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Chairman: Mr. Djafar ABDOL (Iran).

AGENDA ITEM 24

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/3630 and Corr.1, A/3657, A/3674/Rev.1, A/3685, A/C.1/793, A/C.1/797, A/C.1/L.174, A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.176/Rev.4, A/C.1/L.177, A/C.1/L.178/Rev.2, A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.180, A/C.1/L.181 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.182, A/C.1/L.184, A/C.1/L.185) (continued):

- (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
- (b) Expansion of the membership of the Disarmament Commission and of its Sub-Committee;
- (c) Collective action to inform and enlighten the peoples of the world as to the dangers of the armaments race, and particularly as to the destructive effects of modern weapons;
- (d) Discontinuance under international control of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons

1. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Soviet Union had on several occasions submitted concrete proposals to the United Nations with a view to expediting the negotiations on disarmament. In view of the attitude of the Western Powers, the Soviet Union had concluded that it was necessary to proceed in stages and to make a start with partial measures of disarmament. It had endeavoured as far as possible to take account of Western proposals, but whenever it had stated its willingness to accept them, the Western Powers had abandoned their own suggestions.

2. The latest Western proposals (DC/113, annex 5) were in substance an ultimatum. The Western Powers pressed for their adoption as a whole and made the agreement which would be based on those pro-

posals conditional on the solution of political problems.

3. If the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution which those Powers were attempting to impose on it, the parties to the negotiations would have to use the Western proposals as a basis for their work. In those circumstances, how could the negotiations be fruitful?

4. Disarmament, a relaxation of international tension, the ending of the "cold war" and the elimination of the threat of a new war were matters of concern to the people of all countries. The Soviet Union was therefore prepared to negotiate on the basis of any constructive proposals which might be submitted to it and also to consider the problem of disarmament both as a whole and in its separate aspects. It was also prepared to agree to solutions at the regional level.

5. Experience had shown that the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee were incapable of achieving any progress in the negotiations. The United States and the other Western Powers—in other words, four out of five members of the Sub-Committee—true to their policy of obstructing progress in the negotiations, persisted in the belief that an intensification of the armaments race and possession of nuclear weapons were the sole means of achieving their goals.

6. Every State in the world should be able to make its contribution to the solution of the disarmament problem. For that reason, the Soviet delegation proposed (A/C.1/797) the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission in which all the States Members of the United Nations would be represented. It was understandable that the United States, the United Kingdom and France, which had an interest in keeping the negotiations stalemated, should oppose that proposal as well as the Indian draft resolution which proposed the enlargement of the membership of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee (A/C.1/L.177).

7. The Soviet Government believed that the work of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee could yield no further results, and accordingly declared that it would no longer participate in the work of those two bodies unless there was a change in their composition. The Soviet Union had submitted in its memorandum (A/C.1/793) concrete proposals to the General Assembly which were capable of immediate application and was prepared to conclude an agreement on the basis of those proposals. It was also willing to consider the proposals of other States. The establishment of a permanent disarmament commission would introduce a new element into the negotiations on disarmament and would provide a basis for working out practical steps conducive to promoting a solution of the problem, which was of such vital importance to all the peoples of the world.

8. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom) presented the conclusions reached by his delegation with respect to the various draft resolutions before the Committee.

9. The United Kingdom delegation warmly supported the Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1) because it agreed on the need for wider dissemination of accurate and impartial information to enlighten the peoples of the world concerning the dangers of the arms race, the need for real and practical measures of disarmament, and the vital importance of effective control measures. He emphasized, however, that any effective publicity campaign must extend to all countries alike; the Disarmament Commission would have to find out if that was possible. His delegation could not support the amendments submitted by Poland (A/C.1/L.185) since it did not think it appropriate to introduce controversial questions of nuclear weapons testing and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons into a draft resolution on quite a separate aspect of the disarmament problem.

10. He had already explained (869th meeting) why his Government opposed the draft resolution put forward by the Soviet delegation (A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1). The most that any Government could honestly undertake was to reserve the use of nuclear weapons solely for self-defence. In the proposals made by the Western Powers on 29 August 1957 (DC/113, annex 5) his Government had reiterated its readiness to give such an undertaking, which was indeed a firm part of its policy. It was regrettable that the Soviet Union was apparently unwilling to join in such an undertaking.

11. In his speech on 30 October (885th meeting), the Soviet representative had argued that, in opposing the Soviet draft resolution, the United Kingdom was contravening General Assembly resolution 808 (IX) which spoke of the need to reach agreement on the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons. The Indian representative had also quoted that resolution and expressed disappointment that the twenty-four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1) said nothing about prohibiting nuclear weapons. The reason for that omission was that the twenty-four-Power draft resolution was concerned with partial disarmament, whereas resolution 808 (IX), adopted in 1954, was concerned with comprehensive disarmament. Moreover, that resolution had also called for effective control over all disarmament measures; and it was clear that prohibition of the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons could not be controlled under partial disarmament.

12. The draft resolution submitted by the twenty-four Powers confined itself to the measures that could be controlled. His Government still regarded the prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons as part of the ultimate goal of comprehensive disarmament. With that understanding, his delegation could accept the first of the Indian amendments (A/C.1/L.182) to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, whereby the preamble to that draft would contain a reference to resolution 808 (IX).

13. With respect to the three draft resolutions dealing separately with nuclear tests, which had been submitted by the Soviet Union (A/3674/Rev.1), Japan (A/C.1/L.174) and India (A/C.1/L.176/Rev.4), he emphasized that the Western Powers were not seeking to delay the suspension of tests; they were ready for

it as soon as there was agreement for real disarmament. What was holding up progress towards disarmament was the refusal of the Soviet Government to agree, even in principle, to stop, under international control, the production of fissionable material for weapons. The United Kingdom could not agree to the suspension of tests without any assurance of real disarmament. His delegation would therefore vote against the three draft resolutions.

14. Commenting on the two draft resolutions submitted by Yugoslavia (A/C.1/L.180) and by the twenty-four Powers (A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1), which dealt generally with the substance of the disarmament problem, he said that the Yugoslav draft represented an effort to seek some compromise between the main opposing points of view and it was in many respects very near in substance to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution. Nevertheless, there were important differences which made the Yugoslav draft less realistic and less workable. Moreover, in certain respects, it was definitely unacceptable.

15. With regard to the twenty-four Power draft resolution, he believed that there was a wide measure of support in the Committee for the six measures listed in paragraph 1 of the draft resolution as being necessary elements of a balanced partial disarmament agreement. His delegation was sympathetic to the principle of the amendment proposed by Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay (A/C.1/L.181 and Add.1). It would prefer, however, to see the wording of the amendment altered so as to follow more closely similar recommendations adopted by the Assembly at previous sessions.

16. His delegation would vote for the amendments proposed by Norway and Pakistan (A/C.1/L.184). Without the technical studies proposed, it would not be known whether disarmament measures, even if agreed on in principle, were going to be satisfactorily workable in practice. His delegation also supported the proposal that each of the study groups should include three experts from States not represented on the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission. That was a welcome suggestion which in great measure met the views of representatives who wished to see more countries participating in future disarmament talks.

17. His delegation could not accept the Indian delegation's amendments (A/C.1/L.182), with the exception of the first, which would insert a reference to resolution 808 (IX) in the twenty-four-Power draft resolution. The second amendment removed any mention of the need for a disarmament agreement which would cover all the various disarmament measures listed in the draft resolution. The third Indian amendment was largely covered by the amendments submitted by Norway and Pakistan. He had already explained why his delegation opposed the fourth amendment.

18. Lastly, there was the group of draft resolutions relating to the procedure and machinery of the disarmament discussions. As the Norwegian representative had said (884th meeting) the failure to reach agreement on disarmament could not be ascribed to any fault of machinery or procedure. His delegation would not support the Soviet draft resolution calling for a permanent disarmament commission of all eighty-two Member States (A/C.1/797), because such a body would be quite unsuited to detailed and continuous negotiation. It could only undertake a general

review, such as the First Committee already carried out each year. There was therefore no point in abolishing the present Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee and in setting up a new commission which in its turn would inevitably set up similar subsidiary bodies.

19. Nor could his delegation support the Indian draft resolution which would expand the Sub-Committee (A/C.1/L.177). The Sub-Committee had never been meant to be a representative body. It had been set up by the General Assembly to enable the Powers principally involved to pursue negotiations in private. His delegation would vote against the Indian draft resolution suggesting tripartite bodies to study certain specified disarmament problems (A/C.1/L.178/Rev.2) because it disagreed with the terms of reference suggested for the studies and preferred the procedure proposed in the amendments to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution submitted by Norway and Pakistan.

20. His delegation joined with the French delegation in urging the Committee to give priority in the vote to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution. Contrary to some opinions expressed, he thought the General Assembly had a right and a duty to express a preference between the differing viewpoints of the great Powers. It must be emphasized that a vote in favour of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution was not in any way a vote to put an end to negotiation. The Western Powers were anxious to continue negotiations and had made that clear all along.

21. He had been astonished to hear the Soviet Union representative state that the Soviet Government would not participate in the work of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee in their present composition. That was a most discouraging development on which he would comment later if necessary. The twenty-four-Power draft resolution set forth the principles of a plan which was the fruit of long and patient effort and was by far the most realistic and balanced plan of disarmament yet proposed. No plan could be imposed on any State against its will, but by voting in favour of that draft resolution, the Assembly would set future negotiations on the right path, the only path likely to lead to real disarmament.

22. Mr. BRUCAN (Romania) said that there was agreement in principle on the suspension of tests of nuclear weapons and that all the conditions necessary for the implementation of that measure had been fulfilled. It was unfortunate that the Powers members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization refused to consider it as an independent question separate from other questions and to settle it forthwith.

23. The twenty-four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1) which restated the Western proposals of 29 August 1957 could not create a favourable climate for successful negotiations. Instead of stopping the armaments race, adoption of the draft would result in increased military expenditure and attempts to discover new weapons.

24. The representatives of the three Western Powers had put forward their own interests as a major argument in favour of their proposals. However, the interests of those three Powers often differed from those of other nations and sometimes were quite opposite. For instance, many States held the view that nuclear weapons should be prohibited. The First

Committee could not adopt a proposal reflecting the interests of a single group of countries.

25. The Western Powers insisted that their proposals must be accepted as a basis for negotiations. That sounded like an ultimatum. By influencing public opinion, the United States, the United Kingdom and France hoped to put pressure on the Soviet Union to accept their proposals: that was why they were anxious to obtain priority in the vote for the twenty-four-Power draft resolution.

26. His delegation doubted that many representatives would accept the role the Western Powers asked them to play. Further, the Western Powers failed to distinguish between their own desires and those of world public opinion. The peoples of the world knew who was acting in good faith.

27. The twenty-four-Power draft resolution was unrealistic because it ignored the interests of the security of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries inhabited by more than one-third of mankind. The Romanian delegation which hoped that a sense of responsibility would prevail, would support any measures conducive to a solution of the question.

28. Mr. NESBITT (Canada) said that, despite his disappointment, he would abstain at the present time from commenting on the Soviet Union representative's statement announcing his Government's refusal to participate in future in the work of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee.

29. Canada was a co-sponsor of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution and strongly urged its adoption. It was believed that, in all the circumstances, the draft represented the most hopeful and practical proposal for such steps in disarmament as were immediately possible.

30. The Canadian delegation supported the amendments of Norway and Pakistan (A/C.1/L.184), which added an important element to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution. The amendments would help to overcome the mistrust which had held up even a first step towards disarmament.

31. Although the amendments left it open to the Sub-Committee to decide exactly what working groups to establish, it should be possible at an early date for such groups to begin work on the inspection machinery necessary to prevent surprise attack and to stop the tests of nuclear weapons. His delegation sincerely hoped that the Government of the Soviet Union would be willing to have its experts meet with those of the other Governments to be represented.

32. His delegation very much agreed with the arguments which the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom had presented to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission on 17 July 1957,^{1/} and again to the General Assembly on 24 September (685th plenary meeting), urging the earliest possible study of the practical details of inspection.

33. Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay had presented an amendment (A/C.1/L.181 and Add.1) regarding the possibility of devoting the funds made available as a result of disarmament to the improvement of living conditions throughout the world and particularly in the less developed countries.

^{1/} See document DC/SC.1/PV.137.

His delegation was prepared to accept an addition along those lines provided the exact wording was satisfactory.

34. India had also presented amendments (A/C.1/L.182) to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution which would seem to have the effect of reducing or destroying the relationship between the various parts of that draft. India also proposed a measure which amounted to prohibition of use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. While joining with the Indian delegation in the earnest hope that those weapons would not be used, his delegation considered that that was a goal which could not be included in a disarmament agreement because it was impossible to devise any method of control of such prohibition. His delegation would therefore be compelled to vote against the Indian amendments, with the exception of the first, which proposed the insertion of a reference to General Assembly resolution 808 (IX).

35. His delegation would be happy to vote in favour of the Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1).

36. Turning to the Japanese draft resolution (A/C.1/L.174), he said that at the eleventh session his delegation had joined with the delegations of Japan and Norway in sponsoring a separate draft resolution (A/C.1/L.162/Rev.1) relating to advance registration of tests of nuclear weapons. Under the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, the suspension of tests would be the very first step taken, and such suspension could continue for two years, even if the other parts of the agreement were not actually put into effect. That draft was therefore by no means backward or restrictive with respect to suspension of tests of nuclear weapons. It was most regrettable that the Soviet Union had so far been unable to accept it, since such acceptance could bring an immediate suspension of tests.

37. After careful analysis of the Japanese draft resolution, his delegation had come to the reluctant conclusion that it was not as satisfactory as the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, and would not be able to support it.

38. With regard to the Yugoslav draft resolution (A/C.1/L.180), his delegation, while grateful to Yugoslavia for its effort to produce a compromise, was convinced that the twenty-four-Power draft offered at the present time the best prospects for a sound partial agreement. It would accordingly be unable to support the Yugoslav draft.

39. Although the Soviet delegation had submitted a number of documents, the only draft resolutions which it had offered to the First Committee were those dealing with the prohibition of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons (A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1), with the immediate and isolated discontinuance of tests of such weapons (A/3674/Rev.1) and with the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission consisting of all Members of the United Nations (A/C.1/797).

40. His delegation had frequently indicated in statements on disarmament that an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons was by its nature uncontrollable and would be valid only until one Government decided to change its mind. Moreover, he could see no gain to the cause of disarmament in the scheme for a permanent eighty-two-member disarmament commission. Such a body would be obviously too unwieldy and its creation would hardly be a constructive measure for advancing serious negotiations.

41. Mr. DAVID (Czechoslovakia) said that, as the attitude of the Western Powers prevented the conclusion of a general agreement, partial measures must be taken as a first step, the most important being the unconditional and immediate discontinuance of tests of nuclear weapons. Such a measure would reduce the danger of increased radio-activity in the atmosphere and would create the conditions necessary for the discussion of other aspects of the disarmament problem.

42. The Soviet Union's proposal for the discontinuance of tests of nuclear weapons for a period of two or three years under suitable control (A/3674/Rev.1) was perfectly practicable. The representative of India had submitted a similar draft resolution (A/C.1/L.176/Rev.4), and had demonstrated that effective control would be possible immediately. World public opinion was anxious that the General Assembly should take the necessary measures to secure the discontinuance of nuclear test explosions without delay.

43. His delegation thought that nothing could be achieved as long as the Western Powers made the settlement of the problem dependent on other questions. The prohibition of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, which the Western Powers linked with the suspension of nuclear tests, would not prevent States from manufacturing weapons on the basis of existing stocks. The twenty-four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1) and that of Japan (A/C.1/L.174), both based on Western ideas, were unacceptable.

44. The twenty-four-Power draft resolution made no mention of the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapons which had been included in all General Assembly resolutions hitherto adopted on the subject of disarmament. It had other serious defects, which he had described in his previous statement (872nd meeting) commenting on the Western proposals of 29 August 1957. The text took into account the position of only one of the parties and made a proposal that was in the nature of an ultimatum, for a unilateral solution to the problem of disarmament. The amendments proposed by India (A/C.1/L.182) did little to improve it.

45. The Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1) was likely to distract attention from the question of disarmament proper. It referred to control, but said nothing about agreement on definite measures, without which the concept of control was entirely meaningless. His delegation would accordingly support the Polish delegation's amendments (A/C.1/L.185) to that text.

46. In the circumstances, the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet delegation under which States would assume a temporary obligation not to use nuclear weapons for a period of five years (A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1) was of special importance. His delegation would vote for it.

47. The work of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee had come to a standstill because the membership of those organs and the procedure followed were not in accordance with the needs of the situation. The Indian delegation had proposed an expansion of membership (A/C.1/L.177), but experience showed that it would be better to take more radical measures not only to increase the number of partici-

pants in the negotiations, but also to change the established procedure. As all peoples were concerned with disarmament and the closed meetings of the Sub-Committee in London had merely been a cover for manoeuvres designed to ensure that they failed, it would be better in future for talks to be held in public.

48. The USSR draft resolution concerning the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission consisting of all the States Members of the United Nations (A/C.1/797) offered the best solution to the problem of the reorganization of the bodies responsible for negotiations in that field. The adoption of that draft would enable all States Members of the United Nations to be kept fully informed of the progress of negotiations and the positions adopted by various States. It would encourage all Governments to take steps and would also make them aware of their common responsibilities. Moreover, it would provide a considerable amount of information for world public opinion.

49. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the majority of delegations would not allow themselves to be committed to a course which could not lead to the solution of the disarmament problem, and he paid tribute to the scientists and people of the Soviet Union who had succeeded in launching a second artificial earth satellite.

50. Mr. PRICA (Yugoslavia) said that it was not his intention to deal separately with each of the draft resolutions before the Committee. The manner in which his delegation would vote, should a vote take place, would be designed solely to clarify its attitude on the various proposals. He wished, however, to make some comments on the proposals for a change in the structure of United Nations disarmament bodies, which were of the utmost significance for the continuation of the disarmament talks. His delegation had already expressed (871st meeting) its support for the Indian draft resolution relating to the expansion of the membership of the Disarmament Commission and of its Sub-Committee (A/C.1/L.177). The Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/797) was also designed to secure a change in the structure of disarmament bodies through the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission; but it might be wondered whether, in the present situation, a more practical way of securing progress would not be an expansion of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee along the lines suggested in the Indian draft resolution, while providing for the possibility of convening the General Assembly in special session to consider the problem of disarmament.

51. He was surprised that the Committee had been requested to give the twenty-four-Power draft resolution priority over all others except the Belgian draft resolution. His delegation would oppose the request for reasons of principle. He did not think that anything could be achieved by adopting the proposed course. It would only accentuate the differences which had emerged in London. All the possibilities indicated in proposals submitted to the Committee by a number of countries would be precluded in advance. It would be an illusion to assume that procedural measures and a numerical majority could eliminate from the disarmament talks all the other requests and proposals in the draft resolutions submitted to the Committee. If, on the other hand, it was assumed

that support by a majority in the Assembly for the positions taken on one side would compel the other side to make concessions, that belief was based on an erroneous estimate of the developments which had led to a certain evolution in the attitude of one or the other side.

52. His delegation had submitted its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.180) in an effort to find a compromise, and it had never considered that text in terms of the votes which it might obtain. The text sought concessions from both sides in the negotiations on disarmament. It could accomplish its purpose only if it had the general support of the Committee and the Assembly and was accepted by both sides. He regretted that it had not been sufficiently understood by the Powers which bore primary responsibility in the field of disarmament and that the possibilities which it offered had not been fully examined. His delegation was confident that, whether or not the draft resolution was adopted, the elements of agreement which it outlined would in the near future serve as steps toward a general agreement on disarmament.

53. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) said that the United States delegation would vote for the Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1) because it hoped that the dissemination of information on armaments suggested in that draft would add to public understanding of the urgent need to reach agreement on disarmament.

54. On the other hand, it could not support the Soviet draft resolution which called for discontinuance of nuclear tests for a period of two or three years (A/3674/Rev.1). The United States was in favour of the suspension of testing in a way that would prevent the further build-up of stocks of nuclear weapons. Until such time as agreement had been reached on that point, the defensive strength of the non-Soviet world depended to an important degree on the continuation of experimental nuclear explosions. Those experiments would be conducted with care and restricted to the number considered absolutely necessary.

55. That reasoning also applied to the draft resolution submitted by India (A/C.1/L.176/Rev.4). Similarly, although there was much in the Japanese draft resolution (A/C.1/L.174) with which it agreed, his delegation could not support that draft because of the extent to which it separated the question of nuclear experiments from that of the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

56. His delegation would also vote against the Soviet draft resolution proposing a five-year agreement not to use nuclear weapons (A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1). Many representatives, including those of France (877th meeting) and Israel (883rd meeting), had clearly brought out the limitations of the declaratory approach.

57. His delegation would also be unable to support the draft resolution submitted by India (A/C.1/L.178/Rev.2) which in effect did away with the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, as it asked the Disarmament Commission to appoint representatives of States holding the differing views and representatives of other States to be chosen by agreement to consider the matters under discussion in the Sub-Committee. The United States continued to believe in the utility and value of the present Sub-Committee.

58. With regard to the third Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.177) his delegation did not think that the

possibility of reaching an agreement on disarmament would be increased by expanding the membership of the Disarmament Commission or its Sub-Committee.

59. Those remarks applied even more strongly to the Soviet Union's proposal to establish a permanent eighty-two-member committee (A/C.1/797). In that connexion, the Soviet Union representative had said that his country intended to leave the Disarmament Commission and the Sub-Committee. There was no reason to believe that any nation seriously wished to stand before the world and before recorded history as the nation responsible for the failure of humanity's effort to achieve disarmament and peace. He hoped that wiser counsels would prevail.

60. With regard to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1), of which the United States was a co-sponsor, his delegation was in favour of granting it priority in the vote.

61. He agreed with the Canadian representative and others concerning the need to be flexible. The United States, too, was seeking a disarmament agreement. The proposals in the twenty-four-Power draft resolution had been presented in a working paper, a negotiating document. In seeking endorsement of the draft, the United States delegation had emphasized its desire to see negotiations resumed. It intended to maintain its approach of open-mindedness and flexibility.

62. With respect to the amendments proposed to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, the United States delegation could not support the amendment submitted by Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay (A/C.1/L.181 and Add.1) in its present form. While the United States agreed that a portion of the savings realized from disarmament should be used to assist in economic development throughout the world, some of those savings would have to be devoted to a reduction in the burden of internal taxation, to building schools, hospitals and roads in the United States. He hoped that the sponsors of the amendment would find it possible to revise it in the light of his comments, in which case he would vote for it.

63. The United States would support the first of the Indian amendments (A/C.1/L.182) but would vote against the others, the effect of which would be that the discontinuance of testing was a matter for immediate implementation regardless of the progress made in the other measures proposed.

64. His delegation would support the amendments proposed by the delegations of Norway and Pakistan (A/C.1/L.184). The technical groups proposed could begin to work quickly on the controls involved in the discontinuance of nuclear testing, in the reduction of conventional armaments and in measures to safeguard against surprise attack.

65. The draft resolution submitted by Yugoslavia (A/C.1/L.180) contained much with which the United States could agree. However, its adoption by the Committee would result in the abandonment of the principle to which the United States adhered that, before nuclear tests were discontinued, there should be clear acceptance of the principle that the manufacture of fissionable materials for weapons purposes should be ended within a reasonable period of time.

66. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) said that Syria, in spite of the small amount of arms it possessed, was interested in the proposals submitted to the First Committee because it believed that a general reduction of armaments would tend to diminish the world tensions now centered on the strategic area of the Middle East.

67. His delegation felt that to link the settlement of the disarmament problem with that of other questions such as the Middle East or Germany would only complicate matters. Every nation had to incur inevitable risks by reducing its armaments or by prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. However, the risks should be compared with those involved in the continuation and acceleration of the armaments race. The United Nations could promote disarmament by increasing the membership of its organs responsible for dealing with disarmament and by having the question discussed at public meetings whether in the Disarmament Commission or any other subsidiary organ. Closed meetings did not help to keep public opinion adequately informed and tended to weaken the influence of world public opinion.

68. The establishment of controls to ensure compliance with the obligations assumed under such agreements as might be reached and to prevent the possibility of surprise attack was indeed necessary. The controls should be limited to those which were strictly necessary and should be enforced by international agencies acting in accordance with directives from the Security Council.

69. The several draft resolutions and amendments submitted to the Committee indicated a close relationship between the various aspects of the disarmament problem, which, however, was not an indivisible whole. A greater effort should be made to seek separate agreements, particularly with respect to prohibiting the use and manufacture of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. That implied the cessation, or at least suspension, of tests. Nuclear or thermo-nuclear weapons, whether "clean" or not, could not be regarded as anything but a means of mass destruction.

70. Another agreement which ought to be considered would relate to the reduction of armed forces. An approach along those lines had been made, but had failed to produce tangible results. While the draft resolutions before the Committee could not be expected to produce such results, they might emerge from subsequent negotiations.

71. Lastly, the Syrian delegation considered that the General Assembly and the organ it established to deal with disarmament should reflect the concern of world public opinion. Disarmament could only be achieved through negotiated agreements to which the Powers principally concerned were parties. Some of the draft resolutions submitted, particularly the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, might increase rather than reduce the possibility of stands such as that announced by the Soviet delegation in the course of the meeting. His delegation believed that the twenty-four-Power draft resolution was untimely, to say the least. It could not be considered a mere working paper, as the United States representative had contended. General Assembly recommendations were more than working papers; if they were, they would not have to be put to the vote. The best course would therefore be to refer all the proposals submitted,

including the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, and the texts of the statements made in the First Committee to the United Nations organ entrusted with the disarmament problem.

72. His delegation sincerely hoped that means would be found to resume the discussions on disarmament in a favourable atmosphere and to speed them up. Moreover, it hoped that the membership of the competent United Nations organ would be enlarged and that its debates would be held in public.

73. A unanimous recommendation was the most valuable contribution the General Assembly could make to the solution of the disarmament problem.

74. Mr. MOCH (France) said that, as the French delegation's position coincided on all points with that of the United States delegation, he would merely refer to certain aspects of the problem which, in his view, were important in view of the votes to be taken.

75. Leaving aside the Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1), which was in a special position and would, he hoped, be unanimously adopted, he said that his delegation was unable to support the Indian draft resolutions which would transform or enlarge the organs responsible for studying the disarmament problem (A/C.1/L.177 and A/C.1/L.178/Rev.2), or the Soviet draft favouring the establishment of an eighty-two-member permanent disarmament commission (A/C.1/797).

76. The remaining proposals were the twenty-four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1) and, in the order of their submission, the Japanese draft resolution (A/C.1/L.174), the Soviet draft (A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1), the Indian draft (A/C.1/L.176/Rev.4) and the Yugoslav draft (A/C.1/L.180). In other words, the Committee had to choose between five draft resolutions on the substance of the question.

77. The twenty-four-Power draft sought agreement on six different points on the understanding that the six sets of measures could be adopted at different stages but must be provided for in the same treaty. Thus, the suspension of test explosions could be effected immediately after the treaty was ratified, whereas the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes might take place later, although it must be provided for in the same document. The measures were correlated in the thinking of the twenty-four Powers because they were included in a single treaty. Acceptance in principle of any one measure meant acceptance in principle of the others. That relationship, which was not provided for in any of the four other draft resolutions, was considered essential by the sponsors of the twenty-four-Power draft.

78. For example, the Japanese representative had not convinced the French delegation that his draft resolution was compatible with the twenty-four-Power draft. Under that draft the countries which renounced nuclear experiments knew, from the very moment they renounced them, that once the nuclear weapons race ceased stocks of fissionable materials for military purposes would not only stop increasing, but would start to diminish through conversion to peaceful uses. It would be a complete reversal of the trend. The Japanese draft, on the other hand, would preface the

cessation by a preliminary truce period of less than twelve months. If that proposal was added to the twenty-four-Power proposal, there would be a suspension period which would begin at once, before there was any guarantee that the Soviet Union would agree to cease producing nuclear weapons and begin converting them to peaceful uses.

79. The second proposal, that of the Soviet Union, made the cessation of tests a completely separate matter under conditions which were completely contrary to the twenty-four-Power position. The Indian proposal also was directly contrary, not so much because it envisaged the establishment of a committee of experts, which the twenty-four Powers had also envisaged when they accepted the amendments of Norway and Pakistan (A/C.1/L.184), but because its essential feature was a request to the States concerned to agree to the suspension of tests as an entirely separate matter from the cessation of the nuclear weapons race and it was thus in agreement with the Soviet thesis.

80. The Yugoslav proposal was even further than the Japanese proposal from the twenty-four-Power position. It envisaged separate agreements on various points which it enumerated in a list which was merely indicative and not exhaustive. It thus disregarded entirely the constantly reiterated principle of the Western Powers regarding the necessary relationship between disarmament measures, even measures of partial disarmament, and so reduced the chances of agreement.

81. Recapitulating the statement he had made at the 887th meeting, he announced that, because of the new factor presented by the Polish amendments to the Belgian draft resolution and the discussion to which it had given rise, the sponsors of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution had decided, in agreement with the Belgian representative, to request absolute priority for the twenty-four-Power draft resolution. If, as he hoped, the draft was adopted by a very large majority, the sponsors of the other draft resolutions would either have to withdraw them or agree that they should not be put to the vote. However, the sponsors of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution would not oppose a vote on the other drafts if their sponsors insisted, although the supporters of the twenty-four-Power draft would logically be prevented from voting on the other texts.

82. The Indian amendments would distort the twenty-four-Power draft resolution to a point at which it would say almost the opposite of what its sponsors intended it to express. There remained the amendments of Pakistan and Norway, which the French delegation had accepted gladly as it had the Latin-American amendment submitted by five Latin-American countries on assistance to under-developed countries (A/C.1/L.181 and Add.1).

83. He had been greatly disturbed by the statement which the representative of the Soviet Union had made at the beginning of the meeting. He did not see how a majority vote could become an ultimatum, particularly since the twenty-four Powers had accepted some of the amendments proposed by other Members. He sincerely regretted that the USSR representative had seen fit to make such a statement and hoped that the Soviet Government would reconsider the matter before it

took upon itself responsibility for unilaterally breaking off the disarmament negotiations by refusing to take part in the work of the Sub-Committee or of the Disarmament Commission.

84. After the General Assembly had adopted the twenty-four-Power draft resolution and sent it to the Disarmament Commission, negotiations would have to start again. Negotiations meant compromise. For its part, France would continue to work for conciliation and the narrowing of differences.

85. Mr. PEREZ MATOS (Venezuela) said that his delegation had followed with great interest the discussion aroused by a problem which was of vital importance to mankind. It was grateful to the Japanese, Yugoslav and Indian delegations for having submitted draft resolutions, and to the Secretary for External Relations of Mexico for the very interesting suggestions he had made at the 699th plenary meeting.

86. Nevertheless, it was guided chiefly by practical considerations and it therefore considered that the best means of obtaining the desired objectives was the twenty-four-Power draft resolution.

87. The Venezuelan delegation would therefore vote in favour of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution with the amendments of Norway and Pakistan, which improved it considerably.

88. As the Minister for External Relations of Venezuela had already stated (693rd plenary meeting), the Venezuelan delegation would vote enthusiastically for the Belgian draft resolution. It would also vote in favour of the amendment proposed by the five Latin-American countries, because it repeated an idea which the Assembly had already accepted at its tenth session and with which Venezuela had already announced its agreement.

89. Mr. NISOT (Belgium) noted that the Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1) did not relate to the substance of the question and should therefore normally be put to the vote first. However, the Polish amendments to it did touch upon questions of substance; they would alter the character of the draft resolution by removing its strict objectivity. In the circumstances, the Belgian delegation would prefer its text to be voted upon last.

90. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that it had been agreed that the Committee would decide on the priority to be given to particular draft resolutions after all those delegations which wished to do so had stated their views on the texts before the Committee. It appeared that certain delegations, despite the decisions of the Chairman and of the Committee, wanted to obtain immediate priority for their own draft resolution. The Soviet delegation objected to a priority vote on the twenty-four-Power text. A decision should be taken first on the organ which would be responsible for carrying out the negotiations and on the procedure it would follow. Consequently, the Soviet delegation requested priority for its draft resolution which was intended to set up a permanent disarmament commission (A/C.1/797), and for the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.177).

91. Exercising his right of reply, he said that the representatives of the United States and France were mistaken; the Soviet Union would not go back on its decision to withdraw from the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee unless its composition was modified. Its decision had been prompted by a desire to end the present deadlock in the negotiations.

92. Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan) said, in reply to the remarks of the French representative, that he had never tried to prove that the Japanese draft resolution was in complete agreement with the twenty-four-Power draft resolution. The incompatibility of the two emerged clearly from paragraph 2 of the Japanese draft resolution. What he had meant to say was that the Japanese draft resolution was not similar to the Soviet draft resolution. He added in that connexion that Japan would vote against the Soviet draft resolution.

93. He also wished to draw the French representative's attention to the fact that his conception of the agreement in principle for the implementation of the inspection system did not coincide with the Japanese view, which was that a twelve-month period was not long enough to erect such a system.

94. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran), on a point of order, said that the task of the Chairman and of the Committee might perhaps be facilitated if the sponsors of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution would introduce into their text those amendments to the draft which they regarded as acceptable. That would avoid separate votes, perhaps by roll-call, on the amendments which they accepted.

95. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) said that he had followed the French representative's statement with interest, but his delegation could not agree with the views expressed in it in regard to the principal issue before the Committee. According to the French representative, the adoption of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution would not constitute an ultimatum. Perhaps, if it was not an ultimatum, it was an attempt to use the United Nations in order to create a position of political strength in the forthcoming negotiations. If that was not the case, there was no reason for not contemplating the situation more objectively. Since the proposals in the twenty-four-Power draft resolution were meant primarily as a basis for negotiations, those negotiations should be conducted freely. The Syrian delegation believed that future negotiations would not be favoured by a priority vote on the draft resolution with a view to jettisoning the other draft resolutions, including those submitted by India. The Syrian delegation was more convinced than ever that the Commission should try, if possible, to arrive at a unanimous recommendation.

96. The CHAIRMAN supported the Iranian representative's suggestion that the sponsors of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution should incorporate those amendments they were willing to accept in their final text. That procedure would facilitate the task of the Chairman and would contribute to the smooth running of the Committee's work.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.