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**Chairman:** Mr. Djalal ABDOH (Iran).

## AGENDA ITEM 23

**The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/3672, A/C.1/795, A/C.1/L.190, A/C.1/L.191)**

1. The CHAIRMAN stated that the United States had introduced a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.190) by which the First Committee would decide to invite a representative of the Republic of Korea to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of the Korean question.

2. Mr. JUDD (United States of America), introducing his delegation's draft resolution, said that the proposal was in conformity with the established practice of the Committee and in consonance with the spirit of co-operation which linked the United Nations with the Republic of Korea, a victim of aggression.

3. Mr. LALL (India) thought there were two alternatives, either to discuss the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) (A/3672) only among Members of the United Nations, or to discuss the unification of Korea in the presence of the two parties concerned. The question was not one of determining an aggressor or of deciding to admit new Members, but merely of dealing objectively with the unification of a divided country. To invite only one of the parties would be illogical. India had therefore submitted amendments (A/C.1/L.191) to the United States draft in order that the representatives of the two Korean Governments could participate in the Committee's debate on the agenda item.

4. Mr. CHANG (China) said he would support the United States draft, but not the Indian amendments. He could not see why the Committee should give up the practice it had always followed in considering the question. For the United Nations, the Government of the Republic of Korea was the only legitimate government of that country and it was therefore entitled to a hearing. The Government of the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea was an illegal government, which was trying to extend its domination over the whole country. To attribute to North Korea a status which it did not and should not possess would be playing into the hands of international communism.

5. Mr. MICHALOWSKI (Poland) pointed out that his country, a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), approached the problem impartially. The First Committee could not achieve its purpose if it refused to hear the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Such an illogical attitude would prevent the Committee from forming an accurate idea of a problem that was already very complex.

6. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) drew the Committee's attention to the telegram dated 3 October 1957 sent to the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (A/C.1/795). He stressed the extent to which the Korean people themselves wished to participate in the discussion of the Korean question. To try to solve the problem without one of the parties concerned was both unreasonable and biased.

7. It was for the Koreans themselves to solve the Korean question. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had formally declared on several occasions that it did not regard the decisions on the future of the Korean people taken in the absence of its representatives as legitimate. In those circumstances, a debate in which the representative of the Korean people had not participated could yield no results. Delegations opposing such participation were preventing the settlement of the question. They were promoting the aggressive intentions of militaristic groups in South Korea, which had not given up hope of achieving a settlement by force.

8. Mr. ULLRICH (Czechoslovakia) stressed that the purpose of the debate, which was the unification of Korea, could not be attained without the participation of the parties mainly concerned. Apart from the fact that it was illegal and discriminatory, a procedure providing for the hearing of only one of the parties was bound to give negative results, as earlier sessions had shown. Unilateral action could not lead to unification. The United States draft resolution was not in conformity with the principles of the Charter.

9. The Committee should not allow proposals to be imposed upon it which tended to complicate the question rather than solve it. It was high time to admit that the Korean question should be discussed in the spirit of the Charter and with due respect for the generally acknowledged principles of international law. That was the only way of re-establishing a normal situation in the Far East. If the Committee rejected the Indian amendments, the Czechoslovak delegation would vote against the United States draft resolution.

10. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom) said he would vote for the text proposed by the United States. He considered it would be inappropriate to invite representatives of North Korea to participate in the debate.

11. Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon) pointed out that the First Committee was called upon to discuss not international communism or the "cold war", but the report of UNCURK. There could be no denying that, *de facto* if not *de jure*, there was one Government in North Korea and another in South Korea. That had been recognized by the United Nations when it had set up a Military Armistice and when it had not admitted South Korea to membership in the Organization.

12. The Chinese representative had referred to the practice hitherto followed. But could any progress be achieved by following a practice which had never yielded satisfactory results? However much information was received on the subject, no solution could be reached unless the Koreans were helped to choose their future for themselves. It was regrettable that South Korea should have had to wait so long to obtain what it considered to be its due. He believed, however, that the people of South Korea and those of North Korea wished to meet each other. The situation would merely grow worse if only one of the parties was recognized.

13. Mr. NASE (Albania) pointed out that the most elementary principles of justice would be violated if one of the parties to a dispute was refused a hearing. Such a procedure, moreover, would contribute nothing to the solution of the problem. It would be just and reasonable to put an end to it; no agreement reached in the Committee could be applied without the agreement of both parties. In accordance with the principles of the United Nations, every possible solution should be sought on the basis of agreement between the parties.

14. Mr. FORSYTH (Australia) pointed out that the Committee was discussing, not the unification of Korea, but a question of procedure. The Government which several countries wished to invite had not only flouted United Nations recommendations on war and peace, but had actually fought forces under United Nations command and had never corrected its attitude. There was only one legal Government of Korea. The North Korean régime should not be given a status which it did not possess. The discussion under way showed that the North Korean régime would have its defenders in the Committee.

15. In reply to the representative of Ceylon, he would say neither the time nor the place was appropriate for bringing the two parties together. Recognition of the northern régime would not serve the interests of the people of North Korea. It was not, moreover, true that the presence of that régime's representatives would lead to objectivity in the discussions. The members of the Committee should not yield to pressure put on them to recognize the legitimacy of a régime which continued to defy the United Nations.

16. Mr. BRUCAN (Romania) believed it would be impossible to adhere indefinitely to a practice the ineffectiveness of which had been demonstrated by experience. It was a negative approach to invite only one of the parties to participate in the debate.

17. Mr. JUDD (United States of America) said that his Government was strongly opposed to seating a representative of a régime which had committed aggression against the United Nations and had violated its word solemnly pledged at Panmunjom. The aggressor and his victim should not be placed on an equal footing.

18. The inference that the United Nations should

surrender principles just because there were still some forces in the world that would not live by those principles could not be accepted. The North Korean authorities, furthermore, had themselves never accepted the competence of the United Nations and they had said so at the Korean Political Conference held at Geneva in 1954.

19. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) wished to know which principle of the Charter furnished grounds for believing that the United Nations was competent to decide on the legitimacy of the Government of a country. That was the internal concern of a country and its people. If, as the representative of Australia had said, now was not the time to invite representatives of both parts of Korea to discuss reunification, what was the point of inviting one part?

20. The United States representative considered the North Koreans the aggressors. But Korean troops had not fought on the territory of the United States, while United States troops had waged war upon the Koreans on Korean territory. In any case, that was a question of substance, unrelated to the present discussion on procedure, the object of which was in effect to decide whether the unification of Korea was to be considered without the participation of both parties, that is, without any recognition of the fact that the country was, whether one liked it or not, divided into two States.

21. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) did not think that the issue was whether a Government was or was not legal. The Committee should first form an objective opinion by hearing both points of view and, secondly, bring the two interested parties together in order to facilitate an agreement. There was no question of any surrender on a question of principle. The United Nations would indeed be at fault if it were to renounce the principle of objectivity. The Committee members were not being subjected to any kind of pressure; they were being actuated by logic and by their desire gradually to achieve an easing of the situation in the Far East.

22. Mr. LALL (India) did not see why it was "pressure" to propose amendments to a text but not "pressure" to propose the text itself. The United States representative had made several accusations against the Government of North Korea, but it had not offered that Government an opportunity to defend itself. No one would recognize a system of justice which failed to give the accused the right to be heard in court.

23. Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON (Thailand) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the United States draft resolution and against the Indian amendments. Several peaceful methods, including negotiation, were possible for settling the Korean question. If the First Committee decided that its function was to promote negotiation, the Thai delegation would be prepared to agree with the Indian delegation. That was not the case, however. The Committee was to engage in a debate on the question. Since the Government of the Republic of Korea was the only legitimate Government in Korea, as the General Assembly had already declared (resolution 195 (III)), a representative of the Republic of Korea should be invited to participate in the examination of the question, without the right to vote.

24. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal) said that everyone agreed that the United Nations objective in Korea was the country's unification. The delegation of Nepal believed that, as matters now stood, the Committee would not contribute

to a solution of the problem by inviting a representative of either North or South Korea to be present during the discussion. The issue under consideration was a wider one, and its solution would depend in large measure on the balance of forces in the world.

25. The delegation of Nepal would therefore not take any position in the matter and would abstain in the vote on both texts.

26. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) considered that, when the unification of a country was involved, any exchange of views between the interested parties should be encouraged. The procedure hitherto applied, and which some delegations wished to pursue, had failed because it was wrong.

27. Korea could be unified either peacefully or by war. He believed that the United Nations had voted for the peaceful method, in which case both parties should be granted a hearing.

28. If, on the other hand, the other method were preferred, it was proper to invite only South Korea which desired unification by force of arms. South Korea was preparing to invade the North. In a long statement made before the Committee at its eleventh session (817th meeting), the South Korean representative had clearly implied that war was the only remaining solution.

29. If the Committee wished to give serious study to the Korean problem, to obtain results and not merely to engage in propaganda, it should invite representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate in its discussions.

30. The Bulgarian delegation would vote in favour of the Indian amendments. If those amendments were rejected it would vote against the United States draft resolution.

31. The CHAIRMAN requested the Committee to proceed to the vote on the United States draft resolution and the amendments to it submitted by India.

32. He put to the vote the Indian amendments (A/C.1/L.191).

At the request of the representative of the Dominican Republic, the vote was taken by roll-call.

Iceland, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: India, Indonesia, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Hungary.

Against: Iceland, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras.

Abstaining: Iran, Iraq, Israel, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Malaya (Federation of), Mexico, Nepal, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Austria, Bolivia, Cambodia, Denmark, Finland, Haiti.

The amendments were rejected by 36 votes to 20, with 20 abstentions.

33. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.190).

The draft resolution was adopted by 44 votes to 15, with 16 abstentions.

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Yang, representative of the Republic of Korea, took a place at the Committee table.

34. Mr. JUDD (United States of America) recalled that the Korean question had preoccupied the General Assembly for more than ten years. The United Nations had always kept two specific objectives in view: the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and full restoration of international peace and security in the area. The General Assembly had repeatedly endorsed those objectives by overwhelming majorities.

35. The legitimate aspirations of the Korean people for freedom, independence and unification would long ago have been realized had it not been for the intransigence of the Soviet Union, its North Korean puppet and Communist China. Those communist régimes had persistently rejected all proposals for an equitable solution. They had even gone so far as to commit flagrant aggression against the Republic of Korea, against the only lawful Korean Government.

36. Since 1945, the Communists had been afraid to give the people of North Korea an opportunity to exercise any freedom of choice. Recent events in Hungary had strikingly demonstrated to the Kremlin and Peiping what would happen in any satellite country once the iron grip of the communist dictatorship slackened, even slightly.

37. The Soviet Union had not withdrawn its armed forces from North Korea until 1948, after it had spent three years installing a régime of whose obedience it could be assured. In June 1950, seeing their position threatened by the growing strength of that young democracy, the Republic of Korea, the communist leaders of the North had launched a surprise attack across the 38th parallel, deliberately seeking to unify the peninsula by force. The Members of the United Nations had made magnificent history when they had rallied to the assistance of the tragic victim of that ruthless aggression.

38. It had been a matter of deep regret to the people of the United States that the Soviet Government had not responded to the United Nations appeal, but had preferred, on its own avowal, to assist the aggressor against the United Nations.

39. At the very moment when the communist armies of Korea were defeated and demoralized, the Chinese Communist régime had shown its true character by siding openly with the aggressor against the forces of the United Nations; and when at the beginning of the summer of 1951, the Chinese Communists in their turn were being defeated, the representative of the Soviet Union had proposed the opening of truce talks. That had been a manoeuvre to avoid total defeat and not a sincere effort for peace and unification as two years of delaying tactics at Panmunjom had proved. By the time the Armistice Agreement (S/3079, appendix A) had at last been concluded, on 27 July 1953, the Repub-

lic of Korea had suffered enormous loss of life and tens of thousands of men from sixteen States Members of the United Nations had died for freedom. Since the signing of the Armistice Agreement, the Communist régimes had persistently violated its provisions and had blocked the efforts of the United Nations to obtain a peaceful settlement and achieve unification.

40. At the Korean Political Conference, the Member States which had taken part in the military action on behalf of the United Nations had set forth two fundamental principles which they had considered should be the basis for settling the Korean question. The General Assembly had urged that a settlement should be reached in accordance with those principles. Those principles were:

"(1) The United Nations, under its Charter, is fully and rightly empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security, and to extend its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea; and

"(2) In order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea, genuinely free elections should be held under United Nations supervision for representatives in a National Assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in all parts of Korea" (A/2786, para.1).

41. As a result of the refusal of the Soviet Union and of Communist China to discuss at the Korean Political Conference a settlement based on those principles, the Armistice Agreement remained the basis for the maintenance of a truce in that area.

42. Armed units had to patrol the two sides of the demilitarized zone and United Nations soldiers still had to mount guard with their Korean comrades to prevent any possible renewal of aggression, for the situation remained tense. The communist régime of North Korea, aided and abetted by Communist China and the Soviet Union, continued to maintain a military apparatus designed for aggression.

43. In North Korea there were at the present time some thirty-five communist divisions including a rocket division equipped with the latest weapons of war. Approximately half those forces, which had at their disposal a massive number of attack aircraft, consisted of Chinese communist troops who were in Korea in defiance of the United Nations. In that connexion, he recalled General Assembly resolution 498 (V).

44. The attitude of the communist régimes did not inspire confidence. As the United Nations Command had reported, they had consistently refused to allow any inspection, in order to protect themselves against public disclosure of their large-scale illegal introduction of modern weapons into North Korea, which had not been reported to the NNSC. Those introductions included over 700 aircraft. He quoted in that connexion the statement made by the Swiss representative at the 331st plenary meeting of the NNSC, held at Panmunjom on 5 September 1957, that it was "remarkable indeed" that the communist side had reported no inbound or outbound flights of aircraft in nearly four years.

45. The scale of the violations committed, the refusal to allow inspection by the NNSC and the size of the Chinese communist forces remaining in North

Korea had compelled the United Nations Command in 1956 and 1957 to take the actions already reported to the United Nations. The United Nations Command had taken those measures to defend its position in the event of renewed aggression. The record showed that the United Nations Command had faithfully and honestly observed all the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and that the communist régimes had not. The United Nations Command had not broken the Armistice Agreement, as some had charged; it had merely recognized that the communist side had been breaking it all along and had taken the necessary actions to defend itself against those violations. One party to an agreement clearly had the right of self-protection to redress the consequences of the violation of that agreement by the other party.

46. The progress which the Republic of Korea itself had made under difficult circumstances was to be welcomed. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea had again demonstrated its value by a report on developments in the Republic of Korea. The observations in the UNCURK report were most encouraging. They proved that the Republic of Korea had a just right to become a Member of the United Nations. But very recently the veto of the Soviet Union had once again denied it that right.

47. While democracy was fully operative in the Republic of Korea, a totalitarian régime still prevailed in North Korea. In support of that view he recalled the statement made by the communist authorities themselves on the results of the elections for deputies to the Supreme People's Assembly, held in August 1957 for the first time since 1948, although the puppet régime's Constitution provided for elections every four years; 99.99 per cent of eligible voters had participated in the elections and 99.92 per cent had voted for the single list of candidates "recommended" by the régime. Such results exceeded even the fabulous percentages announced in the Soviet Union and its other satellites. It was obvious why the communist régime of North Korea did not permit the unification of Korea on the basis of United Nations principles, i.e., genuinely free elections under the supervision of the Organization.

48. The communist side had also failed in the obligation it had assumed to account satisfactorily for 2,720 prisoners of war. Most of those men were members of the military services of the Republic of Korea, but the list also included 450 American servicemen. The United States Government was convinced that the communist side knew much more about the fate of those men as yet unaccounted for than it had chosen to reveal.

49. The communist side had also committed another particularly cruel injustice by abducting, during the occupation of Seoul, thousands of innocent Korean civilians, of whom no report had been heard for seven years.

50. His purpose in recalling those facts had been to demonstrate to the Committee the discrepancy between communist words and deeds. The Communists had by their actions, or absence of actions, shown that they did not desire the peaceful unification of Korea.

51. If they really wanted a peaceful settlement, they could show their sincerity by taking the following steps: withdrawing the thousands of Chinese communist troops which still occupied North Korea in de-

fiance of United Nations resolution 498 (V); responding to the fair and still outstanding United Nations proposals for the peaceful unification of Korea; honouring their obligations under the Armistice Agreement to account satisfactorily for the 2,720 military personnel whose fate remained unknown; returning the thousands of abducted South Korean citizens to their homes, or at least disclosing their fate.

52. It was still not too late for the Communists to show good faith and to make possible a settlement of the Korean question which would enable the people of that war-torn land to take their rightful place in the community of nations.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.