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Chairman: Mr. Djalal ABDOH (Iran).

AGENDA ITEM 24

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/3630 and Corr.1, A/3657, A/3674/Rev.1, A/3685, A/C.1/793, A/C.1/797, A/C.1/L.174, A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.176/Rev.4, A/C.1/L.177, A/C.1/L.178/Rev.2, A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.180, A/C.1/L.181/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.182, A/C.1/L.184, A/C.1/L.185, A/C.1/L.186) (continued):

- (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
- (b) Expansion of the membership of the Disarmament Commission and of its Sub-Committee;
- (c) Collective action to inform and enlighten the peoples of the world as to the dangers of the armaments race, and particularly as to the destructive effects of modern weapons;
- (d) Discontinuance under international control of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons

1. Mr. NESBITT (Canada) said that, although Canada was convinced that neither the size nor the composition of the existing disarmament organs had ever been an obstacle to agreement on disarmament, it did not believe that the matter of some alteration in these organs should stand in the way of at least the opportunity for further negotiation. The fact that Canada was not opposed in principle to associating other countries with the disarmament talks had been made clear by the Canadian Prime Minister (683rd plenary meeting) long before the Soviet Union announced (890th meeting) its intention of withdrawing from the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee as at present constituted. The General Assembly should not allow itself to be forced, by the Soviet Union's arbitrary decision, to jettison the existing United Nations machinery. No single Power had the right to disrupt the work of United Nations bodies established by the Assembly. The Soviet

draft resolution calling for a permanent disarmament commission (A/C.1/797) would be destructive to further negotiations. In view of the vital importance of continuing negotiations, however, some reasonable adjustment of the situation was essential. The Assembly should not end without some progress towards agreement on the substance of the issue and at least some machinery for negotiation acceptable to all the major Powers. If such a situation arose, heavy responsibility would attach to the arbitrary position of the Soviet Union.

2. Mr. ENCKELL (Finland) said that Finland was prepared to support any reasonable and practicable proposal, provided it was supported by the great Powers, on whom progress towards disarmament primarily depended. It was evident that no proposal before the Committee would obtain unanimous support and his delegation did not want to support any move which might have the effect of widening the differences between the great Powers or of hardening their positions. It would vote for the Yugoslav draft resolution (A/C.1/L.180) because it was a sincere effort to reconcile these differences and for the Indian draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.176/Rev.4. It would also support certain parts of other proposals acceptable to his delegation. Finland hoped that negotiations could be resumed at the earliest possible moment in a generally accepted form.

3. Mr. AL-SHABANDAR (Iraq) said that the Assembly should not be discouraged by the lack of progress on the very thorny question under discussion. All those concerned directly or indirectly with disarmament were aware that failure to reach agreement jeopardized the very survival of the human race. A boycott of the disarmament negotiations for any reason at all, and especially by one of the major Powers, might be disastrous. Iraq hoped that the tolerance, wisdom and patience of the great Powers would prevail. For its part, Iraq would support the twenty-four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1) as the most logical, clear and practical course for the Assembly to follow, although it would have preferred a draft which could be adopted unanimously.

4. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) said that, in submitting its amendments (A/C.1/L.185) to the Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1), his delegation had not intended to introduce any substantive or controversial issues, as the Belgian, French and United Kingdom delegations contended, either to the Belgian draft or to the disarmament discussion as a whole. Its objective was to work out proposals that were likely to gain unanimous support. In that spirit, his delegation had submitted amendments to the Belgian draft. Essentially, the effect of the first Polish amendment was to refer in the preamble of the Belgian draft to two vital operative provisions of General Assembly resolution 808 A (IX), a resolution which had been unanimously adopted in 1954. Not only did that resolution remain in force, but the very title of

the agenda item on disarmament again reproduced its basic provisions. It did not seem logical for the United Kingdom and France to accept the inclusion of a reference to resolution 808 (IX) in the preamble of the twenty-four-Power text at the suggestion of India while rejecting the identical reference in the preamble of the Belgian draft resolution. The preamble should enumerate the previously agreed, established principles by which the United Nations had decided to be guided in its work on disarmament. Indeed, the United Nations could expound only those agreed principles when it performed the task proposed by the Belgian draft. In the absence of a reiteration of those principles, which constituted the very core of the disarmament problem, the Belgian proposal remained one-sided, with undue emphasis on control as an end in itself.

5. His delegation considered that the objections levelled at the Polish amendments were therefore unfounded and that a vote against them could only mean a retreat from accepted guiding principles.

6. Poland considered that the Committee should continue to seek a compromise resolution on the substance of all the disarmament issues which would be acceptable to all parties.

7. Mr. NISOT (Belgium) pointed out that the Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1) was wholly divorced from all considerations of substance and enjoyed the support of nearly all delegations. It was not unnatural that the States of the Soviet bloc should oppose it: it endeavoured to implement democratic principles to which those States paid lip service, but which they did not apply. The first Polish amendment sought to distort it, to make it a substantive draft resolution and to impair its objective and impartial character. Consequently, without passing judgement on the content of the first amendment, Belgium had to reject it for the simple reason that it dealt with substance. The Belgian delegation, however, accepted the second Polish amendment, which merely expressed the Belgian draft in different words.

8. Mr. Krishna MENON (India) expressed deep regret that the debate had failed to bring agreement on disarmament any closer. Nothing was gained, however, by the adoption of rigid positions on either side and the Indian delegation deplored the rigidity of the French views, which had indeed the characteristics of an ultimatum. India had tried to bring to the attention of the great Powers, without whose agreement disarmament was admittedly unattainable, an independent view, and to emphasize that progress towards disarmament was not a matter of winning a political battle, but of ensuring the survival of the human race. Although the entire responsibility for disarmament continued to rest with the Disarmament Commission, irrespective of its composition, and although that Commission had failed to achieve positive results, some means had to be found to bridge the differences between the major military Powers. In order to demonstrate once again the urgency of an agreement, he quoted the statement made on the previous day by the American General Omar N. Bradley, who had deplored the failure to use human intelligence for the salvation of mankind and the irony of attempting to stave off ultimate disaster by devising increasingly destructive weapons which only aggravated the peril. General Bradley had found little assurance in the argument—which India considered fallacious—that the accumulation of tremendous military

power on both sides would act as a deterrent to war, and had recalled the treachery of the Nazi Government in unleashing the Second World War. Finally, General Bradley had asked why, if Governments were willing to trust in reason as a restraint on the use of nuclear weapons, they were unwilling to make greater use of reason to seek a compromise agreement to control nuclear energy and banish nuclear weapons as instruments of war.

9. It was safe to anticipate that the twenty-four-Power draft resolution would be given priority in the voting and would be adopted by the necessary majority. India considered that the other draft resolutions should then be put to the vote, but it would not press for a course of action which was not likely to succeed. It should be clear to all, however, that the other proposals and not the twenty-four-Power text represented the feelings of the majority of the peoples in the world, who saw in the continued arms race the beginning of the destruction of their lives. The smaller nations could not escape the effects of that arms race, and while they could not individually force an agreement to halt it, collectively they had great influence. India could not vote for the twenty-four-Power draft because it represented a rigid position of one group of Powers directly concerned. It was grateful, however, that the sponsors of the draft had consented to include the Indian amendment to the preamble (A/C.1/L.182).

10. India profoundly regretted the Soviet announcement that it would boycott the existing disarmament organs if they remained as at present constituted. The tragic situation thus created could not be permitted to continue; negotiations on disarmament must be resumed. On the other hand, by adopting the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, the moral force of the Assembly would be used to strengthen the rigid position of the Western Powers. Perhaps time would render the opposing positions more flexible or some means could be found to bring them closer without sacrificing the basic demands of either side. An adjournment might therefore be helpful, provided that it received the support of all the great Powers. By the time the issue came before the plenary meeting of the Assembly, their respective attitudes might have undergone some change. India would support a motion for an adjournment, but would not initiate one for fear of aggravating the existing deadlock.

11. In any event, there should be some machinery for transmitting all proposals to the Disarmament Commission for study with whatever additional assistance the Commission might require.

12. India would vote for its own draft resolutions and for the Yugoslav draft (A/C.1/L.180). It could not support the Japanese draft resolution (A/C.1/L.174) or the Norwegian-Pakistan amendments (A/C.1/L.184).

13. It was the hope of the Indian delegation that, whatever the results of the votes, the position would not be regarded as unalterable or as barring all further progress towards a way out of the deadlock. It was its further hope that the great Powers would show some disposition to act in response to the world's clamour for action with respect to disarmament. Disarmament was a problem of immense magnitude because, as science and technology continued to advance, the prospect of agreement became more remote and the actual problems of limitation, control and inspection became more difficult. India hoped that the great Powers would

apply their wisdom and good will to control the destructiveness of new discoveries.

14. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee had outlived their usefulness and should be replaced by the permanent commission proposed in the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/797).

15. The twenty-four Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1) implied the rejection of all other points of view and draft resolutions and was therefore in the nature of a unilateral ultimatum. As such it would not advance the cause of disarmament. Many of the proposals submitted to the Committee were constructive and warranted further consideration. If the proposed permanent disarmament commission was to reach any solution it must take into account the security, interests and views of all States. That was why his delegation was submitting an amendment (A/C.1/L.186) to the USSR draft resolution providing for the transmission to the permanent commission of all proposals and documents relating to disarmament submitted to the twelfth session of the General Assembly.

16. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that it was the duty of the United Nations to give full support to those proposals designed to expedite the solution of the disarmament problem and to prevent the adoption of draft resolutions which would only stand in the way of that objective.

17. The twenty-four-Power draft resolution could not serve as the basis for agreement. While the draft claimed to set out the fundamental principles which should underlie a disarmament agreement, it made no provision for the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even as a long-term objective. Nor would it contribute to a speedy suspension of atomic weapons tests, which it made contingent on the solution of other aspects of the disarmament question on which it had proved impossible to reach a decision owing to the negative stand taken by the United States and the other members of the aggressive North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Furthermore, if the proposal for the cessation of the production of fissionable material were adopted, it would in future be legitimate for nuclear weapons to be produced from existing stockpiles. There would be no reduction of the armed forces of the United States, United Kingdom and France, inasmuch as any reduction below the existing level was made dependent on the settlement of a number of political problems on terms proposed by the West. An attempt was being made to force through the General Assembly a draft resolution which ran counter to previous decisions adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and the substantial reduction of armed forces. Other omissions in the draft resolution related to the stationing of military units equipped with nuclear weapons on the territories of foreign States and the prohibition of the transfer of such weapons and units from the States possessing them to other States; indeed it was clear from the four-Power proposals of 29 August 1957 (DC/113, annex 5) that the draft resolution was based on the premise that such weapons would be made available to other States. The sponsors of the draft resolution were making every effort to have it put to the vote first and to prevent a vote on all other draft resolutions. Such a vital issue for all States

should not be decided by forcing some States to accept the will of others. Agreement on disarmament could be reached only if the interests of all States were taken into account. His delegation would vote against the twenty-four-Power draft resolution.

18. The Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1) appeared innocuous at first sight, but in fact it sidestepped the solution of the disarmament question. It failed to make any specific recommendations concerning the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, the reduction of the armed forces and armaments of States and concentrated on the necessity for international control. Hence it represented a further attempt to substitute control--over what was not clear--for disarmament. His delegation would therefore vote against the Belgian draft resolution.

19. The Polish amendments (A/C.1/L.185) would improve the draft resolution and make it acceptable. His delegation would vote in favour of those amendments.

20. While he understood the motives underlying the Indian draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.178/Rev.2, he did not feel that the procedure suggested would further the conclusion of a disarmament agreement, and he would consequently be unable to support that proposal.

21. During the debate many speakers had concentrated on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests. Almost all members of the Committee were agreed on the need to reach a speedy decision to that effect. Such a decision was essential to halt the rising level of atomic radiation. It would also constitute a first step towards the ultimate objective of the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. His delegation had repeatedly announced its willingness to sign an agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests immediately if the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom concurred. That objective would be achieved by the Soviet draft resolution in document A/3674/Rev.1.

22. It would constitute a great step towards eliminating the threat of nuclear war if those States having atomic and hydrogen weapons would agree, at least temporarily, to renounce their use. His delegation had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1) providing for such a renunciation for a five-year period. Coupled with the Soviet draft resolution on the suspension of nuclear tests its adoption would mark a real contribution to the solution of the disarmament problem, the improvement of the whole international atmosphere and the strengthening of international trust.

23. The Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.176/Rev.4) merited consideration because it attempted to find a solution to the question of the suspension of nuclear tests. On the other hand the Japanese draft resolution (A/C.1/L.174) was unacceptable, as it made such a suspension of tests contingent on the solution of other aspects of the disarmament question and would therefore mean, in practice, deferring the suspension of tests for an indefinite period. In addition, the draft resolution limited the suspension of tests to one year. His delegation would vote against it.

24. Turning to the Soviet draft resolution concerning the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission (A/C.1/797), he said that his delegation accep-

ted the amendment proposed by the Ukrainian SSR (A/C.1/L.186). In their existing form, with their one-sided membership, closed meetings and only intermittent activity, the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee were clearly unable to discharge the responsibilities vested in them. The majority of Member States could not participate in the negotiations and knew little of the work of the Commission and the Sub-Committee. The permanent commission proposed by his delegation would function continuously and comprise all the States Members of the United Nations. Several speakers had expressed fears lest its establishment would impede consultations and exchanges of views between separate States or groups of States. In his opinion such fears were groundless: the new body would, on the contrary, provide a more favourable framework for contacts and negotiations. Unofficial consultations within the framework of the permanent commission should be encouraged and might be furthered by the commission's officers. In addition ad hoc groups consisting of a few States might be established purely for consultative purposes. The final responsibility for drafting recommendations and submitting them to the General Assembly would however rest with the permanent commission itself.

25. The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and other Western Powers had sought to distort the Soviet proposal and the statement made by the Soviet Union representative in introducing it (885th meeting). The representatives in question stubbornly defended the existing Commission and Sub-Committee despite the fact that they had achieved nothing. It would be interesting to know why those representatives were against referring the disarmament problem to a more representative body. Such a course of action would obviously have to be adopted sooner or later and to defer it would only harm the United Nations. Obviously, the members of NATO supported the Commission and the Sub-Committee so vigorously because, in their present form, those bodies could be used as a screen to conceal the armaments race in which those countries were engaged and as an instrument for their delaying tactics. It was intolerable that the consideration of the most vital problem facing mankind should be the monopoly of a few States and should take place behind closed doors. The statements of many members of the Committee showed that they shared the Soviet delegation's views.

26. He wished to make it clear that his Government's decision not to participate in the work of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee as at present constituted was based not on transitory considerations or the desire to intimidate anyone or force through any draft resolution, but on a realistic appraisal of the situation and a desire to make progress in the matter of disarmament. Adoption of the Soviet proposal to establish a permanent disarmament commission would create more favourable conditions for the activities of those public forces and governmental circles which sincerely sought to strengthen international peace and security.

27. It was urgent and important to take at least a first step towards specific disarmament measures. That would be achieved by the USSR proposal. His Government was prepared immediately to sign an agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests, to renounce the use

of nuclear weapons and to bring about a significant reduction in armed forces, armaments and military expenditure under appropriate international control. His delegation would continue to fight for a speedy solution of the disarmament problem and it was prepared to examine any constructive proposal which would contribute to that end. The next move was up to the Western Powers. If they displayed good will and a desire for co-operation then there was every possibility of reaching a speedy agreement, which would halt the arms race and eliminate the danger of atomic warfare.

28. The CHAIRMAN listed the chronological order in which the draft resolutions before the Committee had been submitted and pointed out that the Committee must decide whether priority should be given to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, as moved by the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, or to the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/797 and A/C.1/L.177, as moved by the Soviet representative. He also informed the Committee that the Japanese delegation had expressed its willingness to have the vote on its draft resolution follow that on the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.176/Rev.4) and that the Belgian delegation had asked to have its draft resolution voted on last.

29. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the draft resolutions before the Committee could be divided into two categories: those dealing with the substance of the question and those dealing with the composition and organization of the United Nations bodies considering it. It had been emphasized by a number of delegations that, in present circumstances and in order to break the deadlock on disarmament, a decision must first be made on the composition of those bodies, for none of the substantive draft resolutions adopted by the Committee would lead to any positive results if they were addressed to the existing disarmament bodies. His delegation therefore proposed that priority should be given to the Soviet draft resolution proposing the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission (A/C.1/797). It reserved the right to speak again on the order in which the substantive draft resolutions should be put to the vote.

30. The CHAIRMAN asked the Committee to vote on the Soviet motion that priority should be given to its draft resolution (A/C.1/797).

The motion was rejected by 40 votes to 10, with 27 abstentions.

31. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation opposed the granting of priority to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution because that would constitute discriminatory treatment of all the other draft resolutions which unquestionably had the right to be considered before it. It was obvious that the sponsors of the motion to give priority to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution wished to avoid a vote on certain other draft resolutions in order to conceal their opposition to genuine disarmament.

32. The CHAIRMAN asked for a vote on the motion to give priority to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution.

At the request of the United States representative, a vote was taken by roll-call.

Norway, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaya (Federation of), Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua.

Against: Poland, Romania, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Hungary, India, Japan.

Abstaining: Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Yemen, Afghanistan, Austria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal.

The motion was adopted by 50 votes to 14, with 17 abstentions.

33. The CHAIRMAN asked the Committee to vote on the twenty-four-Power draft resolution and the amendments to it.

34. He put to the vote the amendments submitted by India (A/C.1/L.182), pointing out that the first amendment had been accepted by the sponsors of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution.

Amendment 1 was adopted by 71 votes to none, with 9 abstentions.

Amendment 2 was rejected by 40 votes to 12, with 25 abstentions.

Amendment 3 was rejected by 40 votes to 11, with 26 abstentions.

Amendment 4 was rejected by 41 votes to 17, with 21 abstentions.

35. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the amendment submitted by Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay (A/C.1/L.181/Rev.1).

The amendment was adopted by 71 votes to none, with 10 abstentions.

36. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the amendments submitted by Norway and Pakistan (A/C.1/L.184).

The amendments were adopted by 61 votes to 9, with 10 abstentions.

37. Mr. SANDLER (Sweden) asked that a vote be taken on the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, as amended, paragraph by paragraph.

38. The CHAIRMAN requested the Committee to vote on the draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Hon-

duras, Italy, Laos, Liberia, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Tunisia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America (A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1). He recalled that the Indian amendment which had just been adopted was now the first paragraph of the preamble.

The second paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 69 votes to 9, with 3 abstentions.

The third paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 61 votes to 9, with 9 abstentions.

The fourth paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 62 votes to 8, with 11 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 1 up to the words "will provide for the following:" and sub-paragraph 1 (a) were adopted by 56 votes to 9, with 15 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph 1 (b) was adopted by 58 votes to 9, with 12 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph 1 (c) was adopted by 59 votes to 9, with 11 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph 1 (d) was adopted by 59 votes to 9, with 13 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph 1 (e) was adopted by 58 votes to 9, with 13 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph 1 (f) was adopted by 61 votes to 9, with 9 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 2 was adopted by 55 votes to 9, with 16 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 3 was adopted by 55 votes to 9, with 16 abstentions.

39. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that, in the draft resolution as amended, operative paragraph 3 would become new paragraph 6, the new paragraphs 3 and 4 being the adopted Norwegian-Pakistan amendments and the new paragraph 5 the adopted five-Power amendment.

40. He asked the Committee to vote on the draft resolution as a whole, as amended.

At the request of the United States representative, a vote was taken by roll-call.

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaya (Federation of), Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey.

Against: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania.

Abstaining: Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Japan, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria.

The draft resolution as a whole, as amended, was adopted by 56 votes to 9, with 16 abstentions.^{1/}

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.

^{1/} At the 893rd meeting, on 6 November 1957, the Chairman announced that, owing to an error, the vote of El Salvador, which was in the affirmative, had been recorded as an abstention.