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Chairman: Mr. Djafar ABDOL (Iran).

AGENDA ITEM 23

**The Korean question: report of the United Nations
Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of
Korea (A/3672, A/C.1/795, A/C.1/L.192) (concluded)**

1. Mr. JUDD (United States of America) wished to correct the distortions of fact contained in the remarks of certain speakers in the debate. It was a fact of history that the communist forces had committed aggression against the Republic of Korea; it had been reported by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) on the spot and reaffirmed in General Assembly resolution 498 (V) of 1 February 1951, which had found that the Chinese Communist régime had also engaged in aggression in Korea. It was in response to the appeal for aid of the Republic of Korea that the United Nations had taken collective action to resist that aggression. Moreover, it was a fact of history that the communist side had grossly violated the Armistice Agreement (S/3079, appendix A) signed in July 1953. That Agreement contained important provisions for maintaining the relative military balance existing at the time and for supervision and inspection to help maintain stability in Korea until such time as a political settlement should be reached. The communist side had violated it by failing to report the introduction of combat equipment and weapons, by frustrating supervision and inspection and by bringing in large quantities of reinforcement equipment and weapons. The United Nations side, for its part, had strictly observed the Agreement and attempted to secure compliance by the communist side. Communist violations had compelled it to suspend provisionally the Armistice Agreement's provisions on inspection and to announce that it considered itself entitled to be relieved of obligations governing the introduction of combat material in its own defence and in order to preserve the substance of the Agreement. Its position had been explained in the reports of the Unified Command (A/3167, A/3631), which he commended to the Committee's attention.

2. In the light of the facts, it was ironic to assert that the United Nations Command had weakened the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). From the outset, the United Nations had attempted to institute strong supervisory machinery: it had requested neutral aerial as well as ground inspection and the stationing of inspection teams at twelve ports of entry on each

side of the demilitarized zone. The communist side had rejected the request for aerial inspection and, having accepted inspection at only five out of the twelve ports, had then bypassed those five and had severely restricted the movement of inspection teams in those areas. Furthermore, whereas the United Nations Command had begun to furnish reports on shipments of equipment and weapons on the day following the signing of the Armistice Agreement, the communist side had delayed all reports until six months after the signing and in the four years since had reported no shipments of aircraft and such negligible shipments of other weapons and equipment as to be incompatible with the magnitude of the armed forces maintained in North Korea. A memorandum issued on 7 May 1954 by the Swiss and Swedish members of the NNSC had emphasized that ports of entry under United Nations control were open to full inspection and control by the Commission's teams, while efficient inspection work in the North had been obstructed by the Czechoslovak and Polish members of the Commission. Inspection teams in the North had never been able to gain the same insight into the movement of equipment and weapons as in the South.

3. Under the Armistice Agreement, both sides had agreed to introduce no combat material except for replacement of existing items. Nevertheless, the communist side had been introducing new items steadily since the Agreement had been signed. At that time, there had been no operational aircraft or facilities in North Korea. However, seven months later, United Nations Command radar equipment had tracked, in the month of March 1954, 4,200 enemy aircraft movements over North Korea and adjacent waters. At present, there were more than 700 combat aircraft, mainly of the latest jet types, introduced illegally and using reconstructed airfields. Although the communist side had strenuously tried to prevent inspection by the NNSC teams, they had been unable to conceal all the evidence: the Swiss and Swedish members of the Commission had reported many MIG-type jet aircraft at various airfields in March and April 1955. Since 1953, the communist side had also built up its military equipment with the introduction of heavier and more destructive weapons, including tanks, armored cars, howitzers, heavy mortars, heavy artillery and rocket launchers. A total of over 3,900 of the latter had been introduced since the armistice had come into effect.

4. In the circumstances, the United Nations Command had been forced to take remedial action to strengthen its defensive position and to restore the relative military balance in Korea, so drastically upset by communist violations of the Armistice Agreement. The United Nations Command intended fully to observe the cease-fire and all other provisions of the Armistice Agreement save to the extent that it was entitled to be relieved from compliance as a result of violations by the communist side.

5. With regard to the charges made against United States servicemen in Korea, he stated categorically that all incidents involving United States military personnel were promptly investigated by military authorities and appropriate action taken, as required by the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice. Moreover, United States military authorities had taken measures in co-operation with the Korean Government to prevent the occurrence of such incidents.

6. The position of the communist side with respect to a settlement of the Korean question had not changed. It refused free and fair elections under United Nations supervision in Korea; it even asserted that the United Nations was in effect the aggressor and therefore not competent to deal with a Korean settlement. On the other hand, the United Nations objectives continued to be the establishment through peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area. Until the communists showed a sincere desire to seek a solution, there was little hope for a settlement. As he had said in his earlier statement to the Committee (899th meeting), the North Korean and Communist Chinese authorities could demonstrate their sincerity by withdrawing the Chinese Communist troops still occupying North Korea in defiance of Assembly resolution 498 (V), by responding to the United Nations proposals for peaceful unification, by accounting for the 2,720 military personnel whose fate was still unknown, and by returning to their homes the thousands of civilians abducted from South Korea or by at least disclosing their fate.

7. The eleven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.192) provided a sound basis for a settlement. The Committee should reassert the basic principles it contained and adhere to them. Their acceptance by the communist side could lead to resolution of the Korean question.

8. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal) said that his country had great sympathy for the Korean people in its struggle for unification and freedom and looked forward to the time when it could welcome a unified Korea as a State Member of the United Nations. He had been impressed with the record of progress of the Republic of Korea, especially in education, public health and democracy, and with the work of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency in laying the foundations for the reconstruction of the country. The continued division of Korea, however, was at the root of the country's economic problems.

9. Korea was a single national entity, more homogeneous than many other countries of the Far East. Its division was an artificial one and showed how difficult it was for the interests of small nations to prevail against the military strategy and the power politics of great Powers. The experience of Korea was a lesson to small nations, for while the successful United Nations military intervention had partially symbolized the realization of the principle of collective resistance against invasion, it had failed to achieve a political solution. The reason was that the Korean problem had arisen from the circumstances leading to the division of Korea at the end of the Second World War rather than to the subsequent situation created by the invasion of South Korea. It was clear that military action, even in the name of the United Na-

tions, could not always achieve a political settlement, given the existing power relationships in the world.

10. Patience and perseverance, not precipitate action, would help the Korean people to settle the problem. The Korean conflict was part of the larger conflict between the great Powers and it would persist so long as there was no political settlement in the Far East. All the United Nations could now do was to maintain the Armistice Agreement and wait for a relaxation of tension between the great Powers to create a climate favourable for such a general political settlement. It must, however, insist on the principle of free elections under international supervision as a means of unification. Since in its view, adoption of the draft resolution would not, as in past years, bring a solution any closer, Nepal could take no position on the draft before the Committee.

11. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, in urging rejection of attempts to impose unacceptable decisions on the Korean people, his delegation had hoped that the Western Powers would finally have realized that there were on the Korean peninsula two States, with different political and social structures, and that their interest must be taken into account if the question of Korean unification was to be settled.

12. The draft resolution introduced by the United States and ten of its followers left no doubt, however, that the United States was still stubbornly refusing to take into account the laws of development in the lives of nations and was ruthlessly pursuing its aggressive policy in Korea. It was using the United Nations to justify that policy and its warlike preparations. The aggressive policy of the South Korean puppet government was determined by the United States military authorities.

13. The draft resolution was an American plan for the solution of the Korean problem which the former advocates of intervention in Korea were now putting forward in the guise of a General Assembly decision; it did not differ in essence from the resolutions advanced in previous years which had not brought a solution of the problem any nearer. Those who were really interested in the unification of Korea as a peace-loving and democratic State must realize that to ignore the existence of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and to attempt to extend the authority of the puppet régime of Syngman Rhee to the whole of the country, would only complicate the problem of its unification and play into the hands of the violators of the Armistice Agreement, who still hoped to unify Korea by force.

14. The United States representative had attempted to justify his country's breach of the Armistice Agreement, but the facts were inescapable. It was the United States which had brought an end to the operations of the NNSC and had declared itself no longer bound by the provisions in the Armistice Agreement prohibiting the reinforcement of military equipment. It was the United States which in 1957 had declared its intention of introducing into Korea unlimited quantities of modern weapons, including atomic weapons.

15. In the light of those facts, the words "the Armistice Agreement of 23 July 1953 remains in effect" in the draft resolution were hollow words, not backed by deeds.

16. That the United States representative's statement to the Committee had surpassed many of his delegation's previous utterances in its hostility towards the USSR and the People's Republic of China was hardly surprising in view of the fact that he was an active member of the Committee of One Million against the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations. A statement in the United Nations based on the point of view of such an organization did no good either to the United Nations or to the cause of unification of Korea.

17. The same demands were now being made which the United States had repeatedly made at previous sessions of the General Assembly. The first demand was that Chinese volunteers should be withdrawn from Korea, yet no mention was made of the withdrawal of United States armed forces.

18. Secondly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was required to acquiesce in proposals for the peaceful unification of Korea. Yet the General Assembly, under United States influence, refused to hear representatives of the Korean people, and the latter could not now be seriously expected to accede to proposals forced upon it by a United States diktat.

19. Thirdly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was asked to observe an Armistice Agreement which it had in effect always observed, but which neither the United States nor the puppet authorities of South Korea considered binding upon themselves.

20. Finally, the question of the return to South Korea of citizens slanderously alleged to have been kidnapped was designed to stir up further trouble.

21. The plan thus outlined was not one for solving the Korean problem, but rather for perpetuating it in the United Nations while preventing any peaceful agreement between the two parties.

22. The adoption of yet another draft resolution could only complicate matters because experience had shown the futility of any attempt to impose a unilateral solution of the problem of unification.

23. The Soviet Union and all peace-loving States were convinced that the only correct approach to the solution of that problem was observance of the Armistice Agreement, its transformation into a lasting peace and the institution and development by the Koreans themselves of political, economic and cultural bonds between the two parts of the country which were ultimately bound to lead to the unification of Korea as a democratic and peace-loving State.

24. It was the duty of the United Nations to help the Korean people in every possible way to those ends. As the draft resolution submitted by the United States and other Powers rejected the only correct and realistic approach to unification, his delegation would vote against it.

25. Mr. QUIROGA GALDO (Bolivia) recalled that at the ninth session of the General Assembly (743rd meeting) his delegation had expressed its regret at the inflexible attitude adopted by both sides on the Korean question in spite of the fact that a solution could be achieved only through mutual concessions. No progress had been made since that time towards the reunification of Korea. The unification of the country by means of free elections did not seem possible in the near future. In those circumstances, his delegation

continued to believe that the best solution would be to establish a federation or confederation of North and South Korea, through the formation of a congress of representatives of both parts of the country. Such a confederation would be an experiment in peaceful and active coexistence which might later lead to the desired unification. It would guarantee peace between the two parts of the country and re-establish its commercial and cultural unity.

26. Once the confederation had been established, a conference of the Powers concerned would be held in order to guarantee the neutralization of the peninsula. The armed forces which consumed so large a part of the national income of both States could then be disbanded. Such an experiment in peaceful coexistence could, if it proved successful, be also applied to Germany.

27. Although such a plan would not immediately solve the serious problems of the reunification of Korea, Viet-Nam and Germany, it would undoubtedly create an area of understanding which might gradually be extended to other points of conflict throughout the world.

28. His delegation reserved the right to speak again on the problem of unifying the divided countries when the Committee took up the item entitled "Declaration concerning the peaceful coexistence of States".

29. Mr. REID (Canada) said that the unification of Korea as one independent State with democratic institutions seemed no nearer than it had when the General Assembly first took up the problem ten years ago. In the light of events during that ten-year period it must be recognized, however regretfully, that more time was needed to allow wartime tensions to relax and thus bring about a situation in which a step forward might become possible.

30. Even though there was no possibility of early progress towards a political solution, some satisfaction could be derived from the fact that the Armistice Agreement had been preserved and that the Korean people, especially in the South, were making continued efforts to rehabilitate their country. Canada was fully conscious of the difficulties which arose in connexion with armistice agreements when they had to remain in effect for periods longer than had been anticipated when they were signed. It attached great importance, however, to the fact that the essential parts of the Korean Armistice Agreement had remained intact and that hostilities had not been renewed.

31. Any approach to the problem of unification would have to be both practical and flexible. The United Nations could not abandon its determination to achieve a united, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, nor could it agree to a settlement reached through subterfuge or one which disregarded the rights of the majority of the Korean people. It could, however, bearing in mind the difficulties of achieving agreement in the face of differences exacerbated by three years of war, be prepared for prolonged and arduous negotiations—negotiations which would undoubtedly not always take the exact form which those in the United Nations might consider ideal but which, taking account of the realities in Korea, should lead to a negotiated settlement safeguarding the fundamental objectives of the United Nations.

32. His delegation considered that the eleven-Power draft resolution made such a pragmatic approach possible, and would therefore vote in favour of it.

33. The CHAIRMAN called for a vote on the draft resolution submitted by Australia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.192).

At the request of the representative of the United States, a vote was taken by roll-call.

Australia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaya (Federation of), Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nor-

way, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina.

Against: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania.

Abstaining: Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, Finland, Haiti, Indonesia, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan.

Present and not voting: India.

The draft resolution was adopted by 53 votes to 9, with 15 abstentions.

Mr. Yang, representative of the Republic of Korea, withdrew.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.