

# GENERAL ASSEMBLY

TWELFTH SESSION

Official Records

Wednesday, 16 October 1957,  
at 10.45 a. m.

NEW YORK

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Chairman: Mr. Djalal ABDOH (Iran).

## AGENDA ITEM 24

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/3630 and Corr.1, A/3657, A/3674/Rev.1, A/3685, A/C.1/793, A/C.1/L.174, A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.176/Rev.2, A/C.1/L.177, A/C.1/L.178/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.179 and Add.1) (continued):

- (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
- (b) Expansion of the membership of the Disarmament Commission and of its Sub-Committee;
- (c) Collective action to inform and enlighten the peoples of the world as to the dangers of the armaments race, and particularly as to the destructive effects of modern weapons;
- (d) Discontinuance under international control of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons

1. Mr. WALKER (Australia) thought that the delegations of the small countries had been waiting to hear the statements of the great Powers on the work of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission and to reflect upon those statements before speaking themselves.

2. As a representative of a member of the Disarmament Commission for nearly two years, he had been in a position to follow the Sub-Committee's work fairly closely. He was also speaking as the representative of a country that did not possess nuclear weapons and was not likely to manufacture them in the near future, although it had provided sites for the testing of nuclear weapons and guided missiles. Moreover, Australia was situated at the very edge of Asia, a part of the world where many countries' problems of national security were aggravated by communist and

alien-inspired subversion. The Australian Government, apart from its primary responsibility for the defence of its own people against any aggression, had obligations towards the other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations and towards countries associated with it in defence treaties: New Zealand, the United States and some of its Asian neighbours.

3. In the Disarmament Commission, Australia had always maintained that the prohibition of nuclear weapons under international control should go hand in hand with a major reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces to agreed levels. Agreements developed mainly against a background of the security problems of the great Powers might require adjustment to take account of the effects of proposed arrangements upon the security of smaller countries in various parts of the world and upon the forces those countries would need to maintain. In particular, Australia felt that a disarmament agreement that would not impose suitable obligations upon Communist China would not be of much use in that part of the world.

4. In his delegation's view, the First Committee's task was to take stock of the work done in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, to see just how far those two bodies had gone and then to give them guidance and encouragement.

5. While in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee it was inevitably the defence technicians who were speaking through their national delegations, it was above all the voice of humanity that must be heard in the First Committee. Delegations should express the aspirations and, if need be, the fears of the people of their countries in terms comprehensible to the ordinary citizen. There could be no doubt as to what the voice of humanity was saying today; it was: "Deliver us from the fear of war." The concentration of so much of human resources, scientific research and national wealth on an arms race was a major factor in the world's present insecurity, and the knowledge of the efforts which other countries were putting into armaments was a cause of mutual fear and of suspicion between nations. Everybody knew, too, that the world's armaments represented a colossal waste of economic resources while millions of people went short of the necessities of life. At the present stage of scientific and technical development, competition in armaments was suicidal folly. Yet it continued because of mutual mistrust.

6. Mutual suspicion had bedevilled disarmament discussions ever since the days of the League of Nations. All disarmament negotiations had been dominated by the fear lest one agreed to something that would make it easier for those in whom one had no confidence to wage war, the fear of being tricked into accepting a reduction in national security.

7. That was why the problem of disarmament could

not be separated from the problem of international supervision and control. Any agreement on international inspection and control entailed first an acceptance of the principle of inspection and control and secondly a readiness to undertake a detailed technical examination of the proposed control measures. That was where the fundamental difference between the approach of the Soviet Union and that of the Western Powers towards the disarmament problem was to be found. The Soviet Union was reluctant to accept international inspection and control in principle and to participate in the technical discussions that would be essential before the establishment of any really effective system of inspection and control.

8. He did not wish to exaggerate that difficulty. He believed the Soviet Union had come some way towards recognizing the fact that there would be no general agreement on disarmament in the absence of agreement on control. It had even made some suggestions on the subject, but it had never accepted the challenge of trying to work out what the representative of France had called the maximum degree of disarmament that could be controlled. The formula used by Mr. Moch at the eleventh session had been thoroughly convincing: no control without disarmament, no disarmament without control, but progressively all disarmament that could currently be controlled (828th meeting, para. 34). The formula appeared to him to be flawless. Why could the Soviet Union not accept it and settle down to working it out in concrete terms?

9. Some people said the reason was that the Soviet Union did not really want general disarmament, that its purpose was to weaken the defences of the West to the point at which the Soviet Union would no longer fear the outcome of any war that its policies, or the policies of its neighbours, might unleash. If such were indeed the Soviet Union's purpose, it would be natural for it to concentrate on propagandist proposals, irrespective of whether their application was really feasible, and on proposals aimed at improving its own military position vis-a-vis the West and at the same time to resist any proposal that would open up any activities of the Soviet Union to international inspection.

10. Others had suggested that the real reason why the Soviet Union was so cold towards proposals for international inspection and control was that its political and social system would not tolerate the full glare of publicity; even though the Soviet Union might have nothing to hide in the shape of aggressive intentions and military preparations against the outside world, it had many other things to hide in the field of economic conditions, civil rights and the working of the governmental machine, things which must be hidden not only from the outside world, but also from the citizens of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.

11. It had also been suggested—and evidence for that suggestion could be found in some Soviet statements—that the main reason why the Soviet Union was so reluctant to accept international inspection as part of a disarmament plan was that it could not conceive that such international inspection could be objective and sincere. The Soviet Union regarded it as disguised espionage conducted by or for its enemies.

12. However that might be, he hoped that the Soviet Union's expressed desire for disarmament was genuine and that whatever its fears and suspicion towards the West, it would approach the problem in a practical

manner. If it did, he was convinced that real progress could be made in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission.

13. His delegation had joined twenty-three others in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.179 and Add.1. It believed that the measures proposed in that text represented the most useful action that the General Assembly could take at the present stage, apart from publicly debating the issues involved, which was also valuable.

14. The draft resolution proposed no new machinery and no new principles. It endeavoured rather to indicate the directions in which the work of the Disarmament Commission might most usefully be directed in the coming year. Unlike Mr. Gromyko, the representative of the Soviet Union, the Australian delegation did not think the draft resolution useless or liable to encourage futile discussions indefinitely.

15. In his statement of 10 October (866th meeting), the United States representative, Mr. Lodge, had clearly pointed out the steps taken by the Soviet representative in the Sub-Committee towards meeting the positions put forward by the United States and other members of the Sub-Committee. He had also mentioned that the Western members of the Sub-Committee had made a number of changes in their own positions in order to meet that of the Soviet Union. At no point had Mr. Lodge's statement indicated that the Western members of the Sub-Committee treated the Soviet Union's participation in the Sub-Committee's work as essentially hypocritical and propagandist. On the contrary, Mr. Lodge had emphasized his belief that the Soviet Union was willing to engage, in the Sub-Committee, in serious discussions on disarmament, and that at times it had even appeared anxious to take steps that would further the chances of agreement on disarmament.

16. However, the Soviet representative had rejected the serious proposals put forward by the Western members of the Sub-Committee in their working paper of 29 August 1957 (DC/113, annex 5), without his Government's even having studied them. For its part, Australia had been shocked and dismayed by that attitude. Mr. Gromyko's statement in the First Committee on 10 October (867th meeting) had provided little reassurance. The Australian delegation had the impression that, since the end of August, the Soviet approach to the subject had reverted to a purely propagandist line which seemed to play upon the fears and suspicions and at times the natural, if mistaken, anxieties of the public. He did not know the reason for that change of attitude, but hoped that the representatives of the Soviet Union would listen to the voice of the United Nations and return to the Sub-Committee in a more constructive frame of mind.

17. Analysing the twenty-four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.179 and Add.1), he noted that sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 1, calling for the immediate suspension of testing of nuclear weapons with prompt installation of effective international control, also coincided with the thought uppermost in most people's minds at the present time. He recalled the statement made by Mr. Casey, the Australian Minister of State for External Affairs, on 30 September 1957 to the Disarmament Commission.<sup>1/</sup> The sub-paragraph provided for in-

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, 63rd meeting.

spection in parts of the world where tests had taken place. In that connexion he referred to the statement issued by Mr. Casey on behalf of the Australian Government on 10 October 1957 in New York. He had announced that Australia would be prepared to accept in principle the establishment in its territory of international inspection posts as provided in the Western proposals. Such a measure would be part of a general international system, applicable to all countries with atomic potential, including of course the Soviet Union. Mr. Casey had made it clear that Australia could not commit itself to any inspection system that did not include potential aggressors, and that Australia's readiness to accept such an inspection system applied only in the context of the Western proposals. It implied no commitment in respect of the Soviet proposal. That statement naturally implied acceptance only of the principle of inspection posts. If those were established, Australian security requirements would, of course, have to be met and Australia would expect to be consulted on and informed of any technical discussions relating to inspection. The proposal for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests with a system for control and inspection was not a separate one and would eventually form part of a disarmament agreement. Australia's position in that respect was the same as that stated by Mr. Noble on behalf of the United Kingdom Government (869th meeting).

18. The second point, paragraph 1 (b), which suggested the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons and the complete devotion of future production to non-weapons purposes under effective international control, was only a first step towards nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, international supervision and control were indispensable. If that measure could be embodied in a disarmament agreement, it would provide the foundation for further steps in the direction of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons when the problems of international inspection and control of such a prohibition had been solved.

19. The third point in paragraph 1 (c), might be called the demobilizing of nuclear weapons through the reconversion of stocks of fissionable material from weapons uses to non-weapons uses. There again, emphasis was laid upon the need for a system of international supervision to be included in the plan. That third point was a further step towards the removal of the spectre of atomic warfare.

20. The fourth point, namely paragraph 1 (d) concerning the reduction of armed forces and armaments through adequate safeguard arrangements, was, of course, a familiar one, though that did not diminish its importance. The Committee might again note the need for appropriate safeguards.

21. The fifth and sixth points were the most important of all. Paragraph 1 (e) concerned the establishment of a system of open inspection with both ground and aerial components, to guard against the possibility of a surprise attack. As already stated by Mr. Casey in the Disarmament Commission, Australia believed that measure to be the only practicable way of breaking the vicious circle in which lack of confidence prevented progress in disarmament, and stagnation in the matter of disarmament hampered the growth of confidence. Until international confidence could be established, the utmost should be done even in the absence of

confidence. Australia believed that the adoption of an effective system of warning against surprise attack would do much to allay the fear of war and would make possible further progress in the field of disarmament as well as towards the solution of other outstanding political problems. He did not underestimate the complexities of the task of evolving such an effective protection against surprise attack. It was possible that current scientific developments were adding new complications at the moment.

22. Finally, the sixth point of the draft resolution, paragraph 1 (f), provided for the study of an inspection system designed to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space would be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes. Now that the first artificial satellite was travelling through space, no one could predict what further advances that achievement would make possible in man's conquest of nature. Who could measure its terrible possibilities if no system of control could be designed and established? The current proposal only covered the study of the problems involved. It was to be hoped that in subsequent years, the study would yield concrete measures to guard against the dangers inherent in those new devices.

23. In the light of those considerations, he recommended that the Committee adopt the twenty-four-Power draft resolution. He reserved his right to intervene again later, if necessary, and to comment on the interesting draft resolutions submitted by Japan, Belgium and India.

24. Mr. ROCHA (Colombia) explained why his delegation had been among the sponsors of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution. Its adherence was based on principle and not on expediency. It was clear to Colombia, as no doubt to the other Members of the United Nations, that a total war in which nuclear weapons were used would destroy the civilization which mankind had built up over the centuries.

25. Colombia was a small and peace-loving nation situated in an area only relatively remote from the points that would be most vulnerable in the event of atomic war. It had no atomic weapons and did not wish any. It was completely disinterested and could judge the urgency of world disarmament with absolute impartiality.

26. The Colombian people hated war, and was horrified by its universal scope and destructive effects.

27. Clearly the question of disarmament by the great Powers was so complex that it could not easily be stated, understood or solved. Countries without an advanced scientific, technical and military establishment were not in a position to express opinions on details which might be important in the matter of disarmament; they could not propose practical steps to ensure broad and effective disarmament. They could, however, express opinions worthy of consideration when political ideas and moral principles, rather than technical matters, were discussed.

28. Apart from the purely technical and military aspect of the proposals and discussions on disarmament, the basic problem was mutual distrust and secrecy, which must be replaced by candour and good faith if agreement was to be reached. Without candour and good faith any agreement reached would not only be useless but even harmful and would produce results contrary to the end sought. Good faith was a funda-

mental principle of the United Nations Charter and a principle which had so far been respected. Distrust did not mean bad faith. It was essential to create an atmosphere of complete confidence among the great Powers; while distrust prevailed, the great Powers would be trapped in a vicious circle, in which they realized that disarmament was necessary to inspire confidence, but they were prevented by mutual distrust from disarming. That was the impression that the long speeches heard for years had produced on the small States.

29. In point of fact, other countries had no reason to criticize the great Powers for fearing a surprise attack or for wanting to guarantee their security by well-considered measures of inspection and control. It would be presumptuous for the small countries to try to judge whether a disarmament proposal was merely a propaganda manoeuvre or whether it would really tend to encourage progress towards disarmament.

30. Members of the United Nations without access to armament secrets or techniques were, for geographical, historical, racial, cultural or religious reasons, drawn into the sphere of influence of one or the other of the two great ideological and social systems: the Christian world and the Communist world, which could not merge into a single whole and naturally tended to develop at one another's expense.

31. Colombia, for its part, had already made its choice. It did not wish to be Communist and could not be Communist. Colombia's position was by its very nature defensive. It developed within the orbit of Western philosophy, which had been shaped by twenty centuries of history. In addition special reasons led Colombia to give firm support to the measures for controlled disarmament proposed by the United States and the other Western Powers.

32. The Colombian delegation recognized the efforts made by both sides in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission and was fully aware of the difficulties that prevented a satisfactory agreement. The United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada considered that there was a logical and necessary link between tests of nuclear weapons and their production, since the suspension of tests would not of itself eliminate the threat implicit in the constant accumulation of nuclear weapons in certain countries. In that connexion he referred to Mr. Lodge's statement at the 866th meeting and compared the United States position with that of the Soviet Union, which considered the Western thesis to be an expression of aggressive intentions. Colombia regarded it as inconceivable that the Western Powers should commit an act of aggression in the present circumstances. On the other hand, an act of aggression directed against the United States from another continent was conceivable. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro on 2 September 1947 would then apply. According to article 3 of that treaty, an armed attack against any American State was considered as an armed attack against all American States. By the very nature of things, the peoples of America were interdependent, a fact recognized by the regional Organization of American States.

33. The Colombian delegation was one of the sponsors of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution favouring the immediate suspension of testing of nuclear weapons

with prompt installation of effective international control, the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and the reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons. Those measures were complementary and provided for effective control to eliminate the distrust which had repeatedly deadlocked negotiations.

34. He fully endorsed the United Kingdom representative's logical and clear analysis of the various proposals.

35. The launching of an artificial satellite showed that human intelligence had broken the bonds that confined mankind to earth and could now conquer far wider spaces than the planet which had hitherto been the scene of international life. The International Geophysical Year also marked the beginning of a new age in which man could take complete and effective possession of the earth. Those events marked a great transformation in the human race and showed that orthodox views of the world and of life would soon be outmoded.

36. It would be wrong to believe that humanity was inevitably facing a war of annihilation. Good faith, a spirit of co-operation and the use of newly discovered sources of energy could mark the dawn of a new age unlike any that man had known before.

37. Mr. DAVID (Czechoslovakia) said that the brilliant achievement of Soviet science and technology in launching an artificial satellite had been received with enthusiasm and admiration throughout the world. The interest taken was evidence of mankind's desire that the various countries should co-operate broadly in the conquest of the forces of nature.

38. The unlimited prospects opened up by that event made it more necessary than ever to solve the question of disarmament in a way which would enable man to use all the resources available to him in order to increase world prosperity rather than to manufacture increasingly destructive weapons. The arms race, weapons of mass destruction, the mounting military expenditures, the creation of aggressive blocs, the establishment of military bases on foreign soil and war propaganda hindered efforts to achieve peace and security in the world and to develop co-operation among peoples on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

39. The peoples demanded an end to the armaments race, a reduction in the armed forces of various countries and the suspension of the tests of nuclear weapons. If that were accomplished and the fear of another war removed, men would have greater resources to develop their national economies and raise their levels of living. Accordingly, the First Committee should seek to find out why no agreement had been reached in the twelve years the Organization had been discussing disarmament, and what steps should be taken to solve the problem. The goal was a substantial reduction in armaments and armed forces, the prohibition of nuclear weapons, their elimination from the armaments of States and the creation of effective controls to ensure the implementation of those measures.

40. The Soviet Union had presented a number of proposals which could serve as a basis for agreement on disarmament. That country had always taken into consideration the proposals of other States taking part in the negotiations, unlike the Western Powers, which



had gone so far as to abandon their own proposals, thus preventing any progress towards a solution of the problem. The United States and its allies had made the adoption of various proposals dependent upon an increasing number of preliminary conditions: such had been their action in the meetings of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in London in 1957.

41. The conclusion was inescapable: the Western Powers did not want an agreement on disarmament. The negotiations served solely to deceive public opinion and to camouflage the arms race, which brought constantly increasing profits to the monopolies.

42. From 1950 to 1956, military appropriations under the United States budget had more than tripled, the major portion being earmarked for the atomic weapons with which several units were now equipped. During that period the size of the United States armed forces had steadily increased, as had the quantity of weapons of other kinds. Under various pacts and agreements, the United States had drawn more than forty States into its military camp and had established hundreds of bases on all continents. That entire aggressive front, equipped with atomic weapons, was directed against the socialist countries. In those circumstances it was not surprising that international tension increased.

43. The United States' position was well illustrated in its approach to the key problem of disarmament, the prohibition of nuclear weapons. No reference to that point appeared in the proposals of 29 August 1957 (DC/113, annex 5) or in the draft resolution which the United States had presented in co-sponsorship with twenty-three other delegations, although the General Assembly had stressed the importance of the question in earlier resolutions. Nuclear weapons were the foundation of the political and military strategy of the United States and for that reason it systematically rejected all proposals for their prohibition and elimination from the armaments of States.

44. Moreover, the Western Powers made an agreement on disarmament conditional on the settlement of various political questions, such as the unification of Germany and the question of the Middle East. It was, however, the Western Powers that impeded the unification of Germany by encouraging the development of a militaristic and anti-democratic West Germany, which they were linking more and more to the Western aggressive bloc. They refused to admit that the unification of Germany was a matter for the Germans themselves. That policy, which could lead neither to a solution of the German question nor to disarmament, merely served the interests of aggressive circles in the West, to the detriment of the German people, the peoples of Europe and the other peoples of the world.

45. In the Middle East there was a situation of continuing tension. Aggressive imperialist circles were interfering in the internal affairs of the Arab States and using threats and other forms of pressure to destroy their independence. In recent weeks, the provocative manoeuvres of their allies had been directed against Syria, an unquestionably peace-loving country, which was accused of being a threat to its neighbours. That situation, like the German problem, was being used as a means of ensuring the failure of the disarmament negotiations.

46. When it had become clear that the Western Powers would not accept a general disarmament agree-

ment, the Soviet Union had proposed the adoption of partial measures. Initially the Western Powers had agreed, but had lost interest as soon as the USSR had proposed a broad programme of such measures. They made each of the proposals conditional on the others, and refused to enter into any commitments unless all the other proposals were adopted simultaneously, although the adoption of effective partial measures would increase international confidence, facilitating agreement on a comprehensive disarmament programme.

47. One of the key questions was agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. His delegation strongly supported the Soviet Union draft resolution which proposed that the States possessing nuclear weapons should undertake not to use them for a period of five years, at the end of which the question would be reconsidered (A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1). The proposal was a highly constructive and useful one and was not conditional on the adoption of any other measure. It would be a first step towards the conclusion of a broader agreement to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons and eliminate them from the armaments of all States. It would also reduce international tension and contribute to the increased confidence necessary for the adoption of further measures.

48. Nuclear weapons tests were an extremely serious hazard to the health and the lives of human beings throughout the world. Despite the contrary views of British and American scientists, the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States were trying to minimize the danger of such tests in an attempt to justify their refusal to agree to their discontinuance. In the circumstances the Soviet Union's draft resolution for the discontinuance of tests, if only for a period of two or three years, from 1 January 1958, and for measures to supervise the implementation of the agreement on the question (A/3674/Rev.1) would provide the basis for a sound and constructive approach to the problem. Agreement on those lines would put a stop to the development of increasingly advanced weapons, prevent any further increase in radioactivity, and facilitate the conclusion of an agreement to prohibit atomic weapons and a comprehensive solution of the disarmament problem. There was therefore no justification for the United Kingdom representative's assertion that such a measure would endanger the balance of security.

49. In a declaration of 1 August 1956, the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic had unanimously supported the proposed measure, which had also been supported by a number of delegations in the General Assembly, including Japan, although in that country's draft resolution (A/C.1/L.174) the necessary conclusions were unfortunately not drawn.

50. The main obstacle to an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests was the attitude of the Western Powers, which subordinated agreement on that point to the solution of other disarmament problems, in particular the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, although the latter obviously would not prevent the manufacture of nuclear weapons from existing materials. A cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for military purposes would not lessen the threat of an atomic war unless it was accompanied by an agreement to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons and destroy existing stocks.

51. The problem was further complicated by the fact that the United States was building up stocks of "tactical" atomic weapons beyond its own borders. United States military units abroad were equipped with such weapons, and the United States was proposing to supply them to its allies. It was essential that States possessing nuclear weapons should undertake not to authorize the stationing of military units equipped with atomic weapons or the establishment of stocks of atomic or hydrogen weapons abroad and not to make such weapons available to other States or to the general staff of military blocs.

52. The Czechoslovak Republic had joined with the Polish People's Republic in undertaking not to produce or store atomic weapons on its territory if the two German States undertook to do likewise. It had done so because foreign atomic bases had been set up in one part of Germany, and it was proposed to supply the latter with atomic weapons of its own. It was even proposed that the Federal Republic of Germany should be given the facilities to produce atomic weapons itself.

53. In taking those steps, the imperialist Powers counted on the West German army to carry out their military plans. That was why Czechoslovakia and Poland had considered it necessary to do everything they could to forestall the danger of the transformation of part of Germany into a base for atomic aggression. The establishment of a large area in the heart of Europe where atomic weapons would be neither manufactured nor stored would help greatly to reduce tension throughout the world.

54. The Czechoslovak delegation also supported the Soviet Union's proposal in its memorandum on partial measures of disarmament (A/C.1/793) for the reduction, by one-third or by some other agreed proportion, of the armed forces maintained by the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom and France in Germany and in the territory of the countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the countries signatories of the Warsaw Treaty.

55. The Czechoslovak Government also fully endorsed the Soviet proposals in that memorandum for the abolition of military bases in foreign territory and also attached great importance to the Soviet proposals for the reduction in three stages of the armed forces of the great Powers, for the reduction of conventional weapons, and for a 15 per cent reduction in military budgets during the first stage.

56. Those proposals gave the lie to the assertion that

the Soviet Union was pressing for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in order to maintain its own superiority in conventional weapons.

57. The Western Powers had raised the question of control in order to prevent the adoption of practical measures. In its memorandum, the USSR had proposed that control posts should be set up during the first stage on a reciprocal basis, to ensure that there was no dangerous concentration of troops or weapons. Aerial photography could neither solve the problem of control nor prevent a surprise attack; it could only perform a useful function when the necessary confidence had been created.

58. With that end in view, steps should be taken to end war propaganda, in accordance with resolution 110 (II) adopted by the General Assembly on 3 November 1947, to re-establish normal trade relations among all countries without discrimination, to strengthen international scientific and cultural relations, as recommended by a draft resolution (A/C.3/L.610/Rev. 2) recently adopted by the Third Committee.

59. In order to create conditions in which disarmament negotiations could be conducted with some prospect of success, it was essential to change the membership and procedures of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. There could be no doubt that the work of the Sub-Committee would be considerably furthered by the participation of States Members actively interested in disarmament and in the strengthening of peace.

60. The Soviet Government's memorandum on partial disarmament measures could provide the basis for an agreement on any one of those measures, and the Czechoslovak delegation therefore warmly welcomed it. The Czechoslovak Republic itself was making every effort to prevent the preparation for another war, to ensure peaceful coexistence among different nations, and to help in solving the problem of disarmament. Czechoslovakia had already twice reduced its armed forces, in 1955 and 1956.

61. It was time to put an end to sterile discussion and to take practical action. His delegation regretted that the Western Powers were unwilling to discuss the substantive issue. Czechoslovakia for its part would do its utmost to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.