government had chosen the second alternative, thus demonstrating the sincerity of its intentions and its confidence in the future.

39. He referred to the statements he had made at the eleventh session (830th and 831st meetings) regarding the complexity of the economic and human problems besetting Algeria and the efforts that France was making there. The French plans were being methodically carried out and such important basic reforms as civil service reform, agrarian reform, and increased school enrolment were producing increasingly encouraging results. For example, the number of Moslems recruited into the public services had increased by 3,000 in a single year; the number of primary-school classes opened had risen from 11,000 in October 1956 to 13,230 in October 1957.

40. Without waiting until the restoration of order made an electoral consultation possible and facilitated the free discussion it desired, France had made some political and administrative changes which, though hardly spectacular to those who favoured the long-range view, were really of vital importance. The most important change had been to transfer to the local authorities some of the broad powers the central administration of Algiers had exercised. The number of services and departments had been reduced from twenty-four to nine. The powers thus withdrawn had

been delegated to the local administrative authorities, the three regions, the departments, which had increased in number from four to twelve the public agencies, the specialized administrative sections, and specially the communes.

41. At the end of 1955, within the framework of the existing circonscriptions, specialized administrative sections had been organized to permit increased personal contacts through a very flexible administrative system adapted to local characteristics. Working in the very heart of the territory assigned them and participating in its day-to-day life, the Algerian affairs officers in charge were generally responsible for extending administrative action into all fields. They administered and offered advice to the population. They were assisted by doctors, teachers, specialized staff and medical social workers. Their work, which called for dedication, bordering on self-sacrifice, had everywhere been welcomed enthusiastically by the populations. The number of such units, of which there had been 180 on 1 January 1956, now exceeded 600.

42. The municipal reform, the principles of which had been decided upon in June 1956, had just begun to be applied at the time of the eleventh session of the General Assembly; since then it had developed beyond the expectations of France. The plan had been to replace direct administration by municipal administration, run by representatives of the population under the same conditions as in metropolitan France. Pending the single-roll elections to the municipal councils, provisional assemblies had been established by the appointment of qualified persons after oral consultations among the heads of families in accordance with local tradition. The membership of those assemblies took careful account of the ethnic composition of the administrative circonscriptions. About 80 per cent of them were now Moslems having Koranic personal status and 20 per cent were persons having civil personal status. A total of 3,400 Moslems sat in the municipal assemblies, compared with fewer than 800 Europeans. Encouraged by the very wide measure of popular support, the Government had extended that same system to larger administrative districts and had set up twelve provisional departmental assemblies and three regional assemblies. In all cases candidates for the posts to be filled had been numerous and the members of the municipal councils and the assemblies exercised their functions with the greatest initiative and zeal.

43. The rebels, of course, had realized the danger of such co-operation. Moslems who had co-operated in carrying out those reforms had received threatening letters bidding them choose between resignation and death. Very few had given in: almost all had persevered at the risk of their lives in the course they considered consistent with their civic duty. Dozens of them had been butchered. But every time, in their villages or towns, others had spontaneously volunteered to carry on their work.

44. Those reforms did not suffice to define what the French Government called "the Algerian personality". The French Government had therefore deemed it necessary to undertake a broader programme. That need was filled by the *loi-cadre*, a law which in French terminology established principles but did not go into all the details of implementation. That *loi-cadre* sought first of all to ensure absolute equality for citizens and communities through the institution of universal

suffrage, by means of a single electoral roll, for elections to all representative assemblies.

45. A further aim was to ensure as great a measure of decentralization as possible by establishing legislative and executive organs in the various regions as well as for Algeria as a whole, in order to enable the Moslems to manage their own affairs at the various levels. Each region would have its assembly elected by a single electorate on the basis of universal suffrage, its council of communities and its responsible government. In Algiers, the corresponding organs would be instituted by indirect election. The powers reserved to the French Republic would be exercised by the Algerian population in so far as it was represented in the metropolitan assemblies.

46. Lastly, the *loi-cadre* contained provision for the development of Algerian institutions, and the powers conferred on the various organs could be modified in the light of experience. The institutions could thus be the object of free discussion between France and the duly elected representatives of the Algerian population.

47. It was true that in September 1957 the National Assembly had rejected a first draft of the *loi-cadre*, but it was noteworthy that the votes of members desiring a more liberal law had outnumbered those of members expressing reservations or suggesting restrictions.

48. The new French government had amended the original text of the bill without narrowing its scope, and had added a draft electoral law embodying the principle of proportional representation as a guarantee of minority representation. Provision was also made for minority councils in order to eliminate all possibility of discriminatory practices. Those were special bodies whose only purpose was to ensure harmony among the communities.

49. In short, the *loi-cadre* attested to the fact that France was determined to bring about conditions conducive to peace and stability and to set up the practical machinery required for the threefold aim of "a cease-fire, elections and negotiations". The *loi-cadre* would facilitate the rise of a new *élite* to govern the country, and was in complete conformity with United Nations principles.

50. France had been reproached for paying too little heed to the principle of self-determination of peoples; but if that principle were applied in the present circumstances, the result would be to split Algeria into two or more States, since the population of European origin would want to administer the territories in which it was in a majority, such as the large coastal cities, while the populations of the Aurès, Tlemcen and Kabylia regions would each wish to be autonomous. He stressed that Algerian history showed those who did not distort it for their own ends that that was the normal course of events unless a new force, with outside support, imposed unity by the harshest kind of coercion, with no respect whatever for the real wishes of the people.

51. The United Nations must not, under the spell of an untenable theory, contribute to the creation of a new source of local and international conflict and the application of a system opposed to the interests of the people concerned. The right of peoples to self-determination would run counter to morality if it were to

take no account of the sanctity of human rights and the interests of the international community. France believed that it should be applied only with due respect for individual freedoms, the protection of minorities, the gradual preparation of a *élite* capable of making valid decisions, the exercise of true democracy and the maintenance of public order, in the absence of which self-determination was governed by violence and fear.

52. In connexion with the future of North Africa, he pointed out that France was more than ever desirous of extending its co-operation with other countries, in particular with those of North Africa, for which a new economic era might dawn when the recently discovered wealth of the Sahara was developed. In expending labour, technical skill, capital and manpower on the exploration and development of those natural resources, France had no intention of setting up a neo-colonial system in the desert; rather it intended to associate neighbouring territories and countries with the work and give them a share in the results which it hoped to obtain.

53. In conclusion, he emphasized that the situation in Algeria had become much simpler. The rebels had lost, militarily, psychologically and politically. They knew that France was prepared to meet the legitimate aspirations of the people by definite action, but not to give their territory over to anarchy and destitution. The rebels' only hope was that the United Nations would restore to them the prestige they were losing.

54. Consequently, any interference in the matter, besides being a violation of the Charter, would be likely only to delay the solution of the problem. France could not show weakness in the face of those who had chosen violence as a means of calling attention to their existence. The situation called for applying to living human beings universally recognized principles and deciding what were the true interests of the people concerned. Were they to be delivered up to terrorism, privation, totalitarianism or anarchy—or were they to be given their only chance of achieving democracy, which would guarantee freedom and peace for all? The States Members of the United Nations must choose. France had made its choice.

55. Mr. LOUFTI (Egypt) said that he could not pass over the French representative's accusations against Egypt. Those accusations were full of wilful inaccuracies and deliberate omissions, and no proofs had been adduced in their support. French propaganda was endeavouring to pin the responsibility for the Algerian war on Egypt in order to delude world opinion; but the attitude of France, which refused to recognize the rights of the Algerians and compelled them to fight an army of half a million men equipped with the most modern weapons, was ample explanation for the events in Algeria; there was no need to bring into the discussion any aid which the Algerian nationalists supposedly received from abroad.

56. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) recalled that the French representative had referred to the news broadcasts from Damascus as "frenzied", and had asserted that

foreign aid to Algeria also took the form of military aid. Those statements were absolutely inaccurate. Information from Arab countries on the situation in Algeria showed how disturbing that situation was for the Arabs, but he knew of no case of any Arab State having broadcast information which was not backed by the most positive proofs.

57. If the Algerians were well supplied with arms, it was because the French troops, being much less mobile than their enemies, had often been obliged to abandon large quantities of arms, which had gradually accumulated and now formed the basis of the Algerian's equipment. He could understand that all the more readily since exactly the same thing had happened in the Syrian revolt.

58. Where financial aid was concerned, it was true that money had been collected in a number of countries for the victims of the Algerian war and French oppression, but it had never been used to finance military operations.

59. The only object of statements seeking to explain events in Algeria by external intervention was to deceive the Committee. In fact, the state of affairs resulting directly from French policy in Algeria was the sole cause of the events there. The Algerian movement was the achievement of a people conscious of its national existence and determined to fight for its full independence.

60. No one had recruited the Algerian army; it was made up entirely of *moujâhidîn*—volunteers prepared to sacrifice their property and their lives so that their cause should prevail. Anyone listening to the French representative's argument might think that Algeria was given over to anarchy. Such was not the case. To some extent, the Algerians themselves administered the country.

61. Mr. MAKHLOUF (Libya) remarked that Sheikh Ben Tekkouk, to whom the French representative had referred, was quite unknown in Libya. He himself had heard the Sheikh's name mentioned for the first time in the halls of the Headquarters Building.

62. Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) asked that the debate should be adjourned until Friday, 29 November, so that he could prepare the reply he wished to make to the French representative's statement.

63. Mr. PINEAU (France) supported Mr. Slim's request. He also noted, and took as promises for the future, the Egyptian and Syrian representative's categorical denials that Egyptian arms had been supplied to Algeria and that false information had been broadcast by the radio services of their countries.

64. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee's next meeting should be held on Friday, 29 November at 10.30 a.m.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.