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Chairman: Mr. Djafar ABDOL (Iran).

AGENDA ITEM 24

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/3630 and Corr.1, A/3657, A/3674/Rev.1, A/3685, A/C.1/793, A/C.1/797, A/C.1/L.174, A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.176/Rev.2, A/C.1/L.177, A/C.1/L.178/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.180) (continued):

- (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
- (b) Expansion of the membership of the Disarmament Commission and of its Sub-Committee;
- (c) Collective action to inform and enlighten the peoples of the world as to the dangers of the armaments race, and particularly as to the destructive effects of modern weapons;
- (d) Discontinuance under international control of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons

1. Mr. Krishna MENON (India), emphasizing that the world looked to the current session of the Assembly for some progress towards disarmament, commented on the statement made earlier (877th meeting) by the French representative, Mr. Moch. He fully agreed that the need for a disarmed peace had never been as deeply felt at any time in world history and that the disillusionment following the talks held in London by the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission had been shattering. That disillusionment could not, however, be allowed to persist. India was convinced of the need for a fresh approach to the problem of disarmament, for the real issue was not just disarmament, but the survival of human civilization. Consequently, all Governments, irrespective of their economic or political power, must press for positive action instead of yielding to the disillusionment resulting from the most recent efforts of the Powers principally concerned.

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2. The Indian delegation took issue with the French representative's statement that, since the Powers principally concerned had been unable to reach agreement after lengthy negotiations, the General Assembly could not be expected, in one short session, to produce a solution satisfactory to them, and that its role was necessarily limited. While he agreed that the great Powers continued to bear the primary responsibility for disarmament, it was the duty of the Assembly to have a policy, to express its views and to attempt to exert an influence. Moreover, there was a profound contradiction in Mr. Moch's assertion, on the one hand, that the Assembly must accept the fact that unanimity among the great Powers on the substance of the problem had proved impossible, and on the other, that it should endorse by a vote proposals on which they had failed to agree. The Assembly could not be expected to play even the limited role assigned to it by Mr. Moch if it were asked to take as a premise that the deadlock between the great Powers must be officially recognized by a majority vote. That could not allay the fears of the world regarding the armaments race and would only make the next stage of negotiation more difficult. Endorsement of one set of proposals as against the other would merely result in a tightening of the deadlock. There had been occasions in the past when it had exerted its influence to resolve deadlocks, and Mr. Moch had himself admitted that it might submit suggestions on aspects of the disarmament issue which the Sub-Committee might have overlooked. The Assembly had not to make a choice between two roads. There was only one road—that of disarmament.

3. India was in sympathy with the Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1) with a reservation: if the dissemination of knowledge regarding the destructive effects of modern weapons meant another period of delay in taking positive action, or if it was to be used as another instrument to minimize the danger of armaments and to convince the world that disarmament was not necessary, it would serve little purpose.

4. He would recall that India had made a proposal for the suspension of tests of nuclear weapons as early as 1954 (DC/44 and Corr.1), long before the Soviet Union had expressed any view on the subject. Though the proposal might be regarded as a political move, the overwhelming weight of world public opinion stood behind it. Quoting surveys of public opinion reported in the Press of the United States and the Scandinavian countries, he showed that pressure for a discontinuance of the tests had been intensified to the point of becoming a clamour. India regarded a ban on tests as essential in view of the dangers of nuclear explosions and of its importance in relation to the whole disarmament problem. It categorically rejected the view expressed by the United Kingdom representative in his statement (869th meeting) that a suspension would not contribute to disarmament.

5. The objections raised to a temporary suspension of nuclear tests were no longer tenable. He had not been reassured by Mr. Moch's comparison between nuclear explosions and earthquakes and cyclones. Earthquakes and cyclones were not man-made, but explosions were. The Chairman of the Special Sub-Committee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Congress had himself concluded, after hearing voluminous scientific testimony, that the effects of radiation from bomb testing were a serious cause for concern. He would point out to the French representative that the testimony of the authorities he had quoted in his first intervention (873rd meeting) when appealing for action to suspend the tests could hardly be described as "science-fiction stories". Far from seeking to trade on the fear and passion aroused by the question of nuclear tests, he was concerned to show that the weight of scientific evidence indicated that there were real hazards, some known and some still unknown, arising from radiation.

6. With regard to the French representative's argument that the amount of strontium-90 present in human bones was so far below the margin of safety that even in 1970, assuming the test explosions continued, it would still be forty times less than that limit, he emphasized that there were no known and established margins of safety and that there was some confusion between the radiation effects of strontium-90 and its effects on bones and blood. Moreover, the scientific authority whom he had originally quoted on the effects of strontium-90, the United States scientist, Mr. Willard F. Libby, had apparently revised his opinion to some extent: he now admitted that there was some risk from radio-active fall-out if testing were continued at the present rate, but that it was extremely small. Mr. Harrison Brown, Professor of Geochemistry at the California Institute of Technology, commenting on that change of view, had refuted the contention that the risk resulting from an increase in the amount of strontium-90 in the blood was "extremely small". The evidence given in the summary of the hearings held in the spring of 1957 by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Congress^{1/} had further indicated that any amount of radiation, however small the dose, increased the rate of genetic mutation of the population. Consequently, there was no "safe level" so far as genetic effects were concerned. There could, in any case, be no valid justification for adding deliberately to the natural background radiation to which all humans were exposed, especially when the consequences were not known. Finally, although the summary of hearings reported differences of opinion on the effects of increased radiation on bones, blood and life expectancy and on the method of forecasting the radiation effects of further nuclear tests, it concluded that the consequences of further testing over the next several generations at the rate of the past five years could constitute a hazard to human health and life. The Radiation Hazards Committee of the Federation of American Scientists had confirmed that opinion and had estimated definite increases in the incidence of leukemia and bone cancer in the next few decades as well as in genetic mutations.

^{1/} United States Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Summary-Analysis of Hearings May 27-29, and June 3-7, 1957, on the Nature of Radioactive Fallout and its Effects on Man*, 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957).

If no further explosions took place, the average concentration of strontium-90 in human bones would increase, by 1970, to a maximum which would give a dose of about one-tenth of background radiation. All that evidence contradicted the assurances given by the French representative and indicated that the increase in radiation would be much greater than was supposed. The fall-out from so-called "clean" bombs exploded from great heights, although it would take longer to come down, would present the same hazards. Obviously, the weight of scientific evidence supported India's contention that nuclear tests were dangerous to human life, notwithstanding the many differences of opinion among scientists still to be resolved.

7. There were other cogent reasons for pressing for a suspension of nuclear tests. Although at the present time, only the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were conducting tests and continually adding to their knowledge of how to reduce the effects of radiation, the amount of radiation released was still considerable. However, if other countries, without experience, were to enter the testing field, they would use cruder bombs, which, while they might prove more devastating, would produce a much larger amount of fall-out. Radiation would thus be increased disproportionately.

8. It was illogical to argue that a moratorium on tests should not be sought, since testing would automatically be discontinued as soon as nuclear weapons were outlawed. It was even more unacceptable to maintain, as the United Kingdom representative had done, that tests should be continued in the interests of policies. Scientific opinion held that a suspension of tests would prevent the development of more devastating weapons of surprise attack and would help confine the production of nuclear weapons to the three main Powers producing them. Finally, a test ban could be monitored, in the opinion of scientists, by a United Nations monitoring agency without requiring free access of inspectors within national boundaries. Another body of scientists had stated that, in view of the known dangers involved, it was imperative to take immediate action to secure international agreement on a test ban.

9. When India had first called for a cessation of nuclear tests in 1954, it had been informed that secret explosions were possible so that each country would suspect the other of conducting such secret explosions even if it was itself observing the test ban. However, the Indian Government now had ample evidence that nuclear explosions, under proper arrangements, were detectable. European investigation had shown that it was possible to construct reliable instruments for the recording of very low radiation levels so that changes could be accurately detected. A world-wide system of control by means of such instruments, sealed by some international authority, would not present any technical difficulties. Those with differing views should assign their scientific experts to study the question and establish an adequate machinery to prevent evasion.

10. The French representative, commenting on India's draft resolution proposing the establishment of a scientific-technical commission to work out a system of inspection arrangements (A/C.1/L.176/Rev.2), had objected to the tripartite division of the world implied by the composition of that body. In that connexion he wished to reiterate that India had no intention that such

a scientific-technical commission should in any way supersede the Disarmament Commission or its Subcommittee or supplant the Powers principally concerned. The tripartite division of the world was a reality as distasteful to India as to Mr. Moch. However, the representatives of the uncommitted nations could sometimes serve as a buffer between the two opposing blocs of Powers. In any case, it was more to the point to review the experience of the Preparatory Commission of the International Atomic Energy Agency in working out the Agency's Statute. It had been found possible, in that body, to overcome many serious difficulties precisely because the membership was not divided into majority and minority blocs. The small States were able to contribute substantially to the results achieved. Similarly, by expanding the membership of the organs dealing with disarmament, as proposed in the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.177), it might be possible to ease, if not break, the deadlock among the great Powers. Admittedly, the Security Council and existing disarmament organs could not be superseded and nobody but the United States and the Soviet Union could bring about disarmament. But it was wrong to suggest that expansion of those organs would lead to further division of world opinion.

11. The suspension of nuclear tests would be the first step towards disarmament even if it did not constitute disarmament. It would create a beginning of confidence and allay fears. When the machinery for detection and control had been worked out, it would serve as a pilot system and prove to be of political value as well as a contribution to a disarmed peace.

12. India did not contend that the suspension of tests was a substitute for the cessation of production or the dismantling of existing bombs or the eventual banning of all nuclear weapons, which was the declared policy of the United Nations. All those goals should be sought urgently, but there was no suggestion in the main proposals before the Committee that the cut-off date with regard to the further production should be effective before the suspension of explosions. The main objection to India's plea had been that the great Powers were being asked to rely on faith. Of course, if it was definitely known that the "other side" could not be trusted, no solution would be in sight. However, if the Western Powers accepted the premise that they could never trust the Soviet Union, the whole disarmament discussion, including the twenty-four Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.179 and Corr.1 and Add.1), would become pointless. On the other hand, India was not arguing that blind faith was sufficient; the establishment of a control and inspection system would create the necessary confidence. And while India did not wish to isolate the suspension of tests as a separate issue, it considered that failure to agree on a comprehensive disarmament programme should not prevent all other action. It was possible that if agreement could be reached on one point, it could ultimately be achieved on others. India therefore appealed, especially to the United States and the Soviet Union, not to rescind their proposals, but to give the Indian proposals further consideration in the Disarmament Commission and to give the world proof of a beginning of agreement on disarmament.

13. The position of India with regard to the development of tactical nuclear weapons was that, with the lightning advance of science, it was possible to foresee a time when such weapons would be portable and

usable all over the world. It had been argued that tactical weapons were not movable because of their great weight and bulk. For example, projectiles for tactical weapons would have to weigh about ten kilogrammes and the magazine of a revolver would alone weigh some 100 kilogrammes. The crux of the question was in the definition of what constituted the "critical mass". In that connexion he said that the United States Atomic Energy Commission had confirmed that the "critical mass" which determined the portability and manoeuvrability of tactical weapons could change according to circumstances so that it was possible to predict a time when smaller tactical weapons could be produced. Therefore, there was some justification for India's warning that to enter into the field of atomic tactical weapons was to create the danger of even greater and more widespread atomic warfare than that involving the use of those bombs. There was, moreover, the further danger that water would be subjected to radiation as a result of atomic depth charges and there was already evidence of the number of square miles of water contaminated after the Bikini explosions in 1954.

14. India was of the opinion that no country wanted to jeopardize peace or to prevent disarmament. Rather, the lack of progress was the result of mistrust and the mistaken idea that disarmament would upset the prevailing balance of power among the great Powers. India was appealing to those Powers for they alone could make progress. It was agreed among them that was needed and not majority votes on their respective proposals. Disarmament had entered a critical phase, especially with the opening up of outer space. The great Powers must seek co-operation, not competition. Their failure to co-operate and the wasteful arms race in which they were engaged deprived the world of what it needed for its prosperity. World public opinion was far more advanced than the Assembly would seem to be. In every country, there was a clamour for action. If, in the United Nations, States remained more concerned with political alignments than with the need for action towards disarmament there could be no real peace.

15. Mr. MOCH (France), saying that he wished to make a five-minute reply to the comments of the Indian representative, pointed out that his earlier statement to the effect that disarmament negotiations had reached a stalemate merely expressed a fact, however deplorable, which the Assembly must recognize. All Governments must now reconsider the entire question, especially since new scientific developments had cast doubt on some of the ideas expressed by both sides.

16. His reference to "science-fiction" had been intended to apply to talk about chain reactions which would destroy the world or atomic machine-guns and revolvers, and had not been intended as a reflection on any scientists.

17. In his reference to Mr. Libby, he had used the internationally accepted criterion of maximum dose of radiation. He had merely wished to point out that the concentration of strontium-90 in human bones in the United States might, after fifty years, if tests continued to be carried out as they were at present, amount to between 4 and 15 units, whereas 100 units was now considered as the safety level. There was no disagreement on that point, if the same units were adopted.

18. France did not desire the continuation or increase of test explosions; as stated earlier, its position was that, if there was a risk, the necessary measures must be taken, without panic, to eliminate any possible danger of increasing the mortality or morbidity rate of the species. In its view, those measures were: the supervision of the tests, together with the cessation of the production of fissionable material for military purposes, and a start in the reconversion of military stocks to peaceful uses.

19. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the recent statements of the representatives of the United States (866th meeting), the United Kingdom and France had confirmed that their Governments had no intention of arriving at any agreement on the reduction of armed forces and armaments and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Instead, they were seeking to achieve military superiority over all other countries, and over the USSR first and foremost. Public statements by the Vice-President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, and other members of the administration left no doubt on that point. For that reason, the Western Powers, headed by the United States, had adopted the policy of putting forward proposals which would place the USSR in a position of inequality while endangering its security. Such a policy did not have the approval of the peoples of the world since it could easily lead to a destructive war. So in order to conceal their true intentions from their own peoples, the Western Powers kept alive the myth of the "Communist threat" in order to justify the continuing armaments race.

20. For the past ten years, the Western Powers had frustrated disarmament negotiations by such tactics; it was noteworthy that, whenever the USSR had accepted any of their proposals, they had immediately retreated from their position. The situation was no different today. The United States representative had sought to give the impression that the USSR had rejected out of hand the proposals submitted by the Western Powers to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission on 29 August 1957 (DC/113, annex 5). The truth was that those proposals had not only already been presented to the Sub-Committee piecemeal, but had been thoroughly discussed by the USSR and United States representatives at unofficial meetings.

21. Those proposals, which were now contained in the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, did not constitute a basis for an agreement on disarmament. As many representatives had pointed out in the course of the debate, the problem of disarmament affected all countries without exception; it was therefore the duty of the United Nations to seek ways of solving it. That would provide equal security for all States.

22. The United States representative had spoken about ensuring the security of States; it should be stressed that the security of no country could be considered of greater importance than that of any other country. The USSR held that all countries had an equal stake in disarmament and should negotiate on a basis of equality. The United States and its partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), on the other hand, felt that those who negotiated with them should make concessions impairing their own security—a selfish approach which had no chance of success.

23. That attitude was clearly illustrated in the matter of nuclear weapons. The USSR had first proposed the prohibition of such weapons as far back as 1946;^{2/} but the United States, which had then enjoyed a monopoly in the field, had refused to relinquish them. The well-known Baruch Plan^{3/} had in effect represented an attempt to legalize the United States monopoly over both nuclear weapons and atomic energy, and, since the United States had already embraced power politics, it had not provided for the prohibition of atomic weapons. The USSR, on the other hand, had always been in favour of prohibition and continued to maintain its position now that it, too, disposed of such weapons. The United States, the United Kingdom and France, however, still wanted to retain nuclear weapons in order to be able to intimidate other countries.

24. One of their arguments had been that they needed atomic bombs to maintain a balance of power, in view of the Soviet Union's large army. Yet when the USSR had agreed to their own proposals to reduce the levels of armed forces, the Western Powers had immediately retreated. In the present debate, the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, in contravention of General Assembly resolution 808 (IX), were opposing the prohibition of nuclear weapons. More than that, in a document which those countries and Canada had submitted to the Sub-Committee on 29 August 1957 they had stated that nuclear weapons could be used in any armed conflict for individual or collective self-defence. There had been cases of aggression in the past when the attackers had claimed that they were acting in self-defence; similar claims could be made to justify the use of nuclear weapons, which would plunge the world into a war of annihilation.

25. In contravention of the basic principles of the Charter, the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France had rejected the USSR proposal that the use of nuclear weapons for purposes of self-defence should be subject to the authorization of the Security Council. They had even rejected the modest USSR proposal to renounce the use of nuclear weapons for a period of five years, although the conclusion of a temporary agreement of that kind would be a first step towards a final solution of the problem.

26. As a sop to world public opinion, the Western Powers proposed that the manufacture of fissionable materials should be discontinued; but, as Mr. Dulles, the United States Secretary of State, had himself recognized, enough nuclear weapons had already been manufactured to constitute a threat to human life in any part of the globe. A mere prohibition of the manufacture of fissionable materials would not mean that the present stocks of nuclear weapons would be reduced or that their use would be prohibited, or even that more bombs would not be manufactured from already available fissionable materials. Indeed, the proposal was calculated to give the United States an advantage over other Powers and to legalize preparations for a nuclear war; the USSR could not be a party to it. It maintained its view that the interests of peace required a complete and unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons, a cessation of their manufacture and their elimination from the armaments of States.

^{2/} See Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, No. 2, pp. 26-28.

^{3/} *Ibid.*, No. 1, pp. 7-13.

27. A discontinuance of nuclear tests could be an important step towards the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons; but the United States, the United Kingdom and France were opposed even to a temporary discontinuance of such tests, heedless of the appeals of hundreds of millions of people. The discontinuance of the tests would prevent a further increase in harmful radiation, would put a brake on the armaments race and would pave the way for a total prohibition of nuclear weapons. The United States, the United Kingdom and France, in a deliberate effort to confuse the situation, linked that simple question to infinitely complex questions whose solutions they themselves opposed—a sure way of shelving it. Mr. Dulles had gone so far as to claim that the tests should be continued for humane reasons, to perfect the manufacture of a so-called "clean" bomb. Surely the word "humane" had not been so misused since the days of Hitler. No matter how "clean" the bomb was it would still be capable of mass murder. In any event, the question at issue was not the advantages or disadvantages of various types of nuclear weapons, but a discontinuance of their tests and the prohibition of their use, which alone could free mankind from the terrible threat under which it now lived.

28. The USSR, aware of the opposition of the Western Powers to a complete discontinuance of nuclear tests, had submitted to the General Assembly a proposal (A/3674/Rev.1) to discontinue such tests at least temporarily, for a period of two to three years, starting on 1 January 1958, under appropriate international control. The immediate cessation of the tests had been called for by many peoples and their parliaments, including the Japanese Diet. It was therefore surprising that in the Japanese draft resolution (A/C.1/L.174) the discontinuance of the tests was made contingent upon agreement on many other disarmament questions, precisely as in the proposals of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, and the tests were to be discontinued for a very limited period only. Consequently, the Japanese draft resolution would not solve the question and was in contradiction with the Japanese Government's earlier demands for an immediate and unconditional cessation of nuclear tests, demands to which, it was hoped, the Japanese delegation would subscribe.

29. The USSR delegation hoped that all delegations, and in particular those of the United States and the United Kingdom, conscious of their duty to their own peoples, would approach the question of discontinuing tests of nuclear weapons in a spirit of co-operation which would make a solution possible.

30. During the debate, the United Kingdom representative had crudely distorted the Soviet Union's position on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments by stating that the Soviet Union had not reduced its armed forces in the post-war period. However, it was well known that all conscripts except those doing their regular military service had been demobilized immediately after the Second World War and that in 1955-1956 the Soviet Union had further reduced its armed forces by 1,840,000 men. The NATO States were falsifying the facts in order to avoid reducing their armaments and armed forces and to derive military advantage from the situation, by placing the Soviet Union in an unequal position and thus threatening its security. In their proposals for partial disarmament measures, the four NATO Powers pro-

vided that the armed forces of the United Kingdom and France should be reduced to 750,000 men each and those of the Soviet Union and the United States to 2.5 million men each, and that the Governments should negotiate on further reductions only under certain conditions, including that of achieving progress in solving outstanding political problems. It was obvious that reductions at the second and third stages were quite unrealistic, since the Western Powers were placing insuperable obstacles in the path of their implementation.

31. The head of the Soviet delegation had already expressed (712th plenary meeting) his country's attitude towards the German and Middle Eastern questions, and the discussion of the agenda item entitled "Complaint about threats to the security of Syria and to international peace" had shown that the policy of the United States and its supporters was thoroughly imperialistic and hostile to the peoples of the region. The same applied to the situation in the Far East. For eight years, United States troops had occupied the Chinese island of Taiwan, which had been turned into a base for military provocations against the People's Republic of China. The South Korean authorities, supported by the United States, were violating the Armistice Agreement and preparing for a new war against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the United States had turned South Viet-Nam into a base for aggression against its peace-loving neighbours.

32. The United Kingdom representative had claimed that the Western Powers had begun to arm and would continue the armaments race because events in certain countries—where, in fact, the people had taken matters into their own hands in the interests of democracy and independence—did not suit them. He had also stated that a reason for Western armament was the ideological struggle that dominated the world, thus implying that the Western Powers would agree to disarm only if the ideology of their ruling circles prevailed throughout the world. That view showed an unstatesmanlike refusal to recognize the political, economic and cultural changes of the past forty years. Any approach to international problems which was not based on the principles of full equality and coexistence was doomed to failure.

33. The sole purpose of connecting disarmament with political questions was to avoid the solution of the problem and, in particular, to avoid any reduction of armed forces, even within the limits laid down in the Western proposals. In addition, those limits were not serious since they would involve no reduction of the armed forces of the United States or the United Kingdom during the first stage. Whereas the Western Powers refused to admit that the political and geographical situation of each Power must be taken into account in fixing the strength of armed forces, the Soviet Government was anxious to reach an agreement based on consideration of mutual interests. The Soviet Union was willing to reduce its armed forces in three stages to the levels proposed by the Western Powers if the latter withdrew their reservations and political conditions concerning the transition from one stage to the next. At the same time, agreement should be reached at least on the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. The USSR was prepared to take the risk of reducing its armed forces to the same level as that of the United States, provided that

the other States showed similar confidence and readiness to come to an agreement.

34. The abolition of military bases on foreign territory and the withdrawal of all foreign troops would greatly promote the strengthening of security and the establishment of an atmosphere of trust. The United States had an extensive network of foreign military bases. Between 1951 and 1957, the number of NATO bases in Europe had been multiplied by ten and troops in NATO countries were being feverishly equipped with all kinds of atomic weapons and rockets. The alleged purpose of that activity was the "defence of the West", but it was difficult to believe that American military bases in Europe, thousands of miles from United States territory, were necessary for that country's security. Nor could the establishment of those bases be regarded as advantageous for the countries where they were situated, for the latter were in imminent danger of being drawn against their will into a destructive atomic war. Nevertheless, the Western Powers had refused to support the Soviet Union's proposals for the abolition of foreign military bases, the withdrawal of the troops of the four Powers from Germany and the reduction of the armed forces of those Powers stationed in NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries.

35. Throughout the disarmament negotiations, the Western Powers had constantly stressed the question of control, and in doing so had distorted the Soviet Union's views on the subject. The Soviet Union had never objected to control, but had on several occasions proposed concrete and practical control measures. Contrary to the assertions of the Western Powers, it was possible now to establish appropriate control in conjunction with concrete measures for disarmament. The Soviet Government had proposed that at the very outset of the initial and partial disarmament measures, control posts should be established on a mutual basis at key points in order to prevent dangerous concentrations of armaments and armed forces (DC/71, annex 15). Of course, the question of those control posts should be settled in accordance with the partial disarmament measures. At the first stage, they would be established on the western frontiers of the USSR, in France, the United Kingdom and the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries and in the eastern United States. The Soviet Government had also agreed to aerial photography in specific areas, but after it had notified its agreement in its proposals of 30 April 1957 (DC/112, annex 7), the Western Powers had apparently lost interest in the question.

36. The Soviet Union considered that partial disarmament measures with appropriate control should be effected without delay, in order to promote the international confidence which, according to the statements of several representatives, was conspicuously lacking among nations, particularly among the great Powers. Such confidence could not be expected to develop overnight and unduly ambitious measures could therefore not be taken. Only when practical measures had been taken for a partial disarmament programme could there be any appreciable improvement in international relations, together with favourable conditions for a wider disarmament programme and far-reaching and effective control.

37. The Soviet Union attached great importance to its proposal of 27 October 1957 (A/C.1/797) for the estab-

lishment of a permanent disarmament commission and hoped that the General Assembly would consider it carefully. At a time when the race for weapons of mass destruction was being rapidly intensified, the United Nations should take new and more effective steps to settle the disarmament problem. At the same time, neither the Disarmament Commission nor its Sub-Committee had achieved any concrete results. Negotiations had reached a deadlock and the Commission and Sub-Committee had become a mask for the unsavoury activities of the opponents of disarmament. It would be highly dangerous to be lulled into a sense of false security by the activities of those bodies.

38. One of the reasons for the lamentable situation was the small number of States represented in the bodies dealing with disarmament. Since the Commission's functions had dwindled to transmitting the Sub-Committee's reports to the Assembly, that group had been reduced to five Powers, the Soviet Union and four NATO countries. The seventy-seven other Members of the United Nations were in fact debarred from participation in the debates. Although the reaching of agreement on disarmament depended to a great extent on the Powers which had the largest armed forces and possessed atomic and hydrogen weapons, all countries and nations were interested in the problem. Accordingly, the views of all Member States, especially those which were decisively opposed to the armaments race, the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons and tests of those weapons, should be taken into account. It would therefore be advisable to set up a permanent disarmament commission, composed of all States Members of the United Nations, to consider all proposals and to prepare appropriate recommendations for the General Assembly. It was important that such a commission should have no time limit for its sessions.

39. The procedure of the bodies concerned with the disarmament problems should also be changed. Many States had voiced dissatisfaction with the practice of closed meetings of the Sub-Committee, which resulted in keeping world public opinion in ignorance of the Sub-Committee's activities, since information on the negotiations was issued only at the discretion of the participating States. Those secret procedures had enabled certain circles in Western countries deliberately to spread the false rumour that the Sub-Committee had achieved serious results. Proceedings in the permanent disarmament commission should therefore be open, so that the peoples could be fully informed on the stages reached in negotiations, and the positions taken by individual Powers.

40. The establishment of a permanent commission would not exclude the possibility of consultations between individual States or groups of States. On the contrary, exhaustive and open discussions of proposals in the commission would create favourable conditions for greater activity on the part of the States, and would extend consultations, meetings and contacts among them. The chairman and vice-chairman would be called upon to promote such activities.

41. Summarizing the work done by the United Nations on the disarmament question, he observed that there were two distinct attitudes to the problem. The one taken by the United States, the United Kingdom and France was based on power politics and had resulted in the armaments race and preparation for a new war.

Their purpose was to prevent any agreement on concrete disarmament measures and to threaten the security of peace-loving States, especially the socialist countries. The attitude was also characterized by deliberate confusion of the issues and by blaming the Soviet Union for the failure of negotiations. The other attitude, held by the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries, was directed towards relaxing international tension, putting an end to the "cold war", preventing the armaments race, prohibiting atomic and hydrogen weapons, averting the threat of a new destructive war and ensuring peace for all nations. Those views were motivated by bitter memories of the great losses the Soviet Union had suffered in the Second World War; the Soviet people hated war and were prepared to make great efforts to reach agreement on disarmament. The Soviet Government had made many constructive proposals to that end and had taken the views of the Western Powers into account; it was therefore entitled to expect them to meet it half way. Those Powers, however, had abandoned their own proposals as soon as the Soviet Union had agreed to them and had tried to use the negotiations to obtain military advantages and to undermine the security of the Soviet Union.

42. The proposals set forth in the twenty-four-Power draft resolution could not serve as a basis for an agreement on disarmament. The time had come to pass from words to deeds. The USSR delegation therefore appealed to all delegations, particularly those of the Western Powers, to join the Soviet Union in taking effective and practical steps.

43. Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan), replying to comments made on his delegation's draft resolution by the French representative, said that the draft presupposed a formal agreement between the Powers concerning the principle of control. Although the Soviet Union had accepted the principle of control, no such formal agreement was yet in existence.

44. The Japanese draft resolution could not be said to be similar to the Soviet Union's proposal; it differed significantly in that it did not separate the issue of the suspension of nuclear test explosions from the other aspects of disarmament, which, under the Japanese plan, were to be discussed during the period in which tests were suspended. That statement was also a partial answer to the criticisms of the Japanese Government made by the Soviet representative. With regard to the other criticisms, he would refer the Soviet representative to his reply (876th meeting) to the comments made by the representatives of Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

45. Finally, the French representative had stated that the establishment of control over the suspension of tests was more complex than was generally supposed, though he had himself told the Committee that the Western Powers were prepared to accept a suspension of nuclear tests even before the establishment of control over that suspension, and that the details of such an agreement on control should be discussed during the first twelve months of suspension. The Japanese draft resolution allowed almost a full year for the working out of such a system. At the very least, that period would be to some extent adequate to test the good faith of the parties concerned.

46. The Japanese draft resolution was a practical proposal for the suspension of tests while negotiations were continued. His delegation considered that once suspension was agreed upon, even for one year, an atmosphere would be created which would facilitate the extension of the period of suspension at the General Assembly's next session.

47. The CHAIRMAN said that the general debate on the disarmament question was now closed, and that the Committee would take up the draft resolutions before it at the next meeting.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.